The Red Army in the 30s of the 20th century. Recruitment of the Soviet (Red) Army

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Red Marshals: 1st row: M. Tukhachevsky, K. Voroshilov, A. Egorov, 2nd row: S. Budyonny, V. Blucher *

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K.E. Voroshilov (1881-1969) In 1925-1934. - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. 1934-1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, since 1940 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the years of the Great Patriotic War- Member of the State Defense Committee and representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on a number of fronts. At the beginning of the war, he showed a complete inability to lead the troops. In 1953-1960 - Chairman of the Presidium, and since 1960 - Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR *

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CM. Budyonny (1883-1973) During the Civil War he commanded the 1st Cavalry Army (1919-1923). Later in command positions in the Red Army, deputy and first deputy people's commissar of defense. In 1941-1942. - commanded the troops of a number of fronts and directions, then - the cavalry of the Red Army. From January 1943 cavalry commander Soviet army and member Supreme Military Council of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and in 1947-53 at the same time deputy. Minister of Agriculture for Horse Breeding. From May 1953 to September 1954 cavalry inspector. *

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A.I. Egorov (1883-1939) Graduated from the Junker Infantry School. Member of the First World War (colonel). After October revolution went over to the side of the Soviet government. Participant civil war. Then the chief General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Marshal Soviet Union. Shot with a group of military leaders. Rehabilitated posthumously. *

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VK. Blucher (1890-1938) In 1920-1922 - Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. The first holder of the Order of the Red Banner. After the Civil War - in the highest command posts in the army. In 1929-1938. - Commander of the Separate Far Eastern Army. In 1938 he was arrested and shot *

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M.N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) From the nobility. Graduated from military school. Member of the First World War (guards second lieutenant). First in 1918 - in the Red Army After the Civil War of 1918-20, he took an active part in carrying out military reform 1924-25. Since 1934, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, since 1936, 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department. He was shot in 1937. *

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Belov I.P. (1893-1938) commander of the 1st rank (1935). The son of a poor peasant. Member of the 1st World War, non-commissioned officer. In 1919 he was commander-in-chief of the troops of the Turkestan Republic. He successfully fought the Basmachi detachments, using their own terrorist methods against them. In 1938, he was arrested as commander of the Belarusian military district. Sentenced to death penalty. Shot. In 1956 he was rehabilitated. *

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Kamenev S.S. (1881-1936) Commander of the 1st rank (1935). Member of the CPSU since 1930. Born in the family of a military engineer. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1900) and the Academy of the General Staff (1907). During the 1st World War 1914-18 in staff positions. In early 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1918 to 1919 he successfully commanded troops Eastern Front, then during the defense and offensive against Kolchak's troops in 1919. From 1919 to 1924 - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. Since 1934, head of the air defense department and at the same time a member of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. He died on August 25, 1936 from a heart attack. *

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B.M. Shaposhnikov (1882-1945) military service since 1901. Member of the First World War (colonel), in the Red Army since 1918. During the Civil War and after it - at the staff and military teaching work. During the Great Patriotic War - Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union. He made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces of the USSR. *

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I.E. Yakir (1896-1937) Member of the Civil War. In the late 1920s studied at the German military academy. For 12 years he commanded the Ukrainian military district. In 1935-1936. in the Politburo, decisions were made on the appointment of Yakir and Uborevich, as the most talented commanders of the troops of the two leading military districts, to the highest positions in the central office of the NPO. Yakir resigned from the post of chief of the General Staff. Repressed in 1937 *

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I.P. Uborevich (1896-1937) At the end of the 1920s. studied at the German military academy. In 1930 he was appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Then the commander of the Belarusian military district. Talented commanders grew up in the Belorussian district under the leadership of Uborevich, who became prominent commanders of the Great Patriotic War: future marshals G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, K.A. Meretskov and others. *

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I WOULD. Gamarnik (1884-1937) In 1929-1937. Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. He led the purge of the political composition of the Red Army from the "former whites" In 1930-1934. first deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR Voroshilov and Deputy. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. He provided all possible assistance to Tukhachevsky in the implementation of the technical reconstruction of the Red Army and played a large role in increasing the combat readiness of the Red Army. In 1934-1937. first deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Gamarnik was the first in the Red Army in 1935 to be awarded the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, corresponding to the rank of army commander of the 1st rank. Shot himself on the eve of the inevitable arrest * V.M. Primakov (1897-1937) In 1914 he joined the RSDLP, a Bolshevik. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner (1920, 1921). Maintained discipline through punitive measures. Educated at the Higher Military Academic Courses (1923). In 1933-1935 - deputy. Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Deputy. inspector of higher military educational institutions. From 1935 deputy. Commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1937 he was sentenced to death. Shot. In 1957 he was rehabilitated. *

I wanted to bypass critical moments ... "(Essays on the history of historical science in the USSR / edited by M.V. Nechkina. - M., 1963. - T. 3. - P. 384).

4. Buzeskul, V.P. historical process according to the views of Greek historians [Text] / V.P. Buzeskul // Education: journal. - St. Petersburg. - 1902, November. - No. 11. - S. 36.

6. Buzeskul, V.P. History of Athenian democracy [Text] / V.P. Buseskul. - St. Petersburg, 1909. - S. 72.

7. Ibid. - S. 28.

8. Buzeskul, V.P. Character traits scientific movement in the field Greek history for the last thirty years [Text] / V.P. Buzeskul // Russian Thought: a monthly literary and political publication. - M., 1900. - Year 21. Book II. - S. 62.

9. Buzeskul, V.P. Introduction to the history of Greece [Text]: lectures / V.P. Buseskul. - Kharkov, 1903. -S. 191, 193.

10. Ibid. - S. 297, 298.

11. Ibid. - S. 324, 325.

12. Ibid. - S. 353-355.

13. Ibid. - S. 343.

14. Ibid. - S. 106; He is. History of Athenian Democracy. - St. Petersburg, 1909. - S. 407, 408.

15. Buzeskul, V.P. Historical process... [Text] / V.P. Buseskul. - S. 35.

16. Buzeskul, V.P. Pericles: historical and critical study [Text] / V.P. Buseskul. - Kharkov, 1889. -S. 402, 403.

17. Buzeskul, V.P. " The World History» Ranke [Text] / V.P. Buzeskul // ZhMNP. - 1885. - July. -WITH. 241.

18. Ibid. - S. 242.

19. Ibid. - S. 233.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid. - S. 235.

22. Buzeskul, V.P. Historical process... [Text] / V.P. Buseskul. - S. 35.

23. In reviews of V.P. Buzeskula often among their undeniable merits are those that he himself noted in the writings of L. Ranke and the presence of which he enthusiastically welcomed in exemplary publications of foreign antiquities. So, S. A. Zhebelev in his review of the "History of Athenian Democracy" notes: "Everywhere V.P. Buzeskul knew how to notice and emphasize the essential and characteristic. Everywhere the story flows smoothly and clearly, strictly objectively; the personality of the author himself, his “I” does not dominate the facts and considerations he sets forth, but does not remain suppressed and absorbed by them either. The book is devoid of any tendencies whatsoever. claims in favor of the author and to the detriment of the interpreted plot. Attention is also drawn to "impeccability. method of processing "sources and their thorough study, thoughtful logic of presentation of both general and particular issues, which allows you to enter" the very essence of historical construction "" (ZHMNP. - 1909. - May. - S. 199-204).

V.V. Zharkov POLITICAL BODIES OF THE RKKA IN THE 20-30s OF THE XX CENTURY

The main directions of organizational and theoretical improvement of the system of training the party and political personnel of the Red Army in the 20-30s of the 20th century are considered, a description is given of the changes that have occurred in the staffing structure of the central and local branches of military-political bodies; the existing forms of the military administrative system in the USSR were evaluated.

V.V. Zharkov POLITICAL AUTHORITIES OF THE RED ARMY IN 20-30 OF THE XX CENTURY

The basic directions of organizational-theoretical improvement of the system of preparation of party-political staff of the Red Army in 20-30 years of the XX century are considered, the characteristic is given to the changes which have occured in the regular structure of the central and local branches of military-political authorities; existed forms of military-management system in the USSR are estimated.

The political apparatus and party organizations created in the army during the Civil War were active conductors of the party's influence on the Red Army masses. During the period of military reform, political bodies were further strengthened.

One of the main measures taken during the military reform was the reduction of the staff of the Political Directorate from 894 people on January 1, 1922 to 118 people in November 1924.

On March 28, 1924, the Political Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council was renamed the Political Directorate of the Red Army (PURKKA). The rights and obligations of this department were clearly defined by the Regulations on PURKKA, approved on September 7, 1925.

The main task of the PURKKA was "the leadership of party, political and political-educational work in all units, institutions and institutions of the Red Army, as well as the military-political training of workers who underwent military training outside the military order on the territory of the USSR."

The political leadership of PURKKA was carried out through the political agencies of the districts, fleets, armies, divisions, etc. The political agencies were entrusted with full responsibility for the upbringing and military cohesion personnel. The new Charter of the Party, adopted at the XIV Party Congress in December 1925, for the first time introduced the section "On Party Organizations in the Red Army", which finally fixed the structure, rights and obligations of party and political organizations.

As noted earlier, as a result of the military reform, the organizational structure of the Red Army, its combat and political training improved, which also affected the development of political agencies.

By April 1, 1925, the political composition of the Red Army consisted of 14,807 people (the average composition - 9,572, the senior composition - 3,837, the highest composition - 1,398 people), which accounted for 20.3% of the total number of command personnel and 2.9% of the total personnel composition of the Red Army.

The need to establish a unified system for training political personnel in the troops became more and more urgent. By order of PURKKA No. 139 of July 23, 1925, the “Regulations on a unified system of current training” were adopted for leadership.

ki political enlightenment workers of the Red Army. According to this document, the training of political workers in the troops was divided into two types:

First, everyday (instructive and methodological meetings of all types);

The second, periodic (seminars of workers of various categories on a company, regimental and garrison scale).

The regulation clearly defined the activities, their frequency for all types of current training in each link.

On March 15 , 1926 , for the first time , a unified differentiated system of military training for political personnel was introduced by PURKKA 's Order No. 3 .

By the beginning of the 30s. there were serious problems in the army that needed to be urgently addressed. The readiness of the Red Army was at an insufficient level. In the Decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR of January 8

1930, a number of such problems were noted:

First, the discrepancy between the peacetime and wartime manning system, the discrepancy between the deployment of mobilization contingents and the deployment of troops;

Secondly, the unsatisfactory combat readiness of the mobilized units;

Thirdly, insufficient support for the mobilization of rear units and institutions.

There were shortcomings in the system of political work, and in particular in the work of political agencies. All of the above measures carried out by the country's military leadership in the 1920s were insufficient to raise ideological and educational work to the required level. Therefore, the leadership of the country was openly confronted with the task of improving and strengthening political work among the troops.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks constantly studied the course and results of the political education of soldiers, summed up the results of this work and outlined new tasks. In a short time, a number of resolutions were adopted regarding political work in the Red Army. So, on October 30, 1928, the decree “On the political and moral state of the Red Army” was issued, on February 25, 1929 - “On the command and political composition of the Red Army”, etc.

In the first resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, it was noted that in practice there are

conflicts between commanders and political workers. These tensions were the result of an insufficiently clear division of functions of the command and political staff. Also in the resolution, proposals were put forward to strengthen the entire system of education in the Red Army, especially its command and Red Army personnel.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated February 25, 1929 “On the command and political composition of the Red Army” stated: “The Central Committee invites the political agencies, party organizations and party command staff of the Red Army in the conditions of the current period to continue with special consistency the education of the Red Army, its command and Red Army staff in the spirit of selfless devotion to Soviet power, vigilance and class intransigence.

This demand of the party formed the basis of the orders and directives of the people's commissar of defense and the head of PURKKA. For example, in the PURKKA directive “On educational work and political studies with the Red Army men and junior commanders of the Red Army in the 1939/40 academic year ”it was said that the main task of such work is to educate an ardent patriot of the socialist Motherland, infinitely devoted to the cause of the party, politically literate, ready at any moment with dignity and honor to defend with weapons in hands of our great Motherland.

For the practical implementation of this directive, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ordered a number of measures to be taken, the purpose of which was:

a) ensuring the growth of the military and political level of the command staff of the Red Army, strengthening the working and party core in the command staff;

b) increased attention to the staffing of military schools qualified personnel, improvement educational process and improving the general educational preparation of candidates for universities;

c) increasing the political education of junior officers;

d) strengthening the party-political education and military training of the political staff.

In 1929, the results for eight recent years on the training and education of command personnel, which were determined in the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 15

July 1929 "On the state of defense of the USSR." It said: “At present, the Red Army has a reliable, politically stable, class-oriented command staff with good fighting qualities. This was the result of a thorough cleansing of the command staff from alien, politically unstable and anti-Soviet elements thanks to hard work on class selection, education, retraining and raising its political level.

In party political documents of that time, it was constantly emphasized that the development of political agencies in the army and navy, party and political organizations of the Armed Forces was proceeding in the right direction and without any special problems.

In fact, there were more than enough problems, and they seriously hampered the solution of the tasks of training and education of personnel.

The most serious problem was a significant shortage of political staff. This was justified by the decline in the status of political workers, who, after the introduction of one-man command in the Red Army, became only assistants to one-man commanders (and not equal co-rulers - commissars, as before).

Most of the political workers, having sufficiently mastered military affairs, gradually switched to team work. This decline in the political staff was not corrected by the cumulative graduation of all political military educational institutions of the USSR. Serious damage was caused to the political agencies in connection with the transition to command positions of qualified political workers with a long record of political work.

In 1931 alone, 843 political workers were appointed to command posts. Including: 800 people - commanders of companies, batteries; 33 people - commanders of regiments and battalions; 10 people - commanders of divisions, brigades, heads of military schools.

In addition, 180 political workers, preparing to switch to team work, entered the higher military educational establishments corresponding profile.

New requirements for political work and political workers were presented by the rearmament and equipping of the Red Army with new equipment. Head of PURKKA Ya. B. Ga-

Marnik wrote: “... we must seize on the most important link - the technique. From the army, more than ever, it is necessary to demand - to master the technique, to learn how to manage it, to raise the technical culture of the fighter, commander and political worker ever higher.

The low level of technical literacy of the political staff led to the fact that the organization of political work in the technical and special troops was also at a low level. The experience of the 1929 maneuvers showed that, as a rule, the political departments, which were given political service to the special units, led them very weakly, and in some cases (at some stages of the combat situation) they did not lead at all. As noted in the review of the results of tactical training for 1929 in the Byelorussian Military District, the political departments did not take into account the peculiarities of work in tank and mechanized units and formations.

In the course of tactical exercises and maneuvers, political agencies did not have time to perform their functions due to the rapidly changing situation. Their connection with the headquarters of the formations was also weak. Often, political agencies during exercises sent instructors who were not sufficiently familiar with military equipment to motorized units. All this significantly reduced the level of influence on personnel in the process of combat training.

Such a situation developed that by the beginning of 1930 they had military education only 76.5% of the senior command staff, 85.6% - senior, 66.7% - middle. With political education, the situation was even worse: 70.2% of the top staff, 54.3% of the senior command staff, 46.1% of the middle command staff had it.

The general level of military-theoretical training of the political staff was low. This was due to the reduction of requirements for entering military-political educational institutions. The often used limited period of training also reduced the level of military and political training of young political workers. According to PURKKA, graduates of military-political schools and courses had a low professional and military-technical level of training.

On December 12, 1929, PURKKA issued a directive “Prepare for political work in a combat situation”, which stated: “Autumn

maneuvers in the districts showed that the party political apparatus could not quickly reorganize all work in accordance with the nature and conditions of the marching and combat situation. The political apparatus has not achieved the necessary mobility, a significant part of the political agencies and party organizations do not have sufficient skills to quickly reorganize work in connection with the sharply changing operational-tactical and political situation in battle.

In the order of the Revolutionary Military Council No. 80 of October 24, 1930 "On the results of the combat training of the Red Army for 1929/30 academic year” it was noted: “The political agencies and organizations have not yet approached closely and specifically to the issues of military equipment. As a result - ignorance of tactical properties technical means and the inability to organize political work accordingly.

The slogan (for the political agencies) was put on the agenda: “to face military equipment meant, first of all, to mobilize the command and political staff for a deep study of weapons and equipment "

It is no coincidence that in February 1930 a minimum of military knowledge was established for all political workers. According to reports in PURKKA, by the end of 1931, the vast majority of political workers of the ground forces had successfully passed the exams for full course military school. In fact, the number of those certified was not high, for example, in the Urals military district it was 65% of all political workers, in the North Caucasus - 60%, in Belarus - 48% and Leningrad - 45%.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the Command and Political Composition of the Red Army”, adopted on June 5, 1931, stated: “Noting that some, but still insufficient, successes have been achieved in the recent period in the military training of the political staff, the Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to further a decisive increase in his military knowledge"

It was proposed to solve the problem in a short time. Articles explaining the requirements of the technical minimum were systematically published in newspapers and military magazines, and tests were constantly monitored.

The implementation of the requirements of this decree led to the fact that by the middle of 1932 almost all political workers had mastered

the minimum military knowledge set for them.

The next problem, which seriously hampered the achievement of high quality political work in the 1930s. XX century, was the extremely low provision of military administration bodies, troops and military educational institutions with political workers with higher education. The Military-Political Academy produced less than 100 political workers per year (1929 - 93, 1930 - 62, 1931 - 76 people with higher education of the necessary nature).

This explains the fact that among the senior and senior political staff, the share of graduates of military academies was insignificant: among assistant corps commanders in the political field, only 14.3% had a higher military-political education, among the heads of political departments - less than 20%.

The transition of many political workers to team work, a sharp reduction in graduates in secondary military-political educational institutions, and insufficient graduation from the Military-Political Academy led to the fact that by the end of 1929 the shortage of political workers in the Red Army amounted to 800 people, and in the middle of 1930 there were 800 people. - 1300.

The reason for this situation was that in August 1926 the training of middle-level political workers underwent a radical change: a system of "mixed training and service" was put into effect for the middle-level political staff. According to this system, communist commanders who received a secondary military education and worked as commanders for at least a year entered military-political courses, after which they were appointed to the posts of political workers. After some time, they were again appointed to combat positions, etc. . Such a policy did not allow regular servicemen to focus on any specific profile of military service, reduced the prestige of political work, which also led to understaffing of the political staff.

It is no coincidence that in 1931 it was decided to abolish the system of "mixed training and service." It was dei-

significant step towards the transformation of the entire system of political work.

To resolve another existing problem - the lack of middle-level political workers - the political department of the Red Army proposed to the political agencies and party organizations of the units to nominate the best Red Army soldiers and junior commanders from among the party activists to the posts of political workers. At the same time, local party organizations were mobilized among the communists (1,300 people were sent to the army for political work).

In February 1931, with the participation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a re-mobilization was carried out, which made it possible to increase the composition of political bodies by another 4,000 people. This mobilization led not only to an increase in the number of political workers, but also contributed to an increase in the quality of political work in general. On the other hand, in connection with the arrival of communists from local organizations, a serious problem arose related to the quality of their military training. Some of those mobilized from the reserve had poor military knowledge, and the bulk of the replenishment that arrived did not possess this knowledge. Therefore, the study of military affairs by political workers, especially their preparation for work in special branches of the armed forces, has become especially important.

In 1931, due to the shortage of political workers and the problem of their military training, PURKKA took measures to increase the number of cadets and students in military-political educational institutions, improve the educational process in them, and train political workers for special military branches.

In 1930, when discussing the issue “On measures to avoid the existing shortage of command personnel in the Red Army,” it was proposed, when recruiting to universities, to strengthen measures for a particularly careful selection of accepted cadets so that the dropout during training does not exceed 10%, and also to establish an initial period (no more than 3 -x months), during which screening should occur.

1931 it was said: “Military educational institutions - military schools, advanced training courses and academies - should become truly leading centers for the entire army in combat

military and political training, in mastering technology, in military scientific work and to meet the needs of the army in a highly qualified and military-technical, and political command staff ".

The network of military-political establishments was expanded and their capacity increased. Thus, the Leningrad military-political courses with a ten-month training period were transformed into a military-political school with a two-year training period. Not only the period of study increased, but also the number of students; thus, the Moscow and Leningrad military-political courses were brought to 1,000 staff members.

In parallel, new military-political educational institutions were opened; so, for example, the Poltava military-political courses were originally created at the rate of 600 people; later the number of trainees here reached 1100 people.

At the same time, the political administration of the Red Army significantly expanded the number of students at the Military-Political Academy. In 1931 alone, admission to it increased by one and a half times compared with the previous year. Opened at the academy extramural for 1000 people, as well as an evening department for 200 people. In addition, one-year advanced training courses for senior political personnel for 100 people and six-month courses for party-political training of one-man commanders for 100 people continued to work at the academy.

To control the fulfillment of the requirements of the party and the Revolutionary Military Council in 1931, the Military-Political Academy was checked. On March 3, 1931, in the resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council “On the results of the survey of the VPA named after. Tolmachev” it was noted that the academy has a healthy party organization, firmly united on the basis of the general line of the party, a good teaching and student staff (80.7% are workers, 75% are participants in the civil war). But during the inspection, a number of shortcomings were discovered, the resolution noted: “The Department of Political Work, having a number of achievements in the development of its theoretical course, does not sufficiently provide trainee training for the practical management of political work in

Peaceful time and does not provide the necessary instructor skills at all.

In 1931, biennial evening so-called komvuzes, which began to be created at the end of 1930, mainly in large garrisons, became widespread. The average command and political staff, as well as party activists from among the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, studied at the Komvos.

Along with increasing the military knowledge of political workers, political agencies paid great attention to improving (in the Soviet sense) their social and party composition. Thanks to the above measures, and in particular the party mobilization to nominate the best Red Army soldiers and junior commanders for political work, the working stratum among the political staff, especially in the middle link, has increased significantly. If at the beginning of 1928 workers accounted for 40% of the middle political composition, then at the beginning of 1931 they were already 53%. The party experience (over 5 years) of medium-level political workers also increased from 64% in 1928 to 74% in 1931.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the command and political composition”, adopted in June 1931 regarding the strengthening of the cadre of political workers over the past two years, said: “The working stratum has grown

among political workers, especially political instructors.

The most important transformation that took place during the period under review was the change in the structure of political bodies.

In July 1932, sectors for work in aviation were created in the political directorates of the districts, and later it was decided to create sectors for work in tank and mechanized troops in the leading districts - Moscow, Leningrad, Ukrainian, Belorussian and the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

In April 1933, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the organizational structure of the political administration of the Red Army was reorganized. The sectors that previously existed in the political department for work in aviation, in tank and mechanized troops were transformed into independent departments.

In 1932 in academic plan command training, a course of Marxist-

Leninist preparation. The study was given 90 hours of study time per year. There was a requirement to submit an assessment at the end of the course. Its program included materials and decisions of congresses and conferences of the CPSU(b); issues of military construction and strengthening of the country's defense power; works, articles and speeches of Soviet political leaders, classics of Marxism-Leninism; questions of the history of the CPSU (b).

But not in all parts and subdivisions this requirement was met; Thus, during the inspection of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School on June 28, 1933, the following facts were revealed: “Marxist-

Leninist training of command personnel and individual training for lagging behind has not been established ... the high quality of teaching, both in content and in methodology, is not sufficiently ensured.

The PURKKA directive “On the direction of propaganda in the Red Army” dated June 22, 1939 emphasized that mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory is not an end in itself, but a means of strengthening the power of the Red Army, raising the political and moral state and combat skills of the personnel of units and subunits.

The responsibility for organizing the Marxist-Leninist training of the political staff of PURKKA was placed on the political agencies according to the principle: each political agency trains commanders and political workers of the lower military level; so, for example, the political department of the district organized the study of the leading link of the formations, etc. .

In September 1933, I.V. Stalin, who, when discussing the nature of command and control in the district, proposed to liquidate the military councils in the districts. Ya.B. opposed this step. Gamarnik, who wrote to the Central Committee of the Party that the military councils in the form in which they

In June 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which existed as a collegial body for the leadership of the Armed Forces, was abolished. By the same decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was renamed the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. K.E. was approved by the People's Commissar of Defense. Voroshilov, his first deputy - Ya.B. Gamarnik, the second - M.N. Tukhachevsky. In November, the Military Council was created under the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR, which served as an advisory body, it included 80 people. At the same time, military councils in the districts and armies were liquidated. The Military Council of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR as an advisory body ceased its activities in March 1938 with the establishment of the Main Military Council, and later this body was completely liquidated.

For development organizational structure and the states of the central bodies of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, on the basis of the defense scheme approved by the People's Commissar, groups of five people were created, who were instructed to submit proposals for reforming the states and organizing departments. A group was appointed to work on the transformation of PURKKA, headed by the deputy head of PURKKA A.S. Boo-lin. After the end of the work of this group, the political leadership received proposals to improve the political work management system and optimize a number of staff categories.

Thus, in the prewar years, the management of the construction of political agencies was of a contradictory, inconsistent nature, which was aggravated by the purge carried out in the army.

Notes

1. Political agencies of the Soviet Armed Forces [Text]. - M., 1984. - S. 116.

2. RGVA. - F. 4. - Op. 18. - D. 19. - L. 7.

3. CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union [Text]. - S. 255.

4. See: "Propagandist and agitator of the Red Army" [Text]. - 1939. - No. 2. - S. 38-39.

5. See: CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union [Text]. - S. 255.

6. Ibid. - S. 265.

7. RGVA. - F. 9. - Op. 29. - D. 10. - L. 216.

9. RGVA. - F. 9. - He. 29. - D. 12. - L. 298.

10. Ibid. - D. 1S0. - L. 272.

11. Ibid. - F. 4. - He. 18. - D. 19. - L. 393.

12. Political agencies of the Soviet Armed Forces [Text]. - S. 13b.

13. CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union [Text]. - S. 2b3.

14. See: Petrov, Yu.P. Construction of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the army and navy (1918-1968) [Text] I Yu.P. Petrov. - M., 19b8. - S. 231.

15. See: RGVA. - F. 9. - He. 31. - D. 1. - L. S1.

16. Calculated but RGVA. - F. 9. - He. 29. - D. 1S0. - L. 273.

17. See: Ibid. - F. 4. - He. 18. - D. 41. - L. 4.

18. RGVA. - F. 4. - He. 18. - D. 19. - L. 79.

19. CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union [Text]. - S. 2b4.

20. See: Iovlev, A.M. Decree. op. [Text]. - S. 112.

21. See: Ibid. - S. 107.

22. See: Petrov, Yu.P. Decree. cit. [Text]. - S. 232.

23. RGVA. - F. 4. - He. 18. - D. 19. - L. 127.

24. Ibid. - F. 9. - He. 40. - D. 1S. - L. 30.

25. CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union [Text]. - S. 32S.

26. Party and political work in the Red Army. - 1939. - No. 13. - S. b.

27. See: Political agencies of the Soviet Armed Forces [Text]. - S. 144.

28. See: RGVA. - F. 4. - He. 18. - D. 24. - L. 18.

29. Ibid. - F. 9. - He. 29. - D. 1S7. - L. 207.

D.N. Malakhov LOGISTICS OF THE RKKA IN THE 30s OF THE XX CENTURY

Comprehensively, on the basis of modern sources, the fundamental problems of the logistic support of the Red Army in the 30s of the XX century are considered; its individual elements (food and fodder, transport and clothing, technical supply, medical support, etc.); problems of their relationship with management and production authorities; the capabilities of the rear of the Red Army in peaceful conditions, during local wars and military conflicts, were evaluated.

THE REAR SUPPLY OF THE RED ARMY IN 30 OF THE XX CENTURY

In a complex, on the basis of modem sources, basic problems of rear supply of the Red Army in the 30th years of the XX century are regarded; its separate elements (food-feed, train-ware, technical supply, medical supply and so on), their mutual relations with administrative and industrial authorities; opportunities of the rear of the Red Army in peace conditions, during local wars and military conflicts are estimated.

Military-political leadership

countries in the 30s of the XX century, realizing that the logistics system does not meet the requirements of the time, began to pay more attention to its organization.

In 1935, in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, food and clothing supply services were separated from the Military Economic Directorate with their own governing bodies: in the center - the Food Supply Directorate and the Clothing Supply Directorate; in districts - departments of these

services, in divisions - branches. In the regiments, the positions of the head of the food and fodder service and the head of the transport and clothing supply were introduced. The reforms carried out made it possible to significantly improve the provision of troops with food and baggage and clothing, to prepare these services for successful work in wartime.

On August 9, 1935, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On the state of the transport and clothing and food supply of the Red Army and Navy” was issued. In the basis of

K. E. VOROSHILOV (1881 -1969) IN 1925 -1934 - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. 1934 -1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, SINCE 1940 - DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL'S COUNCIL. DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR - MEMBER OF THE GKO AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, I SHOWED A COMPLETE INABILITY TO LEAD THE TROOPS. IN 1953 -1960 - CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM, AND SINCE 1960 - MEMBER OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF THE USSR 3

S. M. BUDONNY (1883 -1973) DURING THE CIVIL WAR, COMMANDED THE 1st cavalry army (1919 -1923). LATER AT COMMAND POSITIONS IN THE RED ARMY, DEPUTY AND FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE. In 1941 -1942. - COMMANDED THE TROOPS OF A NUMBER OF FRONTS AND DIRECTIONS, THEN - THE RED ARMY CAVALRY. FROM JANUARY 1943 COMMANDER OF THE SOVIET ARMY CAVALRY AND MEMBER. OF THE HIGH MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, AND IN 194753 AT THE SAME TIME THE DEP. MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE FOR HORSE BREEDING. FROM MAY 1953 TO SEPTEMBER 1954 INSPECTOR OF THE CAVALRY. 4

AI EGOROV (1883 -1939) GRADUATED THE JUNKER INFANTRY SCHOOL. PARTICIPANT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (COLONEL). AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, HAS GOED TO THE SIDE OF THE SOVIET AUTHORITY. PARTICIPANT OF THE CIVIL WAR. THEN CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR. MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. SHOT WITH A GROUP OF MILITARY LEADERS. REHABILITED POSTMOSTLY. 5

V. K. BLUKHER (1890 -1938) IN 1920 -1922 - MILITARY MINISTER AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF THE FAR EASTERN REPUBLIC. FIRST CAVALIER OF THE ORDER OF THE RED BANNER. AFTER THE CIVIL WAR - IN THE HIGHEST COMMAND POSTS IN THE ARMY. In 1929 -1938. - COMMANDER OF A SEPARATE FAR EASTERN ARMY. IN 1938 ARRESTED AND SHOT 6

M. N. TUKHACHEVSKY (1893 -1937) FROM THE NOBLE. GRADUATED MILITARY SCHOOL. PARTICIPANT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (GUARDS lieutenant). FIRST 1918 - IN THE RED ARMY AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 1918-20 TAKEN AN ACTIVE PART IN THE MILITARY REFORM OF 1924-25. SINCE 1934 DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE, SINCE 1936 1st DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE AND HEAD OF COMBAT 7 TRAINING DEPARTMENT. WAS

BELOV I. P. (1893 -1938) COMMANDER OF THE 1st RANK (1935). SON OF A POOR PEASANT. PARTICIPANT OF THE 1st WORLD WAR, NONTER-OFFICER. IN 1919, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE TROOPS OF THE TURKESTAN REPUBLIC. SUCCESSFULLY FIGHTED THE BASMACH GROUPS, USING THEIR TERRORIST METHODS AGAINST THEM. IN 1938 AT THE POST OF COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE BELARUSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT ARRESTED. SENTENCED TO DEATH PENALTY. SHOT. REHABILITED IN 1956. eight

KAMENEV S. S. (1881 -1936) COMMANDER OF THE 1st RANK (1935). MEMBER OF THE CPSU SINCE 1930. BORN IN THE FAMILY OF A MILITARY ENGINEER. GRADUATED ALEXANDROV MILITARY SCHOOL (1900) AND ACADEMY OF THE GENERAL STAFF (1907). DURING THE 1st WORLD WAR 1914- 18 ON STAFF POSITIONS. AT THE BEGINNING OF 1918 VOLUNTEERLY JOIN THE RED ARMY. FROM 1918 TO 1919 SUCCESSFULLY COMMANDED THE TROOPS OF THE EASTERN FRONT, THEN DURING THE DEFENSE AND OFFENSIVE AGAINST KOLCHAK'S TROOPS IN 1919. FROM 1919 TO 1924 - COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC. Since 1934 HEAD OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF AIR DEFENSE AND AT THE SAME TIME MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S DEFENSE COMMITTEE. DIED ON AUGUST 25, 1936, 9 OF A HEART ATTACK.

B. M. SHAPOSHNIKOV (1882 -1945) IN MILITARY SERVICE SINCE 1901. PARTICIPANT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (COLONEL), IN THE RED ARMY SINCE 1918. DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND AFTER ITS END - ON STAFF AND MILITARY TEACHER WORK. DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR - CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE. MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BUILDING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR. ten

I. E. YAKIR (1896 -1937) PARTICIPANT IN THE CIVIL WAR. AT THE END OF THE 1920s. STUDYED AT THE GERMAN MILITARY ACADEMY. FOR 12 YEARS I COMMANDED THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY DISTRICT. In 1935-1936. DECISIONS WERE MADE IN THE POLITBURO ON THE APPOINTMENTS OF YAKIR AND UBOREVICH, AS THE MOST TALENTED TROOP COMMANDERS OF THE TWO LEADING MILITARY DISTRICTS, TO THE HIGHEST POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE NPO. YAKIR REFUSED THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF. REPRESSED IN 1937 11

I. P. UBOREVICH (1896 -1937) AT THE END OF THE 1920s STUDYED AT THE GERMAN MILITARY ACADEMY. IN 1930 WAS APPOINTED THE 1st DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR MILITARY AND NAVIGATION AFFAIRS. THEN COMMANDER OF THE BELARUSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT. IN THE BELARUSIAN DISTRICT UNDER THE LEADING OF UBOREVICH TALENTED COMMANDERS GROWED UP TO BECOME PROMINENT COMMANDERS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR: FUTURE MARSHALS G. K. ZHUKOV, I. S. KONEV, K. A. MERETSKOV AND OTHERS. 12

(1884 -1937) In 1929-1937. HEAD OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE RKKA. LEAD THE PURGE OF THE POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF THE RKKA FROM "FORMER WHITES" IN 1930-1934. FIRST DEPUTY People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR Voroshilov and Deputy. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. PROVIDED THE FULLEST ASSISTANCE TO TUKHACHEVSKY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TECHNICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE RED ARMY AND PLAYED A GREAT ROLE IN INCREASING THE COMBAT READINESS OF THE RKKA. In 1934-1937. FIRST DEPUTY People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. GAMARNIK WAS THE FIRST IN THE RED ARMY IN 1935 WAS AWARDED THE RANK OF ARMY COMMISSAR OF THE 1st RANK, CORRESPONDING TO THE 13TH RANK OF COMMANDER OF THE 1st RANK.

AI KORK (1887 -1937) MILITARY SPECIALIST, COMMANDER OF ARMIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR, COMMANDER OF THE 2nd RANK (1935), HEAD OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE RKKA IM. FRUNZE, MEMBER OF THE CEC OF THE USSR, MEMBER OF THE AUCP(B) SINCE 1927. DURING WORLD WAR I WAS ON STAFF POSITIONS, LIEUTENANT COLONEL. SHOT DURING REPRESSIONS IN THE RKKA (1937). fourteen

V. M. PRIMAKOV (1897 -1937) IN 1914 JOIN THE RSDLP, BOLSHEVIK. AWARDED WITH TWO ORDERS OF THE RED BANNER (1920, 1921). MAINTAINED DISCIPLINE WITH THE HELP OF PUNITIVE MEASURES. EDUCATED AT THE HIGHER MILITARY ACADEMIC COURSES (1923). In 1933- 1935 - DEP. COMMANDER OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT, DEP. INSPECTOR OF HIGHER MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Since 1935 ZAM. COMMANDER OF THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT. IN 1937 SENTENCED TO DEATH PENALTY. SHOT. IN 1957 15 REHABILITED.

Number By the end of April 1918 - 196,000 people. By the beginning of September 1918 - 550,000 people. By the end of October 1918 - almost 800,000 people [. By the end of 1919 - 3,000 people [. By the autumn of 1920 - 5,500,000 people. By January 1925 - 562,000 people. In 1927 - 586,000 people. March 1932 - 604,300 people (of the entire Red Army (land Red Army, red air fleet and red navy)). As of January 1, 1937 - 1,518,090 people. As of January 1, 1938 - 1,582,057 people. On February 21, 1939 - 1,910,477 people. On September 20, 1939 - 5,289,400 people. On December 1, 1939 - 3,273,400 people. As of January 1, 1940 - 3,851,700 people. As of February 1, 1940 - 4,229,954 people. As of April 1, 1940 - 4,416,600 people. As of May 1, 1940 - 3,990,993 people. As of June 1, 1940 - 4,055,479 people. On September 1, 1940 - 3,423,499 people. As of October 1, 1940 - 3,446,309 people. By January 1941 - 4,200,000 people. On June 22, 1941 - 5,080,977 people. By July 1, 1941 - 10,380,000 people. By the spring of 1942 - 5,500,000 people ( active army and fleet). Since the spring of 1942 - 5,600,000 people (Active army and navy). By the summer of 1942 - about 11,000 people. By the beginning of 1945 - 11,365,000 people. By May 1945 - 11,300,000 people. By February 1946 - 5,300,000 people. sixteen

CREATION Given the current situation, the Bolsheviks quickly formed an army, created a special method of managing the economy, calling it "war communism", and established a political dictatorship. 1 In October 1917, there were 6.3 million people in the army (mainly at the front). , 3 million were in the rear. The soldiers no longer wanted to fight. . The adoption of the Decree on Peace 1 and the demobilization in the midst of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations hastened the collapse of the armed forces. In the winter of 1918, the decree on the creation of the Red Army (January 28, 1918) was still on paper. The new government actually had no army. For the defense of the capital, it had only 20 thousand people, of which about a thousand were Red Guards. Since the problem of armed protection of power required an immediate solution, the Bolsheviks faced a choice: either use the structures of the old army, which had already begun to be demobilized, or introduce compulsory service for workers, thus expanding the Red Guard and depriving factories of manpower, or create a new type of armed forces from soldiers -volunteers and selected commanders. At the beginning of 1918, the last option was adopted. 17

The first "red" armed forces consisted of volunteers, often recruited with the help of trade unions. As for the Red Guards, close to the factory committees, they also gradually merged into the Red Army. Until the autumn, the battles were fought by units of hastily recruited volunteers and Red Guards, weakly armed and fighting each with their enemies: the Red Guard - with "internal part 0 izans", and the volunteers - with White Czechs and the White Army, treating with complete contempt for the traditional military science. The growth of opposition and the beginning of foreign intervention revealed the insufficiency of these forces, and the government returned to the old practice: on June 9, 1918, it announced compulsory military service. The size of the army increased from 360 thousand in July 1918 to 800 thousand in November and up to 1.5 million people in May 1919, and at the end of 1920 the army numbered up to 5.5 million people. Nevertheless, the war was so unpopular among the peasant soldiers (some of them had been drafted into the army four years earlier) that desertion became widespread. During the year their number reached 1 million people. The experience of creating a democratic army spilled out with a bang. People's military commissar, chairman of the Supreme Military Council, Trotsky established strict discipline and began to vigorously fight desertion. eighteen

He did not stop even before the introduction of the hostage system, when members of his family were responsible for the deserter. In addition to desertions, the army was greatly destabilized by problems of equipment and command. Issues of equipment were called upon by a newly created body - the Council military industry(Industrial Military Council), directly subordinate to the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense (established in November 1918), headed by Lenin and responsible for coordinating the actions of the front and rear. The Industrial Military Council disposed of all military facilities. The Red Army was both the main employer and the main consumer in the country. Half of all clothes, shoes, tobacco, sugar produced in the country went to the needs of the army, its role in the economy was decisive. To solve the personnel problem and despite the objections of the "left communists", the government turned to specialists and officers of the tsarist army. Approximately 50 thousand of them went to serve in the new army. Most often these were "trench" officers, as well as soldiers opposed to regular officers - the colors of the white army. In each subdivision, the orders of the military experts had to be signed by a political commissar appointed by the party and obliged to monitor the execution of the orders of the command. nineteen

Cases of betrayal were rare, but the order provided that if an officer was betrayed, the commissar responsible for him would be shot. During this time, tens of thousands of "red officers" left the soldiers. In the new society created after the revolution, service in the Red Army was one of the main ways to move up the social ladder. In the army, first of all, they taught to read: millions of illiterate peasants completed various courses created in units. They also taught "to think correctly", assimilating the foundations of a new ideology. The army was the main supplier of personnel for the Komsomol, which in 1920 consisted of a third of former military personnel. administration, especially in small towns and villages.In 1921, about 2/3 of the chairmen of the village councils were former Red Army soldiers.They immediately began to impose a military style of leadership on their subordinates.Penetration of the military in all spheres of cultural, economic, social and political life led to the "coarseness" of social relations.

SUMMARY The year 1919 was decisive for the Bolsheviks, they created an active, growing army. Later they defeated Yudenich, Denikin, Wrangel. . . Later, the crisis of "war communism", etc. It seems to me that I have examined in sufficient detail the beginning of the civil war and the dynamics of its development from different angles of modern historical views. And I decided for myself that all this is the natural course of history, which means that it obeys the laws of history; therefore, it is possible to foresee the future based on the past, and I would not like that now, with all the complexity of the current economic situation, a similar political situation could arise with the same consequences for the consumer. 21

Red Army in the 30s of the 20th century

slide 2

slide 3

Red Marshals: 1st row: M. Tukhachevsky, K. Voroshilov, A. Egorov, 2nd row: S. Budyonny, V. Blucher

slide 4

K.E. Voroshilov (1881-1969) In 1925-1934. - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, Chairman

RVS USSR. 1934-1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, since 1940 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the State Defense Committee and a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on a number of fronts. At the beginning of the war, he showed a complete inability to lead the troops. In 1953-1960 - Chairman of the Presidium, and since 1960 - Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

slide 5

CM. Budyonny (1883-1973) During the Civil War he commanded the 1st Cavalry Army (1919-1923). Later

in command positions in the Red Army, deputy and first deputy people's commissar of defense. In 1941-1942. - commanded the troops of a number of fronts and directions, then - the cavalry of the Red Army. Since January 1943, the commander of the cavalry of the Soviet Army and member. Supreme Military Council of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and in 1947-53 at the same time deputy. Minister of Agriculture for Horse Breeding. From May 1953 to September 1954 cavalry inspector.

slide 6

A.I. Yegorov (1883-1939) Graduated from the Junker Infantry School. Member of the First World War

(Colonel). After the October Revolution, he went over to the side of the Soviet government. Member of the Civil War. Then Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Shot with a group of military leaders. Rehabilitated posthumously.

Slide 7

VK. Blucher (1890-1938) In 1920-1922 - Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief

People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. The first holder of the Order of the Red Banner. After the Civil War - in the highest command posts in the army. In 1929-1938. - Commander of the Separate Far Eastern Army. In 1938 he was arrested and shot

Slide 8

M.N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) From the nobility. Graduated from military school. Member of the First World

war (guards second lieutenant). First in 1918 - in the Red Army After the Civil War of 1918-20, he took an active part in the military reform of 1924-25. Since 1934, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, since 1936, 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department. He was shot in 1937.

Slide 9

Belov I.P. (1893-1938) commander of the 1st rank (1935). The son of a poor peasant. Member 1st

world war, non-commissioned officer. In 1919 he was commander-in-chief of the troops of the Turkestan Republic. He successfully fought the Basmachi detachments, using their own terrorist methods against them. In 1938, he was arrested as commander of the Belarusian military district. Sentenced to death. Shot. In 1956 he was rehabilitated.

Slide 10

Kamenev S.S. (1881-1936) Commander of the 1st rank (1935). Member of the CPSU since 1930. Born in the family

military engineer. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1900) and the Academy of the General Staff (1907). During the 1st World War 1914-18 in staff positions. In early 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1918 to 1919 he successfully commanded the troops of the Eastern Front, then during the defense and offensive against Kolchak's troops in 1919. From 1919 to 1924 - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. Since 1934, head of the air defense department and at the same time a member of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. He died on August 25, 1936 from a heart attack.

slide 11

B.M. Shaposhnikov (1882-1945) In military service since 1901. Member of the First World War

(Colonel), in the Red Army since 1918. During the years of the Civil War and after its end - at the staff and military teaching work. During the Great Patriotic War - Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union. He made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces of the USSR.

slide 12

I.E. Yakir (1896-1937) Member of the Civil War. In the late 1920s studied in the German military

academy. For 12 years he commanded the Ukrainian military district. In 1935-1936. in the Politburo, decisions were made on the appointment of Yakir and Uborevich, as the most talented commanders of the troops of the two leading military districts, to the highest positions in the central office of the NPO. Yakir resigned from the post of chief of the General Staff. Repressed in 1937

slide 13

I.P. Uborevich (1896-1937) At the end of the 1920s. studied at the German military academy. In 1930 was

appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Then the commander of the Belarusian military district. Talented commanders grew up in the Belorussian district under the leadership of Uborevich, who became prominent commanders of the Great Patriotic War: future marshals G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, K.A. Meretskov and others.

Slide 14

I WOULD. Gamarnik (1884-1937) In 1929-1937 Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. Led the purge

political composition of the Red Army from the "former whites" In 1930-1934. first deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR Voroshilov and Deputy. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. He provided all possible assistance to Tukhachevsky in the implementation of the technical reconstruction of the Red Army and played a large role in increasing the combat readiness of the Red Army. In 1934-1937. first deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Gamarnik was the first in the Red Army in 1935 to be awarded the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, corresponding to the rank of army commander of the 1st rank. Shot himself on the eve of the inevitable arrest

slide 15

A.I. Cork (1887-1937) military specialist, commander of armies during the Civil War, army commander

2nd rank (1935), head of the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army, member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, member of the CPSU (b) since 1927. During the 1st World War he was in staff positions, lieutenant colonel. Shot during the repressions in the Red Army (1937).

slide 16

V.M. Primakov (1897-1937) In 1914 he joined the RSDLP, a Bolshevik. Awarded two orders

Red Banner (1920, 1921). Maintained discipline through punitive measures. Educated at the Higher Military Academic Courses (1923). In 1933-1935 - deputy. Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Deputy. inspector of higher military educational institutions. From 1935 deputy. Commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1937 he was sentenced to death. Shot. In 1957 he was rehabilitated.

View all slides

Lesson Objectives:
educational:
To give students knowledge about the history of the Red Army in the 20s-30s, to acquaint students with the most talented representatives of the military elite of the 30s, whose activities, views and ideas largely determined the future victories of the Soviet army, but were not worthy appreciated by the Stalinist leadership.
educational:
Education in students of a negative attitude towards the totalitarian regime. Show how dangerous the absence of democratic institutions and the establishment of the cult of one person for society and the state.
developing:
To teach students to critically analyze the source of historical information (characterize the authorship of the source, time, circumstances and purpose of its creation);
distinguish between facts and opinions in historical information,
mastering by students the skills and abilities of searching, systematizing and complex analysis historical information;
formulate their own position on the issues under discussion, using historical information for argumentation;

Lesson equipment:

A computer
Multimedia presentation "The Red Army in the 30s of the 20th century" (Appendix 1)
Packages of documents with questions for their analysis (Appendix 2, Appendix 3, Appendix 4)

Plan for studying a new topic:

What changes are taking place in the Soviet armed forces ah in the 30s in connection with the growth of aggressive intentions of the probable opponents of the USSR?
The most prominent representatives of the military elite of the 30s, their relationship.
The beginning of repression in the army. What is the real reason for the repression? Why was Stalin not afraid on the eve of the war to destroy the best commanders of the Red Army?

Learning new material

1. What changes are taking place in the Soviet armed forces in the 30s in connection with the growth of aggressive intentions of the probable enemies of the USSR
Teacher's story:
In the second half of the 1930s, vols. The Red Army was undergoing major changes. There were profound changes in the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. As the military danger grew, the number and technical equipment of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army grew. If by the beginning of the 1930s. in terms of the quality of weapons, it was at the level of the Civil War, then by the end of this decade the situation had changed radically.
a) The transformation of the USSR into an industrial power made it possible to equip the army with a sufficient number of modern weapons.
b) Until the mid 1930s. The Red Army was built on the basis of a mixed system. Due to the limited financial and material resources, our country could not maintain a large cadre army.
If by the end of the Civil War 5 million people served in the army, then after the military reform of the mid-1920s. about 600 thousand Red Army soldiers and commanders remained in it. In the 1930s the number of military personnel grew slowly. But well-trained personnel divisions made up only a small core of the army, and the rest of the divisions were territorial, those. were recruited from citizens called up for short-term bathroom training. The fighters of the military units worked most of the time in national economy and every few years military training took place. Naturally, the level of combat training of the military units was significantly lower than that of the personnel. This was shown by the very first military conflicts in which they had a chance to participate.
“Our territorial divisions were badly trained,” recalled Marshal G.K. Zhukov. - The human material on which they deployed to full strength was poorly trained, had neither an idea about modern combat, nor experience in interacting with artillery and tanks. In terms of the level of training, our territorial units could not be compared with personnel.”
In the context of the approaching war, such a situation could not be tolerated. It was required to transfer the entire army to a personnel position(completed in 1939: general conscription introduced).
c) For the effective use of new opportunities, it was also necessary to increase professional level commanders of the Red Army.
In 1935 and 1936 Grandiose military maneuvers took place in Ukraine and Belarus, during which the interaction of various branches of the armed forces was worked out, for the first time tanks, aviation, and airborne troops were used on such a scale. Military representatives invited to the maneuvers European countries were amazed at the scope of the exercises, the clarity and coherence of the actions of the troops. Commanded the Ukrainian military district Iona Emmanuilovich Yakir(Slide number 12), and Belarusian - Ieronim Petrovich Uborevich(Slide number 13) These were active participants in the Civil War, who successfully commanded divisions and armies, and in peacetime became military leaders on a large scale.
G) In 1935, personal military ranks were established, new form and insignia. (Slide #2)
Highest military rank "Marshal of the Soviet Union" was awarded to the five most popular military leaders: K.E. Voroshilov, S.M. Budyonny, M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.I. Egorov and V.K. Blucher. (Slide #3)
five steel commanders of the 1st rank: I.P. Belov (Slide No. 9), S.S. Kamenev (Slide No. 10), B.M. Shaposhnikov (Slide No. 11), I.E. Yakir (Slide No. 12), I.P. Uborevich (Slide No. 13).

In addition to five marshals and five commanders of the 1st rank, the ranks of the highest command staff were awarded to about 750 more military personnel. (10 people became commanders of the 2nd rank, 62 - commanders, 201 - commanders, 474 - brigade commanders). These people should have future war to command brigades, divisions, corps, armies and fronts. In addition, in the highest commanding staff there were 16 army commissars of the 1st and 2nd ranks, 30 corps, 130 division and 304 brigade commissars; corintener, 16 divinzhenerov, 100 brigengineer, corintendent, 23 divintendant, 44 brigintendant; 1 military jurist, 3 military jurists, 21 military jurists, 99 brigade jurists and 84 military doctors.
However, most of them did not have to participate in the Great Patriotic War, because. they died during the Yezhovshchina.
e) The growing army needed qualified officers. For their preparation in the 1930s the network of military educational institutions was expanded.
New military academies opened:
artillery, military engineering, military chemical, electrical, as well as the academy of mechanization and motorization. Started work in 1936 Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army designed to train senior officers.
By the beginning of 1937, personnel for the army were being trained 12 military academies and 1 veterinary institute, where 11 thousand students studied at the same time.
Over the past 12 years, the academies have trained 13,000 commanders and other specialists with a higher military education, and the military schools have trained 134,700 junior officers. As a result, by the beginning of 1937, the Red Army had 206,000 officers and commanders. Of the command, military-technical and medical staff, 90% had a completed military education, and among the military-administrative and political staff, the level of education ranged from 43 to 50%.
The figures characterizing the educational level of the command staff were good, but in subsequent years, when its number increased several times, and repressions fell upon the old cadres, these figures deteriorated significantly.

2. The most prominent representatives of the military elite of the 30s, their relationship.
Presentation work ( Appendix 1)
The teacher invites the students to name the names of those military leaders that they have heard about and know something about them. The teacher then introduces the class to the others. He notes what positions each of them held in the 20-30s, who was repressed, how the fate of those who escaped repression developed.
K.E. Voroshilov (1881-1969)- During the Civil War, the commissar of the 1st Cavalry Army. In 1925-1934. - People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs (until 1925 this post was held by L.D. Trotsky (1879-1940)), Chairman of the RVS of the USSR. 1934-1940 - People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, since 1940 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. During the Great Patriotic War, he was a member of the State Defense Committee and a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on a number of fronts. At the beginning of the war, he showed a complete inability to lead the troops. In 1953-1960 - Chairman of the Presidium, and since 1960 - a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
S.M. Budyonny (1883-1973)– During the Civil War he commanded the 1st Cavalry Army (1919-1923). Later in command positions in the Red Army, deputy and first deputy people's commissar of defense. In 1941-1942. - commanded the troops of a number of fronts and directions, then - the cavalry of the Red Army. Since January 1943, the commander of the cavalry of the Soviet Army and member. Supreme Military Council of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and in 1947-53 at the same time deputy. Minister of Agriculture for Horse Breeding. From May 1953 to September 1954 cavalry inspector.
Egorov A.AND. (1883-1939) - Graduated from the Junker Infantry School. Member of the First World War (colonel). After the October Revolution, he went over to the side of the Soviet government. Member of the Civil War. Then Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Shot with a group of military leaders. Rehabilitated posthumously.
V.K. Blucher (1890-1938)- In 1920-1922. - Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic. The first holder of the Order of the Red Banner. After the Civil War - in the highest command posts in the army. In 1929-1938. - Commander of the Separate Far Eastern Army. In 1938 he was arrested and shot
M.N. Tukhachevsky (1893-1937)- From the nobility. Graduated from military school. Member of the First World War (guards second lieutenant). First in 1918 - in the Red Army. After the Civil War of 1918-20, he took an active part in the implementation of the Military Reform of 1924-25. He was the head of the Military Academy of the Red Army (1921), commander of the troops of the Western Military District, from 1924 assistant chief, and from November 1925 to May 1928 chief of staff of the Red Army.
From May 1928 to June 1931 he commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District. Since 1931, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Chief of Armaments of the Red Army, since 1934 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, since 1936 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the combat training department.
He played a large role in the technical re-equipment of the Red Army, changing the organizational structure of the troops, in the development of new types of troops and types of armed forces - aviation, mechanized and airborne troops, Navy, in the training of command and political staff.
He was the initiator of the creation of a number of independent military academies - mechanization and motorization, etc.
Author of many books, articles and reports containing a system of strategy, views on modern warfare and having a significant impact on the development of military thought and the practice of military construction. Contributed to the development of strategy, operational art, tactics and military science in general; stressed the need to prepare the army for a long protracted war.
The activities of Tukhachevsky, especially in the posts of chief of armaments and deputy people's commissar of defense, were of great importance in the field of organizational and technical preparation of the USSR Armed Forces for a future war. In May 1937, Tukhachevsky was arrested on charges of organizing a conspiracy in the Red Army. On June 11, Tukhachevsky was sentenced to death, the execution took place the next day.
In 1957 Tukhachevsky was rehabilitated.
Belov I.P. (1893-1938)– commander of the 1st rank (1935). The son of a poor peasant. Member of the 1st World War, non-commissioned officer. In 1919 he was commander-in-chief of the troops of the Turkestan Republic. He successfully fought the Basmachi detachments, using their own terrorist methods against them. In 1938, he was arrested as commander of the Belarusian military district. Sentenced to death. Shot. In 1956 he was rehabilitated.
Kamenev S.S. (1881-1936) - Commander of the 1st rank (1935). Member of the CPSU since 1930. Born in the family of a military engineer. He graduated from the Alexander Military School (1900) and the Academy of the General Staff (1907). During the 1st World War 1914-18 in staff positions. In early 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1918 to 1919 he successfully commanded the troops of the Eastern Front, then during the defense and offensive against Kolchak's troops in 1919. From 1919 to 1924 - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. Since 1934, head of the air defense department and at the same time a member of the Military Council under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. He died on August 25, 1936 from a heart attack.
B.M. Shaposhnikov (1882-1945)- In military service since 1901. Member of the First World War (colonel), in the Red Army since 1918. During the Civil War and after it - at the staff and military teaching work. During the Great Patriotic War - Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Marshal of the Soviet Union. He made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces of the USSR.
And.E. Yakir (1896-1937)– Member of the Civil War. In the late 1920s studied at the German military academy. For 12 years he commanded the Ukrainian military district. For a long time, he studied well all the commanders of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments, was familiar with their families, was constantly aware of their official and everyday problems. With many subordinates, the commander established informal friendly and friendly relations. Yakir tried not to take strangers into his district, especially horsemen. Many subordinates were loyal to their commander and ready to follow him into battle. In 1935-1936. in the Politburo, decisions were made on the appointment of Yakir and Uborevich, as the most talented commanders of the troops of the two leading military districts, to the highest positions in the central office of the NPO. Yakir resigned from the post of chief of the General Staff. Repressed in 1937
And.P. Uborevich (1896-1937) - Member of the Civil War. In the late 1920s studied at the German military academy. In 1930 he was appointed 1st Deputy People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Then the commander of the Belarusian military district. A born commander, educator of troops, Uborevich introduced everything into combat training. latest achievements military science and practice, could not stand self-satisfied ignoramuses who did not want to improve their professional level, whose only merit was a worker-peasant origin. He strongly insisted on the need for constant study, demanded to educate a cultural commander, which caused extreme irritation among the former sergeant majors, who believed that they had already reached the highest heights in military art.
At the same time, under the leadership of Uborevich, talented commanders grew up in the Belorussian district, who became prominent commanders of the Great Patriotic War: future marshals G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, K.A. Meretskov and others.
Uborevich mastered the operational-tactical art to perfection. “He was in the full sense of the word a military man,” wrote Marshal G.K. Zhukov. - Appearance, the ability to hold on, the ability to briefly express one's thoughts - everything indicated that I.P. Uborevich was an outstanding military leader.
In 1935-1936. Uborevich resigned from the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Aviation. Some commanders and commanders considered this behavior an open demonstration of discontent and unwillingness to work with Voroshilov. Both Yakir and Uborevich in the circle of their associates spoke disrespectfully about the people's commissar, believed that they were undeservedly bypassed, not conferring on them the rank of marshal. In 1937 he was repressed.
Ya.B. Gamarnik (1884-1937) - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. Committed suicide in 1937
A.I. Kork (1887-1937)– military specialist, army commander during the Civil War, commander of the 2nd rank (1935), head of the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army, member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, member of the CPSU (b) since 1927. During the 1st World War he was in staff positions, lieutenant colonel. Shot during the repressions in the Red Army (1937).
V.M. Primakov (1897-1937)- In 1914 he joined the RSDLP, a Bolshevik. He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner (1920, 1921). Maintained discipline through punitive measures. Educated at the Higher Military Academic Courses (1923). In 1933-1935 - deputy. Commander of the North Caucasian Military District, Deputy. inspector of higher military educational institutions. From 1935 deputy. Commander of the Leningrad Military District. In 1937 he was sentenced to death. Shot. In 1957 he was rehabilitated.

In order to understand how relations developed among the senior command staff of the Red Army in the 1930s, why the most talented of them were repressed, students are invited to independently analyze the following testimonies belonging to one of the most talented military leaders, Jerome Petrovich Uborevich: Application2.
The teacher sums up the discussion of the source. And he gives additional facts characterizing the relationship in the Red Army:
Commander I.S. Kutyakov mentioned one such case in his diary: “On March 2, 1936, Marshal Tukhachevsky led an almost 100% decisive attack on Vor. + Egor. + Yakir + Uborevich. This can be understood in such a way that on this day Tukhachevsky criticized the policy pursued by Voroshilov and he was supported in this by Marshal A.I. Egorov and commanders of the 1st rank I.E. Yakir and I.P. Uborevich. Kutyakov's conclusion about Voroshilov's role in the development of the Red Army was merciless: “March 75, 1937 Kuibyshev. As long as the "iron" will be at the head, as long as there will be stupidity, sycophancy and everything stupid will be held in high esteem, everything smart will be humiliated.
Everyone in the army knew about the constant disagreements on questions of military theory and practice between the amateur Voroshilov and his deputy Tukhachevsky, who was a recognized military theorist. Stalin skillfully played on these contradictions, supporting one or the other.
I must say that the command staff of the Red Army in the 1930s. continued to secretly divide into peculiar fraternities that competed with each other. This has been going on since the Civil War. Former Chapaevs, Shchorsovtsy, Kotovtsy, Primakovtsy, Budennovtsy from time to time gathered separately from others, recalling the past, discussing the current situation in the army. There was a hidden rivalry, promotion to command positions of people from their group. However, relations within these groups were not idyllic either. Veterans could not share the past glory in any way, they considered themselves bypassed by awards and positions. At times, their rivalry escalated, and Stalin skillfully used this.
In the circles of the highest military, the idea was expressed of the need to replace the people's commissar of defense. Voroshilov knew about these sentiments of a part of the military elite, but Stalin's patronage guaranteed him against any steps of his competitors. Stalin considered statements against his protégé and attempts by the military to raise the question of replacing the head of the military department with the top political leadership of the country as interference by the military in the prerogatives of the Politburo, which the dictator could not allow, but until the summer of 1936 he did not make any organizational conclusions.
3. The beginning of repression in the army. What is the real reason for the repression? Why was Stalin not afraid on the eve of the war to destroy the best commanders of the Red Army?
In August-September 1936 there were important events: the process of G.E. Zinoviev and L.B. Kamenev ended with their execution, N.I. Yezhov was appointed to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs instead of G.G. Yagoda. A prominent military leader, head of the air defense(Air Defense) commander of the 1st rank S.S. Kamenev, and arrests were made among the military.
Earlier, others were arrested by members of the Supreme NPO commanders V.M. Primakov, S. A. Turovsky and the Soviet military attaché in England V. K. Putna. These three figures of the Civil War were charged with participation in the "fighting group of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary organization."
They spent over nine months in prison, where they were required to confess to preparing a military coup and to name accomplices from among the top military leaders.
But until May 1937, the NKVD investigators failed to achieve this. The first arrests of the three commanders were not considered by the military leaders as the beginning of a large-scale purge of the army. Having lost three of its members, the NPO Supreme Council continued to function. Stalin and Voroshilov showed no clear signs of distrust of the military elite.
After the February-March (1937) Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Arrested: Tukhachevsky M.N., Yakir I.E.,
Uborevich I.P., Kork A.I., Eideman R.P., Feldman B.M. This was the beginning of mass repressions in the army. From 1937 to the autumn of 1938, out of 733 people in the highest command and political staff of the armed forces, 579 people died.
To understand the events of 1937-1938, to understand what motivated Stalin, how contemporaries assessed what was happening, the teacher invites students to complete individually cognitive tasks according to the documents presented: Appendix 2 and Annex 3.

After discussing the students' answers, the teacher proposes to draw conclusions:
1. What is the real reason for the repressions in the Red Army?
2. Why is Stalin not afraid that repression will greatly weaken the army on the eve of the war?
3. Why does society not condemn mass arrests, but take them for granted?

Literature:

I don't speak American. Evidence of repressions in the Red Army in 1937-1938. - The newspaper "History", No. 21, November 1-15, 2007:
A. Pechenkin "Earth - dust - wind, and that's it!". - The newspaper "History", No. 21, November 1-15, 2007
School encyclopedia “History of Russia. 20th century". - M. "Olma Press" Education, 2003