Formed by the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Direction in accordance with the directive VGK rates dated April 17, 1942. The corps was formed in April - May 1942 in the Krasny Oskol area of the Voroshilovgrad region. In May 1942, he was transferred to the Kharkov direction to the troops Southwestern Front.
The 23rd Panzer Corps almost shared the fate of the 21st, having lost the 131st Tank and 23rd Motorized Rifle Brigade near Kharkov. And from the 6th and 130th tank, originally included in its composition, little is left.
From June 20 to July 15, 1942, he was under operational control of the 28th A, then in the reserve of the South-Western Front.
On July 22, 1942, by the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 994124 of 07/22/1942, the corps was included in the 4th TA.
On July 27, 1942, the corps as part of the Stalingrad Front was operationally subordinated to the 1st TA.
The second time the Corps was formed on August 31, 1942, by order of the command of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern Front.
On October 28, 1942, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Stalingrad front, and then assigned to the Shirokoye and Tatishchevo areas for additional recruitment, where it entered the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
According to the directive of NCO UF-2/883 of October 25, 1942, the management of the corps was transferred to the new staff No. 010/369.
On December 9, 1942, by the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170699 of 12/08/1942, the corps was included in the 5th Division. BUT .
On December 25, 1942, by the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 170714 of December 25, 1942, the corps was transferred to the 5th Division. BUT .
December 31, 1942 Corps as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front. On January 3, 1943, the corps was operationally subordinated to the 3rd Guards. A. On February 25, 1943, the corps was withdrawn from combat to the reserve of the Southwestern Front for resupplying in the city of Kupyansk. Since July 16, 1943, the corps has been operationally subordinate to the 1st Guards. A. Since July 24, 1943, the corps has been in the reserve of the Southwestern Front. Since August 8, 1943, the corps has been operationally subordinate to the 3rd Guards. A. On August 26, 1943, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Southwestern Front. On September 4, 1943, the corps entered the operational subordination of the 3rd Guards. A. On September 30, 1943, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Southwestern Front and concentrated in the Grigorievka, Chaplino area. And after replenishing the tank on October 10, 1943, it concentrated in the Blagoveshchenskoye area. October 14, 18943 captured the city of Zaporozhye.
October 17, 1943 withdrawn from combat to the reserve of the 3rd Ukrainian front and reassigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front. As part of the 4th Ukrainian Front was until October 30, 1943.
On October 30, 1943, the corps became subordinate to the 46th A of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. From November 25, 1943, the corps as part of the 8th Guards. BUT.
From December 23, 1943, the corps as part of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front fought until March 18, 1944. Then it was withdrawn to the front reserve until March 30, 1944. Until April 24, 1944, it attacked again. From April 24 to June 4, 1944 he was in the reserve of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
From August 21 to August 30, 1944 he was part of the KMG Gorshkov (7th Guards A).
In June 1945, the corps left the 2nd Ukrainian Front and entered the Lvov Military District.
As part of the active army:
- from 04/12/1942 to 10/28/1942
- from 12/31/1942 to 05/09/1945
The tactical sign of the 23rd Panzer Corps was a white rhombus, usually 400 mm high, with the letters of the Russian alphabet in the center. The letter "V" identified the 3rd Tank Brigade, the letter "G" the 39th, and the letter "D" the 135th Tank Brigade. In the lower right corner relative to the letter, a small Arabic numeral was applied, indicating the number of the battalion. For example, "B1" - the 1st battalion of the 3rd Tank Brigade of the 23rd Tank Corps. In addition to the tactical designation of the formation, a personal identification number was applied to the tank in large numbers.
After several of Degen's stories, which reflect specific situations so colorfully and vividly, with such details and details that create the effect of presence in the reader, I found it necessary to place Degen's more general reasoning about tank war. The text that will be given below, I would find it difficult to call a story. It is rather an essay on the topic of tanks, about the feelings of tankers, about different attitudes towards the remains of the dead.
The Germans knew very well the difference between worthless trained newcomers Soviet tankmen, who arrived at the front in tanks just now created, that is, replenishment from marching companies, and tankers who arrived from hospitals after being wounded. They already know how to fight. Therefore, the Germans sought not only to destroy the tank, but also the tank crew. For this purpose, land mines appeared against the tanks - an anti-tank mine served only as a detonator for several hundred kilograms of explosives. A sea mine, unlike a tank mine, was a kind of landmine. Several hundred kilograms of explosives. And she didn't need a detonator.
Disarmament of an enemy mine by Soviet sailors
There are no words to describe the fear that even the thought of a landmine caused in me. It would seem, is it worth it for a front-line soldier to think that he will be killed by a bullet weighing 9 grams, or a land mine weighing 200 kilograms? But, when I saw for the first time the tower of a thirty-four weighing eight tons, thrown twenty meters from the tank hull by a land mine explosion, I could no longer get rid of the memories of this spectacle, of this fear that had stuck into me.
The command, who did not realize what a coward I was, considered me a wise tactician, and my driver probably cursed me when, avoiding roads and tank-accessible terrain as much as possible, I ordered the car to be driven through the devil knows what obstacles. And the reason was not tactical wisdom, but simply cowardice, vile fear. Land mines! Of course, I'm ashamed to admit it, but I had such an incurable disease - land mine phobia.
I also had other fears. Somehow, passing by a wrecked tank, I saw a neat hole in the turret, on the side of the gun mantlet. So neat and precise, as if it was done at the factory in the tower workshop. So. Blank. Eighty eight millimeters. Fear pierced me to the bone, although there was silence and safety around. I turned away. I didn't want the turret number to remind me who fought in this tank. Saved from memories. He came to his crew and immediately wrote down a rhyme.
Gaping in thick frontal armor
A hole through and through with a blank.
We are used to everything in the war.
And yet near the frozen tank
I pray to fate when they order to fight,
When the rocket takes off, matchmaker's death,
Can't even see in my mind
From this hole of splashing fear.
Wrote, and it seems to be easier. Seems to have healed. Anyway, I didn't think about that damned hole in the tower anymore. But the turret, which flew off the hull, did not leave me alone. Land mine phobia.
So here's the note on the internet. From it, written unprofessionally, without technical details, I nevertheless learned that the thirty-four's turret flew off the hull several meters. Therefore, not an anti-tank mine. Land mine! No, the bridge was not mined with hundreds of kilograms of explosives with an anti-tank mine-detonator. A large number of unused sea mines turned out to be in the port of Rostock. Such a "toy" cannot be disguised on the bridge. It was possible to find it when inspecting the bridge without any effort.
Do you understand? This happened on the first of May 1945. Before the end of the war, there were 7 days and a few hours. The day after the explosion of the tank ended the fighting in Berlin. But it's the first of May!
He told how it happened at that time the boy, who was going to go there, to the eastern part of the bridge, to which the tank drove up. It must be assumed that the bridge is not short. This is already the delta of the Varnov River, which flows into the Baltic Sea. If the boy could easily get on the bridge, then, too, one must assume that there was no protection of the bridge. Rostock already had a premonition of capitulation and did not fight much, if at all. It was possible to enter the city even on this mined bridge without much danger. Why? Why was this death necessary?
Rostock (Germany), May 1945. White flags are visible in the windows. (Frame from a German film).
I was sure that after the wounds I had well-strengthened scars for a long time. Even an illiterate surgeon could confirm this officially. But I was wrong. It turned out that I did not have strong scars, but open wounds. And on each of these wounds, salt poured as the cursed note was read.
I suddenly felt like that dead guard lieutenant, the commander of the found tank. I imagined him giving the order. The first of May! Day of the review of the revolutionary forces of the world proletariat! It is today, on the day of this very review, that Rostock should be taken! Forward! Your mother! .. Forward!
Who was the source of the order? Who gave it away? Battalion commander? Brigade commander? Or did the brigade commander receive an order from an even higher commander? It is the first of May to take Rostock. And no nails! Let's say. But did this brigade commander have intelligence in his brigade? After all, even, in addition to the intelligence unit, the head of intelligence was sitting at the headquarters of the brigade. The one who received his orders, never even close to being in danger. Could he order to inspect the unguarded bridge? Was it possible to send sappers after that to remove or defuse the mine?
And why is it giving the order? Why, one might say, on the last day of the war, change the accepted customary and established rules of warfare? Why change the style of command used throughout the war? Nonsense! Which of the big commanders ever felt sorry for tanks? Tanks? New ones will be made. After all, those who did not give orders in agony and hunger, in hard work, with broken hands, these tanks worked. Will tankers die? Well, don't make me laugh! Who ever took pity on them? New additions are coming.
I am well aware of this from personal experience. I remember very well receiving orders. But you can consider that I was lucky to have relatively good commanders. I remember very well how my battalion commander, giving me an absurd order, was clearly worried and tried to spice up this absurd order by treating me to a glass of vodka. He knew he was sending me to a pointless death. Did he hope that in some incredible way I would fulfill this criminal order and not even die? Maybe.
And in fact, I really carried out orders in some incredible way. Or, rather, tried to do it. At the same time, for a very long stay in the breakthrough brigade (long by military standards for the survival of a tanker), in eight months he lost only four tanks, in which he was a member of the crew. Commander. That is, he knew what I was dooming to four of my subordinates, bottled up with me. That is, he was not only a suicide, but also a murderer. One was killed in the first tank. One was killed in the second tank. Three were killed in the third tank. Three were killed in the fourth tank. Two are badly injured. And yet, in addition to tankers, six paratroopers were killed. The third tank also had paratroopers. Soldiers of the penal battalion, formed from officers released from captivity. Perhaps the battalion was not penal, but assault, but they called themselves penalists. These paratroopers did not die on a tank. Concussions, minor injuries, burns are not taken into account.
Soviet tank T-34 with a tank landing during the attack.
To be continued
Sources of illustrations:
http://humus.livejournal.com/3422993.html
http://niemirow-41.livejournal.com/975.html
http://topwar.ru
http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/
Pilot No. 1 (registration number 3098787), with the exception of the fighting compartment, was manufactured by the General Electric Company's Erie Works in January 1943. The manufacture of the machine was authorized after the electric transmission showed excellent results on the T1E1 heavy tank. The T23 medium tank was used the same scheme modified for the Ford GAN engine, which was as follows.The Ford GAN gasoline engine drove an electric generator, which in turn fed two traction motors (one for each track).Since the engine and tracks were not mechanically connected, the speed The power output of the engine could be varied and controlled independently of the speed of the machine, allowing the engine to run at its most efficient speed at all times, and thereby greatly extend its lifespan. circuit diagram, which did not require a mechanical transmission, made it possible to very accurately, quickly and easily adjust the speed of the tank. Preliminary tests showed that the T23 was extremely maneuverable, could turn within its length, i.e. in place, and gave the highest speed of 35 miles per hour (56.32704 km / h). Unlike other machines of the T20 series, the T23 tank had a suspension with vertical springs, like on the M4 Sherman tank. The drive wheels were at the back, and the sloths that regulate the tension of the tracks were at the front. The tracks were standard, brand T51.
Pilot tank No. 1 was ready before the agreement reached between the Artillery Department and Tank Waxes in December 1943 came into force. The co-pilot had already added height, for the convenience of seated tankers, and increased the size of the driver's hatches. The upper frontal sheet was rolled with a cast piece welded on top in the middle, covering the fan installed between the driver and his assistant. Initially, this fan was not provided and was added in October 1943.
The pilot of the T23 differed from the rest of the machines by the presence of a welded turret. This was the result of a program to create an improved turret and carriage for the 76mm gun. Work began in July-August 1942, when the 76mm T1 gun was mounted on the M34 carriage on the M4A1 tank. The long gun required a counterweight of about 800 pounds (362.87 kg). The gun pointing mechanism turned out to be too weak, and the turret was cramped, which made maintenance of the gun very difficult. As a result, a program appeared to develop an improved turret for a 76mm cannon for medium tanks. In the meantime, the 76mm cannon itself was also reworked - in order to improve the balance, it was shortened by 5 calibers (38.1 cm). The modified gun was standardized as M1A1. On all machines of the T20 series, the 76mm gun was equipped with a stabilizer in the vertical plane.
After preliminary calculations, it was decided to continue the detailed development of two different towers and carriages. The design of one carriage was based on the combined M34 carriage, which was already on the M4 tank with a 75mm gun. His cradle was attached to the trunnions bolted to the frontal armor of the tower. A small shield was put on the trunk and screwed to the cradle to close the hole that appeared when the trunk was raised or lowered. The M71D sight was the same as on the standard M4 tank. To the left of the gun was a twin .30 machine gun. This version was based on the standard turret of the M4 Sherman tank and was called the T79 combined carriage. The turret was cast, and in addition to the rotating commander's hatch, it was equipped with a smaller double-leaf hatch for the infector. The commander and gunner each had an M6 overscope, and around the commander's cupola there was a ring for an anti-aircraft .50 machine gun. Photographs taken in March 1943 show this turret in a T23 co-pilot (registration number 3098788). In addition, the same tower was placed on the T20, T20E3 and T22.
The second type of installation of the gun consisted in the fact that the frontal sheet of the tower was removed altogether, and instead of it a large movable armored mask was attached, connected by boots to the cradle. The mask was attached to pins fixed on the tower itself. The turret was fully welded with a T80 carriage. This variant was much better balanced than the cast turret with the T79 carriage, due to the fact that the rear turret was longer.
Both towers had the same turret glass. The glass contained 42 76mm shots and a sufficient number of .30 and .50 caliber cartridges for machine guns. The pilot tank T23 No. 1 had a welded turret with an early T80 carriage.
After successful testing, the T80 carriage was sent into production. The welded turret with this carriage was redesigned as a cast one, with an elongated bulge at the rear, necessary for balance. After this, the new turret was approved and entered service with the M4 series tanks. Changes were also required so that the turret did not interfere with the opening of the hatches of the drivers on the M4 tanks. At the same time, a fan had to be added to the rear of the turret, since the M4 Sherman did not have a rotoclone fan, which was on the front plate of the T23 tank. This version of the turret with the T80 carriage, standardized as the M62, was approved for the production of the T23 tanks.
Preliminary tests of pilot models of the T23 tank were so successful that in May 1943 a contract was issued for the production of 250 tanks. The vehicles received registration numbers from 30103052 to 30103301. However, numbers from 30103252 to 30103301 were later assigned to the T25E1 and T26E1 tanks, and the number of T23 tanks was reduced in the contract to 200 vehicles. Later, another contract was signed for the production of 50 T23 tanks, which again brought the total number of T23 tanks to 250, which should have been completed before December 1944. The 250 vehicles included two T25 pilots, which were initially classified as T23 with a 90mm cannon. Their registration numbers are 30103053 and 30103054. The first pilot, which included a number of modifications, was completed in October 1943 and taken to the Aberdeen Proving Ground.
The production T23 pilot included an improved cast turret with a T80 (M62) carriage and commander's cupola. A rotating hatch with an anti-aircraft machine gun was moved to the loader and a 2-inch M3 mortar was installed on the left front on the roof of the tower, firing smoke grenades. The thickness of the front plate on the pilots was increased from 2 ½ inches to 3 inches. Additional improvements were already based on test results at Fort Knox and were made during production. Late production vehicles received fully waterproof protection for all electrical components, electric brakes in case of emergency braking when the tank loses power. According to the test results, changes were made in the engine compartment - valves, seals, flame arresters.
Tank T23 No. 55. Trials in Phoenix, Arizona.
Tank T23. View of the right side of the tower. In front of the middle loader, behind - the commander.
76mm M1A1 gun of the T23 tank.
An interesting feature of tanks with electric transmission was the ability to control them remotely from the tower or even walking next to the vehicle. Two controllers were required to use the full power. The first, the master controller, was responsible for the general control, and the second was the remote acceleration controller. Both could be installed in the tower. If the machine was maneuvering in contact with the enemy and the power requirements did not exceed 1300 rpm, then only a remote master controller was required. This device on the cable could be used while being near the machine. The Tank Waxes were unenthusiastic about the possibility of remote control, considering it unnecessary, and instead pointed to the need to fix the turret on the march. The developers were advised to remove remote control devices from the tank, and use the freed space for more necessary equipment.
Tests of the first ten pre-production T23s, conducted at Fort Knox, revealed that the tank was unsuitable for combat use. The difficulty in maintaining the tank, together with the need for retraining of technical personnel, led to the fact that the vehicle was abandoned. The same refusal was received in February 1945, when the American command at the European Theater was informally informed that there were about 200 T23 tanks available. The refusal noted that the introduction of this tank into service would require a complete retraining of the existing trained personnel in addition to the introduction of a new inventory of spare parts. Such a shortcoming at that time could not be justified.
In April 1943, the Artillery Committee recommended that pilot models of the T23 tank be assembled with torsion bar suspension and given the designation T23E3. In December 1943, this proposal was approved and the Chrysler Corporation received an order to build two pilot tanks. Later, the order was reduced to just one car. The pilot medium tank T23E3 (registration number 30103068) was manufactured and transferred to the Detroit Tank Arsenal on August 29, 1944 for shipment to Fort Knox.
The torsion bar suspension was equipped with a 19-inch wide lantern track and six double track rollers. The first two and the last two road wheels on each side were equipped with shock absorbers. Each track was supported by five twin support rollers. The turret and most of the equipment used in the manufacture of the T23E3 were inherited from the pre-production T23 #19 tank, as well as the registration number. This car was assembled at the Detroit Tank Arsenal and transferred to the Tank Laboratory for dismantling. Т23№19 was manufactured even before the adoption of the requirements for watertightness of electrical equipment, however, before installation on T23E3, all electrical equipment was sealed. The tower was also brought into line with the new requirements - the basket was removed and the equipment attached to the tower platform was moved to another place. The suspension and tracks for the new pilot tank came from the Aberdeen Proving Ground from the T25E1 tank. The hull was made anew, and the hull of the T23 No. 19 tank was sent to the Aberdeen Proving Ground for ballistic tests. After the assembly was completed, the tank was handed over to the Tank Directorate at Fort Knox. Due to the loss of interest in tanks with an electric transmission, production was stopped.
In July 1943, a proposal was made to standardize the T23E3 as the M27 medium tank with electric transmission and torsion bar suspension. At the same time, it was proposed to standardize the T20E3 as a medium tank M27V1 with a torkmatic transmission and a torsion bar suspension. Although the OSM prepared the relevant documents, standardization did not take place.
With the advent of the next M4E8 tank, a proposal arose to borrow from it new system pendants for T23. The M4E8 was equipped with horizontal spring suspension and a 23-inch lantern track. The Artillery Committee recommended that the T23 pilot tank be made with this suspension and be designated as the T23E4 pilot medium tank. Engineering Troops The US protested because the new car would have been 131 inches wide, 7 inches wider than the AR850-15. This was the reason why the production of a pilot tank was not approved. However, later, three pre-production T23s were fitted with horizontal spring suspension and T80 23-inch tracks. The vehicles were taken to Fort Knox for testing. Testing showed that the wide horizontal track was superior to the standard 16-9/16 inch track and vertical spring suspension found on the standard T23. In conclusion, it is worth noting once again that the production of T23 tanks was never launched due to the end of the war and the loss of interest in tanks with electric transmission.
| 76mm Gun M1, M1A1, M1A1C, and M1A2 76mm gun M1, M1A1, M1A1C, and M1A2 |
||
| accommodation | medium tank line M4 on M62 carriage, medium tanks T20, T20E3, T22, and T23-2 on T79 carriage, medium tanks T23 and T23E3 on T80 carriage, Motor Carriages M18, T86, and T86E1 on M1 carriage |
|
| chamber length (without rifling) | 22.46 inches | |
| threaded length | 133.54 inches | |
| chamber length (to the edge of the projectile) | 20.7 inches | |
| channel length | 135.3 inches | |
| barrel length | 156.00 inches, 52.0 calibers | |
| shutter recoil length | 7.75 inches | |
| length from the muzzle to the back of the bolt | 163.75 inches, 54.6 calibers | |
| extra length, with M2 muzzle brake | 11.6" M2 muzzle brake on M1A1C and M1A2 | |
| total length | 163.75" (M1, M1A1), 175.4" (M1A1C, M1A2) | |
| channel diameter | 3 inches | |
| chamber volume | 142.6 cu. inch (APC M62), 140.50 inch (HE M42A1) | |
| barrel weight (without muzzle brake) | 870 lbs (M1), 940 lbs (M1A1) | |
| weight of the entire gun (without muzzle brake) | 1.141 lb (M1), 1.206 lb (M1A1C), 1.231 lb (M1A2) | |
| muzzle brake weight M3 | 62 pounds | |
| total weight | 1.141 lb (M1), 1.268 lb (M1A1C), 1.293 lb (M1A2) | |
| shutter type | semi-automatic, the gun is mounted so that the bolt opens horizontally on the M62 carriage, T79 and T80 and 45 degree angle on M1 carriage |
|
| rifling | 28 grooves, right hand, 1 turn/40 gauge (M1, M1A1, M1A1C) or 1 turn/32 gauge (M1A2) | |
| ammunition | unitary | |
| fuse | impact type | |
| the weight of the entire ammunition | APC M62 Projectile (APCBC/HE-T) - 11.2490908 kg HVAP M93 Shot (APCR-T) - 8.57743172 kg AP M79 Shot (AP-T) - 10.995079 kg HE M42A1 Shell (HE) - 10.0833584 kg HC BI M88 Shell, Smoke - 6.07813776 kg |
|
| projectile weight | APC M62 Projectile (APCBC/HE-T) - 7.00346619 kg HVAP M93 Shot (APCR-T) - 4.26376828 kg AP M79 Shot (AP-T) - 6.80388555 kg HE M42A1 Shell (HE) - 5.8377338 kg HC BI M88 Shell, Smoke - 3.34751169 kg |
|
| the highest pressure of powder gases | 43,000 psi | |
| highest rate of fire | 20 shots/min | |
| starting speed | APC M62 Projectile (APCBC/HE-T) - 792.48 m/s HVAP M93 Shot (APCR-T) - 1 036.32 m/s AP M79 Shot (AP-T) - 792.48 m/s HE M42A1 Shell (HE) - 822.96 m/s HC BI M88 Shell, Smoke - 274.32 m/s |
|
| projectile muzzle energy, KE= 1/2 MV2 | APC M62 Projectile (APCBC/HE-T) 724 ft-tons HVAP M93 Shot (APCR-T) 7 5 3 ft-tons AP M79 Shot (AP-T) 703 ft-tons HE M42A1 Shell (HE) 650 ft-tons |
|
| firing range | APC M62 Projectile (APCBC/HE-T) 16,100 meters HVAP M93 Shot (APCR-T) 13,100 meters AP M79 Shot (AP-T) 12,770 meters HE M42A1 Shell (HE) 14,200 meters HC BI M88 Shell, Smoke (at 12 degrees) 2,000 meters |
|
| armor penetration of the 76mm M1A1 gun against homogeneous armor at an angle of 30 degrees | |||||||||||
| projectile type | title | Weight, kg | initial speed, m/s | range, m | |||||||
| 457.2 | 914.4 | 1 371.6 | 1 828.8 | ||||||||
| armor-piercing with armor-piercing cap | APC M62 | 7.00346619 | 792.48 | 93mm | 88mm | 82mm | 75mm | ||||
| armor-piercing sub-caliber | HVAP M93 | 4.26376828 | 1 036.32 | 157mm | 135mm | 116mm | 98mm | ||||
| armor-piercing | AP M79 | 6.80388555 | 792.48 | 109mm | 92mm | 76mm | 64mm | ||||
| The table shows the armor penetration for the M1A1 gun. For the M1A2 cannon, armor-piercing capped (APC) shells perform slightly better at longer ranges. | |||||||||||
In words, we are always good with the slogan “No one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten”, in reality it is not so good. I'm not talking about the Great Patriotic War now, I'm talking about the current war. This war already has its own pantheon of heroes, and its own monuments, only real true stories about how it all happened, not distorted, not embellished, without the prefixes “legendary”, are not heard. Painfully, everything in reality was not the way we would like to see in the movies.
And the real stories of heroes and monuments of this one, still going to this moment, wars are either erased altogether, or when the monument stands, you can’t erase it, and the national myth does not tolerate emptiness, they are replaced by beautiful fairy tales. With the wrecked Luhansk tank, turned into a monument, which stands near the village of Khryashchevatoe, such a “replacement” took place.
Here is a beautiful patriotic fairy tale about a crew of three heroic nameless grandfathers who knocked out three tanks, which was replaced with a fairy tale real story that fight.
And here are the poems about the "Black Tank". “And the tank had a double-digit personal account ...” Yes, yes, William Wallace hit the British with hundreds, hundreds of ass lightning!
And now the “Afghans” start a tank and knock out 4 tanks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on it.
Such substitutions and legend texts, written with a claim to “realism”, to put it mildly, have been freezing me out from the very day when, having returned from Sanzharovka to the base in Bryanka in January 2015, I read “Stalingrad near Sanzharovka”. The story written by Gleb Bobrov allegedly “in hot pursuit”, supposedly a “documentary” story, completely misrepresented the story of the unsuccessful attack of the tanks of the “August” battalion on the “Valera” GP of the Ukrainian 128th GPD. After reading the fables about how Misha’s “Mongol” tank “activated dynamic protection” when hit by an ATGM, I then could not help but write the truth - that the tanks were thrown into the attack on a height not only without infantry escort, that there were no plates with explosives in the KDZshkakh - there was nothing to “work”. The tankers rolled out the height, crushed the dugout there, burned all the iron that stood there (there weren’t any three “Bulats”, about which Bobrov so confidently lied, there was one semi-serviceable tank and infantry fighting vehicles), but they themselves were knocked out, helpless against the infantry , who worked from the trenches from RPGs at “dagger distances”. And the enemy held the height. Yes, it just so happened that I was at a meeting before the offensive, where the question was raised “When will the plates for the KDZ be brought?” and knew there were no explosives in the containers. And in those days I was also in Sanzharovka. (By the way, our tanks entered Grozny during the “New Year’s assault” without explosives in the KDZ. Read the tanker who survived there: There were many questions: including the absence of explosive plates in the KDZ boxes (boxes of dynamic protection). There were also such bosses who answered me why do you need plates in the KDZ, on a tank and so 45 tons of armor (progress in the tank troops is hindered by: gouges, gouges and gouges). never received them.)
The story about Sanzharovka written by Bobrov was an attempt to “cover their ass” for those who suffered the tank attack an hour earlier and did not inform our intelligence, which at that moment played the role of a tank landing, about this. If the scouts, right there, in a hut not far from the tanks, knew that the tanks were not just warming up the engines or changing positions, but going on the attack, everything would be much different. But it was as it was.
Later heroic stories many appeared. It even came to the “network-centric capture of Debaltseve” in three days in an interview with Zakharchenko Shurygin, another media prostitute of this war.
All these stories, in addition to the rude and cynical abuse of the memory of the dead guys and covering the asses of the multi-star bosses, prevent people in Russia from understanding the situation. They make it difficult to understand that we have been at war with a very stubborn enemy for a long time, whom the TV pumps up with well-constructed propaganda, and the “Western partners” - modern technology. We are fighting in by no means favorable conditions, we are fighting in such a way that any military man will grab his head with a cry of “Idots! Who fights like that?!?
You can harbor illusions about wars two hundred or three hundred years ago, especially if you are not a military historian, but illusions about the situation in the war going on here and now are disastrous. You can’t lie, you need the most reliable information and a sober analysis, and not a “Collection of jokes about the exploits of the heroes of the ATO” like the one that the writer Martyanov was going to release. Shortcomings in this area will be paid in blood.
In the case of tank number 23 and the summer battles near Khryashchevaty, the story about the “grandfathers”, as if they had come from that previous war with Nazism, could not but contain a rejected offer to surrender and three wrecked enemy tanks. "So according to the plot it is necessary." It’s probably easier for many to come up with this tank beautiful story, accept it, dwell on it and continue to replicate it. It's easier than digging and discovering that someone's heroism is most often the flip side of banal incompetence, problems with organization, and lack of interaction. It's easier to "see the myth as a fact," as Minister Medinsky says.
Some time ago I met with an eyewitness of those battles. He was born in the Donbass and when the war began, he returned to defend motherland, leaving a relatively well-fed and calm, successful and accomplished life away from the hell that opened up in his homeland. By the way, even now he brings joy and does good to our respected partners to the best of his ability (and is determined to continue). Then, in the summer of 2014, he participated in the battles near Luhansk and with the circumstances of that attack, after which a wrecked tank with tail number “23” remained standing on the highway, which is not known from a third hand.
The attack in which the tank was hit actually took place on August 14, 2014. There was no “detachment of Ukrainian armored vehicles that broke into Krasnodon” and no one liquidated this “breakthrough”. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (parts of the 1st brigade and the 80th brigade) and Aidar, relying on the area of the Luhansk airport they occupied, advanced on August 13 to Novosvetlovka and Khryashchevate. The Lugansk cauldron was formed.
Yes. For those who are not aware that the first two boilers of this war were not Yuzhny and Ilovaisky, but Slavyansky and Lisichansky, I, perhaps, will remind you what the “crooked Sumerians” managed to achieve by August 14. Already in late June - early July, the Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrated that they could successfully attack by gathering motorized infantry, tanks and artillery into a single, at least somehow controlled fist. Near Yampol, not without losses, but quite successfully, they crushed pockets of resistance, into which the defense of the “Prapor” battalion broke up almost immediately. The battalion was formed literally "on the go", people sometimes came to fight directly from the shift at the mine, all in coal dust. Where there were at least some experienced people, there was stubborn resistance. But the army is an army - the shortest route of communication between the Luhansk and Donetsk residents was killed, then they blocked Slavyansk and Lysichansk. At the same time, the "pincers" of the "large encirclement" began to move from two flanks. From the south, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, flowing around Saur-Mogila, cut the direct roads from Donetsk to the border with the Russian Federation. In the north, in the LPR, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Aidar intercepted the Lugansk-Izvarino highway in the Novosvetlovka-Khryashchevatoye area in a similar way. In the DPR, the first counterattacks were already greatly disturbing the enemy, and the situation in Ilovaisk was hanging by a thread. I posted here, on LiveJournal, a clip by Chicherina, where, among other things, there were shots from the epicenter of that “anvil”, which was soon hit by the “hammer” of the “Northern Wind”. The main caliber of the city's defense at that moment was one towed "Nona", from which "Kostyan" and Vitalik worked.
The fate of the republics directly, visibly depended at that moment on the courage and skills of individuals, calculations, crews. And these individuals were monstrously few. In some areas, units simply withdrew without orders and left, leaving their positions ( characteristic example- the desertion of the “Minyor” from Slavyansk), in the units that did not leave the positions, the Alpachens rapidly disappeared, who came to pose for the camera with machine guns and grenade launchers, the militia remained. Grandfathers, by the way, not mythical, but quite real, came.
Why did you come? You understand that we will all be killed soon.
We understand. Someone has to die in a war.
And without ostentatious heroism, without hysterical "daring brave" old men calmly harnessed next to the young in a soldier's strap, in, it would seem, complete hopelessness. To understand, in the period from that same August 13, when the Luhansk highway was cut until August 29-30, when it was finally opened, the number of Lugansk militia in the boiler was more than halved, mainly due to banal desertion. These days, crushing Lugansk was a trifling matter for the Ukrainian Armed Forces who were sitting at the airport, but they did not know this. Apparently, they thought that they wanted to cunningly lure them into urban battles and cunningly ignored the practically abandoned, dark city without light. They simply shot at him, often without any aim and system, killing and maiming civilians. Plotnitsy, by the way, these days remained in the city. He bruised, of course, like the entire leadership of the “cauldron”, but did not shrug. The city was held by several groups of exhausted people with chronic sleep deprivation and light weapons. The “ceiling” of the local arsenal was a few mortars and guns for the whole city and the same ridiculous amount of occasionally serviceable “armor”.
The attack on August 14th was the first attempt to unblock the track, it is quite reliably described, for example, here. I quote:
After some time, another order was received: at 03.00 in the morning there will be artillery preparation, after which a green flare will follow, after which we must advance to storm the village.
At three o'clock, several artillery shots followed, there was no signal rocket, only an hour later it appeared, but no one advanced from the positions, morning came.
An order was received to advance to Khryashchevatoye, a landing force was loaded onto my car, among which there was one woman.
I have an order: before reaching the village, stop the car, wait until people dismount and continue moving.
So: two tanks, two infantry fighting vehicles and two armored personnel carriers with infantry on board went to the village.
A tank with b.n. was the first to go along the highway. 23, my car was behind him, the 23rd stopped, started firing, our infantry was on both sides of the road.
Small arms fire was fired at us from unfinished buildings to the right of the highway, a couple of shots from RPGs also flew from there, the tank fired in the other direction.
The infantry asked me to work on the buildings from which the fire was fired, but at the most inopportune moment my gun jammed, I contacted another vehicle by radio, and the crew complied with my request, a few minutes later I saw a shell arrive on the port side of our On the 23rd, flames spouted from the engine compartment. After some time, we received a command to withdraw, we retreated to Lugansk.
From my source, I can add that there was only one tank, the 23rd, directly in the attack, the 11th had some problems with the gun or the guidance system, it did not participate in the battle itself. The tanks belonged to the Zarya battalion. The attack was supposed to be carried out jointly by several units, but, alas, most of the infantry, for some reason, did not appear at the event. Thus, due to technical malfunctions and organizational inconsistencies, instead of attacking with at least approximately comparable forces, the Lugansk attacked the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Aidar in a proportion inverse to that academic miscalculation of which military theorists like to refer to - instead of the minimum three-fold advantage given to the attacker, they were in minority with the same ratio. And, in addition to this, - with the missing connection between the infantry and the tanks. “I hear other tanks, but what’s the point?” - said the young tanker Dima. The infantry did not have walkie-talkies in the range of tanks, even the heavy, uncomfortable R-159s.
As a result of the lack of interaction between the tank and the infantry, the advancing infantry was pressed down by enemy machine guns, and the tank, deprived of target designation for these firing points from the infantry, was forced to come closer. Probably, they expected at least the corps to cover the infantry. At this time, an enemy tank platoon, 2 tanks, appeared on the scene. Here is how the commander of a tank platoon of the Armed Forces of Ukraine describes the destruction of the tank:
There is also a slightly different version. In accordance with it, the tank, due to the fact that it pulled itself forward, towards the infantry, ended up in the range of the RPG of the enemy infantry and the driver was killed by the RPG, and after that the tank received two hits from shells of Ukrainian tanks. After that, the attack finally choked, the Luhansk retreated.
Of the tank crew that day, only the driver died. At first, I managed to find out only the name - Dima and the call sign "Diesel". When there was time to google, Google suggested that on August 14, Dmitry Vitalievich Oleinikov, call sign “Diesel” (born July 28, 1990), died in that area in Zarya.
The one whom the VSUshnik calls the "tank commander", the fighter lying next to the tank, in fact, according to my source, was an infantryman. The source did not remember the call sign - “some kind of National Bolshevik”.
The National Bolshevik who died at this place that day is also only one - Ilya "Hare" Guryev. Full data on it, I think, will be found with party members, now, alas, I no longer have time for a long thoughtful Google. Ilya died, apparently, running from place to place, from a close explosion of a shell that hit the tank. Clothes caught fire, well, they took him for a dead turret or commander.
The attack on the 14th was unsuccessful. Ours lost a tank, lost at least two people killed, retreated. The enemy, entrenched in locality, it is quite possible that there were no losses at all. In the following days there were many more attacks and sorties. Again, not too coordinated, without communication, without full-fledged artillery preparation, without everything that "according to science is supposed to." Two days later, on August 16, the vanguard of the first "White Convoy" drove into the motor depot in Russian Donetsk, which is located opposite Izvarino. On the 22nd, the militias managed to lead him through the steppe fields to Luhansk, where there had been no water, no electricity, no food supply for a long time, and then, immediately after unloading, they brought him back. On August 29-30, the militia cleared the road with the help of the "northerners". Apparently, it was these Ukrainian tanks that were knocked out two weeks later that the rumor attributed to the crew of the 23rd, who, in reality, conscientiously fulfilling their military duty, did not knock out a single tank on the 14th. People in their places did everything they could. Two of them died. Those who did not do something in their place, creating the situation of this suicidal attack, will be asked from those.
What happened to the other two members of the crew on the 23rd, I don't know. There is someone alive from that attack, who can correct / supplement. In the meantime, it would be necessary to return the names of the dead soldiers. Screw a small plate on the tank:
Oleinikov Dmitry Vitalievich, call sign "Diesel", tanker, [place of birth], 07/28/1990 - 08/14/2014
Guryev Ilya [patronymic], call sign "Hare", infantryman, Tolyatti, [date of birth] - 08/14/2014
I think that's enough. I will try to inspire the Luhansk guys from the military-patriotic clubs to do this.
Something like this, probably. And let's try not to invent beautiful fairy tales where you can just go not even to the archive, but go and find out from living witnesses how it was. Let's try not to lie and not hide our eyes from the bloody truth of this still far from over war. From how soberly we will look at this war, its outcome directly depends.
Official designation: T23 Medium Tank
Alternative notation:
Start of design: 1942
Date of construction of the first prototype: 1943
Completion stage: six prototypes and 248 serial T23s built.
The model range of medium tanks of the "twentieth" series, the development of which was initiated in 1942, was not limited to T20 and T22 alone. Simultaneously with the T22, a terms of reference was issued for the design of an alternative version equipped with a running gear using vertical coil spring suspension. However, new project, which received the designation T23, was created not only with the aim of using ready-made components that were well developed in mass production. The main feature of its design was an electric transmission, the development of which was entrusted to General Electric. The reason for choosing this particular element was the positive test results of the T1E1 heavy tank, which used a transmission of a similar type.
In total, in order not to deviate from the accepted scheme, three prototypes were ordered: T23(with a 76.2 mm caliber gun), T23E1(with 75 mm gun and automatic loader) and T23E2(also with 76.2 mm gun). As the work progressed, plans changed and the last two projects remained only on paper.
The hull of the T23 tank was similar in design to the T22 and was a box assembled from sheets of armored steel. The upper frontal sheet with a thickness of 64 mm was installed at an angle of 47 °, and the lower one at an angle of 53 °; The sides of the hull were made of armor plates 51 mm thick and mounted vertically. The stern armor plate, set at an angle of 10 °, had a thickness of 38 mm.
The hull layout was classic. In front there was a control compartment, where the driver's seat was located on the left, and his assistant, who also served the course 7.62-mm machine gun, was located on the right. The fighting compartment was located in the middle part of the hull, on the roof of which two hatches were made, closed by armored covers that folded to the sides, as well as a cutout for a turret ring with a diameter of 1750 mm.
The turret housed the main armament, which included a 76.2 mm M1 cannon on an M34 carriage and a 7.62 mm Browning M1919A4 machine gun coaxial with it. True, for this it was necessary to introduce a counterweight weighing 800 pounds (363 kg). Sights and observation devices remained unchanged. On the roof of the tower there was a pin for mounting an anti-aircraft 12.7-mm machine gun. In the vertical plane, the gun could be aimed in the range from +25° to -10°. The maximum rotation speed of the tower, equipped with both manual and hydraulic drives, was 24 ° per second.
The crew of the tank consisted of five people. In the tower were the places of the commander (rear-right), artilleryman (front-right) and loader (rear-left). In front of the hull housed the driver (on the left) and his assistant (on the right), who also performed the duties of servicing the course machine gun.
The engine compartment was located in the aft part of the hull. The T23 tank was equipped with a Ford GAP gasoline engine, which transmitted power first to an electric generator, and from it to two traction engines. Thus, there was no direct connection between the power plant and the tracked propulsion unit, which increased the engine life.
The chassis of the T23 prototype borrowed the main elements from the serial M4 tank. As applied to one side, it consisted of the following components:
- three bogies with two double track rollers, suspension on vertical coil springs;
- three supporting rollers (installed on brackets attached to the top of the carts);
- front steering wheel and track tensioning mechanism;
- rear guide wheel of the lantern gear;
- a large-section caterpillar made of T51 steel tracks with a width of 406 mm and a pitch of 152 mm.
The pilot model T23 (serial number 3098787) was built in January 1943 and became the first tank of the "twentieth" series to be tested. The machine has earned positive reviews, showing good dynamic characteristics, small turning radius and top speed up to 35 mph. However, the military commission noted a number of shortcomings. The mechanism for pointing the gun in the vertical plane turned out to be weak, and the turret turned out to be too cramped for three tankers. This required significant changes to the design of the tank. In particular, it became necessary to increase the free space inside the tank for more comfortable work for the crew. In addition, the length of the gun barrel was shortened by 5 calibers, which corresponded to 38.1 cm.
After evaluating the whole set of changes, it was decided to proceed with the design of two different towers and gun carriages. The first sample was based on the T79 carriage and the 75 mm gun from the M4 tank (with M4 and M6 periscopes), while the second sample used the improved T80 carriage and a completely redesigned turret front. The ammunition load in both cases was 42 rounds, but the second option was preferable, since the turret turned out to be more balanced. However, the second experimental T23, sent for testing in March 1943, received a T79 carriage in a modified turret. The tests did not reveal any serious shortcomings, which made it possible in May 1943 to sign a contract for the supply of 250 production tanks.
Production of the T23 was launched by the Detroit Arsenal in November 1943 and continued until December 1944 inclusive. The serial T23s differed from the prototypes in the new T80 carriage, the upgraded 76.2 mm M1A1 gun, the 2-inch M3 smoke grenade launcher on the turret, the commander's turret with all-round visibility and the rotating driver's hatch.
While production was unfolding, projects T25E1 and T26E1 became more priority, which led to a reduction in the order to 200 copies. Later it turned out that new tanks would not appear before the second half of 1944, so ground forces were forced to additionally order the same 50 tanks. True, they included two experimental T25s, which were modernized T23s with 90-mm guns. The total number of serial T23 was 248 copies.
In the course of an extensive testing program conducted with the participation of production tanks at the Fort Knox test site, additional improvements were made to power plant. In addition, one T23 was experimentally equipped with equipment to overcome water obstacles and a fully pressurized hull. At the same time, the army considered the T23 tanks unsuitable for use in combat conditions. The reason for this was the difficulty in maintenance tank and some excess combat weight. Thus, all serial T23s remained in the United States and were mainly used for training personnel.
However, the history of T23 did not end there. In April 1943, the Ordnance Committee recommended the assembly of an additional pilot model fitted with a torsion bar suspension. The tank was designated T23E3, and Chrysler has been developing it since December 1943. Without waiting for the start of testing, the army standardized the tank under the designation M27 and as it turned out - very hastened.
At first, the assembly was initiated, but in total it was possible to assemble only. The main differences, as expected, were in the undercarriage, which used six dual road wheels with individual torsion bar suspension and 19-inch wide tracks. Also, the first two and the last two road wheels were equipped with additional shock absorbers. The turret and most of the equipment was borrowed from the 19th production tank.
The prototype T23E3 was sent to the Detroit Arsenal on August 29, 1944, from where it was to be shipped for testing at Fort Knox. Later, at the Aberdeen test site, comparative tests of the T23 and T23E3 hulls were carried out. The results were positive, but it did not reach mass production due to a change technical requirements to a medium tank.
The latest modification was the pilot model T23E4. Having assessed the success of the HVSS type suspension, it was decided to equip one of the experimental T23s with a similar chassis. The corresponding order came from the Ordnance Committee in the spring of 1943, but calculations made by Corps Of Engineers showed that the width of the tank would be 131 inches - this was 5 inches more than the established standards. Then, instead of developing a new model, a proposal was made to upgrade three production T23s. These tanks, which received the HVSS suspension and T80 tracks, also entered testing at Fort Knox. In general, the experiment was very successful, but due to the end of the war T23 HVSS were not accepted for mass production.
Also, on the basis of the T23, a project was being worked out at the beginning of 1943. In fact, it was an anti-tank self-propelled gun with a modified upper part of the hull and a fixed open-top cabin instead of a turret. The main armament was a 90 mm cannon. The layout of the self-propelled gun was reviewed by the military commission, but further work on anti-tank self-propelled guns were not carried out in view of the receipt of tanks with similar weapons by the troops. At the same time, they abandoned the design of heavy self-propelled guns on the same chassis, equipped with a 155-mm M1 gun or an 8-inch M1 howitzer.
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Sources:
P. Chamberlain and K. Alice "British and American tanks of the Second World War." AST \ Astrel. Moscow. 2003
R.P. Hunnicutt "Pershing. A History of the Medium Tank T20 Series»
AFV Database: T23 Medium Tank
300 rounds of 12.7 mm caliber
5,000 rounds of 7.62 mm
12 smoke grenades
periscope sight M4
hull forehead (bottom) - 63.5 mm
hull board - 50.8 mm
hull feed - 38 mm
hull roof - 19 mm
bottom - 13-25 mm
tower forehead - 89 mm
turret sides - 64 mm
turret feed - 64 mm
tower roof - 25 mm