33 army. January - April 1942.

On the anniversary of the death of the Western grouping of the 33rd army of General Efremov

By April 1942, the Germans came to their senses after the defeat near Moscow and began to systematically destroy the Soviet units wedged into their location in the Vyazma region.

The Western Group of the 33rd Army, led by the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Mikhail Grigoryevich Efremov, was the first to come under attack.

After several days of fierce fighting, lacking weapons and ammunition, the Western group went for a breakthrough along the shortest path - to join with units of the 43rd and 49th armies. This breakthrough, as you know, ended with the death of Efremov and the commanders of his headquarters, the capture of a large number of fighters and commanders.

Until now, historians are arguing about how events developed in the last days of the existence of the Western Group of the 33rd Army.

Questions arise literally in every episode: when did the breakthrough from the Shpyrevsky forest begin, where and by what forces did it pass, how did the breakthrough through the Belyaevo-Buslav road take place, what routes did the groups of General Efremov, Colonel Kuchinev, Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov, Captain Stepchenko move, what was the fate of those who remained in Shpyrevsky forest parts.

The impetus for studying the topic of recent battles was a long-standing discussion on the Vif 2ne .org forum, in which chapters from the book by A.V. Isaev “Georgy Zhukov. The last argument of the king”, in which he placed all responsibility for the failure near Vyazma on the commander-33 Efremov, who failed to realize the good plan of G.K. Zhukov.

My conclusions based on studying the documents are as follows:

1. The order to attack Vyazma by part of the forces of the 33rd army was a gamble:

Neither the command of the Western Front nor the command of the 33rd Army knew the composition of the enemy grouping in the Vyazma region;

The front command incorrectly assessed the combat readiness of the German troops opposing the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies, and believed that these armies would take Yukhnov as soon as possible and continue moving west;

The divisions of the 33rd, 43rd, 49th, 50th armies and Belov's Cavalry Corps were weakened by previous battles and needed to be replenished and rested;

The command of the front considered the capture of Yukhnov, and not the attack on Vyazma, as the main direction. Accordingly, the commanders of the armies also oriented themselves;

The front command was unable to provide air cover for the advancing troops. Aviation of the 33rd Army could not do this due to its small number and the predominance of U-2 type aircraft;

Snowdrifts extremely limited the possibilities of both maneuver and supply of the advancing troops. The advancing units reached Vyazma without supplies of food and ammunition;

Ignoring by the command of the front of the threat to the right flank of the 33rd Army (on which the enemy had a constant impact) in the area of ​​Kamenka - Zubovo - Klimovo), as well as the lag behind the troops of the 43rd Army, advancing to the left.

2. A breakthrough from the encirclement of the 33rd Army grouping was real:

The choice of the direction of the breakthrough in the direction of the 43rd army was due to the current situation;

Ensuring a breakthrough by the Air Force and, when approaching the front line, by the artillery of the 43rd Army, made it possible to break through the sparse battle formations of the Germans.

3. The death of the Western group was due to the following factors:

Low equipment Soviet troops means of radio communication. The loss of the only radio station in the Efremov group did not allow coordinating actions with the 43rd army, incl. in terms of artillery support for the breakthrough;

The delay in ordering a breakthrough led to the onset of a thaw and ruled out the massive use of aviation to ensure a breakthrough. In addition, the opening of the rivers sharply reduced the ability to maneuver.

Sources

Currently, the main information on these fights is collected:

In the book by Vladimir Melnikov “They were sent to death by Zhukov? The death of the army of General Efremov";

At the forum "In the middle reaches of the Ugra River"

In the book by Sergei Mikheenkov "The Tragedy of the 33rd Army";

In the TsAMO documents posted on the websites:

The following websites were also used:

https :// rkka . en

Personalities

Bogolyubov Alexander Nikolaevich	major general	Chief of Staff 43 A
Vasily Semenovich	colonel	Chief of Artillery 113th Rifle Division
Konstantin Dmitrievich	major general	Commander 43 A
Golushkevich Vladimir Sergeevich	major general	Chief of Staff Zap. front
Ermashkevich Boris Kirikovich		Head of intelligence department 33 A
Vladimir Vladislavovich		Commander of a partisan detachment (regiment)
Zakharkin Ivan Grigorievich	lieutenant general	Commander 49 A
Kazankin Alexander Fedorovich	colonel	Commander of the 4th Airborne Corps
Kirillov Joseph Konstantinovich	lieutenant colonel	Head of the 1st branch of the headquarters of the 160th division
Maria Alexandrovna	civilian	Radio operator of the reconnaissance department 33 A (pseudonym "Kuznetsova", call sign r / st "Zarya")
Kolesnikov Venedikt Vladimirovich		The operational department of the headquarters of the Zap. front
Kondyrev Vladislav Ivanovich		Acting Chief of Operations. headquarters department 33 A
Nikolay Ivanovich	regimental commissioner	Military commissar 113 sd
Vladimir Georgievich	colonel	Commander 338 sd
Konstantin Ivanovich	colonel	Commander of the 113th division
Onuprienko Dmitry Platonovich		Deputy Commander 33 A
Nikolai Demyanovich	major general	Head of Communications Department front
Samsonov Illarion Gavrilovich	colonel	Head of the staffing department of the headquarters of 33 A (head of the rear of the Western group)
Stepchenko Ivan Sergeevich		Commander 1292 sp 113 sd
Tretyakov Andrey Rodionovich		Head of Art. supply 160 sd
Turantaev Vladimir Vladimirovich		Assistant Chief of Operations at Headquarters 43 A
Ivan Vasilievich	colonel	Deputy early operational department Zap. front
Shioshvili Panteleimon Shisevich	lieutenant colonel	Head of intelligence department 43 A
Nikolay Nikitich	colonel	Commander 160 sd

The combat composition of the Western grouping of the 33rd Army by April 1942

	1288 cn, 1292 cn
	1295 sp,1297 sp
	1134 cn, 1136 cn, 1138 cn

However, there is no need to talk about strengthening the Western Front by the 33rd Army, since the army has united in its composition formations that have been fighting for a certain period of time. fighting as part of the neighboring armies of the Western Front and at the same time suffered heavy losses in personnel, weapons and equipment. The only exception was the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which was transferred by decision of the Stavka from the Southwestern Front.

Commander of the 2nd rank M. G. Efremov. Photo 1939

Commander of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army G.K. Zhukov

AT this case there was a fact of organizing a more rational command and control of troops in directions along the highways leading to Moscow, one of which, the Kiev highway, was to be covered by the troops of the 33rd Army.

Having received the order, brigade commander D.P. Onuprienko instructed the acting chief of staff of the army, Colonel B.V. Safonov, to collect the necessary information about the formations that were to be part of the army in order to prepare an action plan for the next period by the set time. Onuprienko understood that in the near future, until the new commander arrived, the whole burden of organizational work would fall on him, especially since the new chief of staff of the army, Major General A.K. Kondratyev, had not yet arrived.

Dmitry Platonovich was, of course, offended by the dismissal of the commander of the 33rd Army, especially since during the three months of continuous fighting while he led it, he had no particular complaints from the front command. However, he met the news that it was Lieutenant General Efremov who had been appointed commander of the army with some sense of satisfaction. Before that, they had not had to meet, but he had heard about the high authority of the new commander among those officers and generals who happened to serve under him.

Since July 1941, Brigadier Commissar M.D. Shlyakhtin has been a member of the Military Council of the Army. Mark Dmitrievich Shlyakhtin and brigade commander Onuprienko developed good official and friendly relations, especially since they had much in common: they were the same age, both “grew up” in the depths of the NKVD system.

In accordance with the order of the commander of the Western Front, the army included: 1st Guards Motorized Rifle, 110th, 113th, 222nd Rifle Divisions, 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 9th Tank Brigade.

The command of the Western Front and the 33rd Army pinned special hopes on the 1st Guards Moscow Proletarian Motorized Rifle Division, hardened in previous battles with the Nazi invaders during the fighting on the Southwestern Front, well-equipped with personnel, weapons and military equipment. After being transported by rail from the city of Sudzha, Kursk Region, the division was to take up defensive positions directly on the outskirts of Naro-Fominsk.

The 110th and 113th rifle divisions, which became famous in the battles for Borovsk, as well as the 151st motorized rifle brigade, at that time, under the onslaught of the enemy with heavy fighting, retreated in the general direction to Naro-Fominsk.

The 110th and 113th SDs were formed in July 1941 in the Kuibyshevsky and Frunzensky districts of the city of Moscow, respectively, and received the name: 4th and 5th divisions of the people's militia of the city of Moscow. The division commanders were Colonels S. T. Gladyshev and K. I. Mironov.

Participating in previous battles with the Nazi invaders as part of the 43rd Army, the divisions suffered very heavy losses, both in personnel and in weapons. So, for example, on October 16, 1941, the 113th SD consisted of only about 2,000 soldiers and commanders, having lost 558 people only during the last battles in the Borovsk region.

Deputy Commander of the 33rd Army Brigade Commander D.P. Onuprienko. Post-war photo. Member of the Military Council of the 33rd Army, Brigadier Commissar M. D. Shlyakhtin. Snapshot 1941

Commander of the 110th Rifle Division, Colonel S. T. Gladyshev. Post-war photo. Commander of the 113th Rifle Division Colonel K. I. Mironov

Despite the very high assessment of the activities of the 110th SD and its command during the fighting for Borovsk, given by G.K. Zhukov, its commander, Colonel S.T. Gladyshev, a few days later, at the end of October 1941, for the loss of control of the division during the withdrawal to the Naro-Fominsk region, he was removed from his post.

The fate of the commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K. I. Mironov, turned out to be tragic. Having passed with the division as part of the 33rd Army the entire combat path from Naro-Fominsk to Vyazma, Konstantin Ivanovich died on April 17, 1942 during a breakthrough from the encirclement in the area of ​​​​the village of Fedotkovo. The place of his burial, like many other encircled, remained unknown.

The 222nd Rifle Division, which was previously part of the 5th Army, at that time was marching along two routes in marching order in the direction of Naro-Fominsk. The division was commanded by Colonel Novikov Timofey Yakovlevich, who took office just two days ago.

Despite the complexity of the situation, which was characterized primarily by the absence of a continuous front of defense and the confusion that reigned in the management of units and formations, due to the forced withdrawal of our troops, by 12 o’clock in the afternoon the army headquarters had a certain idea about their condition and the nature of the conduct of hostilities. In accordance with the order of the commander of the Western Front, by 15 o’clock the army headquarters under the leadership of the brigade commander D.P. Onuprienko prepared a document called the “Action Plan of the 33rd Army”, in which the combat missions for the offensive planned for the second half of 19 October.

In connection with the sharp changes in the situation in the army zone, the drawn up plan did not correspond to the real state of affairs, which was shown by the subsequent course of events. So, the 151st motorized rifle brigade by this time had already left Vereya under the onslaught of the enemy and in the afternoon of October 18 fought with units of the 258th Infantry Division east of the city.

Commander of the 222nd Rifle Division Colonel T. Ya. Novikov

The brigade again suffered very heavy losses in personnel, a significant number of fighters and commanders were reported missing. On the evening of that day, the commissar of the 455th MSB of the 151st brigade, senior political instructor Ershov, was shot, because the battalion, succumbing to panic, left the line of defense it occupied and retreated without an order, dragging other units with it.

The 110th SD at that time was fighting at the line of Mishukovo, Ilyino, Kozelskoye, Klimkino. One rifle battalion occupied the village of Kuzminki, intercepting the road to Naro-Fominsk. Units of the enemy's 258th Infantry Division, supported by several tanks, advanced in front of the division's front.

The 113th SD with two rifle regiments occupied the defense on the eastern bank of the river. Protva from Lapshinka to Krivskoe. Another regiment defended on the outskirts of the village of Gorodnya, 7 km northeast of Maloyaroslavets, the same settlement that housed the headquarters of Napoleon, who retreated with his army from Moscow, during the famous Maloyaroslavets battle on October 12 (24), 1812 years of the vanguard of the French army with the corps of generals D. S. Dokhturov and N. I. Raevsky.

There was no solid front of defense. Moreover, the gap, not covered by the troops, between the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 110th SD was about 18 km. In the event that the enemy succeeded in discovering this gap in the defense of our troops and using mobile formations in this direction, the consequences for the entire Western Front would be most negative.

The 222nd SD, advancing in this direction, could cover it at best only a day later - in the second half of October 19. At this moment, the division, which included only two regiments - the 479th and 774th joint ventures, was on the march. The 479th SP, following on foot along the road from Kubinka to Naro-Fominsk, reached the village. Tashirovo, the 774th joint venture was on the way to Naro-Fominsk, following along the Kyiv highway.

The location and condition of the 9th Tank Brigade, which acted the day before jointly with the 110th SD, could not be found out.

The 600th PTO Artillery Regiment and the 978th ​​Artillery Regiment were in firing positions on the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk.

The combined rifle battalion of the Naro-Fominsk garrison took up defense along the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk.

At 4:30 p.m., the first echelon of the 1st Guards motorized rifle division. The rest of the echelons, in view of the incessant enemy attacks on the Nara station from the air, were forced to unload at the Aprelevka station and march to the indicated area on their own. The brigade commander Onuprienko ordered the division commander to immediately move the arrived units to the western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk and cover the city from the side of Borovsk, from where the enemy’s units of the 258th Infantry Division were expected to attack.

Commander of the 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A. I. Lizyukov

The 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division was commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A. I. Lizyukov, who was awarded this high rank at the very beginning of the war for his skillful command of the troops in battles against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time.

By the end of October 18, the command and headquarters of the 33rd Army were able to take control of the situation in the army zone, preparing in the morning to prevent the development of the enemy offensive by active actions. The lack of reliable communication with subordinate headquarters and, as a result, the weak organization of command and control sharply limited the ability of the army command to influence the course of events. Essentially, the connections were left to themselves. The situation was somewhat reminiscent of the course of hostilities near Vyazma in early October, with the only difference being that this time the enemy failed to penetrate deeply into our defenses and cover the flanks of the withdrawing troops: despite the general superiority in manpower and equipment, he was clearly not enough.

October 19, 1941

All day the units of the 33rd Army fought hard battles with the enemy. The action plan developed the day before by the army headquarters was never implemented, because it did not correspond to the situation. The initiative was in the hands of the enemy, and the formations of the army had to beat off one of his attacks after another, without thinking about the offensive. The only thing that could be done in accordance with the plan was to advance the 222nd SD to the unoccupied defense sector in the army zone and, if not completely, cover the gap between the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 110th SD.

The 151st motorized rifle brigade fought bloody battles with units of the enemy's 258th Infantry Division east of Vereya, occupying the line: the edge of the forest east of the village of Godunovo, Kupelitsy, the edge of the forest east of the village of Zagryazhskoye. One motorized rifle battalion of the brigade fought, occupying the defense along the eastern bank of the Protva River near Embankment Sloboda. The situation of the units of the brigade was extremely difficult: ammunition was running out, for the third day the fighters and commanders did not receive any food except bread.

By 1900 hours, the 222nd SD, with the forces of the 479th Rifle Division, engineer, anti-aircraft and barrage battalions, took up defense at the turn: height from el. 224.0, Potarashchenkov, Smolinskoye, Berezovka and immediately entered into battle with the enemy, who was trying to advance in the direction of Nazarevo.

From the operational summary of the division headquarters:

“…3. 479 SP defends the line mark. 200, POTARASHCHENKOV, SMOLINSKOE.

4. Sapper battalion defends high. 224.0, (exc.) 200.

5. Anti-aircraft battalion defends the eastern encirclement. NAZAREVO.

6. Zagradbattalion defends the RADIONCHIK area.

7. There are no neighbors to the right and left. ”

Attempts by enemy infantry to infiltrate in small groups into the depths of its defenses were repulsed by the fire of our fighters. Realizing that the division clearly did not have enough strength to defend the line indicated to it and at the same time launch an attack on Vereya with part of its forces, the army headquarters sent two rifle battalions to reinforce it in the afternoon.

175th moto rifle regiment 1st Guards The MSD, as ordered by the army commander, immediately after unloading began to take up defensive positions along the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, encircling the city in a semicircle. The flanks of the regiment rested on the Nara River: the right one - at the brick factory, the left one - at the railway bridge.

The 110th SD occupied the line: Tatarka, height from el. 191.2, Inyutino, Ermolino.

All day there was no data on the position of the units of the 113th SD. Several liaison officers sent by the army headquarters did not return. It was only known that the division fought heavy battles with superior enemy units, presumably at the line of exclusion. Ermolino, along the eastern bank of the river Protva, Malanyino, Skuratovo.

In the middle of the day, the commander of the army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, arrived at the army headquarters. There are different data about the time of his arrival in the army. The assistant to the chief of intelligence of the army, Captain A. M. Sobolev, claims that he arrived in the army on October 18, 1941.

In the book "Hero Commander", based on the memoirs of army veterans, the date is indicated - October 17.

According to the documents of the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Red Army, the date General Efremov took office is October 25.

However, an analysis of archival documents allows us to make an unambiguous conclusion that Mikhail Grigoryevich Efremov arrived at the army headquarters and took up the duties of commander in the middle of the day on October 19, 1941. All documents on October 18, as well as the first half of October 19, were signed by brigade commander Onuprienko, but already at the disposal of the regimental commissar M.A. year, is the name of General Efremov. All subsequent documents, instructions and orders, preserved in the archive, were signed by Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov.

In the afternoon, a reinforcement of 1,750 men arrived at the Nara station for the 173rd SD, which had previously been part of the 33rd Army, armed with rifles, two heavy machine guns and two light machine guns. General Efremov immediately sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Lieutenant General V. D. Sokolovsky, in which he asked to use this replenishment for the 222nd SD, to which he soon received the consent of the front headquarters.

The situation in the army's defense zone continued to worsen with each passing hour. The formations and units of the army, drained of blood in previous battles, offered stubborn resistance to the enemy, but were forced to retreat. Ammunition was running out, there were big problems with catering. The troops were forced to be content with dry rations or whatever the local population of villages and villages that found themselves in the combat zone could help.

Equally difficult was the situation in the defense zones of the other armies defending on the outskirts of Moscow. Only thanks to the courage and selflessness of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army, it was possible with the last of their strength to restrain the onslaught of the German hordes, rushing to the capital of our Motherland. In connection with the menacing situation that has developed on the outskirts of Moscow, and in order to mobilize the efforts of the troops and the population of the capital to repel the enemy, the State Defense Committee on October 19, 1941 adopted a resolution on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow and its surrounding areas.

October 20, 1941

Early in the morning, an order from the commander of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, was sent to all subordinate formations, in which combat missions were defined for the firm holding of the occupied defense lines. 1st Guards The MSD, in addition, received the task of being ready to destroy the enemy grouping in the Oreshkovo, Bashkardovo, Mityaevo area.

However, the 458th and 479th PPs of the 258th Infantry Division of the enemy, which regrouped their combat formations during the night, after massive artillery and aviation preparation, with the support of 10–15 tanks, went on the offensive along the Borovsk-Balabanovo highway, inflicting main blow in the areas defended by the soldiers of the 1289th and 1291st rifle regiments of the 110th SD.

Soldiers and commanders repelled the first attack of the enemy. However, then, when the enemy infantry, having regrouped its forces and means, again went over to the attack, some confusion arose in the ranks of the defenders, both regiments faltered and, leaving the occupied line, began to retreat in panic. The enemy, noticing this, stepped up their artillery fire and, increasing their efforts, made an attempt to outflank the 1291st Rifle Division, as a result of which the withdrawal of units of the 110th Rifle Division turned into a flight. Pursued by the attacking enemy, the 1291st and 1289th joint ventures began to randomly retreat along the Kyiv highway.

Soon the disorganized retreat turned into a stampede. There was no longer any talk of resisting the enemy. Completely demoralized units of the 1291st joint venture, having crossed a little south of Naro-Fominsk across the river. Nara did not even try to organize defense on its eastern shore.

Moscow militias. The 33rd Army included three divisions of the people's militia of Moscow (4th, 5th and 6th)

The 1287th Rifle Regiment, which was defending at some distance from the main forces of the division, could not withstand the enemy's attack, and also began to withdraw in a disorganized manner in the northern and northeastern directions south of the Kyiv highway. At the request of the commander of the 110th SD, Colonel S.T. Gladyshev, the Chief of Staff of the 43rd Army, Colonel A.I. destruction and destruction.

In this critical situation, the command of the 110th SD failed to keep the threads of control in its hands, and, carried away by the flight of subordinate units, also rushed east to the line of the Nara River. Many, even experienced, commanders then turned out to be hostages of the current situation, and not all of them managed to realize their commanding potential. The division at that time practically did not exist. Parts and subunits fled, leaving the occupied line, wherever their eyes look. Panic seized not only the troops, but also the headquarters, which, as they say, God himself ordered to hold the reins of control, no matter what. The headquarters of the 110th SD was discovered only two days later, far beyond its defense line.

From the combat log of the 33rd Army:

“... Having pushed aside parts of the 110th SD, the avenue occupied ILYINO, MISHUKOVO, KOZELSKOE by 12.00. Parts of the 110 SD withdraw for defense to a new line. The infantry units, retreating, abandoned the materiel of the artillery, which is withdrawn from the battle by the artillerymen. At 15.35, the avenue was occupied by MISHUKOVO, TATAR ... "

Thus, the Kyiv-Moscow highway turned out to be uncovered by our troops, which allowed the enemy to go directly to the Naro-Fominsk region in a matter of hours.

Having learned about this, being at the command post of the army, located in the village of Novo-Fedorovka (now Volodarsky Street. - Note. author), General Efremov sent the following order to the command of the 110th SD:

"TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 110th SD TO COLONEL GLADYSHEV

COMMISSIONER OF THE DIVISION BAT. COMMISSAR BORMATOV

1. You opened the way to Naro-Fominsk for the enemy, having fled to a new frontier, frightened of yourself.

2. The Military Council gives you until the morning to restore your previous position, until the enemy figured out your flight in the darkness.

3. If the situation is not restored by 7–8 o'clock on 21.10, you will be immediately put on trial as deserters, organizers of the flight from the battlefield, for failure to comply with the combat order.

(Lieutenant General Efremov ".)

However, no matter how hard Major Kuzmin tried, who was instructed to convey this order of the commander, he did not succeed in finding the headquarters of the 110th SD and finding the division commander, Colonel S. T. Gladyshev. Only at about 9 pm the army headquarters received information that the headquarters of the 110th SD in the afternoon concentrated in the area of ​​​​the village of Kamenskoye. Two more officers were sent to establish contact with him.

Some time later, a new alarming message was received, this time that units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, unable to withstand the blow of superior enemy forces, began to randomly retreat to the east, suffering heavy losses. Communication with the brigade was interrupted. But, despite the coming night, to the west and south-west of Naro-Fominsk, a fierce battle continued to boil. The divisions and units of the retreating divisions were mixed up, it was impossible to understand who was where. But even in this most difficult situation, our fighters and commanders continued to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, regardless of anything.

On the outskirts of the capital. October 1941

At 10 p.m., the head of the Special Department of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, lieutenant of state security Timofeev, left for the brigade, having with him a telegram from the Army Military Council to transfer it to the brigade command:

"TO THE COMMANDER OF 151 MSBR MAYOR EFIMOV

TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF ST. TO THE BATTALION COMMISSAR PEGOV

1. I warn you: if the brigade withdraws again without the permission of the army commander, you will be brought to justice ...

(M. Efremov, M. Shlyakhtin, B. Safonov ".)

The 222nd SD, with the forces of one rifle regiment and separate battalions of the division, continued to defend the former line. The 774th Rifle Division, which advanced in marching order into the division's defense zone, has not yet arrived in the area indicated to it.

The situation continued to worsen by the minute. The 113th SD left its line, which, having no connection with the army headquarters and its neighbor on the right - the 110th SD, due to the threat of bypassing the enemy's flanks, retreated to the eastern bank of the river on the orders of the division commander. Istya.

The army command, knowing the state of subordinate formations and units, their extremely low staffing with fighters, and especially command personnel, foresaw that it would be very difficult for the troops to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces, but no one could have imagined that events within one day would take such a negative turn .

The army command hoped that the measures taken could stabilize the front of subordinate formations and units and stop the advance of the enemy. It was no longer necessary to think about an attack on Vereya, as planned the day before.

In the afternoon, information began to come in that advanced enemy units were found in the immediate vicinity of Naro-Fominsk, but the army headquarters could not confirm or refute this information. One of the weak points in the organization of command and control of units and formations of the 33rd Army in the early days of the battles for Naro-Fominsk was the low level of organization of communications with subordinate formations, due to the lack of the necessary means of communication both in the army and in subordinate formations.

The army headquarters had to transmit most of its instructions and orders through communications officers, which greatly hampered the management of formations, did not allow timely transmission of orders and orders, obtaining the necessary data and information from subordinates to assess the situation and make decisions. In rare, urgent cases, orders and orders were transmitted by radio, but radio facilities were sorely lacking.

Due to the lack of accurate data on the locations of the headquarters, which moved several times a day, often without the consent of the superior commander, the necessary transport and the poor condition of the roads, all combat documents, both from the army headquarters to subordinate headquarters, and from subordinate headquarters to the army headquarters, were delivered very late and often no longer had the proper value due to the changes in the situation that had taken place during this time.

The only consolation of this day was the message from the commander of the 1st Guards. Colonel A. I. Lizyukov’s MSD that all units of the division unloaded at the Aprelevka station and advanced to the areas indicated by him.

October 21, 1941

During the night of October 21, formations and units of the 33rd Army continued to conduct heavy defensive battles with the advancing enemy, who the day before managed to surround a number of units and units of the 110th SD and 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade. The situation of the 1289th joint venture of the 110th SD, which was surrounded north of the Bashkino junction, was especially difficult.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, holding back the onslaught of the enemy, fought at the line: Novonikolskoye, Aleksino, Simbukhovo. 4 km north of it, in the Petrishchevo area, a separate cavalry regiment held the defense.

In the operational summary for the day, the brigade commander reported:

“I report that the replenishment sent for the 151st MSBR, in the amount of 750 people, has not yet been received by me. My attempts to find it fail, because it is not known which route it follows.

At the same time, I report that I am forced to carry out the wrong task that I have by your order, because, in spite of everything, SIMBUHOVO enters the band of the 222nd SD, the latter takes up defensive positions in the NAZAREVO region. In order not to open the road to the enemy through SUBBOTINO-SIMBUKHOVO to the MINSK highway, I am forced to defend these points, for which I do not have enough strength.

(Commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade Major EFIMOV ".)

The 222nd SD continued to hold the line of Subbotino, Potarashchenkov, Smolinskoye, Semidvorye. Separate enemy units, bypassing the left flank of the division, acted in its rear, threatening to cut the division's communications.

Commander of the 5th Tank Brigade Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno

175th SME 1st Guards. The MSD under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Novikov, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, took up defense at the turn: the northern outskirts of Gorodishche (now it is the area of ​​​​Naidova-Zhelezov Street. - Note. author), western outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, altitude from el. 201.8, further east to the Nara River. At the same time, the regiment was preparing for the offensive, which was planned by the army command for the morning of October 22.

The 1st company of the 175th SME, under the command of Lieutenant Miradonov and political instructor Kozhukhov, sent by order of the division commander to reconnaissance along the Moscow-Kyiv highway in the direction of Balabanovo, in the area of ​​​​the village of Shchekutino, unexpectedly collided with the enemy. For almost three hours, the company fought with him and only under cover of darkness was able to retreat to its original position. The 4th company of the same regiment, sent to reconnaissance at Kamenskoye, having reached Ateptsevo, was stopped by strong enemy mortar fire. This meant that the settlements, located only 3–5 km from Naro-Fominsk, were occupied by the enemy.

Two battalions of the 6th SME in the first half of the day took up defense along the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, Nara station, the state farm "Vegetable" (now a number of streets in the city of Naro-Fominsk on the east bank of the Nara River south of the railway bridge, inclusive to Pogodina Street. - Note. author), Afanasovka. The location of the regimental headquarters and the first battalion, who got lost during the march from the Aprelevka unloading station, was unknown.

Military commissar of the 5th brigade, Hero of the Soviet Union, senior battalion commissar A. V. Kotsov

The division's main strike force, the 5th tank brigade, which included 38 tanks and 8 armored vehicles, arrived in full strength by morning in the indicated concentration area, 1 km northwest of the village of Novo-Fyodorovka. The brigade was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno, the military commissar of the brigade was Hero of the Soviet Union A. V. Kotsov, who was awarded this high title even for Khalkhin Gol.

Thus, the section of the defense zone of the 33rd Army, unprotected by troops, in the direction of the most probable enemy offensive, turned out to be reliably covered.

The 113th SD worked all night on the engineering equipment of the line of defense it occupied along the river. Istya on the site: Shilovo, Staro-Mikhailovskoye, Kiselevo, Pobeda state farm. The division artillery (5 guns of the 109th GAP) took up firing positions along the western edge of the forest east of Alopovo.

The army command, as before, was most worried about the fate of the 110th SD, from which no information was received during the day, and the communications delegates sent to the division did not return to the army headquarters. At this time, the main part of the units of the 1287th and 1291st joint ventures and the headquarters of the division were already on the eastern bank of the river. Nara in the adjacent forests.

The heavily depleted units of the 1289th SP, which broke out of the encirclement at night, fighting off the enemy with bayonets and grenades, retreated in small, scattered groups in the direction of Bashkino, Christmas, Kotovo. Near the village of Kotovo, the remnants of the regiment again found themselves in the enemy's ring, but, despite this, the fighters and commanders continued to fight courageously with him. After the commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel N. A. Galagyan and the commissar of the regiment, senior political instructor A. M. Terentyev, were captured by the wounded, a small group of Red Army soldiers and commanders was able to break out of the encirclement on the night of October 22 and exit near the village of Konopelovka, 1.5 km north west of Naro-Fominsk.

The commander of the combined detachment, then the 1289th joint venture, Major N. A. Bezzubov. Photo 1935

Almost at the same time, somewhat to the right of the defense sector of the 175th SME, in the area of ​​​​the Tashirov turn, with a detachment of 150 people, the commander of the 1283rd joint venture of the 60th SD, Major N. A. Bezzubov, left the encirclement.

The army commander, General Efremov, ordered Major Bezzubov to unite under his command the remnants of the 1289th joint venture and his regiment into a separate detachment and take up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River, to the right of the 175th SME.

Major Bezzubov's detachment, by the will of fate, will be destined to play an important role in the defense of Naro-Fominsk. Throughout the entire period of fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction, the fighters and commanders of the detachment will honorably fulfill the tasks assigned to them to defend the specified sector, repelling more than a dozen attacks by the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him. A great merit in this will belong to the skillful organizer, the brave and competent commander, Major Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bezzubov, who in a month and a half will become the commander of the 110th Infantry Division.

At this time, the headquarters of the 110th SD and headquarters units, numbering about 250 people, concentrated in the forest south of Sotnikovo, but no one knew about this. The division headquarters still had no connection with the army headquarters and subordinate units.

At midnight, an alarming radiogram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front:

“According to the available data, the enemy with a small number of tanks at 16.30 went to TASHIROVO (5 km north-west of NARO-FOMINSK).

THE COMMANDER ORDERED: To immediately reveal the actual situation in the TASHIROVO area and tonight to throw the enemy out of TASHIROVO and cover the direction to KUBINKA, having captured and firmly secured PLESONSKOE with the forces of the rifle battalion, tanks up to the battalion; KUZMINKA - an infantry battalion with tanks and have at least a battalion in TASHIROVO.

Execution to be reported by 8.00 on 22.10.41." .

Some time later, another radiogram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front, concerned about the state of affairs in the Naro-Fominsk region:

“The commander ordered: to immediately establish the actual position of 110, 113, 222 SD and 151 MSBR.

During the night, drive the enemy out of TASHIROVO and occupy with forces up to a battalion, reinforced with tanks, each of the following points: TASHIROVO, PLESENSKOE, KUZMINKA and stubbornly defend, prevent the enemy from reaching KUBINKA.

Organize all-round defense in the area between 222 and 110 SD.

1 MSD to immediately concentrate NARO-FOMINSK, pulling up trains from APRELEVKA and ALABINO.

By the end of the day, the headquarters of the 33rd Army had the most conflicting information both about the actions and location of the enemy, and about the position of their formations. The weather also made its own adjustments to the action of the troops. The roads, due to the autumn thaw, were practically impassable for wheeled vehicles, with the exception of the Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka and Naro-Fominsk - Bekasovo highways.

Most of the German generals in their memoirs written after the war, revealing the reasons for the failures of the German troops, pay a lot of attention to "Her Majesty the Weather", which, in their opinion, became almost the root cause of their defeat, forgetting that the roads had become unusable on both sides of the front. Not only German soldiers and officers, but also our fighters and commanders froze from the extreme cold.

An analysis of the captured documents shows that the weather conditions became the factor that only complicated the situation that began to develop for the formations of the GA "Center" as a result of the increased resistance of the Red Army troops. It is no coincidence that in the OKH report of October 18, 1941, the focus was primarily on the "high defense capability of the Russians" and not on weather conditions. The next day, in the next summary of the command of the German ground forces, an entry appeared:

"... On the front of the 4th Panzer Group, the enemy still puts up stubborn resistance and does not surrender without a fight an inch of land, not a single house ...".

On September 3, 1941, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, ordered his troops to take all necessary measures to prepare for operations in the conditions of autumn thaw and low temperatures.

The exceptionally difficult situation that developed in many sectors of the Soviet-German front forced the command of the Red Army to take a number of measures that have been ambiguously assessed for many years after the end of the war. One of these measures was the creation of barrage detachments. The order to create them was issued by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-September 1941, but due to the lack personnel the armies and divisions were in no hurry to implement it, however paradoxical it may sound. And where they were formed, they often participated in repelling the enemy offensive in the same chain, together with combat units.

The events of recent days in the zone of action of the Western Front, numerous facts of unauthorized abandonment of the occupied lines, and sometimes simply flight from the battlefield, forced the command of the Western Front to recall this "draconian" measure again. On October 21, 1941, a document signed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and a member of the Military Council of the Front N.A. Bulganin was sent to the Military Councils of the armies, in which it was required within two days to form a barrage detachment of no more than a battalion in each rifle division, in calculation of one company per rifle regiment, subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks, several tanks and armored vehicles.

The following task was assigned to the barrage detachments: “... direct assistance to com. composition in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in divisions, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by a general flight.

October 22, 1941

On the night of October 22, 1941, German troops, using the dark time of the day and gaps in the battle formations of formations and units of the army, quietly reached the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, the district center of the Moscow Region, located 70 km from the center of the capital from south-western direction, near the Kievskoye highway, the construction of which was started a few years before the war.

The advanced units of the enemy’s 258th Infantry Division, which reached the settlements of Tashirovo and Novinskoye, located 5-6 km northeast of Naro-Fominsk, had no troops in front of them, apart from several hundred fighters and commanders of the detachment under the command of Major Bezzubov, who were on the defensive along the east bank of the river. Nara.

The commander clarified the situation all night, listened to the reports of the commanders of formations and chiefs of services, and when reinforcements arrived for the 222nd SD - 2600 people, he found time to talk with him. After the conversation, Mikhail Grigorievich ordered to send 1300 people to the 222nd SD, and distribute the second half of the replenishment among the units of the 1st Guards. The MSD of Colonel Lizyukov and the detachment of Major Bezzubov, who some time ago were given the task of driving the enemy out of the vicinity of Naro-Fominsk in the morning.

Only the lack of reliable information about the strength of the enemy and the nature of his actions can explain the setting by the army commander of such an unrealistic combat mission. So, a detachment under the command of Major Bezzubov, equal in number to two battalions, received an order to destroy the enemy in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Tureyka rest house, Tashirovo, Cheshkovo, Redkino, Aleshkovo, Alekseevka and, after completing this task, go to the defense of the line: Nikolskoye - Plesenskoye, Cheshkovo , Alekseevka, which was beyond the power of an entire rifle division. But this will become clear only in the morning, when parts of the 1st Guards. The MSD and the combined detachment of Major Bezzubov will face a clearly superior enemy.

At 05:30, after a short artillery preparation, Major Bezzubov's detachment started a battle with enemy units near the village of Konopelovka. At six o'clock the 1st Guards went on the offensive. MSD.

The 175th SME, reinforced by a platoon of tanks, had the task of destroying the enemy on the outskirts of Naro-Fominsk and reaching the exclusion line. Alekseevka, junction 75 km (now station "Latyshskaya". - Note. author), Kotovo.

The 3rd battalion of Captain A.I. Krasnochiro moved forward 1-1.5 km and, having reached the edge of the forest, 1 km south-west of the height from el. 201.8, was stopped by strong enemy machine-gun and artillery fire.

The 2nd battalion of senior lieutenant P. M. Andronov, advancing to the left, on the approaches to the 75 km siding was stopped by strong artillery and mortar fire from the enemy from the village of Kotovo.

The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Novikov, who led the battle with the NP, who was in the offensive sector of the 3rd battalion, saw how the attack of his units began to choke. It was obvious that the enemy had well thought out the system of fire and the construction of the defense, besides, the presence of a large number of fire weapons - artillery, mortars and machine guns - made it possible to defeat our attacking units from long distances.

At the same time, the 6th SME went on the offensive, trying to reach the Elagino-Gorchukhino line. When approaching Gorchukhino, the regiment's units were met by strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire from the enemy. The situation was aggravated by the fact that his aviation was actively operating, inflicting strong bombing strikes on the battle formations of the regiment. Rifle battalions, suffering losses, were forced to lie down and conduct a firefight with the enemy at the reached line. The headquarters of the regiment, located in the area of ​​the state farm "Vegetable", was repeatedly bombarded from the air.

Units of the 258th Infantry Division, reinforced with tanks, occupying the defense along the western bank of the Nara River in the Tashirov area, the Tureika rest home, easily repelled an attempt by the Bezzubov detachment to seize a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the river. Nara. Having suffered losses, the detachment retreated to the eastern coast and took up defensive positions in the area: the Konopelovka cottage, a turn of the road, 700 m east of Tashirovo, the Tureika rest house.

In the second half of the day, the enemy crossed the river in a narrow place. Nara and captured the cottage "Konopelovka", knocking out one of the units of Major Bezzubov's detachment, which was defending there. Part of the forces of the German infantry went to the military town, but was stopped by fire from the 2nd rifle company of the 1st battalion, which was defending in the area of ​​the military town. The battalion was commanded by senior political instructor A. I. Antonov.

After the 3rd battalion was stopped by enemy fire, the commander of the 175th SME, Lieutenant Colonel Novikov, decided, together with the regimental commissar, battalion commissar A.M. Myachikov, to advance to the regimental command post and report to the division commander about the situation. Driving by car along one of the streets on the northwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, they unexpectedly stumbled upon a column of our trucks, which occupied the entire narrow carriageway; there was no way around them. On the right ahead, at the factory workers' town, they heard shooting. P. V. Novikov ordered the driver to find a detour on a nearby street, and he himself, with the commissar and adjutant, decided to get to the headquarters of the regiment, which was located not far from the church across the Nara River, on foot.

However, it didn't take long to get going. From the transverse street, about a hundred and fifty meters from them, frightened soldiers of the rear units and drivers of cars began to run out one after another. They quickly crossed the road and hid behind houses on the opposite side of the street. To the right, the firing continued to increase. Novikov tried to detain the Red Army soldiers who had fled in a panic, but no one paid attention to his cry. Suddenly, a group of German soldiers appeared on a nearby street. There were ten of them. Having opened fire from small arms on the move, they killed the adjutant of the regiment commander Nikolai Stein with the very first shots and seriously wounded Novikov. Having fired several more bursts along the street, the German infantrymen crossed to the other side and slowly headed down to the city center.

The battalion commissar Myachikov, frail and short, dragged the seriously wounded commander on himself for some time, and then, exhausted, crawled with him on all fours.

The fact that German machine gunners had penetrated into the southwestern part of Naro-Fominsk and were spreading panic there was learned at the regimental headquarters from the driver of the regiment commander. He raised the alarm first. Making his way to the factory along a side street, the driver first came across a group of fighters running across the street and hastily firing back, and then came under fire from enemy machine gunners. The car arrived at the headquarters with a broken body.

Some time later, at the location of the rifle company of the 2nd battalion, which was defending near the city park, the commissar of the regiment A. M. Myachikov appeared, in a wet overcoat, stained with the blood of the commander and thickly stained with mud.

Not far from the park, near the stone bridge, he found the commander and commissar of the division. Next to them, at the fork in the street, a platoon of tanks stood ready. The regimental commissar reported to them what had happened. Colonel Lizyukov ordered Myachikov to take one of the tanks and immediately make his way to the place where the wounded regiment commander remained.

The tank took off, jumped over the bridge and, without slowing down, rushed along the main street uphill, past the gates of the spinning and weaving factory, past the city council building, to the place where Lieutenant Colonel P. V. Novikov had remained. But he was no longer there. Later, Lieutenant Colonel Novikov was found among the fighters and commanders who fell during the battle in the city. Thus, one of the best commanders of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, a fearless and courageous officer, commander of the 175th Motorized Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Novikov Pavel Veniaminovich, died.

Already by ten o'clock in the afternoon, having suffered significant losses in personnel, the 175th SME and 6th SME were forced to go on the defensive at the reached line, and then, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, they began to retreat to the western and southwestern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk , where sufficiently large enemy forces have already infiltrated. Part of the units of the 175th SME was surrounded in the area of ​​​​the factory village.

At 11 o'clock the command post of the army headquarters in Novo-Fedorovka was bombed by six enemy aircraft, in connection with which the army commander gave the command to move the command post first to the village of Kuznetsovo, and from 16 o'clock to the village of Yakovlevskoye, located northeast of Naro-Fominsk .

In the afternoon, individual enemy units tried to cross to the eastern bank of the Nara River, near the northern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. However, the fighters of the 2nd battalion of the 175th SME repulsed his attack, preventing the enemy from reaching the east coast.

An exceptionally difficult situation developed throughout the army's combat zone. Heavy fighting went on in all sectors, but it was especially difficult for units of the 1st Guards. MSD. The rifle battalions of the 6th and 175th SMEs fought the enemy without fire contact with each other, surrounded by a number of units, fighting in a city where it was especially difficult to maintain interaction with neighbors and one could not hope to support the fire of their own artillery.

The army commander felt great anxiety about the state of affairs on the right flank, where the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was fighting, from which not a single combat report was received throughout the day. There was no radio contact with the brigade.

On the eve of the brigade, the remnants of its units waged heavy bloody battles with the advancing enemy on a wide front, which at times reached 14 km, for which there was clearly neither the strength nor the means. The battalions fought without having any tactical or fire communication with each other. The brigade headquarters practically did not control the actions of subordinate units, due to the lack of communication, the remoteness of the units and the weak organization of control on the part of the brigade command. The battalions, in fact, were left to their own devices. During the week of continuous fighting, the strength of the brigade was reduced by six times, only three tanks remained in the tank battalion.

The 455th MSB held back the enemy offensive, defending itself on the eastern outskirts of Novo-Nikolskoye.

The 454th SME fought the enemy south of the village. Novo-Ivanovskoye, but the brigade headquarters did not have exact information about it.

The 453rd MSB, which had only about 90 people, defended the Aleksino line, the northern outskirts of Simbukhovo.

On the right flank, the brigades were fighting the enemy with the remnants of units of the 185th SP, numbering 32 people. By the end of the day, due to the losses suffered, the regiment ceased to exist.

At about 12 noon, the enemy, with a force of up to two companies, taking advantage of the absence of a solid defense front between the 454th and 455th MSBs, went to their rear, attacked the brigade headquarters, located in Kolodkino, and defeated it. The remnants of the headquarters withdrew to the village of Arkhangelskoye.

At 15 o'clock, the army headquarters received a report from the commander of the 222nd SD, in which it was reported that the division had been fighting enemy units at the Subbotino-Nazarevo line since morning. The enemy sought to bypass the division from the right flank in the area of ​​​​the village of Semidvorye. The command of the division was forced to ask for help from the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade. By joint efforts, the advance of the enemy was stopped.

In the afternoon, reinforcements arrived in the division in the amount of 1300 people, and almost simultaneously the 774th SP approached. This made it possible to somewhat stabilize the situation in this direction.

The headquarters of the 110th SD was located in the forest south of the village of Sotnikovo, having no information about where the subordinate units were located, with the exception of the 1287th SP, whose units were located nearby. There was no communication with other regiments, as well as with the army headquarters.

The units of the 1287th joint venture, which had escaped defeat during the retreat, were at that time in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlements of Shalamovo and Myza, leaving behind the Nara River and not even making an attempt to take up defense on its eastern bank. For the fifth day, the fighters and commanders ate, as they say, what God sent.

The 1289th joint venture, in fact, did not exist. Only separate groups of his fighters managed to retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara near Tashirovo.

But the most amazing thing happened to the 1291st joint venture, which, carried away by an unknown force, continued its flight to the east, leaving both Naro-Fominsk and Aprelevka far behind.

The command of the 113th SD, which was also in some confusion, by the end of the day still managed to take the situation in subordinate units under its control, despite the fact that a number of units were also located somewhere unknown. With the remnants of the rifle regiments, the division took up defense at the turn: the forest east of Aristov, the forest east of Staro-Mikhailovsky, Alopovo. The division headquarters was located in the village of Savelovka. There was also no connection with the army headquarters, just as there was no food or ammunition.

For six days of fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction from October 16 to October 21, 1941, only the 110th Infantry Division lost 6179 soldiers and commanders killed, wounded and missing.

At 4 p.m., Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, realizing the complexity of the situation in the Naro-Fominsk region, was forced to send a report to the commander of the Western Front troops with the following content:

"COMZAPFRONT TO GENERAL ZHUKOV.

1. The situation by 16.00 is very serious for the city of NARO-FOMINSK.

The enemy, infiltrating the forests and throwing out landings of their cutthroats, surrounds the city, crowding parts of the 1st MSD and a regiment of 1200 soldiers of the 110th SD thrown up.

2. The enemy suffers huge losses from our actions, but our losses are also large.

3. By 16:00 on 10/22/41, the enemy occupies the following position: up to an infantry regiment with tanks in the TASHIROVO region, RED TUREYKA, ALEKSEEVKA. Up to 2 regiments directly southwest and south of the city. Before the motorized infantry regiment advances on AFANASOVKA from the south.

Unidentified forces cut the highway at ZOSIMOV PUSTYN. Part of the enemy broke into the northern encirclement. cities. The 175 MP battalion and the 6 MP battalion are fighting in KOTOVO, ATEPTSEVO.

4. The actions of the enemy are continuously supported by his aircraft. I earnestly ask you to help our aircraft by bombarding the convoy moving from Kuzminok to the city.

Please send several U-2 planes to establish contact.

(Commander 33 Lieutenant General M. Efremov,) (Member of the Military Council of the Brig, Commissar M. SHLYAKHTIN ".)

By evening, the battle for Naro-Fominsk reached its highest point. The enemy, having increased their efforts, brought fresh reserves into battle. Soldiers and commanders of the 1st Guards. The MSD fought heroically, not paying attention to the fact that at times it was impossible to understand where the enemy was and where our units were.

The 1st battalion of the 175th SME, which fought all day surrounded, only in the evening was able to break through to its own and retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara. The 3rd battalion fought in the southwestern part of the city, being pressed by the enemy to the river. Thus, by the end of the day, most of Naro-Fominsk was in the hands of the enemy.

Toward evening, taking advantage of the absence of a continuous front at the junction of the 1st Guards. The MSD and the 110th SD, up to the infantry company of the 479th PP, penetrated deep into our defenses, reaching the area of ​​the Zosimova Pustyn station, not far from the army command post. To destroy the infiltrated enemy infantry, the commander sent a small detachment, composed of fighters from headquarters and rear units.

At 18.50, the army headquarters received a formidable telegram from the front commander:

"TO THE COMMANDER 33 YEFREMOV

The enemy, taking advantage of your sluggishness, carelessness and lack of understanding of the importance of the Cuban direction, intercepted the highway in small groups.

I order to immediately deploy the entire 1st Infantry Rifle Division, destroy the enemy in the area of ​​TASHIROVO, PLESENSKOE, KUZMINKA and close the gap between 222nd Rifle Division and 110th Rifle Division by occupying the PLESONSKOE, ATEPTSEVO front.

The tank brigade should immediately be put into action to destroy the enemy in the TASHIROVO area and clear the highway.

I warn you, if you sit idly by, the enemy will immediately occupy the KUBINKA region and put the 5th ARMY in a catastrophic situation.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN ".)

You can understand General of the Army G.K. Zhukov: there was a clear threat of an enemy breakthrough to Moscow. The enemy went ahead, realizing that if now he could not fight his way to Moscow, in the future it would be much harder to do so. However, the order is rather strange, to say the least. How could at that moment deploy the entire 1st Guards. MSD in order to destroy the enemy in the Tashirovo area, if the division had already been fighting a bloody battle for a day in direct contact with the enemy in the urban areas of Naro-Fominsk?

The headquarters of the Western Front, apparently, at that time did not fully control the situation that had developed in the Naro-Fominsk direction.

It was hard not only for the 33rd Army. All the armies of the Western Front from the last forces offered fierce resistance to the enemy. The troops suffered incredibly heavy losses: divisions, in terms of their numbers and capabilities, became regiments, regiments - battalions, battalions - companies. The number of killed and wounded grew, the number of missing people was incredibly large, given in the reports. In some formations and units, there were several times more than the dead and wounded combined.

By the end of the day, not only the 110th SD, but also the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the remnants of which still continued to resist the enemy in the surrounding forests, practically did not exist. The coming night forced the cannonade of the battle to subside somewhat, but everyone understood that the denouement was yet to come. The troops were preparing for further struggle for Naro-Fominsk and its environs. It was hard for everyone: the infantrymen, the artillerymen, and the rear. Warriors of all specialties worked with incredible effort, providing combat operations for the troops fighting near Naro-Fominsk.

The soldiers of the 22nd separate engineer battalion under continuous fire during the day were working on the restoration of the Shelomovo-Bekasovo road in order to arrange the supply of materiel to the formations and units of the army. Signalers, doctors, soldiers of the rear units worked tirelessly.

October 23, 1941

In a combat report to the commander of the Western Front on the results of hostilities for the day, sent at 4 a.m., the Military Council of the 33rd Army reported:

"one. During 10/22/41. the enemy waged a vigorous offensive on the front TASHIROVO, BALABANOV, with the main efforts in the direction of NARO-FOMINSK.

2. 1st GMSD, 1289th joint venture and MAYOR BEZZUBOV'S DETAIL, advancing on the TASHIROVO, ATEPTSEVO sector, collided with two enemy infantry divisions supported by 27 bombers. One enemy PD - 258, was advancing south of the KUZMINKA, NARO-FOMINSK road, and another division, of unknown numbering, was advancing along the road from KUZMINKA and north of it.

As a result of the daytime battle, the enemy suffered heavy losses, and by the end of October 22, our units held the line along the eastern bank of the river. NARA in the area east of YERMAKOVO, dachas to the south of the city and further with the front to the south to IVANOVKA. An attempt to intercept the roads from NARO-FOMINSK to the northeast. in the area of ​​ZOSIMOV PUSTYN were suspended, the advanced units of the bypassing column up to the infantry regiment stopped in the forest south of ZOSIMOV PUSTYN. 1 GMSD prepares a counterattack to capture the western part of the city. The highway to KUBINKA is provided with reconnaissance reinforced with tanks.

3. According to the data delivered at 20.00 10.22.41. pilot from 110 and 113 divisions, the latter are upset by the daytime battle with the advancing enemy. 110 SD forces up to 200 fighters with the remaining artillery (three batteries) held KAMENSKOE. 113 SD up to 400 fighters retreated under the onslaught of the enemy to the edges of the forest to the east of the line Aristovo, Mashkovo. The position of these divisions is specified by Shtarm.

4. I have no reports on the actions of the 151st MSBR and the 222nd division. According to Shtarm, 151st MSBR withdrew to ARKHANGELSK by 13:00 22:10.

(Commander of the 33rd Army) (Lieutenant General M. YEFREMOV ".)

At night, a message was received from the headquarters of the front about the status and location of the units of the 110th and 113th SD, in search of which one of the officers of the operational control of the front was sent.

"TO THE COMMANDER 33 YEFREMOV

According to the communication officer of the Front Headquarters, the 110th SD is occupying the defenses of KAMENSKOE, RYZHKOVO, Shtadiv KLOVO.

Position at 16.30 22.10. there is no enemy in front. The enemy on the right flank of the division occupies ATEPTSEVO, SLIZNEVO. At the front, only 200 people occupy the defense, according to NO-1 Shtadiv 110, where the rest of the people, he does not know, are allegedly gathering somewhere. The division has no food and ammunition.

113 SD at the same time 16.30 22.10 occupied the defense at the front of the forest east. Aristovo, forest east. STARO-MIKHAILOVSKOE, ALOPOVO. Shtadiv 113 - elev. 160.8 southwest SAVELOVKA.

The enemy in front of the division on the right flank up to 2 companies, in the center of small groups, on the left flank up to 3 battalions with separate tanks.

In the division in the regiments on the line of defense, the right-flank regiment - 150 people, the central - 175 people and the left-flank 90 people. Artillery has absolutely no shells, little cartridge. There is no food in the division. According to the division commander, the vehicles sent for shells and food had not yet arrived by 16.30 and did not know where they were.

COMFRONTA ORDERED:

Send a member of the Military Council of the Army with commanders to the division to restore order in the divisions and take immediate measures to provide the divisions with food and ammunition.

Establish regular communication with the divisions by delegates, radio and communications aircraft.

Deliver execution.

(SOKOLOVSKY, KAZBINTSEV ".)

In the morning, a messenger arrived from the commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, who transmitted the report of the brigade commander on the results of the battle for the past day, which allowed the army headquarters to receive some information about the state of affairs in the brigade.

"TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 33rd ARMY

I report that on 10/22/41 at 11.00, units of 151 MSBR occupied the position: 185 joint ventures consisting of 32 people. defended NIKOLAEVKA, providing the right flank of the brigade, 453 SMEs firmly held the line: Taganovo - Aleksino, turning three times into counterattacks, knocking out the enemy from the east. banks of the river ISMA (composition of 150 people), 455 SMEs from 2 o'clock on 10/22/41, together with two squadrons of 1 OS. CAV. POLKA defended NOVO-NIKOLSKOE, NOVO-MIKHAILOVSKOE, preventing the 151 MSBR from being bypassed from the right flank (the quantitative composition of 455 MSB is 90 people).

On the morning of 10/22/41, the enemy, in groups up to a battalion company, with mortars, began to seep through the battle formations of the brigade on the right flank, sought to reach the VEREYA-DOROKHOVO highway, in the GRIBTSOVO-NOSODINO sector.

I took measures to eliminate the enemy that had broken through - all available reserves were sent out, retreating units of the 50th SD were organized, as a result of which the enemy was stopped.

At 11.00 on 22.10.41, the enemy, with a force of up to a company of submachine gunners, with two machine guns and mortars, attacked the headquarters of 151 MSBR.

Within 30 min. the headquarters held out, after which I decided to take the headquarters into the forest, since there was no one to defend the headquarters. Having gone out into the forest, he tried to go out to his troops, in the SIMBUHOVO district, but this was not possible.

At present, parts of the brigade are in the following position: 200 people. they are defending SIMBUHOVO (453 SMEs and 1 company of 455 SMEs), the rest of the units are defending the line: GRIBTSOVO - NIKOLSKOE. The composition of the units defending this line includes: rem. company 455 SMEs - up to 100 people in total. 185 joint venture, operating from 151 MSBR, having 10/22/41 32 people, by the morning of 10/23/41 lost the last ...

(EFIMOV ".)

The 222nd SD fought with the enemy in the Subbotino area, the height from el. 224.0, Nazarevo. Given the difficult situation in the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, the army commander ordered the division commander, Colonel Novikov, to subjugate the remnants of the brigade and organize defense in this direction. However, soon the situation in the zone of the 222nd SD, which the enemy began to bypass from the flanks, deteriorated sharply, and the division command was forced to take urgent measures to avoid encirclement and defeat. There was no longer any talk of interaction with the remnants of units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade.

With the onset of dawn in the entire defense zone of the 1st Guards. MSD again broke out a fierce battle. The actions of the enemy were actively supported by aviation, which all day delivered bombing and assault strikes either on the battle formations of our troops, or on artillery firing positions, not forgetting to periodically shoot the rear columns from the air. Separate units of the 175th SME continued to conduct street battles in the residential areas of Naro-Fominsk, repulsing the fierce attacks of the enemy. The southwestern part of the city changed hands twice during the day.

Ruins of the shed building. The picture was taken in December 1941, immediately after the liberation of Naro-Fominsk

In the buildings of the spinning and weaving factory and the factory town there was a fight literally for every floor, for every stairwell.

In the afternoon, the enemy, pushing our troops to the Nara River, "on the shoulders" of the retreating units of the 3rd battalion of the 175th SME, went to the stone bridge and crossed over to the east bank, capturing a foothold in the area of ​​the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker. A bloody battle broke out directly at the church, where the soldiers of the reconnaissance company were defending themselves. Separate enemy units went to the Nara station area, where the headquarters of the 6th SME was located.

By evening, the battle for Naro-Fominsk had become even more brutal. The enemy, unable to withstand the furious counterattacks of the guards of Colonel Lizyukov, was forced to retreat to the western coast by the end of the day. Lizyukov's guardsmen, entrenched on the eastern bank, during an unexpected attack drove the enemy out of the shed factory building on the territory of the weaving and spinning factory, located in the bend of the Nara River and adjacent to one of the bridges, and took up defense there. The soldiers of the 4th rifle company of the 175th SME under the command of senior lieutenant A.I. Kudryavtsev and political instructor Dyakov defended this building during the entire period of the battles for Naro-Fominsk.

A small detachment of the 175th SME under the command of the battalion commissar A. M. Myachikov successfully completed its task. The detachment drove the Germans out of the military town and village of Konopelovka, which the enemy occupied the night before. The Cuban highway became free to travel again.

Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, destroyed during the fighting with the enemy at the end of October 1941

The rest of the formations and units of the army also fought the enemy all day. The situation in the defense zone of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade continued to be especially difficult. The brigade commander, Major Efimov, having completely lost control over the course of hostilities, after the defeat of the brigade headquarters by the enemy, abandoned the battlefield and, together with the brigade commissar, senior battalion commissar Pegov, independently arrived at the army headquarters. However, neither he nor the commissar could report anything concrete about the position and condition of the brigade units. According to unverified reports, part of the brigade units retreated to the Simbukhovo-Dorokhovo line, while the other part operated in the area of ​​the village of Arkhangelskoye.

General Efremov, together with members of the Military Council of the Army, Brigadier Commissar Shlyakhtin and Major General Kondratyev, gave a proper assessment of the actions of the brigade commander and commissar, qualifying them as a shameful flight from the battlefield. They were given the task of immediately leaving for the brigade, finding and gathering the remaining units and continuing to carry out the assigned combat mission.

The 222nd SD fought all day with units of the 258th Infantry Division, taking up defense along the line: Subbotino, Nazarevo, Semidvorye, with the front to the south-west. The enemy, with the support of tanks and artillery fire, sought not only to capture the indicated settlements, which were heroically defended by the soldiers of the division together with the remnants of the units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, but also to surround parts of the division. In the afternoon, units of the division, under the threat of encirclement, were forced to retreat in battle to the area of ​​​​the settlements of Shubinka and Bavykino. But, despite the measures taken, the enemy still managed to close the encirclement around the division.

Late in the evening, the division received the task - on the morning of October 24, to strike in the direction of Slepushkino, Gorki, Maurino, break through the encirclement of the enemy and reach the Maurino line, the propaganda center school, where to take up defense.

The situation on the left flank of the army continued to be very difficult. The ten-kilometer stretch of terrain from Ateptsevo to Kamenskoye was still not occupied by our troops, and only the enemy’s lack of sufficient forces and means did not allow him to move forward and completely cut off the extremely small 110th and 113th SDs from the main forces of the army and destroy them.

By order of the commander of the 110th SD, Colonel Gladyshev, the 1287th SP, which by that time had only about 200 people with six 85-mm guns and an anti-tank artillery battery, took up defense at the turn: Kamenskoye, Klovo. There was still no connection with the army headquarters, so there was no supply. There were no products for a long time, we had to count every shell and cartridge. The position of the division was simply catastrophic.

The 113th SD, which had only about 450 fighters and 9 guns in its units, left its positions at night and, on the orders of the division commander, withdrew to the line: Ryzhkovo, Nikolsky yards, a forest to the northeast, intercepting the road going from Warsaw highway to Romanovo .

Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General A. K. Kondratiev. Photo 1938

One of the reasons that made it much more difficult for the formations of the 33rd Army to conduct a stable defense at that time was the fact that they fought the enemy in isolation from each other, under the threat of the enemy's flanks being flowed around.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade held the defense, being four kilometers from the 222nd Rifle Division, which, in turn, fought 14 km (!) From the 1st Guards. MSD. The interval of terrain not occupied by troops between the 1st MSD and the left-flank divisions was about 10 km. The 113th SD and the 110th SD also did not have a continuous front, conducting combat operations at a distance of up to 3 km from each other.

After analyzing the current situation, Lieutenant General Efremov came to the conclusion that if the gaps between the formations were not eliminated, then it would be impossible to hold the occupied line. The commander made a decision by withdrawing parts of the 222nd SD and the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to the line of the river. Nara, on the Maurino - Lyubanovo section, join them to the right flank of the 1st Guards. MSD, and having occupied the 110th and 113th SD lines of Baraki, Gorchukhino, Mogutovo, Machikhino, create a continuous line of defense with the 1st Guards. MSD south of Naro-Fominsk. In addition, in order to coordinate the actions of our troops in the area of ​​​​the pioneer camp, located at the fork in the roads to Kubinka and Vereya, the army commander ordered that Major Bezzubov's combined detachment be reassigned to the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD.

The proposal of the commander of the 33rd Army, despite its apparent expediency, was initially ambiguously assessed by the command of the Western Front, but this time reason won over emotions, and General of the Army G.K. Zhukov allowed the troops to be withdrawn to the line indicated by General Efremov. At the same time, the front commander quite reasonably demanded that the front line of defense of the 110th and 113th SDs pass closer to the river. Nara, for which it was necessary to drive the enemy out of a number of settlements on its eastern shore, which he managed to occupy earlier.

By closing its battle formations and eliminating the gaps not occupied by the troops, the 33rd Army increased the reliability of its defensive lines, which played an important role in the psychological stability of the troops, who were already tired of fighting, constantly being under the threat of being outflanked by the enemy. Only during October 22 and 23, anti-aircraft artillery units of the army and the front destroyed five enemy aircraft, of which 2 bombers near the village of Alabino and 3 near the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

October 24, 1941

The third sleepless night of fighting for Naro-Fominsk began. At one in the morning, a telegram unexpectedly arrived from the front headquarters with the following content:

"TO THE COMMANDER 33 YEFREMOV

FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER

COMMISSIONER 1 MSD LIZYUKOV, COMMISSAR 1 MSD MESHKOV

Tov. STALIN personally ordered the transfer of comrade. Lizyukov and comrade. MESHKOV that he considers it a matter of honor for the 1st MSD to clear the enemy from the enemy by the morning of October 24, 24.10. On the execution of this order Comrade. Lizyukov and comrade. MESHKOV to report personally to Comrade 24.10. STALIN

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN ".)

Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov immediately summoned the commander and commissar of the division, the commanders of the 175th and 6th SMEs to the army command post and, in the presence of members of the Army Military Council, brought them the contents of the telegram. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, dead silence reigned in the headquarters room for a moment. None of those present expected such a reaction from the country's leadership to the course of hostilities in the Naro-Fominsk region. The meeting and the setting of tasks were extremely short, all those present understood well what this telegram meant for each of them. It was clear: you must either die or complete the task. It should be noted that in the three days of previous battles for Naro-Fominsk, the division had already lost 1,521 people, including: 115 people were killed, 386 were wounded, and 1,020 were missing.

Report card of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. The position of the troops as of October 24, 1941

In the morning, a fierce battle flared up with renewed vigor. The first to attack were the fighters of the Bezzubov detachment, who, according to the plan of the army command, were supposed to divert part of the enemy forces defending on the northeastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk in order to facilitate the actions of the rest of the division.

The detachment of Major Bezzubov, reassigned the day before to the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD, made an attempt to force the river. Nara in the area of ​​​​the cottage "Konopelovka", however, having suffered heavy losses and not completing the task, was forced to retreat to the Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka highway.

Units of the 258th Infantry Division, in turn, also made an attempt to reach the eastern bank of the river. Nara, but the artillery fire of the division and the fighters of the Bezzubov detachment repulsed their attack. A major role in repelling this attack by the enemy was played by six tanks, which were allocated the day before by the commander of the 5th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Sakhno, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Guards. MSD.

At six o'clock in the morning, after a short artillery preparation, units of the 175th and 6th SMEs, in cooperation with the tankers of the 5th Tank Brigade, went on the offensive against the enemy, who was defending himself in the residential areas of the city of Naro-Fominsk. Special hope was placed on the tankers. The actions of the infantry were supported by thirteen T-34 tanks: the 175th SME was given 7 tanks, the 6th SME - 6. Several volleys were fired at the German units defending along the western bank of the river by guards mortars.

However, as soon as our units went on the attack, the enemy immediately opened heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, his artillery made several heavy fire raids on the front line and command posts of units and subunits on the eastern bank of the river. Nara. But, despite this, the battalions of the 175th SME, which included about 500 people, by 9 o'clock in the morning were able to reach the line of the factory railway line. The enemy increased fire on our attacking subunits and, having transferred part of the troops from non-attacked sectors, was able to slow down the offensive of the regiment. Soon, in the course of his counterattack, the 3rd battalion was surrounded, fighting in one of the residential areas in the city center.

The 6th SME, advancing to the left, slowly moved towards the city center from the south-western side. Enemy resistance kept growing.

By 14 o'clock the advance of both regiments was completely stopped by the enemy. The battle became bloody and protracted. Soon, information was received that the 2nd battalion of the 6th SME, having lost more than half of its personnel, began to retreat to the river under the onslaught of the 479th PP. Nara.

From the radio intercepts of the enemy’s conversations, it became known that the units of the 258th Infantry Division, defending Naro-Fominsk, were expecting reinforcements in the near future. The command of the division was forced to send a report to the army headquarters, which stated:

“The division has no reserves; motorized rifle regiments suffered significant losses in personnel.

The approach of new enemy units will put the division in a difficult position.

But the army commander was in no hurry to give a command to withdraw, and only an hour and a half later, when it became clear that further continuation of the offensive was pointless, Colonel Lizyukov received an order to retreat to his original position.

At 18 o'clock Bezzubov's detachment made a second attempt to force the river. Nara on his left flank in the area of ​​the brick factory. The attack was preceded by a fire raid by artillery from two battalions of the 486th GAP, but again failed to complete the task. The detachment withdrew to its original position, taking up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the Nara River, at the turn: excl. Tashirovo, Settlement.

By the end of the day, the 4th rifle company of the 175th MP under the command of senior lieutenant Kudryavtsev continued to hold one of the buildings of the weaving and spinning factory, the rest of the units were engaged in a firefight with the enemy, being near the river itself. The enemy fired heavily, trying to force the division's units to retreat to the eastern bank of the river. Nara. The 3rd battalion of the regiment, numbering about 40 people, who managed to break out of the encirclement, was withdrawn to the reserve of the regiment commander and took up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River.

The 6th SME with one rifle battalion continued to fight on the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. Two other battalions held the line: excl. station Nara, Afanasovka, Ivanovka, covering the left flank of the division.

At 1945 hours, when the army commander was on the NP of the 1st Guards. MSD, a new telegram from the Military Council of the Western Front has arrived:

"T. Efremov

FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSFER

COMMANDER OF THE 1st MSD Comrade Lizyukov, COMMISSAR OF THE 1st MSD MESHKOV

T. LIZYUKOV and comrade MESHKOV have not yet reported anything about the execution of Comrade STALIN's order. Send a report immediately, present a copy to us.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN ".)

And there was, in fact, nothing to report. The day of fighting for the city did not bring the desired result, not to mention the fact that the division lost more than 50% of its personnel on the streets of Naro-Fominsk. The total losses of the personnel of the combat units of the 6th and 175th SMEs for four days of fighting were huge and amounted to 70% according to the report of the division headquarters.

According to radio interception and the testimony of a captured prisoner, the enemy concentrated his main efforts on capturing bridges across the river. Nara, in order to block the retreat of the division's units to the opposite bank and surround them in urban areas on the western bank of the river.

After much deliberation, it was decided to send a telegram to I.V. Stalin and the headquarters of the Western Front with the following content:

"MOSCOW. TOV. STALIN.

COPY TOV. ZHUKOV, TOV. Bulganin.

By 20.00 he captured the northern, western, northwestern, central and southeastern parts of the city of NARO-FOMINSK. Hard fighting continues. We will give the details in code.

(LIZYUKOV, MESHKOV 24.10.41. 21.40 ".)

For some time after sending this telegram, everyone waited with bated breath for the reaction of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and commander of the Western Front to the report of the command of the 1st Guards. MSD. However, there was no answer to it and additional questions to the command of the division from both I.V. Stalin and General of the Army Zhukov.

At this time, no less bloody battles continued in other sectors of the front. The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade defended itself with separate strongholds at the front: excl. Lyakhovo, Yastrebovo, Yumatovo, Radchino. According to unverified data, no more than 600 fighters and commanders remained alive in the brigade.

The 222nd SD, having in its composition about four thousand soldiers and commanders, completed the task set by the army commander and fought out of the encirclement, breaking through the enemy defenses in the Shubinka-Bavykino sector. By the end of the day, the regiments of the division were on the defensive at the turn:

774th joint venture - Maurino, excl. Lyubanovo;

479th joint venture - Lyubanovo, a school north of Tashirov.

According to intelligence data, in the area with. Tashirovo was up to an enemy infantry battalion with tanks, and in the village of Novinskoye - up to an infantry company.

By order of the commander, the Moscow marching battalion in the amount of 1275 people, intended to replenish the 110th SD, covered the gap between the 1st Guards. The MSD and the 110th SD, having taken up defense at the turn: barracks, then along the edge of the forest northeast of the settlements of Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo.

Commander of the 110th Rifle Division, Colonel I. I. Matusevich. post-war photo

In the morning, the army headquarters was finally able to establish contact with the headquarters of the 110th and 113th rifle divisions, thanks to which comprehensive information was obtained about their condition and location. The acting head of the rear of the army, Lieutenant Colonel A. N. Lagovsky, received the task of preparing transport with food and ammunition for dispatch to the division.

The 1287th joint venture of the 110th SD continued to occupy the defense in the Kamensky area, the rear and headquarters units of the division were in the Shalamovo, Myza, Sotnikovo areas. The division headquarters was located in the village of Sotnikovo. In total, there were 2653 soldiers and commanders in the division.

According to the report of the division commander, the 1291st joint venture, consisting of 691 people, was putting itself in order while in the village of Puchkovo. How he ended up there, 40 km northeast of Naro-Fominsk, God only knows.

Colonel I. I. Matusevich immediately received a task from the commander: on October 25, with the available forces and means, in cooperation with the 1st Guards. MSD, destroy the enemy in the area of ​​​​Chukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo and seize the line: Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo, then advance in the direction of Nefedovo and by the end of the day reach the line: Kozelskoye, Ivakino. The depth of the task was about 15 km.

It is hard to say what General Efremov motivated his decision by setting, in fact, such an overwhelming task for the demoralized division. Of course, it was necessary to take the initiative into our own hands and improve the general situation in the combat zone, but setting such tasks could, at best, lose the fighting spirit in the troops, at worst, lose the last combat units of the division.

The situation in the 113th SD remained difficult. The regiments of the division, which still did not have military numbering, took up defense at the turn:

2nd joint venture, numbering 150 people with 4 light and 2 heavy machine guns and 4 guns - Kamenskoye, Klovo;

1st joint venture - height from el. 208.3, the road from the village of Romanovo to the village of Savelovka;

The 3rd SP defended Romanovo, covering the roads leading from Romanovo to Panino and Shibarovo.

The sapper battalion of the division covered the ford east of Ryzhkovo.

The enemy pulled up reserves from the depths, but did not take active actions, with the exception of the height area from el. 208.3, where, up to an infantry company, they tried to attack the positions occupied by units of the 1st SP.

The division had a large shortage of commanders at various levels, including the vacant post of commander of the 3rd joint venture, things were no better with the staffing of headquarters. The chief of staff of the division, Major N. S. Stashevsky, reported to the chief of staff of the army:

“The headquarters of the division is currently not fully staffed. Absolutely not at the headquarters of the 5th and 4th units, there is no one to deal with the rear and accounting of personnel.

There are only 4 commanders in the headquarters who do not know the headquarters service.

The headquarters of regiments and battalions are also not fully staffed. In the shelves there is no technical equipment of communication, cable, telephones.

I ask you to take urgent measures to staff the headquarters and those. means of communication".

The commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K. I. Mironov, late in the evening, also received the next day a combat mission for the offensive, and, like the 110th SD, absolutely impossible. The division was supposed to, advancing in the direction of Klovo, Shilovo, Lapshinka, seize the line: Shilovo, Aristovo, Alopovo.

In addition to the 110th and 113th SDs, the 1st Guards received a combat mission for the offensive. MSD and Moscow marching battalion.

With the onset of darkness, the battle for the city of Naro-Fominsk began to slowly subside.

During the day of the battle, according to the report of the division headquarters, the 1st Guards. The MSD lost 43 killed, 97 wounded and 621 missing. Total 761 fighter and commander. Such was the terrible result of just one day of battle of one division.

A very large number of missing people (in this case - 81.6%) clearly indicates the complete apathy of the fighters and commanders to their fate. The stupidity and futility of the daily attacks, carried out by the commanders only so that the senior commander would not reproach them for inactivity, gave rise to indifference in people to what was happening: they hated the enemy and did not want to live anymore. Therefore, the weakest in terms of psychological stability, the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, at the first opportunity, stopped resistance and surrendered. Captivity for many of them was deliverance from the daily hell of war and bacchanalia that was going on in units and formations at that time.

75% of the total number of missing persons were fighters and commanders who surrendered, and only 25% were those whose death on the battlefield went unnoticed by their comrades in the heat of the fight against the enemy, as well as the wounded who were captured not for good will, but according to the circumstances of the combat situation.

October 25, 1941

From early morning the battle flared up with renewed vigor. The entire first half of the day of the 1st Guards. The MSD not only did not move forward, but also with difficulty held back the attacks of superior enemy forces, being subjected to the most severe artillery and mortar fire. At about 2 p.m., the enemy launched an air strike on our troops with a group of up to 25 aircraft and launched a decisive attack.

The 175th SME, which had only about 250 people before the start of the battle and defended itself in houses and buildings directly on the river bank, suffered heavy losses and was soon forced to retreat to the opposite bank.

Two companies of the 2nd battalion of the 6th SME with a platoon of tanks fought all day on the southern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk. One company held the defense at the Nara station.

The 1st battalion with three tanks, taking up defense in the barracks area on the southern outskirts of the city, covered the Kiev highway.

The 3rd battalion defended the settlements of Afanasovka and Ivanovka.

During the battle for the day, the tankers of the 5th Tank Brigade lost 5 tanks.

The unknown village of Novo-Fedorovka became on that day the place of shelter for four command posts: the 33rd Army, the 1st Guards. MSD, 175th SME and 5th TBR.

An interesting document of that time has been preserved in the archive, which allows us to assess the state and capabilities of the 33rd Army formations at that time. For some unknown reason, there is no data on the status of the 110th SD, with which communication has already been established.

Information on the combat and strength of the formations of the 33rd Army as of 10/25/41

Name of connections	Beginning compound	Private and ml. early compound	Total	Screw. and autom. screw.	Art. pool.	Manual pool.	mortars
1 Guards MSD	857	7712	8569	6732	92	181	57
151 MSBR	124	991	1115*	942	3	13	-
113 SD	185	990	1175	1003	2	6	-
222 SD	360	3032	3392	1934	17	25	6
Replenishment for the 1st Guards. MSD	21	2208	2229	-	-	-	-
For the army	1547	14 933	16 480	11 613	130	247	63

* The data does not correspond to the true state of affairs. There were no more than 600 people in the brigade. - Note. author.

It is striking that for 12,725 fighters and junior commanders of the 113th, 222nd SD and 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, there are only 11,613 rifles and machine guns, that is, 735 people did not have small arms at that time.

The commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major Efimov, together with the commissar and the surviving commanders and political workers during the day tried to somehow organize the battle of their disparate units, but little came of it.

By the end of the day, the headquarters of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade found itself in Sofyino, a village located in the north of the Narsky Ponds, outside the combat zone of the brigade and the 33rd Army, in the defense zone of the 5th Army, moreover, at a considerable distance from the subordinate battalions. It was from there that Major Efimov received a report on the state of affairs in the brigade, which testified that, as such, there was no defense in the brigade zone. It was felt throughout that both the commander and the commissar of the brigade were in complete confusion. The uncertainty of the command of the brigade was transferred to subordinate units, which, even without this, did not differ in particular psychological stability, more than once leaving their positions without orders and visible circumstances.

Ignoring such a deplorable state of affairs in the brigade, the army commander ordered Major Efimov in the morning to go on the offensive with part of his forces and drive the enemy out of the settlements of Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki. Major Efimov, together with the commissar of the brigade, battalion commissar Pegov, took all measures to fulfill the order received by the commander. Surprisingly, by morning they managed not only to find the commanders of the 453rd and 455th SMEs, but also to assign the battalion commanders the task of capturing the village of Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki, and also to assist in resolving a number of issues related to the organization of the offensive. Finally, they managed to feed the personnel, who in recent days ate only what could be obtained from the local population.

As expected, the left-flank divisions were unable to fulfill their task of capturing the frontier on the opposite bank of the Nara River.

The 110th SD reached the approaches to the settlements of Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo, where it was stopped by enemy mortar fire defending in these settlements, and by artillery fire from the opposite bank of the river. Nara. By the end of the day, parts of the division went over to the defense of the line, passing along the edge of the forest to the northeast of the indicated settlements. Based on the size, capabilities and condition of the division, this was already an undoubted success, although the army command remained extremely dissatisfied with the fact that the division did not fulfill its task.

The 113th SD, numbering according to the report of the division headquarters, in its composition "... 1330 people with 1052 rifles", after an unsuccessful attack on Kamenskoye, Klovo, Ryzhkovo, went over to the defense of the line passing along the edge of the forest northeast of these settlements.

Despite the fact that the 110th and 113th rifle divisions did not fulfill the combat mission set by the army commander, they managed to achieve the main thing: the left flank of the army acquired a certain stability, and the units operating here were able to enter into tactical and fire communication with each other, which was very important in this challenging environment.

October 26, 1941

1st Guards The MSD continued to fight the enemy throughout the day. By the end of the day, units of the 175th MP managed to capture the village near the Berezovka stream, located on the eastern bank of the Nara River, in which units of the 479th PP of the 258th PD were in charge for two days.

Active combat operations of the army troops that day took place on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, despite the fact that the units that were part of the brigade were extremely small in number and fought at a considerable distance from each other.

The brigade, which at that time consisted of only about 600 fighters and commanders, occupied a 14-kilometer-long defense line from Lyakhov (near Mozhayskoye Highway) to Radchino (east of Golovkovo). The headquarters of the brigade was still located in Sofiin near the Narsky Ponds, at a distance of 8 km from the front line.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, the 453rd SME, with the support of two T-26 tanks remaining in service, went on the offensive against the enemy defending in the village of Kryukovo from the line of the state farm Golovkovo, Radchino. The enemy met our attacking units with strong artillery and mortar fire. The battle took on a protracted character, but the units of the battalion, despite the losses, slowly moved forward.

With the approach of the battalion to Kryukovo, the enemy, with a force of up to one and a half companies of infantry, supported by mortar fire, unexpectedly launched a strong counterattack, as a result of which the 3rd company and the battalion headquarters were cut off from the rest of the units and, suffering heavy losses, retreated to Yakshino. The first and second companies, which were surrounded, continued to fight the enemy and almost completely died on this field.

At 15 o'clock, the 455th MSB, newly formed from different groups of fighters and commanders, numbering 131 people, also launched an attack on the village of Kryukovo from the direction of the hospital, but the enemy did not even allow him to approach the village.

The 454th MSB, with 255 men, continued to hold the occupied defense area west of Brykin throughout the day, conducting a firefight with the enemy.

The 1st cavalry regiment, which was in the reserve of the brigade commander, in the area southwest of Zhikharev, did not take part in the hostilities and only by the end of the day, having allocated a detachment of 80 dismounted cavalry with machine guns and guns, made an unsuccessful attempt in cooperation with 774 -m joint venture of the 222nd SD to drive the enemy out of the settlement of Maurino.

Thus, the attempt of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to fulfill the task set by the army headquarters of capturing Kryukovo and Bolshie Gorki ended in complete failure. Having suffered significant losses, parts of the brigade were forced to retreat to their original position.

The 774th and 479th joint ventures of the 222nd SD took up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the same line: from Maurin to the school north of Tashirov.

An attempt made by the 774th Rifle Regiment, together with a unit of the 1st Cavalry Regiment, to capture Maurino failed. The enemy, with strong machine-gun and mortar fire, stopped their advance at the edge of the forest, 700 m north of Maurin, and did not allow the attackers to even approach the settlement. The division headquarters was located in Myakishev.

The 110th SD at night, at 03:30, unexpectedly for the enemy, went on the offensive, with the task of capturing the settlements of Gorchukhino, Ateptsevo, Sliznevo. The detachment under the command of the assistant chief of staff of the 1291st Infantry Regiment, Captain S. G. Izakson, acted swiftly, whose fighters and commanders in the morning, during a fierce attack, drove the enemy out of the village of Gorchukhino and entrenched themselves in the village.

On the left flank of the division, during a bayonet attack, one of the units broke into the village of Sliznevo. Some time later, the enemy, having brought up reinforcements, with the support of four tanks, launched a counterattack and forced our soldiers to withdraw to their original position, to the edge of the forest west of Sliznevo.

At 4 o'clock in the morning, units of the 113th SD launched an attack on the enemy, who was defending in the village. Kamenskoye and south of it. However, the enemy repelled their offensive without much difficulty, and in the course of the counterattack, forced our units to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Nara River, occupying the village of Romanovo, which had previously been defended by one of the battalions of the 3rd SP, and the dominant height from el. 208.3, where one of the companies of the 1st SP was on the defensive. Thus, the division not only failed to fulfill the assigned task, but was also forced to leave to the enemy part of the territory it had previously occupied.

October 27, 1941

Having received information that the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade failed to complete the task of capturing Kryukov and Bolshiye Gorki, the army commander, General Efremov, ordered the army chief of staff, General A.K. Kondratiev, to immediately send the brigade commander an order: by the end of the day, by all means began to take possession of the settlement Bolshie Gorki.

Having received the order of the army commander, the brigade commander, Major Efimov, sent a short combat order to the commander of the 454th SME:

"TO THE COMMANDER OF 454 MSB

The fulfillment of the task of mastering MAURINO-GORKA is a condition for the fulfillment of the task of the entire army.

I ORDER:

MAURINO - SLIDES to master at all costs, at any cost. To persons who do not comply with the order, apply all measures in full, using all their rights ...

(Commander of the 151st MSBR, Major EFIMOV. 10/27/41 ".)

The brigade again received an obviously impossible order from the army command. Major Efimov, setting the task for the battalion commander to capture the settlements of Maurino and Gorki, of course, understood that the battalion, having 270 people in its composition, without the support of artillery, had no way to capture these settlements, but could not do anything.

At this time, the 454th MSB was on the defensive in the Brykin area, being 11 km from the settlement of Bolshiye Gorki and 9 km from Maurin. The distance between these settlements was about 5 km. In addition, on the way to the Bolshoi Gorki was with. Kryukovo, that is, at first it was necessary to destroy the German units defending in Kryukov, and only after that to continue the offensive on Bolshie Gorki.

The successive attack of the battalion, first on Maurino, and then on B. Gorki, was also fraught with great difficulties, since even in the event of a successful battle for Maurino, the subsequent attack on Bolshiye Gorki would most likely be repulsed by enemy fire defending in Kryukov, as this and was done by him the day before.

While the command of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was preparing to attack Maurino and Bolshiye Gorki, a directive of the Military Council of the Western Front dated 10/27/41 was adopted by telegraph at the army headquarters, which was ordered to be immediately brought to the attention of the formation and unit commanders:

“The Military Council of the front considered the decision of the Military Council of the 33rd Army of October 23, 1941 on the issue of leaving the commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade Major EFIMOV and the Military Commissar of the Brigade PEGOV of his brigade.

The Military Council of the 33rd ARMY, having qualified the act of EFIMOV and PEGOV as a shameful flight from the battlefield and a treacherous act dooming the 151st Brigade to complete collapse, at the same time, by the above-mentioned decision, instructed EFIMOV and PEGOV to immediately go to the unit to carry out a combat mission and collect a unit.

The military council of the front considers such a decision harmful and objectively provocative, allowing desertion and even betrayal while leaving such commanders and commissars in their places.

The decision of the Military Council of the 33rd ARMY, in this regard, to cancel.

The Prosecutor of the Front and the Head of the Special Department of the Front immediately leave for the 33rd ARMY, conduct an investigation on this matter and, if desertion from the field of EFIMOV and PEGOV is confirmed, they should immediately be shot before the line of commanders.

Commander of the 33rd ARMY YEFREMOV and Member of the Military Council of the 33rd ARMY SHLYAKHTIN to announce a severe reprimand with a warning that they themselves will continue to be removed from their posts and put on trial for their conciliatory attitude towards such shameful behavior of commanders and political workers.

Bring this decision to the attention of the Military Councils of the armies, commanders and commissars of divisions, formations and units.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN ".)

The fate of the command of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was decided, but neither Major Efimov nor the senior battalion commissar Pegov knew anything about this and continued to take measures to fulfill the task set by the army commander.

Leaving the previously occupied defense sector completely uncovered, units of the 454th MSB made a march to the Maurina area all night of October 27, where they arrived at 4 o'clock in the morning. The commander and commissar of the brigade were at the command post of the cavalry regiment on the outskirts of the village of Zhikharevo, and from there they supervised the preparation of the brigade for the attack on Maurino. Despite the fact that the army commander ordered the enemy to be driven out of Maurino on October 27, Major Efimov decided to launch an offensive on the morning of October 28, due to the fact that the battalion was unable to attack due to fatigue of the personnel after making a night march in conditions of complete impassability.

Units of the 454th MSB, together with part of the forces of the 1st Separate Cavalry Regiment, put themselves in order all day, conducted reconnaissance and prepared for an attack on Maurino, where, according to intelligence, they defended up to an enemy battalion. However, the forces and means to capture the settlement, turned by the enemy into a well-equipped stronghold with a well-thought-out fire system, were clearly not enough. From the east, units of the 774th SP of the 222nd SD were to attack Maurino.

In the midst of preparing units for the offensive, representatives of the army headquarters, the Special Department and the Military Tribunal of the Western Front arrived at the brigade, who had in their hands a copy of the directive of the commander of the Western Front received in the morning. Together with them, a new brigade commander, Major Kuzmin, and a new commissar, senior political instructor Yablonsky, arrived.

Major Efimov and senior political instructor Pegov were immediately removed from command of the brigade and arrested.

The 222nd SD, continuing to defend the occupied defense zone, part of the forces of the 774th Rifle Division was preparing for an attack on Maurino from the east.

1st Guards The MSD continued to fight for Naro-Fominsk, although it had long been clear that the city could not be recaptured from the enemy with the available forces and means. The replenishment received at night, in the amount of 533 people, was immediately distributed in parts, and already on the same day its main part took part in the battles for the city.

Understanding the attention paid by the command of the Western Front and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the course of hostilities for Naro-Fominsk, the army command was forced to conduct senseless military operations on the southwestern outskirts of the city and send reports of the appropriate content to the front headquarters, in which there were more illusions than truth:

“...1 MSD - there are no significant changes in the location. Conducts stubborn battles for the final mastery of the city ... ".

Of course, there could be no question of any mastery of the city. The enemy's 258th Infantry Division managed to turn the city into a strong stronghold, concentrating significant reserves to the west of Naro-Fominsk. A significant amount of artillery weapons allowed the German units, already on initial stage offensive of our units, from a long distance inflict heavy losses on them.

By the end of the day, the situation in the combat zone of the 1st Guards. The MSD has not changed. The division had to fight with an eye on the flanks, which were not well protected. Communication with the neighbors was absent, although it was not necessary to rely on their help, in which case, especially. The replenishment allocated to the division could not make up for its losses both in quantity and especially in quality. The construction of the division's battle formation in one echelon on a wide front, with the allocation of a minimum reserve, did not allow for a sufficient number of forces and means in the direction of concentration of the main efforts, which doomed its actions to failure in advance.

In the afternoon, another cipher telegram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front:

"TO COMMANDER YEFREMOV

DIVISION COMMANDER LIZYUKOV

Your actions to master NARO-FOMINSK are completely wrong. Instead of encircling, isolating the enemy in the city, you have chosen protracted, exhausting street battles, in which you also use tanks, as a result of which you suffer huge losses in people and tanks.

I ORDER:

With a blow to the flanks of 1 GMSD, discard the pr-ka in the southern and south-west. directions, isolate the enemy occupying part of the city, and block part of the forces, thus destroying the city.

It is forbidden to use tanks in the city.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN, SOKOLOVSKY ".)

The headquarters of the Western Front, apparently, still did not know and did not understand the complexity of the situation in the Naro-Fominsk region, not even trying to realize that the formations of the 33rd Army, bled dry during continuous, many days of fighting, were holding back the onslaught enemy, and there was no need to talk about active offensive operations.

Deadly tired during the six-day battles with the enemy, having practically not taken any food during this time except bread, the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders sometimes fell asleep in their hastily built trenches and cells right during the battle.

The 110th SD, continuing to restore the combat capability of its units and subunits, conducted active combat operations with small groups of trained fighters and commanders detached from the battalions, giving the enemy no rest. The battalion of the 1287th joint venture continued to hold the village of Gorchukhino, which was repeatedly attacked by the enemy. The battle for this settlement, which at times turned into bayonet battles, continued throughout the day, but the enemy did not succeed in capturing it.

In the morning, part of the units of the 1287th and 1291st joint ventures and the consolidated company of the Moscow marching rifle battalion launched an attack on Sliznevo. Setting an example for the fighters and commanders, the attack was personally led by the division commander, Colonel I. I. Matusevich and the military commissar of the division, V. V. Kilosanidze. The enemy, having met the attackers with strong machine-gun and mortar fire, forced them to lie down and then retreat to their original position. The repeated attack on Sliznevo, carried out at night, also did not give positive results.

In his report addressed to the army commander about the main reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the division to capture the village of Sliznevo, the division commander, Colonel Matusevich, reported:

“The main reasons for failure are:

a) the lack of artillery fire weapons, mortars, and especially machine guns, the existing 120-mm mortars are not provided with mines;

b) the lack of means of communication does not make it possible to use the firing of divisional artillery from closed OPs. Shooting from closed positions is impossible, since the guns are put out of action by enemy mortar fire;

c) a large shortage of command personnel and their inability to manage, lead troops, as a result of which, acting in the conditions of forest areas, units crawl through the forest and cannot be assembled by this command staff.

As a result of extreme fatigue during the continuous conduct of hostilities, with insufficient technical equipment, in full staff, in constant understaffing from different units by Red Army soldiers assembled by detachments, irregular food supply, lack of hot food (no kitchens, insufficient transport, extremely difficult road conditions) stability in combat is weak.

The 3rd Rifle Division of the 113th Rifle Division, which had left Romanovo the day before, received an order from the division commander to drive the enemy out of the village. Coming to the eastern edge of the forest northeast of Romanov, the attacking units were met by strong mortar and machine-gun fire from the enemy and could not complete the task, losing about 60 people killed and wounded. The actions of the 2nd joint venture on the offensive in the direction of the village of Iklinskoye were just as unsuccessful. After several unsuccessful attacks, Colonel Mironov ordered the unit commanders to withdraw to their original position.

The staffing level of the combat units of the division continued to be extremely low. At that time, the 1st joint venture had only 15 people in the rifle battalions (!), the 2nd joint venture - 108 people, and the 3rd joint venture - 220.

It is impossible not to admire the courage and steadfastness of these people, who, being in inhuman conditions, fought day and night, holding back the onslaught of German troops rushing to Moscow. But it must be taken into account that in order to conduct hostilities, it was also necessary to deliver ammunition, food, military-technical and other necessary equipment to formations and units of the army. The condition of the roads at that time, as well as the weather, not only made it difficult to transport material resources, but simply made this event impossible. Probably, nature itself, God himself, realizing the scale of this universal catastrophe called the Second World War, seemed to reconcile people, forcing them to stop this bloody slaughter.

“... The roads in the army's zone of action are impassable, even for guzhtransport, vehicular traffic is possible only along the highway.

Delivery of ammunition to the left flank of the army 110 and 113 SD is carried out manually at a distance of 20-25 km.

October 28, 1941

Early in the morning, units of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division began, as it turned out later, the last attempt to drive the enemy out of Naro-Fominsk.

The consolidated detachment of the division, made up of soldiers of the 175th SME and tankers of the 12th Tank Regiment of the 5th Tank Brigade, under the overall command of the commander of the 175th SME, Major N. P. Baloyan, was supposed to break through the city to the southwestern outskirts and gain a foothold there.

In the predawn twilight, tanks with infantry landing at high speeds rushed along the stone bridge to the city center, but the enemy was on the alert and immediately opened heavy barrage fire. The sky was lit up with rockets. Only the first vehicles that managed to use the surprise factor were able to slip through the bridge and break into the city. The remaining tanks were knocked out and set on fire by enemy artillery not far from the main building of the weaving and spinning factory. The KB tank under the command of Lieutenant G. Khetagurov was able to penetrate the deepest defenses of the enemy, but even he, having received damage, was forced to retreat to the factory building, where the fighters of the company of Senior Lieutenant Kudryavtsev were defending.

The small battalions of the division, having gone on the offensive, immediately came under heavy enemy fire. Having advanced four hundred meters forward, to the area of ​​the city hospital, they were stopped by the enemy and, suffering heavy losses, fought a firefight with him at the reached line.

At the same time, units of the 1289th joint venture, under the command of Major Bezzubov, crossed the Nara River in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Konopelovka dacha, trying to capture a small bridgehead on the western bank. At the cost of heavy losses, the regiment was able to gain a foothold on the opposite bank, but strong machine-gun and mortar fire from the enemy prevented it from moving forward.

Every two hours, reports on the state of affairs and the progress of the task were sent to the army headquarters, but there was nothing significant in these reports - the offensive was clearly choking. The enemy did not let him raise his head, the units of the division paid too high a price for each meter of the recaptured territory, but an order is an order, and it had to be carried out. There is no reason to doubt the fierceness of the battles for Naro-Fominsk on this day, all the more surprising are the reporting documents of the headquarters of the 1st MSD, studying which one might think that no hostilities took place in the Naro-Fominsk region that day.

From the operational summary of the headquarters of the 1st Guards. MSD No. 012 at 16.00 10.28.41:

“... Losses of personnel for 10/28/41 according to tentative data:

175 MP lost killed - 1, wounded - 36; 6 MP lost killed - 6, wounded - 23; 5 TBR and 13 AP have no personnel losses.

For 9 hours of continuous battle, when the regiments, according to the report of the division headquarters, could not raise their heads due to the strong artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire of the enemy, without having any advance, the losses of the division's units amounted to only 7 people killed.

The 151st motorized rifle brigade, with the forces of the 454th MSB and the 1st separate cavalry regiment, in cooperation with the battalion of the 774th joint venture of the 222nd SD, early in the morning after a short artillery preparation carried out by the artillery forces of the 222nd division, launched an attack on Maurino . Despite heavy losses, the soldiers of the 454th MSB and the dismounted cavalrymen of the 1st Cavalry Regiment broke into the northern outskirts of Maurino at 11 o'clock and started a battle with the enemy in the village. A desperate struggle went on for every house.

Taking advantage of the success of the brigade, units of the 774th joint venture of the 222nd SD broke into the eastern outskirts of Maurino. However, the enemy did not think to retreat. Pulling infantry from Kryukov to the company, the enemy with a strong counterattack, supported by mortar fire, forced the soldiers of the 454th SME and the cavalrymen of the 1st cavalry regiment to retreat to its northern outskirts. By this time, parts of the brigade had suffered very heavy losses: out of 250 fighters and commanders who took part in the attack on Maurino, no more than 60 people survived.

At 18:00, German artillery launched a heavy fire raid on the northern outskirts of Maurino and forced the remnants of the units of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to retreat to the edge of the forest 500 m north and east of the settlement. Somewhat earlier, the battalion of the 774th Rifle Division retreated to its original position. Despite the heroism and courage of the fighters and commanders, it was not possible to capture Maurin.

The position of the brigade battalions was very difficult. Almost uninterrupted battles with the enemy for two weeks, lack of normal nutrition, heavy losses among the personnel, and especially among the commanders of the link, the platoon-company led to the complete moral and physical exhaustion of the fighters and commanders. Battalions and companies existed only on paper.

In the 455th MSB, after two days of fighting for Kryukovo, only 40 people remained in the ranks.

While the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade was fighting the enemy for Maurino, the headquarters of the 5th and 33rd armies were fighting over who would have the brigade at their disposal. In the afternoon, a telegram was received from the headquarters of the Western Front, in which, finally, her fate seemed to be decided. According to the order of the commander of the Western Front, she became part of the 33rd Army.

The chief of staff of the 33rd Army, Major General A. Kondratyev, sent a telegram to the headquarters of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 5th Army with the following content:

"TO THE COMMANDER OF 151 MSBR

copy: TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH ARMY

According to a telegram from the headquarters of the Western Front, the 151st MSBR is completely subordinate to the 33rd ARMY.

COMMANDER ORDERED:

1. Immediately regroup the brigade to the right flank of the 222nd SD in the area of ​​LYUBANOVO, MAURINO ... "

However, the liaison officer, who had gone to the headquarters of the 5th Army with the text of this telegram, brought it back with the resolution of the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army, Major General A. A. Filatov:

"TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF 33 A

On the basis of personal negotiations with the chief of staff of the FRONT, the 151st Brigade temporarily remains in place until the final decision of the Komfront.

The final decision was made at night. For some unknown reason, the front commander, General Zhukov, changed his original decision and ordered the reassignment of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade to the commander of the 5th Army.

Parts of the 222nd SD fought the enemy all day. The offensive of the battalion of the 774th Rifle Division, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, on Maurino was repulsed by the enemy. An attempt by the 779th Rifle Regiment, together with part of the units of the 774th Rifle Regiment, to drive the enemy out of Tashirov also ended unsuccessfully.

The 110th SD captured Sliznev by the end of the day.

The commander of the army, General Efremov, in a combat report for the day, reported to the headquarters of the front:

“... During the attack of SLIZNEVO, exceptionally bold and decisive actions of fighters and commanders are noted, who managed to drive out a stubbornly defending enemy from the settlement, well equipped with automatic weapons, supported by three tanks” .

Part of the forces of the division fought in the direction of with. Ateptsevo, however, here the enemy managed to repulse the attacks of her units.

During the day, the 113th SD repelled attacks by small enemy units from the direction of Chichkovo.

The fighting in the army zone continued until late at night. No one knew that this was the last day of offensive battles between formations and units of the army against the German troops. Within a few hours, an order will be received from the commander of the Western Front on the transition to defense.

October 29, 1941

At 2:45 a.m., a telegram was received from the Military Council of the Western Front with the following content:

“TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 33rd ARMY.

The task set by the Zapfront has not been completed by you. You poorly organized and prepared the offensive, as a result of which, without completing the tasks, you suffered heavy losses.

In connection with this, the military council of the Western Front considers it useless to continue the offensive.

I ORDER:

on the front of the army, go over to stubborn defense on the line occupied, continuing to clear NARO-FOMINSK in small detachments.

Create a solid anti-tank defense, layered depth, reinforcing it with tanks set in ambush.

Create a reserve in the army, having it on the NARO-FOMINSK highway.

Immediately begin to restore the divisions of the army and put them in order, first of all, the 1st Guards. MSD.

Continue to destroy and exhaust the enemy with small fighter detachments.

(ZHUKOV, BULGANIN ".)

The army headquarters, in accordance with a telegram from the commander of the Western Front, gave preliminary orders to the army formations to go over to the defense on the occupied lines and proceeded to develop a decision on defense and prepare an order.

The 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, together with its defense zone, was transferred to the 5th army of General Govorov. The stay of the brigade as part of the 33rd Army was short-lived, only eleven days, but during this short period its fighters and commanders, covering the right flank of the army, did not allow the enemy to freely break through to Naro-Fominsk from the north-western direction. In the course of many days of continuous battles with the enemy, the brigade inflicted heavy damage on the enemy in terms of manpower and equipment. There were also significant shortcomings, but who didn’t have them then: both fighters and commanders were just learning to fight for real.

The next day, in his report to the commander of the 5th Army on the results of the combat operations of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade over the past period and the state of subordinate units, the new brigade commander, Major Kuzmin, reported:

“As a result of the fighting from 13 to 29.10.41. 151 MSBR suffered very significant losses in personnel and weapons. The personnel of the battalions was changed almost completely twice, and yet on 10/30/41. battalions consist of 20 to 60 people. The most difficult situation with the command staff. The battalions are commanded by junior lieutenants, only one 455 SME is commanded by a senior lieutenant. There are no company commanders, no platoon commanders either. Thus, even if the brigade is replenished with Red Army personnel, it is impossible to create full-blooded battalions, and in the present situation, when the battalions are only designated, the brigade is able to carry out combat missions that are feasible for one or two rifle companies.

In addition to the battalions, the brigade has two T-26 tanks and artillery divisions consisting of 7 guns. I ask you to replenish the brigade with personnel and, first of all, command staff ...

(Commander of the 151st Motorized Rifle Brigade, Major KUZMIN.)

A few days later, the 151st motorized rifle brigade was disbanded.

The 222nd SD, occupying the defense at the turn: the edge of the forest north of Maurino, Lyubanovo, the Tashirovo school, part of the forces of the 774th SP was preparing for a new offensive on Maurino.

1st Guards MSD took up defensive positions along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the turn: excl. Ateptsevo, barracks, a large stone bridge near the Church of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, a pioneer camp at the Tashirov turn.

Parts of the division continued to fight in small units on the eastern and northeastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, as well as in the area of ​​​​a weaving and spinning factory, where one of the buildings was held by a rifle company of the 175th SME. German troops controlled the main part of the city. Before the enemy company, it again leaked to the eastern bank of the Nara River, to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Berezovka, threatening a breakthrough to the Moscow-Kyiv highway.

The position of the units of the division was as follows:

1289th defended the line: excl. school Tashirovo, state farm, artel "Ogorodniki", having headquarters in a military town.

The 175th SME took up defense along the eastern bank of the Nara River, from the Ogorodniki artel to the railway bridge across the Nara River. The headquarters of the regiment was in the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

The 6th SME covered the intersection of roads Moscow - Kyiv, Naro-Fominsk - Ateptsevo with one battalion, and fought with the enemy who had penetrated into the village of Berezovka with another. Closer to the night, the battalion received the task of going on the defensive at the turn: the railway bridge, excl. Gorchukhino. The regimental headquarters was located in the Nara station area.

The 110th SD, as a result of an enemy counterattack with a force of up to two companies with three tanks, was forced to leave the village of Sliznevo at 8:30. Attempts by units of the division to return Sliznevo, undertaken in the afternoon, were unsuccessful, despite the fact that one of the German tanks was hit during the battle. By the end of the day, parts of the division took up defense along the line: Gorchukhino, the western edge of the forest east of Ateptsev, the edge of the forest east of Sliznev.

The 113th SD was defending along the edge of the forest northeast of the settlements of Kamenskoye, Klovo, Ryzhkovo.

At 0940 hours, the commander of the army, General Efremov, signed a combat order to go over to the defensive:

"BATTLE ORDER No. 061. START 33. YAKOVLEVSKOE. 10/29/41.

1. On the front of the army, the enemy, with forces of up to two divisions (part 7 of the PD, 258 PD and part 3 of the MD), puts up stubborn resistance.

In the coming days, we should expect an offensive in the NARO-FOMINSKY and TASHIROV-KUBAN directions ...

3. 33 ARMY: 222 SD, 1 Guards. MSD, 110 and 113 SD, 486 GAP, 557 PAP, 2/364 KAP, 1/109 GAP, 600 AP PTO, 989 AP PTO, 509 AP PTO, 2/13 GV. MIN. DIVISION, 5 DIV. GV. MIN. DIVISION, continuing to clear the west in small detachments. part of the city of NARO-FOMINSK and the left bank of the river. NARA from the enemy, from the morning of October 29, goes on the defensive along the left bank of the river. NARA in the area LYUBANOVO (10 km northwest of NARO-FOMINSK), RYZHKOVO (18 km southeast of NARO-FOMINSK).

4. 222 SD with 509 AP VET, 2/364 KAP and 2/13 GV. MIN DIVISION, vzv. PTR in cooperation with 151 MSBr during 29.10 destroy the enemy in the MAURINO area and move to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the site: LYUBANOVO, RED TUREYKA (ERMAKOVO); especially densely occupy the approaches to the KUBAN highway, creating an anti-tank rifle in the areas:

a) LYUBANOVO, NEW;

b) road junction with elev. 182.5;

c) SMALL. SEMENYCHI, GOLOVENKINO.

Provide a joint with 5 A. Select at least reinforced

battalion reserve division and locate in the MAL area. SEMENYCHI…

5. 1 GV. MSD with 600 AP PTO, 486 GAP, 557 PAP, 5 sec. MIN. DIVISION, four PTR platoons, continuing to clear the zap. part of the city of NARO-FOMINSK in small detachments, go to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the site RED TUREYKA (ERMAKOVO), (claim) GORCHUKHINO. Create PTR in areas:

a) COTTAGE KONOPELOVKA (D. O. TUREYKA);

b) east. part of NARO-FOMINSK;

c) ALEKSANDROVKA;

d) BEKASOVO, RAZ. BEKASOVO. Reinforce anti-tank missiles with tanks placed in ambushes.

Have a reserve of at least a reinforced battalion with tanks in the NOVO-FEDOROVKA area ...

6. 110 SD with him one cock. PTR during 29.10 to destroy the enemy in ATEPTSEVO and go to a stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the site GORCHUKHINO, (claim) CHICHKOVO.

Create PTR in areas:

a) VOLKOVSKY COTTAGE;

b) MAYBE...

7. 113 SD from 1/109 GAP, two batteries of 989 AP PTO, from the morning of October 29, go to stubborn defense along the left bank of the river. NARA on the section CHICKOVO, RYZHKOVO. Create PTR in areas:

a) KAMENSKOE;

c) SERGOVKA, PLASINA;

d) MACHIKHINO.

KP - PLAKSINO.

8. Continue to destroy and exhaust the enemy with small fighter detachments ... ".

With the receipt of the order to go on the defensive, the units and formations of the army proceeded to the engineering equipment of the indicated lines.

Commander of the 1st Guards MSD Colonel Lizyukov, by his order, assigned the defense of the left bank of the river to the 1289th Infantry Regiment. Nara to the north of Gorodishche, in the area from Krasnaya Tureyka to the ravine, through which an unnamed stream flowed.

The 175th SME was ordered to defend the left bank of the Nara south of Major Bezzubov's 1289th SP, from the ravine to the railway bridge inclusive.

The 6th SME was supposed to defend itself from the railway bridge to the village of Gorchukhino.

Before the front of the 1st Guards. MSDs were fighting units of the 478th and 479th regiments of the 258th Infantry Division, which took up defensive positions in Naro-Fominsk and its immediate environs.

Gradually, the banks of the Nara River, both to the left and to the right along its course, began to be surrounded by trenches, trenches, residential dugouts, command and staff dugouts.

According to intelligence, the enemy was pulling up reserves from the depths, preparing for a new offensive, which, according to the assumption of the Red Army command, could begin in the very near future.

October 30, 1941

The 222nd SD continued to occupy the defense along the northeastern bank of the river. Nara was in the zone indicated to her and actively carried out work on the fortification equipment of the defense sections of the units.

The 774th SP defended along the southwestern edge of the forest northeast of Maurin, covering the Maurino-Dyutkovo road;

The 113th joint venture, reassigned on the eve of the division, took up defense at the turn: excl. Lyubanovo to the mouth of the Inevka stream;

The 479th joint venture took up defense in the area: excl. the mouth of the Inevka stream along the edge of the forest to the Tashirovo school.

1st Guards The MSD continued to work on the fortification equipment of the units' defense sites.

The right-flank 5th company of the 1289th Rifle Division, together with the battalion of the 479th Rifle Division of the 222nd Rifle Division, attempted to destroy the enemy in the Tashirovo MTS area, but, having suffered heavy losses, retreated to its original position.

The units of the 175th SME by 14 o'clock occupied the following position:

The defense of Konopelovka and the military camp was entrusted to the 3rd battalion.

The 1st battalion defended along the eastern bank of the Nara River at the line: state farm, gardeners artel to the mouth of the Gvozdnya stream.

The 5th and 4th companies of the 2nd battalion defended from the mouth of the Gvozdnya stream to the railway bridge and from the bridge to the village of Berezovka, respectively. The 6th company was in reserve, located in the center of the village of Novo-Fedorovka.

The 6th SME with the forces of the 3rd battalion continued to hold part of the eastern outskirts of Naro-Fominsk, conducting street battles with the enemy 500-700 meters south of the Stone Bridge. The battalion received the task on the night of October 30 to go to the second echelon, concentrating in the area of ​​​​the "Vegetable" state farm.

The 2nd battalion fought with the enemy, who had penetrated the northwestern outskirts of the village of Berezovka.

The 1st battalion took up defense at the turn: excl. barracks, excl. Gorchukhino. Despite the fact that active hostilities were not conducted that day, the losses of the division (without the 1289th joint venture) from enemy artillery and mortar fire amounted to 170 people killed and wounded.

Due to the fact that the army commander ordered the inclusion of s. Tashirovo in the defense zone of the 1st Guards. MSD, division commander Colonel Lizyukov ordered Major N. A. Bezzubov “to clear the east from the enemy. bank of the river NARA, opposite the village of TASHIROVO, starting from the MTS, and organize a stubborn defense of the east. banks of the river NARA against the village of TASHIROVO ".

The 110th SD, occupying the defense at the previous line, part of the forces of the 1287th SP fought for Ateptsevo, and the 1291st SP fought for Sliznevo. The units of the enemy's 8th Motorized Regiment, defending there, with a strength of up to a company in each settlement, repulsed the attacks of our units with mortar fire and forced them to retreat to their original position. The division headquarters was located in the village of Volkovskaya Dacha.

Parts of the 113th SD continued to occupy and improve the engineering line: excl. Chichkovo, Kamenskoye, Ryzhkovo, river bend 1 km to the south.

Late in the evening, a cipher telegram was received from the headquarters of the front, in which the directive of the commander of the troops of the Western Front on measures to disrupt the offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow No. 0428 was set out.

October 31, 1941

The 222nd SD with reinforcements occupied the former defense line. Artillery units and subunits attached to reinforce the division occupied firing positions in the depths of the defense, part of the artillery units was involved in creating an anti-tank defense line in the areas: the northeastern outskirts of Maurino, the northeastern outskirts of Lyubanovo, Novaya and Myakishevo. The combined arms reserve of the division commander - the 3rd battalion of the 479th joint venture, the reconnaissance company and the command post of the division were located in the forest north of the village of Malye Semenychi.

The enemy took up defensive positions on the western bank of the river. Nara, concentrating in the village of Tashirovo and its environs up to an infantry regiment. At least a company of infantry was in the MTS on the eastern bank of the Nara River, which German units had captured the day before, turning it into their stronghold.

Parts of the 1st Guards. MSD continued engineering work on equipping defense areas. The 6th SME fought with the enemy between the railway and the Berezovka stream. However, the attack, undertaken by the 2nd Battalion, supported by the division's artillery, was not successful. On the opposite bank of the river, only one company of the 175th SME, senior lieutenant Kudryavtsev, remained, defending itself in one of the factory buildings.

Parts of the 110th SD occupied the former defense sectors, carrying out work on their engineering equipment. A platoon of anti-tank rifles, allocated to the division commander, was in firing positions, covering the main tank-dangerous direction in the area of ​​​​the village of Ateptsevo.

The 113th SD continued to improve the line of defense it occupied. The command post of the division moved to Plaksino. The combat report of the headquarters of the 113th SD for the day noted:

“... During the night, engineering work was carried out to equip the defensive section with trenches of a full profile and to equip the PTR in KAMENSKOE, KLOVO, RYZHKOVO, PLAKSINO.

The absence of a trench tool slows down the pace of work - the division has only 63 shovels, there are also no PP and PT obstacles ... ".

In the afternoon, another replenishment for units and formations of the army arrived, among them there were many Muscovites: workers of the Moscow Automobile Plant, metallurgists of the Sickle and Hammer plant, fitters of the Mytishchi plant, railway workers, workers and other specialists of many Moscow enterprises.

Replenishment arrived almost every day and in quantitative terms, if not completely, then to a large extent covered the losses of troops, which could not be said about the quality of its training and armament. Needless to say, such replenishment did not have the best effect on the morale and psychological state of the fighters and commanders.

However, the replenishment arrived practically unarmed. The commander of the 113th SD, Colonel K. I. Mironov, was forced to send a telegram to the army headquarters with the following content:

"TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE 33rd ARMY

The artillery supply of the division does not have any surplus combat weapons.

Meanwhile, replenishment in recent days arrives almost without any weapons. So, on October 29, 1941, 210 people arrived. with one easel, one light machine gun and 29 rifles.

On October 30, 1941, 85 people arrived with 33 rifles.

Arriving replenishment in the division without weapons has a demoralizing effect on the rest of the division's fighters.

I ask for your order on the direction of replenishment with full combat weapons.

(Commander of the 113th SD Colonel MIRONOV ".)

October 1941 was the most difficult period of the Moscow battle. The troops of the Western, Kalinin and Bryansk fronts, finding themselves in a difficult operational situation, managed to counter the energetic attempts of the German troops of Army Group Center to break through to Moscow. Formations and units of the Red Army, while suffering heavy losses, nevertheless actively delayed the advance of the enemy troops towards Moscow, exhausted him in the most difficult struggle, gaining such precious time for organizing defense on the outskirts of the capital. However, the mortal danger for Moscow and the whole country grew more and more.

Notes:

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 7, l. one.

TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 1029, l. 177–178. - Emphasized by the author.

See: Combat Composition of the Soviet Army. Part 1. July - December 1941 - M.: VNUGSH, 1963. S. 50–51.

See: Formation and resubordination of combined arms armies 1941–1945. - M.: GSH. pp. 42–43.

See: Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - M.: APN, 1970. S. 334.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 125, l. 23.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 30–31.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. eighteen.

Lizyukov Alexander Ivanovich was born on March 26, 1900 in the city of Gomel (now the Republic of Belarus). Hero of the Soviet Union (1941). Major General (1942). He took an active part in civil war, being the chief of artillery and deputy commander of an armored train. In the prewar years he graduated from the armored school and the Frunze Military Academy. For several years he taught tactics at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization. For four years he commanded a heavy tank regiment, and then another four years - a separate tank brigade. During the period of command of the regiment, for excellent combat training of the unit, he was awarded the order Lenin. The war found him in the position of deputy commander of the 36th Panzer Division of the 17th Mechanized Corps. From August to November 1941 - commander of the 1st Proletarian motorized rifle division, which under his command earned the high rank of "Guards" in battle. From November 1941 - commander of the operational group as part of the 16th Army, General K.K. Rokossovsky. From December 1941 he was commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps. In April 1942, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Tank Corps, on the basis of which the 5th Tank Army was formed, which Major General Lizyukov became commander in June 1942. Due to the unsuccessful actions of the army on the western bank of the river. Don 5th Tank Army was disbanded, and Lizyukov was again appointed commander of the 2nd Tank Corps. July 25, 1942 during the fighting in the area with. Medvezhye, Semiluksky District, Voronezh Region, Major General A.I. Lizyukov died. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the medal "XX Years of the Red Army". - Note of the author.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 5, l. one.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 21, 26.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 21, l. 48.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 47.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 49.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 4, l. 43.

Bezzubov Nikolai Aleksandrovich was born on December 11, 1902 in the village of Zheludki, Palkinsky District, Yaroslavl Region. In 1930 he graduated from the Ryazan infantry school and served in various command positions. In May 1938, he was appointed battalion commander of the 131st Rifle Division of the 44th Rifle Division, and exactly a year later he became commander of the 556th Rifle Division. Before the war, he graduated from the "Shot" courses and was appointed regiment commander. During the fighting near Naro-Fominsk, he commanded the 1289th SP, then the 110th SD of the 33rd Army. For skillful command of the regiment during the fighting near Naro-Fominsk, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In June 1942 he was awarded the military rank of colonel. After commanding the 110th SD, he was at the disposal of the GUK, commanded the 10th motorized rifle brigade, and was deputy commander of the 303rd SD. Acting commander of the 100th SD, in the battle on July 27, 1943 he was seriously wounded and on the same day he died from his wound. - approx. author.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 67.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 68.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 108.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 159.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 91.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 13, l. 71.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 21, l. 60.

TsAMO RF, f. 3391, on. 1, d. 5, l. 150–151.

The pioneer camp was located near the fork in the roads Naro-Fominsk - Kubinka, Naro-Fominsk - Vereya and was characteristic of pre-war and post-war years name - "Spark". Having stood in the first months of the fighting in the Naro-Fominsk direction and survived under the fire of fascist artillery in early December 1941, it was destroyed during the period of perestroika and glasnost in the mid-90s. Now only a well-preserved monument on a mass grave, where 452 fighters and the commander of the 1289th rifle regiment are buried, is now reminiscent of the fierce battles with the German invaders during the Battle of Moscow, from which a copper plate with the names of the fighters and commanders was stolen several years ago by some scoundrels . For some time, the headquarters of the 1289th Infantry Regiment was located on the territory of the pioneer camp, it is here that the soldiers of the regiment under the command of Major N. A. Bezzubov will fight with the infantry and tanks of the enemy during his last strike in the Naro-Fominsk direction in early December 1941. - Note. author.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 2, l. 94–95.

TsAMO RF, f. 1044, on. 1, d. 4, l. 112.

There, l. 117–118.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 6, l. 25.

TsAMO RF, f. 388, op. 8712, d. 6, l. nineteen.

On April 4, the German command, after two days of bombing, resumed the operation to destroy the encircled 33rd Army immediately from the east (d Kozly) and from the south (Arakcheevo), and on April 10 - from the north and northwest. At this point, it controls the territory, a kind of sleeve, 30 km long and 6 km wide. There are about 10,000 people in the encirclement (The last exact data was on March 10 and consisted of 12,780 combat-ready personnel plus 3,100 people wounded and sick in hospitals). In two days, units of the 5th Panzer Division, together with the 15th Infantry Division, managed to win a serious tactical victory for the first time. On April 12, ice drift began, but the Germans managed to cross the Ugra River and captured the villages of Korosteli and Krasnoye from the west and north. The army is divided into two boilers. The first is in the area of ​​Stuklovo and the forests around, and the second is limited by the villages of Zholobovo, Lutnoye, Naumenki, Fedotkovo, Shpyrevo.


At this moment, realizing the criticality of the situation, from the mainland, the commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, gives the order to break through on the 12th, into the night towards Mal. Viselevo and further to the confluence of the Ugra and Vorya rivers, while the 43rd and 49th armies should advance to meet them and do what they could not do the previous two months. (It’s more correct to say that, under pressure from the Headquarters, he agrees with Efremov’s plan. Zhukov himself insisted on going south towards Belov. Later he was reprimanded for not insisting)
Efremov managed to assemble the units defending the outer perimeter of the ring only a day later. The Germans, to their surprise, at this moment, almost without a fight, take Lutnoye and Naumenki, which they considered well-fortified points with a large concentration of forces. Although the units that held the defense there were supposed to go east, the Germans report a significant number of prisoners taken when combing the forest around Naumenka. On the night of Monday 13 to Tuesday April 14, 1942, the remnants of the western grouping of the 33rd Army prepared to break through in three columns. One column from Zholobovo goes to Belyaevo, (the commander, Colonel Kuchinev, wounded and frostbitten), The second column, under the command of Efremov himself, goes straight along the Shpyrevo-Zhara road. At the head are the remnants of the 160 s.d. According to some reports, there was another group that went around Buslava to Peskovo and from there turned south. The meaning of the movement in three columns is the following, when two columns go in a parallel course, each is responsible for only one flank. In addition, 338, a badly battered division, obviously, it was decided to sacrifice. (Having traveled less than a kilometer through the forest, parallel to the course, she was supposed to reach the heavily fortified village of Belyaevo and tie the Germans there in battle, which would not allow them to send reinforcements to the place of the breakthrough of the main forces). The task of the third column was about the same, but from the side of Buslava, Peskovo. In the rear guard, the retreat near the village of Fedotkovo was covered by the remnants of the 113th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel Bodrov and the reinforcement group of Lieutenant Colonel Kirilov.
At night, the Germans fired at the Shpyrevsky forest with chemical mortars, and then with propaganda shells with leaflets. " German command addressed us: “Soldiers of the 33rd Army! Your position is hopeless, the divisions are broken. Your commander, a lieutenant general, left you and flew away by plane. Further resistance is futile. Surrender! Who will interfere with you - arrest!
During the shelling, the commander of the 1136 joint venture, Major Andreev, was killed. He enjoyed special respect and this made an extremely depressing impression on the soldiers.
The Germans have radio interception and almost accurate decoding of Efremov’s radio message to the center (Wear) and the return answer, they have a complete picture of the group’s exit and the oncoming strike of the Red Army from Krasnaya Gorka
"The intercepted radio message allows us to conclude that the offensive is planned to continue at night, namely in this place" Scheme 2 "we should expect the entry into battle of 3-4 Russian divisions, with the task of reaching the Maloe Viselevo-Zhara line at night from 12.04 to 13.04 and at night from 13.04 to 14.04 to the line of Bolshoe Viselevo - Novaya Mikhailovka In a conversation between the commander and Colonel Vogel at 21:40, the chief of staff reports that another telephone message was intercepted, in which the encircled grouping was urged to break through to the east to the envisaged breakthrough sites south of the confluence of the rivers Ugra and Vorya. The battalion of the 17th Infantry Division is seconded at 22:40 to Maloye Viselevo at the disposal of the XII Army Corps, orders for further combat use will come from there." Here is her text - ““ To Efremov .... You must pass with the main forces during 12.4 and on the night of 13.04 the section of Malaya Veselevo-Zhara and, after fixing on this segment, take it at night or 14.04. Large .... Veselevo - Novaya Mikhailovka 1st Guards Rifle Division (5th Guards Rifle Division?) with ...., 17th and 415th Rifle Divisions must, together with the 53rd Rifle Division, 13.04. .... Small Veselevo ... New Mikhailovka ..... ".
Just in case, one additional battalion takes up defense along the Belyaevo-Buslaev line, the second battalion of 3 battalions 5 infantry. The regiment of the 268th Infantry Division is withdrawn from the front and sent to Maloye Viselevo at the disposal of the 12th Army Corps. (The Germans very rarely indicated the number of battalions. It could be 800 or 300 people) and another barrier was organized outside the village of Rodnya.

The movement began at 22:00 on April 13. The army at that time should have had about 7,000 thousand people, of which 2,193 were wounded and sick, 500 people were not seriously wounded. The wounded were placed on 200 carts. (The Germans were based on a total of 10,000 people at the time of the start of the operation) Patients with typhus who could not move should have been left in the village of Molodeni. There were typhoid barracks. (for sure there are huge sanitary burials there. In general, sometimes there were up to 7 patients with typhus for 1 wounded person).

Contrary to popular belief, Efremov did not walk along the Shpyrevo-Shumikhino road, but to the left of it 700 meters through the forest. This was repeatedly noted on the map compiled in May 42 along the routes of the officers who left the encirclement. In addition, along the road, at that time, there were hayfields and the column would have to go through open space. But then: Can you imagine how to drag 200 wagons with the wounded through the woods? me not. They say that the Germans crushed the carts on the Shpyrevo-Shumikhino road with tanks. Search engines have tried many times to find traces of this tragedy. Sledge runners, horseshoes, horse bones, honey tools should remain ...... To no avail. No trace. This looks strange. And if everything happened in the forest, then the tanks will not reach there.

I think those who could move - went out on their own, in one of the columns, and the rest remained in the place of concentration, and did not move anywhere. Here is a quote confirming this, from the German interrogation of the senior surgeon of the 33rd Army Zhorov on May 5, 42 - “In order to make it easier to get out of the encirclement, small groups were formed. The sick and wounded were “split” into two groups, each under the supervision of one doctor. Later in the course retreat, the seriously wounded were left near Buslav (we have already discovered).When asked why, as a responsible doctor, he did not hand over the seriously wounded to the German troops, since it was impossible to leave the encirclement with them, he replied that his personal convictions did not allow him to leave them to be shot by the Germans. Being under the strong influence of Russian propaganda, he considered it probable that the wounded Russian soldiers would be shot."
Contrary to other popular belief, there was no special ambush on the Belyaevo Buslav road. The Germans simply did not have enough strength for all this. The road was controlled by about, I'm afraid to make a mistake, about 500 people.

At the same time, there were about 25 tanks in the villages themselves. On April 13, the main forces of the 15th Panzer Division were engaged in clearing the forests around Naumenok. Despite the intercepted radio message, the Germans considered the most likely exit route - due east through Peskovo and further to the eastern bank of the Ura. (There was already such an experience. Parts of the three regiments of the 160th Rifle Division, driven out of this village on April 7, and surrounded, after three days of unsuccessful attempts to break back to join the 33rd Army, on April 10 went east, through the Ugra). They thought the same thing would happen this time. Moreover, there was no counter offensive of the Russian armies from the side of the Small Mouth. Having discovered a large concentration of troops, they, as before, surrounded it with guard lines and began to prepare forces for combing the area inside the boiler. The only thing, opposite the intersection of the Belyaevo-Buslav and Fedotkovo-Zhara roads, the guards were a little stronger.

Then the following happened: Approaching the road in the dark, more than 700 meters to the left of the intersection, where the forest comes close to the road, the breaking units broke through it almost immediately, without a strong fight. The guard was destroyed, and possibly fled to the right and left. But, nevertheless, the fight was short. The sounds of gunshots raised the alarm and the remaining guards managed to pull up to the breakthrough site and take the area under crossfire. The longer the corridor existed, the more forces gathered on its sides. Half an hour later, reinforcements and tanks appeared. (how long does it take to get the order to start the cars and drive one and a half kilometers?) After that, the hole was caulked. The Germans did not even understand what happened. Based on the Combat Report, the night of April 13-14 passed calmly, with small skirmishes with the enemy, who tried to break out of the boiler in scattered groups but was thrown back ......

Now let's return to the eastern part of the arm, which was of no particular interest to anyone - to the eastern flank of the western grouping of the 33rd Army. On April 4, the German 20th Panzer Division takes the village of Kozly, the foothold of the 33rd Army on the eastern bank of the Ugra River, with battle. Then on April 7, taking advantage of the negligence of the commanders of the 160th Rifle Division. the Germans occupied Peskovo in a memorandum of the beginning. opera. Department of the 33rd army of Colonel Kinosyan has a record:
On the night of 7.4.42 over 400 people. enemy infantry with six tanks, supported by artillery and mortar fire, went on the offensive on Peskovo.
Units of the 160th Rifle Division, occupying the defense in the forest, sowing. Buslav had no fire connection with the neighbor on the right and did not interact with him. The commander of the 160th Rifle Division did not study the terrain in the Buslav defense area, he did not pay attention to the forest at all. The gap between 1297 joint ventures, which occupied the defense of the sowing. Buslav, and the detachment of Captain Roshchin, was 2.5 km, which was not viewed or guarded by anyone. The unit commanders did not worry about their flanks and reestablishing contact with their neighbors. The forest massif northwest of Buslav is passable for infantry and tanks, and therefore it was necessary to carry out reconnaissance, well - thoughtfully organize defense, especially the fire system on clearings, roads, clearings, organizing close interaction with neighbors. Constantly guard the area with patrols, which was not foreseen and organized by the division commander and not done by the unit commanders. As a result of such carelessness, the enemy infantry with tanks, having paved the way from the northwestern outskirts of Buslav through the forest, unexpectedly entered Peskovo. After a short battle, the enemy took possession of Peskovo, cut off from the 160th rifle division - 1290.1297 joint ventures and part of the forces of 1295 joint ventures. Then he launched an offensive on Shpyrevo, but with timely thrown forces from other sectors and the organization of defense at the turn of the eastern edge of the west. Peskovo, forest to the west. 201.5 and high. 201.8 - the enemy offensive was stopped.

April 1942 Yukhnov area

Several hundred people were surrounded. The main fortified positions north of Buslava. The Germans call this place the "forest camp". Then, on the 8th, they take the Forest Camp in the late afternoon, and comb the forest. The report says that the forest was combed by 19 o'clock, trophies, prisoners, and so on were taken. "Scattered parts" can roam in the forest. However, on the morning of April 9, the "Forest Camp" is again occupied by these "scattered units." All the next day, they wait for attempts to break through the encircled units to the main group of the 33rd Army, but by the next night, some of the encircled seeps to the east, some surrender. The rest are squeezed out to the Ugra and destroyed by mortars in the forest opposite Abramovo.

On April 12, German air reconnaissance reports a large movement of 33rd Army forces from Zholobov towards Fedotkovo. In this regard, the Germans suggest that it is possible to increase pressure or even attempt to break through towards the bridge over the Ugra and towards Abramov (to the east)
On April 13, the Germans are surprised to find that Shpyrevo is defending from the south stronger than they expected, and that there is someone in the Shpyrevo forest. As before, they do not have any exact information about the Russians, except that large forces have accumulated in the area between Fedotkovo - Shpyrevo, and Naumenki - Zholobovo. It was decided on the morning of April 14 to start clearing the forest from the Belyaevo-Buslav road to Shpyrevo, and to subject this area to intensive shelling at night. Another surprise was the discovery of a well-camouflaged battery of howitzers with tractors nearby in the forest near the village of Stupenki.
It is believed (although I don’t know who counted and how. How it was even possible to count.) that 800 people died when the barrier line was broken. Of which 500 from artillery and mortar fire. It's called it happened. The Germans did not assume that almost the entire western group had gathered here in the forest to break through to the southeast. And as I said, they did not notice this breakthrough at all. Perhaps everything was banal and tragic. - After the 338th division and the headquarters group behind it crossed the guard line, the army left without commanders "stuck" as soon as machine-gun fire began from the flanks. There was no violent battle at all. I will now say sedition! there were no tanks on the night of the 13th to the 14th. At least neither the 20th tank from Buslava, nor the 5th tank from Belyaevo singled them out. And there were no others there. There is not a word about night fighting on the road in any of the other documents.
On the morning of April 14, the Germans are still sure that the 33rd Army is inside Semeshkovo, Naumenki Zholobovo, Fedotkovo. The plans of the Germans for the day - the 15th Infantry Division is advancing on Semeshkovo and Naumenki, the 5th Panzer Division is advancing from the north on Zholobovo. The 20th Panzer Division plans to launch an offensive from the south through Hill 201.8 towards Shpyrevo. Due to the complete slush, traffic on the roads is impossible. Also, the Germans cannot transport tanks of 5 TD remaining outside the bend of the river through the Ugra.
In the morning, Colonel Samsonov, the head of the rear of the army, gathers people in the forest and tries to break through again from the boiler in the same place. This time they are noticed "After a good night with small skirmishes with the enemy, the cleaning of the boiler continued in the early morning. Part of the enemy group is trying to break out of the encirclement in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bElevation 201.8 to the south, crossing the Buslav - Belyaevo road. The guards involved there are not strong enough to containment of the enemy, having, according to preliminary estimates, the number of about 300 people, so the enemy manages to cross the road and go to the forest north of Rodnya.

The Germans hastily send reinforcements to Rodnya, and there they intercept and disperse this group. At the same time, 35 people are taken prisoner. In the meantime, a battle had already begun in the Shpyrevsky forest with units of the 20th division that had come to the rescue, and the remnants of the 33rd army were no longer destined to break out to the east in this place. On the Belyaevo-Buslav road, 230 people were left dead.
During this repeated attempt to break through, Colonel Samsonov died. By evening, the Germans manage to clean up the Shpyrevskiy forest, almost the entire forest. The report says that the Russians have only the village of Shpyrevo left, the number of Red Army soldiers, according to the instructions of the prisoners, varies from 200 to 800 people, at most about 1000 people, other Russian prisoners testify that at least 5000 have gathered in the cauldron for a breakthrough to the east people with the General. (perhaps he meant Major General Afrosimov.)
"Trophies" were taken - 3 heavy machine guns, 100 rifles, 8 rapid-fire rifles, 3 anti-tank guns model 1941. with ammunition and many communication devices, in addition, many horse-drawn vehicles and several horses. (not particularly thick). Also by 19 o'clock, the 5th Panzer Division announced the capture of the last line of defense in its area - the village of Zholobovo. General Efremov with his group at that moment was already not far from the Ugra River and quite far, ten kilometers from this place. It snows heavily at night.

R Ugra April 1942
April 15 in the morning the Germans are in high spirits. A message about the moral decay of the enemy goes to the headquarters. They are preparing to storm Shpyrev with the forces of the 5th and 20th Panzer Divisions and partly of the 15th Infantry Division. The rest of the 15th Infantry Division, from Semeshkov, is involved in combing the areas around Zholobov. However, the unexpected happened. - the height in the middle of the forest was again in the hands of the encircled units. At night, Colonel Mironov with a group of 300 people, thinking that the Germans moved forward to Shpyrevo and the Belyaevo Buslav road is free again goes to the height, trying to cross the road from the east. But it turned out that the Germans did not leave the road. After a short fight on the highway, he retreats to the heights. At the same time, the German battalion dug in near Shpyrevo was surrounded, between the village and the group of 160 rifle divisions that settled there under the command of Colonel Yakimov and Lieutenant Colonel Kirilov from the north and the Mironov group from the south. Groups wandering through the forest join Mironov. The Germans are throwing tanks at Mironov's group. A fierce battle begins. At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, at a height of 201.8, the commander of the 14th regiment, 5th tank division, holder of the Knight's Cross, lieutenant colonel Erdman, dies. from the 5th tank division of the Wehrmacht. His tank is down. His adjutant died with him on assignment.

Suddenly, a large group of Red Army soldiers attacked Zholobovo, but having run into resistance without getting involved in a serious battle, they left to the south to the right of Belyaevo. The Germans do not pursue them, because there is nothing trite. All main forces are involved in Shpyrevo and marks 201.8. Even the baggage units of the 15th division are involved in action. Most likely it was Art. Stepchenko, who subsequently led a detachment of 500 people out of the encirclement. At the same time, at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, the Germans recorded as a group of Russians about 300 people from Les north of Shpyrevo, crossed the Ugra along the ford up the river from Abramovo. The Germans are losing contact and control over the units located in the forest. It is not clear who surrounded whom. A chaotic battle goes on until the evening. They suffer significant losses. groups of Red Army soldiers are trying several times during the day to escape from the cauldron across the Belyaevo-Buslav road. In the evening, the Intelligence Service of the 5th Army Corps reports that at 20:30 the 3rd motorized infantry division a radiogram from Efremov was intercepted (probably not Efremov, but the radio station went out with the call sign of the 33rd army.): - “I guarantee success if 1000 people are parachuted. airborne assault.

At dawn they should be parachuted on high." On the mainland, this radiogram was heard but not deciphered due to the weakness of the signal. The Germans are in a desperate situation. In the evening, at a meeting, the commander of the 12th Army Corps demands an end to the well-begun and bogged down operation to destroy the 33rd Army. He demands that the 5th Panzer Division be sent to the Ugra to prevent the collapse of the front. Verbatim. - "If 5TD does not arrive at the front, the front itself will go to it." In addition, the 17th and 268th Infantry Divisions are informed that a certain number of Reds have broken out of the cauldron and that they may appear on the communications and rear of the divisions. And the division commanders themselves must find resources to strengthen their rear. Convoy and construction units begin to build fortifications on the outskirts of the villages of Nov Mikhailovka Lomenka, Slobodka, Zary. The Germans still have 14 combat-ready tanks. The only good news is that the operation to comb the forests around Zholobovo is over. 1436 people were taken prisoner. Own losses: 4 killed, 15 wounded.
April 16 in the morning, the situation is changing for the better for the Germans. In the morning, the commander of the 160th SD dies in Shpyrevo. His deputy Lieutenant Colonel Kirilov leaves the village and takes away the remnants of the division, who did not want to surrender into the forest. After that, the soldiers defending around begin to surrender. By evening, the number of prisoners rises to 3050 people. According to German estimates, another 800 people were killed. among those killed were 2 colonels, 1 lieutenant colonel (parachutist), 2 majors, several captains and lieutenants. 7 officers escaped surrender by committing suicide. By personal documents and the testimony of the prisoners identified the bodies of the commander of the 160th Infantry Division, Colonel Yakimov, early. the rear of the army, Colonel Samsonov and the Chief of Staff of the Military Aviation of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant Colonel Goncharov. Altitude 201.8 continues to hold until the 18th. On April 20, the Germans report that the Russians left the height at night ....

On the morning of April 12, the 113 Infantry Division defended Fedotovo, Medvedevo, Molodeny and Lutnoye. With headquarters in Semeshkovo. During this time, the Germans ousted the 113th division from almost all villages and the headquarters was transferred to Shpyrevo. During the day, at night from April 12 to 13, Colonel Mironov, the division commander, was summoned to the headquarters of Efremov in Naumenki to clarify tasks. As a task for the 113th division, it was assigned to move the headquarters to the same place in Naumenki, and to protect this village. No other instructions followed. The 113th division held out at Naumenki until 15:00 on 14 April. Communication with the main forces of the army was absent from the very morning of April 14. The division headquarters was located in the forest northeast of the 200.0 mark. After the Germans occupied Naumenki, it was decided to transfer the headquarters to Zholobovo, (which by this time was already in the hands of the enemy). However, at that moment unexpected information came that Efremov, along with 338 PD left last night across the Belyayo-Buslav road. In the evening, in the same forest, there was a meeting of the commanders of the remaining 113 and 160 SDs on how to get out of the encirclement. Further, it makes sense to quote the description of the exit from the encirclement of the beginning of artillery of the 113th rifle division, Colonel Bodrov. (text according to the document, the only clarification is that Colonel Bodrov confuses the days. And the meeting took place not on April 15, but on April 14, then you also need to make an amendment for one day, then everything converges)
“On the evening of April 15, at a meeting of the command of 113 and 16 ° C, a decision was made: the withdrawal of manpower, using night marches through forests along the following route: the initial position of the forest is 1.5 km south. Shpyrevo, along the river. SEMEZGA, forest 1 km north. PESKOVO - force the river. UGRA s.-v. PESKOVO, a forest with a mark of 177.8, a forest between KOBELEVO-DOLZHENKI, a forest between SLYKOVO-GULYAEVO with an exit BOL. MOUTH.
8. The movement was made in one column, and by morning
On April 16, the columns reached, approximately, the line of mark 157.8; after 3-4 hours of rest, the columns moved to the southeast, but, having met stubborn resistance, returned back to force the river. UGRA between ABRAMOVO and FEDOTKOVO; in this battle, Colonel MIRONOV and I were wounded in the leg.
9. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, a detachment of about 300 people. crossed the river UGRA, took possession of the forests of the West. ABRAMOVO; the action of this detachment was led by I and NSh 113 SD, Lieutenant Colonel STASHEVSKY with headquarters commanders; the remaining units and divisions of the division moved with Colonel MIRONOV. (this was the group that the Germans recorded at 12 noon on April 15 on the Ugra River)
10. Having put the units in order, we moved further with battles in two clones, the enemy from the direction of PRUDKA and ABRAMOVO used tanks and artillery, which continuously pursued our movement. Under Art. enemy fire, the column of Lieutenant Colonel STASHEVSKY moved across the river. UGRA to the south, and I, with my column, having accepted the battle near ABRAMOVO, went around it from the south and moved into the forest south of the mark 177.8, (Bodrov obviously had a German map, since these marks are present on German maps and are absent on Russian) where he made a 4-hour halt, put the detachment in order, and with the onset of darkness on April 16, he crossed the Kobelevo forest; on the night of April 16 to 17, we resumed movement in the direction of Gulyaevo, on the line KOBELEVO, DOWN, we met the stubborn defense of the enemy, crossed the river under machine-gun fire. DITCH; here I was wounded in the other leg, on the morning of 17.04 they concentrated in the forest sowing. Shlykovo, the whole day they made a crossing over the river. UYKA, before dark they crossed it and moved through the forests to BOCHAROVO; in the forest sowing The WAULINS were surrounded by the enemy, who offered us to surrender; allowing it to reach 50-70 meters, they destroyed the western group of the enemy with the fire of 11 machine guns, the rest fled.
From 23.00 on 17.04.42 to 01.00 on 18.04, the front was passed under heavy machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire of the enemy and friendly troops, it was especially difficult to overcome the line of wire obstacles.
At 1.30 we established contact with our troops in BOCHAROVO.
We inflicted great defeats on the enemy, especially in the battle of Abramovo and the forest west, in the forest sowing. WOWLENKES.
The entire material part of the artillery of the 113th Rifle Division was put into disrepair at various times.

Colonel BODROV

A few days before, on April 11, the remnants of Units 1290, 1297 and 1295 Rifles encircled near Peskovo crossed the Ugra and appeared in Abramovo. As a result, the Germans remove the battalion of the 17th SD from the front and fortify this village as the most likely site of a breakthrough. In this part of Mironov they meet strong resistance there. After the groups of Stashevsky and Bodrov disengage, the Germans lose sight of Bodrov and attack Mironov and Stashevsky with all their might.
From the combat log 20 TD.
"One enemy group of 200 people manages to break out of the forest south of Fedotkovo, overcoming the Ugra and leaving for the forest guarded by Zigman's company to the west and northwest of Abramovo. Immediately involved in the encirclement of the forest from the north, east and southeast of the Kalya, Netzold and sapper companies a platoon of the 1st battalion of the 59th motorized infantry regiment prevent the enemy from further breakthrough to the east. The attack of this enemy group on Abramovo is repulsed, the enemy loses about 80 people killed and 40 people taken prisoner "

I must say that Colonel Bodrov himself already had experience of getting out of the encirclement in the fall of 1941, when he, with the rank of Major General, was the head of artillery of the 32nd Army, which was surrounded near Vyazma. He then went out to his people and brought out 5 officers. After that, he was deprived of the military rank of major general, removed from his post and appointed head of artillery of the 113th rifle division as part of the 33rd army.

Let's try to deal with the group that slipped through the night of April 13-14, Belyaevo-Buslav and in which the headquarters group was located along with Efremov. In general, there were three large columns or groups in this area. In which of them the headquarters group was located is not exactly known. (Perhaps not in any.) So ... Having passed the road without much fighting, the column moved in the direction of Klyuchik, where, according to Efremov's calculations, units of the 43rd army should have been located, which were supposed to break through the German defenses. We walked through the forests parallel to the road about five hundred meters to the left. The village of Rodnya was bypassed, on the left along the way. They were fired on by the Germans, who in the dark did not understand who and how many people were breaking through here. The first at least some resistance was offered to them at 12 noon on the 14th, on the highway Shumikhino - Buslav. Having broken through the liquid German barrier line, Yefremov obviously suspected something was wrong. No sign of broken retreaters German units not found. After walking a couple more kilometers, he stopped in the forest between Staroselye and Malaya Buslavka, where they stood until the night of the 15th. Then intelligence reported that there were neither Germans nor ours in Klyuchik, but behind Klyuchik there was a strong enemy defense. Then the first indeterminate moment arises. We know that a large group, about 1000 people, is trying to break through the Ugra at night directly between Bolshoi and Maly Viselevo opposite Kostyukovo, being 100% sure that we are in Kostyukovo. A. Sizov, who was Efremov's guide and was the only living witness to his death, describes this, which means he was there and probably Efremov was also there. Therefore, we will assume that the names of his group approached the Ugra at night. “They started moving. We went to the river, the water spilled, we see a strip of bushes in front of the water. The coast is close. We went there, the water was chest deep, the Germans don't shoot. And when they reached the bushes, they realized that this was still this shore, and not that one. And the river is still ahead. As they entered the river, the Germans waited, launched a rocket and opened fire from the other side. We are back and in loose .... " In the combat log of the 20th TD of the Germans there is an entry "Efremov's group, according to the testimony of the prisoners, suffered heavy losses during the attack on Kostyukovo and Efremov himself drowned"
Realizing that that shore is also occupied by the enemy, Efremov leaves the remnants of his column and leaves again for Klyuchik (the command staff and submachine gunners, the headquarters guard, leave with him. According to preliminary estimates, this is 200-300 people). then he tries to go further through the new Mikhailovka to the west. But here in N. Mikhailovka the Germans have a strong fortified area. In case of a breakthrough of the 49th army from the side of Red October. Even three tanks from the 21st regiment of the 20th Panzer Division were dug into the ground. There is a fight. We have to retreat, return again back to Klyuchik and cross the highway Klimov Zavod - Kobelevo, where they came under fire. Having bypassed N. Mikhailovka from the north, we again went south and stopped in a ravine between Lomenka and Nov. Mikhailovka. If you believe the recollections of communications officer Okhromkin, then at night from 15 to 16 Efremov was in the forest in front of Moseenki, in the area of ​​179.5 (the Germans mark an attempt to break through a small group in this area on the morning of the 16th). The remaining soldiers on the banks of the Ugra - from about 500 to 1000 people, on the night of April 15-16, attack Maloye Viselevo (zone 17 of the Wehrmacht infantry division) in search of food and capture it. In the morning, the enemy from the side of Gorodets knocked them back, and the remnants of this group moved separately, also in the direction of point 179.5 In the village and around, 600 people remained lying. A little short of this mark, on the slope of the ravine they stumble upon the headquarters of the 488th infantry regiment guarded by a company of submachine gunners. We do not know anything about this episode with the capture of Mal. Viselevo, probably because none of the participants in these events survived.

We know more about the second large group. (Let's call it the Kuchiniv group, if we attribute all the noise made in Gornevo to this group). Having passed Belyaevo-Buslav, Kuchinev with his "division" took much to the left of Rodney, passed through the field north of Buslav and ran into the German defenses in Borisenki. (The date 04.14.04 is indicated on German maps. That is, approximately at the time when Efremov crossed the security line). He did not get involved in the battle, and went around to the north, in the direction of Staroselie. The Germans spotted Russian reconnaissance in front of Starosely at 7 pm. Having found the enemy there too, Kuchiniv, after waiting for darkness, went sharply to the south. At night from 14 to 15 he crossed the Staroselye-Shumikhino road and then - from the report of the 268th Wehrmacht infantry division regarding the 33rd army follows ....
“In the early morning of April 15, the engineering unit north of Gornevo was attacked by the enemy. Gornevo is equipped for protection. Assault detachments are deployed against the forest to the north of Gornevo. The forest is occupied by large enemy forces. "Efremov" (most likely a collective image) changed the route of movement and turned south. Several enemy attacks on Gornevo fail. The Russians then attack Tarasovka and take its western part and the forest between the two districts. With a counterattack with artillery support, the Russians are ejected from Tarasovka. Enemy troops appear in the evening in the southwest forest. Degtyanki at the Division's ammunition depot and on the outskirts of Slobodka. During the day of stubborn fighting, it was possible to disperse the enemy, who attacked in the morning in a number of about 2000 people into several small groups "
From Schroeder's diary, 268 pd, artillery regiment. (Mitteilungsblatt, der kameradschaft der ehem. 268., 132. u. 326. I.D., Nr. 129, translated from German:
“On the morning of April 15, a group (33 armies) suddenly attacked Gornevo and Tarasov. Tarasov was left with the entire food supply of the 3rd squad. Losses: 6 non-commissioned officers and 16 privates killed, 4 privates missing, 3 non-commissioned officers and 20 privates wounded. The senior sergeant-major of the 1st battery died of wounds.
All available reserves are directed to the defense of Degtyanka. In the afternoon, the Russians, after having already destroyed the foodstuffs seized in the houses, again capture Tarasov. It must be two groups. The remnants make their way with losses between Slobodka and Tibeikino into the forests to the south. At 17th Infantry Division, our neighbor, another Russian group makes its way near Veselevo. By evening, it is reported that the enemy left behind 600 dead ... "
From the summary of the 12th Army Corps.
“In the afternoon, the enemy did not attack. Harassing fire on settlements located in the near rear. 268 pd: Destroyed the accumulation of the enemy in the woods south-west of the area of ​​Mal. Mouth. Of the scattered groups of the 33rd Russian army ... 100 people were taken prisoner, 700 people were destroyed. Approximately the same strength units are still in the rear.


April 1942 Ugra region.

It is possible that Efremov was not on the Ugra, but immediately went to Gornevo, and someone else was on the Ugra, but it seems to me that he was not in command of this group either. This contradicts the testimony of those who were at the headquarters. And Sizova and Akhromkina and Zhorova and Zelfa (among other things, they all indicate that under Efremva, the headquarters of 200-300 machine gunners remained guarded. Secondly, secondly, none of them described attempts to break through in battle, and thirdly, it was there for The commander of Tarasovo died on the morning of April 19. Why should he return there again in three days and again climb on the same rake.

On April 18, spring began abruptly. Daytime temperatures rose to 18 degrees. In the evening message of the 12th Army Corps, it was recorded for that day. ““...12 ak: As a result of battles with disparate groups from the 33rd Russian Army, 44 people were killed on April 18, 111 people were taken prisoner, including 25 officers. Trophies: 8 guns, 30 tractors, 3 anti-tank rifles"
When I came across this entry in the combat log 268 PD, I did not believe it. Somehow the battle in and the heroic breakthrough through Belyaevo-Buslav a battery of heavy howitzers, following on tractor traction in a marching column, does not fit. Probably this is 364 KAP. Which was practically disbanded due to lack of shells.
and Document on their discovery, I posted a couple of years ago. Here is the text from it.
Commander of the 4th Art Division 268
Major Barchel

About Russian howitzers and tractors

268 infantry division
With respect to those reported on 20.03. 42 years of Russian tractors and howitzers found in the forest between Grekovo and Shumikhino. After more detailed research, it turned out that
1.) Location about one and a half kilometers on the southern road after Shumikhino
2.) a) found eight 15.2 cm guns and 13 heavy tractors belonging to them, as well as about 80 rounds of ammunition.
c) 7 howitzers were taken to the front and were hooked to the tractors. Panoramic sights are not available for all, without exception, and there are damage to the machines.
The eighth howitzer is uncoupled from the tractor, the crossbar is removed from the frame, the legs are wide apart
otkatnik pipe ran back and rested on the rear prong on the path of sliding down. The guns are partially defective.

I must say that until this moment, starting from the breakthrough of the 33rd army into the Shumikhinsky forest, the Germans did not dare to go there, and perhaps they did not have the strength for this. in fact, this is a full artillery battery. In addition, with a full ammunition load, this is a powerful means of suppressing the enemy. Too bad no one has ever taken advantage of it. (perhaps there will be interrogations of prisoners of war who will shed light on this) Starting from April 18, the Germans are changing tactics. They surround and offer to surrender. It works. “In the forest south of Abramovo, another enemy group of 40 people is surrounded, however, their violent destruction, taking into account the desire to avoid unnecessary losses, is not carried out, the division is more counting on the fact that this resistance will soon be broken due to hunger.”

The headquarters group led by the army commander MG Efremov is located in a small forest, between Luanovka and Gornevo, southwest of Degtyanka. On the evening of the same day at 12 o'clock at night, units of the artillery regiment of the 268th Infantry Division captured a lieutenant and a nurse at their location, who tried to go east unnoticed. The lieutenant gives important information. Early in the morning of April 19, the Germans surround the forest and begin to fire at the discovered crowd of people with mortars. Part of the encircled, not wanting to fight, or not having the opportunity to do so, immediately surrenders. Efremov with a headquarters group is trying to break out to the southeast through a small river, a tributary of the Sobzha. Due to the melting of snow, the brook turns into a river, which later Tolya Sizov ( only person who was with him, and who left memories of death) takes for Sobzha. From his words, “I don’t remember where they crossed Sobzha. We could only cross the dam. When they jumped over Sobzha, there was no longer any guards. The commander's guards were all killed. And so we came to a clearing at the edge of the forest.
The commander there sat down with the commissar, three more people sat opposite. I did not see that the commander was wounded. When the Germans appeared from the field, they walked in a chain, the commander shot himself. And we went head down. The Germans have passed. Those who were alive were shot and nothing was taken from the dead. They went through the chain. When they had already disappeared, I see that I and one girl remained alive. Maybe someone else was alive, I don't know.
I took a piece of bread, salt, a tablet with a map from the murdered commissar, and I took a small pistol from the commander, and next to it I picked up another big one. We followed the Germans to Sobzha.
When they approached Sobzha, it was already getting dark. Sat there, I leaned against a tree and fell asleep. They spent the night there. As soon as it dawned, we went down the steep bank to the river, a large tree was felled there, we crossed the river along it. Near the village of Tarasovka we went down the slope and went across the field. We went, and as soon as they began to approach the forest, the Germans fired at us. We stopped in this forest. It turned out that German artillery was stationed in this forest. Our group told us about it. who bumped into us."


photo taken April 19, 1942

Interim on 04.19.1942
At the front, weak harassing fire
Small enemy groups in the forests at the division's location are taken prisoner or destroyed. A group of about 100 people located in the forest west of Lukanovka is discovered and attacked. The battle against the stubbornly fighting opponents is still going on.
14.25 hours
By UnterOfficer Wagenknecht
From shelling, people fled in different directions. The battle in the forest broke up into several pockets and lasted a whole day. The wounded, those who could not or did not want to fight took refuge in the ravine. Efremov was wounded, tried to walk but could not. About 10 people remained with him, fought back to the last bullet. The rest went through the forest to the west, across the road to Tibeikinoo, and there they took their last stand.

“04/19/42. According to the testimony of a prisoner, a combat-ready group, up to about 300 soldiers under the leadership of the commander of the 33rd Army, is located in a copse southwest of Degtyanka. Our squad is holding the edge of the forest in the west and northwest of Lukanovka. The strike of the last, still military-controlled Russian battle group, is directed against the firing positions of the 12th battery. As a result of a fierce battle, the group was defeated. General Efremov and about 40 officers with him, who defended to the last bullet, fell in battle. Later it was counted 90 killed and 100 captured. At the 12th battery, 4 privates were killed and 5 wounded.
In the final report, the Germans write about 130 people taken prisoner that day, about the Efremov group it is written separately “the commander-in-chief of the 33rd army, General Efremov, when his position became hopeless, shot himself. From the headquarters group, 7 officers were taken prisoner. Banner captured. In fact, this was the most serious and fierce resistance the Germans had faced in the last few days. In Kapusto's book, it is told how the Germans finished off without exception all those who survived. It is obvious that this was not the case. The wounded were collected and taken to the hospital for Russians in Klimov Zavod. Together with the wounded, Elena Dmitrievna Snigireva also got there. It was at her that Efremov shot before his death. She was neither a signalman nor a nurse. She wasn't military at all. She was only 21-22 years old. From local. She survived, but left no memories. Shurochka Krylova, a sanitary instructor of the 160th division, was still alive.

Medical instructor Alexandra Krylova before leaving for the front

It was with her that Tolya Sizov went out. (she does not outwardly look at the child, which she is described as). Tolya Sizov was indeed taken prisoner by the Germans on the 25th, taking him for a Russian intelligence agent. He tells about some large group of 1000 people, which will have to break through the Ugra to the east.
Everything that is said about the funeral of the commander is true, and true. The commander of the 268th Infantry Division was impressed with the courage and perseverance with which those who remained with the General sold their lives. Therefore, the respect shown was more likely to them and not to the 33rd army as a whole.
On the German forum dedicated to 268 PD, the memoirs of Private Willy Richter were posted
“A group of Russian prisoners of war, guarded by German soldiers, carried their murdered commander-in-chief, General Efremov, to the cemetery in Slobodka on tied poles. It was an unforgettable moment. There he rested, under an inconspicuous wooden board with a Russian inscription. The last one who gave him military honors, as having won a mortal battle, according to the old German custom, was the commander of the 268th Infantry Division, General Greiner.
For the period from 10 to 15
On April 33, the army lost 4 l00 killed and 2,950 captured. German losses during this period were killed: 4 officers, 46 non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel
Wounded: 5 officers and 224 officers and enlisted personnel. The Germans consider the death of the cavalier to be the main loss. knight's cross Major Erdman, commander of the 14th regiment of the 5th tank division.
Of course, more than one group of Stepchenko came out to the side of Desire. German patrols fix several more small groups. Even the 34th German infantry division, through whose orders they went, was able to collectively capture 60 people, but they try not to get involved with groups of forty people or more. There is simply no possibility for this. They just fix it, and how scavengers catch the stragglers.
I wanted to write my opinion about everything that happened, but, as they say ..... Efremov behaved like a real hero. That's just 7 thousand Red Army soldiers sorry.
In the forest south of Abramovo, another enemy group of 40 people is surrounded, however, their violent destruction, taking into account the desire to avoid unnecessary losses, is not carried out, the division is more counting on the fact that this resistance will soon be broken due to hunger ...

33 army. Interrogations of prisoners of war. Afanasy Petrov, party organizer Pavel Smirnov.

Field secret police. Division 570
directorates of the 12th army corps
30.03.1942

Report
Interrogation of two political officers about the attitude towards prisoners of war.

On March 29, 1942, the junior political instructor of the division, Afanasy Petrov, was interrogated at the headquarters of the 268th Infantry in order to clarify the fate of four German servicemen taken to Rlen in the Borisenki area on March 12, 1942.
Afanasy Petrov was born on March 25, 1905 in Arbuzov-Baran, Kazan region. Before the war he was a foreman. He was called up on August 27, 1941 to the regiment 1297 and was a platoon political commissar. His official rank was not a political commissar, he was just an ordinary soldier, but the one who performs the duties of a political commissar in a platoon is usually also called a political commissar. He has been a member of the Communist Party since 1939. The fact that he does not refuse to be called a political instructor, but in fact he is not, was confirmed by other platoon soldiers and the platoon commander, Lieutenant Proskurikov.
He cannot say anything about the fate of 4 German servicemen, since the platoon of Lt. Proskurikov was used in defense in the forest between Borisenki and Shumilino. This was confirmed by Proskurikov.

Proskurikov himself knows only about the prisoner of war, who was taken to Moscow by plane, because it was established that before the war he worked at the Junkers aircraft factory. Neither Petrov nor Praskurikov knew anything about other prisoners of war, they only said that according to the rules they should be immediately delivered to the headquarters of the regiment or Division.

In addition to him, the secretary of the party organization of the 1297th regiment, Pavel Vasilievich Smirnov, was interviewed. He willingly and apparently truthfully answered all questions. Petrov was born on September 23, 1900 in Khomutovo near Yaroslavl. Before the war, he was the head of the state store in Khomutov. He has been a member of the Communist Party since 1920 with a break from 1933-1935. He reported about German prisoners of war that near Borisenki, the Russians managed to intercept a German patrol in the amount of 17 people. 16 of them were killed in battle, one was captured. He was taken for interrogation to the regiment, and then to the division headquarters. He was wounded. Petrov claims to have heard the shot after the interrogation, however, it was said that he died from his wound.
On the attitude towards prisoners of war in general, he gives the following information.

The captured German soldiers must be shot, on Stalin's orders, as they must be exterminated to the last man. The defectors are kept alive but must be deported to Siberia. He himself did not see the German prisoners of war in Russia, not their transportation, not the detention camps. Prisoners with valuable information should be left alive for possible re-interrogation. Interrogation is carried out at the headquarters by the commander or political department. In case of refusal to testify, the prisoner is tortured. According to rumors, he knows a case when a German soldier refused to testify, he was beaten for this, when he showed a Soviet leaflet, which guaranteed good treatment for prisoners of war, he was beaten again, and after interrogation he was shot. To shoot a prisoner after interrogation, an order is given in writing. This order must be signed by both, the commander. The commissar of the 1297 Infantry Regiment is called Mikhail Ivanovich Ovodov. Smirnov answered all other questions, for example, the mood in the Red Army, and among the population, about the supply situation clearly, without hesitation. I am satisfied with the attitude towards him in German captivity. He also compiled, prepared and signed an appeal to the rest of his regiment, so that they would come over to our side.

feldpolizeisekretar...

On April 14, 1942, in the rear of the 20th Panzer Division, from the prisoners of war of the 33rd Army, not a platoon, not a company, but a whole battalion of volunteers is already being formed. Battalion Commander Von Rentlin. Isn't this the German officer who speaks without an accent in Russian, who, according to the locals, was at Efremov's funeral? Who ordered to treat the killed general as a general, and forced him to shift from the poles to the stretcher.

Sonderf. V. Renteln / Pz. Jg. Abt. 53 Hauptmann

1) Von Reiteln's volunteer battalion is formed from suitable defectors and prisoners located on the territory of the division in the Vyazenki camp
2) the unit requires training in tactical interaction with the division
3) Sonderführer von Rentlin, as a disciplinary officer for his battalion, receives an additional communications officer as commander
How the liaison officer is subsequently sent on mission (last name is illegible)
4) The battalion is supplied with monetary allowance by the supply officer 85 together with the division
5) Ibid in the division, request equipment, clothing and conventional vehicles for that battalion.
6) Volunteers will receive mixed meals. The main ration will be ration "B" with a supplement, and a regular tobacco ration.
7) Volunteers get paid. namely
Privates - 8 rubles per day
Deputy. Com department - 10 rubles per day
squad leader - 11 rubles per day
Deputy Platoon commander - 13 rubles per day
platoon commander - 15 rubles per day
company commander - 23 rubles per day

Other distinctions between ranks are not made.
Promotion to a higher group than enlisted personnel, as a rule, depends on the reliability and length of service. They should be considered as remuneration and are made by decision of the authorized services.
Ranks as platoon commander and company commander should be squeezed out with a big exception and only for those who were previously platoon or company commanders.

Married volunteers receive along with this money, receive a family allowance of 10 rubles a day from the rank and file to the commanders of departments and up to 15 rubles from the deputy platoon commander and above.
As for the members of these units, whose relatives, due to official reasons, cannot fully or partially use the daily allowance or cannot physically claim it, the money is paid out with the exception of the family allowance.
Monetary allowance is (summed up)
In case of refusing food for 6 rubles a day
In case of refusal (non-receipt) of lunch 3 rubles per day
Breakfast or dinner 1.5 rubles per day.

Child allowances and other benefits, such as front-line allowance, are not paid. Salaries, rank allowances, family allowances, etc., are treated as public expenditures and are not taxed.
Accommodation, soap, bed linen, is provided according to the accommodation, and compensation for absence is not paid.
distributor
Div. Nachsch.fhr 1a 2a c (signature), Fehn
Irreg. B. Renteln. P.Z. Jg. Abt. 53 Hauptmann

33 army. Interrogations of prisoners of war. Major Bocharov

Headquarters XIIAK
Intelligence department (1s) Corps command post, 30.4.1942.

Regarding: Interrogation of prisoners of war

Captured on February 24, 1942. major Bocharov, commander of the 462nd engineer battalion of the 160th rifle division, b. 25.12.04 in Pristennoye near Kharkov, a civil engineer, gave the following testimony:
1) Organization of troops:
My sapper battalion consisted of 1 mine engineering company, 2 sapper companies and 1 utility company with its own warehouse and supplies.
The battalion was subordinate to the 160th Infantry Division of the 33rd Army. It was formed by me in October 1941 in Gzhel (60 km east of Moscow).
The division consists of 1293, 1295, 1297 rifle regiments, 973 artillery regiment, 861 communications battalion, anti-aircraft artillery battalion, mortar battalion, reconnaissance company and chemical company.
My battalion was supposed to have the following weapons and equipment: 240 rifles, 120 submachine guns (automatic), 12 machine guns and 36 mine detectors. In fact, we received 227 rifles, 2 machine guns and 9 mine detectors.
The composition of the staffing had 427 people. for 4 companies and battalion headquarters. I received only 227 pers. personnel after the formation of the battalion. According to the wartime staff, according to the instructions of January 1942, the engineer battalions of the rifle division should have two more additional companies.

2) The composition of the troops
The personnel consisted of carpenters, demolition workers, blacksmiths, etc. aged 18 to 36 years old, and was formed mainly from broken and scattered military units. According to the national composition, they were 60% Ukrainians and 40% Siberians.

3) Replenishment
I have not received any replenishment since the beginning of the receipt of the combat order. The collection point for the 160th Infantry Division in Gzhel was responsible for the replenishment. In Gzhel, there is still the commander of the 2nd rank Orlov, who again formed the 160th rifle division from the defeated 6th Moscow division of the people's militia in November. He continues to form new military units and I am convinced that they will soon appear again in the new division under the number 160, after the 160th rifle division has now been defeated.
About the recruitment service, I, as a former clerk of the recruitment service for the technical troops of the Western Front, can give the following testimony:
The entire recruitment service is subordinate to the recruitment department at the People's Commissariat of Defense in Moscow. The same departments are located at each front (army group) and army. At Army Group Zhukov, the 4th department is responsible for manning. The head of the department is Colonel Mikhlin (a Jew). The department is divided into sectors of artillery, infantry, technical troops and air force, each of which is commanded by a major. The cavalry sector is an independent department under the command of Colonel Zubarev. I was the head of the technical troops sector.

For recruitment, the territory of the Soviet Union is divided into regions. One territorial strip, roughly corresponding to the width of the front line (army group) and extending 400-500 km behind the front line, is at the disposal of the army group as a replenishment area. The entire territory of Siberia is directly subordinate to the staffing headquarters under the People's Commissariat of Defense. Army groups have allocated from their territory to their subordinate armies the corresponding army area as a replenishment area in which the replenishment of the reserve regiment of the army takes place. In the rear area of ​​the army group (front) there are reserve regiments and reserve brigades, subordinate to the staffing headquarters of the army group.

The area of ​​replenishment of the army group (Western Front) Zhukov covers the Moscow, Ryazan, Gorky, Ivanovo, Mordovian regions, the northern part of the Voronezh region (approximate width of the army group) and, in addition, the territory of the Tatar Republic. I know the following reserve regiments: 153 in Naro-Fominsk, 165 in the Bekasovo camp (near Naro-Fominsk), 202 in Mytishchi and Bolshevo, 208 in Kratovo, 33 reserve brigade in Vladimir and Murom. In Murom, there are 603 and 605 spare rifle regiments and 2 spare artillery regiments on the territory of aircraft factory No. 253. In Gzhel there is one recruitment point with a number unknown to me under the command of the commander of the 2nd rank Orlov.

These spare military units, which I learned about from my previous activities, are subordinate to the recruitment department of the Zhukov Army Group. The acquisition department was located in Paravikha (?) near Moscow 15 days ago.
These reserve regiments, the strength of which can reach 30,000 people, are sent to all the soldiers detained in the operational rear of the front, who have left the encirclement, and the replenishment collected by local military commissariats (recruiting centers). In the regiments, the reception and distribution battalion is engaged in distribution among military units.
202 reserve regiment, the number of l / s of which in January was approx. 30.000 people and therefore it was stationed in Mytishchi and Bolshevo, supplying reinforcements mainly to technical military units. I know about the 4th Tank Brigade that it has a reserve battalion in Podlipki.
The principle of recruitment is the formation of completed marching battalions. If the military units already have 50% of the command staff, the army will replenish from its reserve regiment. The missing quantity is supplied by the front staffing headquarters upon request.
To this day, conscripts born in 1891-1925 have been mobilized.

The older conscripts called into the reserve regiments today are specialists reserved for other purposes. Control railways, which until recently was spared in spite of everything, should already have canceled the reservation for 25% of the personnel of the workers. The bulk of these people received military training, even if for a short time within the framework of the territorial system of civil defense. The younger generations of conscripts do not come from the front. Stalin's order dictates that all residents of those annexed to the Soviet Union western regions in 1939 they were recalled back. According to the order of December 1941, Red Army servicemen from the occupied territories should be used only on the second line of defense. However, this last order of Stalin was nowhere strictly carried out.
I don't know anything about new formations.

33rd ARMY formed 16 July 1941 in the Moscow Military District. It included the 1st, 5th, 9th, 17th and 21st divisions of the people's militia, artillery and other units.
On July 18, 1941, the army was included in the Front of the Mozhaisk line of defense; since July 22, it has been on the defensive at the line of Karacharovo - Shustiki (west of Mozhaisk).
On July 30, the army was transferred to the Reserve Front and, after regrouping in the Spas-Demensk region, took up defense at the Rzhev-Vyazemsky defensive line.
From October 3, 1941, army troops participated in the Vyazemsky defensive operation (October 2-13), from October 13, as part of the Western Front, in the Mozhaisk-Maloyaroslavets defensive operation (October 10-30). By October 24, the army troops stopped the opponents on the Nara River.
In early December 1941, army troops, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Army, in intense battles, defeated a group of German troops that had broken through north and south of Naro-Fominsk, and restored the defense along the Nara River.
In December 1941 - April 1942, the army took part in the counteroffensive near Moscow and the general offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction, during which they liberated the cities of Naro-Fominsk (December 26, 1941), Borovsk (January 4, 1942 d.) and Vereya (January 19).
By the beginning of February 1942, its troops reached the area southeast of Vyazma and, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, tried to capture the city on the move. The enemy cut off part of the formations of the army and corps from the main troops of the Western Front with strong counterattacks. Operating behind enemy lines, units of the army, in cooperation with the 1st Guards Cavalry, 4th Airborne Corps and partisan detachments, until June 1942 held a vast area, holding down significant German forces. some troops. During heavy fighting in the encirclement, the commander of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant General M. G. Efremov, died. In early June 1942, many units of the army managed to break through the encirclement front and link up with the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts.
In the second half of 1942, army troops defended the Gzhatsk-Yukhnov line.
In March 1943, they participated in the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya operation (March 2-31), during which, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Army, they liberated Vyazma (March 12), reached the right bank of the Ugra River northeast of Yelnya, where they went on the defensive.
In the summer and autumn of 1943, the army took part in the Smolensk strategic operation (August 7 - October 2). By the end of the operation, her troops reached the line east of Lenino - north of Dribip. In October, in the battles near Lenino, the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after I.I. Tadeusha Kosciuszko.
In early December 1943, the army was withdrawn to the front reserve for resupplying.
In late 1943 - early 1944, she participated in offensive operations on the Western Front in the Bogushev and Vitebsk directions.
In April 1944, army troops were transferred to the Orsha direction and until the end of June they defended the Baevo-Dribin line. As part of the 2nd Belorussian Front (since April 24), they participated in the liberation of Belarus.
During the Mogilev operation (June 23-28), army formations successfully crossed the Pronya, Basya, Dnieper rivers, liberated the city of Shklov (June 27) and by the end of the operation reached the interfluve of the Druti and the Dnieper west of Shklov.
In the Minsk operation (June 29 - July 4), the army, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 50th and 49th armies, participated in the defeat of the encircled enemy grouping east of Minsk. Subsequently, making up the second echelon of the 3rd Belorussian Front (from July 6), she reached the Neman. In mid-July, its formations concentrated northeast of the city of Alytus.
At the end of July - August 1944, they participated in the Kaunas operation (July 28 - August 28), during which they reached the approaches to East Prussia.
September 10, 1944 the army was put into reserve VGK rates, regrouped in the area southeast of Belostock and from October 19 included in the 1st Belorussian Front of the 2nd formation.
In the Warsaw-Poznan operation (January 14 - February 3, 1945), army troops advanced from the Pulawy bridgehead in the direction of Shidlovets, Opoczno, Kalisz. By the end of the operation, they reached the Oder in the Furstenberg area, crossed the river and captured a bridgehead.
During the Berlin strategic operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945), after a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, the army troops, in interaction with the troops of other armies of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, participated in the defeat of the grouping of German troops surrounded southeast of Berlin.
The army completed the fighting on May 6 with the exit of its main forces to the Elbe northwest of the city of Desau.
The army was disbanded in August 1945; its field administration was turned to the formation of the administration of the Smolensk military district.
Army commanders: brigade commander D. P. Onuprienko (July - October 1941); Lieutenant General Efremov M. G. (October 1941 - May 1942); Army General Meretskov K. A. (May - June 1942); Lieutenant General Khozin M. S. (June - October 1942); Lieutenant General, from September 1943 - Colonel General Gordov V.N. (October 1942 - March 1944);Colonel General Petrov I. E. (March - April 1944); Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon (April - July 1944); Lieutenant General Morozov S. I. (July - September 1944); Colonel General V. D. Tsvetaev (September-September 1944 - until the end of the war).
Members of the Military Council of the Army: Brigadier Commissar Shlyakhtin M.D. (July 1941 - March 1942); Brigadier Commissar, from December 1942 - Major General Babiychuk R.P. (March 1942 - until the end of the war).
Army Chiefs of Staff: Colonel Prostov I.K. (July - October 1941); Major General Kondratiev A.K. (October 1941 - May 1942); Major General Pokrovsky A.P. (May - July 1942); Major General S. I. Kinosyan (July 1942 - June 1944); Major General N. V. Pastushikhin (June 1944); Major General Penchevsky A.P. (June - August 1944);colonel Perventsev G. N. (August - September 1944); Major General Orleans V.P. (September-September 1944 - until the end of the war).

During the Battle of Moscow, units of the 33rd Army defended the Borovsky District. The line of defense passed along the river. Nara, and the city of Naro-Fominsk became an insurmountable barrier to the advancing Nazi invaders. During the December counter-offensive, on January 4, 1942, parts of the 33rd Army liberated Borovsk. By mid-January 1942, the Borovsky district was completely liberated from the invaders.

this section is dedicated to military units and divisions that were part of the 33rd Army from October 1941 to January 15, 1942

110th SD (rifle division)

201st Latvian SD

I. Active army. Reserve front. 33 army:

17 rifle division,

18 rifle division,

60 rifle division,

113 rifle division,

173 rifle division,

876 Artillery Regiment PTO,

878 Artillery Regiment PTO.

Notes:

17 rifle division. II formation

Renamed from the 17th Moscow People's Militia Division.

In the active army 09/26/1941 - 05/09/1945.

1312 Infantry Regiment,

1314 rifle regiment,

1316 rifle regiment,

980 artillery regiment,

129 ski battalion,

102 separate anti-tank battalion (from 12/30/41),

266 anti-aircraft artillery battery (161 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalions) - until 30.03.43,

477 mortar division (from 11/22/41 to 10/26/42),

479 reconnaissance company,

464 sapper battalion,

280 separate communications battalion (109 separate communications battalions, 725 and 385 separate communications companies),

88 (292) medical battalion,

115 separate company of chemical protection,

316 motor transport company,

271 field bakeries,

696 divisional veterinary infirmary,

924 field post station,

324 field cash desk of the State Bank.

18 rifle division II formation

Renamed from the 18th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia. In the active army from 09/26/1941 - 01/05/1942.

Transformed into the 11th Guards Rifle Division on 01/05/1942.

1306 Infantry Regiment (until 12/7/41),

1308 Infantry Regiment (until 12/26/41),

1310 Infantry Regiment (until 10/22/41),

365 Infantry Regiment (since 10/24/41),

518 Infantry Regiment (since 11/28/41),

282 Infantry Regiment (from 12/13/41),

978 artillery regiment,

702 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion,

477 reconnaissance company,

461 engineer battalion,

866 separate communications battalion,

500 medical battalion,

344 separate company of chemical protection,

312 motor transport company,

927 field post station,

394 field cash desk of the State Bank.

60 rifle division Renamed from the 1st Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army - 09.26.41–01.03.42, 02.01.42–02.09.44, 03.05.44–09.5.45.

1281 rifle regiment,

1283 rifle regiment,

1285 rifle regiment,

969 artillery regiment,

71 separate anti-tank battalions,

468 reconnaissance company,

696 (84) engineer battalion,

857 separate communications battalion,

491 medical battalion,

330 separate company of chemical protection,

327 motor transport company,

260 field bakery,

180 divisional veterinary infirmary,

968 field post station,

27 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113 Rifle Division. II formation.

In the active army 09/26/41–02/02/43, 03/06/43–05/09/45.

1288 rifle regiment,

1290 rifle regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

203 motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

932 field post station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

173 Rifle Division. II formation.

Renamed from 21st Moscow People's Militia Rifle Division. In the active army 26.9.41–1.2.43.

Transformed into the 77th Guards Rifle Division on March 1, 1943.

1311 rifle regiment,

1313 Infantry Regiment,

1315 rifle regiment,

979 artillery regiment,

252 separate anti-tank battalion (since 19.02.42),

280 anti-aircraft artillery battery (768 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion),

478 reconnaissance company,

464 sapper battalion,

867 separate communications battalion,

309 medical battalion (501 medical battalion - I) - until 10/25/41, 501 medical battalion (II) - from 11/28/41,

345 separate company of chemical protection,

313 motor transport company,

270 field bakery,

191 divisional veterinary infirmary,

832 (930) field post station,

429 field cash desk of the State Bank.

876 Artillery Regiment PTO. In the active army 07/30/1941–12/24/1941. Disbanded.

878 Artillery Regiment PTO. In the active army 08/03/1941–12/24/1941. Disbanded.

I. Active army.

Western Front

110 rifle division,

113 rifle division,

222 Infantry Division.

600 Artillery Regiment PTO,

989 Artillery Regiment PTO,

2/364 corps artillery regiment,

5/7 Guards Mortar Regiment,

2/13 Guards Mortar Regiment,

Military History Department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Moscow, 1966. *

Notes:

1st Guards Motor Rifle Division.

In the active army 09/22/1941 - 01/23/1943.

35th Guards Artillery Regiment,

18 medical battalion,

4 motor transport battalion,

9 field bakery,

218 field post station,

63 field cash desk of the State Bank.

II. Guards rifle and motorized rifle divisions.

110 rifle division,

II formation

Renamed from the 4th Moscow People's Militia Division.

In the active army 26.9.1941-9.4.1943.

Transformed into the 84th Guards Rifle Division on 10/4/1943

1287 rifle regiment,

1289 rifle regiment,

1291 rifle regiment,

971 artillery regiment,

470 reconnaissance company,

463 sapper battalion,

859 separate communications battalion,

493 medical battalion,

329 motor transport company,

262 field bakery,

754 field post station,

599 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113 Rifle Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

1288 rifle regiment,

1290 rifle regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239 separate anti-tank battalion,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150 separate company of chemical protection,

203 motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary infirmary,

932 field post station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222 Infantry Division.

In the active army 15.7.1941-10.9.1944, 10.19.1944-9.5.1945.

757 (457) rifle regiment,

774 rifle regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

389 sapper battalion,

261 motor transport company,

351 field bakeries (484, 353 field bakeries),

317 field post station,

active army. Troop lists

List No. 5 of Rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle and motorized divisions that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Rifle and mountain rifle divisions.

Note:

In 1941-1943, there were two howitzer artillery regiments in the Red Army under the number 109.

486 howitzer artillery regiment - 486 cannon (howitzer) artillery regiment.

In the active army 07/15/1941 - 07/21/1941, 10/16/1941 - 9/11/1943. 12/26/1943 - 05/09/1945.

557 cannon artillery regiment of the RVGK - 557 corps cannon artillery regiment.

Formed on the basis of the 598 separate artillery battalion.

In the active army 10/15/1941 - 05/09/1945.

active army. Troop lists.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army

I. Artillery regiments.

a) cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK

600 artillery regiment anti-tank artillery - 600 anti-tank artillery regiment - 600 light artillery regiment.

In the active army - 10/18/1941 - 05/09/1945.

989 Artillery Regiment PTO - 989 Light Artillery Regiment.

In the active army - 10/18/1941 - 01/15/1942, 02/23/1942 - 06/13/1942.

Disbanded.

active army. Troop lists.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and machine-gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_03.html

364 howitzer (corps) artillery regiment.

In the active army 07/15/1941 - 09/11/43.

Converted to complete the 118 heavy howitzer artillery brigade.

active army. Troop lists.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and machine-gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

a) Cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_01.html

5th Battalion, 7th Guards Mortar Regiment.

7th Guards Mortar Regiment (1 formation).

In the active army 09/24/1941 - 11/17/1941.

Disbanded.

2nd Battalion, 13th Guards Mortar Regiment

13th Guards Mortar Regiment, was part of the active army 10/15/1941 - 12/15/1941, disbanded.

active army. Troop lists.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and machine-gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

III. Guards mortar regiments.

teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Perechni_voisk/Perechen_13_08.html

5 tank brigade

formed on September 17 (according to other sources, September 24), 1941 in the city of Mozhaisk (Moscow region) on the basis of the 12th tank regiment of the 1st tank division (II formation). GKO Decree No. 671ss of September 13, 1941. The GABTU was obliged to complete the formation of the brigade by September 23, 1941.

brigade management,

control company,

reconnaissance company,

5th tank regiment: 1st tank battalion, 2nd tank battalion, 3rd tank battalion,

motorized infantry battalion

antitank battalion,

antiaircraft division,

transport company,

repair company,

Sanitary Squad.

She was part of the active army from 09/28/1941 to 03/05/1942. On March 5, 1942, it was transformed into the 6th Guards Tank Brigade "a".

Brigade commander Lieutenant Colonel Sakhno Mikhail Gordeevich (09/17/1941 to 03/05/1942) transformation of the brigade.

Chief of Staff of the brigade, Major Polushkin Mikhail Alexandrovich (since November 1941);

Head of the political department, battalion commissar Katilov Alexander Grigorievich (from 09/20/1941 to 12/28/1941), battalion commissar Mirgorodsky Leonid Konstantinovich (from 01/07/1942 to?)

tankfront.ru/ussr/tbr/tbr005.html

5 tank brigade

Formed on the basis of the 12th tank regiment of the 1st tank division

In the active army 10/23/41 - 03/05/1942.

active army. Troop lists.

Lists of formations, units and institutions of the Soviet Army with the terms of their entry into the army.

List number 7. Management of brigades of all types of troops.

1. Active army

Western Front

33rd Army 1st Guards Motor Rifle Division

110 rifle division

113 rifle division

222 rifle division

109 howitzer artillery regiment

486 howitzer artillery regiment

557 cannon artillery regiment of the RVGK,

600 Artillery Regiment PTO

989 Artillery Regiment PTO,

2/13th Guards Mortar Regiment

16 separate guards mortar division,

Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff

Military History Department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Managing editor Major General A. N. Grylev.

Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Moscow, 1966.

Note:

1st Guards Motor Rifle Division.

Reorganized from 1 Panzer Division. The new numbering of the units of the division was assigned on February 19, 1942.

In the active army 09/22/1941-01/23/1943.

Reorganized into 1 Guards Rifle Division (II).

1 Guards motorized rifle regiment,

3rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment

35th Guards Artillery Regiment,

17th Guards separate anti-tank battalion,

29th Guards Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion,

2nd Guards Reconnaissance Battalion,

20th Guards Sapper Battalion,

23 Guards separate communications battalion,

18 medical battalion,

9 field bakery,

218 field post station,

63 field cash desk of the State Bank.

110 rifle division

113 Rifle Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army 09/26/41 - 02/02/43, 03/06/43 - 05/09/45.

1288 rifle regiment,

1290 rifle regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239 separate anti-tank battalion,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150 separate company of chemical protection,

203 motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary infirmary,

932 field post station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222 rifle division

757 (457) rifle p,

774 rifle regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

666 (664) artillery regiment,

722 howitzer artillery regiment (until 10/15/41),

297 reconnaissance company (297 reconnaissance battalion),

602 separate communications battalion (602, 426 separate communications company),

391 medical battalion,

351 PHP (484, 353 PHP),

124 (170) dvl,

486 howitzer artillery regiment

557 cannon artillery regiment of the RVGK,

600 Artillery Regiment PTO

989 Artillery Regiment PTO,

2/364 Corps Artillery Regiment

5 tank brigade.

I. Active army.

Western Front

1 Guards Motor Rifle Division,

93, infantry division

110 rifle division,

113 rifle division,

201 rifle division,

222 rifle division,

338 rifle division,

separate consolidated rifle regiment (b / n),

23 separate ski battalion,

24 separate ski battalion,

109 howitzer artillery regiment

364 howitzer artillery regiment

386 howitzer artillery regiment

320 artillery regiment

403 artillery regiment

557 artillery regiment,

551st Artillery Regiment PTO,

600 Artillery Regiment PTO,

18 separate guards mortar division

25 separate guards mortar division

42 separate guards mortar division,

3/590 howitzer artillery regiment.

246 separate sat,

Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff

Military History Department

Combat composition of the Soviet army

(January-December 1942)

Managing editor Major General A. N. Grylev.

Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense

Moscow, 1966.

Notes:

110 rifle division. II formation.

Renamed from the 4th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia. In the active army 09/26/1941-04/09/1943.

Transformed into the 84th Guards Rifle Division on 10.04. 1943.

1287 rifle regiment,

1289 rifle regiment,

1291 rifle regiment,

971 artillery regiment,

200 separate anti-tank battalion,

274 anti-aircraft artillery battery (695 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion),

470 reconnaissance company,

463 sapper battalion,

859 separate communications battalion,

493 medical battalion,

332 separate company of chemical protection,

329 motor transport company,

262 field bakery,

720 divisional veterinary infirmary (since 01.12.41),

754 field post station,

599 field cash desk of the State Bank.

113 Infantry Division.

II formation.

Renamed from the 5th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia.

In the active army 09/26/1941-02/02/1943, 03/06/1943-09/05/1945.

1288 rifle regiment,

1290 rifle regiment,

1292 rifle regiment,

972 artillery regiment,

239 separate anti-tank battalion,

275 anti-aircraft artillery battery (275 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion) - until 6.5.43,

149 (471) reconnaissance company,

204 (456) engineer battalion,

228 separate communications battalion (644 separate communications battalion, 860 separate communications company),

201 (494) medical battalion,

150 separate company of chemical protection,

203 motor transport company,

263 field bakery,

21 divisional veterinary infirmary,

932 field post station,

1140 field cash desk of the State Bank.

222 Infantry Division.

In the army: 15.7.1941 - 10.9.44, 10.19.1944 - 05.09.1945.

757 (457) rifle regiment,

774 rifle regiment,

787 (479) rifle regiment,

666 (664) artillery regiment,

722 howitzer artillery regiment (until 10/15/41),

43 separate anti-tank battalion,

297 reconnaissance company (297 reconnaissance battalion),

389 sapper battalion,

602 separate communications battalion (602, 426 separate communications company),

391 medical battalion,

309 separate company of chemical protection,

351 PHP (484, 353 PHP),

124 (170) divisional veterinary infirmary,

317 field post station,

338 rifle division.

I formation.

In the active army 3.12.41-24.5.42.

Addressed to the formation of the 113 Infantry Division (II).

1134 Infantry Regiment.

1136 Infantry Regiment.

1138 rifle regiment,

910 artillery regiment,

258 separate anti-tank battalion,

634 anti-aircraft artillery battery (634 separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion),

510 mortar division,

409 reconnaissance company,

479 sapper battalion,

798 separate communications battalion,

432 medical battalion,

425 separate company of chemical protection,

201 field bakeries,

770 divisional veterinary infirmary,

143 field post station,

777 field cash desk of the State Bank.

active army. Troop lists.

551 anti-tank regiment, 551 light artillery regiment, 10/21/1941 - 04/22/1944, 05/28/1944 - 05/09/1945.

active army. Troop lists.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and machine-gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

c) anti-tank artillery regiments, anti-tank artillery regiments, anti-tank artillery regiments and light artillery regiments.

590 howitzer artillery regiment, separated from 403 howitzer artillery regiment.

In the active army 06/22/1941 - 06/25/1943.

Turned to the formation of the 119 howitzer artillery brigade.

active army. Troop lists.

List No. 13 of Artillery, mortar, anti-aircraft and machine-gun regiments and air defense regiments of railway echelons that were part of the army during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.

I. Artillery regiments

a) Cannon and howitzer regiments of military artillery and artillery of the RGK.