Appendix 3. COMPOSITION OF THE GREAT GREAT GROUPING GREAT BRITAIN 3rd Marine Brigade ...... 40th, 42nd, 45th Marine Battalions Support Helicopter Squadron 2nd, 3rd Airborne Battalions 29th Marine Artillery Regiment Marine Logistics Regiment

Appendix 5. COMPOSITION OF THE ARGENTINA NAVY AIR GROUP Part number ...... Composition / Mission 2nd Naval Fighter-Attack Squadron ...... 5 "Super Etandar" / Deck, Fighter-Attack/Rio Grande 3rd Navy Fighter-Attack Squadron ...... 8 Skyhawk A4-Q /

The Creation of the Boko Haram Group The emergence of Salafi movements in Nigeria dates back to the second half of the 70s of the last century. Then a group called “Azala al-bad’a wa igama as-suna” (“Cancellation of innovation and restoration of the teachings of the prophet”) arose, which

The scorched sky of Afghanistan. Combat aviation in the Afghan war Markovsky Viktor Yuryevich

Mi-8 helicopters

Mi-8 helicopters

In the Afghan war, helicopters were destined to take a special place. Due to their versatility, they were used to solve a wide range of tasks, and often became the only means of ensuring and supporting the diverse activities of the troops. It can be said without exaggeration that helicopters bore the brunt of the war, going through it from the first to the last days. Moreover, their work began even before the appearance of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The first military winter in Afghanistan turned out to be unusually snowy.

The work of helicopter pilots was limited for the most part to routine transportation, for example, mail delivery.

Among the military equipment in March 1979, in addition to the already existing eight Mi-8s, another 8 "eights" were delivered to the DRA. A transport squadron of Soviet An-12s, a communications center and an airborne battalion to protect them were stationed at the Bagram base (the paratroopers were dressed in overalls for aircraft technicians to disguise them). In the summer they were joined by Lieutenant Colonel A. Belov's squadron of "eights", which arrived from Bukhara. Her task was "court" transportation and communications, it was ordered to refrain from participating in hostilities. To complete the squadron, they specially collected flight personnel from all over the Soviet Union from Tajiks, who looked like Afghans in face and speech. But the squadron did not become a "purebred" squadron: it was not possible to recruit the required number of Tajiks, moreover, not all of them had the proper class, and six "white" pilots still had to be left. True, the disguise was pretty much broken by Russian speech with specific turns heard a mile away, and the Afghan stars and ears of wheat that were hastily applied were far from the original.

Back in mid-December, helicopter pilots from the Turkestan and Central Asian districts were alerted with an order to relocate to border sites in Kalai-More, Kokaity and Sandykachi. To conceal the operation, a rumor was spread about the upcoming landing in Iran in order to support the anti-Shah revolution, the crews were even given maps of this country. The legend was maintained until December 25, when helicopter units began to transfer soldiers and property to places of concentration near the border with Afghanistan and landing troops to capture key positions and airfields on its territory. December 27, when taking the palace of Amin for abandonment assault group it was planned to use the Mi-8 on the roof of the building, but due to the risk of a night landing, this plan was abandoned, having carried out the capture by special forces with the support of armored vehicles. On the morning of that day, Amin, who had no more than ten hours to live, said with glee to his entourage: “Everything is going fine, the Soviet units are already on their way here!”

Navigator of the "native squadron" of the 280th OVP Sergey Mukhitdinov

By the beginning of 1980, the 34th mixed air corps, attached to the grouping in Afghanistan, had 110 helicopters, of which 85% of the Mi-8s were to become the “workhorse” of that war. The appearance of such an armada on Afghan airfields caused a real panic among the advanced teams - the deployment and, especially, refueling of many helicopters was a serious problem for the poor local supply service. On January 2, 1980, Kandahar, the country's second largest city, was taken under the control of a large helicopter landing force. The same method ensured the rapid deployment of garrisons in remote places, on important roads and key points, which made it possible to control entire areas. The opposition, which had managed to gain a foothold in the provinces, often resisted. So, in the border Kunduz, the rebels managed to cut the road to the northern regions. To restore traffic on February 12, with the help of Mi-8, an assault company was landed near the village of Kojagar, which captured the only bridge in these places. From this operation, helicopter pilots brought the first dead - the assault cost the lives of seven paratroopers.

The most important task of helicopters in the first military winter was the supply of units stationed in the DRA. Snowy weather made the few roads impassable, and helicopters became almost the only means of delivering everything from food and ammunition to winter clothes, firewood and books for garrison libraries, providing at least a tolerable existence for the hastily brought in troops, then numbering 81,800 people. . A significant proportion of the cargo was building materials - boards, reinforcement and cement, which went to the construction of checkpoints and outposts on roads and passes. The cargo compartment was stuffed to capacity, if only the car could rise, and the helicopter with knotty logs sticking out outside was not surprising. The provincial center of Fayzabad, completely cut off from the center by continuous snow blockages, was saved from starvation by helicopters. Mi-8Ts of the Moscow border detachment, which controlled the Pamir region, actively worked in the areas bordering the USSR. With their help, they equipped and supplied the front line of border protection, which consisted of a chain of outposts and observation posts located on the Afghan side to prevent enemy attacks.

After the deployment of troops, part of the helicopter group was withdrawn back. On some of the remaining "eights", hiding their belonging, Afghan identification marks remained on top of the somehow painted over red stars. They belonged to the same "native squadron" sent to Afghanistan on the eve of the introduction of troops to help Soviet military advisers.

In the spring, the rebels began active operations. Plans for an early withdrawal of troops had to be postponed until the "stabilization of the political situation in the country", which was decided to be carried out by a series of operations to defeat the opposition. The first of these, in early March, was the raid along the roads in Khairabad near Kabul and the province of Kunar, during which the blockade of the surrounded villages was lifted and the roadside areas were cleared. It was already a real war, which replaced episodic skirmishes and skirmishes. The limited number of roads, gorges and passes, areas with the threat of talus and rockfalls made the movement of troops extremely difficult. Fire support by artillery and tanks often turned out to be completely impossible - they simply could not be pulled up to the right places. The nature of the hostilities again demanded the build-up of a helicopter group.

In the spring of 1980, helicopter units again began to be pulled into the DRA, placing them in garrisons and distributing areas of responsibility: Mi-8s from Bagram and Kabul worked in the center of the country and the Charikar Valley (up to the Salang Pass and Miterlam in the east). Based in Kandahar, the 280th Helicopter Regiment controlled the southern belt - the main highway and the surrounding areas. The western provinces and covering the border with Iran were handled by a squadron from Shindand. In the northern provinces, Mi-8s of the 181st brigade operated from Fayzabad and Kunduz, which lay near the Kabul-USSR border highway and was distinguished by good supplies. In Jalalabad in the east, the 335th Airborne Regiment was deployed. If necessary - conducting operations, transferring and supplying troops - maneuver was carried out by the forces of a helicopter group using other airfields, where asphalt strips, bulk "patch" of gravel or hastily laid metal decks served as bases. Such bases were Ghazni lying among the mountain ravines, commercial Herat and Farah and Lashkargah blown by the hot "Afghan" (immediately renamed Loshka-Revka by aviators). For efficiency, it was often necessary to work in small groups of one or two links from field sites, where even refueling was a problem. To solve it, they arranged field storages from voluminous rubber "skins" with kerosene laid on the ground or sent a "cow" - Mi-8 or Mi-6 with fuel to help. In August 1980, tanker helicopters provided a major landing at Maiman, in the northwest of the country, supplying two helicopter regiments with fuel.

For closer interaction, helicopter squadrons were attached to each of the three (5th, 108th and 201st) motorized rifle and 103rd airborne divisions, helicopter squadrons reinforced the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle brigades. Helicopter units stationed in the DRA usually consisted of one to four squadrons. Often they, formed on the basis of several regiments and understaffed on the spot with individual machines and pilots from different districts, were a "hodgepodge". The average level of crew training, satisfactory for peacetime, in Afghanistan turned out to be completely insufficient: many pilots did not have permission to independently choose a landing site, could not keep their car in line, lagged behind and got lost even when flying in a group. Navigators often lacked training in flying over terrain devoid of clear landmarks and familiar radio beacons. There were cases when, upon returning, the pilots got confused on the map, indicating the place of landing. There were also perfect oddities: in the air, all three crew members - the commander, navigator and flight engineer - disagreed about where the helicopter was flying. There was also a lack of skills in the use of weapons, since during the combat training of transport helicopter pilots in the USSR, very modest attention was paid to this. On account of most of them there were only a few test firing, not to mention the knowledge of the intricacies of tactics. You still have to learn how to fight.

The average age of helicopter pilots of the "first run" in Afghanistan was 25-26 years

Another reason for the problems was the numerous instructions and regulations governing the performance of flights. The restrictions, designed for the good purpose of ensuring safety, fettered the pilots in combat, and even turned out to be completely impossible. The roll limits of up to 30 degrees and dives of no more than 15 degrees, established for the Mi-8T, could lead to the death of a helicopter in mountain gorges. Aerobatics stretched in time allowed the enemy to hide, change position or return fire, and a “safe” pancake turn exposed the side of the car to fire.

I had to learn literally on the fly, adopting the experience of great pilots. One of the most famous helicopter pilots who opened the Afghan campaign was Major Vladimir Kharitonov, who served as deputy commander of the 280th regiment for flight training. He took out young pilots, revealing the capabilities of the machine and demonstrating excellent piloting technique, including in modes that the creators of the Mi-8 themselves hardly imagined. All members of his crew could replace each other, any of the pilots had to be able to troubleshoot himself, and even technicians received the necessary skills to pilot a helicopter.

A remarkable pilot was Vyacheslav Gainutdinov, commander of the 181st OVP, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union already in April 1980. He received the award for rescuing a reconnaissance group trapped in the village, having managed to take off and find it in a dust storm. Landing under fire right in the village, he covered the withdrawal of the group, firing back and spinning on one wheel, while the scouts made their way to the helicopter along the narrow streets. Major Gainutdinov died four months after the award, on Aviation Day - burned down in a helicopter shot down near the airfield in Kunduz.

The best teacher was everyday work: the crews performed 5-6 sorties per day, spending up to 8 hours in the air. The practice included maneuvers with large overloads, strictly prohibited at home: turns with a roll of up to 90 °, “fighter” combat turns, slides with negative overloads (theoretically unacceptable for a helicopter!) And steep dives, during which it became dark in the cockpit from the ground that filled the entire review. Many pilots later said that Afgan really taught them to fly, but “there” they preferred not to talk about their achievements in aerobatics - the prohibitions remained prohibitions. Kharitonov was repeatedly called "on the carpet", subjected to penalties and threatened with removal from flight work, quietly, however, encouraging "the culprit of our victories." In connection with the need that has arisen, the Design Bureau has carried out work to expand the range of acceptable flight modes for the Mi-8, and together with the LII - to increase the maximum takeoff weight by changing the piloting technique and performing a takeoff run.

"Cool aerobatics" was necessary, but also risky. Vigorous maneuvers with supercritical angles of attack led to a stall flutter of the main rotor and shaking, so piloting in extreme conditions required special attention from the pilot. On April 9, 1980, in Kandahar, Captain Kharin on a Mi-8T with a landing force on board laid a sharp turn immediately after takeoff, lacking altitude and speed, and lost control (this was his first sortie on the G8). In the crashed helicopter, everyone died, except for the navigator, who, fortunately, did not have time to buckle up and was thrown through the blister upon impact. The development of the piloting technique in extreme conditions cost the lives of the most experienced LII testers V.E. Turovets and N.A. Bessonov, who crashed in Zhukovsky on February 8, 1982, while simulating the landing of a downed Mi-8 - with the engines turned off at the maximum pitch and descent angles.

In flights among the monotonous mountains and gorges, noticeable trees, characteristic rocks or buildings that were not marked on any maps and passed by pilots to each other under the record could serve as landmarks. The maps themselves were often old and inaccurate, and in Bagram, the notes of the academician-breeder N.I. Vavilov about his travels in Afghanistan, containing sketches of the terrain, heights of passes and descriptions of landscapes with many signs. Flights "according to Vavilov" were appreciated, the book that became a bestseller was passed from hand to hand and even specially ordered in the Union. Due to the considerable distance between the airfields and the characteristics of the flight missions, the helicopters were equipped with a pair of additional 915-liter tanks, which provided the Mi-8T with a flight range of up to 930 km. Bulky "barrels" occupied a good half of the cargo compartment, but the pilots were reluctant to part even with one of them, fearing an emergency landing due to running out of fuel in inhospitable places. Due to their versatility and due to the lack of Mi-24s, the G8s from the first months of the war began to be used for strike operations, for example, fire support for their own landings. The squadrons also had several special attack transport Mi-8TV (“heavy weapons”), protected by armor and equipped with an A-12.7 heavy machine gun, six 32-round UB-32-57 units and four 9M17P Scorpion-P anti-tank missiles ". However, these obviously overweight machines were not popular due to reduced flight performance, especially noticeable in the rarefied mountain air. The pilots preferred the usual Mi-8T to the clumsy "iron", which could also carry quite powerful weapons - bombs and S-5 missiles in 16-charge UB-16-57UMVP blocks on four hardpoints.

Installation of the GOST nose machine gun on the Mi-8

The battles and the first losses quickly supplanted the former parting words about the “high and honorable mission of providing international assistance”, which were replaced by the simple logic of war: “Shoot first!” In June 1980, while conducting reconnaissance in the vicinity of Ghazni, a pair of Mi-8T Surnin and Solovyov discovered firing points on a mountain ridge, which they decided to fire on in the second run. The vehicles were met with heavy return fire. The “eight” of the wingman came out of the attack with a smoky plume: the bullets set fire to the equipment in the cargo compartment, nothing was visible behind the dense smoke, and the flight engineer tried to determine by touch whether the tanks were burning, threatening to explode. The shabby old car of the leader shone in the sun, as if polished - oil flowed all over the board from a broken radiator.

"Eights" at the landing site in the foothills

To increase the firepower of the "eights", they began to take on board armed AKM and PKK shooters from among the soldiers, unemployed pilots and technicians of the airfield team. To cover the helicopter at the exit from the attack, one of them was often planted behind the hatch in the cargo door. Infantry 30-mm rapid-fire automatic grenade launchers AGS-17 "Flame" were installed in the opening of the front door. A tripod with a grenade launcher on wooden shoes was fastened with braces so that the AGS, twitching when firing, would not fly out of the cockpit. "Flame" turned out to be a very effective tool in the fight against manpower at distances up to 800 m: a dense fan of fragments even mowed the grass within a radius of six to seven meters from the explosion site. The ammunition in the drum was 29 fragmentation 280-g grenades. The fire was fired sideways along the flight, covering the target with a clearly visible chain of explosions or from a turn, tightly laying grenades in the center of the circle. On June 11, 1980, south of Ghazni, a detachment of armed horsemen was noticed from the G8 patrol. Trying to hide from the chase, they rushed to a nearby grove. Cutting off the road, the helicopter went into a U-turn, and flight engineer Mikhail Kel covered them with one burst. A dozen grenades were enough for the whole group to remain among the split palms. The helicopter pilots of Kandahar worked out a group strike of the AGS, approaching the target from the front, while turning sideways and giving a well-coordinated airborne salvo. The disadvantage of the weapon was the absence of any sighting devices - the standard sight was not suitable for firing on the move, and there was no time to develop a special sight. The accuracy of firing from the air depended solely on the skill and apt eye of the flight engineer.

In a duel situation, small arms on board did not give an advantage, and when meeting with the DShK, they were noticeably inferior to it in range and strength of fire. S-5 missiles have become an indispensable weapon, allowing them to hit a variety of targets. 57-mm rockets were used in a variety of options, which differed mainly in the design of the warhead; high-explosive fragmentation S-5M and S-5MO were especially common (S-5M gave 70–75 fragments weighing 0.5–1 g, and another 20 steel rings were strung on the body of S-5MO, scattering along cuts), S- 5KO had a cumulative effect, knocking out sharp fragments of stone, which struck no worse than fragments. A significant dispersion of NARs meant their use against area targets, but they were also widely used against point targets: a salvo bombarded the target with a hail of missiles, one or two of which gave a direct hit on a machine-gun nest or shelter. Usually the number of NARs in a salvo was 8, 16 or 32. The prescribed effective firing range was 1600–1800 m, but for greater accuracy many “rocket battle masters” tried to plant missiles at point-blank range right into windows and embrasures and hardly knock out an enemy entrenched in a crevice not from a steep dive.

The disadvantages of the S-5 included their low lethality, especially in the fight against protected targets. The high-explosive effect of NAR, containing only 200 g of explosives, was weak, often C-5 got stuck in the clay of walls and duvals. Light fragments retained their lethal force only a few meters away, at the end they could not penetrate the thick cotton robes of the "targets", and the reports noted "high survivability of targets when hit by fragmentation ammunition."

When attacking structures and shelters, bombs were more practical, usually fragmentation “hundreds” of AO-50-100M, high-explosive fragmentation OFAB-100-120, OFAB-100M and OFAB-250-270. The “hundredth” gap gave up to 2500 large fragments with a radius of continuous destruction of 35–40 m. Usually, a bomber helicopter carried a couple of bombs, less often four. The combined armament of two UB-16-57UMVP blocks and two bombs had greater versatility and was used to attack protected targets: by suppressing resistance with a missile salvo, the helicopter could destroy the target with bombs. For a bombing and assault strike, weapons could be distributed among the vehicles in the group. For launching missiles, the Mi-8T was equipped with a PKV collimator sight, and for bombing - with an optical OPB-1r, but many pilots preferred more practical shooting in the mountains and dropping bombs "by eye", using horizontal lines drawn on the windshield that corresponded to the usual dive angles and carried out according to their height and eye level.

There were cases of using completely unforeseen weapons with the Mi-8T: having used up ammunition, the enemy was bombarded with hand grenades, and Colonel A. Burkov, after a dozen unsuccessful attempts to bomb the narrow bridge across the gorge, blew it up, placing bags with explosives and a set fire to fickford cord from a helicopter. Local craftsmen tried to adapt the GSH-23 cannon removed from the fighter and even the 73-mm 2A28 gun from the BMP-1 on the G-8s, but they did not dare to test it in the air, fearing that the strong recoil would destroy the helicopter.

Improving tactics, helicopter pilots began to use a vicious circle (“turntable”), which is effective when attacking as a group, usually as part of a link, entering the target from a dive and covering each other when leaving. The safe interval between the machines was 1000-1500 m, but for the continuity of the fire impact, it was compressed, and the next helicopter opened fire, as soon as the one in front turned away. Less often they practiced a blow from a flat circle, taking the target into the ring and firing from the sides; in this case, only small arms could be used, and bullets ricocheting from stones could hit the helicopter opposite. Some targets, such as a chain of firing points, stormed the front of helicopters, turning into a "scallop", usually with a ledge-bearing, guided by the leader. In narrow gorges and intermountain areas, they attacked in single file - one after another, with minimal gaps.

They worked mainly from low altitudes, where the helicopter had great capabilities, and the main enemy was machine guns and English 7.62-mm Lee-Enfield rifles (the so-called "Boers"), beloved by the Mujahideen, a large number of which fell into Afghanistan in 20-30 -s yrs. At first, the enemy arrows, having no experience in repelling air attacks, did not take lead when firing at a fast moving target, and the hits fell mainly on the tail section. Compared to tightly packed fighters, where even one bullet often disabled a system or assembly, an “empty” helicopter endured, without serious failures, many bullets that pierced it through. Mi-8s returned from battle with up to three simultaneously damaged blades (there were 5–6 holes in the blades themselves), with tanks shot through, torn spars and frames, broken pipelines and control wiring. Somehow, an Mi-8 escorting a convoy of troops was damaged by fragments of an anti-tank mine that exploded under an armored personnel carrier, over which it was flying.

The crews received protective helmets and body armor, but there were few people who wanted to wear them. A two-kilogram helmet did not allow you to turn your head, and in a heavy bulletproof vest you could “boil in your own juice” in no time. To protect against bullets, they were hung behind the seat, on the side of the blister, or placed under the feet. Pilots and technicians already had a hard time: in summer, the skin heated up to +80 - +90 ° C, real hell reigned in the cockpit (reporting documents stated: “In the heat when working in the cockpit, and even more so in the tail booms of helicopters, it’s generally impossible to be” ). Escaping from the heat, the crews often flew in far from the authorized form - underpants and panama hats. Nothing could save us from the eyes that penetrated everywhere, climbing into the nose and dust sticking to the body - in a year a person inhaled so much that would be enough for two bricks.

The greatest load fell on the "extreme" in the crew - the flight engineer. In addition to the usual work of preparing the helicopter, he was responsible for the supply of ammunition, refueling, loading. In flight, he monitored the operation of the systems, helped the pilot and navigator, fired from a machine gun and AGS, controlled the firing of paratroopers and their landing, not being able, as the pilots joked, except to give birth. When landing on field sites, where it was possible to run into a stone, a pothole, break the landing gear or roll over, the flight engineer jumped out first and, pointing to a level place, helped the commander to sit down (from the side of his waving his arms, crouching and bouncing in a cloud of sand in front of the helicopter, they vividly reminded shaman dance). Flight technicians spent 12–17 hours a day on board and in the parking lot, having, according to military doctors, “a 3-4-fold excess of the limits of permissible fatigue standards.” In order for the “techies” to remain combat-ready, their duties were partially entrusted to other specialists.

To avoid burns and sunstroke when performing heavy work (the suspension of 250-kg bombs was not considered such!), The helicopters in the parking lot tried to pour water, if only it was at hand. Daily sorties forced to abandon the days of preliminary training, performing it after the flights, "between times", and reducing maintenance to the minimum necessary work. If there was not enough time, cars were allowed to be released on a mission with a part of non-working equipment, failures of individual systems and unwired holes, from which a draft walked around the cabin (“if only the propeller would spin and machine guns would fire”). The hardy "eight" withstood unthinkable operating conditions: there were helicopters with dozens of holes, with propeller blades that had not been balanced (although this caused shaking, it was possible to fly). In the spring of 1980, two Kandahar Mi-8Ts hit each other with propellers in the air. Having sat down on a forced one in the desert, the damaged sections of the blades were trimmed by eye with a chisel, and the helicopters were able to return to base.

At the usual for Afghanistan summer +40 ° C, even at flat airfields, the available power of the TV2-117A engines fell by a third, and in the highlands of the theater they did not give out even half the power. Accordingly, the payload had to be reduced, the rate of climb fell almost three times, and maneuverability decreased. With the "passport" load of the Mi-8 up to 4000 kg, in most cases 9-10 paratroopers were the limit. In the summer of 1980, a Soviet squadron went to the rescue of an Afghan battalion stuck in the mountains near Kandahar. In total darkness, the pilots managed to find the Afghans and take them out of the plateau at an altitude of 2200 m. Having recruited 14–16 people into the cabins, they barely took off and reached home on the verge of burnout of the turbines and fire.

It was especially difficult when starting engines, which hardly grabbed hot air. It was the helicopter pilots who invented the “evaporative” method - from a tank standing at the ready through the upper hatch into the air intakes with a ladle or a mug they splashed water that cooled the air at the inlet (once in the 280th OVP, the scouts picked up in the desert first of all drank all the water on board, and in order to take off, the flight engineer had to sacrifice "NZ" - a stock of homemade mash).

Landing of troops from the "eights" of the 181st OVP

In the summer, the grease in the nodes melted and oxidized, and the batteries boiled from overheating. Several times, the hurricane wind twisted the propeller blades in the hinges, and sometimes the helicopters themselves had to be tied to tanks so that they would not be blown away. Constantly airborne dust from the salt marshes entered the hinges, hydraulic and oil systems, causing wear and corrosion of steel parts that were considered stainless under normal conditions. For every ton of fuel in the tanks of tankers, there was up to half a kilogram of dust and sand, some of which somehow got into the tanks, clogging the filters and threatening the engine with spontaneous departure from the mode, or even a stop. Compressors wear out dust in the first place. Due to erosion, the profile of the blades changed, leading to off-design flow around and even surge. TV2-117A did not produce even half of the assigned resource, and when they were sorted out, it was found that the miniature blades of the last stages were “eaten” almost to nothing. Dust protection devices (ROM) installed on the Mi-24 have not been used on the Mi-8T. Turning on the ROM took away up to 6% of the already missing power. Pulling another hundred “horses”, the technicians often over-adjusted the gas temperature limiter behind the turbine, raising it from the allowed 880 ° C to 920 ° C, reasonably believing that the engine would still not reach the set resource.

Since June 1980, the Mi-8T began to be finalized, strengthening armament and security. The cockpit was covered with external 5-mm armor screens and internal armor plates behind the pilots' seats, on the sides and below in front of the dashboards (these sheets could be folded to improve visibility). The total weight of the armor gave a weight gain of 180 kg, but it turned out to be quite effective: it stopped 70% of the bullets that hit, including large-caliber ones. In the nose, instead of the frontal glazing section, a mobile PKT tank machine gun was placed - a powerful weapon under a cartridge reinforced compared to the "handbrake". Two more machine guns were mounted on top of the suspension trusses. The choice of the army model was justified: he had to work in his “native environment” - dust and dirt, with insufficient cooling. Farm machine guns were aimed so that their tracks converged 800 m in front of the helicopter. They had 400 rounds of ammunition with alternating conventional, armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets. At the bow PKT, the ammunition included 500 rounds. Another PKT with a pair of cartridge boxes was placed in the tail hatch to protect the rear hemisphere, from where spooks often tried to hit the helicopter with fire in pursuit. The PKT differed from the infantry model in a more massive barrel, which made it possible to conduct continuous fire without overheating.

In 1980, the first Mi-8MT appeared in the Air Force of the 40th Army, equipped with more powerful TVZ-117MT engines and standard ROMs. The power-to-weight ratio increased by almost one and a half times provided them with superiority in speed, ceiling, rate of climb and maneuverability. The new helicopter did not even want to land unloaded, hanging freely near the ground at “low throttle”, and flew normally on one engine (on the Mi-8T, an engine failure made it immediately look for a place to land). To the pilots who tried the "emteshka", the usual "eight" seemed to lack power. With the same engines and similar firepower as the Mi-24, the Mi-8MT was a ton lighter and noticeably "flyer". The increased carrying capacity made it possible to carry up to 6 pylons with weapons, including bombs up to 500 kg and more powerful UB-32-57 blocks, which made it possible to effectively use it in an attack. Gradually, the entire fleet of "eights" began to be updated with new helicopters.

In the summer of 1980, arrivals at the Kabul airport were greeted by the slogan "Peace to the world!" and the local joke “There is no war here, but soon there will be no stone left unturned from our struggle for peace.” Fighting at that time was already going on throughout Afghanistan. The KhAD report on the densely populated Charikar Valley near Kabul itself read: "People's power is of a focal nature and, as a rule, extends to a building or a fortress." Could it be otherwise in a country where they tried to impose a "bright future" by force on the people with long-standing customs and traditions, there was no longer any need to think about the blood and fury of the battles. There was an enemy in the sight, and all that remained was to shoot and shoot. They no longer counted the cartridges: 10-12 “zincs” were taken on board the “eight” in addition to the standard ammunition, and after another hot fight, hundreds of spent cartridges rattled underfoot, covering the cabin floor. They had to be raked out with a broom and buckets, pouring them into heaps around the parking lots and filling local ditches to the top.

When providing fire support, close contact with ground units was of particular importance. In this, helicopter pilots had an undoubted advantage over fighter or fighter-bomber aviation: if necessary, they could take on board an air controller who knew the area or sit down in the battle formations of troops in order to clarify the situation and coordinate actions. At the disposal of Colonel B.V. Gromov, then the commander of the 5th motorized rifle division, there was a soldier-artist, who depicted in color a panorama of the area, according to which the helicopter pilots were assigned places of work and targets. From a small height, signal flares and smoke bombs were clearly distinguished, the chain of which indicated the front of the unit. The attack of helicopters gave much greater efficiency and accuracy than the strikes of high-speed aircraft, often from a height not able to notice these signals (there were cases when the aircraft controller, desperate to show the target to the aircraft dangerously circling overhead, took them aside, giving a guide to a rock in the distance).

Working in conjunction with the IA and IBA, the helicopters could "highlight" the target with machine-gun tracks or work according to a system called "smoke-fire": they struck the NAR, and aircraft dropped bombs on the rising cloud of dust and smoke. Having overcome the well-known arrogance towards rotary-winged "Carlsons", the pilots of "real" aviation did not miss the opportunity to "fly up" on the Mi-8 with gunners, feel the flight near the ground and meet the enemy closely. And his helicopter pilots saw literally in the face, and the words of the song from their rich folklore were not an exaggeration:

... I see you through the reticle,

Through the haze from a volley of rockets,

I see you still whole -

Rifle, turban and beshmet.

Patrolling (“looking through”) the surroundings and border areas, helicopters searched for armed groups and blocked the path of caravans with weapons. In the deserts of Registan and Khash, which stretched behind Farah and Kandahar, the search was facilitated by paths that were clearly visible from the air and trails of dust, which for hours clung to a past caravan or car. Travelers were caught up on them, inspection groups were landed, and even their fate was decided on the move. A person or a group who had weapons, who tried to break away from persecution, run away or hide, was unequivocally recognized as an enemy. During the inspection, special flair and caution were required: a machine gun could instantly appear in the hands of a peaceful merchant, and caravaners, it happened, themselves rushed to the attack. In the summer of 1980, the commander of the Mi-8T G. Pozharishchensky from the 280th OVP, who landed in the Registan, was killed in this way. A car with a wounded navigator and a gunner was able to bring home a flight engineer of "Kharitonov's training" A. Medvedev. Shortly before that, in the same place, in the same place, in a skirmish with a gang, commander Sidorov was “cut” by a bullet, his navigator was wounded in the neck, and the flight engineer had to shoot back from the PKK from the pressing Mujahideen, while the retreating group loaded the dead and wounded on board.

For surprise, “viewing” and approaching the target were carried out at extremely low altitudes, at the level of treetops (although the instructions forbade flights below 50 m, later lowering the “bar” to 25 m). In August 1980, the Mi-8T returned to Kandahar without the nose strut, demolished in a low-level flight. He had to sit on the substituted boxes. The car was repaired, and it continued to fly, keeping an impressive dent in the cabin floor as a keepsake.

The main work of the "eights" remained the transportation and landing of troops, which occupied, respectively, 18% and 12% of total number sorties of army aviation (AA), increasing to 40-45% during operations that are generally impossible without landing from helicopters and air supply. When cleaning the province of Fariab, bordering the USSR, in January 1982, 40 Soviet Mi-8T and MT, 12 Mi-24, 8 Mi-6 and 12 Afghan Mi-8T were involved, landing 1200 fighters, while losing two "eights". During the 2nd Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, tactical landings of 20 Soviet and Afghan battalions with a total of 4,200 people played a decisive role, which were carried out by 104 of our helicopters and part of Afghan vehicles. The main task was to capture the dominant heights in order to cut off the enemy's escape routes, for which helicopters had to operate at altitudes up to 3500 m. Supporting the landing force, in addition to bombs and missiles, aviation fired 415,226 rounds of ammunition during the three weeks of the operation.

The reconnaissance group is loaded into the Mi-8 of the 280th ovp. Kandahar, spring 1982

The most complex flights were carried out to provide high-mountain outposts and reconnaissance posts that controlled passes and roads. To throw food, fuel, ammunition and ordinary water there, the Mi-8 was made extremely light by removing armor, suspension trusses, some equipment, seats in the cargo compartment, and sometimes even weapons and cargo hatch doors. A “undressed” helicopter could gain an extra couple of hundred meters in height, but there was often nowhere to land, and the car had to be kept on weight, sticking to a rock ledge with one wheel, while cargo was thrown out of the cabin and people were taken. Sometimes, having climbed to a high-altitude platform with acceleration, the helicopter could no longer take off normally from there. In this case, a stall technique was worked out, in which the helicopter slid down, gained sufficient speed in the fall and switched to level flight. Once, Captain Kabdulin managed to take away 30 people blocked at the top in this way at once, explaining later that he simply could not climb this platform again.

"Turntables" enjoyed well-deserved love and respect: in addition to delivering everything necessary and fire support, they took out the wounded and those affected by heat strokes ("sunshine"), rescued those cut off from their units. For many who found themselves in a hopeless situation, the roar of helicopters meant salvation. Among them was the head of the rear of the 40th Army, Colonel V.A. Vasin, an armored personnel carrier with whom they shot down in the "zelenka" near Charikar.

The growth of losses in aviation made it necessary to improve the tactics of search and rescue groups (PSS). At first, a pair of Mi-8s with weapons, a first-aid kit and a rescue team on board, whose task was to support the downed crew and help them get out, were on duty at the airfield and rose on call. The fate of the pilots who had landed on a forced flight was often decided by minutes, and a couple of PSS began to be attached to the main group. She was trailing in order of battle to see all the other machines. Air duty at the target was carried out at a safe level, circling 300–500 m higher than the others. If necessary, the nearest of the helicopters sat down to the rescue, while the rest covered it with fire, becoming in a circle.

In units of the 40th Army, from the first day, there was an order that not a single fighter - wounded, shell-shocked or killed - should remain on the battlefield. In April

In 1981, during the fighting in the Anardara Gorge near Farah, five people disappeared. When the helicopter pilots found them, only one remained alive, but the bodies of the dead had to be recaptured, landing troops and knocking the enemy out of the area. In June 1985, helicopter pilots of the 280th OVP, searching for a fighter pilot shot down near Kandahar, found him dead: the pilot, descending on a parachute, was shot by dushmans in the air. The flight engineer of the Mi-8, who opened the door, was killed on the spot by a sniper hiding in an ambush, who knew that the Shuravis would certainly fly in to pick up their own. Immediately, a helicopter was also shot from ZGU, from which the commander and navigator barely had time to jump out.

The helicopter pilots themselves annually lost 30–35 vehicles (almost a whole regiment), many of which carried the crew with them. There was not much left of the burned-out helicopter: a burning spot visible from afar, a tail boom and wheels flying off on impact, engines tangled in scraps of wires in a puddle of duralumin, and a cockpit skeleton covered with greasy soot. The main number of damage to the Mi-8 was received during landing, landing and picking up people on the fired areas (up to 50%), and during transportation (up to 15%). To avoid defeat during landing, the "maple leaf" technique was invented: the helicopter was descending, wagging along the course and roll. At the same time, the flight direction was maintained, but from the ground it was difficult to understand the true position of the machine and the maneuver being performed.

Gaining experience, the enemy shooters tried to knock out the crew with aimed fire: 44% of all losses in helicopter aviation accounted for the death of a pilot from small arms. By 1982, the number of hits in the cockpit reached 74% of the total, while 42% of the bullets in front fell on the unprotected glazing of the Mi-8. "Bur" with an effective range of up to 2600 m was no less dangerous than an automatic weapon. In March 1982, Senior Lieutenant Minin from the 335th Regiment, who was picking up the wounded from Gardez, was hit in the face by a Bura bullet. He died in the air, the entire cockpit was covered in blood, but the navigator managed to take control and take the helicopter away. Captain Alexandrov, who was walking as a wingman, was immediately wounded in the arm, and he rolled over on landing. On board, everyone remained intact, and the "tagged" pilot, returning to service, received a sniper's bullet in the same place on the first sortie! Major Kharitonov was saved in flight by the artificial horizon, in which a bullet lodged, which went exactly to the head.

Shot down in the Panjshir operation "eight". May 1982

Against helicopters taking off and landing, the Mujahideen used hand-held grenade launchers, in handling which they were real masters. The cumulative RPG grenade pulled out up to 1.5 square meters. m of the side, caused a fuel leak and a fire, could tear off the tail boom or smash the propeller. A grenade launcher lay in wait for Captain Ivanov on takeoff in Asadabad. The "Spirit", dirty and shaggy, rose from behind the stones nearby and planted a grenade at point-blank range. The G8, which had barely left the ground, collapsed in flames, machine guns immediately hit it, but the pilots managed to jump out and, hiding behind the creeping fire, took cover behind the armor of the infantry fighting vehicle that came to the rescue. Barrage fire could also be fired from RPGs, while the grenades worked to self-destruct, scattering fragments around (apparently, such cases gave rise to rumors about the use of MANPADS at the beginning of the war, because the flash of a grenade burst in the air was very similar to a rocket burst).

One of the Mi-8s became a victim of the Shilka hijacked from the Afghan unit. On July 23, 1980, while conducting reconnaissance at the Marble Mountain near Kandahar, Captain Epifanov's helicopter was hit in the fuselage, cutting the car in half, and fell to the ground. The follower, who followed, could not help in any way - everyone in the car engulfed in fire burned down.

With the saturation of air defense with large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and anti-aircraft guns with an effective slant range of up to 1500 m, it was necessary to raise the flight levels of helicopters. The number of hits from small arms, including those with a caliber of up to 14.5 mm, at altitudes above 1200 m fell to 3-5% of the total, and after 2000 m it could be ignored. The appearance of MANPADS qualitatively changed the nature of the use of helicopters, in fact, the war for air supremacy began. "Red Eye - dangerous areas" were noted on flight maps as early as 1980, and in May 1982, the first Dushman "Arrows" were captured in Panjshir. However, the new weapons had not yet been properly mastered; the batteries taken from the trophies, for example, turned out to be completely damp. The first launches were recorded in 1983, then their number began to increase menacingly; by the end of 1984, 62 cases of the use of missiles were noted, in 1985 - 141 launches, in 1986 - already 847, hitting 23 vehicles. In 1987, according to the operational department of the headquarters of the 40th army, the enemy had 341 MANPADS, and in the camps in Pakistan and Iran, where anti-aircraft gunners were trained, the specialty of a rocket shooter became one of the mass ones. A hit by a missile with a powerful warhead, which slashed the helicopter with a dense stream of fragments and a high-explosive strike, most often led to a catastrophic outcome - a fire, an explosion and the death of pilots. Specialists who studied the resistance of helicopter systems and assemblies to MANPADS came to a conclusion worthy of citation: “A direct hit of missiles on a helicopter leads to its death, therefore, the specific nature of combat damage to aircraft in this case is of no practical interest.” The air defense reach zone with the advent of more advanced Stingers covered heights of up to 3500 m, and arrows could wait for aircraft everywhere: they even reported launches from the center of Kabul, from the roofs of houses and cars.

The first improvements to improve protection against MANPADS were carried out in the summer of 1980. They included the installation of screen-exhaust devices (EVU) and automatic jammers ASO-2V with IR traps. EED, mixing hot exhaust gases with outside air, reduced the thermal background of the engines by two to three times. The ASO blocks, containing 32 LO-56 squibs, were hung on steel bands under the tail boom. Later, on the Mi-8MT, they began to be mounted in packs of three on the sides of the fuselage, so that the traps would burn out in the thermal wake of the engines. Shooting was set automatically in series of 4-16 pieces. However, these systems did not provide a radical solution: the efficiency of low-power traps with a burning time of 5–8 seconds was only 10–15%, and the design of the EED was not entirely successful. They directed the exhaust gases upwards to be washed away by the flow from the propeller, but the experiments carried out at TsAGI, during which the helicopter with the EED was filmed from different angles with thermal imaging equipment, revealed an unexpected effect - the presence of clearly identifiable bursts of IR radiation that are attractive to the seeker during the passage of the blades missiles. Achieving a satisfactory result, I had to change three types of EED.

Since 1982, the S0EP-V1A optoelectronic interference station (L-166 or Lipa product) appeared on helicopters, which was mounted on the top of the fuselage. With the help of a heating element (a powerful xenon lamp or a nichrome coil) and a system of rotating lenses, Lipa created a pulsed stream of continuously moving infrared rays around the helicopter, which caused the missile tracking system to build up and the guidance to fail. The station turned out to be extremely effective: during the test, it disrupted the attack with a probability close to 1, although it had “dead zones” at the bottom and did not provide full protection against the Stingers. Practical helicopter pilots also found domestic use for a truly universal system, adapting to fry potatoes and boil kettles on its powerful “stove”. The total effectiveness of all three helicopter systems of active and passive protection in combat conditions reached 70–85% (it was estimated by the number of thwarted launches to their total number).

Aircraft and Helicopters Note that on sections of movement with a direction close to the “observer-aircraft” line, an eyewitness (due to the autostatic effect) may notice an object “stopping/hovering”. So, for example, an aircraft performing a 90µ turn can

The interest of the Soviet Union, and then its successor, Russian Federation, to Afghanistan has a very long history. In the middle of the 19th century, this mountainous country with rugged terrain became the arena of rivalry between Russian Empire, seeking to expand its sphere of influence and acquire a port on the Indian Ocean, and the British Empire, determined to protect its interests in India. After World War II, the attention of the Soviet Union to this region increased significantly. Both Afghanistan and Iran shared several thousand kilometers of borders with the USSR and were buffer states against forces hostile to the Soviet Union. Back in 1925, the USSR began to provide assistance to the Royal Air Force of Afghanistan, and in the 50s. XX century became their main supplier of military equipment.

In 1973, the monarchy in Afghanistan was overthrown, but the republican government that came to power, headed by General Mohammed Daoud, continued to maintain friendly relations with Moscow. The country's armed forces were equipped with new Soviet equipment, which was purchased in large quantities. This was especially true for the Air Force, where by the end of the 70s. more than 180 units of military equipment were in service, including MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighters, Su-7BM attack aircraft and Il-28 bombers.

In April 1978 there was a military coup. Daoud died, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) headed by Mohammed Hyp Taraki came to power. Soon he was replaced by Hafizullah Amin, who was educated in America and for this reason was not trusted in the USSR. Land reform hastily began in the country, which caused discontent among the general population. An uprising broke out. Several army units went over to the side of the rebels. In March 1979, the rebel forces grew so large that they were even able to capture Herat, a large city in the west of the country, where hundreds of government soldiers were executed, as well as about fifty Soviet advisers and their families.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION

At that moment, there were over a thousand advisers from the USSR in Afghanistan. Not wanting to further risk their lives, the Soviet Union began planning an operation to bring its troops into this country, which, according to the plan of Soviet strategists, should have led to the stabilization of the internal political situation in Afghanistan. However, the fate of the advisers was not the only factor that worried the USSR. The Soviet leadership was also seriously alarmed by the apparent resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism and wanted to send unequivocal warnings to Iran and Pakistan through the upcoming invasion. Army General Epishev, in addition, signed an agreement with the then Afghan government, according to which 100 T-62 tanks and 18 Mi-24 fire support helicopters were delivered to Afghanistan.

Further attacks by the rebels led to the fact that the USSR supplied the Kabul regime with 18 more Mi-24 helicopters, including several fire support vehicles of modification D. In December 1978, the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty was signed. It was registered with the UN in September 1989. According to this pact, in the event of a threat to the security of any of the parties, the other side received the right to intervene to eliminate such a threat. A few weeks before the start of the invasion, the Soviet command concentrated on air bases in Bagram and Shindand. placed at his disposal, shock units numbering up to 6,000 soldiers. In the period from December 24 to 26, 1979, when all Western countries were politically and militarily powerless to do anything, the intensity of Soviet air traffic increased sharply. In total, about 300 flights of military transport aviation were noted.

On December 27, Soviet special forces attacked the presidential palace in Kabul, and after the overthrow of Amin, former Deputy Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, who had been in exile before the invasion, was put in power. At the same time, the 15,000-strong Soviet grouping of troops began its advance from the Soviet border into the depths of Afghanistan. It was covered from the air by MiG-21 fighter-bombers and Mi-24 fire support helicopters.

Afghan representatives of the Islamic fundamentalist movement put up strong resistance in the countryside, declaring jihad, a "holy war" against the Soviet troops. The United States began secretly supplying weapons to the rebels. Initially, they organized the supply of Soviet-made weapons from Egypt.

Just like the British and the Soviet military once discovered, the territory of Afghanistan was simply impossible to control. The Mujahideen, operating in small groups, easily found refuge in mountainous terrain and distant valleys. Soviet bases and airfields scattered throughout the country were islands in a hostile world.

Soon the fighting came to a stalemate. Soviet troops regularly carried out operations to clear this or that area from the rebels, however, as soon as they left, the Mujahideen returned again. As a means of fire support, the Soviet command widely used helicopters. Both fighter-bombers based in Afghanistan itself and long-range bombers operating from bases in the Soviet Union also took part in the operations. A special tactic was developed, which consisted in the fact that mobile ground forces drove the insurgents out into the open, where they were destroyed from the air by helicopters.

CONDITIONS OF BATTLE OPERATIONS OF AIRCRAFT ON THE TERRITORY OF AFGHANISTAN

70% of the territory of Afghanistan is occupied by mountains with poor vegetation. The height of the Hindu Kush mountain range is up to 6-7 thousand meters. The depth of the gorges reaches 3000 meters, and the width of some of them is such that even a helicopter cannot turn around there. In the north of the country there is a plain, in the south and southwest there is a large desert.

Heaps of rocks and stones make it extremely difficult to detect ground targets.

8 months a year over Afghanistan is sunny, hot weather. Temperature up to +50 degrees. But at this time, flight weather may be limited due to dust storms and too high air temperatures.

Mountains make it difficult to use ground-based RTSs. The main method of aircraft navigation is considered to be flight according to the course and time with constant monitoring of the path using visual landmarks. However, the monotony of the mountainous terrain makes it difficult to navigate.

Airfields and landing sites are at a significant elevation above sea level (up to 2500 m). This reduces the range of combat aircraft and the time spent over the battlefield.

MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

In conditions when the movement of military columns along the roads was fraught with significant risk and required very strong security, Soviet and Afghan troops were forced to use mainly transport aircraft both to deliver manpower and equipment from the USSR to Afghanistan, and to redeploy troops within the country . Interestingly, many Soviet transport aircraft flying to Afghanistan carried Aeroflot identification marks, although they were piloted by VTA crews.

The main types of military transport aircraft used to transport troops and cargo in Afghanistan were the An-22 Antey, Il-76 and An-26.

An-22 was the largest transport aircraft of all that made regular flights to Afghanistan. However, the main part of the traffic both from the USSR to Afghanistan and within Afghanistan was carried by the jet Il-76. By the time the troops entered Afghanistan, the Soviet VTA had already, in the main, managed to rearm with these machines instead of the An-12 turboprops. However, the An-12 was also not completely abandoned.

The Afghan Air Force had a small transport aircraft, which was armed with various types of aircraft. The most modern of them was the An-26. Equipped with an auxiliary power unit located in the engine nacelle, the An-26 proved to be excellent in conditions of heat and high mountains and turned out to be indispensable for transporting small loads.

Military transport aviation (VTA) of the USSR Air Force began to be used for the transfer of cargo to the military airfields of Afghanistan in the pre-war period. Already at that time, a helicopter squadron of 280 ovp and a military transport squadron (detachment) of 10 An-12 aircraft were based at the Bagram airfield.

December 25, 1979 at 18.00 local time, the airborne assault began as part of the 103rd Airborne Division and a separate RAP. 55 BTA aircraft were involved in this operation. The length of the route was more than 2 thousand km, and several times the aircraft had to go in complete radio silence. Aircraft landing was carried out at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. It took 10-15 minutes to unload.

Military transport aviation made 343 flights, including 66 An-22 flights, 77 Il-76 flights, 200 An-12 flights, totaling 47 hours. Thus, air transport delivered the first Soviet military units to Afghanistan with a total number of 7,700 people, with 894 units of military equipment. In addition to personnel and military equipment, 1062 tons of various cargoes were delivered. However, this was only 2% of the total volume of cargo that transport aircraft had to deliver to Afghanistan.

At the same time, the VTA and the paratroopers suffered their first losses in Afghanistan. At 19.35 on December 25, when landing in Kabul, an Il-76 aircraft under the command of Captain V.V. Golovchin, carrying 37 paratroopers and 7 crew members, crashed into a mountain and exploded. On the morning of December 26, General Egorov took off from the squadron of the 280th Air Regiment in a helicopter to the disaster area. However, it was not possible to start a search and rescue operation, both because of the weather conditions and the lack of necessary forces and means. In a hurry, climbers from the army sports club were called, who trained in Central Asia. They were given weapons, given 5 paratroopers as guards, and sent to the fall area. On January 1, 1980, after three days of searching, the cockpit of an aircraft with the body of the commander was found in the mountains. Most likely, the plane caught on one of the mountain peaks, and broke in half ...

In subsequent hostilities, it is daily work military transport aviation to a large extent ensured the operations of the entire Limited contingent. From 150 to 200 flights were operated monthly both within Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union and back. In preparation for and during large-scale operations, the number of BTA sorties reached 400-500 per month. The crews continuously performed the tasks of supplying the contingent of Soviet troops with everything necessary not only for combat operations, but also for life. Parts of the VTA provided maneuver for front-line and army aviation. A significant share in the total volume of traffic was made up of humanitarian cargo intended for Afghans. The garrisons regularly flew around and took away the seriously wounded and sick, ambulance aircraft, for which, according to the mobilization plan, Il-18 passenger aircraft were re-equipped.

Flights for transportation were carried out, as a rule, with the maximum load. The delivery of cargo and ammunition by transport aviation was carried out at a lower cloud cover of 1000 meters. However, this rule was often violated due to the requirements of the combat situation, and the most trained crews of the VTA units flew at the lower cloud limit of 800 and even 600 meters.

In connection with the conversation about transport aviation, one cannot fail to mention the ominous symbol of the Afghan war - the "Black Tulip". This was the name of the An-12 military transport aircraft, which was used to transport coffins with the dead. In fact, this name comes from the name of a funeral company in Tashkent, which produces coffins upholstered in zinc, especially for the OKSV. From eight to fifteen coffins were usually loaded into the plane, this load was accompanied by an officer from the unit where the dead were from or a close friend who was in battle with the deceased comrade. Having delivered the cargo to the Union, they were transferred to the district military registration and enlistment offices, from where the dead were called up.

In total, the crews of military transport aviation alone performed 27 thousand aircraft flights in Afghanistan (of which 14,700 were in the face of enemy air defense), transported more than 880 thousand personnel and about 430 thousand tons of various cargoes. More than 1,700 BTA servicemen have been awarded orders and medals. During the war, 2 Il-76, 5 An-26, 8 AN-12 and 1 An-30 were lost from anti-aircraft fire of dushmans and as a result of accidents. A favorite tactic of the Mujahideen was to place anti-aircraft weapons near Soviet air bases, and "catch" planes on takeoff or landing. So, in February 1983, an An-12 was shot down over the Jalalabad airfield while landing from a MANPADS, all crew members died. And already in July of the same year, another An-12 was shot down from the DShK over the same airfield on takeoff. There were 8 people on board, all of them died.

FRONT AVIATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Fighter and fighter-bomber aviation in Afghanistan solved the following tasks:

• air support of troops, cover of transport columns and escort ground forces in raid operations;
• air strikes against identified enemy targets;
• cover for helicopter units;
• destruction of firing points, strongholds of the Mujahideen;
• aerial reconnaissance;
• covering the territory of the DRA in the general air defense system.

The main burden of combat work during the Afghan war lay with the Air Force of the 40th Army (until 1980 - the 34th Aviation Corps). At different times, in rotation military units, six fighter aviation regiments passed through the aviation of the 40th Army ( iap), one assault aviation regiment ( hat), one separate attack aviation squadron ( oshae), one separate mixed aviation regiment ( osap), four fighter-bomber aviation regiments ( ibap), eight separate helicopter aviation regiments ( ovap), eleven separate helicopter aviation squadrons ( ovae).

The headquarters of the Air Force of the 40th Army was in Kabul. The main air bases were the airfields of Kabul, Kandahar and Bagram. The airfields had equipment from the USSR, which simplified the task of repairing and maintaining Soviet aircraft on them. According to the recollections of aviators, the living conditions there in the first winter were a real nightmare. They lived in tents and dugouts, somehow escaping from snow and cold rain. They didn’t take off their clothes for two weeks - there was still nowhere to wash them. But over time, real towns grew up around the airbases, with power plants, boiler houses and water supply.

It must be said that in the first time after the introduction of the OKSV, the Soviet leadership did not rule out the invasion of Afghanistan by troops of US-friendly countries in the Middle East, and even by the United States itself. Based on this scenario, fighter aircraft were needed. In the future, all fighters performed purely assault missions - the Mujahideen did not have aviation.

To destroy manpower, unprotected and lightly armored targets, one-time bomb cassettes (RBK), cannons, NURS S-5 and S-24 with proximity radio fuses were used to detonate at a height of 15-30 m. and high-explosive fragmentation bombs with a caliber of 250-500 kg and NURS S-24 with a contact fuse.

At the first stage, the fighter group of aviation of the 40th Army was represented by the MiG-21bis aircraft, the latest modification of the MiG-21. There were cars of two versions: in the usual configuration and with an additional set of radio systems for short-range navigation RSBN. The latter significantly simplified flights in difficult conditions, making it possible to perform round-the-clock descent and landing approach even with limited instrument visibility. An instrumental approach was allowed up to a height of 50 m at any time of the day and in any weather conditions. Another advantage of the MiG-21bis was an increased flight range with a ventral external tank (up to 1480 km) and increased capabilities in terms of weight and arsenal of weapons (up to one and a half tons of bombs, 32-charging UB-32 units, gun GSh-23L). Thus, far from being a new MiG-21bis, in some respects it surpassed even more modern machines, such as the MiG-23.

As a purely attack aircraft, an older modification of the "twenty-first" - the MiG-21PFM was used (in March 1980, the units armed with them were withdrawn and re-equipped with more modern MiG-21SM). As fighters, they were no longer of value, and they were still quite capable of firing and bombing ground targets.

The first case of a clash with the use of aviation occurred on January 9, 1980. Afghan partisans successfully attacked a military column marching from Termez to Fayzabad. Losses killed in the convoy amounted to 42 people. Combat aircraft were called. The planes worked in pairs, in turn, shooting a large number of foot Mujahideen and cavalry with NURS almost in open areas.

Already in February-March 1980, aviation was used "with might and main": fighter-bombers supported the advance of motorized rifle units, which eliminated the centers of resistance of the Mujahideen. The first major operation of this kind was carried out in March in Kunar province. The reinforced motorized rifle regiment had to go to locality Asabad to release the garrison of government troops. The only road leading to the city, which went mainly along the mountain ledges. Fighter-bombers supported the advance of the ground troops, however, small gun emplacements were difficult to detect in the rocks, especially at high speed, and strikes had to be made mainly on squares. Aircraft controllers who were in the battle formations of the ground troops themselves often could not determine where the fire was coming from. Not without strikes on their units, but fortunately, there were no casualties.

Another common method of combat work was reconnaissance and strike actions, colloquially - "hunting". Fighter-bombers carried out reconnaissance in designated areas, and when targets were detected, they attacked them, having previously received permission to use weapons.

Subsequently, more modern Soviet front-line MiG-23ML/MLD fighters were sent to Afghanistan. They, like the MiG-21, performed mainly ground strikes (with the exception of rare clashes with the Pakistan Air Force) and have proven themselves very well.

Attack aviation in Afghanistan was represented by Su-17 fighter-bombers and Su-25 armored subsonic attack aircraft. The latter turned out to be especially well adapted for mining from the air. He was also involved in strikes against pre-planned targets, and in support of troops. The Su-25s also conducted independent reconnaissance and strike operations, hunting for caravans and campsites of Afghan partisans. At the same time, the combat load was chosen to be universal and included a pair of bombs or RBCs of 250-500 kg caliber and two UB-32 or B-8 blocks. The recognition of the merits of the Su-25 was the fact that the ammunition that came from the Union was primarily distributed in favor of these aircraft, since they gave the best result. Yes, and aircraft controllers preferred to work with pure attack aircraft, rather than fighter-bombers - armor protection and lower speed allowed them to work on ground targets at a height of 600-1000 m (fighters - from 2000-2500 m), with minimal risk of “hooking” their own. Aircraft controllers especially noted the accuracy of attack aircraft, the power of their strikes and the ability to "point work".

But the MiG-27D fighter-bomber has not found wide application in Afghanistan. This aircraft was created for air operations in Western Europe, during which it was planned to strike from low altitudes. It was equipped with modern avionics, but turned out to be unnecessary in the conditions of Afghanistan, where efficient, simple and reliable aircraft took advantage.

The tactics of attack aircraft depended on the combat situation, weather conditions, target characteristics and combat mission. As a rule, 4 groups were distinguished:

• air defense suppression (2-4 fighter-bombers) - struck by NURSs or RBCs in the target area and on both sides of the combat course;
• target designation (2 Mi-8 or a pair of aircraft) - designated the target with NURSs;
• strike group (4-8 fighter-bombers) - to deliver the main strike on the target;
• strike results control group (2 reconnaissance aircraft).

However, such a scheme was more relevant for combat work on the plain, where there is a lot of space. In narrow gorges, one most powerful bombing and assault strike was used so that the enemy did not have time to disperse.

The following strikes were used:

Pair dive strike - after detecting the target, the leader performed a turn with a slip and a half-flip, put the aircraft into a dive, usually at an angle of 30–40 or more steep descent. The height of the bombs and the lower limit of the withdrawal were determined by the conditions of safety from air defense fire, fragments of their own bombs and the features of the mountainous terrain. The wingman lagged behind the leader before the attack, increasing the distance for freedom of maneuver and, aiming independently, followed him in a combat approach

"Carousel" - a more complex scheme in which aircraft come in to bomb with small impacts, providing a continuous effect on the target. Required precise calculation and coordination of actions.

Cabriolet bombing - used to hit targets with a known location, usually areal. Thus, it was possible to throw bombs, for example, over a mountain range, while remaining outside the air defense coverage area. Having accelerated in a gentle descent, the aircraft performed a slide with an angle of 25-30 o (or up to 45 o) with the separation of bombs at the top point and turned to the side. The bombs went up along the trajectory, flying a few more kilometers to the target

Night strike - the leader, having found a target or focusing on its approximate location, drops parachute light bombs from a height of 2000–3000 m and strikes in the next run using 6–8 minutes of illumination. When acting in pairs, the wingman, following the safety conditions of a night flight with an interval of 2–3 minutes, attacks with bombs, NAR or cannon fire from a gentle dive from a distance of 1500–2000 m. For secrecy, combat maneuvering was carried out while being above the SAB torches, where the aircraft remained invisible In the dark.

Since 1984, Su-24 front-line bombers have been used in Afghanistan. These aircraft could carry 7,000 kg of bomb load, had a range of 2,400 km, and could be used from the airfields of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. The immediate reason for their involvement in military operations was the grandiose offensive of the Soviet troops planned for the spring-summer of 1984 on the Panjshir Valley - the stronghold of the famous field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. In this operation, the Su-24 carried out carpet bombing of the defensive positions of the Mujahideen along the route of the Soviet troops. The bombardments were carried out from a height of 5000 m. However, they did not bring much success - partly because of the too high speed of the bombers and the low effectiveness of the bombs (a direct hit was required to destroy the adobe structure with thick walls), partly because Ahmad Shah Massoud their main forces from the valley.

The Su-24 proved to be a reliable machine, but its capabilities for counterguerrilla warfare were redundant. However, where the total destruction of all life was required, they coped best. Preference was given to the powerful FAB-1500 bombs in conjunction with the RBC-500. The FAB-1500s were the first to reach the ground, destroying the walls of the duvals, and the RBC-500s flew after them. The latter, during the explosion, scattered hundreds of thousands of steel 5.5-mm balls, cutting everything into dust in an area of ​​400 by 600 m. If the Mujahideen hid in the green, they were mowed down along with it.

Gradually, the strengthening of the air defense of the Mujahideen led to the fact that at the end of the war the Su-24s were forced to work already from 7500-8000 m, respectively, the accuracy of bombing became very approximate.

Su-24s worked in Afghanistan until the very withdrawal of OKSV. During the days of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, bombers "chopped off their tails", striking at Salang, the Charikar valley, and areas from Kabul to Pyanj. Moreover, after the departure of the Soviet contingent, the Su-24s were for some time ready to support Najibullah's troops in the event of a direct threat to Kabul from the opposition. However, the storming of the city did not follow, and on March 6, the bombers were given a “retreat”.

During the Afghan war, the losses of Soviet attack aircraft turned out to be quite significant: 21 MiG-21, 11 MiG-23, 34 Su-17 and SU-22 (export version of the Su-17), 1 Su-24 (as a result of an accident), 36 Su-25, 2 Yak-28 and 1 Yak-38.

LONG RANGE AVIATION

Long-range aviation in Afghanistan was represented by Tu-16, Tu-22M2, and later - the latest at that time Tu-22M3. Long-range aviation aircraft were relocated from other regions of the Soviet Union closer to Afghanistan - to the airfields of Hydabad, Semipalatinsk, Mary and Mary-2.

The advantages of Long-Range Aviation, due to which such a powerful force was attracted to combat work in Afghanistan, were as follows:

• the ability to "cover" any point in Afghanistan from airfields on Soviet territory;
• the possibility of using air bombs with a caliber of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg.
• independence from weather conditions;
• more advanced navigation equipment than on front-line aircraft;
• invulnerability from anti-aircraft fire of dushmans, since flight and bombing were carried out at altitudes of the order of 10 km.

However, if the Su-24 front-line bombers were ill-suited for counterguerrilla warfare, then Long-Range Aviation aircraft were not created for these purposes at all. They are intended primarily to destroy strategic objects and the rear of the enemy, and the partisans, as a rule, carried all their property with them and did not have a developed infrastructure.

The only case of combat use of Long-Range Aviation more or less for its intended purpose was the bombardment of lapis lazuli mines in the Jarma district, which was the economic basis of the power of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Bombing was carried out from a height of 10-12 thousand meters, while the mines themselves were at an altitude of 6729 meters above sea level. The effectiveness of the bombing could not be established.

The next operation with the participation of Long-Range Aviation was the already mentioned offensive on Panjshir in 1984. The Tu-16 and Tu-22M2, like the Su-24 bombers, could not realize their potential here. Their bombs of 3000, 5000 and 9000 kg calibers did not correspond at all to the tasks of combating manpower - they appeared in the 1940s as a means of combating large ships. Meanwhile, the radius of lethal damage by the FAB-3000 shock wave did not exceed 39 m, and even for the FAB-9000 it remained within 57 m.

However, since 1986, Long-Range Aviation has again been involved in work in Afghanistan. This time, her task was the destruction of caves and other fortified objects of the Mujahideen. Often such shelters, being carved into solid rock, withstood hits of 500-kilogram bombs. Large caliber bombs came in handy here. A high-explosive impact caused cracking and collapse of the caves. Bombing on the slopes gave good results. The descent of a huge mass of stones tightly filled up the entrances to the caves, cut a few mountain paths, and caused the collapse of the cornices. All this created additional difficulties for the partisans.

In the fall of 1988, a separate long-range aviation group was created, the main task of which was to cover the units withdrawn from the DRA. It included the Tu-16 of the 251st Guards TBAP from Bila Tserkva and two Tu-22M3 squadrons from the Poltava 185th Guards TBAP. At this time, the bombing took on the character of a counterbalance to the growing guerrilla activity, since the ground units Soviet army had already begun to withdraw, and there was little use from the Afghan allies. Kabul was already constantly subjected to rocket attacks from various groups of the Mujahideen, and "long-range" were attracted to respond to them. They bombed the outskirts of the city, paying special attention to those places where the launches were seen, but the effectiveness of combat work was low - the launchers were mounted mainly on cars and quickly left the impact. At the end of November 1988, the lapis lazuli and emerald mines of Masud were again bombed.

Long-range aviation aircraft worked under the cover of fighters. They feared, first of all, Pakistani aviation. The use of Tu-22M3 heat traps to divert Mujahideen missiles with infrared seekers was common practice. Three Tu-22PD electronic warfare aircraft also flew in the Tu-22M3 combat formations, the task of which was to disrupt the possible launch of Pakistani missiles by the Krotal air defense system and, especially, F-16 attacks.

From the beginning of February 1989, flights were carried out without Tu-22PD escort, since most of the targets were located in the central regions, far from the border. The last sortie of the crews of a separate long-range aviation group practically coincided with the moment of the complete withdrawal of troops. On February 14, when only General Gromov and his escort were left to cross the border, the "long-distance" bombers bombed the northern regions. The Afghan government insisted on the continuation of the bombing by Long-Range Aviation as compensation for the departure of the 40th Army, but they did not go for it. Nevertheless, the "long-range" lingered at the Mary airfield for three weeks after the withdrawal of troops, in combat readiness "just in case", and left it only on March 13, 1989. During the war in Afghanistan, Long-Range Aviation managed to do without losses.

HELICOPTER WAR

According to the estimates of air controllers who worked in combat formations of ground units, it was helicopters that had the highest efficiency with fire support. The use of helicopters has allowed Soviet command promptly respond to the partisan tactics of the Mujahideen. Helicopters were used for fire support of ground units, pursuit of the retreating enemy, air patrols of the area and escort of convoys, landing troops at key positions, supplying troops, rescuing downed pilots and evacuating the seriously wounded. (True, in areas with an elevation above 2500-3000 m above sea level, helicopters were already working at the limit of their capabilities, and here Su-25 provided fire support to the troops).

Helicopters became real flying tanks and armored personnel carriers, which were not afraid of the most rugged terrain. That is why helicopters were priority targets for Mujahideen fire. A favorite tactic of the Mujahideen was to let a helicopter fly over their camouflaged positions and then open fire in pursuit. In May 1980, the Mi-24s appeared in the air for the first time, armed with machine guns for firing backwards.

Mi-24 is a combat helicopter with a partially armored body. In the basic version, the armament included a heavy machine gun for firing forward, NURS blocks, and 4 ATGMs of the Falanga-M complex. Subsequently, it was modified several times. The most massive version was the Mi-24V with a USPU-24 mobile machine gun mount with a four-barreled 12.7 mm YakB-12.7 machine gun, 16 ATGMs and weapons units with various types of unguided aircraft missiles (NARs). Additionally, the helicopter could carry bomb weapons.

Mi-24s played a leading role in the Afghan war. By the end of 1980, the number of Mi-24s in the 40th Army was increased to 251 units. In combat, the Mi-24, as a rule, fired rockets from 1200-1500 m, and opened fire from a machine gun at a distance of 800-1000 m. Helicopter armament was quite effective against enemy manpower: each S-8 NAR warhead provided a solid defeat within a radius of 10-12 m, and a four-barreled machine gun gave especially powerful and accurate fire and pierced a duval up to half a meter thick. 250 and 500 kg air bombs or 500 kg incendiary tanks were used to destroy fortified objects resistant to NAR.

In the first months after the introduction of Soviet troops, Mi-8 helicopters were added to the Mi-24 helicopters to strengthen helicopter air support, some of which were borrowed from the civil airline Aeroflot. Mi-8s did not have such formidable firepower as Mi-24s, but they were indispensable in landing operations. They were most often involved in ensuring the delivery and evacuation of special forces groups during reconnaissance operations, raids, and ambushes. By the way, in Afghanistan, the Mi-8 flew as a flight engineer, later Hero of Russia, Guards Lieutenant Colonel of the Special Forces of the Airborne Forces - a fairly well-known personality.

The volume of daily combat work carried out by helicopter pilots defies any description. If in 1985 the average number of sorties per Su-25 was 216, and for the MiG-23 - 112, then on average there were 360-400 sorties per helicopter, and for some aircraft the number of sorties per year reached a thousand.

Hence the terrifying, in comparison with other types of aircraft, the number of losses - 333 vehicles, of which 28 Mi-6 heavy transport helicopters, 174 Mi-8 transport and combat helicopters and 127 Mi-24, 4 Mi-9 and Mi-10 combat helicopters. To this number should be added another 338 Mi-8/17 and Mi-25/35 of the Afghan army.

Many of these vehicles were not shot down directly by Mujahideen fire, and outwardly their death looked like an accident. However, helicopter accidents occurred mainly as a result of entering risky flight modes in extreme combat conditions. For example, an attempt to escape from rocket fire on a low-level flight, resulting in a collision with the ground.

AIR DEFENSE OF THE MUJAHEAD

In the initial period of the war, the air defense of the Mujahideen consisted of small arms. In addition, they had no training for shooting at flying aircraft. At first, the “Chinese method” was used, when the entire detachment opened massive fire in front of the aircraft in the expectation that it would hit the wall of bullets.

But over time, the dushmans acquired DShK heavy machine guns and 14.5-mm ZGU anti-aircraft mountain mounts with a range of up to 2000 m. According to pilots, the mountains literally “sparkled”, especially near partisan bases and strongholds. In 1985, the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud received 30 20th Swiss Oerlikon-Berle anti-aircraft guns with a reach of 2000 m. Gradually, the Mujahideen learned to build an air defense system around their bases, taking advantage of the mountainous terrain. The firing points were camouflaged and spaced so that when one of them attacked, the aircraft or helicopter would come under fire from the others. Cars began to increasingly "bring" bullet holes. Sometimes the damage was very serious.

In response, Soviet aviation in combat operations began to be allocated special air defense suppression groups from fighters with NAR or RBC with ball or fragmentation equipment. In this case, it was necessary to achieve direct hits. The destruction of the calculation did not solve anything - other Mujahideen immediately took the place of those killed. Only disabling the fire weapon itself could silence the firing point.

A further increase in the anti-aircraft capabilities of the Mujahideen is associated with the saturation of their air defense with MANPADS of various types, which in a roundabout way got into Afghanistan. At first, it was the Arrows and Red Eyes that were easy to use. They did not require specially equipped positions, they could be used from cars and roofs of buildings, and even secretly delivered directly to airfields. The first cases of using MANPADS were recorded in 1983, and since 1986 this phenomenon has become widespread. The advantage of MANPADS was also the fact that undermining a powerful warhead missile put an aircraft or helicopter out of action even without a direct hit. The result of the damage, as a rule, was the loss of the car.

In the fall of 1986, the Mujahideen received the Stinger MANPADS, expanding the range of their air defense to 3500 m. From that moment on, a real fierce struggle for air unfolded. Soviet pilots had to forget about low level flying. Working from safe heights became a condition of survival. And all the same, aircraft increasingly received serious combat damage and died. The impoverished highlanders turned out to be a surprisingly formidable opponent for Soviet aviation, not to mention the Air Force of the Afghan government.

PAKISTAN AIR FORCE INCIDENTS

The Soviet presence in Afghanistan did not create problems for neighboring countries, with the exception of Pakistan, where it affected almost immediately and had far-reaching consequences. Thousands of refugees poured into Pakistan across the border, including the Mujahideen. Having set up bases in Pakistan, they carried out raids against Soviet troops in Afghanistan from there. Violations of the border became inevitable, since its line was determined very roughly, and the Soviet and Afghan allies were eager to strike back. Sometimes violations of the Pakistani-Afghan border were accidental, out of ignorance, sometimes deliberate, in connection with the requirements of the combat situation.

Initially, the Pakistani Air Force showed restraint, especially since relations between the USSR and Pakistan were not entirely bad, and both sides acted on the principle of "a bad peace is better than a good quarrel." Another reason for the “peacefulness” of Pakistan was the outdated fleet of fighter aircraft: Mirages-III and Chinese MiG-19s with short-range missiles did not have much chance of intercepting Soviet aircraft.

However, the situation gradually escalated, especially after several tragic incidents. So, in July 1981, helicopter pilots delivered a group of sappers to mine the road going from Peshawar to Jalalabad. As a result, they mistakenly mined the Pakistani section of the road, which led to casualties.

Pakistan began to strengthen its northern border by deploying the Krotal air defense system there. From January 1983, the Pakistan Air Force received F-16 fighters, which dramatically strengthened their positions. In the end, it was decided that the Pakistan Air Force was obliged to respond to violations of the border, and the squadrons based in Peshawar and Kamra were put on alert. Despite the fact that since 1980, Pakistani fighter-interceptors had to take off many times on alarm, it was not until May 1986 that they managed to impose an air battle on the intruder for the first time.

From that time until November 1988, F-16s from Nos. 9 and 14 Squadrons shot down seven intruder aircraft, one of which was classified as a probable intruder. In the first skirmish, the commander of the 9th squadron, Kuadri, shot down the Su-22 with an AIM-9 missile. The second intruder was hit by fire from a 20-mm cannon, but managed to escape towards the border and allegedly fell or made an emergency landing on Afghan territory. March 30, 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Razzak shot down an An-26. The latter performed the task of transporting cargo and personnel to the Khost airfield, located just 15 km from the Afghan border. The fact is that the Khost area was completely surrounded by the Mujahideen, and held on only thanks to the air bridge. Soviet planes performing supply missions were forced to huddle close to the border and expose themselves to attack. Subsequently, Pakistan claimed that the aircraft was "reconnaissance".

However, on April 29 of that year, fortune turned its back on the Pakistanis, who lost one F-16 in combat with six Afghan aircraft. It is possible that this F-16 was shot down by its own leader, who then claimed to have destroyed the enemy vehicle. The Afghans returned home without losing a single plane.

On August 4, 1988, Major Bokhari of the 14th Squadron shot down a Soviet Su-25 piloted by Alexander Rutskoi, who later became Vice President of Russia. On September 12 of the same year, Captain Mahmud from the 14th squadron opened his own combat account by shooting down two MiG-23 fighters. On November 3, the same pilot shot down a Su-22 fighter-bomber. On January 31, 1989, the same Mahmud watched the An-24, which he flew to intercept, crash while trying to land. This was already the second An-24/26 shot down that winter. The first transporter was destroyed on the night of November 20-21, 1988, however, the Pakistani Air Force did not officially confirm this fact.

The Soviet pilots were aware of the constant danger coming from the Pakistani side. During the actions of strike groups in the border areas, a pair or a link of MiG-23MLD, armed with missiles and carrying PTB-800, was necessarily sent to escort. The fighters carried two R-24R and two R-60 missiles, combining weapons for long-range and short-range maneuverable combat. In addition to missiles, full ammunition for the cannon was equipped without fail. The cover was carried out by the method of screening in the air with duty in the zones on the most probable directions of enemy attack.

According to some reports, Soviet aircraft managed to shoot down several Pakistani fighters, in particular, a case is given when a MiG-23MLD shot down one F-16.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE FSUE AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN

By August 1988, 50% of the Soviet military contingent had returned to the USSR. The complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops was completed in February 1989.

However, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan did not lead to the end of hostilities. Various rebel groups began to fight not only with the Kabul regime, but also among themselves, as a result of which the Najibullah government lasted another three years, which surprised many. This is partly due to the fact that the former communists shared power with the most powerful of all the mujahideen factions.

In April 1992, President Najibulah was finally overthrown, and an Islamic regime was established in the country, headed by President Rabbani. Masoud was appointed Minister of Defense in his government, who began fighting against the forces of the Patan Hezb-e-Islami movement, led by former Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

To prevent Hekmatyar from seizing power, Massoud formed an alliance with General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The latter controlled a province in the north of the country centered on the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, and previously served in the army of the communist Kabul government.

The Air Force of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has undergone Islamization and purge. Air bases fell under the control of various groups. The Kabul and Bagram bases became the backbone of Masud's Air Force, Shindand and Jalalabad went to Hekmatyar, and Mazar-i-Sharif to Dostum. The situation was complicated by tribal strife, often taking the form of an armed conflict.

The backbone of Hekmatyar's power was the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, and it was from there that a new, much stronger threat emerged in 1994.

The Islamic militia of the Taliban consisted mainly of religious students - followers of the fundamentalist teachings of Mullah Muhammad Omar. Capitalizing on the hostility of various warring factions, the Taliban quickly enlisted the support of the broad masses of the population and took control of vast areas in the south of the country.

The fierce fighting continued until September 28, 1996, when the Taliban finally captured Kabul. Then it seemed that the capture by the fundamentalists of the north of the country had already been decided and it was just a matter of time. However, the Taliban alienated many of their former supporters, primarily with their extremely harsh interpretation of Islamic law. Taking advantage of this, Ahmad Shah Massoud united a significant part of the detachments of the former Mujahideen around him and dealt a strong blow, pushing the Taliban troops to Kabul.

The combat readiness of the Air Force units that fell under the control of various warring factions fell to a very low level. Only transport planes and helicopters occasionally took to the air. In 1995, several Afghan Air Force fighters and at least three Su-20 fighter-bombers belonging to the Mujahideen were shot down, one of which was destroyed by an Afghan Air Force MiG. The Taliban also lost several helicopters.

With the departure of the Soviet Army, the war did not end, it entered a new stage...

Current page: 2 (total book has 21 pages) [accessible reading excerpt: 14 pages]

Soviet pilots were involved in the Afghan war, in fact, even before the official start date of December 25, 1979. The fact is that military transport aircraft have been delivering military cargo to all airfields in Afghanistan since 1977.

However, the flights became especially intensive in the fall of 1979. As the adviser to the head of the Signal Corps and RTO of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA (1980-1981), Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko, recalled, “in October 1979, arrivals of BTA aircraft to the Kabul airfield became more frequent. More often they were Il-76, less often An-22. During the days they flew in several planes and, quickly unloading, flew away. In normal mode, the Kabul airport could receive planes only during the day.

But in October, and especially in November, and at night, ten or even twenty Il-76s landed on Kabul. The planes were released from the cargo and departed before dawn. What they brought “disappeared” from the airport before dawn too.

Foreign correspondents accredited in Kabul tried unsuccessfully to reveal the nature of the night traffic. To answer their many questions, the Afghan Foreign Ministry held press conferences and briefings almost daily, at which, in response to regular questions about the night transportation of Soviet aviation, it answered that a group of transport aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR was based in Bagram ("as you gentlemen know") (on On the sides of the An-12 there were indeed Aeroflot identification marks). During the day, they carry various cargoes at our request, and at night they work out the training tasks assigned to Afghan pilots in order to acquire the appropriate flight qualifications. With mostly night takeoffs and landings, it seems like a lot of planes are coming in.”

At the moment it is not possible to give a general statistics of sorties, I will give a chronicle of the flights of Soviet transport aviation to Afghan airfields only a few days in March 1979:

And besides, by December 1979 there were aviation units that were based directly on the territory of Afghanistan: for example, a helicopter squadron from the 280th OVP (commander - Lieutenant Colonel Belov) and the 224th separate detachment of the MGA, which consisted of eight An-12s (commander - Colonel Ishmuratov) 2
In fact, the unit was equipped with crews and equipment from the regiments of the VTA and performed the functions of an advisory squadron. The detachment was in Afghanistan from August 1979 to November 1988.

Very little is known about these units and the nature of their actions during that period. Having collected scattered information, we can state the following: the “Belov group” itself consisted of servicemen of the 280th OVP of the Army Aviation of the USSR Air Force, which was based at the Kagan airfield. The group was selected on a voluntary basis, the most trained crews, and preference was given to pilots who had experience flying in the Pamirs.

In preparation for the transfer of the squadron to Afghanistan, 12 helicopters painted over the stars and applied the identification marks of the DRA Air Force with homemade stencils. At the same time, the crews changed their regular uniforms to overalls and civilian clothes.

On August 23, 1979, the group took off under its own power from Kagan and landed at the Bagram airbase after five hours of flight. In parallel, for the delivery of technical equipment, 24 flights were made by An-12 transport aircraft and 4 flights by Il-76. Initially, the direct participation of Soviet helicopter pilots in combat operations was assumed, but the chief military adviser (to whom, in fact, the squadron was subordinate) almost immediately introduced a ban on the participation of squadron pilots in hostilities. Moreover, the Soviet crews were even ordered to refrain from returning fire while performing their tasks.

The primary tasks were defined: the delivery of goods, personnel, food to Gardez and Shindand, and most importantly, “government transportation”. One helicopter was constantly on standby to provide possible search and rescue operations. In addition to Bagram, individual crews were periodically on duty in the centers of the provinces and in Kabul.

The Afghan leadership in its own way assessed the work of the transport helicopter squadron and tried to take it also with the transportation of national economic goods. At the same time, as noted by some researchers of the Afghan problem, the squadron has become an instrument in the political and economic game of a large scale. The fact is that the USSR provided military assistance to Afghanistan almost free of charge. However, there were other economic agreements, the legal successor of which was post-revolutionary Afghanistan. Thus, for gas supplies, the USSR owed Afghanistan, according to various estimates, from 270 to 500 million US dollars. But Afghanistan did not go to pay off this debt at the expense of military supplies from the USSR. Afghanistan was offered to buy a batch of Mi-8s through Aviaexport, and it was supposed to pay for the delivered vehicles and spare parts for them. The Afghan leadership refused, having such help as a free Mi-8 squadron with Soviet crews and service. Then the Soviet leadership gave the order to send the squadron home and began to implement the plan. This forced the Afghans to shell out. But even after that, they insisted on using reliable Soviet equipment with even more reliable crews.

It should also be said that at the end of 1979 there were more than enough Soviet pilots in Afghanistan: according to intergovernmental agreements, Soviet military specialists were in all Afghan aviation units (up to the squadron level).

Advisors - senior teams of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA in the period 1978-1979. worked: Major General of Aviation O.G. Orlov, Major General of Aviation A.G. Arevshetyan, Colonel N.D. Orlov, Colonel N.G. Berdichevsky, Colonel E.I. Mishustin, Major V.A. Pekhotin, Lieutenant Colonel V.D. Stadnichenko, Colonel A.I. Postelnikov.

In addition, in the Main Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defense of the DRA during this period worked: Major General of Aviation A.A. Egorov, colonels E.N. Kuznetsov, P.M. Kopachev, N.P. Kozin, O.S. Savrasenko, Yu.V. Razuvaev, V.P. Anokhin, I.I. Nesterenko, A.I. Uvarov and others.

Another little-known fact is also interesting: immediately before the entry of the Soviet contingent, Afghan aircraft arrived at the Bagram airfield after a major overhaul, which were overtaken by Soviet crews. It was no coincidence that these pilots lingered - in order to take a direct part in the hostilities.

In early December 1979, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov brought information to the leadership of the General Staff that in the near future, a political decision might be made to send a group of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in the amount of up to 75 thousand people.

On December 25, 1979, at 18:00 local time, the airlift of units of the airborne troops to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. So, for the transfer of personnel and equipment of the 103rd airborne division and a separate parachute regiment, 343 aircraft flights were made, including 66 An-22 flights, 77 - Il-76 and 200 - An-12. In total, 7,700 personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1,062 tons of various cargoes were delivered to both airfields.

Here is how, for example, Soviet adviser Colonel Valentin Dmitrievich Gerasimenko described the events at the Kabul airport: “Il-76 planes landed at regular intervals, turned onto taxiways and, while still in motion, lowered the ramps, opened all the hatches. At short stops with the engines running, paratroopers poured out from the inside of the sides and jumped out from 1 to 3 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery pieces and other equipment rolled out. The planes taxied further and, as the runway was liberated, they took off and left for new personnel and equipment.

As for the invasion aviation group, it was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of combat operations by combined arms formations and units in disparate operational areas.

Naturally, the airfield network of the Afghan Air Force was the basis for basing aviation units, which, if necessary, ensured the regrouping of aviation in order to increase its efforts in certain areas.

According to military intelligence, before the introduction of the OKSV, the country's airfield network was as follows: “There are 28 airfields on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 with capital runways (runways), 8 of them are suitable for basing tactical aviation, their estimated operational capacity was 120–160 aircraft. The largest airfields are Bagram, Kabul (Khoja Revash), Kandahar, Herat and Shindand (Sebzevar). The airfields of Kabul and Kandahar are classified as international. All these airfields are equipped with 1-2 main runways with a width of mainly 45 m, taxiways and group concrete aircraft parking. These airfields have warehouses for various purposes, hangars, service and residential buildings. Shelters for aircraft from protective walls were built only at the Bagram airfield.

Unpaved airfields are mainly used by civil aviation. As alternate airfields for basing tactical aircraft, 6 unpaved airfields can be used - in Dehdadi, Lashkargah, Matun, Kandahar, Faizabad and Chaghcharan. Airfields with runways less than 1800 m long are used by light aircraft. The permanent deployment of the air force (Air Force) of the DRA is carried out at the most equipped airfields: Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and Shindand. The main means of radio navigation equipment in the territory of Afghanistan are medium-wave radio beacons available at 11 airfields. The airfields of Kabul (Khoja-Revash) and Kandahar have, in addition, a short-range radio navigation system. The length of international airlines in the country is over 2 thousand km. Air transportation is carried out by one national airline, Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, which serves both domestic and international airlines. 3
"Afghans" Donetsk region. Donetsk: OOO IPP Promin, 2010. P. 495.

Thus, at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, there were few airfields, and with the increase in the aviation component, the question of building new airfields almost immediately arose. In the shortest possible time, several sets of metal airfield pavement from K-1D slabs were delivered to create runways and taxiways.

The engineering and airfield service of the TurkVO Air Force was able to bring the country's airfield network to mind - by the middle of 1985, seven Afghan airfields had been built or significantly re-equipped by Soviet units: Herat, Shindand, Farah, Kandahar, Kabul International Airport, Bagram and Jalalabad. The airfields at Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Ghanzi and Pol-i-Shakri were of no strategic importance and were subject to reconstruction to a much lesser extent.

Thus, during the war in Afghanistan, eleven airfields were able to provide round-the-clock jet flights in all weather conditions, however, Jalalabad was used only by helicopter pilots.

The key bases for basing Soviet aviation were the bases in Bagram (the largest number of Soviet aircraft and helicopters were based here) and Shindand (here, among other things, aircraft were repaired and maintained). From these airfields, mainly Su-25 attack aircraft and MiG-23 fighters made sorties.

At the base airfields of Soviet aviation, radio navigation and communication facilities were additionally installed, joint command posts were created for flight control, combat operations control, as well as air traffic of Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan.

Soviet air units, together with Afghan ones, were based at four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), and four more airfields were based separately on Soviet (Kunduz, Faizabad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-i-Sharif) units.

During the regrouping of aviation in the interests of the upcoming operations, Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were jointly based at almost all available airfields. To strengthen the security and defense of airfields, one motorized rifle (less often, parachute) battalion was allocated to each of them.

The total staffing of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force of the 40th Army) initially included two aviation regiments and one separate squadron, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiments, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter detachment. A total of 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and transport-combat helicopters. Taking into account the physical and geographical conditions and the deployment of combined arms formations and individual units of the 40th Army and the areas of combat operations assigned to them, the aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40th A) was divided into four groups: “North”, “Center”, “ South" and "West".

Combat strength of the Air Force of the 40th Army as of 2.01.1980

Sometimes, during major operations, individual aviation subunits from the named groups were involved in operations in other areas, however, when planning military operations, they tried to avoid this because of the difficulties of regrouping aviation. "Worked" in the sky of Afghanistan reconnaissance aircraft, bombers from the Long-Range Aviation. Afghan airfields also visited a lot of ambulance aircraft, for which, according to the mobilization plan, Il-18s from the Ural air squadrons of the civil air fleet were converted.

With the relocation of fighters and fighter-bombers to Afghanistan at the airfields of Bagram (115th Guards IAP), Kandahar (136th Apib) and Shindand (217th Apib, then a squadron of the 136th), combat duty of Soviet aircraft was introduced in the general system Air defense of Afghanistan.

Already with the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, Soviet aviation suffered its first loss - on December 25, 1979, an Il-76 crashed with paratroopers on board.

Flying as part of a trio of Il-76M from the 128th Guards Vtap (commander - Captain V.V. Gol Ovchin), while building a landing approach at Kabul airport, he collided with a mountain. The black box could not be found, because the plane crashed high in the mountains in a hard-to-reach place. Rather, the cockpit with the crew turned out to be on the other side of the ridge, where it was still possible to somehow get to, and the remains of the pilots, with great difficulty, but got it. And the salon, where there were 34 paratroopers and equipment, fell into an inaccessible gorge, and only in September 2006 they were found.

Immediately after the plane crashed, the military tried to get to the crash site. The surviving records of the search and rescue work tell how difficult it was:

“December 26, 1979. While performing a landing maneuver, an Il-76 aircraft crashed with the crew, paratroopers and equipment on board. He crashed into one of the peaks surrounding the Kabul airfield. As a result, 7 crew members and 34 paratroopers were killed.

12/27/1979. In the morning, Major General Egorov A.A. flew on a Mi-8 helicopter to the alleged area of ​​the crash, but the exact crash site was not found due to heavy snowfall.

12/28/1979. The head of the operational group of military transport aviation called a group of CSKA climbers who were training camps in the Tien Shan. For them, this was a complete surprise, and they were very sorry that they did not have with them a helicopter providing them, the crew of which was trained for landing and rescue work in the mountains. All climbers in bright down jackets stand out noticeably among the gray-green mass of troops.

12/30/1979. 8 climbers, 2 aviation engineers and 5 paratroopers were landed on the mountain. There is an agreement with the hospital to transport the bodies that died in a plane crash to the morgue.

At 16.00, the Mi-8 helicopter found the mountain ridge at the site of the Il-76 strike, one part of the aircraft on one side, the other on the other side of the ridge. The most interesting parts are located on the opposite side of the slope on which the climbers' tent is set.

01/01/1980. At 10.30 the climbers found the cockpit of the Il-76 with the remains of the body of Shishov, the assistant commander of the ship…” 4
Ablazov V.I. Over the whole of Afghanistan, a cloudless sky. Kyiv, 2005. S. 116.

Yervand Ilyinsky, head of the group of climbers, shared interesting details about these tragic events in his interview with journalists of the BBC Russian Service. 5
Il and n s k i y E. - head coach of the Kazakhstan mountaineering team and honored coach of the USSR.

: “One day, at the end of December 1979, a telephone rang in my apartment in Alma-Ata.

They called from Moscow. The conversation was short - they said that they urgently needed to fly to Dushanbe, for some kind of rescue work at an altitude of up to six thousand meters, the fourth category of complexity. I was told to gather a group and take singles there.<…>At that time, no one knew about the upcoming war - the Soviet leadership announced the introduction of troops into Afghanistan only the next day.

When landing, we stuck our faces to the windows. The runway was completely surrounded by Soviet military tents, and BMDs, airborne combat vehicles, stood right along the perimeter.

We were surprised, but took such a concentration of Soviet troops in Afghanistan simply for some kind of exercise.<…>On the morning of December 27, we were finally told about the upcoming operation, about the plane that had crashed in the mountains, the dead paratroopers and the briefcase with documentation.<…>

After that we went to the foothills of the Hindu Kush. The road went through numerous villages, and I got the strange impression that war was war, and dinner was lunch - somewhere someone fought, and in the villages life went on as usual.

Later, we transferred to a helicopter, which took us directly to the crash site, which was at an altitude of 4200 meters. The snow was very deep, the helicopter could not land and hung in the air, and we jumped down from two or three meters.

We were ordered to search for the bodies of the dead and collect their documents, which we did for several days. There were not bodies, but fragments of bodies - after all, the plane crashed into a rock at a speed of about 500 km / h. In addition, shells were scattered around - we walked, as if through a minefield. There, in the snow, among mines and human remains, we met the new year, 1980.

On the morning of January 1, one of our men found a black leather briefcase and handed it over to the authorities. After that, the work began to curtail.

APPLICATION OF AVIATION DURING THE WAR

At the first stage of the war, the combat activities of the aviation group in Afghanistan were seriously affected by shortcomings in the material and technical support of the troops. Often, on bare stones, in desert areas, pilots and technicians had to equip landing sites, parking lots for aviation and special equipment, and, together with units and subunits of the ground forces, organize their protection and defense. In view of the fact that the preparations for the entry of troops into Afghanistan were carried out hastily, the troops were largely unprepared for war. Logistic, food, clothing, and household support had many problems: for example, there were not enough elementary spare parts, there were no lights and special equipment for repairing aircraft and helicopters in the field.

According to one of the An-12 pilots, Viktor Viktorovich Istratov: “The provision of the flight crew in the unit was useless. Suffice it to say that we washed our bedding ourselves, there was no elementary shower in the module. They were saved by squatter baths and the famous "buchila" at the end of the 31st lane in Jalalabad. I remember the constantly hot compote in the flight canteen. Amazing concern for the health of the pilots - so that the throat does not hurt. They prepared disgustingly. There was always stew."

This unsettledness has led to the spread of infectious diseases. During the first year of their stay in Afghanistan, 17,000 people fell ill with the hepatitis virus alone in the troops of the 40th Army, of which 280 were pilots and 291 were engineering and technical personnel. Water sources in the country were highly contaminated, in fact, water without special treatment was practically unsuitable for consumption.

Another serious problem at the first stage was the training of flight personnel. In the early years of the war, when selecting aviation personnel for combat missions in Afghanistan, a superficial approach to their business and moral qualities was often allowed, which affected military discipline and law enforcement. So, for drunkenness and smuggling during the first four years, 346 officers and 495 ensigns were sent ahead of schedule from Afghanistan.

Experience quickly prompted the need to create a special selection committee, which was entrusted with the task of studying the moral and psychological qualities military personnel arriving at the Air Force of the TurkVO, their state of health, the level of training in their specialty. In parallel, the same commission carried out explanatory work, concerning primarily the peculiarities of the presence of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan.

At the same time, traditional methods, forms and means of peacetime were used, such as: political studies, political information, political hours, conversations and lectures.

However, decades after the end of the war, it is worth admitting that political workers failed to fully explain what the international duty in Afghanistan was. Apparently, they themselves did not understand everything due to the lack of complete and objective information, clear explanations from the party-political bodies. Political workers, like everyone else, fulfilled their international duty, having mastered the main form of party political work during the Great Patriotic War - a personal example. Very often during the fighting, when the commander was killed or wounded, the political officers took command.

It is also important that in Soviet times political workers did not study such disciplines as sociology, psychology, psychodiagnostics or psychoanalysis. It was believed that the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism", adopted in 1961 by the XXII Congress of the CPSU, would ensure the political and moral qualities of military personnel in the performance of international duty.

Work with personnel acquired a systematic approach after the issuance of a directive by the commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district. In accordance with its requirements, commanders were trained not only on the basis of an individual and differentiated approach, but their phased training was also applied in the district, army, units and subunits.

The practice of carrying out planned replacements in the composition of the Afghan regiments consisted in the fact that from the regiments that were in the Union, helicopter squadrons were sent to Afghanistan in full strength, units. That is, the regiment stationed in Afghanistan bore one constant number, but its squadrons could belong to different regiments and, at the end of the business trip, returned to their units. According to the same scheme, planned replacements took place in individual helicopter squadrons. Resupplying units with separate crews was carried out in case of combat losses or single replacements.

At the same time, a system for training aviation personnel for replacement in Afghanistan was developed. Until 1986, the flight personnel were trained for replacement in two stages in places of permanent deployment and additional training at the airfields of Afghanistan directly in the combat area. For example, a short additional training (usually it was a week) for army aviation pilots was given at the Kagan airfield.

After the organization of the 1038th Flight Personnel Training Center, preparations for replacement in units stationed at the airfields of Afghanistan were carried out in three stages, each of which consisted of theoretical and flight training.

The first stage was carried out at the airfields of permanent base, the second stage - in the 1038th TsPLS at the Chirchik airfield and the Chirchik-Gorny training ground, the third stage - at the airfields of Afghanistan.

Such training was extremely necessary, since landings and takeoffs from high-altitude or dusty sites, at high temperatures, are among the most complex elements in the flight training of a helicopter pilot. Here is what the Hero of the Soviet Union, test pilot Vasily Petrovich Koloshenko recalls about this: “Engines, throwing hot gases out of the flame tubes, spin the main rotor. The main rotor throws hot air down and mixes it with hot gases coming out of the engines. This mixture, descending to the ground, spreads to the sides, raises dust, and then rises up and again falls into the propeller. Around the helicopter, such a dense veil of air, hot gases and dust is formed that even before takeoff the helicopter finds itself in a downward airflow. A helicopter with a heavy load cannot rise vertically; for this, its many thousands of horsepower are not enough.

As a result of passing the additional training program in special centers, the flight crew was generally ready to conduct combat operations using new tactics in the conditions of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the process of additional training, the unit commanders determined the composition of regular groups for various tactical purposes based on individual features every pilot. The flight personnel, who did not master the additional training program with good quality, were seconded to their units. With this method of preparing flight personnel for combat operations, the number of combat and non-combat losses was significantly reduced.

The system of purposeful training of aviation personnel for combat operations as a whole justified itself - the personnel were included in combat operations, mostly more or less prepared in technical, tactical and moral and psychological terms.

And yet, two or three months of combat work were required to noticeably increase the quality of piloting technique, tactical thinking and combat use of the flight personnel. So, the accuracy of bombing for pilots with excellent training upon arrival in Afghanistan was 60 m, with good - 90 m and with satisfactory - 130 m. After the adaptation period, it more than doubled, the number of direct hits increased significantly. Approximately in the same progression, the results of the use of unguided missiles and small arms and cannon weapons grew.

A feature in the activities of the flight crew was also the fact that directly in the course of hostilities, the pilots had to comprehend all the combat capabilities of their helicopters. What yesterday in peaceful conditions was considered impossible and unacceptable, here it became the norm. Turns with a roll of 45 degrees or more, the combat use of all types of weapons at dive angles of 30 degrees or more, unique helicopter landings on mountain eaves at altitudes of three thousand meters or more, and the evacuation of the sick and wounded from hard-to-reach places, delivery of oversized cargo on an external sling. Life and the combat situation made it necessary to significantly expand the scope of helicopter flight operation. The statistics of more than ten thousand flights at altitudes from two to five thousand meters or more convinced that a well-trained, psychologically prepared pilot can withstand about an hour of flight in these conditions.

Operational data, which met the requirements of combat training of helicopter pilots in peacetime, ceased to satisfy them in a real combat situation. Exceeding the calculated characteristics, as a result, led to many phenomena for which both pilots and technicians were not prepared even theoretically. So, helicopter pilots were forced to get acquainted with such unusual phenomena as “dipping into a dive”, “falling”, “picking”, “vortex ring”, etc. Each such case became the subject of a thorough analysis: the actions of the pilot in each unusual phenomenon were analyzed, all flight parameters were taken into account, at what stage during the performance of which element it arose. Experience was collected bit by bit, and recommendations were processed for each specific case.

Great work in the scientific substantiation of these phenomena and the development of practical recommendations was done by: Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Colonel A. Volodko; Candidates of Technical Sciences, Colonels A. Ustenko, M. Elkin, G. Samoilov, G. Kuznetsov, commanders and test pilots of the Center for Combat Use of Army Aviation, Heads of the Combat Training Directorate, Major General of Aviation P. Navitsky, Colonel A. Koshelev, V Seleznev, V. Tarasov, A. Shurenkov, I. Smirnov, test pilots of the State Research Institute of the Air Force and specialists of the Design Bureau named after M.L. Mil, led by helicopter designer M. Tishchenko.

Thus, there was an operating time, generalization and implementation into practice of combat experience, which was taken into account primarily in the documents for the training of flight personnel.

In the difficult conditions of mountainous desert terrain, in order to fully utilize the flight tactical characteristics and combat capabilities of equipment and successfully complete combat missions, it became necessary to find new methods and methods of combat operations. Based on the characteristics of each period, the nature of the activities of the air force of the 40th Army Air Force in the performance of combat missions changed. To a greater extent, this concerned the preparation and performance of combat missions by flight personnel.

The increase in the probability of being shot down by enemy air defense systems entailed not only a change in the tactics of aviation operations, but also increased attention to the issues of moral and psychological training of flight personnel, a more substantive development of all issues of interaction between aviation and ground forces with their support, landing tactical airborne assault and providing his fighting. The transition to active combat operations at night made serious adjustments not only to the organizational work of aviation and combined arms commanders, but also led to an increase in the moral and psychological stress of the flight crew, increased clarity in the organization of search and rescue support and search and rescue operations during hostilities. .

Particular attention was paid to targeted flights of flight personnel for combat operations. Thus, the arrived pilots, under the guidance of experienced instructors, necessarily performed flights in the area of ​​​​the airfield and flights to perform individual combat operations. This was indicated by the requirements of the directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense dated May 12, 1981. It noted that the experience of the combat operations of our troops in Afghanistan showed the weakest link in their training - mountain and night training. A number of shortcomings were pointed out in solving tactical issues, fire training, and low physical endurance. The task was to radically improve the training of troops for operations in mountainous areas and at night, and, in particular, to train army aviation for operations in the mountains and at night, together with combined arms formations and units.

The main tasks that the flight crew had to solve were air support, as well as cover and escort of troops. However, in addition, Soviet pilots performed a fairly wide range of tasks.

For fire support and attack, the Air Force of the 40th Army had well-armed and protected Mi-24s. True, their number was at first extremely small, and in the 40th Army Air Force that was being formed in the first months of the war, there were only six units.

One can see the short-sightedness of the leadership in this, however, apparently, the reasons were of a more ordinary nature: the directives of the high command provided for the introduction of troops almost exclusively by the forces of the local military districts, TurkVO and SAVO (paratroopers from the central districts participating in the operation in the 40th armies were not included). Meanwhile, aviation forces in the southern direction, which was considered "rear", were very limited. There were few helicopter units here, and there were very few combat helicopters (for example, in the 280th ORP at the place of deployment in Kagan near Bukhara, there were two of them, and then the very first Mi-24A model).

Mi-24P in flight over the suburbs of Kandahar. 205th OVE, autumn 1987_
After it turned out that the army was in the thick of the armed struggle and open hostilities could not be avoided, the situation began to be corrected by the most energetic methods. On February 1, 1980, the aviation units received an order to lift restrictions on the consumption of ammunition. To strengthen the air group, it was necessary to attract combat helicopters from other military districts. On February 29, with the help of the Anteev transport aviation, a squadron of the Mi-24D helicopter regiment from Raukhovka (OdVO) was transferred to TurkVO, which immediately left for Afghanistan, starting to operate from the Bagram airfield. Next, another helicopter squadron was sent to the Tajik village of Moskovsky to work in the northern regions of Afghanistan. It was located in Kunduz and on June 27, 1980 was officially included in the Air Force of the 40th Army.

A Mi-24D squadron from the Transcaucasian 292nd OBVP settled in Jalalabad (a year later, in the summer of 1981, the regiment was replaced by the newly formed 335th OBVP). The 50th OSAP, which was formed in accordance with the directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense dated January 4, 1980 at the base in Chirchik, immediately provided for the presence of a combat helicopter squadron on the Mi-24. A pair of regimental Mi-24Ds made their first sortie from Kunduz on March 11, 1980. By the end of the month, the regiment flew to Kabul, from where it worked until the end of the war, constantly having one squadron of Mi-24s. Another combined helicopter detachment, numbering two dozen Mi-8s and Mi-24s, arrived in Kunduz at the end of 1980.

In total, the Air Force of the 40th Army by January 1982 had 251 helicopters, including 199 "combat ones", as stated in the document of the SMI Air Force (apparently, there was an inaccuracy in the terminology and all armed Mi-8s were meant and Mi-24). Nevertheless, the lack of the Mi-24 remained tangible, which explained the protracted practice of using the "eights" for strike purposes. In the absence of combat helicopters in most parts of their tasks, they had to solve the same Mi-8, albeit not in the best way adapted for this. In the aforementioned operation to destroy the Dushman base in Rabati-Jali at the beginning of April 1982, a whole armada of two helicopter regiments was involved, but not a single Mi-24 was found among them - they simply did not exist at the Kandahar base then.

Later, combat helicopters were added to other parts of the army aviation already in Afghanistan. In mid-February 1982, the Mi-24D squadron was included in the Kandahar 280th ORP. Since April 1982, the Mi-24 squadron became part of the 181st ORP in Kunduz. As a result, almost all units of army aviation in the Air Force of the 40th Army, from regiments to individual squadrons, received Mi-24 helicopters (with the exception of advisory ones, which had only transport aircraft, whose tasks were not to directly participate in hostilities by definition) .

Another, and very significant, event of an organizational and staffing nature was the transfer of helicopter units and subunits to reinforced wartime staffing. By the end of the summer of 1980, all helicopter squadrons in Afghanistan were equipped with five squadrons of four helicopters each - instead of the previous four squadron. Accordingly, the squadrons had 20 helicopters instead of 12-16, as it was before (the number could differ both up and down, according to circumstances - for example, after losses or, conversely, recovery after an accident of "unaccounted" machines, moreover, the tail number of the downed helicopter, with an eye on the bad omen, was never assigned to a new one). To replenish the helicopter units in Afghanistan, according to the new states, it was necessary to find crews and equipment in different districts, literally going through the entire army aviation with a “comb”. At the beginning of August 1980, 72 helicopter crews for the Mi-8 and Mi-24 with equipment were assembled at the base in Kokaity, which flew to Afghanistan on the 16th of the same month and were distributed to the Air Force units of the 40th Army.

The start of the combat work of the Mi-24 was accompanied by a fair amount of problems, due to both a lack of experience and the features of the machine itself, multiplied by the specifics of the Afghan conditions. The high speed and maneuverability of the Mi-24 was achieved due to the higher specific load on the main rotor (in terms of area it was one and a half times less than that of the G8), which did not have the best effect on take-off and landing qualities and carrying capacity. During combat maneuvering at high speeds, the "striped" with its high aerodynamic load on the propeller blades was subject to the dangerous phenomenon of "pickup" with overload overshoot and stalling. The unexpected behavior of the helicopter was perceived as a loss of control and insubordination of the machine.

Helicopter pilots of the 181st OVP Manzhosov and Sholokhov from the 3rd squadron of the regiment. On the Mi-24V, OFAB-250-270 bombs and B8V20 blocks were suspended. Kunduz, December 1984_
The helicopter landing at the exit from the dive was palpable. When performing energetic maneuvers, the car could burrow, losing height and slipping on a turn. Vigorous control during maneuvers, braking and avoiding obstacles led to dangerous situations - uncoordinated maneuver, getting into a difficult spatial position, hitting the propeller on the tail with the inevitable transition to an emergency. In combination with a lack of power and throttle response in mountainous conditions, stall flow and "heavy" control, piloting the Mi-24 was significantly more difficult, which was especially noticeable compared to the lighter and "flying" Mi-8.

Local features contributed their share - poor landing sites with limited approaches, flying in narrow mountainous areas with unsatisfactory conditions for maneuver, the meteorological situation itself with many orographic disturbances4, unexpected air currents and turbulence, throwing the helicopter onto the rocks. Many gorges looked like real "stone bags", having no way out, and air currents blew in different directions near the neighboring slopes - ascending from the sun-warmed and descending from the remaining in the shade. In addition to the difficulties in piloting, the cramped conditions and fairly strong winds affected the use of weapons: the pilot had very little time to assess the situation and aim, and the air currents literally “blew away” the rocket salvo and carried the dropped bombs.

Technicians and pilots of the 181st OFP are engaged in the procurement of building materials. With the almost complete absence of wood and other materials, boxes from under rockets are dismantled for arrangement on boards, bomb bombers from timber were also in great demand. Kunduz, autumn 1983_
Fire training in the training of combat helicopter crews occupied its due place. Practically no one had the skills of combat use in the local difficult conditions, and practically no one had the practice of piloting in such an environment: the pilots who arrived from the Odessa steppes had only seen mountains before only at the resort in Minvody. The lessons were worth considerable losses, mainly due to accidents. By the end of 1980, the Air Force of the 40th Army lost 21 Mi-24 helicopters (even more than the Mi-8, of which 19 were lost). The bulk of them were lost not at all for combat reasons and without any fire damage. In particular, half of the available Mi-24s were destroyed in the Kunduz squadron in all kinds of flight accidents - from piloting errors to getting into difficult conditions. In particular, in December 1980, the Mi-24 taking off lifted a snow whirlwind with its propeller and, when the pilots lost visibility, ran into the Mi-6s standing nearby, chopped up the extreme helicopter with blades and fell right there.

The first helicopter pilot to die in Afghanistan was the Mi-24 flight engineer, Senior Lieutenant A.N. Saprykin. On January 21, 1980, his helicopter was conducting aerial reconnaissance and came under fire. The pilot, who was on his ninth sortie, was seriously wounded and died in the hospital two days later. Three weeks later, on February 13, the Mi-24 of Captain S.I. was shot down near Jalalabad. Khruleva from the 292nd regiment, who crashed along with the crew. This Mi-24 was the first to be lost in Afghanistan, and the first combat loss of aviation of the 40th Army.

At the same time, in a combat situation, the Mi-24, with its powerful weapons and security, had clear advantages, being a machine designed and adapted specifically for strike operations (although the opinion of its superiority was repeatedly disputed, and many preferred the Mi-8MT for most tasks, considering the "twenty-four" overweight and insufficiently maneuverable in high altitude conditions). Nevertheless, the specifics of the battlefield took their toll, and gradually the share of the Mi-24 increased to almost half of the helicopter fleet, and mixed units from pairs of Mi-8 and Mi-24, which complemented each other, entered into practice. Already in the Panjshir operation in May-June 1982, 32 Mi-24 helicopters were involved - almost all that were then available. It is significant that with the saturation of the Air Force of the 40th Army with G8 combat helicopters, which had previously acted as "jacks of all trades", they began to be involved much less frequently in performing strike missions, giving way to more adapted "crocodiles". Over time, the participation of the Mi-8 in aviation support, for quite understandable reasons, decreased even more, and since 1985 the share of sorties to perform such tasks did not exceed 10-12%. According to the Mi-8 pilot-navigator senior lieutenant A.M. Degtyarev, who arrived at the 50th OSAP in November 1985 and served there until January 1987, during these fifteen months “bombs were used only twice, they destroyed the bridge near Asmar and in the operation in the Kunar Gorge, however, they bombed to the conscience, working ten Mi-8s and throwing four OFAB-250s. The blocks were also used infrequently, the specifics of the tasks were different, most of the sorties were for transportation, supplying posts, target designation, which is why even unnecessary farms were removed and flew without them.

Mi-24s cover a transport column on the way to Kabul_
Since this practice has become a habit and the Mi-8 pilots in most sorties entrusted the provision of fire cover and support to the "crocodiles" accompanying them, the army commander even pointed out that the equipment of the helicopters corresponded to the combat situation and that, in the event of an unforeseen development of events, they did not turn out to be "unarmed". ". In particular, it turned out that the helicopters involved in the “Veil” system, flying out to fight the caravans, very often went “empty”, although the inspection teams usually needed air support. By order of the 40th Army of December 11, 1987, helicopters participating in reconnaissance and patrol operations were ordered to equip properly and for this purpose without fail “to designate targets, as well as to destroy identified firing points, Mi-8MT with landing groups to equip two units UB-32"

Blocks UB-32 with 32 57-mm NAR S-5_
Organizational measures were, as they say, a matter of gain and accompanied the entire course of the Afghan campaign in accordance with the changing situation. The materiel, including weapons, as a system that primarily determines the effectiveness of a combat helicopter, also showed its own characteristics in intense combat work.

Charging helicopter units with S-8D missiles. 262nd OVE, Bagram, summer 1987_
The envisaged possibilities of placing landing troops on board the Mi-24 (at that time the concept of using a combat helicopter as a “flying infantry fighting vehicle” was popular) turned out to be unclaimed. As at home, in practice, this was hindered by the low bearing properties of a fairly heavy armored vehicle with a set of weapons (empty, it weighed almost 1.5 tons more than the Mi-8). With paratroopers, the Mi-24 became clumsy, and dwarfs were more suitable for placing fighters in the cargo compartment - its height was only 1.2 m. .

One of the few examples of the use of "crocodiles" in this capacity was the flights of Kunduz vehicles in the first war year: having decided to use the existing capabilities, on board the Mi-24 from the squadron of Major Kozovoy from time to time they took riflemen from the neighboring 56th air assault brigade. To increase firepower, four soldiers with light machine guns were placed on board, who fired through the side windows in the windows. Their presence added extra half a ton, however, in the winter months, this did not particularly affect the "volatility" of the helicopter. It is not known to what extent this idea justified itself, however, during one of the sorties, Captain Glazyrin's helicopter landed on a forced one in the mountains, and seven crew members and shooters were with him at once. Captain Valiakhmetov's Mi-24 sat down to the rescue, picking everyone up at once. How the rescued were accommodated in a cramped compartment the size of a Zaporozhets is known only to them, but along with “their” rifle group, 14 people were on board at once. The helicopter, however, was able to perform a vertical takeoff from a mountainous area and deliver everyone to the airfield.

Equipping blocks with missiles of the S-8 type. With a shell in his hands - Lieutenant of the weapons group of the 205th OVE A. Artyukh. Kandahar, summer 1987_
Difficult operating conditions soon revealed a number of shortcomings in the Mi-24 weapons and, above all, in its USPU-24 rifle mount. The high rate of fire of the YakB-12.7 four-barreled machine gun at 4000-5000 rds / min (it was not for nothing that it was called “high-rate”) and an impressive second salvo, which was 3.6 kg (for comparison: the DShK with the same caliber has only 0, 5 kg) were achieved by a significant complication of the design. The rotating block of barrels with the help of a kinematic mechanism was set in motion by a kind of gas-powder motor, which used the discharged powder gases. The fire from a machine gun was conducted by a pilot-operator with the help of a mobile sighting station KPS-53AV, which ensured the aiming of weapons and firing with the necessary corrections for speed, angular displacement and others required for aiming (the station standing in the operator's cabin was curiously called "stern", retaining the letter "K" in the name from the prototype, borrowed from long-range bombers). The pilot could also fire, however, only when the machine gun was installed in the forward position along the axis of the machine and used as a stationary one, aiming at his ASP-17V sight (on the Mi-24V, on the previous Mi-24D they used a simpler sight - PKV type) .

The Mi-24P is firing from a cannon: fountains of explosions are visible in front of the machine itself. The Black Mountains near Kandahar, autumn 1987_
The machine gun jammed, the gas engine jammed, the kinematics suffered. A high rate of fire required the same feed rate of the tape, which stretched along the winding sleeve, and it often broke when jerking. The use of special two-bullet cartridges designed for the YakB-12.7 and capable of doubling the density of fire, entailed failures due to poor sealing of the bullets in the muzzle of the sleeve: when the tape was jerked, they loosened up, went skewed and more than once led to swelling and rupture trunks. In the 50th regiment, which began combat work in the spring of 1980, thanks to the perseverance of the weapons service, it turned out that a fair part of the failures were factory reasons and the YakB-12.7 helicopters standing on the helicopters did not pass the firing tests required at all. There were failures of the control system (tracking selsyns of synchronization and pickup electric drives), in which the machine gun hit away from the line of sight and did not return to the neutral position. To get rid of the defect, the machine gun was sometimes fixed along the axis of the helicopter, and the pilot fired from it using his ASP-17V automatic sight.

Repeaters came to eliminate defects, the design bureau tried to solve the problems, but the results remained modest. However, partly the malfunctions were due to harsh operating conditions and not always full-fledged supervision of the weapon, which required too much attention in intense combat work, and the YakB-12.7 clearly did not tolerate maintenance “as it was”. In the summer of 1982, in the 4th squadron of the Kandahar Regiment, out of 20 Mi-24 helicopters, machine guns worked normally on only seven machines, earning the ironic decoding of their name "Allegedly shoots." The situation almost did not change in subsequent years, when a significant part of the machine-gun "twenty-fours" were replaced by cannon Mi-24P.

According to the story of A. Maslov, “in May 1986, due to a non-working machine gun, we had to fly without it at all. They were working in the Chakaray district then, they were hollowing out one village, and at the most interesting moment my machine gun jammed. After the sorties, until late at night, they were busy with him, everyone got smeared, tired, but never did. I had to call gunsmiths from Kabul, they flew in, dug and dug with a machine gun, but they didn’t fix anything, they took it off altogether and threw it into the cargo compartment. They flew with a hole in place of a machine gun, it was drafty in the cockpit. The next day, the specialist finally broke the machine gun for us. Already when they returned to the base in Kabul, they replaced it with a new one.”

With the advent of powerful NAR S-8, new B-8V20 blocks first of all tried to equip machine guns, compensating for the unsatisfactory operation of the machine gun with long-range rockets. By the spring of 1987, in the detachment of the 205th separate helicopter squadron, attached to special forces in the same Kandahar, there remained the only Mi-24V, on which the YakB-12.7 could not withstand even several days without another failure. According to the recall of Lieutenant A. Artyukh, who was in charge of armaments, “the machine gun pulled out our whole soul, it was not possible to achieve its stable operation and we even had to get a second one in order to change the jammed one. Nothing helped - neither regular cleanings, nor stuffing and lubrication of the tapes. We already considered a flight without refusal a success, but it happened that he wedged twice a day. Then, suddenly, once again, the tape was cut off, but the machine gun did not jam and suddenly began to work normally. We were afraid to breathe on it, we didn’t touch it and didn’t clean it, we only replenished the tape. What happened remained unclear, but he shot perfectly for a month and a half, until the helicopter was shot down on February 16 ... "

The appearance of the Mi-24P with a double-barreled gun GSh-2-30K in the performance of 9A623K, which differed by 900 mm longer barrels from those used on Su-25 attack aircraft, made it possible to remove most of the problems inherent in machine guns. The fixed installation got rid of the defects in the guidance system, but now it was possible to fire only strictly along the course, pointing the weapon at the target with the whole machine, and this role was assigned to the commander (which caused a certain jealousy of the operators who remained on the "bench"). A fair amount of power and recoil even led to the tail lifting and loss of speed when firing, and sometimes the AZR and equipment were “knocked out” by concussions.

GSh-2-30 on Mi-24P_
Depending on the tactical situation and the nature of the target, the pilot could choose the mode of fire at his own discretion. Avoiding long bursts that “led away” the helicopter, firing was usually carried out by setting the switches to the position “Queue short / low rate” and, having got the hang of it, they could limit the fire to single shots. The accuracy of the fire was also excellent: the cannon made it possible to conduct aimed fire up to a two-kilometer range, and at ordinary distances of several hundred meters, an experienced pilot cut down a tree or brought down a camel in a caravan with one or two shells. Full ammunition of 250 rounds was almost never taken, being content with 150 shells: with reasonable use, they were quite enough, and gaining a hundred and a half kilograms of weight in flight had a positive effect on the maneuverability and acceleration characteristics of the helicopter.

Park day in the 4th squadron of the 181st ORP. The work is carried out on a helicopter with suspensions of bombs and charged units. The machine gun that had failed the day before was removed, and there are no frames for the Sturmov. Kunduz, October 1983_

The crew of the Mi-24V of the 4th squadron of the 181st ORP - pilot Efimenko (right) and operator Pryamoye. The helicopter carries OFAB-100-120 bombs and B8V20 blocks. Kunduz, October 1983_
Heavy tapes were loaded with cartridges with 400-gram OFZ-30-GSh high-explosive fragmentation and incendiary projectiles and OFZT-30GSh tracers, as well as special "multi-element" ME projectiles. The latter contained 28 bullets in packages with expelling charge, which retained a lethal force of 400 m from the point of rupture of the projectile. Unlike machine-gun ammunition, it was more convenient to stack the cartridge belt, filling it in a cartridge box that folds out along with the gun (however, in the difficult work of the armament service, convenience was a relative concept). According to V. Paevsky, “Usually, the tape was laid directly from the boxes in which it was brought to the helicopter, without contacting any devices - this way it is both faster and easier. Before loading, it was supposed to be generously lubricated with cannon grease No. 9, after which two or three of them picked up a weighty and greasy, all in grease, tape, striving to fold under its own weight like a fan either outward or inward - by the way, each link with a projectile pulls about a kilogram . You hold this weight on your hands, and the “playing” tape pinches your fingers and nails to the blue; I didn’t take off my watch - consider it gone, I have changed about a dozen during my service on the Mi-24P.

Armor-piercing explosive shells BR-30-GSh were little used: there were no targets for "blanks" with a small 14.6-gram explosive charge. The fuse designed to meet the armor did not work when it hit a weak barrier, and the projectile could pierce the car through and through without exploding, and gaps on the ground, on which fire could be corrected, were almost not noticeable due to the same low explosive effect, due to the small amount of explosives.

The GSh-2-30K gun remained a favorite weapon for both pilots and gunsmiths, although during intensive work it was not without failures. The reasons could be wear of parts, careless stuffing of tapes, dirt and sand on the cartridges, which clogged the receiver and gun compartment. According to the regulations, mandatory cleaning was prescribed no later than the next day after use, and after every 600 shots - cleaning of the gun with its removal from the machine and complete disassembly (a laborious task that took a lot of effort, but not very effective, because after a couple of days the tape receiver and kinematics again clogged with dust, turning the lubricant into a dirty mess). Folk remedies and ingenuity came to the rescue: the cannon, without disassembling, was completely washed in kerosene from dirt and soot and the mechanism was twitched several times, removing only the gas pistons that set the automation in motion for a more thorough cleaning.

To protect the receiver from dirt, the tape was abundantly stuffed with grease, and it went into the gun literally like clockwork, and dirt and soot, along with the used grease, flew out. “Wedges” were practically excluded: in the 205th OVE in the fall of 1987, the gun on one of the Mi-24Ps worked for several months without a single failure and cleaning, firing 3000 shells!

The good location of the gun simplified its maintenance, and the electric ignition of the primer guaranteed against accidental shots, which are not so rare with machine guns. Safety was not the last thing: when jamming, a projectile stuck in the chamber usually had to be cut into pieces, pulling it out piece by piece.

There was a case when a cannon helped to save a helicopter on the ground: the one who landed on a forced Mi-24P was surrounded by a gang, and Captain V. Goncharov decided to use weapons more powerful than the machine guns of the PSS group. He had never fought on foot, but he had a cannon at hand. The helicopter was manually deployed in the direction of the attackers, the pilot took a seat in the cockpit and fired a burst. The "spirits" lay down, hiding behind the stones, then began to run across, stealing up from the other side. Hanging on the tail, the fighters tossed the helicopter from side to side, and the pilot fought off the spooks in short bursts until help arrived.

Part of the cannon machines carried a laser rangefinder, coupled with a computer sight. A fairly compact device was made on the basis of marine binoculars adapted for this purpose. The rangefinder significantly improved the conditions for solving the aiming task, giving the range to the target on the sight instead of the previous "eye-measuring" method of determining the firing distance, which had a positive effect on the accuracy of the fire.

Mi-24P is preparing to take off to cover the air base. Bagram, December 1988_
The Mi-24 could carry up to four rocket units, but this option was considered reloading. Each curb block weighed more than a quarter of a ton (260 kg), and after the launch of the missiles, they remained hanging on the suspension with a shaped “sieve”, significantly adding aerodynamic drag, which is usually limited to a couple of blocks. Since for guidance and aiming when firing NAR it was necessary to “direct” them by maneuvering the entire vehicle, fire control from the blocks was transferred to the commander. It was also envisaged that the NAR could be fired by the operator with aiming at the sighting station, since there was also a control stick in his cockpit, which made it possible to pilot the car in the event of a failure of the commander. In this case, all weapon control was switched to the operator's cabin.

The "division of labor" was also provided for when using bomber weapons: in this version, the helicopter could carry up to four bombs of 100 or 250 kg, or two of 500 kg. On the Mi-24D, the operator carried out the bombing using his KPS-53AV station, the pilot could only drop bombs in emergency mode. On the Mi-24V and cannon vehicles with a more advanced automatic sight of the ASP-17V pilot, even the commander could carry out targeted bombing. For aimed bombing on the Mi-24D and Mi-24V, the VSB-24 on-board firing and bombing computer was used, usually used in semi-automatic mode (working in the “automatic” in the mountains gave too many misses).

Pilot Mi-24 E.E. Goncharov, who served in the Kunduz 181st OVP, said: “Some said that the sight in the mountains is useless, so people invent all sorts of ways, draw crosshairs on the windshield and so on. Even during preparation, they indicated: “ASP-17V and VSB-24 are not used in mountainous areas, since automatic operation is unreliable.” We had to work from a height, keeping above the reach of small arms, and the sight gave quite normal results. It took, of course, to adapt: ​​at first, the bombs were placed with an accuracy of up to a hundred meters, or even more, but after a couple of months they began to hit straight on the target, and then it even became possible to reduce the strike groups - three out of four bombs fell direct hits. The actions of the crew during normal operation of the sight are greatly simplified. The operator puts the mark of the sight on the target, turns on the mode and accompanies the target, keeping the mark on it. The pilot on his sight has an indicator indicating the position of the target, left or right, and he tries to lead the helicopter on a combat course according to the indications of the indicator exactly through the target, keeping the speed and altitude (visually, the target is not visible to him, since it immediately goes under the helicopter). The calculator at the right time gives a buzzer, and the operator can only press the reset button. When you fill your hand, you don’t need to spend bombs on “zeroing” and even unnecessary conversations on the air with the target designation group and the gunner are not needed.

However, others relied more on a sharp eye and skill, bombing according to their landmarks, aiming at the tip of the PVD or the lower edge of bulletproof glass and reasonably indicating that the result is important and “you need to hit, not aim.”

The usual variant of the equipment of the Mi-24 helicopter was a combination of two blocks and two bombs of 100 kg caliber. Loading a helicopter with blocks and bombs of 250 kg was used less frequently. In particular, according to data for 1984, such Mi-24 weapons were carried only in 16% of sorties (after all, the helicopter became half a ton heavier). Bombs were always hung on external holders, since the wheels of the main landing gear prevented them from rolling to the internal ones.

"Five hundred" were used infrequently, mainly when absolutely necessary. A helicopter with such a load became heavy and clumsy, and even when suspended, the bombs were too heavy and it turned out to be impossible to handle them manually. In addition, after the bombing, the helicopter remained with only one machine gun: blocks were not taken due to overload. In Kandahar, during the whole of 1982, the FAB-500 bombs on the Mi-24 were used only four times. On one such occasion, in November 1982, Captain Anatoly Chirkov from the well-known "Alexander Squadron" attacked an Islamic committee that had gathered in one of the villages. The purpose was a large adobe drying house, where the local leaders conferred. The object looked like a real fortress, but the “five hundred” covered it with the first blow and destroyed it together with the “activists”.

Dushmansky duval after a helicopter attack. A trench and bomb craters are visible nearby. Outskirts of Kandahar, autumn 1987_
In Ghazni in May 1987, heavy bombs almost did harm to themselves. At night, the duty group rose to call the guard battalion to strike at a gang seen nearby. The target was indicated by a lighting mine. FAB-500 hung on the Mi-24 from the evening, and they worked on the illuminated place. The pilots had just arrived with a replacement and, out of ignorance, were throwing bombs in one gulp and from a low altitude. The helicopters were thrown over a hundred meters, fortunately without being hit by shrapnel. On the ground, they were already met by the squadron commander: set aside the Five Hundred, henceforth - only 250 kilograms and one at a time. It turned out that the ruptures lay not far from the residential town, everything was shaking there and glass flew out in the modules.

In the course of improvements on the Mi-24 of all modifications used in the Air Force of the 40th Army, the possibility of suspension of multi-lock bomb racks MBD2-67u was provided. Using a pair of such holders, the helicopter could carry up to ten 100 kg bombs (four on each of the holders and two more on free wing nodes). The accuracy of such bombing turned out to be low, but a similar version of the weapon, nicknamed the "hedgehog", was used in mining. A pair of helicopters ensured the laying of a sufficient number of powerful bomb "mines" in the right place, laying two dozen "acres" near a hostile village or dushman camp and reliably blocking any movement on the outskirts of them. For the same purpose, the Mi-24s were modified for the installation of KMG-U small cargo containers, which could carry both mines and small bombs used for mining. Each KMG-U contained 1248 PFM-1 mines. With the suspension of four KMG-Us, the helicopter could sow a vast area with inconspicuous "butterfly" mines, in the strip of which the area and density of mining depended on the unloading mode, set by the control of the container, which had four different intervals for ejecting blocks with ammunition - from 0.05 to 1, 5 s.

The full ammunition load for the YakB-12.7 machine gun was 1470 rounds. 262nd OVE, Bagram, summer 1987_
Volumetric detonating air bombs (ODAB) were also used on helicopters - a new weapon and at that time unknown to anyone. Taking the opportunity to test them in a combat situation, ODAB was put into action already in the first war year. In practice, however, it turned out that the ammunition of an unusual device containing liquid explosive, requiring a whole system of charges to disperse and undermine the detonating cloud, is rather capricious and sensitive to external conditions. The formation of an explosive fog could be affected by the temperature, density and humidity of the surrounding air, as well as the wind, which prevents the creation of an optimal concentration of aerosol enveloping the target. As a result, far from all the dropped bombs worked (according to the experience of the Americans, who first tested the ammunition of a volumetric explosion in Vietnam, from 30 to 50% of such bombs exploded altogether).

Apparently, the first use of ODAB from helicopters took place in August 1980 by pilots of the Kunduz Mi-24 squadron. Eliminating Dushman ambushes in the Fayzabad Gorge, helicopter pilots worked as a link in which the leading pair carried two ODAB-500s, and the trailing pair carried blocks with missiles. Zamkomeska Alatortsev described the organization of the raid as follows: “We went at an altitude higher than usual, keeping at 300 meters, since the ODAB has no fragments, although there are a lot of offal in the new hull and when triggered, these pieces of iron fly up to 200 meters. The bombs themselves are also some kind of unusual , pigs with a rounded snout, like barrels, with contents squelching inside. We were told that during the ODAB tests, not everything went well, something in the filling did not work as it should and might not detonate. We decided that the process could be supported by missiles, and so it happened. After the drop, a cloud rose below, even seemingly heavy and viscous, and rockets from the wingmen immediately entered this oily fog. It rushed, bless you, threw helicopters, only teeth clanged. The explosion also does not look like ordinary bombs, from which only a dusty fountain and a smoky cloud, and here - a flash and a fireball swirling for a long time below. The shock wave of the bomb is harder than that of ordinary ones, well, it finishes everything down there with fire. The effect is a combination of shock pressure, like high-explosive, and high temperature. The paratroopers later said that the "spirits" remaining in place were in creepy- charred corpses, with gouged out eyes, those who survived - and those shell-shocked, with torn lungs, blind and deaf.

On board the Mi-24P, reinforcements from the corners and reinforcement of the side, which were required due to the large recoil of the gun, are clearly visible. In the cockpit - the flight engineer of the helicopter Iosif Leshchenok. 205th OVE, Kandahar, autumn 1987_
With the successful use of ODAB in the Afghan situation, they turned out to be even more effective weapons than other ammunition. The incandescent cloud of a volumetric explosion penetrated caves and mountain crevices, covered stone placers and labyrinths of duvals with a fiery blow, overtaking the enemy where he was invulnerable to conventional means. ODAB also found application in the landing of airborne assaults, when, before landing helicopters, it was necessary to quickly and over a large area eliminate the mine threat. Dropped ODAB passed through the site with a shock wave front with high pressure, instantly freeing it from mines.

It was supposed to store ODAB with sensitive content, protecting it from direct sun rays and overheating. In fact, there were no sheds in the ammunition depots, and it’s good if the bombs were covered from the sun with at least a tarpaulin (“it’s the Americans that the soldiers, that the bombs are spoiled, give them warehouses with air conditioners”).

However, the use of ODAB was hampered not only by the features of the device: it turned out that this weapon, in addition to its effectiveness, managed to earn a reputation as “inhumane” in a number of conflicts, as causing excessive human suffering. The UN has managed to stigmatize volumetric explosion ammunition as contrary to accepted norms of warfare. In 1976, the Geneva Emergency Committee on Conventional Weapons adopted a resolution recognizing volume explosion ammunition as a type of weapon requiring a ban on qualification grounds. Although none of the countries possessing such weapons thought to part with them, the opinion of the international community had to be taken into account. In the event of the arrival of journalists and all kinds of foreign representatives, who from time to time appeared in Afghanistan with humanitarian missions, they tried to remove the bombs away from prying eyes and fight only in a "humane way."

The destruction of manpower remained the primary task of the counterguerrilla war: the NAR S-5S and S-8S, filled with blocks of steel feathered arrows of 1100 and 2200 pieces, respectively, went into action. Shooting them, however, required careful range maintenance so that the "buckshot" beam retained lethal force and did not scatter in vain. The use of ammunition, which "indiscriminately" decided everything in its path with a shower of arrows, also contradicted a number of international conventions, which is why the command of the Air Force of the 40th Army, guided by "orders descended from above", either banned them or allowed them again, although the pilots highly appreciated it is a weapon of "local mass destruction". Helicopter pilots in Faizabad in the winter of 1981 were once brought fifty boxes of C-5Cs. They shot them in a day, asking for more. Instead of ammunition, the head of the regiment's weapons service rushed in, demanding that all rockets with "nails" be returned immediately. Of the six hundred pieces, only two could be presented to him, “crooked”, which were stale only because they did not climb into the trunks.

Since 1982, rocket blocks for 57-mm S-5 projectiles began to replace the new B-8V20 launchers for more powerful S-8 type 80 mm rocket launchers. Under them, the machines in service were finalized, and the helicopters of the new series immediately received more modern weapons. The superiority of the new rockets was so convincing that in order to accelerate the rearmament of aircraft by them, a special directive government document appeared - a resolution of the commission on military-industrial issues under the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated July 27, 1984 on the accelerated introduction of the C-8 family NAR. With reference to the Afghan experience, it was required to increase the production of new missiles, increasing production volumes by reducing the production of 57-mm shells.

However, the S-5 did not stop using until the last days of the war.

Armed soldiers Shiraliyev and Khazratulov unload a cannon before cleaning. Next to the tools lies a cartridge with an armor-piercing explosive projectile removed from the breech. 205th OVE, Kandahar, autumn 1987_
Projectiles of various types and models were used, and from time to time, NARs of the earliest samples came across among the imported ammunition. To spend the accumulated supplies, the rear men cleaned up warehouses in the Union, and in parts even the first modifications of the C-5 were imported, which looked like real rarities. Such products were distinguished not only by their low power, twice as destructive as more modern models of the family, but they also required much more time and effort in preparation: before loading, each such missile had to be equipped with a fuse that went separately, which was screwed into the body with a special key. Considering that 64 missiles had to be prepared for one helicopter alone, one can imagine how much trouble it cost. There were even shells of the S-5M and S-5K modifications of the 1950s, which had their own electric plugs, each of which, when charging, had to be inserted into the corresponding block connector, and the block itself had to be pre-converted with the installation of a set of additional parts. Many of these "antiques" of twenty years ago did not have time to catch at home, and only veterans of armament groups remembered how to handle them. The newer shells had a built-in fuse and required much less care, being immediately ready for use.

Some Mi-24s were modified for the installation of large-caliber rockets S-24 and S-25, as well as S-13, used in five-shot blocks. The advantage of large-caliber missiles was an impressive range of aimed launch, which made it possible to hit targets from a safe distance without entering the enemy’s air defense zone, however, the features of the missiles themselves, equipped with a powerful engine, which could cause a helicopter power plant surge, prevented the wide spread of such weapons. When launching heavy NARs, the car was literally overwhelmed by a plume of gases from the rocket "powder flare", and for firing it was necessary to carefully maintain the flight parameters of the helicopter, when launching missiles, switching its engines to a reduced mode.

Model of an unguided aircraft missile of the S-25_ series
In the 50th OSAP, four Mi-24s were converted for heavy S-24 missiles in 1984; There were also such machines in the 262nd, 205th and 239th separate squadrons. Launches were trusted only to the most experienced pilots, and then heavy shells were used only from time to time, when it became necessary to destroy targets protected and covered by an anti-aircraft screen. In addition to high accuracy, the projectiles provided a significant area of ​​damage, especially when equipped with a non-contact radio fuse RV-24, which undermined the projectile over a target showered with thousands of fragments from above, from the most unprotected side.

In the 50th OSAP for the whole of 1984, 50 S-24 launches were made. In Lashkargah, in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 205th OVE, Mi-24s were occasionally equipped with S-24 missiles, flying in search of Dushman caravans.

In the Kandahar 280th regiment, work with the S-24 led to an incident, directly with shells and not related, but culminating in a helicopter breakdown. In August 1987, a group of Mi-24s flew out to attack in the morning, but when setting at low level against the sun, one of the helicopters hit a dune and “plowed” the ground. The blow turned out to be so sensitive that the pilot's door and the operator's hatch jammed. I had to shoot from machine guns to break the lanterns in order to get out. In justification, it was said that the car was pretty overweight with a suspension that pulled a ton. Nevertheless, the pilots were subjected to "the highest measure", written off from flight work as aircraft controllers. The victims could consider that they were still lucky: the helicopter was badly deformed from the impact, turning out to be literally a twisted corkscrew. The repair team struggled for a long time to restore it, but no one dared to fly on the "invalid", and he was written off to one of the schools as a visual aid.

The use of even more impressive S-25s was completely limited to a few test launches. Not all aircraft could carry a four-hundred-kilogram projectile, and on a helicopter, the S-25 was accompanied by such a plume of flame and a roar that everyone unanimously decided that this was not a helicopter weapon at all.

The equipment of the Mi-24 with a guided weapon system distinguished it from other types of aircraft and helicopters that were part of the Air Force of the 40th Army. Combat helicopters were the only ones that had such weapons for quite a long time - until 1986, when guided missiles began to be used on Su-25 attack aircraft. However, in subsequent years, guided weapons did not become widespread on attack aircraft and were used only sporadically, being rather expensive weapons. It was trusted only to the most trained pilots.

In contrast, almost all Mi-24 crews could operate guided missiles, and the helicopters carried ATGMs literally in every flight. To a decisive extent, this was facilitated by the sophistication of the guided weapons complex, its good mastery by combatant crews, as well as its low cost compared to other types of guided weapons. ATGMs had high efficiency, good accuracy and high destructive power with a significant firing range, which was practically limited only by the possibility of visual visibility of the target.

At first, however, cases of using ATGMs were infrequent. So, for the whole of 1980, the number of used ATGMs was limited to 33 units. During this period, mainly Mi-24D helicopters were in Afghanistan. This modification carried the 9P145 Falanga-PV missile system with a semi-automatic radio command guidance system, quite effective and providing a firing range of up to 4000 m. The missiles were quite impressive products that had a wing without a small meter span, which is why their presence on the suspension was reflected in helicopter behavior. The bulkiness of the "Phalanx" also affected the preparation of the machine. The ATGM was delivered in a heavy sixty-kilogram box, which had to be dragged to the helicopter, with all precautions, remove the rocket, deploy and fix the wing, check the air charge, the condition of the tracers and pipelines, the letter and code of the guidance system, and then install the weighty product on the rails, connect the connector, fix it and remove the clamps from the rudders. The whole procedure took 12-15 minutes.

An example of fuselage painting on the Mi-24V. Similar drawings by the end of the war were carried by other helicopters of the 262nd OVE_
Soon, more modern Mi-24Vs began to arrive in the unit, featuring new pilot sighting equipment instead of the former simple collimator sight, as well as a new-generation 9K113 Shturm-V missile system with 9M114 supersonic missiles. The advantage of "Shturm" was not only increased accuracy and range, brought to 5000 m, but also a successful solution for the rocket, which was supplied directly in the launch container-pipe, in which it was hung on a helicopter. Plastic pipes were convenient in transportation and storage and extremely undemanding in preparation: to install the Sturm, it was enough to place the container on supports and close the locks by turning the handle.

ATGM 9K113 "Shturm-V"_
The missiles themselves were supplied in the Shturm-V and Shturm-F versions with a five-kilogram cumulative and high-explosive warhead. The latter had volumetric detonating equipment with liquid explosives, in the device of which it was possible to get rid of the shortcomings of the first samples of such ammunition, and was much more reliable and efficient. It is curious that in the ranks, many did not even know about the filling of the rocket, believing that it carried an ordinary high-explosive charge (“Shturm-F” differed from the anti-tank cumulative version by a noticeable yellow stripe on the launch tube).

The launch of the ATGM was carried out by the operator, who guided the missile with the help of the Raduga-Sh sighting system (the Mi-24D used the equipment of the former Raduta-F phalanx configuration). Having found the target using the optics of the guidance device, the operator translated it into a narrow field of view and then only kept the mark on the target, and the radio command line itself led the missile until it hit. The installation of an optical observation head on a gyro-stabilized platform helped to keep the target in the field of view and keep the mark superimposed on it, and the supersonic speed of the rocket reduced the duration of its flight to meet the target and, accordingly, the time the operator was busy in guidance to a few seconds (before the helicopter had to remain on a combat course twice or three times longer, which was unsafe during enemy anti-aircraft action). Stabilization of the field of view during guidance allowed the helicopter to perform anti-aircraft maneuvers with deviation from the direction of the target up to 60 ° and rolls up to 20 °. The operation of the machine gun and especially the cannon caused some problems for sensitive equipment: the rumbling weapon shook the machine; due to vibrations, hydraulic dampers leaked, and the working fluid flowed into the guidance device located right there, flooding the optics. The “Rainbow” block had to be untwisted and cleaned of greasy liquid (someone was more lazy by unscrewing the plugs, draining the liquid and somehow wiping the glass with a cotton swab on a wire).

Launch of S-24 missiles from the Mi-24. Usually, a single launch of heavy projectiles was recommended as less affecting the operation of helicopter engines_
The pilots highly appreciated all these advantages of the ATGM, and the Shturm became a very popular weapon. The damaging effect of the rocket was enough to deal with a variety of targets - from cars in Dushman caravans to firing points and shelters. At the same time, it did not play a special role, a high-explosive rocket or a cumulative one was used - the power of a charge capable of penetrating half a meter of armor was more than enough to smash a duval or other structure. The usual thing was the firing of ATGMs from extreme distances, of the order of 3500-5000 m, including anti-aircraft weapons to clear the zone of operations of the strike group. High-explosive "Storms" became especially effective when hitting caves, in which the enemy who had settled down for other means was practically invulnerable, and his fire from there turned out to be devastatingly accurate. Limited volumes ideally contributed to the operation of the rocket filling with the maximum effective development explosive blow.

The massive use of ATGMs already in 1982 is evidenced by the scale of their use in the Panjshir operation: for the period from May 17 to June 10 of this year, in less than a month, 559 guided missiles were used up (on average, a dozen and a half for each participating in combat actions of the Mi-24).

The accuracy of hitting ATGMs on small objects such as a truck was about 0.75-0.8, and on buildings and other similar targets it was practically close to one. An interesting remark was contained in one of the reports on the effectiveness of equipment and weapons: the interviewed pilots complained that the use of ATGMs was hindered by "insufficient number of suitable targets." As an example, the actions of the helicopter crew of the squadron commander of the 181st ARP, Lieutenant Colonel N.I. Kovalev, who destroyed eight objects of the rebels in a month of combat work on the Mi-24P with eight Shturm-V missiles, i.e. each rocket was laid exactly on target (Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kovalev died with the entire crew on June 1, 1985 in a downed helicopter that exploded in the air after the defeat of the DShK).

There were many examples of the successful use of Sturm, including in duel situations against firing points and anti-aircraft weapons. In August 1986, a flight of helicopters from the 181st Regiment, under the command of Major A. Volkov, flew out to strike at the shelter of the local leader, "engineer Salim." The village in the mountains near Puli-Khumri, which served as the base of the dushmans, had good anti-aircraft cover. With this in mind, the attack was planned using ATGMs, and the flight itself was scheduled for the early morning. With the very first approach of the Mi-24, Senior Lieutenant Yu. Smirnov "Storms" drove directly into the building, burying its inhabitants in dusty ruins.

Several times, ATGMs were used "for their intended purpose", to combat armored vehicles - armored personnel carriers and tanks that ended up in the hands of dushmans. On January 16, 1987, helicopter pilots of the 262nd OVE received the task of destroying an armored personnel carrier captured by dushmans, from which they fired at security posts at the Bagram airfield. The Mi-24 link was raised into the air, firing at the ATGM target in three rounds and, to guarantee that they also worked with cannon fire and NAR salvos, after which from neighboring posts they were pleased to report the onset of "peace and quiet." A couple of months later, a Mi-24 flight flew out to suppress an annoying firing point near Bagram. All helicopters launched four "Sturm"; Returning pilots reported hits exactly on the windows of the duval.

Confirmation of the effectiveness of the "Shturm" on the Mi-24V, as well as the sighting system with good capabilities that stood on it, was the prevalence of the "striped" of this modification, which soon "survived" the former Mi-24D. So, by the fall of 1984, the only Mi-24D remained in the Kunduz 181st ORP, which they tried not to send to combat missions, using it as a messenger and a “mailer”.

The original revision was carried out in the fall of 1987 in Kandahar, where a dozen machines received two APU-60-1 launchers for the R-60 missiles borrowed from fighters. These missiles, created for close air combat, were supposed to be carried by helicopters in case of a meeting with “spiritual” planes and helicopters, reports of flights of which from the Pakistani side appeared from time to time, but it was not possible to meet them “live”. For air targets, the R-60 was intended on the left pylon, the right APU was tilted down so that its thermal seeker could capture a ground “hot” target - a fire or a car engine. According to the results of tests of the R-60 on helicopters, however, it was known that missiles against such air targets with low thermal contrast are not very effective and are capable of capturing an alien helicopter from a maximum of 500-600 m, and even less piston "intruder".

Launcher APU-60-I with a model rocket R-60M_
R-60s were also installed on the Mi-8, but the author does not know anything about the success of their use.
In addition to improving the effectiveness of weapons, attention was paid to their reliability. It was possible to increase the resource of many systems and their "operability" as a response to stressful operating conditions. The list of innovations and improvements was endless - from new types of ammunition to more "hardy" steel grades and electronic equipment element base, capable of withstanding the most severe operating conditions.

Among the problems that have not been solved, it is necessary to include the provision of night work. The need for sorties to search for the enemy, who felt freer under cover of darkness, remained urgent all the time, but the proportion of sorties, and most importantly, their effectiveness, were small. To illuminate the impact site, the helicopters carried 100-kg luminous bombs (SAB), which gave a torch with an aperture ratio of 4-5 million candles for 7-8 minutes (time sufficient for a couple of attacks). If necessary, it was possible to immediately illuminate the target by launching special NAR C-5-O along the course, hanging powerful parachute torches 2500-3000 m in front of the helicopter. However, for the strike, it was necessary to first detect the target, and the helicopter pilots did not receive sufficiently effective night vision devices and night sights. When patrolling, goggles were used for night driving equipment PNV-57E, but they could only see the general "picture" of the area at a short distance. They tried to work with tank sights, but they had a limited range, distinguishing the car at a distance of 1300-1500 m. The reconnaissance night observation devices also had a low resolution.

You had to rely on moonlit nights, a sharp eye and luck, which made it possible to notice a sneaking caravan or a halt fire. Such sorties were entrusted to the most experienced crews, and yet their effectiveness remained low, and the consumption of ammunition was irrational. At the site of the strike in the morning, they usually did not find any traces of the attacked enemy (if anything remained after the raid, the survivors managed to steal weapons and other goodies). At the same time, the risk of flying into a rock in the dark or touching another obstacle during the maneuver was too great, which is why night work was forbidden every now and then, making an exception only for round-the-clock patrolling of the well-known surroundings of garrisons and airfields, which protected them from shelling and sabotage .

Another permanent and, in the truest sense, vital factor was the improvement of the security of the Mi-24. The armor of the Mi-24 was considered good: in addition to the overhead armored steel screens on the sides of the pilot's and operator's cabins (contrary to popular belief, the helicopter's armor was just a bill of lading and was attached to the structure from the outside with screws), the crew was covered with front armored glass of impressive thickness, and the pilot's seat was equipped with an armored back and armored head. Armor on the hoods also protected the engine units, gearbox and valve body.

Nevertheless, with the increase in the number of fire weapons from the enemy, helicopters were increasingly subjected to fire, the caliber and power of anti-aircraft weapons grew, the number of hits multiplied, becoming a real and very tough test of vulnerability and revealing the weak points of a combat helicopter. As for the protection of the crew, most of the bullets fell on the operator's cabin in front, the armor of which could not always withstand large-caliber weapons. Of the number of bullets "taken" by the armor protection of the operator's cabin, 38-40% pierced it, while for the pilot their share was half as much, 20-22%. Even without penetrating the armor, the impact of a heavy DShK or ZGU bullet was capable of knocking out a lot of secondary fragments from the back of the armor plate, which posed a considerable danger: small steel “chips” fanned into the cockpit, injuring the pilots and sieving equipment, electrical fittings and other cockpit filling. Powerful frontal armored glass was not pierced by bullets and fragments in any case, even when hit by 12.7 mm caliber bullets. At the same time, the return of helicopters with multiple traces of bullets on armored glass was noted (in one such case, marks from six bullets remained on the glass, turning it into crumbs, but never getting inside).

In most cases, the operator suffered from the defeat as part of the crews. However, no matter how cruel it sounds, the best security of the commander was calculated and decisive, having its own rational justification for the survival of both the machine itself and the crew: a pilot who remained operational could reach home even on a damaged helicopter and in case of failure of other crew members, while his death or even injury did not promise such an outcome (up to 40% of helicopter losses occurred precisely because of the defeat of the pilot).

During the Panjshir operation, on its very first day, May 17, 1982, two Mi-24s were shot down at once. The cause of the defeat in both cases was aimed fire from the DShK on the cockpit, which led to a loss of control, a collision with the ground and the destruction of helicopters. Another car came under fire from an anti-aircraft gun, being at an altitude of 400 m, but the bullets entered the cockpit, breaking the glass and injuring the pilot. The flight crew rescued: the flight engineer made his way to the commander and assisted him, and the operator intercepted control, he brought the crippled helicopter home.

The armament group is loading the cartridge belt for the Mi-24P cannon. Usually, sparing time and effort, they laid an incomplete ammunition load of 120-150 rounds, which was enough to complete most tasks_

Loading a cartridge belt for the YakB-12.7 machine gun of the Mi-24V helicopter. In the Afghan climate, the cold morning quickly gave way to the heat of the day, which is why those participating in the work look extremely diverse, combining winter hats and boots with shorts and summer panamas_

Mi-24V in flight over the Panjshir Gorge. The helicopter carries B8V20 and Shturm units with a high-explosive warhead with a noticeable yellow stripe on the launch canister. 262nd OVE, summer 1987_
When returning from a night reconnaissance flight on October 1, 1983, a Mi-24 of the Jalalabad 335th OBVP came under concentrated fire from grenade launchers and machine guns. Hits soaked propeller blades, cut control rods and engines. The impact also hit the cockpit. At his workplace, the operator, Lieutenant A. Patrakov, was seriously injured, and a week later he died from wounds in the hospital.

On April 22, 1984, during the operation to seize the Dushman warehouses near the village of Aibak in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 181st ORP, the Mi-24s covering the landing force came under fire from disguised DShKs. Shooting was carried out from the caves on the side of the mountain, at close range. The first turn passed through the leader's helicopter. Having broken through the side, two large-caliber bullets wounded the operator V. Makarov in the arm (as it turned out later, 12 cm of the elbow joint was crushed). The lieutenant, who was barely 23 years old, lost consciousness, but then regained consciousness and continued to help the commander in flight as best he could (after spending almost a year in hospitals, he returned to duty and flew again).

On August 16, 1985, covering the evacuation of the wounded near the village of Aliheil near Gardez, a pair of Mi-24Ps of the Kabul 50th OSAP was engaged in suppressing enemy firing points. As it turned out, the dushmans were well-equipped positions and had not only small arms, but also large-caliber installations. The flight commander, Captain V. Domnitsky, described what happened as follows: “At the exit from the attack, another blow to the helicopter, and again this nasty, pungent smell of burnt metal in the cockpit ... I need to cover the wingman, but I feel that my hand is going numb from effort step-gas, the lever stretches with difficulty. He raised his hand, and on the back of it there were a dozen and a half holes and blood was oozing from them. He immediately discovered two fragments in the leg above the knee, and also to the left along the side the fuel system control panel was turned around. On the ground, after turning off the engines, they found that the DShK bullet pierced the helicopter from the bottom-side, then the folded armored head (a flat, clean hole), then knocked out a decent hole in the armored seat (on impact, the thought that the flight engineer was pushing still flashed), ricocheted to the left side , mixed the switches and wiring of the fuel system, again ricocheted off the overhead outer armor on board, hit the ceiling of the cockpit and more ... We found her in a parachute seat. Then 17 fragments were pulled out of my hand.”

Despite the injuries (fortunately, minor), on the same day, Captain Domnitsky again took to the air in his helicopter. However, fate had already made its choice: having prepared for the meeting, the enemy was waiting for them at the same place where the Mi-24 again came under aimed fire. The helicopter shook from the blows of the DShK, one of the engines turned out to be shot through, after which it only remained to pull for an emergency landing. Having flopped down on the path winding along the slope, the only more or less flat place below, the helicopter demolished the landing gear and fell on its side, burrowing into the ground. The pilot-operator S. Chernetsov had to break the glazing with the help of a machine gun in order to pull out the commander and flight engineer.

A month later, on September 14, 1985, in the same helicopter squadron of the 50th OSAP, the operator of the Mi-24, Lieutenant A. Mironov, died. During the operation in the Kunduz region, the task was carried out in the north, near the border, faced with dense enemy fire. The hit fell on the side of the front cockpit, and the blow was unusually strong. Commander S. Filipchenko was able to land the helicopter, but no one could understand what the machine was struck by, in which the side gaped with many holes, on the armor of the cabs there were a lot of dents several centimeters in size, as if from large shots and like burnt holes, and the body of the deceased operator was literally riddled. Apparently, the Mi-24 was hit by an RPG, whose cumulative grenade was able to pierce even a tank. When firing at helicopters, the dushmans used RPG fragmentation equipment from a long distance, with the expectation that grenades would trigger on self-destruction, which took place at a distance of 700-800 m.

As a reminder of the formidable "storm" in the 335th OBVP, the armored helmet of flight engineer A, Mikhailov, who was killed on January 18, 1986, already on the landing course by a sniper bullet, pierced through the side of the helicopter and through the helmet, was kept. In another case, in Ghazni, the ZSh-56 titanium armor saved the pilot, retaining an impressive dent from a slipping burst (but not protecting him from the ridicule of his colleagues - “not every head can withstand the DShK!”).

As an emergency measure, already in the first war year, the Mi-24 began to install additional armored glass cabins. Since the pilots at their workplaces were open to the very forearms, in the cockpits along the sides, from the side of the inner surface of the blisters, special bulletproof glass blocks were attached in frames on brackets. However, this refinement was not very successful: the useful volume of the cockpit in the blister zone decreased by almost 2 times, visibility deteriorated due to the massive frames, which the pilots literally touched with their heads. In addition, bulletproof glass was very massive, giving an increase in weight of 35 kg and affecting the alignment. Due to its impracticality, this option was soon abandoned (by the way, they also abandoned part of the reservation in the cockpits of the G-8s in favor of maintaining visibility, which is no less important in a combat situation than security and armament).

In the course of improvements, five-millimeter steel sheets were additionally shielded by pipelines of oil and hydraulic systems, the tanks were filled with polyurethane foam, which protected them from fire and explosion. The tail rotor cable wiring was spaced apart on different sides of the tail boom in order to reduce its vulnerability (before, both cables were pulled side by side and there were repeated cases of their simultaneous interruption by a bullet or shrapnel). In addition to the obligatory EVA, "Lipa" and ASO traps (without which, as they said, "Baba Yaga would not fly in Afghanistan either"), there was a place for active defense means.

The consequences of the incident with the helicopter of Captain Nikolaev from the 262nd OVE. After being hit by a DShK bullet, the helicopter lost its directional control, but managed to land and drove into the hangar already on the run. The car was seriously damaged, but soon returned to service, Bagram, March 1987_

At the site of the death of the Mi-24V near Gardez. The helicopter crashed, colliding with a rock in a "stone bag", the operator captain 3. Ishkildin died, the commander captain A. Panushkin was wounded. 335th OBVP, December 10, 1987_
A noticeable drawback of the Mi-24 was the lack of a stern firing point. At home, this did not interest anyone, but in a combat situation it began to cause criticism, especially in comparison with the Mi-8, whose “tail” was covered. The statistics also confirmed the impressions of the pilots: avoiding falling under fire from the front, the enemy tried to hit the helicopter from unprotected rear angles. So, the glazing of the Mi-24 cockpit accounted for only 18-20% of damage from bullets from the front hemisphere, against 40-42% for the Mi-8 (this was partly due to the smaller glazing area of ​​the "twenty-four"). With regard to damage to the power plant, this dependence was even brighter: the dust-proof coca of the air intakes, which met bullets coming from the front, received hits from the Mi-24 1.5 times less often than from the Mi-8 (16-18% versus 25-27%).

The security of the “eights” with fire protection of the rear hemisphere (which the enemy soon became convinced of from his own experience) in many cases forced the dushmans to refrain from firing from previously attractive aft angles. The presence of a tail machine gun also gave obvious advantages in tactical terms: the number of hits on the departure from the target for the Mi-8 was half that of the Mi-24, on which it was possible to fire in pursuit fearlessly and without risking "surrender" (in numbers: Mi-8s at the exit from the attack received 25-27% of hits, while Mi-24s at the retreat from the target received 46-48% of their total hits).

The flight engineer, who was in the cargo compartment, was engaged in covering the helicopter from fire from vulnerable directions on the Mi-24. Shooting from the windows, as envisaged by the creators of the helicopter, was extremely inconvenient due to the limited view and the firing sector. To expand the opening during firing, the opening doors of the troop compartment were used, which made it possible to direct the fire sideways and backwards. A machine gun (usually the same reliable PKT) was kept in the landing cabin, with fire from which the flight engineer protected the helicopter at the exit from the attack, when the target went under the wing, disappearing from the pilots' field of vision, or turned out to be on the side during a combat turn.

For quite a long time, machine guns had to be taken from broken Mi-8s or bargained with neighbors, and only over time they entered the state (usually one for each squadron helicopter, plus one spare). Many crews were not limited to one barrel and took two machine guns each, protecting both sides and not wasting time transferring fire. An impressive arsenal accumulated on board, just in case, they also took a light machine gun with them (it was impossible to fire from the PKT with their hands). In addition, each of the pilots, in addition to a personal pistol, always had a mandatory machine gun with them - “NZ” in case of an emergency landing or parachute jump (in order not to lose it, it was often fastened with a belt to the thigh). Navigator-operator A. Yachmenev from the Bagram 262nd OVE shared his painful feelings: once, climbing into the cockpit, he hung the machine gun on the PVD and, forgetting about it, took off. He caught himself already in the air, not feeling the usual heaviness from the side, but looking around, he noticed: “AKS was left overboard, dangling in front of his nose, but you couldn’t get it ... he felt like naked ...”

Household flight technicians grabbed captured machine guns in reserve, and the rearmament of the Mi-24 depended only on the ability of the crew to get and install additional weapons. All sorts of "self-made" improvements were widespread - stops and sights, up to sniper ones. The disadvantage was the inconvenience of firing from a low cockpit, where you had to bend or kneel. Captain N. Gurtovoy solved this problem very elegantly in the 280th regiment, having got hold of a seat from the "eight", which he adapted to the central pillar of the troop compartment and, without getting up, turned on it from side to side when transferring fire.

Mi-24P captain G. Pavlov, shot down near Bamiyan. After the failure of the hydraulic system and control, the helicopter was crashed during an emergency landing. An economic flight engineer takes a PK machine gun from the cockpit. 50th OSAP, June 18, 1985. Skillful and well-coordinated actions helped the pilots to survive in an emergency, but the commander managed to get out of the cockpit only by breaking the glass_

Crashed during takeoff in Farahrud Mi-24V. Operator V. Shagin died, commander Petukhov was seriously injured. 205th OVE, June 9, 1986_
Since, structurally, both wings of the airborne compartment were swung up and down together by means of rods (“providing a quick and convenient landing and disembarkation of paratroopers,” as stated in the description of the car), there was nothing to support the machine gun in the doorway and the flight technicians had to be smart and knowledge of materiel, disconnecting the door opening actuator so that the lower leaf remains in place. Later, the door opening system was finalized, providing the standard possibility of opening only one upper sash.

In normal flights, the machine gun removed from the side lay in the cockpit. A PKT with a sensitive electric trigger required caution - it was worth touching it so that the shooting would start right in the cockpit. On the "eights", where the machine gun remained on the rifle installation all the time, "looking" outward, there were no such problems, but on the Mi-24 such incidents sometimes occurred. In one such case, in the 280th ORP, a flight engineer from the crew of Major A. Volkov, throwing a machine gun from side to side, put six bullets into the cabin ceiling. In another case, under similar circumstances, the helicopter engine was shot through by bullets that had gone up. On September 8, 1982, the flight engineer, removing a machine gun, “due to a violation of security measures when handling weapons, opened unintentional fire towards the pilot’s cabin, firing 15-20 shots, as a result of which more than 500 wires of weapons systems, equipment and electronic equipment were broken, units were damaged helicopter control and electrical systems.

The Mi-24 flight engineer is engaged in stuffing cartridge belts for PKT. The machine gun itself lies nearby on the threshold of the cabin. Ghazni, 335th OBVP, autumn 1985_
In the general statistics of Mi-24 losses, more than half of the accidents had catastrophic consequences (with the death of pilots), numbering 52.5% of the total, while almost two-thirds of such cases (60.4% of the number of accidents) were accompanied by the death of all who were on crew members on board.

In order to prevent the loss of flight personnel at the end of January 1986, it was ordered to fly the Mi-24 with a crew limited to two people from the pilot and operator, leaving the flight engineer on the ground, since the pilots coped with their duties without him. With regard to the effectiveness of his work as a shooter, there was no unity: somewhere they considered such a cover necessary, while others, especially with the advent of MANPADS, considered him a whim and bluntly called the onboard technician a “hostage”. There was some truth in this. The possibilities for covering his car at the “bortach” were indeed quite limited: he could fire only in lateral directions, along the beams of the helicopter flight, while the most vulnerable rear hemisphere remained unprotected.

At the same time, in an emergency situation, when the machine was hit, the flight engineer had much less chances for salvation than the pilot and operator, whose jobs were much better adapted to the emergency escape of the helicopter and it was possible to “go overboard” directly from the seats. At the same time, the flight engineer had to get out of his place in the narrow passage behind the commander's seat, in a falling uncontrolled vehicle, get to the doors of the airborne compartment and open them, trying not to catch the pylons and suspension blocks sticking out dangerously close under the wing during a parachute jump. As a result, there were not isolated cases when the pilot and operator managed to escape, and the flight engineer died, remaining in a falling car (in the 50th OSAP at the end of 1984, in such situations, two flight technicians died in a downed Mi-24 in just one week, despite the fact that the rest of the crew survived). In the general statistics of losses, the death of this category of flight personnel in the crews of the Mi-24 happened more often than pilots and operators. In the end, such cases had their effect, and the order to reduce the crews seemed quite reasonable. However, it was not observed everywhere, and often flight technicians still flew as part of crews. On the Mi-24 border aviation, which had a different subordination, such an order, apparently, did not apply at all, and their crews continued to take to the air in full force, often with an "additional" shooter on board.

Captain N. Gurtovoy in the landing cabin of the Mi-24V, equipped with a swivel seat from a downed "eight". Kunduz, 181st OBVP, spring 1986_
The Mil Design Bureau also proposed its own option for re-equipping the helicopter. In 1985, instead of improvised rifle installations to protect the Mi-24, they developed an aft firing point, testing it on the Mi-24V (serial number 353242111640). A large-caliber machine gun NSVT-12.7 "Utes" was installed on the helicopter, which made it possible to fight on an equal footing with the Dushman DShK. The rifle installation was equipped in the stern under the tail boom: it was open at the back, and had abundant glazing on the sides to view the rear hemisphere. Since the rear of the helicopter's fuselage was occupied by the lower fuel tank and racks with radio compartment equipment, which prevented access to the shooter's workplace, a kind of tunnel was built from the cargo compartment to the installation, and rubberized fabric "pants" hanging down were attached under the shooter's feet. Having taken a place, he found himself twisted in cramped quarters under overhanging blocks and boxes of equipment, control cables and a tail rotor shaft rotating overhead.

The construction turned out to be very cumbersome and inconvenient, besides, the review and the firing sector turned out to be unsatisfactory. When shown to the authorities, a certain colonel from the staff wished to personally test the novelty. The office complexion let the chief down - when trying to get to the machine gun, he was tightly stuck in a narrow passage and had to be pulled out backwards. In addition to layout flaws, the equipment of the "firing position" in the stern adversely affected the centering of the helicopter with the ensuing consequences for maneuverability and controllability. Even after the installation was finalized with access from the outside, due to obvious shortcomings, it was recognized as unusable. In the ranks, the lack of rear protection was somewhat compensated for by a revision with the installation of rear-view mirrors for the pilot, similar to those tested on the Mi-8, but mounted inside the cockpit, taking into account high flight speeds.

***

A story about the armament and work of helicopter aviation in the Afghan war would be incomplete without mentioning the participation in the campaign of Kamov's rotorcraft, which remained a practically unknown page of the events of that time. It was by no means about testing new equipment in a combat situation, which was the Ka-50 being worked out at that very time: a car of an unusual design and concept that had just taken to the sky was then in its “childhood” age and it had enough problems with fine-tuning that did not allow make risky attempts to put her into battle. Nevertheless, Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters, which were already in service, appeared in Afghanistan from time to time. In addition to the fleet, Kamov helicopters served in border aviation, being in demand in the districts of border troops in mountainous areas, where their high power-to-weight ratio, excellent carrying capacity, altitude and rate of climb, as well as resistance to the influence of the usual wind in the mountains, fair and lateral, turned out to be beneficial. The compactness of coaxial machines was not least suitable for the peculiarities of work in cramped mountain conditions (Kamov helicopters had a main rotor of 16-meter diameter - a third less than the Mi-8 propeller).

Helicopter Ka-29_
Kamov helicopters were available in the aviation of the Transcaucasian border district, in particular, in the 12th separate regiment, whose units were stationed in Georgia and Azerbaijan. The first squadron of the regiment at the Alekseevka airfield near Tbilisi had several Ka-27s, the second squadron, located in Kobuleti, had two Ka-27s and two Ka-29s. The crews of the regiment were constantly involved in work in Afghanistan on business trips lasting 45 days, supporting and replacing fellow border guards from the Central Asian and Eastern districts. Kamov's helicopters also participated in these missions, from time to time working in the border areas (according to the stories, they happened to appear in Shindand), but the author does not have reliable information about their participation in hostilities.

This is not limited to the history of improving weapons during the "helicopter war" in Afghanistan. In addition to the emergence of new types and systems of weapons, sighting equipment underwent changes, components and assemblies were modified, their reliability and efficiency increased, defects were “caught”, and these painstaking work aimed at maintaining the proper level of machines accompanied her all the time of operation.

Shooting installation for protecting the rear hemisphere of the helicopter, tested on the Mi-24V (machine gun removed). On the left side of the installation there was a large landing hatch_
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Author Viktor Markovsky
Based on materials from the site topwar.ru