A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River.
June 1944
This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. In the course of it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.
Unparalleled in terms of spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the greatest achievement of the national military art. As a result, the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.
Map of the Belarusian operation
After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed in Belarus a huge ledge with an area of \u200b\u200babout 250 thousand square meters. km, facing east. He penetrated deeply into the disposition Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the Red Army the shortest route to Poland and Germany, endangered flank attacks by the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".
In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partly of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, in which there were 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns and more than 1300 combat aircraft. The reserve of the Army Group "Center" had 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.
During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944. VGK rate planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of the 4 fronts were to act in concert. The troops of the 1st Baltic (commanded by General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd (commanded by Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd (commanded by Colonel General G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian Fronts (commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky), Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.
Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEM. Baghramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation
The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the group consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. 5 air armies provided air support and cover for the troops of the fronts.
The idea of the operation was to break through the enemy defenses in 6 directions with deep strikes from 4 fronts, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions on Minsk, surround and liquidate east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the strike, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.
When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy's forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves in repelling the offensive of our troops.
To reinforce the grouping, in the spring and summer of 1944, the Headquarters replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four artillery divisions breakthrough, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, four engineering brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the numerical strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.
The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, expected to repel a private offensive of the Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive lanes with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, defense in depth, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.
By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops included 1.2 million people, 34,000 guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 5,000 combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts by 4.5 times, and aircraft by 3.6 times.
In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.
By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi area, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area. Subsequently, develop an offensive on Lepel;
The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway on Borisov, and part of the forces on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;
The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, to defeat the Mogilev group, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;
Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy. To this end, the front was to deliver two blows: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second - from the area of the lower reaches of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;
The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.
The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on the rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first undermining of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.
Much attention was paid to the concentration of aviation efforts on directing the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Only on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas of front breakthrough.
The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned by methods of barrage, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the double barrage method.
At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel General M.S., is on the phone. Malinin, far left - Front Commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944
The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - the head General Staff Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. For the same purpose, a commander was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. operational management General Staff General S.M. Shtemenko. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of Artillery N.D. arrived from Moscow to help the artillery commanders and headquarters. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.
The operation required 400,000 tons of ammunition, about 300,000 tons of fuel, over 500,000 tons of food and fodder, which were delivered on time.
According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the operation "Bagration" is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.
The 1st stage of the Bagration operation included breaking through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks and defeating the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. the liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Wisla. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of up to 160 km.
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.
The actions of the troops during the operation "Bagration", as in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.
German captured soldiers of the Army Group "Center" are being escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944
The troops, advancing 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.
Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944
The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The success of the Belorussian operation was timely used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian front. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops on July 17-18 crossed state border Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.
Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944
Further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and by order of the Stavka they went on the defensive.
2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander General of the Army
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan to strike the enemy from the air. August 1944
As a result of the Belorussian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for inflicting new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic States, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations of the Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.
The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Her distinguishing feature- huge spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.
Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944
The troops of the Red Army, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550-600 km to the west, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the outskirts of Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.
Battalion commander of the 297th rifle regiment 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia
During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions lost more than 50% personnel, lost combat capability. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.
Operation "Bagration" showed vivid examples of high skill Soviet generals and military leaders. She made a significant contribution to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched military art experience in encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in a variety of situational conditions. The task of breaking through the powerful defense of the enemy was successfully solved, as well as rapid development success in operational depth due to the skillful use of large tank formations and formations.
In the struggle for the liberation of Belorussia, Soviet soldiers displayed mass heroism and high combat skills. 1500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.
Exclusively important role partisan formations played in the liberation of Belarus.
Parade partisan brigades after release
the capital of Belarus - Minsk
Solving problems in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the advance transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to heavy losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the start of the operation. BUT irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also had heavy losses in armament.
The world community appreciated the events on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Political and military figures of the West, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. “The swiftness of the offensive of your armies is amazing,” wrote President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 to I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government dated July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." One of the Turkish newspapers on July 9 stated: "If the advance of the Russians continues to develop at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."
Professor of the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English specialist in military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin” emphasized: “The defeat of the Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their biggest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, bigger than Stalingrad."
Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out at a time when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe. However, 70% of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive operations of the allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.
The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. By liquidating the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were advancing in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads by the Soviet troops on the Vistula in the areas of Pulawy and Magnuszew opened up prospects for conducting new operations to defeat the enemy in order to completely liberate Poland and advance on the German capital.
Memorial Complex"Mound of Glory".
Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen hill 35 m high is crowned by a sculptural composition of four bayonets lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made in the mosaic technique, the text is beaten off: "Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!"
Sergey Lipatov,
Research Fellow at the Research
Institute military history military academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation
In the late spring of 1944, relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened the defense, and the Red Army rested and gathered strength for the next blow.
Looking at the map of the fighting of that time, you can see on it two large projections of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far to the east, is in Belarus, with a border along the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This ledge was called the "Belarusian balcony", and after a discussion that took place at the end of April 1944 at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, it was decided to fall upon it with all the might of the Red Army troops. The operation to liberate Belarus received the code name "Bagration".
The German command did not foresee such a turn. The terrain in Belarus was wooded and swampy, with a large number of lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of the Nazi generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to reflect Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. So, in the subordination of the army group "Northern Ukraine" were seven tank divisions and four battalions of Tiger tanks. And in the subordination of the Army Group "Center" - only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one battalion of "Tigers". In total, Ernst Busch, who commanded the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.
The Germans created a fairly powerful and layered defense in Belarus. Since 1943, the construction of fortified positions has been underway, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication nodes were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev and others. The defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable artillery and machine-gun positions.
According to the operational plan of the Soviet high command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were to defeat the enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th air armies (more than 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved a significant, and in many respects, overwhelming superiority over enemy troops.
In order to keep the preparations for the offensive secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. Parts moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, settling in the forests and carefully disguised themselves. In parallel, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance was carried out in combat in the areas of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in the Bagration operation, whole echelons with models of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. In general, the measures achieved their goal, although the preparations for the offensive of the Red Army were not completely hidden. Thus, prisoners captured in the zone of action of the 3rd Belorussian Front said that the command of the German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected active actions from the Red Army. But the time of the beginning of the operation, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the strike remained unsolved.
Before the start of the operation, Belarusian partisans became more active, committing a large number of sabotage on the communications of the Nazis. More than 40,000 rails were blown up between 20 and 23 July alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but they still did not cause critical damage to the railway network, which was directly stated even by such an authority in reconnaissance and sabotage as I. G. Starinov.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.
The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Bagramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, hit at the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th shock army was to advance on Polotsk.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky, attacked Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. To develop the operational success of the front, the horse-mechanized group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.
After artillery preparation on June 23, the troops of the fronts went on the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th shock army met fierce resistance and had little success. The width of the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.
The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant success in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchesa River. For the Vitebsk grouping of the Nazis, there was a threat of the formation of a "cauldron". The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.
During June 24-26, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division that was covering the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, however, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they did not succeed. On June 27, the encircled Germans capitulated. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Orsha was also liberated on June 27. The forces of the Red Army entered the Orsha-Minsk highway. On June 28, Lepel was released. In total, at the first stage, parts of the two fronts advanced to a distance of 80 to 150 km.
The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was conducted by the 2nd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced about 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. Their pursuit was carried out by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28, Mogilev was liberated. The German 12th Infantry Division, which was defending in the city, was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. German units retreated to Minsk under attack attack aviation front. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.
The Bobruisk operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. According to the plan of the front commander, the blow was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction to Bobruisk in order to encircle and destroy the German group in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pukhovichi and Slutsk. From the air, the advancing troops were supported by about 2,000 aircraft.
The offensive was carried out in an impenetrable wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to go through training in order to learn how to walk on bogshoes, overcome water obstacles on improvised means, and also build gati. On June 24, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Soviet troops went on the attack and by the middle of the day broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into battle made it possible to reach a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.
On June 27, the Bobruisk group of Germans was completely surrounded. There were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers in the ring. Leaving part of the forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive against Osipovichi and Slutsk. The encircled units attempted to break through to the north. A fierce battle took place in the area of the village of Titovka, during which the Nazis, under cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through the Soviet front. To hold back the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 aircraft continuously bombed the concentration of German troops for an hour and a half. Leaving the equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. June 28 remnants German forces were taken prisoner.
By this time, it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, was destroyed and captured Soviet forces a large amount of technology. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created for the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post, and Field Marshal Walter Model took his place.
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to force the river and, bypassing the strongholds of the Nazis, develop a swift offensive against the capital of the BSSR.
On June 29, the advanced detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and in some areas deepened into the enemy’s defenses by 5-10 kilometers. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th Guards Army broke into the city of Borisov from the south and southwest, freeing it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleschenitsy were liberated.
On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the retreat routes for the Minsk grouping of the enemy. The cities of Vileyka, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, Krasnoye were taken. Thus, the Germans were cut off from all major communications.
On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the north and northwest direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd completely take over the city.
On July 3, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th rifle corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the tankers of the Tatsinsky Guards Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the offensive against the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.
As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions. The 1st Baltic Front, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, in converging directions from the south and northeast, was supposed to surround and destroy the German troops.
The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, the Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German group and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Violent street fighting ensued, lasting until 4 July. On this day the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, pursuing the retreating German units, went west for another 110 kilometers, reaching the border of Lithuania.
The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days amounted to 225-280 kilometers. A gap about 400 kilometers wide was formed in the German defense, and it was already very difficult to fully cover it. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation by relying on individual counterattacks in key areas. At the same time, Model was building a new line of defense, including at the expense of units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the "catastrophe zone" did not significantly affect the state of affairs.
On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to cover it. On July 8, the Germans brought reinforcements to Vilnius. About 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated to break through the encirclement. A significant contribution to the failure of all these attempts was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of resistance of the Germans. On July 13, Vilnius was taken, and the encircled group was destroyed.
The 2nd Belorussian Front developed an offensive against Bialystok. As a reinforcement, the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred to the front. During the five days of the offensive, the Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their forces, the formations of the Red Army had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16 this Belarusian city was also cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.
The 1st Belorussian Front was to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin with strikes bypassing the Brest fortified area and reach the Vistula River. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through the German defensive line near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers until July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron formed near Brest, but the Soviet soldiers failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of the Nazi forces were able to break through. By the beginning of August, Lublin was taken by the Red Army and bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula were captured.
Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. During the two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland were liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was defeated.
By June 1944, the Red Army had liberated almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, on Ukrainian soil, that the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. However, by the spring of the penultimate year of the war, the offensive of the Soviet troops slowed down: the enemy constantly transferred from western front fresh forces, which, by imposing protracted battles, were able to stop the advance of the Red Army.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not put up with such a state of affairs. At the same time, the Stavka understood perfectly well that it was impossible to throw an army into battle without careful planning of operations. That is why the General Staff and the Headquarters made the only right decision in such a situation - to change the direction of the main strikes.
By that time, the front line passed along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. On operational maps, it looked like a wedge, the tip of which was turned deep into the Soviet Union. The area of \u200b\u200bthe "balcony", the so-called ledge, was almost 250 thousand square kilometers.
In Berlin, the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus was not expected: the military leadership of the Third Reich was sure that the offensive should be expected north of Leningrad or in the direction of "Southern Poland - the Balkans".
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the contrary, considered the complete liberation of Belarus to be the primary task of the summer-autumn campaign.
It was assumed that four Soviet fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharova and I.D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan, - inflicting deep blows in six directions at once, they will first break through the defenses, surround and destroy enemy groups that are on the flanks, eliminate the main forces of Army Group Center and reach the Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin line.
In total, under the command of four commanders 27 armies: 20 combined arms, two tank and five air armies.
With the choice of the direction of the main attack, they quickly decided - the Minsk direction.
A rather difficult task was to break through the front in six sectors: however, the implementation of this particular decision could lead to a quick dissection of enemy forces and would make it difficult to use reserves.
On May 30, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the final plan for the Belarusian offensive operation, which received the code name "Bagration".
Right up to the beginning of the operation, the Headquarters replenished the fronts that were supposed to take part in the offensive: more than 100 trains with manpower, fuel, ammunition, and equipment were delivered to the front every day. The result was an almost fourfold advantage of the Red Army in tanks and guns, a threefold advantage in aircraft and one and a half times in manpower: before that, in none of the offensive operations, Soviet troops had such superiority.
At the same time, the enemy, who still did not expect a large-scale offensive in the Minsk direction, was confident that any local offensive by the Soviet troops would be calmly repelled by the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command pinned great hopes on a multi-lane, defense in depth.
In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops carried out a whole cascade of powerful offensive operations along the entire stretch from the White to the Black Seas. However, the first place among them is rightfully occupied by the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, which received the code name in honor of the legendary Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General P. Bagration.
Three years after the start of the war, Soviet troops were determined to take revenge for the heavy defeats in Belarus in 1941. In the Belarusian direction, the Soviet fronts were opposed by 42 German divisions of the 3rd tank, 4th and 9th field German armies, in total about 850 thousand . Human. With Soviet side Initially, there were no more than 1 million people. However, by mid-June 1944, the number of units of the Red Army intended for the strike was increased to 1.2 million people. The troops had 4 thousand tanks, 24 thousand guns, 5.4 thousand aircraft.
It is important to note that the powerful operations of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 were timed to coincide with the start of the landing operation of the Western Allies in Normandy. The strikes of the Red Army were supposed, among other things, to pull the German forces onto themselves, to prevent them from being transferred from east to west.
Myagkov M.Yu., Kulkov E.N. Belarusian operation of 1944 // Velikaya Patriotic War. Encyclopedia. /Answer. ed. ak. A.O. Chubaryan. M., 2010
FROM ROKOSSOVSKII'S MEMORIES ON THE PREPARATION AND BEGINNING OF OPERATION BAGRATION, May-June 1944
According to the plan of the Headquarters, the main actions in summer campaign 1944 were to be deployed in Belarus. To carry out this operation, the troops of four fronts were involved (1st Baltic - commander I.Kh. Bagramyan; 3rd Belorussian - commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky; our right neighbor 2nd Belorussian Front - commander I.E. Petrov, and , finally 1st Belarusian) ...
We prepared for the battles carefully. The preparation of the plan was preceded by a lot of work on the ground. Especially at the forefront. I had to literally crawl on my stomach. The study of the terrain and the state of the enemy defense convinced me that on the right wing of the front it was advisable to deliver two blows from different sectors ... This went against the established view, according to which one main blow, for which the main forces and means are concentrated. Taking a somewhat unusual decision, we went to a certain dispersal of forces, but in the swamps of Polesye there was no other way out, or rather, we had no other way to the success of the operation ...
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his deputies insisted on inflicting one main blow - from the bridgehead on the Dnieper (Rogachev area), which was in the hands of the 3rd Army. Twice I was asked to go into the next room to think over the Stavka proposal. After each such "thinking" I had to new force defend your decision. Convinced that I firmly insist on our point of view, he approved the plan of operation in the form in which we presented it.
“The persistence of the commander of the front,” he said, “proves that the organization of the offensive is carefully thought out. And this is a reliable guarantee of success ...
The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on June 24. This was heralded by powerful bomber strikes in both areas of the breakthrough. For two hours, artillery destroyed the enemy's defenses at the forefront and suppressed his fire system. At six o'clock in the morning, units of the 3rd and 48th armies went on the offensive, and an hour later, both armies of the southern shock group. A fierce battle unfolded.
The 3rd Army on the front of Ozerane, Kostyashevo on the first day achieved insignificant results. The divisions of its two rifle corps, repulsing the fierce counterattacks of the enemy infantry and tanks, captured only the first and second enemy trenches at the Ozerane-Verichev line and were forced to gain a foothold. The offensive developed in the sector of the 48th Army with great difficulties. The wide swampy floodplain of the Drut River extremely slowed down the crossing of infantry and especially tanks. Only after a two-hour intense battle did our units knock out the Nazis here from the first trench, and by twelve o'clock in the afternoon they had captured the second trench.
The offensive developed most successfully in the zone of the 65th Army. With the support of aviation 18th rifle corps in the first half of the day he broke through all five lines of enemy trenches, by the middle of the day he deepened by 5-6 kilometers ... This allowed General P.I. Batov to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough ...
As a result of the first day of the offensive, the southern strike group broke through the enemy defenses on the front up to 30 kilometers and in depth from 5 to 10 kilometers. Tankers deepened the breakthrough to 20 kilometers (Knyshevichi, Romanishche area). A favorable situation was created, which we used on the second day to enter the battle at the junction of the 65th and 28th armies of the cavalry-mechanized group of General I.A. Pliev. It advanced to the Ptich River to the west of Glusk, crossing it in places. The enemy began to retreat to the north and northwest.
Now - all the forces for a rapid advance to Bobruisk!
Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier duty. M., 1997.
VICTORY
After breaking through the enemy defenses in Eastern Belarus, the fronts of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky rushed further - in converging directions to the Belarusian capital. A huge gap appeared in the German defense. On July 3, the guards tank corps approached Minsk and liberated the city. Now the connections of the 4th were in a complete environment german army. In the summer and autumn of 1944, the Red Army achieved outstanding military successes. During the Belarusian operation, the German army group "Center" was defeated and driven back 550 - 600 km. In just two months of fighting, she lost more than 550 thousand people. A crisis arose in the circles of the highest German leadership. On July 20, 1944, at a time when the defense of Army Group Center in the east was bursting at the seams, and in the west the Anglo-American formations began to expand their bridgehead for the invasion of France, unsuccessful attempt assassination attempt on Hitler.
With the release of Soviet units on the approaches to Warsaw, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet fronts were practically exhausted. A respite was needed, but it was at this moment that an event occurred that was unexpected for the Soviet military leadership. On August 1, 1944, at the direction of the London government in exile, an armed uprising began in Warsaw, led by the commander of the Polish Home Army T. Bur-Komarovsky. Not coordinating their plans with the plans of the Soviet command, the "London Poles" in fact went on an adventure. Rokossovsky's troops made great efforts to break through to the city. As a result of heavy bloody battles, they managed to liberate the Warsaw suburb of Prague by September 14. But more Soviet soldiers and the soldiers of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, who fought in the ranks of the Red Army, failed to reach. On the outskirts of Warsaw, tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were killed (the 2nd Panzer Army alone lost up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns). On October 2, 1944, the rebels capitulated. The capital of Poland could only be liberated in January 1945.
The victory in the Belarusian operation in 1944 went to the Red Army at a high price. Only irretrievable Soviet losses amounted to 178 thousand people; over 580,000 servicemen were wounded. However, the overall balance of forces after the end of the summer campaign has changed even more in favor of the Red Army.
TELEGRAM FROM THE US AMBASSADOR TO THE US PRESIDENT, September 23, 1944
Tonight I asked Stalin how satisfied he is with the ongoing Red Army battles for Warsaw. He replied that the ongoing battles had not yet brought serious results. Due to the heavy fire of the German artillery Soviet command could not transport their tanks across the Vistula. Warsaw can only be taken as a result of a wide outflanking encirclement maneuver. Nevertheless, at the request of General Beurling, and contrary to the best use of the Red Army troops, four Polish infantry battalions still crossed the Vistula. However, due to the heavy losses they suffered, they soon had to be taken back. Stalin added that the rebels were still fighting, but their struggle was now giving the Red Army more difficulties than real support. In four isolated districts of Warsaw, insurgent groups continue to defend themselves, but they have no opportunities for offensive action. Now there are about 3,000 rebels in Warsaw with weapons in their hands, in addition, they are, where possible, supported by volunteers. It is very difficult to bomb or fire on the German positions in the city, since the rebels are in close fire contact and mixed with the German troops.
For the first time, Stalin expressed his sympathy for the rebels in my presence. He said that the command of the Red Army had contacts with each of their groups, both by radio and through messengers who made their way to the city and back. The reasons why the uprising began prematurely are now clear. The fact is that the Germans were going to deport the entire male population from Warsaw. Therefore, for men there was simply no other choice but to take up arms. Otherwise, they were in danger of death. Therefore, the men who were part of the rebel organizations began to fight, the rest went underground, saving themselves from repression. Stalin never once mentioned the London government, but said that they could not find General Bur-Komarovsky anywhere. He obviously left the city and "is in command through a radio station in some secluded place."
Stalin also said that contrary to the information that General Dean has, the Soviet Air Force is dropping weapons to the rebels, including mortars and machine guns, ammunition, medicines, and food. We receive confirmation that the goods arrive at the designated place. Stalin noted that Soviet planes drop from low altitudes (300-400 meters), while our Air Force - from very high altitudes. As a result, the wind often blows our cargo to the side and they do not get to the rebels.
When Prague [a suburb of Warsaw] was liberated, the Soviet troops saw to what an extreme extent its civilian population was exhausted. The Germans used police dogs against ordinary people in order to deport them from the city.
Marshal in every possible way showed his concern about the situation in Warsaw and his understanding of the actions of the rebels. There was no sign of vindictiveness on his part. He also explained that the situation in the city would become clearer after Prague was completely taken.
Telegram from US Ambassador to the Soviet Union A. Harriman to US President F. Roosevelt about the reaction of the Soviet leadership to the Warsaw Uprising, September 23, 1944
US. Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Harriman Collection. cont. 174.
By June 1944, the Red Army had liberated almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, on Ukrainian soil, that the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. However, by the spring of the penultimate year of the war, the offensive of the Soviet troops slowed down: the enemy constantly transferred fresh forces from the western front, which, by imposing protracted battles, were able to stop the advance of the Red Army.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not put up with such a state of affairs. At the same time, the Stavka understood perfectly well that it was impossible to throw an army into battle without careful planning of operations. That is why the General Staff and the Headquarters made the only right decision in such a situation - to change the direction of the main strikes.
By that time, the front line passed along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. On operational maps, it looked like a wedge, the tip of which was turned deep into the Soviet Union. The area of \u200b\u200bthe "balcony", the so-called ledge, was almost 250 thousand square kilometers.
In Berlin, the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus was not expected: the military leadership of the Third Reich was sure that the offensive should be expected north of Leningrad or in the direction of "Southern Poland - the Balkans".
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the contrary, considered the complete liberation of Belarus to be the primary task of the summer-autumn campaign.
It was assumed that four Soviet fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharova and I.D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan, - inflicting deep blows in six directions at once, they will first break through the defenses, surround and destroy enemy groups that are on the flanks, eliminate the main forces of Army Group Center and reach the Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin line.
In total, under the command of four commanders 27 armies: 20 combined arms, two tank and five air armies.
With the choice of the direction of the main attack, they quickly decided - the Minsk direction.
A rather difficult task was to break through the front in six sectors: however, the implementation of this particular decision could lead to a quick dissection of enemy forces and would make it difficult to use reserves.
On May 30, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the final plan for the Belarusian offensive operation, which received the code name "Bagration".
Right up to the beginning of the operation, the Headquarters replenished the fronts that were supposed to take part in the offensive: more than 100 trains with manpower, fuel, ammunition, and equipment were delivered to the front every day. The result was an almost fourfold advantage of the Red Army in tanks and guns, a threefold advantage in aircraft and one and a half times in manpower: before that, in none of the offensive operations, Soviet troops had such superiority.
At the same time, the enemy, who still did not expect a large-scale offensive in the Minsk direction, was confident that any local offensive by the Soviet troops would be calmly repelled by the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command pinned great hopes on a multi-lane, defense in depth.