The Soviet commander is the author of Operation Uranus. Still need to revisit. The balance of forces on the fronts

17:17 05.04.2013 While the German troops were bogged down in street fighting in Stalingrad, the Red Army began to carry out Operation Uranus to encircle the 6th Army. On November 11, German troops launched the last decisive offensive in Stalingrad. By evening, parts of the Soviet troops retained only three small bridgeheads on the banks of the Volga: in the north - about 1000 people in the area of the market and Spartakovka; in the center - 500 people near the Barrikady plant; in the south - 45,000 men and 20 tanks.

Over the next five days, German attacks divided the 62nd Army. The Soviet grouping in the area of the market and Spartakovka, attacked by units of the 16th Panzer Division, was reduced to 300 people. Soviet command disturbed and new problem- the ice on the Volga, because of which the transfer of troops stopped, did not strengthen in any way. Attempts to organize the supply of the 62nd Army by air ended in nothing - it controlled only a narrow strip of land, and most of the cargo dropped from aircraft fell into the hands of the Germans. Meanwhile, Luftwaffe intelligence discovered a build-up of Soviet troops northwest of the city. This excited Paul Yus, and indeed there were reasons for concern: Soviet troops were preparing to crush the enemy with a crushing blow during Operation Uranus*.

For the impending offensive at Headquarters with with great difficulty managed to accumulate the following forces: Southwestern Front - 398,000 people, 6,500 guns and mortars. 150 Katyushas, 730 tanks and 530 aircraft; Don Front - 307,000 people, 5,300 guns and mortars, 150 Katyushas, 180 tanks and 260 aircraft; Stalingrad Front - 429,000 people, 5,800 guns and mortars, 145 Katyushas and 650 tanks. Defensive positions on the sector of the Don and South-Western fronts were occupied by the 3rd Romanian army (100,000 people), and on the sector of the Stalingrad front - by the 4th Romanian army (70,000 people).

Operation Uranus

Operation Uranus began on November 19 with an attack by the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts on the positions of the 3rd Romanian Army. Despite outdated weapons and a lack of armored vehicles, the Romanians at first successfully resisted the concentrated attack of the Soviet 5th Panzer, 21st and 65th armies for some time, and the Soviet offensive initially developed slowly. However, finally, the 1st and 26th corps of the 5th Panzer Army managed to make a wide gap in the Romanian front, through which the reserves went into the breakthrough. By the end of the day, the Romanians had lost up to 55,000 men. On November 20, the 1st Romanian armored division was defeated by units of the 5th Soviet tank army, which also attacked the 22nd tank division, pushing it back to Chir. In Stalingrad, the advance of the German XIV Panzer Corps, which ran out of fuel, choked. On the southern sector of the front, the positions of the 4th Romanian army were attacked by the Soviet 51st, 57th and 64th armies. The Romanians tried to resist, but the swift blow of the 13th gun and 4th mechanized corps broke their defenses. 35,000 people lost, the Romanians retreated in panic, only the German 29th motorized and 297th infantry divisions offered at least some resistance.

November 21 flanks german army from the north and south of Stalingrad were crushed, and units of the Red Army were rapidly approaching Kalach from two sides. Two days later, 27,000 Romanian soldiers capitulated - this was the end of the 3rd Army, which since the start of Operation Uranus had lost 90,000 people. I am an army, part of the 4th Panzer Army and the remnants of the defeated 4th Romanian Army - 256,000 Germans, 11,000 Romanians, 100 tanks. 1800 guns and mortars, 10,000 vehicles and 23,000 horses. During Operation Uranus, Paulus' troops lost 34,000 men, 450 tanks, and 370 guns and mortars. In the meantime, the Don Army Group, composed mostly of secondary formations, began to urgently create a new line of defense along the Chir and Don rivers. General Paulus regrouped his troops, taking up an all-round defense.

Agony of the 6th Army

By November 25, Soviet troops completed the formation of an inner ring around the Stalingrad enemy grouping - these were 490,000 people of the 21st, 24th, 57th, 62nd, 64th, 65th and 66th armies.

In early December, the Soviet 5th Panzer Army occupied the bridgeheads on the Chira in the Nizhnyaya Kalinovka area, and the 51st Army cut off the railway near Kotelnikov, along which some cargo was still coming to surrounded Stalingrad. At the same time, units of the I.VII Panzer Corps (6th Panzer Division) approached the city. The Germans from the wheels attacked and drove back the Soviet troops.

The reconnaissance operations of the Red Army in the Stalingrad region showed that significantly more troops were encircled than originally planned. This forced the Headquarters to make a change in Operation Saturn, the purpose of which was to defeat the 8th Italian Army and encircle the Hollidt group. The new operation was codenamed "Little Saturn".

On December 12, Manstein's German troops launched Operation Winter Thunderstorm (Wintergewitter), the purpose of which was to release the 6th Army. I.VI Panzer Corps (30,000 men, 190 tanks and 40 assault guns) defeated the Soviet 51st Army near Kotelnikovo. However, the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops, as well as bad weather, allowed the German tanks to advance only 19 km, and Eremenko got time to reinforce the 51st Army with the 13th Panzer and 4th Mechanized Corps. Two days later, on Chir, the Soviet 5th shock and 5th tank armies continued their offensive against the XLVIII Panzer Corps. After the 13th Panzer and 4th Mechanized Corps entered the battle, the offensive of the I.VII Panzer Corps quickly fizzled out, in addition, units of the 2nd Shock Army delivered an auxiliary blow to the enemy. On December 16, the Headquarters launched Operation Little Saturn, which involved 425,000 people and 5,000 guns and mortars. The troops of the Soviet 1st Guards and 6th Armies attacked the positions of the 8th Italian Army (216,000 people), but, despite the superiority in manpower and equipment, they achieved only local successes, faced with well-fortified defense lines, minefields and fierce resistance of the German units (27th Panzer Division). Three days later, 15,000 Italians were surrounded by a flurry of artillery fire. In the meantime, the 1st Romanian Corps was defeated, covering the left flank of the Hollidt group, which created a very real threat of Soviet troops reaching the Chira line, in the rear of Army Group Don. Parts of the German 6th Panzer Division reached the Myshkova River - 48 km from the positions of the encircled 6th Army. Manstein transmitted the code signal "Thunderclap", which Paulus was to strike towards his troops. However, Hitler categorically forbade Paulus to make a breakthrough.

On December 24, Soviet troops captured the village of Tatsinskaya, where the airfield was located, which the Luftwaffe used to fly to Stalingrad. Some 56 Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed on the ground. During the period from November 19 to December 31, the Red Army achieved a lot, but it had to pay a high price for its success. The Southwestern Front lost 64,600 killed and missing, the Stalingrad Front - 43,000, the northern and Black Sea groups - 132,000.

On January 8, 1943, Rokossovsky approached Paulus with a proposal to capitulate, but Hitler forbade even negotiations on surrender. Two days later, the Don Front (281,000 men, 257 tanks, and 10,000 guns and mortars) launched Operation Koltso, the planned destruction of the enemy group surrounded in Stalingrad. The Don Front was opposed by 191,000 freezing soldiers of the 6th Army, 7,700 guns and mortars, and 60 tanks practically left without fuel.

By January 22, the 6th Army in Stalingrad was split into two groups, and Hitler once again reminded Paulus that he must not surrender under any circumstances.

On January 19, after the start of the offensive of the Voronezh Front against Army Group B, the remnants of the 2nd Hungarian Army (50,000 people) capitulated in the Ostrogozhsk region. Soviet artillery began shelling the last Gumrak airfield remaining at the disposal of Paulus, which was finally taken by the troops of the 21st Army on January 23. To Paulus's request for surrender, Hitler replied: "I forbid surrender, the 6th Army will hold its positions to the last man and to the last bullet, and with its heroic stamina will make an unforgettable contribution to stabilizing the defense and saving the Western world."

On January 30, Hitler promoted Paulus to Field Marshal, apparently in order to induce the commander of the 6th Army to commit suicide ("No German field marshal has ever surrendered to the enemy!"). In a radio speech, Göring announced to the nation: "For a thousand years now the Germans will speak of this battle with deep reverence and reverence and, in spite of everything, will remember that it was there that the final victory was predetermined." Paulus surrendered at Stalingrad the next day. Only the XI Corps in the northern pocket continued to resist. Outraged Hitler declared: “How can a man, while fifty or sixty thousand die and fight bravely to the last man, can surrender to the Bolsheviks! » On February 2, 1943, the remnants of the XI German Corps capitulated in Stalingrad, putting an end to the almost six-month battle of the Paulus army. At Stalingrad, the 6th Army lost 150,000 killed and 90,000 captured, including 24 generals and 2,000 officers. The Luftwaffe lost 488 aircraft and 1,000 crews during the operation to supply the Stalingrad group by air. Dead Losses Soviet troops during Battle of Stalingrad amounted to almost 500,000 people.

Results of the Battle of Stalingrad

The Axis failed to find replacements for the troops lost at Stalingrad (below). While the German troops had not yet come to their senses from the Stalingrad defeat, the Stavka ordered the army to continue the offensive. At the end of January 1943, the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts advanced to Kharkov and the Donbass. At the first stage, they achieved brilliant successes, capturing Kursk, Kharkov and Belgorod. Stalin, believing that the Germans in southern Russia were on the verge of complete defeat, ordered the offensive to continue, despite the fact that the troops were exhausted and needed to rest and replenish. Although the German troops managed to stabilize the front in mid-March, the final defeat of Nazi Germany was now only a matter of time.

counteroffensive of the troops of three Soviet fronts: Southwestern (gen. N.F. Vatutin), Stalingrad (gen. A.I. Eremenko) and Don (gen. K.K. Rokossovsky) to encircle and destroy the enemy group of troops in the interfluve of the Volga and Don in the autumn of 1942. In the spring of 1942, enemy troops broke through the Soviet front and in July reached the Don. There was a threat to Stalingrad and North Caucasus. Stalingrad was the most important strategic point and a large industrial area. In addition, both for the Nazis and for Soviet citizens, Stalingrad was a city - a symbol. A. Hitler said more than once that Stalingrad is his destiny, and he must take it. In August 1942, the Nazi troops crossed the Don. Soldiers of the 62nd Army Gen. IN AND. Chuikov, 64th Army Gen. M.S. Shumilov, divisions under the command of generals A.I. Rodimtseva, L.I. Gurtiev heroically defended the city. The German command was forced to remove the 4th Panzer Army from the Caucasus direction and transfer it to Stalingrad. On August 23, 1942, German troops launched a new offensive with the aim of capturing Stalingrad with simultaneous attacks by the 6th and 4th armies in converging directions. On August 23, the Germans reached the Volga, and on September 13 they began the assault on Stalingrad. The most stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops forced the Germans to stop their attacks and go on the defensive. The German command decided not to take the offensive anymore in order to more thoroughly prepare "for the second Russian winter", accumulate strength and in the spring of 1943 again go on the offensive. In operational order No. 1 of the main command of the German fascist ground forces dated October 14, 1942, it was said: "The Russians themselves were seriously weakened during the last battles and will not be able to have the same large forces in the winter of 1942/43 as they had last winter." But it wasn't. By the autumn of 1942, the enemy no longer had absolute superiority on the Soviet-German front, offensive capabilities German Wehrmacht were seriously undermined. In the first half of September 1942 at Headquarters Supreme High Command and the General Staff came up with a plan for an offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Stalingrad region, code-named "Uranus".

The operation plan was developed in detail with the involvement of the commanders of the military branches in this work, as well as taking into account the proposals of the front commanders of the Stalingrad direction. In the summer of 1942, in the region of the Middle Don, Stalingrad and to the south along the Sarpinsky Lakes, the main forces of Army Group "B" operated: the troops of the 8th Italian, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies and the 6th and 4th tank German armies . In this grouping there were more than a million people, 675 tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars. Army Group B was supported by the 4th Air Fleet and the 8th Air Corps. When choosing decisive strikes, it was taken into account that the main enemy grouping was in the Stalingrad area - the 6th and 4th German tank armies, and its flanks on the middle reaches of the Don and south of Stalingrad were covered mainly by Italian and Romanian troops, which had relatively low equipment and combat capability . The main role in Operation Uranus was to be played by the Southwestern Front. Troops Southwestern Front struck from bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don in the areas of Serafimovich and Kletskaya. The Stalingrad Front was advancing from the Sarpinsky Lakes region. The shock groupings of both fronts were to join in the Kalach-Khutor Sovetsky area and thereby complete the encirclement of the main enemy forces (6th and 4th German armies) near Stalingrad. Further separate troops The southwestern front from the bridgeheads southwest of Serafimovich and in the Kletskaya area were supposed to break through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian army and go to the rear of the Stalingrad group in order to cut off all the ways to retreat. Thus, the Southwestern Front and the Stalingrad Front created an outer ring of encirclement of the enemy grouping. The Don Front carried out auxiliary operations, and it created an inner encirclement ring of the enemy in a small bend of the Don. In the first half of November, in deep secrecy, large forces of Soviet troops were drawn up to Stalingrad, huge flows of military cargo were transferred. On the eve of the battle, the balance of power was approximately the same, with the exception of a slight superiority. Soviet side in tanks. On November 19, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern Front and the right wing of the Don Fronts went on the offensive, and on November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front. On November 23, the main forces of the 6th Army and the 4th Tank Army (330 thousand people) were surrounded. On November 16, the troops of the South-Western and Voronezh fronts, by advancing on Morozovsk and Kantemirovka, thwarted the German plans to unblock Stalingrad. Attempts to organize the supply of German troops by air failed. On January 26, the encircled grouping of enemy troops was divided by Soviet troops into two parts, after which mass surrender began. On January 31, 1943, the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal F. von Paulus, surrendered. In total, 91 thousand people were captured. In Germany, a nationwide mourning was declared.

Code name for the plan of the offensive operation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don fronts during the Great Patriotic War, during which the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht was surrounded.

The situation at the beginning of the operation

By the time the operation began, it had already been four months. Repeated attempts by the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel General) to take Stalingrad by storm were unsuccessful. The 62nd and 64th armies held a strong defense on the outskirts of the city. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the stretching of the rear and the approach of winter led to the fact that the German army was in a difficult position. The command of the Wehrmacht intended to hold the occupied lines until the onset of spring, and then carry out a decisive offensive.

Operation plan and preparation for it

The first discussions of the plan for an offensive operation near Stalingrad took place at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early September 1942. During them, it was decided that the offensive should solve two main tasks - to surround and isolate the German group operating in the city area from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, and then defeat it.

The plan for the operation, which received the code name "Uranus", was distinguished by its breadth and boldness of design. The troops of three fronts were involved in it - Stalingrad (commander - colonel general), Southwestern (commander - lieutenant general, from December 1942 colonel general) and (commander - lieutenant general, from January 1943 colonel general ). The total offensive area was 400 square meters. The northern group of troops had to overcome the German defenses and fight 120-140 kilometers, and the southern group - 100 kilometers, after which both groups were to meet, completing the encirclement of Paulus's army. When developing the operation, it was taken into account that the German troops, in an attempt to take Stalingrad, had used up all their reserves - by mid-November, he had only six reserve divisions scattered over a large sector of the front. The German command tried to strengthen them, but it was too late.

To prepare for the offensive, the fronts were strengthened. The Southwestern Front included two tank divisions, cavalry corps, a number of artillery and tank units and formations; in the Stalingrad - mechanized and cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades; the Donskoy included three rifle divisions. All these forces were deployed as soon as possible - from October 1 to November 18, 1942. In total, at the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops involved in it numbered about 1 million 135 thousand soldiers and commanders, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.9 thousand aircraft. Thus, a decisive superiority over the enemy was created in a given sector of the front: in personnel 2-2.5 times, and in artillery and tanks - 4-5 times.

The general management of the operation from the Headquarters was carried out by the head General Staff colonel general (since January 1943 - army general). Preparation for it was carried out with the participation of General of the Army and Colonel-General of Artillery N. N. Voronov.

The Soviet command widely used methods of misinforming the enemy about the place and time of the strike. Thanks to the high-quality camouflage of troop movements, the enemy did not know until the very last moment what kind of forces the Soviet troops had on the Stalingrad sector of the front. The construction of false objects was widely used - only 17 bridges were built across the Don, 12 of which were false. All these measures led to the fact that the Wehrmacht command did not expect a counter-offensive near Stalingrad, thinking that an offensive operation would be undertaken on the Rzhev salient or in the Caucasus.

The course of hostilities

The operation began on November 19, 1942. On this day, the South-Western and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Due to bad weather conditions, the command had to abandon air support, and rely only on artillery. At 7:30, 3,500 guns and mortars began shelling enemy positions simultaneously in several areas. German troops, not expecting a strike, suffered heavy losses. The first to go on the attack were the 14th (commander - Guards Major General A. S. Gryaznov) and the 47th (commander - Guards Colonel, from December 1942 Guards Major General F. A. Ostashenko) Guards, 119th ( commander - colonel, since January 1943, Major General M. M. Danilov) and the 124th (commander - Major General A. I. Belov) rifle divisions. The enemy offered stubborn resistance - in the first four hours of the offensive, the Soviet units advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The 1st (commander - Major General of Tank Troops M. E. Katukov) and 26th (commander - Major General of Tank Troops A. G. Rodin) tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough, which completed the work of breaking through the defense - enemy troops , most of which in this area were Romanian units, were partly pushed back, partly surrendered. By the middle of the day, the defense was finally broken through and developed further actions behind enemy lines. In an effort to push back the Soviet troops and restore the situation, the German command brought operational reserves into action - four divisions. However, they only managed to delay the advance of the Red Army units. The 63rd (commander - Colonel N. D. Kozin), 76th (commander - Colonel N. T. Tavartkiladze), 96th (commander - Major General I. M. Shepetov), 293 -I (commander - Major General F. D. Lagutin) rifle divisions, 4th Panzer (commander - Major General of Tank Troops A. G. Kravchenko) and 3rd Guards Cavalry (commander - Major General I. A . Pliev) Corps. The mobile formations of the Southwestern Front were rapidly moving south, into the operational depth, destroying the enemy's reserves, headquarters and retreating formations. The Romanian troops suffered especially heavy losses here - two of their corps were completely defeated, another one was surrounded.

On the Don front main blow inflicted by the 65th army (commander - lieutenant general). By the end of the first day of the operation, she advanced 4-5 kilometers, failing to break through the defenses. However, the stubborn resistance of the enemy in this area could not save the situation - the gap formed as a result of a breakthrough on the left flank of the Paulus army was growing rapidly. On November 20, 1942, units of the 26th Tank Corps stormed a strategically important node highways Perelazovskoe. On the same day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were put into action. The 57th (commander - major general) and 64th (commander - lieutenant general) armies simultaneously, after artillery preparation, struck enemy positions from two flanks. The enemy defense was broken through in several sectors: the 57th Army by the forces of the 169th (commander - Colonel I.I. Melnikov) and 422nd (commander - Colonel I.K. Morozov) rifle divisions, and the 64th - by the forces of the 36th Guards (commander - Major General M.I. Denisenko), 38th (commander - Colonel A.D. Korotkov) and 204th (commander - Colonel, from December 1942 Major General A. V. Skvortsov) of rifle divisions. The 13th tank (commander - Colonel T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th mechanized (commander - Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th cavalry (commander - Lieutenant General T.T. . Shapkin) corps, which launched an offensive to the north-west and south-west. In contrast to the blow in the north, the south for German command turned out to be unexpected. Already on the second day of the operation, the enemy was forced to put into action all his remaining reserves. These measures could only delay the advance of the Red Army.

The command of the 6th Army and the Wehrmacht did not assess the scale of the threat to their Stalingrad group in time. It was not until the evening of November 20, 1942 that it became apparent to Paulus that the Soviet major operation. Realizing that the threat of complete encirclement loomed over him, he transferred part of his reserves, but many of them did not manage to break through. Seeing this, Paulus suggested that the command break through to the southwest, leaving the Stalingrad lines, but Hitler did not go for it. The offensive of the Soviet troops led to the fact that the command post of the 6th army was under the threat of a blow, and Paulus transferred it deeper to the rear, to the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. In the ranks of the German units, and especially among their allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians - panic began to grow.

On November 23, 1942, the 26th Tank Corps liberated the city of Kalach. On the same day, near the Soviet farm, its units met with the 4th mechanized corps, which marked the connection of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts and the closing of the encirclement. It contained about 330 thousand enemy soldiers and officers (22 divisions, 160 separate and auxiliary units). The next day, the defeat of the Romanian units in the area of the village of Raspopinskaya was completed - about 30 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. In the shortest possible time, an encirclement front was created, protected both from the inside and from the outside - it was obvious that the enemy would soon try to break through it. On November 24, 1942, Paulus suggested that Hitler leave Stalingrad and break through to the southwest to join the main forces, but he again answered with a categorical refusal.

Over the following week, the Stalingrad and Don Fronts completed the encirclement by pushing back parts of the 6th Army and thereby reducing the front to 80 kilometers from west to east and to 40 kilometers from north to south. Having condensed his battle formations, Paulus managed to organize an effective defense, including using those fortified lines on which the Soviet troops held the defense during the summer-autumn of 1942. This significantly delayed the Soviet troops and delayed the defeat of the Stalingrad group.

The German command tried to organize a breakthrough with the forces of the Goth shock army group (commander - G. Goth), which was part of the Don Army Group (commander -) and numbered 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions. Manstein intended to implement it in the area of the city of Kotelnikovo. On December 12, 1942, the troops involved went on the offensive and pushed back the Soviet troops. However, on December 15, 1942, beyond the Aksai River, as a result of stubborn resistance from the Soviet troops, this offensive was stopped. The enemy had 40 kilometers to the front line from the inside of the ring. On December 16, 1942, units of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive and broke through its defenses over the next three days. The Gotha group, which also included one Italian army, suffered heavy losses, its front completely crumbled. As a result of the counterattack, the outer line of the encirclement was pushed back from the inner line by 200-250 kilometers, which finally deprived the 6th Army of any hope of breaking it in the near future.

By January 1943, the position of the Stalingrad group had finally deteriorated. On January 8, the Soviet command gave Paulus an ultimatum to surrender, but Hitler categorically forbade surrender. Then the Soviet troops took offensive operation on the final defeat of the 6th Army (code name - Operation "Ring"), as a result of which Stalingrad was liberated, and the enemy soldiers and officers still alive by that time, led by Paulus himself, surrendered.

Operation results

As a result of Operation Uranus, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Croatian units suffered a severe defeat. Their irretrievable losses amounted to more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers. During the fighting, more than 155 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed, more than 300 thousand people were injured. This operation demonstrated to the whole world the operational and tactical skills of the Red Army command and had a huge political effect - in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the occupied territories, the victory on the Volga caused a general upsurge. In Germany, the defeat of the Stalingrad group was met with three days of mourning. In Italy, Hungary and Romania, which have lost a significant part of their armed forces, the defeat became one of the reasons for the internal political crisis, which subsequently resulted in the overthrow of the leaders of these states and their withdrawal from the alliance with Hitler.

The November steppe was covered with snow. The weather turned bad, the blizzard hid the outlines of hills, beams - and hundreds of tanks and guns, frozen in anticipation of the command. Soon a steel avalanche fell on the heads of the enemy. On November 19, 1942, the counteroffensive of the Red Army near Stalingrad began - Operation Uranus.

In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht delivered a series of blows that shook the Soviet-German front. The defeats suffered by the Red Army were not as crushing as in 1941, but too much had already been lost, and a new retreat could have catastrophic consequences. For a while it seemed that only a miracle could save the world from Nazi domination. Miracles do not happen, so the Soviet 62nd Army saved the world. She managed to retreat in an organized manner to the streets of Stalingrad, and instead of the 10 days planned for the assault, the Wehrmacht was stuck for two months, fighting for the ruins. The strongest of the German field armies, the 6th under the command of General Paulus, was drawn into the battle. However, the desperate defense of the 62nd in the city could become useless if the Headquarters did not take advantage of the weeks presented to it.

While an indescribable battle was going on in the city, in Moscow they were puzzling over how to turn its course in their favor. The Germans very slowly, with heavy losses, but confidently ousted its defenders from Stalingrad. The bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga was shrinking and shrinking. Of course, the constant introduction of reserves made it possible to slow down the retreat and prevent the Germans from throwing the army into the river, but more and more new quarters passed into the hands of the Germans.

Already in September, counterattacks across the steppe followed, designed to break through the corridor to Stalingrad from the north, near the Kotluban station. These attacks remained almost unknown, and meanwhile the Red Army suffered severe losses in them, trying to alleviate the fate of the defenders of the city. The blows failed one after another. The Germans bombed the echelons approaching from the north, tank brigades and rifle battalions burned out in attacks in a matter of days. The Germans so far surpassed the Soviet troops in the ability to conduct a positional battle. Time after time the same thing happened. The infantry was cut off by fire, the tanks left without cover were on fire, the dead shooters were mowed down by machine guns and mortars. There were less and less hopes for saving Stalingrad with a direct blow. How the battle in the city would turn out, one could only guess. The first attacks failed due to lack of time to prepare them. It seemed that with more careful preparations it would be possible to achieve a better result. However, the Wehrmacht withstood all the blows.

Other decision

In September, a landmark meeting was held at Headquarters. Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, in the presence of Stalin, discussed the search for some "other solution" to the Stalingrad problem. Stalin, who heard this, asked what "other" decision was meant, and offered to report on it the next day. Both generals were of the same opinion. Since it is impossible to break through the German defenses in the Kotluban region, it is necessary to increase the backswing, cover the Paulus army attacking Stalingrad from the flanks and surround it, advancing through the positions of Germany's weak Romanian allies.

Looking at the map, this idea seems obvious. As Stalingrad attracted the infantry and tank divisions of the Wehrmacht like a magnet, the Romanians began to cover the ever longer front to the left and right of Paulus's troops. They did not have the discipline, tactical skill and excellent weapons that distinguished the Germans. However, in reality, this was a much more difficult plan to carry out than it might seem.

The fact is that the Germans were well aware of the real combat value of the Romanians. They assigned to the allies those sectors of the front that passed through the wild, almost uninhabited, and most importantly, roadless steppe. The offensive requires ammunition, fuel, medicines, food, spare parts - these are thousands and thousands of tons of cargo. If you drive numerous armies into the wastelands and start advancing, after a while they will simply stop: consumables will run out, and new ones will not be brought across the steppe in sufficient quantities. And if you use small forces, then even the Romanians will be able to withstand the blow and push back the attackers. Interestingly, two opposing plans were considered as an alternative to the actually adopted plan.

Konstantin Rokossovsky suggested, since the area far to the west and south of Stalingrad is inconvenient, still try again to break through to Stalingrad in a short way and cut off the nearest German divisions in a small cauldron. General Andrey Eremenko proposed something different: his plan was to attack the Romanians with small forces and a giant raid on their rear with the help of cavalry and small mechanized units. Both of these plans contained sound considerations, but both had huge shortcomings. Rokossovsky proposed to break the Germans with a rough onslaught where they were strong and expected to be hit. It is not certain that this could be done. Eremenko's plan would have helped stop the Germans for a few days, but it did not solve the problem. Of course, the Wehrmacht would quickly clear its rear from weak raid groups.

Thus, the most ambitious plan was adopted. This meant that it was necessary to be able to carry out an offensive with large forces in an area that was inconvenient for this, and to complete all preparations before the Germans nevertheless defeated the garrison of Stalingrad. It required truly nerves of steel. Stalingrad was in a desperate situation, emotions demanded to take all the divisions in the reserve and immediately throw them into Stalingrad itself or near Kotluban - to cut through the corridor along the shortest route. However, the Headquarters resisted and did not go on about the emotions.

Over the next few weeks, a complex of tasks had to be solved. While fighting raged in the streets, railway lines stretched into the steppes blown by the autumn winds. Enormous stocks of fuel and ammunition were brought to the starting positions. A completely new formation, a tank army, was advancing from the north to the front. The Germans detected activity on their flanks, but did not attach much importance to it. The Romanians were slightly reinforced by separate German units. However, an offensive in these recently roadless wastelands was considered unrealistic. Well, a fresh tank division sent to help Paulus from the west was prosaically late.

The general offensive was coordinated by Vasilevsky. The operation was codenamed "Uranus". A blow to the Romanian troops from two sides was scheduled for November 19. At this point, the Germans were already extremely weakened by the fighting in the city. The 6th Army of the Germans remained a powerful, cyclopean-sized army, but many wounded accumulated in the rear, combat units were seriously worn out in battles, and reserves were drawn to the bottom. Before restoring her strength before the final push to the Volga, she needed very little time - literally two or three weeks. It was at this moment that the Stavka threw the accumulated reserves on the scales. It is difficult to imagine what feelings Vasilevsky experienced during the new and new assaults on Stalingrad, when the Stavka was drop by drop draining the reserves that supported the defenders. Now all doubts have been cast aside.

Breath blow

Thick snowfall interfered with the actions of aviation, but it also chained the Luftwaffe to the airfields. The first to go on the offensive was the northern "claw" - the front of General Nikolai Vatutin, which included a tank army. Hurricane artillery fire and an avalanche of several hundred tanks made the blow irresistible. This offensive was in no way reminiscent of hopeless attacks on German positions at Kotluban. Soviet troops passed through the Romanian positions like a knife through butter. The Romanian front line was swept away, and in some places tanks immediately drove into divisional command posts and even corps headquarters.

Interestingly, on the first day, Paulus did not yet consider that any significant events were taking place. He had no idea about the state of the Romanian troops, and he did not know that the allies were throwing down their weapons in droves and surrendering. He considered an offensive with large forces west of Stalingrad impossible, and on the first day he sent his only reserve towards him - one German and one Romanian tank division. A curious incident is connected with the German tankmen. The bulk of the equipment of this mobile reserve could not move. According to the official version, the wiring in the tanks… was gnawed by mice.

The joke about saboteur mice became known to the entire army, but the tankers themselves were not at all amused. It is difficult to explain this miraculous phenomenon, but the fact is that about two-thirds of the division's tanks never went anywhere. However, the fact that the remaining third still started up was of little use. To the considerable amazement of the Wehrmacht commanders, all the circumstances that played a fatal role in the fate of the Soviet troops in 1941 have now turned against them. In the chaos, the German and Romanian divisions were unable to establish contact with each other, fought at random, fell under blows in marching columns, could not orient themselves, and were defeated in a couple of days.

The corps commander, who united the armored reserves of Paulus, lost his position, and then his freedom: Hitler ordered him to be imprisoned. In reality, the general simply experienced all the delights of commanding a counterstrike in the midst of a general collapse. The remnants of the two divisions fought their way to the southwest in agony. They lost almost all their equipment, their soldiers - especially the Romanians - were demoralized, so that for the next few days the two divisions did not pose a threat.

The weather was still bad over the battlefield, so the formidable German aircraft could not participate in the battle. Moreover, the Soviet units began to seize airfields with planes chained to the ground. Due to the defeat of the Romanian units on the front line, their remnants fled to the band of the German 6th Army.

In the rear of the Germans themselves, a grandiose mess reigned. The modern army is not only front-line units, but also hundreds of rear units. Now they were all rushing along the icy roads. Some went south, away from the tanks with red stars on board, others went east, into the emerging cauldron, many went straight into captivity. The only success of Paulus was the rapid folding of the flank. The group of Germans beyond the Don was able to retreat to the boiler in an organized manner and build a new line of defense. However, most of the rear units turned into an uncontrollable mess.

The offensive took by surprise even those units that were not supposed to be here. For example, an Estonian police battalion was hit on the march on the road to Donetsk. Paulus simply did not have reliable information about what was happening in his own rear. The advancing tankers and riflemen walked through the continuous chaos. Abandoned horses rushed along the roads, somewhere a car with an empty gas tank was standing, and just a few kilometers away was an abandoned fuel depot. The military police could not regulate traffic, and there were traffic jams for kilometers. Fights broke out near river crossings and road junctions, sometimes with shooting. Some even drowned, trying to go west across the Don on the ice. German field hospitals were filled with patients, but due to constant marches, even dugouts could not be dug out there. The infirmaries were more like meat-packing plants.

At this time, the remnants of the 3rd Romanian army were dying near the village of Raspopinskaya. Its main forces were commanded by the divisional commander, General Laskar. All higher commanders either had no connection with the troops, or were already in captivity. Laskar tried to act like his German counterparts and make a breakthrough to the west. However, on November 22, he was captured after an unexpected Russian attack and did not participate in the events anymore, and by the 25th, the remnants of the Romanian army - 27 thousand starving and frozen people - laid down their arms.

Only got out of the way small group led by General Zion, but she did not go far. Romanians met with German part, however, the Germans literally a few hours later transferred their guns to another area. The Romanians settled down for the night in the village. For the first time in several days, the soldiers, who had fallen into the heat and eaten, zakemar in full force, not excluding sentries. At night, Soviet units entered the village, killing or capturing everyone they found.

On November 20, the southern "claw" went on the offensive. Here things with roads and landmarks were even worse than in the north. Therefore, there were fewer troops in general, but the share of mobile formations was greater. The condition of the Romanian troops was no better than in the north. The first day was spent in the fight against the positional defense of the Romanians. During the long weeks of standing, they managed to create an impressive line of field fortifications, but it quickly turned out that by itself it was not capable of holding back a powerful blow.

The German motorized division, which had left to meet them, was met on the march and driven inside the planned encirclement ring - to the north. A huge problem for the Soviet troops was the complete lack of reference points. Due to the snowstorm in the first days it was impossible to conduct air reconnaissance, there were no inhabitants in rare villages. Therefore, the two mechanized corps marching in the vanguard raced for some time in the void, vaguely imagining where the enemy was. Even communication with the command had to be kept through couriers on motorcycles.

However, the very next day an excellent landmark was found - Railway to Stalingrad. The pliable rear of the German 6th Army was also found there. Within two days, only one of the avant-garde mechanized corps took seven thousand prisoners at the cost of losing only 16 people.

This phenomenon should be considered separately. Huge number of prisoners Soviet soldiers in the campaign of 1941 is often explained by unwillingness to fight, mass cowardice, and similar reasons of little honor. In fact, as we see, in a similar situation, the Germans already began to surrender in droves, almost without resistance.

This happened not because the Germans, until recently terrible opponents, suddenly lost interest in fighting. However, during deep breakthroughs, a huge number of rear servicemen turn out to be at the forefront: builders, drivers, repairmen, signalmen, doctors, loaders in warehouses, etc. etc. They almost never have the tactical training for proper combat, and often even weapons. Moreover, the Germans were constantly losing communication, and besides the infantry, tanks fell upon them. Vasily Volsky, commander of the 4th mechanized corps, sent even the headquarters guards on motorcycles and armored cars to collect a plentiful harvest of prisoners and trophies.

On November 21, one mechanized wedge was driven into the positions of the Germans and Romanians from the north, the other from the east. Between them remained the armada of the German 6th Army. The culmination of Operation Uranus was the capture of the bridge across the Don near the town of Kalach. The crossing was captured by Lieutenant Colonel Filippov's brigade advancing from the north. Filippov acted with a fair amount of audacity. In the darkness of the night, a small column with lit headlights drove forward. In addition to Soviet ones, it also consisted of several captured German cars, so the bridge guards saw familiar silhouettes and were not worried. Thirty-fours were taken just for German trophies. When the imaginary Germans jumped from the tanks and opened fire, it was already too late. Soon Kalach itself was occupied. On November 23, at four in the afternoon, the Soviet groupings met at Kalach. The largest army of the Wehrmacht, 284 thousand soldiers and officers, was surrounded.

The pictures of the defeat of the German and Romanian rear were inspiring. In the terrible summer of 1942, even the most staunch soldiers hesitated. Now fear and humiliation have become the lot of the opposite side. Crowds of exhausted prisoners, many of whom were wounded or frostbitten, aroused pity rather than hatred. Mountains of broken and abandoned equipment stood at the roadside like monuments of victory. True, here and there there were constant outbursts of rage.

The retreating units of the Wehrmacht mercilessly shot down prisoners captured in summer and autumn, whom they could not take away with them. In one of the camps, they found a mountain of stiffened corpses and only a few emaciated living people. Now that Germans and Romanians were the main prisoners, such a spectacle could easily cost the lives of soldiers captured nearby. And yet the moral uplift of Soviet soldiers and officers was unprecedented. The taste of victory was intoxicating. Some of the fighters later said that they did not experience such strong feelings even after the capture of Berlin.

Operation Uranus turned the tide of the entire Second World War. In just a few days, the roles were reversed. In the coming months, the Wehrmacht will have to patch up holes in the front, try to successfully or unsuccessfully break through the encirclement rings and throw reserves under the tank tracks with no visible effect. November 1942 became real finest hour Red Army.

On November 19, 1942, Operation Uranus began - the offensive of the Red Army against Stalingrad, captured by the German troops. The headquarters set the fighters the task of encircling and destroying the enemy troops. In a few days, the army managed to close the ring around the 6th army of Friedrich von Paulus.

The defense of Stalingrad lasted 200 days. Fights were fought for every house, for every meter of land. German aviation made about two thousand sorties, literally wiping the city off the face of the earth, burned down the center with incendiary bombs along with the inhabitants.

July 17, 1942 is officially considered the start date of the Battle of Stalingrad. On this day, at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers, the forward detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies met with the vanguards of the 6th German army. By the beginning of the battle, the German troops had superiority over the Soviet in tanks and artillery - 1.3 in aircraft - more than 2 times. In terms of numbers, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were twice inferior to the enemy.

By the end of July, the enemy pushed the Soviet troops back beyond the Don. The line of defense stretched for hundreds of kilometers along the river. By September 13, the Wehrmacht's shock groups pushed the Soviet troops in the direction of the main attacks and broke into the center of Stalingrad. Fierce battles went on for every house. Strategic positions changed hands many times, such as Mamaev Kurgan, Train Station, Pavlov's House and others. By November 11, after the most difficult and bloody battles, the Germans managed to break through to the Volga in a section 500 meters wide. 62nd Soviet army suffered huge losses, some divisions numbered only 300-500 fighters. By that time, the Headquarters already had a plan for a counteroffensive against Stalingrad. The operation was called "Uranus". The plan was to defeat the troops covering the flanks of the enemy's Stalingrad grouping with strikes from the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, and, developing the offensive in converging directions, encircle and destroy the main enemy forces near Stalingrad.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army began on November 19, 1942. On the first day, the 1st and 26th Panzer Corps advanced 18 kilometers, and on the second day, 40 kilometers. On November 23, in the Kalach-on-Don area, the encirclement ring around the 6th Wehrmacht Army closed.

On January 10, 1943, the troops of the Don Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky began to carry out Operation Ring to defeat the group of Nazi troops surrounded near Stalingrad. The plan provided for the phased destruction of the enemy and the dismemberment of the 6th Army.

By the end of the day, Soviet troops, supported by artillery, managed to advance 6-8 km. The attack progressed rapidly. The enemy offered fierce resistance. The advance towards Stalingrad had to be temporarily halted on January 17 to regroup troops. The command of the 6th Army was again asked to capitulate, which was refused. On January 22, Soviet troops resumed their offensive along the entire encirclement front, and already on the evening of the 26th, a historic meeting of the 21st and 62nd armies took place near the village of Krasny Oktyabr and on Mamaev Kurgan.

On January 31, 1943, the southern group of troops of the Wehrmacht ceased resistance. The command headed by Colonel-General Friedrich von Paulus was captured. On the eve of his order, Hitler promoted him to field marshal. In a radiogram, he pointed out to the army commander that "not a single German field marshal has yet been captured." On February 2, the northern group of the 6th Army was liquidated. Thus, the battle for Stalingrad was over.