In accordance with the military-political goals of the further conduct of the war, in the early spring of 1942, when the active armed struggle on the Soviet-German front almost ceased, both belligerents began to develop strategic plans for military operations.
The development by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the strategic plan of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for the next stage of the war and the carrying out of measures to prepare a new military campaign had a number of characteristic features. They were determined by the peculiar conditions of the military-political and strategic situation that had developed by the spring of 1942. Firstly, there was no firm confidence that the second front would be opened on time that met the common interests of the struggle of the anti-fascist coalition, that is, in 1942. At the same time, the Nazi leadership was aware that there would be no second front in the near future. Therefore, it could use the maximum of forces and means to deploy new active operations on Eastern Front. Secondly, the allies did not fully fulfill their obligations to deliver military materials to the USSR under Lend-Lease. So Soviet Union I had to rely only on myself.
The Soviet command took into account measures for a significant organizational restructuring and technical re-equipment of the Soviet Army, as well as the creation of large reserves, which could not be completed until the summer of 1942. Meanwhile, numerous data indicated that a new major enemy offensive on the Soviet-German front would begin already in the spring of 1942.
On March 18, 1942, military intelligence reported to the General Staff: “Preparation for the spring offensive is confirmed by the transfer of German troops and materials. During the period from January 1 to March 10, up to 35 divisions 1 were transferred, and human reinforcements to the active armies are continuously going on. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, and there is an intensified importation of military and transport vehicles, ammunition, and artillery. It is possible that a decisive German offensive on the Eastern Front will be accompanied by a simultaneous action by Japan against the USSR and pressure from the Germans on Turkey in order to force it to let German troops into the Caucasus ... The Germans, not being able to carry out an appropriate regrouping of forces on the front, did not will be able to repeat the offensive on a broad front. They are concentrating all their efforts on the preparation of successive operations: first with the aim of capturing the Caucasus and the Murmansk (Kirovskaya - Ed.) Railway, then spreading operations to the north with the task of capturing the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. The solution of these tasks would achieve "the main strategic goal - isolating the USSR from the allies, depriving it of oil, and if not defeating it, then reducing it to the point where it loses all significance. This is the main plan of the German command.
1 In fact, fewer were transferred - about 20 divisions.
The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north, while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow ... "1 And as a conclusion, the report noted: "Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will first unfold on southern sector and spread further to the north. For the spring offensive, Germany, together with the allies, will put up to 65 new divisions ... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942. ”
On March 23, 1942, the state security agencies reported to the State Defense Committee: “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. In the event of a successful operation with access to the Volga near Stalingrad, the Germans planned to launch an offensive north along the Volga. The Germans this summer will strive not only to reach the Volga and the Caspian Sea, but will also undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since their capture is a matter of prestige for the German command.
Such forecasts of strategic intelligence could not but influence the assessment of the situation by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and its decision to continue the armed struggle at the new stage of the war.
In the spring of 1942, the Stavka did not have sufficient forces and means at its disposal to conduct a large-scale offensive, but it was impossible to postpone active operations for a long time. In this situation, writes Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, “the fronts went over to the defensive. Before us was the question of a plan of military action for the next six months. It was thoroughly discussed at the General Staff. None of us had any doubts that the enemy would again take serious active actions no later than the summer in order to again seize the initiative and defeat us. We critically analyzed the results of the winter. Now the Headquarters, the General Staff and the entire leadership of the Armed Forces tried to more accurately reveal the enemy's plans for the spring and summer periods of 1942, to determine as clearly as possible the strategic directions in which the main events were destined to play out. At the same time, we all perfectly understood that the further development of the entire world war, the behavior of Japan, Turkey, etc., and perhaps the outcome of the war as a whole, would largely depend on the results of the summer campaign of 1942.
1 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5, ll. 296-297.
2 IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6083, l. 6.
3 A. Vasilevsky. The work of a lifetime. M., 1975, p. 203.
The strategic plan of action of the Soviet Armed Forces for a longer period was to provide for the ultimate political goal of the war for 1942 - the defeat of the enemy and the liberation of all occupied Soviet territory. This was the basis for the development of the solution, launched by the Headquarters and the General Staff after the end of the winter offensive campaign.
Assessing the situation that had developed by the spring of 1942, the Supreme Commander II. V. Stalin assumed that the Nazi command in the summer of 1942 would be able to conduct large-scale offensive operations simultaneously in two strategic directions - Moscow and in the south of the country. He attached particular importance to the Moscow direction, where the enemy had more than 70 divisions.
JV Stalin believed that the Soviet Armed Forces did not yet have sufficient forces and means to launch large offensive operations in the spring of 1942 in the absence of a second front in Europe. Therefore, he considered it expedient for the near future to confine himself to active defense on the entire Soviet-German front, while simultaneously conducting private front-line offensive operations in its individual sectors.
The General Staff, in particular its chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov and his deputy, General A. M. Vasilevsky, basically adhered to the same opinion as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov firmly stood on the fact that at the first stage of strategic actions it was limited only to active defense, to withstand the blow of the enemy, to exhaust and bleed him at the beginning of summer, and then, having accumulated reserves, to move on to broad counteroffensive actions.
The State Defense Committee envisaged as the main immediate task: to create powerful trained reserves by May - June 1942, accumulate weapons, ammunition, tanks, aircraft and other military equipment, as well as the necessary material resources to provide troops in the subsequent offensive. All justifications and calculations according to the plan of strategic actions for 1942 were completed by the General Staff by mid-March. The main idea of the plan: active defense, the accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. However, work on the plan continued in connection with the proposal of the command of the South-Western direction to conduct a large offensive operation in May with the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts.
The final version of the action plan of the Soviet Armed Forces was considered and approved at the end of March at a joint meeting of the State Defense Committee and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. At this meeting, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov once again stated the opinion of the General Staff on the advisability of transferring the entire active army to a temporary active defense and the concentration of the main strategic reserves in the western direction and partly in the Voronezh region, where the main events can play out in the summer. This opinion was justified mainly by the numerical superiority of the enemy forces and the absence of a second front in Europe. B. M. Shaposhnikov did not agree with the proposal of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko on the possibility of conducting a major offensive operation in the spring by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern fronts, motivating his disagreement with the difficulties of organizing such an operation and the lack of necessary reserves. However, the arguments of the General Staff were not fully taken into account. The meeting ended with an instruction from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to prepare and carry out in the near future offensive operations in the Kharkov area, in the Crimea and in other areas.
1 See G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. T. 2. M., 1974, pp. 64-65. See ibid.
Thus, the strategic plan of the Stavka for 1942, on the whole, corresponded to the military-political goal of the Soviet state for the next stage of the war and, in its essence, was of an active nature. The first part of this plan, which dealt with the planned actions of the Soviet Armed Forces in the spring and early summer of 1942 (April - June), was developed in the most detailed way. During this period, the Soviet Army was to remain in a temporary strategic defense with the task of completing the reorganization of the troops and re-equipping them with new equipment, as well as accumulating reserves in order to launch a new offensive from the summer of 1942. In order to give the defense an active character, the plan also provided for row offensive operations on separate directions of the front from the Barents to the Black Sea with the general task of consolidating the successes of the past winter campaign, improving the position of troops in certain areas and disrupting the enemy’s preparations for a summer offensive with preemptive strikes.
The second part of the plan outlined the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces from the summer of 1942 to a decisive offensive on most of the Soviet-German front, with the main blow on the southern wing. It was developed in the most general terms, since detailed planning of major offensive operations could only be carried out taking into account the results of military operations in the spring of 1942.
In accordance with the decision taken, in April-early May, the Stavka assigned specific combat missions to the fronts of the active army for the next spring stage of the struggle.
On April 20, the troops of the Bryansk Front were ordered to conduct an operation with the forces of two armies and a tank corps in the Kursk-Lgov direction in early May in order to capture Kursk and cut the Kursk-Lgov 1 railway.
The Southwestern Front received permission to conduct the Kharkov operation with the assistance of part of the forces of the Southern Front. According to the plan, approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction on April 10, the purpose of the operation was to forestall the enemy in launching offensive operations in the Kharkov direction and to retain the initiative. The Southwestern Front was supposed to, using bridgeheads on the right bank of the Seversky Donets, northeast and southeast of Kharkov, deliver two blows in converging directions to Kharkov, defeat the enemy’s Kharkov grouping and capture Kharkov, an important stronghold of enemy defense.
The southern front was supposed to defend the occupied lines, covering the Rostov and Voroshilovgrad directions and the area of Lozovaya, Barvenkovo, Izyum. It was assumed that the Southwestern and Southern Fronts would create the necessary conditions for the deployment in the summer of a major joint offensive operation in order to liberate the Donbass and reach the border of the Dnieper.
In order to facilitate command and control of troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in the upcoming offensive in the summer of 1942, the Headquarters considered it necessary to create the North Caucasus direction on April 21. It included the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol Defensive Region, the North Caucasian Military District, Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. M. Budyonny was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the North Caucasian troops, P. I. Seleznev, Secretary of the Krasnodar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed a member of the Military Council, Admiral I. S. Isakov, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief for the Marine Part, chief of staff - General G. F. Zakharov.
1 This offensive was subsequently canceled by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
The troops of the North Caucasian direction were to completely clear the Crimea of the enemy and prevent the landing of amphibious assault forces on the coast of the Azores and the Black Seas in the Rostov, Tuapse sector, as well as airborne assault forces on the Kerch Peninsula and on the territory of the North Caucasian Military District. In the event of an enemy attempt to launch an offensive in the Rostov direction, these troops, in cooperation with the troops of the Southern Front, were to firmly hold the line of the Don River, preventing the enemy from advancing into the North Caucasus.
Active offensive tasks were assigned to the fronts of the army in other directions of the Soviet-German front.
The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts were ordered to complete the operations begun in the winter to defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping of the enemy with the subsequent development of an offensive against Smolensk. At the same time, the commander of the Western Front received the task of carrying out an air transport operation in order to strengthen the cavalry group of General P. A. Belov, operating behind enemy lines, with personnel, weapons and logistics 1. These troops were supposed to hold and expand the occupied by them area, as well as strike at communications, railways and enemy bases in the areas of Smolensk, Yartsev, Vyazma, Pochinka 2. The duration of the operation was determined from 10 to 25 May. According to the directive of the Headquarters, 120 aircraft were involved in the operation, which were to be allocated by the commander of the Air Force, the commander of long-range aviation and the commander Western Front. The commander of the Air Defense Forces of the country was entrusted with the task of covering the airfields for loading heavy aircraft. The return flights of the aircraft were supposed to evacuate the wounded from Belov's group.
The Headquarters demanded from the troops of the North-Western Front to complete the liquidation of the enemy's Demyansk grouping, which had deeply wedged into the location Soviet troops at the junction of the Northwestern and Kalinin fronts.
The troops of the Karelian Front were to prepare and conduct private operations in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kestenga directions and reach the state border 3, and the troops of the 7th separate army were to completely clear the left bank of the Svir River from Finnish troops and seize bridgeheads on its right bank 4.
In the strategic plan of the Headquarters, the Navy was taken into account mainly as a force carrying out independent combat operations in the Northern and Black Sea theaters. It was planned to use the Baltic Fleet to a limited extent, since it was blockaded in Kronstadt and Leningrad. The Northern Fleet was given the task of protecting sea lanes in the Barents and White Seas, as well as on the Northern Sea Route. It was also entrusted with the task of disrupting the enemy’s maritime communications, but the organization and conduct of special operations were especially important, which were supposed to ensure the safety of convoys heading to the northern ports of the Soviet Union. In addition, the forces of this fleet were involved in joint operations with the 14th Army of the Karelian Front, which was conducting an operation in the Murmansk direction. The Black Sea Fleet, together with the Fighters of the Primorsky Army, was supposed not only to actively participate in the defense of Sevastopol, but also to ensure the combat operations of the Crimean Front on the Kerch Peninsula, supply troops, strike at enemy communications and repel attacks by torpedo boats and enemy aircraft on their bases and ships .
1 The group of P. A. Belov included the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps in separate parts of the 4th Airborne Corps.
2 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 41 pp. 130-131
3 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 31, ll. 173-175.
4 Ibid., ll. 178-179.
While aiming the Navy at solving independent tasks, the Headquarters also drew attention to the shortcomings in the use of the forces of the fleets in joint operations with the troops of the fronts in coastal areas. The directive of the Chief of the General Staff gave specific instructions on the use of naval artillery, the improvement of the organization of interaction between the ground forces and fleets, the organization of reconnaissance, and other issues.
The fronts operating in the western and southwestern directions simultaneously with offensive tasks received instructions to create reserves and build military defensive lines: on some sectors of our common front with smaller forces in order to group the liberated forces and equipment in the army and front reserves and prepare them for participation in our upcoming offensive operations, as well as for counterattacks in case of an unexpected enemy offensive.
In these types, the Headquarters considers it necessary that ... the front urgently build a military defensive line along the entire front, which should make it possible to release part of the troops to form shock fists "1.
In the instructions of the Headquarters on strengthening the defense of the fronts, it was ordered to bring the depth of the main defense line to 10-12 km. Along with this, the Headquarters carried out significant measures to strengthen the old and build new rear defensive lines to a considerable depth, reaching a total of 600 km (to the Volga River).
In the southwestern direction, the construction of a frontier along the Voronezh, Starobelsk, Rostov-on-Don line was unfolding; the old defensive lines along the Don River were improved and defensive contours were built around such large cities as Voronezh, Rostov, Saratov, Stalingrad. In the western direction, the Mozhaisk line of defense was erected and the defense around Moscow and the old lines along the Oka and Volga rivers were strengthened. For the defense of the Caucasian direction, at the end of 1941, the construction of a field fortified line along the Lower Don from the village of Nizhnechirskaya to Azov with a total length of 700 km, as well as lines along the Kuma and Manych rivers, began. However, by the spring of 1942, all of them were poorly developed in depth in the main directions. In addition, due to an unsuccessfully chosen place for the defensive structures, some of them were flooded during the spring flood.
In May 1942, construction began on defensive lines between the Don and Kuban, along the Terek River and bypasses around Tikhoretsk, Voroshilovsk, Grozny, Mineralnye Vody, Krasnodar.
The Headquarters also paid great attention to strengthening the defense of Leningrad. The evacuation of the city's population continued.
Navigation was being prepared on Lake Ladoga. A second route was created through the Shlisselburg Bay, about 30 km long. For this purpose, the Kobono-Korej port was built on the eastern shore of the lake.
1 Archive of Moscow Region, f. 132a, op. 2642, d. 32, ll. 89-95, 185-187, 190-195.
The ship fleet was replenished: metal barges were built in Leningrad, wooden ones - at a shipyard on the Syas River. Small ships and barges were transferred to Ladoga from the Volga, Severo-Kama and other shipping companies.
By a resolution dated April 9, 1942, the State Defense Committee assigned responsibility for organizing transportation across the lake to the Ladoga military flotilla, commanded by Captain 1st Rank V.S. Cherokov. The North-Western River Shipping Company was operationally subordinate to the commander of the Ladoga military flotilla. Measures were taken to strengthen the air defense of the Ladoga highway.
As an important factor in the strategic plan of the Stavka, the partisan movement was also taken into account, the forces of which were to be used on a large scale to disorganize the enemy rear.
Thus, all the fronts deployed from the Arctic to the Crimea received not only instructions to improve the defense in their zones, but also offensive tasks with limited goals. They had to solve these tasks in conditions of temporary defense until the summer of 1942, that is, before the start of a new strategic offensive with decisive goals - the defeat of the main enemy groupings and the liberation of Soviet territory. The general goal of all spring offensive operations was to improve the operational and strategic position of the Soviet Armed Forces in the main directions, to reveal the intentions of the opposing enemy, to defeat his groupings, to disrupt the plan of the Ghggler command to launch a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front with preemptive strikes, thereby giving the strategic defense of the Soviet troops an active character. When delivering preemptive strikes, the greatest importance was attached to the Kharkov region - the most important strategic object in the southwestern direction. All this was supposed to create favorable conditions for the deployment of large-scale offensive operations in the summer on a huge front from the Baltic to the Black Sea in order to defeat the main enemy groupings and create a decisive turning point in the war in favor of the USSR, which began near Moscow in the winter of 1941/42.
Taking into account the timing of the readiness of the reserves and the degree of reorganization of the Air Force and armored forces, the summer offensive of the Soviet Army could begin only in the second half of July 1942.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command arranged its reserves so that they could be used, depending on the prevailing situation, both in the southwestern direction - to repel the expected enemy strike and go on a decisive offensive, and in the western direction - to reliably secure the Moscow region. Therefore, the main forces of the reserves were concentrated in the areas of Tula, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Saratov, from where they could be quickly advanced to one or another threatened direction. Between these two directions were distributed and all the marching reinforcements of the army in the field.
The basis of the new offensive plan in 1942, the Nazi leadership laid the desire to achieve the political goals of the war against the USSR, which Nazi Germany failed to achieve in 1941. The strategic concept of the Wehrmacht Supreme High Command defined the Soviet-German front as the main front of the struggle. It was here, the leaders of fascist Germany believed, that the key to winning victory over the anti-fascist coalition, to solving the problem of gaining world domination, lay. The general strategic plan was to deliver a powerful strike with concentrated forces in one strategic direction - the southern wing of the front - and to consistently expand the offensive zone to the north.
In a conversation with the Japanese ambassador Oshima on January 3, 1942, after the defeat of the Nazi troops near Moscow, Hitler confidentially informed him: “The Soviets will be defeated already next summer ... Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be thrown back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe. Developing and concretizing his adventurous plans, he continued: “I intend for the time being to carry out no more offensive operations in the center of the front. My goal will be to attack on the southern front. I decided, as soon as the weather improved, to again attack in the direction of the Caucasus.
This direction is the most important. We need to go to oil, to Iran and Iraq. If we go there, then, I hope, the liberation movement of the Arab world 1 could also help our breakthrough. Of course, in addition, I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed...
If England loses India, the whole world will collapse. India is the nucleus of the British empire. It is necessary that Germany and Japan consult on joint plans for 1942 and 1943. Both allies must under no circumstances stop halfway. I am sure that England can be destroyed. How to eliminate the USA, I don't know yet" 2.
The question of draft plans for a new offensive campaign first arose in February 1942, when the situation on the Soviet-German front had somewhat stabilized. A new offensive in the East was planned to begin immediately after the spring thaw. On February 20, General A. Heusinger, Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, had already submitted to General F. Halder the first draft of the offensive plan. This plan provided for two stages of the struggle: spring and summer-autumn. In the spring of 1942, the forces of Army Group "South" were meant to capture the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol, as well as to liquidate Soviet troops in the front ledge in the Barvenkovo area, which should have created the necessary conditions for the deployment in the summer of that year of the main operation on the southern wing of the Soviet German front. The plan of the summer offensive itself provided for a single strike by large Wehrmacht forces on the southern wing in order to break through to the Caucasus.
At the end of February 1942, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the Japanese ambassador in Germany, said: “Plans for the campaign are now being developed by the General Staff. In general terms, the plan that Hitler outlined at the end of January: in all operations against the USSR, the southern sector should have the greatest importance - the offensive will begin there, and the battles will gradually turn to the north ... In any case, if it is possible to cut off the USSR from external assistance and expand the capture in the south, including the entire Donbass and the Caucasus, then even if it is not possible to completely break the Soviet regime, the USSR will still lose all significance and strength ... Operations against the Middle East will follow operations against the Caucasus.
During March, the General Staff of the Ground Forces was systematically developing a plan for a new offensive in the East under the code name of Operation Siegfried. On March 28, 1942, at a meeting at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht, a detailed plan for the summer offensive was considered. The deputy chief of staff of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht, General V. Warlimont, who was present at the meeting, subsequently wrote down:
1 This refers to the anti-British elements in the Arab countries, on which the Nazis intended to rely in the fight against the British.
2 N. Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten. Darmstadt, 1961, S. 288.
“... Hitler, despite the failures that befell the Germans, again returned to his main idea, which he adhered to in December 1940 and in the summer of 1941. He again wanted to concentrate his main efforts on the extreme flanks of a widely stretched front. The only difference was that the heavy losses suffered by the land army and which could not be fully replenished forced him to set himself successively one goal after another, starting from the southern sector, from the Caucasus. Moscow as the goal of the offensive ... so far has completely disappeared" 1.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Keitel, who, during an interrogation on June 17, 1945, testified: “As a result of the 1941 campaign, it became clear that there was a moment of a certain balance of power between the German and Soviet troops. The Russian counter-offensive, which was completely unexpected for the high command, showed that we had grossly miscalculated in assessing the reserves of the Red Army. It was all the more clear that the Red Army was making maximum use of the winter stabilization of the front for further reinforcement, replenishment and training of new reserves. It was not possible to win the war with lightning speed. However, this in no way took away our hope of achieving a military victory by a new offensive.
In drawing up the plan for the 1942 campaign, we were guided by the following guidelines:
a) the troops of the Eastern Front are no longer able to advance along the entire length of the front, as it was in 1941;
b) the offensive should be limited to one section of the front, namely the southern one;
c) the purpose of the offensive: to completely exclude the Donbass from the military-economic balance of Russia, cut off the supply of oil along the Volga and capture the main oil supply bases, which, according to our assessment, were located in Maikop and Grozny. The exit to the Volga was not planned immediately in a wide area, it was supposed to go out in one of the places in order to then capture the strategically important center - Stalingrad. In the future, in the event of success and the isolation of Moscow from the south, it was supposed to take a turn with large forces to the north (provided that our allies would take over the Don River). I am at a loss to name any terms for carrying out this operation. The entire operation in the southern sector was to end with a large encirclement of the entire southwestern and southern groups of the Red Army, which were covered by our army groups "A" and "B" ... "2
Historians have at their disposal documentary materials on the plans of the fascist political leadership and military command for the summer of 1942. In the final form, the goal and intent of the new offensive campaign in the East were formulated in OKW directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942, and then specified in directives No. 44 and 45 signed in July.
The military-political goal of the new offensive of the fascist Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front was to regain the strategic initiative and destroy the "remaining" forces of the Soviet Army, capture the maximum number of the most important political, economic and military centers of the Soviet Union.
The strategic plan of the Nazi command was to "... while maintaining a position in the central sector, take Leningrad in the north and establish contact on land with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus" 3.
1 W. Warlimoiit. Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht. 1939-1945. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 242.
2 Quot. Quoted from: Military Historical Journal, 1961, No. 9, pp. 83-84.
3 Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhruug 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Frankfurt a/M., 1962, S. 184.
The solution of these tasks was supposed to be carried out consistently "taking into account the situation created after the end of the winter campaign, the availability of forces and means, as well as transport capabilities." At first, the Nazi command needed to create conditions for conducting the so-called "main operation" in the south of the Eastern Front "with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge" For this, the Nazi troops needed to improve their operational position, stabilize and strengthen the Eastern Front and rear front-line areas. Their specific tasks were to seize the Kerch Peninsula and Sevastopol during the spring, cut off the Barvenkovsky ledge of Soviet troops, eliminate their bridgehead northwest of Novgorod, and level the front line in the Moscow direction.
By the end of May, the fascist German command intended to complete the concentration of the main forces of the strike groups for the "main operation". The immediate goal of this operation was to deliver a series of successive, complementary strikes, which were to develop "from north to south in such a way that in each of these strikes in decisive directions as many forces as possible were concentrated as land army and, in particular, aviation.
The first blow was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel to Voronezh. From here, mobile formations were to advance downstream of the Don towards the grouping, which was delivering a second blow from the Kharkov region to the east. Then it was supposed to unite in the area west of Stalingrad the troops advancing along the Don, and the troops striking east from the Taganrog, Artemovsk region. After that, a rapid development of success was planned directly to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.
Operations in the north to capture Leningrad and the Kirov railway were planned to be carried out after the defeat of the Soviet troops in the south and the capture of the oil regions of the Caucasus, the richest agricultural regions of the Middle and Lower Don and the Kuban. In the western direction, where the Soviet troops had significant forces, the enemy planned containment actions and private offensive operations to improve his operational position.
Thus, according to the plan of the fascist command, the armed forces of Germany in the summer offensive of 1942 were to achieve the solution of the political goals set by the Barbarossa plan. The enemy intended to strike the main blow on the southern wing. The Wehrmacht was no longer capable of delivering simultaneous strikes in other strategic directions, as it was in 1941.
Having concentrated all their reserves in the south of the Eastern Front, the rulers of the "Third Reich" counted on the fact that the loss of Donbass and Caucasian oil would weaken the Soviet Union and provide Germany with the opportunity to successfully continue the war, and the withdrawal of German troops in the Transcaucasus would disrupt the USSR's connection with foreign countries through the Caucasus and Iran. Moreover, the Nazis, not without reason, hoped that the breakthrough of the German troops in the Transcaucasus would allow them to draw Turkey into the war against the USSR.
The successful implementation of the initial tasks planned by the German strategists for May - June 1942 largely depended on the implementation of the military-political goals of the entire offensive of the Nazi army in the East in the summer of 1942.
In order to ensure the secrecy of the summer offensive of 1942, the fascist leadership carried out a number of disinformation measures.
In order to keep the direction of the main attack secret, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces decided to create the impression that the German troops would launch a powerful offensive in the western direction in order to defeat the central grouping of Soviet troops and capture Moscow. To this end, the headquarters of the Army Group "Center", at the direction of the OKH, developed a plan for a special operation under the code name "Kremlin". The calculation was made on the fact that her plan would become known to the command of the Soviet Army and it would be misled. This plan provided for the implementation of a whole range of various disinformation measures, which were closely linked in time with the preparation and implementation of the offensive in the south. However, the operation "Kremlin" did not achieve its goal.
So, in the spring of 1942, both belligerents worked out strategic plans and were preparing for the next round of active operations on the Soviet-German front, which was caused by the urgent need to have a strategic initiative in the hands of crohx.
In accordance with the general plans for the forthcoming actions, groupings of forces of the active armies were created.
The Soviet active army included 9 front-line formations, a separate army and troops of the Moscow defense zone, 3 fleets with 3 flotillas operationally subordinate to them. By May 1942, there were still three main commands of the strategic directions - Western, South-Western and North Caucasian, headed by General G.K. Zhukov, Marshals S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Budyonny, respectively. The forces of the active army included 10 strike aviation groups of the Stavka, formations and units of long-range aviation, as well as the Moscow Air Defense Front and the Leningrad Air Defense Army. In the strategic reserve of the Stavka were 2 combined arms armies (1st reserve and 58th) and about 80 separate formations and units. In total, the troops of the Soviet army in the field (excluding the Air Defense Forces of the country and the Navy) at that time had 5.1 million people, almost 3.9 thousand tanks, 44.9 thousand guns and mortars x, about 2.2 thousand .combat aircraft.
1 Without 50-mm mortars, of which there were 21.4 thousand pieces.
2 IVI. Documents and materials, Inv. No. 3, p. 364; f. 244, op. 287, d. 47, ll. 65-66.
The Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets had 140 warships of the main classes: 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 32 destroyers and 100 submarines.
The fascist German armed forces had 3 army groups on the Soviet-German front, which included 9 field and 4 tank armies, 3 operational groups and 3 air fleets. The total number of enemy forces that opposed the Soviet army in May 1942 is shown in table 11.
Thus, the ratio of forces and means of the parties was: in people - 1: 1.2, in guns and mortars - 1: 1.3, in combat aircraft - 1: 1 in favor of the enemy; in tanks - 1.2: 1 and in warships - 2.2 M in favor of the Soviet troops and fleet 2. With such a balance in forces and means, both sides entered in the spring of 1942 into new stage World War II, deploying active operations on its main front.
Battles of the Third Reich. Memoirs of the highest ranks of the generals of Nazi Germany Liddell Hart Basil Henry
Plans for 1942
Plans for 1942
During the winter, it was necessary to decide what to do next, that is, about plans for the spring. Their discussion began even before the last attempt to take Moscow was made. Blumentritt said the following about this: “Some generals argued that the resumption of the offensive in 1942 was impossible and that it was wiser to stop there. Halder also had great doubts about the continuation of the offensive. Von Rundstedt was even more categorical and insisted on the withdrawal of German troops into Poland. Von Leeb agreed with him. The rest of the generals did not go as far, but still showed concern about the unpredictable results of the campaign. After the removal of von Rundstedt and von Brauchitsch, opposition to Hitler weakened, and the Fuhrer insisted on continuing the offensive.
In early January, Blumentritt became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. He worked directly under Halder and knew better than anyone else the motives behind Hitler's decision. He shared with me the following thoughts.
"First. Hitler hoped to achieve in 1942 what he had failed to achieve in 1941. He did not believe that the Russians could increase their forces, and resolutely did not want to see evidence that this was actually happening. There was a "war of opinion" between him and Halder. Our intelligence had information that Russian plants and factories in the Urals and elsewhere were producing 600-700 tanks a month. Hitler glanced at the information presented to him and declared that it was impossible. He never believed in what he did not want to believe.
Second. He did not want to hear anything about the retreat, but he did not know what to do next. At the same time, he felt that he must immediately do something, but this something should have been only an offensive.
Third. Increased pressure from the leading industrialists in Germany. They insisted on continuing the offensive, convincing Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat.
I asked Blumentritt whether the General Staff considered the validity of these claims and whether it was true that the manganese ore, which is located in the Nikopol region, was vital to the German steel industry, as was reported at the time. He first answered the second question, saying that he did not know anything about it, because he was not familiar with the economic aspects of the war. I found it significant that the German military strategists were not familiar with the factors that were to form the basis for the development of operations. He further stated that it was difficult for him to judge the validity of the claims of the industrialists, since representatives of the General Staff were never invited to joint meetings. In my opinion, this is a clear indication of Hitler's desire to keep the military in the dark.
Having made the fateful decision to continue the offensive and penetrate even deeper into Russian territory, Hitler found that he no longer had the forces necessary for an offensive along the entire front, as he had a year ago. Faced with a choice, he hesitated for a long time, but still resisted the temptation to go to Moscow and turned his gaze towards the Caucasian oil fields, not paying attention to the fact that this meant stretching the flank, like a telescopic pipe, past the main forces of the Red Army. In other words, if the Germans got to the Caucasus, they would be vulnerable to a counterattack at any point for nearly a thousand miles.
Another sector where offensive operations were envisaged was the Baltic flank. The plan of 1942 originally envisaged the capture of Leningrad during the summer, thus ensuring reliable communication with Finland and easing the situation of partial isolation in which it was. All units of the North Army Group, as well as the Center Army Group, not engaged in this operation, were to remain in defensive positions.
Specially for the attack on the Caucasus, a special army group "A" was created, commanded by Field Marshal von List. Army Group South, downsized, remained on its left flank. Reichenau succeeded Rundstedt as commander of the latter, but died suddenly of a heart attack in January. Bock became the commander of the army, who was removed before the start of the offensive. Kluge continued to command Army Group Center, and Bush replaced Leeb as commander of Army Group North. Explaining the latter, Blumentritt said: “Field Marshal von Leeb was so dissatisfied with the decision to continue the offensive that he chose to relinquish command. He did not want to participate in the upcoming adventure. This man sincerely considered the upcoming event completely hopeless from a military point of view and, moreover, was an ardent opponent of the Nazi regime. Therefore, he was glad to have an opportunity to resign. In order for the resignation to be allowed, its reason must have seemed to Hitler good enough.
In the course of further discussion of plans for 1942, Blumentritt made several general observations which I think are very important. “My experience in staff work shows that in times of war, fundamental decisions should be made based not on strategic, but on political factors, and not on the battlefield, but in the rear. Debates leading up to a decision are not reflected in operational orders. The documents are not a reliable guide for the historian. People who sign an order often don't think what they put down on paper. It would be wrong to consider the documents found in the archives as reliable evidence of the thoughts and beliefs of this or that officer.
I began to comprehend this truth quite a long time ago, when, under the leadership of General von Heften, I worked on the history of the war of 1914-1918. He was an amazingly conscientious historian and taught me the technique of making historical research pointed out the difficulties encountered. But to the end, I understood and realized everything only when I got the opportunity to draw my own observations and conclusions in the process of working in the General Staff under the Nazis.
The Nazi system produced some strange by-products. The German, who has an innate desire for order and organization, is more than anyone else prone to keeping records. But in the course of the last war, a particularly large number of papers came into being. In the old army, it was customary to write short orders, leaving the performers a lot of freedom. AT last war the situation changed, freedom began to be more and more limited. Now the order should describe every step and all possible scenarios - the only way to save yourself from penalty. Hence the increase in the number and length of orders - which went against our previous experience. The pompous language of orders and the abundance of superlatives of adjectives fundamentally contradicted the strict old style, the main advantages of which were precision and brevity. However, our new orders were supposed to have a propagandistic, stimulating effect. Many orders of the Fuhrer and the command of the Wehrmacht were reproduced verbatim in the orders of lower authorities. Only in this way could we be sure that if things did not go as we would like, we could not be accused of misinterpreting the orders of superiors.
The conditions of coercion in Germany under the Nazis were much the same as in Russia. I have often had the opportunity to verify their similarity. For example, at the very beginning of the Russian campaign, I was present at the interrogation of two high-ranking Russian officers taken prisoner in Smolensk. They made it clear that they did not agree at all with the plans of the command, but were forced to follow orders so as not to lose their heads. Only in such circumstances could people speak freely - in the grip of the regime they were forced to repeat other people's words and hide their thoughts and beliefs.
National Socialism and Bolshevism have much in common. During one of the conversations in a narrow circle, which was attended by General Halder, the Fuhrer admitted that he was very jealous of Stalin, who was pursuing a tougher policy towards recalcitrant generals. In addition, Hitler talked a lot about the purge of the command staff of the Red Army carried out before the war. In conclusion, he remarked that he was jealous of the Bolsheviks - they have an army that is thoroughly saturated with their own ideology and therefore acts as a single entity. The German generals did not possess fanatical devotion to the ideas of National Socialism. “They have their own opinion on any issue, they often object, which means they are not completely with me.”
During the course of the war, Hitler often expressed similar thoughts. But he still needed the old professional military, whom he secretly despised, but at the same time he could not do without them, so he tried to control as much as possible. Many orders and reports of that time seemed to have two faces. Quite often a signed document did not reflect the real opinion of the person who signed it. It's just that a person was forced to do this in order to avoid the well-known dire consequences. Future historical researchers - psychologists and scientists - must certainly keep this special phenomenon in mind.
From the book From Munich to Tokyo Bay: A Western View of tragic pages history of the second world war author Liddell Garth Basil HenryPlans for 1942 The question of what should be done in the spring of 1942 was discussed by the German command throughout the winter. Returning to these events, Blumentritt said: "Some German generals said that the resumption of the offensive in 1942 was impossible and
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abstract
USSR during the Great Patriotic War
Completed by: student of the group AF 11-11 Matveev A.V.
Head: Gryaznukhin A.G.
Krasnoyarsk 2011
In 1941 the Second World War entered a new phase. By this time, fascist Germany and its allies had captured virtually all of Europe. In connection with the destruction of Polish statehood, a joint Soviet-German border was established. In 1940, the Nazi leadership developed the Barbarossa plan, the goal of which was to defeat the Soviet armed forces with lightning speed and occupy the European part of the Soviet Union. Further plans included the complete destruction of the USSR. For this on eastbound were focused 153 German divisions and 37 divisions of its allies (Finland, Romania and Hungary). They were supposed to strike in three directions: central (Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow), northwestern (Baltic - Leningrad) and southern (Ukraine with access to the Black Sea coast). A lightning campaign was planned to capture the European part of the USSR until the autumn of 1941.
SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT
The beginning of the war
The implementation of the Barbarossa plan began at dawn on June 22, 1941. Broad air bombardments of the largest industrial and strategic centers, as well as the offensive of the ground forces of Germany and its allies along the entire European border of the USSR (for 4.5 thousand km) For the first few days, German troops advanced tens and hundreds of kilometers. In the central direction in early July 1941, all of Belarus was captured and German troops reached the approaches to Smolensk. In the northwestern direction, they occupied the Baltic states; on September 9, Leningrad was blocked. In the south, Moldova and Right-Bank Ukraine are occupied. Thus, by the autumn of 1941, Hitler's plan to capture the vast territory of the European part of the USSR was carried out.
Immediately after the German attack, the Soviet government carried out major military-political and economic measures to repel the aggression. On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created. On July 10, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It included I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny, K. E. Voroshilov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, and G. K. Zhukov. By a directive of June 29, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks set the task for the entire country to mobilize all forces and means to fight the enemy. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was created, concentrating all power in the country. The military doctrine was radically revised, the task was put forward to organize a strategic defense, wear down and stop the offensive of the fascist troops.
At the end of June - the first half of July 1941, major defensive border battles unfolded (the defense of the Brest Fortress, etc.). From July 16 to August 15, the defense of Smolensk continued in the central direction. Failed to the northwest german plan capture of Leningrad. In the south, until September 1941, the defense of Kyiv was carried out, until October - Odessa. The stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the summer-autumn of 1941 frustrated Hitler's plan for a blitzkrieg. At the same time, by the fall of 1941, the capture by the fascist command of the vast territory of the USSR with its most important industrial centers and grain regions was a serious loss for the Soviet government.
Moscow battle
In late September - early October 1941, the German operation "Typhoon" began, aimed at capturing Moscow. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through in the central direction on October 5-6. Pali Bryansk and Vyazma. The second line near Mozhaisk delayed the German offensive for several days. On October 10, G.K. Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front. On October 19, a state of siege was introduced in the capital. In bloody battles, the Red Army managed to stop the enemy - the October stage of the Nazi offensive against Moscow ended. The three-week respite was used by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense of the capital, mobilize the population into the militia, accumulate military equipment and, above all, aviation. On November 6, a solemn meeting of the Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies was held, dedicated to the anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 7, the traditional parade of the Moscow garrison took place on Red Square. For the first time, other military units also took part in it, including militias who went straight from the parade to the front. These events contributed to the patriotic upsurge of the people, strengthening their faith in victory.
The second stage of the Nazi offensive against Moscow began on November 15, 1941. At the cost of huge losses, they managed to reach the approaches to Moscow in late November - early December, envelop it in a semicircle in the north in the Dmitrov region (Moscow - Volga Canal), in the south - near Tula. On this, the German offensive bogged down. The defensive battles of the Red Army, in which many soldiers and militias died, were accompanied by the accumulation of forces at the expense of Siberian divisions, aircraft and other military equipment. On December 5-6, the counter-offensive of the Red Army began, as a result of which the enemy was driven back from Moscow by 100-250 km. Kalinin, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga, other cities and settlements. Hitler's plan for a blitzkrieg was thwarted.
In the winter of 1942, units of the Red Army launched an offensive on other fronts as well. However, the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad failed. In the south, the Kerch Peninsula and Feodosia were liberated from the Nazis. The victory near Moscow in the conditions of the military-technical superiority of the enemy was the result of the heroic efforts of the Soviet people.
Summer-autumn campaign of 1942
The fascist leadership in the summer of 1942 relied on the capture of the oil regions of southern Russia and the industrial Donbass. JV Stalin made a new strategic mistake in assessing the military situation, in determining the direction of the enemy's main attack, in underestimating his forces and reserves. In connection with these, his order to advance the Red Army simultaneously on several fronts led to serious defeats near Kharkov and in the Crimea. Kerch and Sevastopol were lost. At the end of June 1942, a general German offensive unfolded. Fascist troops in the course of stubborn battles reached Voronezh, the upper reaches of the Don and captured the Donbass. Then they broke through our defenses between the Northern Donets and the Don. This made it possible for the Nazi command to solve the main strategic task of the summer campaign of 1942 and launch a broad offensive in two directions: to the Caucasus and to the east - to the Volga.
In the Caucasian direction at the end of July 1942, a strong enemy group crossed the Don. As a result, Rostov, Stavropol and Novorossiysk were captured. Stubborn battles were fought in the central part of the Main Caucasian Range, where specially trained enemy Alpine riflemen operated in the mountains. Despite the successes achieved in the Caucasian direction, the fascist command failed to solve its main task - to break into the Transcaucasus to master the oil reserves of Baku. By the end of September, the offensive of the fascist troops in the Caucasus was stopped.
An equally difficult environment for Soviet command developed in the eastern direction. To cover it, the Stalingrad Front was created under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. In connection with the current critical situation, an order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 227 was issued, which stated: "To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time our Motherland." At the end of July 1942, the enemy under the command of General von Paulus delivered a powerful blow on the Stalingrad front. However, despite the significant superiority in forces, during the month the fascist troops managed to advance only 60-80 km and with great difficulty reach the distant defensive lines of Stalingrad. In August, they reached the Volga and intensified their offensive.
From the first days of September, the heroic defense of Stalingrad began, which actually continued until the end of 1942. Its significance during the Great Patriotic War is enormous. During the struggle for the city, Soviet troops under the command of Generals V. I. Chuikov and M. S. Shumilov in September-November 1942 repelled up to 700 enemy attacks and withstood all tests with honor. Thousands of Soviet patriots heroically proved themselves in the battles for the city. As a result, in the battles for Stalingrad, the enemy troops suffered colossal losses. Every month of the battle, about 250 thousand new soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht, the bulk of military equipment, were sent here. By mid-November 1942, the Nazi troops, having lost more than 180 thousand people killed, 50 thousand wounded, were forced to stop the offensive.
During the summer-autumn campaign, the Nazis managed to occupy a huge part of the European part of the USSR, where about 15% of the population lived, 30% of the gross output was produced, and more than 45% of the sown area was located. However, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The Red Army exhausted and bled the fascist hordes. The Germans lost up to 1 million soldiers and officers, more than 20 thousand guns, over 1500 tanks. The enemy was stopped. The resistance of the Soviet troops made it possible to create favorable conditions for their transition to a counteroffensive in the Stalingrad region.
Battle of Stalingrad
Even during the fierce battles, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command began to develop a plan for a grandiose offensive operation, designed to encircle and defeat the main forces of the Nazi troops operating directly near Stalingrad. G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky made a great contribution to the preparation of this operation, called "Uranus". To accomplish the task, three new fronts were created: the South-Western (N. F. Vatutin), the Don (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Stalingrad (A. I. Eremenko). In total, the offensive group included more than 1 million people, 13 thousand guns and mortars, about 1000 tanks, and 1500 aircraft. November 19, 1942 The offensive of the South-Western and Don fronts began. A day later, the Stalingrad Front advanced. The offensive was unexpected for the Germans. It developed at lightning speed and successfully. November 23, 1942 There was a historic meeting and connection of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. As a result, the German group near Stalingrad (330 thousand soldiers and officers under the command of General von Paulus) was surrounded.
Hitler's command could not come to terms with the situation. They formed the Don army group consisting of 30 divisions. She was supposed to strike at Stalingrad, break through the outer front of the encirclement and connect with the 6th army of von Paulus. However, an attempt made in mid-December to carry out this task ended in a new major defeat for the German and Italian forces. By the end of December, having defeated this grouping, Soviet troops reached the Kotelnikovo area and launched an attack on Rostov. This made it possible to begin the final destruction of the encircled German troops. M January 10 to February 2, 1943. They were finally eliminated.
The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad led to a broad offensive of the Red Army on all fronts: in January 1943, the blockade of Leningrad was broken; in February, the North Caucasus was liberated; in February - March - in the central (Moscow) direction, the front line moved back 130-160 km. As a result of the autumn-winter campaign of 1942/43, the military power of Nazi Germany was significantly undermined.
Battle of Kursk
In the central direction, after successful operations in the spring of 1943, the so-called Kursk salient was formed on the front line. The Hitlerite command, wanting to regain the strategic initiative, developed Operation Citadel to break through and encircle the Red Army in the Kursk region. In contrast to 1942, the Soviet command unraveled the enemy's intentions and created a defense in depth in advance.
Battle on Kursk Bulge – biggest battle World War II. About 900 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks (including latest designs- "Tiger", "Panther" and guns "Ferdinand"), more than 2 thousand aircraft; with Soviet side- more than 1 million people, 3400 tanks, and about 3 thousand aircraft. AT Battle of Kursk commanded: marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, generals N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky. Strategic reserves were created under the command of General I. S. Konev, since the plan of the Soviet command provided for the transition from defense to a further offensive. July 5, 1943 A massive offensive by German troops began. After tank battles unprecedented in world history (the battle near the village of Prokhorovka, etc.), on July 12 the enemy was stopped. The counteroffensive of the Red Army began.
As a result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk in August 1943, the Soviet troops captured Orel and Belgorod. In honor of this victory, a salute was fired in Moscow with 12 artillery volleys. Continuing the offensive, the Soviet troops inflicted a crushing blow on the Nazis during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation. Left-bank Ukraine and Donbass were liberated in September, the Dnieper was forced in October, and Kyiv was liberated in November.
End of the war
In 1944-1945. the Soviet Union achieved economic, military-strategic and political superiority over the enemy. The labor of the Soviet people steadily provided for the needs of the front. The strategic initiative completely passed to the Red Army. The level of planning and implementation of major military operations has increased.
In 1944, relying on the successes achieved earlier, the Red Army carried out a number of major operations that assured the liberation of the territory of our Motherland.
In January, the blockade of Leningrad was finally lifted, which lasted 900 days. The northwestern part of the territory of the USSR was liberated.
In January, the Korsun-Shevchenko operation was carried out, in the development of which Soviet troops liberated the Right-Bank Ukraine and the southern regions of the USSR (Crimea, Kherson, Odessa, etc.).
In the summer of 1944, the Red Army carried out one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War "Bagration". Belarus was completely liberated. This victory opened the way for advances into Poland, the Baltic states and East Prussia. In mid-August 1944, Soviet troops in the western direction reached the border with Germany.
At the end of August, the Iasi-Kishinev operation began, as a result of which Moldova was liberated. The opportunity was created for the withdrawal of Romania from the war.
These largest operations of 1944 were accompanied by the liberation of other territories of the Soviet Union - the Karelian Isthmus and the Arctic.
The victories of the Soviet troops in 1944 helped the peoples of Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in their struggle against fascism. In these countries, pro-German regimes were overthrown, and patriotic forces came to power. Created back in 1943, on the territory of the USSR, the Polish Army took the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. The process of re-establishing Polish statehood began.
The year 1944 was decisive in securing the victory over fascism. On the Eastern Front, Germany lost a huge amount of military equipment, more than 1.5 million soldiers and officers, its military and economic potential was completely undermined.
Summer campaign 1942
On instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in the spring of 1942, the General Staff began planning the upcoming summer campaign. The main attention was paid to determining the direction of the main attack of the Germans.
The report of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (GRU) dated March 18, 1942 stated that “the center of gravity of the German spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow. The most likely date of occurrence is mid-April or early May.”
On March 23, 1942, the USSR state security agencies reported to the GKO (State Defense Committee): “The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. By this the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. In the event of a successful operation with access to the Volga near Stalingrad, the Germans planned to launch an offensive north along the Volga ... and undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since capturing them is a matter of prestige for the German command.
Based on a study of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, we came to the conclusion that with the start of the summer campaign, the Hitlerite command will probably undertake its main operation in the Moscow direction, again try to capture Moscow in order to create the most favorable conditions for the further continuation of the war. . This circumstance induces us in the time remaining until the summer to thoroughly prepare for the disruption of the enemy's intentions.
Stalin believed that in order to conduct an offensive along almost the entire Soviet-German front (from Leningrad to Voronezh, Donbass and Rostov), the Red Army had the necessary forces and means by the spring of 1942: more than 400 divisions, almost 11 million people, over 10 thousand tanks, more than 11 thousand aircraft. At the same time, apparently, it was not properly taken into account that more than half of the replenishment was not trained, the units were not knocked together, understaffed, lacked weapons and ammunition.
As in the winter campaign, Stalin overestimated our capabilities and underestimated the strength of the enemy.
Marshal Zhukov did not agree with the plan to deploy several offensive operations at the same time, but his opinion was not taken into account.
Subsequent events showed that adventurism summer plan Stalin led to a new catastrophe.
At the same time, on March 28, 1942, a special meeting was held at Hitler's Headquarters, at which the Wehrmacht's summer offensive plan was finally adopted. Hitler returned to his basic idea, which he held in December 1940 and summer 1941, to concentrate his main efforts on the flanks of a wide-spread front, starting in the Caucasus. Moscow as the target of the offensive has so far fallen away.
“...First of all, all available forces should be concentrated to carry out the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, in order to then capture the oil regions in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasian ridge.”
Hitler decided to carry out here the task of a large strategic scale with far-reaching goals.
By the beginning of the spring-summer campaign, the Nazis concentrated their main grouping against the southern wing of our troops to deploy a major strategic operation with the aim of invading the Caucasus and reaching the lower reaches of the Volga in the Stalingrad region.
The result of the implementation of Stalin's plan was: the tragedy of the 2nd shock army in the swamps near Leningrad, the death of troops in the Crimea, the breakthrough of our front near Kharkov, from where the 6th army of Paulus then moved to Stalingrad.
The defeat of the Soviet troops south of Kharkov in May 1942 was especially difficult, when 240 thousand people were captured because of Stalin's stubbornness, who did not allow the withdrawal of troops to the east, although the command Southwestern Front insisted on it.
In the same month, the Kerch operation ended in failure, costing us only 149,000 prisoners. Military experts believe that incompetent, gross interference in command and control of the representative of the Headquarters of Mekhlis, who was there, led her to such a result.
As a result of these failures, and then the defeat of our troops near Voronezh, the enemy seized the strategic initiative and launched a swift offensive towards the Volga and the Caucasus. In this regard, it took incredible efforts to delay the advance of the Nazis in the foothills of the Main Caucasian Range and on the banks of the Volga and Don.
More than 80 million people turned out to be in the territory occupied by the Germans. The country lost its largest industrial and agricultural areas, which produced over 70% of cast iron, 58% of steel, 63% of coal, 42% of electricity, 47% of all sown areas. This meant that our country could only use half of its economic potential.
The main reason for the failure of the summer campaign of 1942 was the erroneous incompetent definition The supreme commander of the main direction of the German offensive, as well as his desire to "suspend" numerous private offensive operations on all fronts from the strategic defense. This led to the dispersion of forces, the premature expenditure of strategic reserves, which obviously doomed the Stalinist plan to failure.
Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky noted: “The events that unfolded in the summer of 1942 showed with their own eyes that only the transition to temporary strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front, the refusal to conduct offensive operations, such as Kharkov, would save the country and its Armed Forces from serious defeats would allow us to switch to active offensive operations much earlier and recapture the initiative in our own hands. (Marshal THEM. Bagramyan. "My memories", 1979)
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The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933-1945
Their aces were rightfully considered the best in the world.
Their fighters dominated the battlefield.
Their bombers wiped entire cities off the face of the earth.
And the legendary "things" terrified the enemy troops.
The Air Force of the Third Reich - the famed Luftwaffe - was as important a part of the blitzkrieg as the tank forces. The resounding victories of the Wehrmacht would have been impossible in principle without air support and air cover.
Until now, military experts are trying to understand how the country, which was forbidden to have combat aircraft after the First World War, managed not only to build a modern and efficient air force in the shortest possible time, but also long years to maintain air supremacy, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy.
This book, published by the British Air Office in 1948, literally "hot on the heels" of the just ended war, was the first attempt to comprehend her combat experience. It is detailed and the highest degree a competent analysis of the history, organization and combat operations of the Luftwaffe on all fronts - Eastern, Western, Mediterranean and African. This is a fascinating tale of the meteoric rise and disastrous fall of the Third Reich air force.
Summer campaign of 1942 (June - December)
Sections of this page:
Summer campaign 1942
(June - December)
Preparing for the campaign
Faced with the prospect of continuing large-scale hostilities on the Eastern Front, German strategists were forced to admit that operations built on the same principles as the previous summer's offensives could hardly produce the desired result. The great length of the Eastern Front inevitably led to the conclusion that in order to obtain a satisfactory result, it was necessary to concentrate the maximum possible forces on one sector. Therefore, it was decided to conduct the main military operations on the southern sector of the front in order to capture the Caucasus (which would cut off the Soviet Union from the main sources of oil and at the same time provide oil to the ever-increasing needs of Germany) and open the way to the Middle East at the same time as Rommel's strike through Egypt in the Mediterranean theater.
The first condition necessary for the implementation of this plan was the complete occupation of the Crimea, necessary to cover the southern flank of the German troops. Therefore, during April, Soviet troops were driven out of the Kerch Peninsula, and only Sevastopol, which was stubbornly defending, remained in the Crimea. In May, the VIII Air Corps was transferred from the central front to the Crimea and subordinated to the 4th Air Fleet. Thus, about 600 aircraft of various types were concentrated at the Crimean airfields, which were ready to take part in the full-scale assault on Sevastopol. The place of the VIII Air Corps on the central sector of the front was taken by the V Air Corps, withdrawn from the southern sector at the beginning of 1942. It was renamed the Luftwaffe Command East and received the status of an air fleet (see map 17).
The choice of the VIII Air Corps to participate in this assault was in line with the already established practice of sending this formation under the command of Richthofen to support the most important operations, given its experience and effectiveness in participating in massive ground support operations.
At this stage of the war in the Soviet Union, the Germans attached great importance to operations in the Crimea, since the success of their summer offensive in the Caucasus depended on the occupation of the peninsula. Kerch had already fallen, but Sevastopol continued to stubbornly resist. Accordingly, the VIII Air Corps, which during this period of the war was usually assigned to carry out the most important operations, was transferred from the Moscow direction to the Crimea, where it entered the disposal of the 4th Air Fleet. The support of the VIII Air Corps, no doubt, contributed a lot to overcoming the resistance of the Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula.
The section of the front liberated by the VIII Air Corps was occupied by the V Air Corps, which was renamed the Luftwaffe East Command. This command had the status of an air fleet and was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. In March, the IV Air Corps had to bear the burden of repelling the powerful and successful offensives of the Soviet troops in the south, therefore, to strengthen it, parts of the direct support of ground troops from other air corps that fought on the Eastern Front were transferred.
The assault on Sevastopol began on June 2 and ended on June 6, and all this time the fortress was subjected to massive air strikes. On average, about 600 sorties were performed per day, with a maximum of more than 700 (June 2). Approximately 2,500 tons of explosive bombs were dropped, many of which were of the maximum caliber . Nevertheless, on June 4, the German infantry, which had gone on the offensive, suddenly found that the fortifications had largely survived, and the morale of the defenders had not been broken. However, the Germans stormed so stubbornly that the resistance Soviet soldiers managed to overcome in a relatively short period of time.
While the operations against Sevastopol were underway, the sudden advance of the Soviet troops on Kharkov forced the Luftwaffe to transfer part of the forces from the Crimea to help stop the enemy advance, and intensive air operations were required to save the situation. preemptive strike Soviet army not only inflicted losses that needed to be replenished, but also delayed preparations for the planned main summer campaign. However, in early June, the VIII Air Corps was again transferred to the north. Its headquarters was located near Kursk, in the northern part of the zone of responsibility of the 4th air fleet (see map 18). From May to June, active measures were taken to accumulate large stocks of bombs, fuel, etc. on the Southern Front, for which the railways were fully involved. At the same time, reinforcements were returning to the Eastern Front, rearmed after six months of fighting and additionally reinforced by aircraft recalled from mediterranean sea after the completion of the air attack on Malta. Thus, by the beginning of July, the number of German aviation on the Eastern Front again reached the level of 2750 aircraft and, thus, reached the level of the forces involved in the operations of the previous summer. However, now 1,500 of them were on the Southern Front as part of the 4th Air Fleet. That is, deterrence forces remained in the central sector of the front - about 600 aircraft, in the Leningrad direction - no more than 375, and another 200 aircraft were based in Northern Norway and Finland.
Fighting in July - August 1942
The German offensive began in the first week of July with the actions of the VIII Air Corps on a relatively narrow sector of the front, where its aircraft supported the first German attack in the direction of Voronezh. Gradually, the area of operations of the corps expanded to the south as the tank units advanced along the Voronezh-Rostov railway east of the Donets River. Ground close support forces quickly followed German units, advancing along the Don, and after the transfer of part of the long-range bombers to the south in the Voronezh region, which was subjected to heavy attacks by the Soviet army from the northeast to the flank of the advancing Germans, only insignificant forces remained. Nevertheless, near Voronezh, the Soviet troops managed to be contained without resorting to the help of the forces participating in the offensive to the south with the constant support of long-range bomber aircraft and units of direct support of ground forces.
Having completed its task on the extreme southern sector of the Eastern Front, the VIII Air Corps was now transferred to a new important direction. The corps was transferred from the southern section of the 4th Air Fleet's area of responsibility to the northern one. The redeployment took place during the preparation by the Germans of the offensive from the Kursk region in the direction of Voronezh.
As a result of the movement of the VIII Air Corps, the southern sector of the front, adjacent to the Black Sea, was occupied by the IV Air Corps.
All the time while the German troops were rapidly advancing along the Don from Voronezh in the direction of Stalingrad and from the Rostov region to the Caucasus in the direction of Maikop and Armavir, a significant part of the long-range bomber aircraft participated in systematic raids on communications behind enemy lines. These operations covered vast areas, including the North Caucasus, where bridges, ferry crossings and railways were subjected to massive strikes. Deeper lines of communication were also bombed strategically to cut off supply lines between Stalingrad and Moscow, but no attempt was made to bomb cities far behind the front lines and not under immediate threat of occupation. On the contrary, long-range bomber aviation concentrated its efforts exclusively on indirect support of the offensive, trying to disable Soviet communications. To this end, attacks were made on the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus up to Poti, and small-scale attempts were made to mine the Volga and were subjected to air strikes by vessels on the Volga as far as Astrakhan.
Unlike the attack on Stalingrad, which was supported by about 1,000 aircraft of all types, the German offensive into the Caucasus after crossing the Don received almost no air support until the advance was slowed down by hilly terrain that prevented mass application tanks. Then it became necessary to strengthen the IV Air Corps, which was responsible for air operations in the Caucasus, and fighter units were deployed to the bases located along the line running approximately from east to west through Krasnodar, armed with single-engine and twin-engine fighters.
Fighting in September - October 1942
In September and October, the determining factor in air strategy was the inability of the German high command to achieve decisive success neither near Stalingrad, nor in the Caucasus. Near Stalingrad, VIII Air Corps, which made up the bulk of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet, conducted active operations. Dive bombers were especially active, often making 4 or more sorties per day.
Despite active hostilities for four months, until October, the strength of the Luftwaffe remained surprisingly stable: 2450-2500 aircraft. Quite a few aviation units during August and September were withdrawn to the rear for re-equipment, but their places were occupied by fresh units, fully equipped with equipment and crews. Nevertheless, the concentration of forces in the south left only small forces for the Moscow and Leningrad directions. Probably, in this area, Soviet aviation owned the advantage in the air, since the offensive of Soviet troops near Rzhev and in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Ilmen forced the Germans in September to transfer to the north part of the aviation that participated in the battle for Stalingrad. However, the reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Leningrad region that took place in September was planned, as well as the reinforcement of ground troops in this direction, in preparation for a full-scale offensive, planned with the expectation that Stalingrad would not last long. By the beginning of October, 550-600 aircraft were concentrated on the Leningrad sector of the front, but Stalingrad did not fall, and the preparations and movements of Soviet troops in the Moscow region and, to a lesser extent, in the south, forced the Luftwaffe to redistribute forces and weaken the group near Leningrad. In the second half of October, at least 300 aircraft were withdrawn from this sector.
At this stage, the dangers to which German aviation was exposed in the Soviet Union became apparent: its supply lines were stretched; she moved away from the bases equipped in the winter of 1941/42, and operated from poorly prepared airfields; its main forces were so involved in the battles near Stalingrad that it was impossible to ensure air superiority anywhere else; parts of the direct support of the ground forces acted intensively, many crews made three or four sorties per day, which affected the state of equipment and crews and ultimately led to catastrophic consequences. At the same time, a continuous series of local operations and the threat of an offensive by Soviet troops in the north required constant redeployment of units, leaving no pauses for rest and restoration of combat effectiveness.
In the Soviet Union, by the end of the summer, the area of responsibility of the IV Air Corps expanded to the Caucasus, and the VIII Air Corps was tasked with supporting the offensive against Stalingrad. Taking into account the concentration of forces of the VIII Corps and the situation in the Don basin, it was decided to create a new operational formation to direct operations north of the zone of responsibility of the 4th Air Fleet, on the Voronezh sector of the front. Accordingly, the 1st Air Corps from the 1st Air Fleet was transferred here (it fought there from the very beginning of the campaign), which received a new designation - the Luftwaffe Don Command and, presumably, was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Aviation. Not a single air corps remained in the 1st Air Fleet.
The map shows the approximate position German armies on the Eastern Front.
Fighting from November 1942 to January 1943
The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began at the end of October and was accompanied by the preparation and concentration of troops in the middle reaches of the Don below Voronezh, where the Germans had only a small force of 70–80 aircraft covering a front of about 500 km. However, this section of the front was considered important enough for the 1st Air Corps, which received the designation Don Luftwaffe Command, to be transferred here from the 1st Air Fleet. Thus, in addition to a frontal attack from the east, the Germans also faced the threat of a flank attack from the northwest. The actions of aviation near Stalingrad and in the bend of the Don were hampered by the disruption of communications, lack of fuel and bad weather, and by mid-November it was decided to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.
The Soviet offensive from the bend of the Don in a southwestern direction deprived the Germans of advanced airfields and forced them to withdraw air support for ground troops to the rear. As a result, Stalingrad was out of range of German single-engine fighters, and Soviet aviation won superiority in the sky over the encircled German group. At the same time, the tension of constant fighting began to affect, and the withdrawal of some units to the rear for reorganization became an urgent need. With the start of the Allied offensives in Libya and Tunisia, it was necessary to withdraw additional forces from the front to reinforce the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean, and by early December the number of German aviation in the USSR had decreased to about 2000 aircraft, of which a significant part was inoperative. The number of VIII and I air corps in the Don region, which had previously reached 1000 aircraft, fell to about 650-700 aircraft.
After the transfer of approximately 400 aircraft to the Mediterranean, it became clear that the Luftwaffe was unable to cope with all the tasks on the Eastern Front, and activity in the Caucasus began to wane. After the transfer of almost all long-range and dive bombers, as well as part of single-engine fighters to other sectors of the front, the initiative in this direction passed to the Soviet troops, who took advantage of the numerical superiority in the air to support the offensive through the Kalmyk steppes to Rostov and through the western part of the Caucasus in the direction of Kerch strait.
The encirclement of the German 6th Army near Stalingrad and the almost complete encirclement of the 17th Army in the Kuban that followed it posed another serious task for the Luftwaffe: supplying the encircled troops by air. To do this, Xe-111 bombers were removed from combat missions and transferred to transport aviation. They suffered heavy losses not only due to adverse weather conditions, but also due to constant attacks on transport aircraft in the air and on the ground. These strikes forced the Germans to commit fighter escorts, reducing the number of single-engine fighters that could be assigned to close ground support. By the end of December 1942, there were only about 375 single-engine fighters on the entire Eastern Front, and it was this lack of fighter cover that could be one of the reasons for the exceptionally high losses during the last few weeks of 1942. However, there was another reason for the high losses: non-combat losses of aircraft left on the ground during the retreat, and losses as a result of adverse weather conditions. If we add to this the loss of combat aircraft used as transport, then the losses in the second half of 1942, apparently, will be equal to the losses in the last six months of 1941, which, as is known, led to a noticeable weakening of the striking power of German aviation in 1942 year, reducing its strength to less than 4,000 vehicles by the end of the year after another peak - 4,800 vehicles in July 1941.
The shortage of first line aircraft at the end of 1942 is evidenced by the commissioning of second line units and the use of obsolete types of aircraft (Xe-146) and reconnaissance aircraft for bombing. During December, the number of German first-line aviation in the East was reduced by about 150 aircraft, despite the fact that Soviet offensive required action a little less active than before the onset of winter.
Analysis of the 1942 campaign
The significant weakening of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1942, which was greatly facilitated by the previous six months of the eastern campaign, is discussed in detail in Chapter 9. Therefore, it will suffice here to give only a brief account of the strategy and tactics of the Germans and the development of new ideas for the use of aviation, which became apparent towards the end of the year.
The campaign in the East in 1942, as in 1941, showed that the Luftwaffe continued to strictly follow the traditional tactics of massive strikes aimed at direct support of tank units. Despite the successes in some cases of the Battle of France and the Balkan campaign, by the end of 1942 it became clear that this approach did not give the necessary results on the Eastern Front. The reason for this was not only the huge length of the front, as a result of which any concentration of forces for a strike left the flank of the German troops unprotected, but also the depth of the theater of operations. Soviet troops took full advantage of these circumstances, retreating, thereby stretching German communications until the Luftwaffe strike forces, which had broken away from their supply bases, were exhausted due to problems with maintenance. Thus, despite the huge successes at the initial stage, the specific conditions of the war in the USSR did not allow the Germans to use the proven strategy of combining the most powerful direct support of troops from the air and massive strikes against factories and rear supply bases to achieve final victory.
By the autumn of 1942, the failure to achieve the expected results began to lead to a modification of German tactics and the reorganization of forces, but no radical changes followed. Thus, there was a tendency to increase the flexibility of the structure on a "functional" basis, and new units were specially adapted to the tactical requirements that were dictated by conditions on the Eastern Front. This trend was manifested in a greater attention to defense issues, which was facilitated by the Soviet strategy of organizing counteroffensives in winter, when the Germans could not fight on equal terms. Such a doctrine was supposed to lead to the creation of a balanced grouping of Luftwaffe forces on the Eastern Front, in which offensive and defensive functions would be more evenly distributed. Therefore, it meant a step forward in tactical terms, the development of a more intelligent, albeit less effective strategy and increased flexibility of use compared to previous campaigns.
This concept manifested itself in the organization of auxiliary units and second line units. These included: units equipped with obsolete Xe-46, Khsh-126 and Ar-66, whose tasks included harassing nighttime bombardments of concentrations of Soviet troops; anti-tank units equipped with Khsh-129, Me-110, Yu-87 and Yu-88, carrying special heavy weapons to fight Soviet tanks that were breaking through the German defense line; and, finally, special squadrons for strikes against railways, equipped with the Yu-88 in the fighter version and designed to strike at the main transport arteries in order to impede the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. All of these units were relatively new categories that did not fall under the traditional organizational chart of the Luftwaffe. These experiments and innovations mainly took place in early July 1942, after the appointment of the commander of the VIII Air Corps, General Oberst von Richthofen, to the post of commander of the 4th Air Fleet, and there is reason to believe that it was von Richthofen who was the main supporter of the new tactics. His experience as commander of the VIII Air Corps, which was the main formation in close support of the ground forces, could well be used to solve defense problems, the main direction of which would be to eliminate those shortcomings that nullified all the successes achieved earlier in the Soviet Union. However, the events of 1943 showed that these innovations, no matter how original, could not be brought to mind in the face of the ever-increasing lag behind the Luftwaffe, both quantitatively and qualitatively, which became stunningly obvious the next year.