In addition to massive attacks and direct hostilities Nazi Germany practiced and sabotage behind enemy lines. It was for this purpose that the Zeppelin organization (or enterprise) was created in 1942. Its direct purpose is reconnaissance and sabotage in the Soviet rear. Zeppelin employees organized one of the assassination attempts on Joseph Stalin in 1944.
Within the framework of this organization, in June 1942, the Nazis assembled the 1st Russian National SS Detachment, known by another name - “Squad No. 1”. A year later, the detachment was renamed into a regiment, then into a brigade. Served in the "Druzhina" former prisoners of war from concentration camps. These were volunteers who were selected and recruited by specially trained fascists.
"Druzhinnikov" were trained, and then thrown into the rear. The task of the saboteurs was such a skillful conduct of propaganda activities that the local population would not suspect them of involvement in enemy formations. "Druzhinniki" were supposed to undermine the confidence of civilians in the Soviet government and thereby incline them to the side of Germany.
History of creation
The beginning of the "Druzhina" was laid in the small Polish town of Suwalki. There the Germans founded one of the Oflag 68 prisoner of war camps, where, among others, there were many Red Army soldiers. The camp administration initiated the creation of an anti-Soviet group. At first, it was called the "National Party of the Russian People", and then became the combat squad of the BSRN.
The formation was led by a former Red Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Gil. Later, for obvious reasons, he took a pseudonym for himself - "Rodionov". Gil was captured by the Nazis in 1941 after the defeat of his division near Bogushevsky. In the spring of 1942, Gil went over to the side of the Germans. From May to the end of August, the "Druzhina No. 1" headed by him grew from 25 people to 700.
The former Soviet lieutenant colonel wrote the program for this organization himself. Its members were dressed in Slovak uniforms with swastikas and other SS insignia. The inscription "For Russia" on the cuffs of uniforms and shoulder straps of their own design distinguished the "vigilantes" from other Nazis. In the summer of 1943, the Russian SS formations already numbered 3,000 well-armed and trained fighters.
The activities of the "Druzhina"
After the formation of the detachments of saboteurs, they prepared for future activities for 3 weeks. Gil himself studied at this time in the intelligence school in the capital of the Wehrmacht, Berlin. The recruitment of volunteers to the "Druzhina" never stopped. After the formation, the first detachments were thrown into the Polish town of Parchev. There they led fighting against local partisans.
In the spring of 1943, detachments under the command of Gil burned several villages in Belarus and machine-gunned 3,000 people. The first group of saboteurs was abandoned on Soviet territory on October 6, 1942. As a result, about a hundred people went over to their side, 25 Red Army soldiers were killed, captured military equipment and weapons.
Going over to the side of the Polotsk-Lepel partisans
In the summer of 1943, partisans from the Polotsk-Lepel region approached Vladimir Gil and established contact with him. For going over to their side, the commander of the Russian SS brigade was promised an amnesty after the war. Gil believed these promises and agreed to cooperate. Following their commander, all the fighters of the Russian SS units (almost 2,200 people) went over to the side of the Polotsk partisans. This is how the 1st Anti-Fascist Partisan Brigade was formed.
Its fighters distinguished themselves by their bravery and carried out many successful operations against the Nazis. Gil was even awarded for bravery and awarded the rank of colonel. But not so much the fighting of the brigade as its very betrayal greatly undermined the prestige of the SS. The Nazis were not going to give up so easily. In the spring of 1944, they launched an operation to defeat the Polotsk-Lepel partisans, which they called "Spring Holiday". In its course, the Nazis destroyed almost the entire 1st Anti-Fascist Brigade.
Further fate
Vladimir Gil was mortally wounded in battle and died in April 1944 near the Nakol farm. There were rumors that the wounded and starving Gil was shot by his colleague for a double betrayal. Where his remains were buried, no one knew until 1991. Subsequently, they were reburied in a mass grave near the town of Ushachi. The surviving fighters of the 1st Anti-Fascist after the war were sentenced to long terms in labor camps (an average of 10 years). The higher ranks were shot.
Thank you for the exhaustive answer, but you didn’t follow the modification of the brigade after the withdrawal of the 5th regiment (this is the first question), and, accordingly, after the withdrawal of the 4th regiment from its composition - i.e. I am interested in how volunteer units poured in there and how it looked structurally. In principle, all the general points are clear - how the volunteers fought in companies inside the legins is generally clear, but here's what structural composition the brigade had February 42, June 42?
Click to reveal...
The staffing of the 2nd SS Brigade "RF CC" on 06/28/1942 (data from Leo Niehorster_German World War II_Organisational Series, vol.4 / II)Headquarters (motorized infantry brigade), communications platoon, motorcycle-rifle platoon (6 light machine guns)
Legion SS "Netherlands" (SS-Legion Niederlande)
- headquarters (mot.inf.regiment), communications platoon
- I, II, III battalions, in each headquarters (motorized infantry b-na), 3 rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 1 heavy anti-tank rifle and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7 cm anti-tank guns, 6 heavy mortars)
- 13th company of infantry guns (2 heavy and 6 light infantry guns)Legion SS "Norway" (SS-Legion Norwegen)
- headquarters (mot. infantry regiment), communications platoon
- I battalion - headquarters (motor infantry b-on), 3 rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 1 heavy anti-tank rifle and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7-cm anti-tank guns, 6 heavy mortars)
- II and III battalions, in each headquarters (of a scooter battalion), 3 scooter squadrons (12 light machine guns and 3 light mortars each) and 1 motorized heavy squadron (a platoon of 6 heavy machine guns, a platoon of 4 8-cm heavy mortars, a sapper platoon with 3 light machine guns)
- 14th anti-tank company (3 5 cm and 8 3.7 cm guns, 6 light machine guns)Legion SS "Flanders" (SS-Legion Flandern)
- headquarters (motorized infantry b-na), 4 motorized rifle companies (18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 1 heavy anti-tank rifle and 3 light mortars) and 1 machine gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 3 3.7-cm anti-tank guns , 6 heavy mortars)Russian SS escort battalion (RF-SS Begleit Bat.)
headquarters (motorized rifle battalion)
4 motorized light rifle companies on Volkswagens (18 light and 4 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 2 heavy mortars)
1 machine gun company (12 heavy machine guns, 6 heavy mortars)
1 motorized anti-aircraft company (8 (elsewhere 9) 2 cm guns, 3 2 cm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, 4 searchlights),
1 motorcycle rifle company (18 light and 4 heavy machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 2 heavy mortars)
1 motorized heavy company (platoon of 2 light infantry guns, anti-tank platoon with 3 5 cm cannons and 2 machine guns, engineer platoon with 4 machine guns)Anti-aircraft division of the SS "Ost" (SS-Ost)
headquarters, headquarters battery
1 self-propelled battery (8 2 cm and 2 2 cm quadruple guns, 4 machine guns)
1 self-propelled battery (9 3.7 cm guns, 4 machine guns)
1 heavy battery (4 8.8 cm guns, 3 2 cm self-propelled guns, 2 machine guns)52nd motorcycle rifle squadron (4 heavy and 18 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 2 medium mortars) with a platoon of armored vehicles (4 2 cm guns, 7 l.pul.)
52nd motorized heavy battery (6 heavy field howitzers, 2 light machine guns)
52nd motorized light anti-aircraft company (12 2 cm guns)
52nd motorized sapper company (9 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles) and bridge column "B" (2 light machine guns)
52nd motorized anti-tank company (9 5 cm guns, 6 light machine guns)
52nd motorized communications company (6 light machine guns)
6 small convoys, 1 large fuel convoy, 2 auto repair companies, 1 supply company
food office, bakery platoon, slaughter platoon
1 ambulance company and 2 ambulance platoons
field gendarmerie detachment (2 light machine guns)
field mailNiehorster has no data on when these units became part of the brigade.
There are no data for February 1942.According to the regular and actual number of volunteers:
"Netherlands": if we sum up all the staffing tables given by Niehorster, then the total composition of the legion should be approximately 3240 people.
"Norway" - approximately 2600 people. According to most other sources, there were only about 1300 in April 1942.
Legion "Flanders" full staff should read 1161 people: 99 at headquarters, 209 each in 4 companies and 226 in a machine gun company.
There is a deep-rooted misconception that the ROA had its own formations before 1944. It is not true. All those who wore ROA chevrons before this year were created under the auspices of various departments of the Reich in the practical continuation of the propaganda campaign "Action Vlasov".
Both "Squads" united in the Belarusian locality Meadows. In addition, a detachment of volunteers from the reconnaissance school in Volau (about 100 people), as well as a Special Russian detachment (battalion) of the SS, appeared in Glubokoye (not far from Luzhkov). This unit was formed at the beginning of 1943 by the former captain of the Red Army Razumovsky and Prince Golitsyn in Breslau with the aim of participating in the "besson" project to send saboteurs into the deep Soviet rear. Until April 22, the detachment was commanded by the former colonel of the Red Army Vasiliev, and then by the former lieutenant colonel of the Red Army Druzhinin (subsequently, Druzhinin went over to the partisans, and Vasiliev was arrested by the Germans).
On the basis of these units, the 1st Russian National SS Regiment (1. Russisches Nationale SS-Regiment) was created. The personnel of the regiment consisted of 1200 people, including 150 officers. They were armed with 60 guns, 95 machine guns and over 200 machine guns. Part was headed by Gil (however, then he already used exclusively the pseudonym Rodionov), and Blazhevich became the chief of staff again.
Both received the rank of colonel (Standartenführer). In May 1943, according to partisan intelligence, there were already 1,500 people in the unit.
Luzhki became the center of the region, given by the German authorities to Gil for independent management (obviously, by analogy and based on the successful experience of B.V. Kaminsky in Lokta and, later, in Lepel).
At the same time, the reorganization measures did not end. In May 1943 (according to other sources, at the end of June), the formation of the 1st Russian National SS Brigade began on the basis of the Gil regiment. 80% of the compound were police officers and the local population, 20% were former Soviet prisoners of war. According to partisan data, 16-17% were police officers, 11% were Russian emigrants, 9% were so-called "kulak elements and bourgeois nationalists", the rest - more than 60% - were former Soviet prisoners of war. Russians in the brigade were 80%, Ukrainians and representatives of other nationalities - 20%. The brigade was armed with: regimental guns - 5, anti-tank guns - 10, mortars - 20, of which battalion - 5 and company - 12, machine guns - 280. Partisans noted that "rifles of Russian, German and Czech samples personnel brigade was fully armed.
In addition to rifles, the personnel of the formation were armed with German MP-40 submachine guns.
At the end of June 1943, the deployment of the "Druzhina" approached the final stage. The brigade consisted of three combat and one training battalions, an auto company, an artillery and mortar battery, a machine-gun company, a training company (non-commissioned officer school), a combat nutrition company, two cavalry platoons, a commandant's platoon, a medical unit, a utility unit, an assault company, a sapper platoon, communications company and a field gendarmerie platoon organized by Blazhevich.
A significant problem is the question of the number of compounds. According to A.B. Okorokov, by June 1943 the brigade consisted of about 8 thousand people. Subsequently, the historian notes, there was another increase in the composition (according to some reports, up to 12 thousand people), which led to the reorganization of the brigade: “Platoons were expanded to companies, companies to battalions, and battalions to regiments. Tank and artillery battalions were also formed. The West German researcher I. Hoffman also notes that there were 8,000 people in the Druzhina. K.A. Zalessky, who edited the monograph by I. Hoffman, claims, based on the documents of the TsSHPD, that “the maximum number of the “Druzhina” when it was deployed into a brigade (July 1943) was 3 thousand people, consisting of 4 battalions, an artillery battalion and support units.”
It is not entirely clear how the “Druzhina” could grow up to 8 thousand people in a short time. It should be noted that Gil's subordinates during this time were involved in operations against partisans, suffered losses, and went over to the side of the people's avengers. In our opinion, the number of the brigade itself never exceeded 4-5 thousand people.
To participate in major actions, the command of the "Druzhina" tried to use the entire personnel of the formation, although, apparently, not all parts of the brigade rushed into battle, but only combat-ready ones. It is possible that an inaccuracy crept into the information of the partisan intelligence, where the figure of 1500 people (May 1943) appears, and the Soviet patriots took into account only the combat strength of the formation, which was directly involved in performing tasks for its intended purpose.
The position proposed by A. Munoz and supported by K.M. Alexandrov. In their opinion, the number of the brigade transferred to the Dokshitsy district of the Vileyka region was increased to 3 thousand people with the deployment of the headquarters (field post No. 24588) in the village of Dokshitsy. Structurally, the brigade was formed by 4 (3 combatant and 1 training) battalions: I (field post No. 29117), II (field post No. 26998), III (field post No. 30601) and IV (field post No. 28344).
Command positions in the brigade were taken as former Soviet officers and Russian emigrants. Among the former officers of the Red Army are colonels Orlov and Volkov, majors Yukhnov, Andrusenko, Shepetovsky, Shepelev and Tochilov, captains Alferov and Klimenko, senior lieutenant Samutin.
Among the emigrants in command positions were Captain Dame (Chief of Staff of the 1st Regiment), Colonel (in the SS he had the rank of Hauptsturmführer) Prince L.S. Svyatopolk-Mirsky (commander of an artillery battery), former officer of Denikin's army, staff captain Shmelev (counterintelligence officer of the brigade), Count Vyrubov and others.
The personality of Major A.E. deserves special attention. Blazhevich. After the regiment was reorganized into a brigade, he was appointed commander of the II battalion. An employee of the propaganda department of the Wehrmacht, Sergei Frelikh, gave him an impartial characterization in his memoirs: “I did not trust him, having found out that in the Soviet Union he served in parts of the NKVD ... that is, formations ... mainly intended for terrorist actions against own people. Collaboration with the NKVD was imprinted on the character of Blashevich [sic]: he was shameless, firm, insincere and knew how to earn the trust of his German bosses his cruel behavior towards the Russian population and the captured partisans. Konstantin Kromiadi is no less categorical in his assessments: “Gil knew how to win over people. However, he had two disgusting subjects with him - his adjutant and the commander of the second battalion, Major Blazevich [sic]. They were different people, but both of them smelled of Chekist savagery, and both followed their commander like shadows; I think they had him in their hands too.” Steenberg also writes that Gil "more and more fell under the influence" of Blazhevich.
Blazhevich, according to Samutin, headed the so-called “Warning Service” in the formation, which was engaged in counterintelligence work to identify among the local population persons with ties to the partisans, and among the personnel of the brigade - pro-Soviet-minded and who had intentions to go over to the side of the partisans. Here a certain incident arises, since, according to a number of historians, the former Major General of the Red Army P.V. was responsible for counterintelligence in the regiment and in the brigade. Bogdanov. But, given the influence Blazhevich enjoyed, it is quite possible to assume that Samutin this time is not prevaricating: “... Blazhevich headed the Security Service, a sort of homegrown SD. To our surprise, he brought with him, as his closest assistant, the former major general Bogdanov, whom we knew from Suwalki, only now the former general was with the person of Blazhevich in the rank of captain ... But with general promotions the former general was not forgotten either. In the new headquarters, he was already listed now with the rank of major, and Blazhevich took him to his department of the Security Service as deputy and head of the investigative unit.
According to partisan documents, Blazhevich was Gil-Rodionov's deputy in the brigade. This does not exclude the fact that Bogdanov was in the position of head of the "Prevention Service" formally, but in fact the intelligence and counterintelligence of the formation was in the hands of Blazhevich. In the future, the influence of Blazhevich in the Druzhina increased. Looking ahead, we note that just before the transition of the brigade to the side of the partisans, Deputy Gil-Rodionov visited Berlin, where he probably tried to obtain the consent of the leadership of the SD to remove Gil from the post of brigade commander, head the formation instead of him and restore appropriate order in it .
In the context of our study, one cannot ignore the issue related to the unsuccessful attempt to form the so-called "1st Guards Brigade of the ROA" on the basis of units withdrawn from Gil's regiment.
At the end of April 1943 - that is, during the period of combat coordination of the 1st Russian National Regiment of the SS - the leaders of referat Z VI of the RSHA instructed a group of their "verified" Russian colleagues to take command of the unit that was being formed in Luzhki. The group included Russian emigrants brothers Sergei and Nikolai Ivanov, K.G. Kromiadi, I.K. Sakharov, Count G.P. Lamsdorf, V.A. Resler. In addition, they were joined by a representative of ROCOR, Archimandrite Hermogenes (Kivachuk) and the former Brigadier Commissar of the Red Army G.N. Zhilenkov, who formally “represented” the Russian Liberation Army, which, however, at that time existed only hypothetically - in Wehrmacht propaganda materials addressed to Soviet servicemen.
Almost all of the above-named persons have already "distinguished themselves" in the service of the Abwehr or SD units. The main thing that connected them was joint service in the Graukopf detachment created under the auspices of the Abwehr (Abwehr Abteilung 203, Unternehmen "Graukopf"; also known under the propaganda name "Russian National people's army", RNNA). This unit was formed in the spring - summer of 1942 in the village of Osintorf Vitebsk region. Political leadership and liaison with German command carried out by S.N. Ivanov (in the 1930s he headed the German department of the All-Russian Fascist Party), and K.G. Kromiadi became the commandant of the central headquarters and the head of the combat and economic unit. In May, he prepared a combined reconnaissance and sabotage group (300 people) from Soviet prisoners of war to participate in the operation to destroy the administration of the 1st Guards Corps, Lieutenant General P.A. Belov, who was surrounded, and subsequently ensured the participation of individual RNNA battalions in anti-partisan operations. In September 1942, the former Colonel of the Red Army V.I. took command of the Graukopf. Boyarsky, and the political leadership - G.N. Zhilenkov. However, after a series failed attempts to use the RNNA at the front and the more frequent cases of its military personnel going over to the partisans, Zhilenkov and Boyarsky were recalled from command posts and joined the "Russian Committee" of General Vlasov. At the head of the RNNA stood former major Red Army and Chief of Staff of the RNNA R.F. Ril, and the connection is focused exclusively on the fight against partisans. At the beginning of 1943, the RNNA was disbanded, and its personnel were distributed among various parts of the Wehrmacht. The employees of Zeppelin paid close attention to the former Osintorf commanders ...
According to Kromiadi’s memoirs, Zhilenkov, having learned about the intention of the RSHA employees to reassign the 1st Russian National SS Regiment to a group of white emigrants, “made an offer to the SD, as a representative of General Vlasov, to take over the Gil Brigade with the condition that it be reorganized into the Russian Liberation Army Brigade. When the SD accepted Zhilenkov's proposal, then the entire Osintorf group agreed to become subordinate to Vlasov and go to the front under the command of General Zhilenkov. This point of view, clearly due to the unwillingness to advertise their work on the SD, was uncritically accepted by many researchers, some of whom generally prefer to remain silent about any connection between the “ROA brigade” and the “Zeppelin”.
Of course, there was no question of any "subordination" of the future compound to Vlasov (although for propaganda reasons, some connection with the "Russian Committee" was declared). Even Samutin, in his memoirs, very frankly notes that "this" Guards brigade of the ROA", as well as the Gil brigade, is the brainchild and dependent of the mysterious "Zeppelin", and that "no actual formation of a brigade from the available battalion will happen ". By the spring of 1943, Zhilenkov had already passed all the necessary checks through the SD, participated in the development of a number of Zeppelin operations, and therefore it is appropriate to say that he played the role of an SS intelligence agent in Vlasov's entourage (and not vice versa).
The head of the group was entrusted to the head of the main team "Zeppelin "Russia-Center"" SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Schindowski. Recall that Shindovsky's unit was transferred to Belarus along with the "combatants" and deployed in close proximity to them - in Luzhki, and then in the town of Glubokoe. On April 29, 1943, Schindowski handed over to the higher authorities in Berlin a report from SS Obersturmbannführer Appel, permanent representative of the SS at the Druzhina: “The situation in the Druzhina requires intervention from higher authorities ... The Druzhina has developed in a direction that is characteristic of the Russians with their mania to greatness. At the same time, growing discontent directed against Germany was noticed ... The Druzhina activists are under the influence of the Russians loitering around the camp, they lead a free life of bandits, drink and eat plenty and do not think at all about the forthcoming activities of the Druzhina. This situation creates a danger to the policy of the empire.
Walter Schellenberg notes in his memoirs that he "repeatedly asked Himmler to remove Rodionov from fighting the partisans." The SS intelligence chief began to doubt the loyalty of the Druzhina commander after several personal conversations with Rodionov: “I began to get the impression that if he was originally an opponent of the Stalinist system, now his position has changed.”
As a result, the leadership of the SD concluded that it was necessary to resubordinate Gil's regiment to politically proven Russian collaborators. Ivanov and Zhilenkov provided the curators from the department of V. Schellenberg with a new staffing table for the formation (for example, it was planned to appoint two former majors Red Army - A.M. Bocharova and I.M. Grachev).
In early May, Shindovsky's group arrived in Glubokoe. The appearance of the commission caused a commotion among the leaders of the Druzhina. Long negotiations began. Kromiadi recalls: “My personal meetings with Gil in Luzhki became more frequent ... Gil pestered me, offering to join him in the Brigade for the position of his chief of staff, and I gratefully declined this offer, explaining my refusal by an agreement binding me to our group.” Kromiadi himself highly appreciated the military training of Gil's subordinates, although he “expressed his bewilderment about the nature and scope of his economic part. Gil to this ... stated that he supposedly allowed his officers and non-commissioned officers to acquire field wives in order to keep them from escaping this way ... It cannot be that such an excellent organizer and construction worker did not know that the presence of women in the military unit was inevitable will lead to a drop in discipline, demoralization of soldiers and officers, as well as to looting.
Thanks to the support and petition of local SD bodies to the higher command in Berlin, Gil managed (although, obviously, not without difficulty) to remain in his former position. At the same time, the SS ordered him to single out several units from the regiment entrusted to him to be transferred under the command of the collaborators who arrived from Berlin (the Special Russian SS detachment from Breslau, the training battalion and the propaganda department; about 300 people, according to other sources - 500).
In mid-May, the battalion formed on the basis of these units was transferred to the village of Kryzhevo, and then to the village of Stremutka (15 km from Pskov), where, since 1942, the Zeppelin reconnaissance and sabotage point was located. Part, where several more replenishment of volunteers joined, was subdued local authorities SD. The consolidated company of the battalion participated in the parade of the Pskov garrison of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1943. The unit marched with signs and emblems of the ROA. Because of this, the former fighters of the "Druzhina" for some reason are often referred to as the formations of General Vlasov, although chevrons, cockades, buttonholes and shoulder straps of the ROA by that time were worn by many eastern units that had nothing to do with the Vlasov army that did not exist at that time.
At the same time, the well-known song of Russian volunteers “We are walking in wide fields”, composed by former propagandists of the Druzhina, sounded on the Pskov radio. It is characteristic that ROA is not mentioned in its text:
We go wide fields
At the rising of the morning rays.
We go to battle with the Bolsheviks
For the freedom of their motherland.
Chorus:
March, forward, in iron rows
Fight for the Motherland, for our people!
Faith alone moves mountains
Only the courage of the city takes.
We walk along the smoldering fires
Through the ruins of his native country.
Come and join us in the regiment, comrade,
If you love your country like we do.
We go, we long way not scary
Not a terrible war.
We firmly believe in our victory
And yours, beloved country.
We are walking, a tricolor flag is above us.
The song flows through the native fields.
Our tune is picked up by the winds
And carry to the Moscow domes.
Member of the NTS R.V. Polchaninov, who was in Pskov at that moment, writes in his memoirs that after the June 22 parade, “ Soviet agents led by one of the machine gunners, who at the parade was an assistant to the standard-bearer, staged a riot ... There were killed on both sides, but the uprising failed, since most of the Vlasovites turned out to be ideological enemies of Bolshevism.
It should be added that in May 1943 the main team of the Zeppelin "Russia-Center" moved from Glubokoye near Pskov to the already mentioned village of Stremutka and the village of Kryzhevo. In August 1943, the team was renamed the main command of the SS "Russia-North" (SS-Hauptkommando Russland - Nord Unternehmen Zeppelin), a new chief was placed at its head - SS Sturmbannführer Otto Kraus.
Samutin writes: “I began to notice that Russian-speaking Germans from the German spy school, located in a barracks town on the southern outskirts of Pskov, on the banks of the river, were beginning to play an increasing role in the affairs of the brigade. Great. Soon… one of these Germans drowned in Velikaya while drunk on a boat. The remaining two, Major Kraus and Captain Horvath, with redoubled energy began to interfere in the internal life of the brigade, almost daily coming to the unit. They had conversations with Lamsdorf in a captious tone, contemptuously treated us, former Soviet officers ... "
The further fate of the so-called 1st Guards Battalion (brigade) of the ROA (according to German documents, the 1st shock brigade - 1. Sturmbrigade) is indicative. Its personnel were used as part of special SD teams to fight partisans (for example, in the 113th hunting team - Jagdkommando 113), thrown into the rear of the Red Army. When the Druzhina was taken over by the Belarusian partisans, the SD considered it inappropriate to create a sabotage brigade. In November 1943, 150 people defected to the side of the Leningrad partisans. As a result, the battalion (at that moment it was commanded by another former "Osintorf" - Major Rudolf Riehl, pseudonym - Vladimir Kabanov) was disarmed and disbanded. The remnants of the unit were transferred to the Russian aviation group in East Prussia, then they joined the ranks of the KONR Air Force.
In view of the foregoing, we note the following. The situation that developed in the "Druzhina" in April 1943 required the rapid intervention of the SD. However, this intervention itself was due not only to the desire of the Germans to restore order in the Gil-Rodionov unit, but also to continue the work determined by the Greife plan. The confluence of these tendencies led to the fact that it was decided to withdraw some units from the Druzhina to form a sabotage formation. For this purpose, for the selection of personnel, a commission was sent, consisting mainly of Russian emigrants who worked for the SD. The commission tried to put pressure on Gil, discredit him and remove him from command. But this idea failed. Gil managed to defend his position, but he had to compromise - to give a number of his units for the formation of a new SD brigade.
All these events unfolded against the backdrop of castling of the Zeppelin intelligence agencies. The transfer of the main command of the SS "Russia-Center" near Pskov meant the intensification of sabotage and reconnaissance work in this sector of the German-Soviet front. And to ensure these activities, the 1st shock brigade was formed. Potential agents, as usual, were tested for reliability as part of the SD fighter and hunting teams that fought the partisans. Despite the significant work carried out by SS intelligence in the north-west of the RSFSR, the main goals set for the team were not achieved. Failures led to the demoralization of Russian agents, going over to the side of the partisans. In the end, the battalion of former combatants was disbanded.
1st Russian National SS Brigade "Druzhina"- connection of CC troops from the times of the Great Patriotic War, which consisted of volunteers from the camps of Soviet prisoners of war. The tasks of the formation included security service in the occupied territory and the fight against partisans, and, if necessary, military operations at the front. In August 1943, the unit went over to the side of the partisans, and was renamed to.
History of creation
Switching to the side of the partisans
In August 1943, the Zheleznyak partisan brigade of the Polotsk-Lepel region made contact with Gil-Rodionov. The latter was promised an amnesty, if his people with weapons in their hands go over to the side of the partisans. Gil-Rodionov accepted these conditions and on August 16, having destroyed the German communications headquarters and unreliable officers, attacked the German garrisons in Dokshitsy and Kruglevshchina. The former Major General of the Red Army Bogdanov was arrested, who back in 1941 had gone over to the side of the Germans and served in the brigade. The formation that joined the partisans (2.2 thousand people) was renamed 1st Antifascist partisan brigade , and V. V. Gil was awarded the Order of the Red Star and reinstated in the army with the assignment of the next military rank of colonel. The commissar of the brigade was approved by the Central Committee of the CP (b) Ivan Matveyevich Timchuk, later Hero of the Soviet Union.
In the autumn of 1943, taking advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons, the brigade defeated the German garrisons in Ilya, Obodovtsy and Vileyka.
Uniforms and insignia
In 1943, the personnel of the regiment, and then the brigade under the command of V.V. Gil-Rodionov, wore the uniform of the “general SS” - gray tunics with black buttonholes and an eagle on the left sleeve, caps with a “dead head”, brown shirts with a tie. For commanders golden epaulettes were introduced. Soldiers and officers of the formation wore a sleeve ribbon with the inscription "For Russia".
According to partisan Yu. S. Volkov, in October 1943, the personnel of the brigade (“Rodionovtsy”) were dressed in German military uniform with a diamond-shaped tricolor white-blue-red patch on the sleeve with three Russian letters ROA and with a red ribbon sewn on a cap.
see also
Notes
Literature
- Chuev S. Damned soldiers. traitors on the side III Reich. - M.: Eksmo, Yauza, 2004.
- Drobyazko S., Karashchuk A. Second World War 1939-1945. Russian Liberation Army. -M.: Ast, 2005.
- Klimov I., Grakov N. Partisans of the Vileika region. Minsk, Belarus, 1970.
Links
- Volkov Y. S. At the end of forty-three. // War without embellishment and heroic deeds. Leningrad, 1999.
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