Intention Soviet command: dismember the opposing enemy grouping and defeat it piece by piece. Main blow it was planned to inflict from the Magnushevsky bridgehead in the direction of Kutsh Poznan by the forces of the 61st, 5th Shock 8th Guards. A, 1st 2nd Guards A and 2nd Guards. kk. To develop success in the main direction, the 3rd Shock A. was intended. Auxiliary strikes were to be delivered from the Ptslav bridgehead in the direction of Radom, Lodz 69th and 33rd A and 7th Guards. kk, north of Warsaw - 47th A. 1st A of the Polish Army received the task of launching an offensive on the 4th day of the operation and in cooperation with the troops of the 47th, 61st A and 2nd Guards. TA to defeat the Warsaw grouping of the enemy and capture Warsaw.
Warsaw-Poznan offensive began on January 14 with a surprise attack by forward battalions from both bridgeheads on the front over 100 km, within an hour they advanced 2-3 km without meeting organized resistance. The troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards A, which then went on the offensive, advanced up to 12 km by the end of the day, and the troops of the 61st A crossed the ice of the river. Pilitsa and wedged into the enemy defenses to a depth of 3 km. 69th and 33rd A, 9th and 11th TCs broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 20 km. Jan 15 formations of the 1st Guards TA came to the river. Pilica. The 11th and 9th shopping malls were liberated by Radom by the morning of January 16th. The 47th A, going on the offensive on January 16, drove the enemy back behind the Vistula and crossed it north of Warsaw on the move. On the same day, in the lane of the 5th Shock A, the 2nd Guards TA was introduced into the breakthrough, which, having made a swift throw for 80 km in a day, went to the Sokhachev district and cut off the escape routes of the Warsaw enemy grouping. On January 17, the troops of the 47th and 61st A, together with the 1st A of the Polish Army, liberated Warsaw. For 4 days of the offensive, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated the main forces of the 9th A of the enemy, carried out a breakthrough of its defense to the entire operational depth, advancing 100-130 km. The offensive of the troops was actively supported by the aviation of the 16th VA, which struck at enemy strongholds in front of the front of the advancing troops, as well as at the troops and communication centers of the enemy in the depths of his defense. On the morning of January 18, the troops of the front began a resolute pursuit of the enemy.
On January 19, the city of Lodz was liberated. By January 22, tank armies reached the Poznań defensive line. On January 23, units of the 2nd Guards TA liberated the city of Bydgoszcz. Having bypassed the fortress of Poznan from the south, the mastery of which was entrusted to the rifle corps of the 8th Guards and 69th A, 1st Guards TA on January 25 crossed the river. Varta and rushed to the river. Oder. On January 26, the tank armies reached the old German-Polish border. On January 28, the 2nd Guards TA broke through the Pomeranian Wall on the move. It was followed by the 3rd and 5th Shock, 61st and 47th A, 1st A of the Polish Army, 2nd Guards KK, which completed the breakthrough and deployed battles west of the Pomeranian Wall. On January 29, the troops of the 1st Guards TA, 8th Guards, 33rd and 69th A, breaking through the Mezeritsky UR, entered the territory Nazi Germany. On January 31, the advanced units of the 2nd Guards TA and the 5th Shock A reached the river. Oder. By the end of February 3, the troops of the center and the left wing of the front had cleared the enemy from the right bank of the Oder, 100 km south of Zeden, and captured bridgeheads north and south of Kustrin on the left bank. At this time, the enemy was concentrating large forces in Pomerania (Army Group Vistula) to attack in a southerly direction. The commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front opposed them with 4 combined arms, 2 tank armies and a cavalry. frame.
In the Berlin direction, there were 4 combined-arms armies weakened in previous battles, 2 tank and 1 cavalry. frame. Because of the danger of a counterattack from the north, as well as because of the lagging behind in the rear and the redeployment of aviation, the continuation of the attack on Berlin was considered inexpedient and, at the direction of VGK rates terminated.
The Warsaw-Poznan offensive operation is one of the largest front-line operations carried out during the war. Having started a breakthrough in several sectors with a total width of 34 km, by the end of the operation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front expanded it along the front to 500 km and advanced to a depth of 500 km, freeing the entire western part of Poland in their zone.
Capture of the fortress of Poznań
(01/23/1945-23/02/1945)
On the night of January 22, the advance detachments of the 1st Guards Tank Army approached the outskirts of Poznan and tried to immediately break into the city, but the garrison repelled their attacks. The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, decided not to delay the tank army near Poznan, but to block the city with the forces of the 8th Guards and 69th Army Generals Chuikov and Kolpakchi. Each army allocated a rifle corps and reinforcements for the blockade.
Poznań was a classical fortress. Forts in the center, in the main defense hub of the Citadel. Both the forts and the Citadel are entirely underground structures. Under the ground, huge shelters were equipped, which housed a large garrison. Reconnaissance and interrogation of prisoners showed that in Poznan all its forts and the center of the entire defense of the fortress, the Citadel, were prepared for defense.
It has been established that the garrison of the city, together with the Volkssturm battalions, numbered up to 60,000 people and consisted of 2 cadet schools, a reserve training division of assault guns, 11 security battalions, airfield service units, a training aviation regiment, 2 officer schools, 2 engineer battalions, a Lenzer battle group from local SS men, 17 companies from vacation soldiers and soldiers of the 10th motorized, 6th, 45th, 251st infantry divisions, defeated in previous battles.
The group was commanded by Colonel Connel. He took over the garrison from Police Major General Mattern, who had been removed from this position for lack of combat experience. Mattern remained in Posen. Connel had been promoted to general the day before.
Fulfilling the will of Hitler, the command of the garrison decided to hold the city to the last soldier.
Hitler's rate gave great importance holding the fortresses of Poznan, Schneidemühl and Breslau as strategic points that covered the operational directions into the depths of Germany.
The assault units of the 39th Guards Rifle Division launched an assault on the outskirts and northern forts of Poznań on the morning of January 26. The main blow was delivered from the south by the 27th and 74th Guards Rifle Divisions. As a result, two southern forts on the western bank of the Warta fell into the hands of the attackers, troops with tanks broke into the ring of forts and attacked the enemy from the inside of his forts.
The attack from the north by units of the 39th Guards Rifle Division was not successful. By January 27, a weakened 91st Rifle Corps of the 69th Army. January 28, 4 divisions of the 8th Guards and 2 divisions 69th armies repeated the assault. Heavy bloody battles ensued for pillboxes and forts of the fortress. No less stubborn struggle went on the streets of the city for every house turned into a stronghold. Assault groups knocked the Germans out of their strongholds in fierce battles.
By February 5 assault groups completely cleared of the enemy residential areas of the city. Citadel, eastern part of the district (Shuling), Khvalishchevo and Glovno were still under siege. The assault did not stop for a minute, day or night. After February 12, the assault began on the Citadel, located on a hill and dominating the entire area. As our troops approached it, the stubborn resistance of the enemy increased.
Near the Citadel there was a railway junction, which was essential for the supply of supplies to all the troops of the front. Therefore, the assault on the Citadel continued until the enemy was completely eliminated in it. For several days, the attacks of our units stopped. They rested, ammunition and heavy artillery were brought up.
The assault on the Citadel began on 18 February. A 5-meter gap was made with artillery fire in the walls of the Citadel. Heavy guns 152.4 mm and 203.2 mm fired direct fire at embrasures and loopholes. Assault groups led the sappers of the 261st separate engineer battalion to the walls of the Citadel and they began to undermine the embrasures with powerful explosive charges. On the night of February 22, assault groups and tanks of the 251st and 34th heavy tank regiments burst into the courtyard of the Citadel through a gap. The garrison, driven into the dungeons, held out for about a day and capitulated on February 23.
The main similarity between the First and Second strategic echelons is the most powerful armies of their composition were deployed not against Germany, but against the oil fields of Romania. The main difference between the First and Second strategic echelons is color. Yes. The echelons had a different color. The first strategic echelon is green and gray-green (protective, as they say in the army), the color of millions of soldiers' tunics. The protective color was also dominant in the Second Strategic Echelon, but it was heavily diluted with black. Once I had to attend a meeting with retired general F.N. Remezov, who in 1941, under the cover of the TASS message, abandoned the Oryol military district, united all its troops and the troops of the Moscow military district into the 20th army and, heading it, secretly led to the west. The conversation went on in its own circle, without outsiders, and therefore quite frankly. The listeners are officers and generals of the district headquarters, who know this issue not only from the memoirs of retired generals. We argued. In the heat of the argument, the brisk colonel put the question directly to General Remezov:
“Why do the Germans call the 69th rifle corps of your 20th army the “black corps” in the documents? General Remezov did not give an intelligible answer. they put on black railway overcoats. But that was in December. Remezov obviously evaded answering. He was asked about June 1941, when there was no shortage yet and when soldiers in battle, of course, did not run in an overcoat - it was hot. In the 69th rifle In the corps, many soldiers were dressed in black uniforms in summer.There were enough of these soldiers that the German military intelligence paid attention and unofficially called the 69th corps "black".This corps was not the only one.The 63rd Rifle Corps of the 21st Army of the Second Strategic echelon also passes according to German documents as a “black corps.” The commander of the 63rd Rifle Corps, commander L.G. Petrovsky, by any standards, was an outstanding commander. At the age of 15 he takes part in the storming of the Winter Palace. Passed all civil war, had three serious wounds. Finished the war as a regiment commander, age - 18. At the age of 20, he brilliantly graduated from the Academy of the General Staff. Commands the best formations of the Red Army, including the 1st Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division. At the age of 35 - Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District.
Komkor Petrovsky proved himself in battles as a commander of a strategic scale. In August 1941, he received the military rank of lieutenant general and was appointed to command the 21st Army. The 63rd Rifle Corps at that moment, after fierce fighting, was surrounded. Stalin ordered the corps to be abandoned and the army immediately taken over. Petrovsky asks to postpone for several days the order to take command of the army, the plane sent for him sends back, putting wounded soldiers on it. Petrovsky withdrew his "black corps" from the encirclement and again returned to the rear of the enemy to withdraw from the encirclement one more division - the 154th Rifle Division (commander of the brigade Y.S. Fokakov). During a breakthrough from the encirclement, Petrovsky was mortally wounded. The German soldiers, having discovered and identified the corpse of Petrovsky on the battlefield, by order of the higher command, buried the Soviet general with full military honors. A huge cross was erected on his grave with an inscription in German: "Lieutenant General Petrovsky, commander of the" black corps ".
Soviet sources confirm this unusual gesture of the German command towards the Soviet general. Details about the actions of the 63rd "black corps" can be found in VIZH (1966. N6).
The Soviet military encyclopedia (T. 6. S. 314) confirms the correctness of this article. Petrovsky's "black corps" can be found in the book of Lieutenant General of Artillery G.D. Plaskova (Under the roar of the cannonade. S. 163).
The unusual black uniform was also noted by German intelligence in other armies of the Second Strategic Echelon. When this uniform prevailed over the usual green, regiments, divisions, and sometimes entire corps were called "black". The 24th Army of the Second Strategic Echelon, secretly advancing from Siberia, was no exception. During the fighting, several of its regiments and divisions were called "black" by the Germans. But even before entering into battle with the divisions and corps of this army, very interesting things happened. At the end of June, the echelons of this army stretched for thousands of kilometers. At this time, the commander of the army, Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin (having abandoned the Siberian Military District) is already in Moscow and is solving the problem of how to feed the 24th Army. He gets an appointment with the secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Word to Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin: "The Secretary of the Moscow City Committee contacted the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs by telephone.
The comrade with whom I just spoke, - explained the secretary of the Moscow City Committee, - has extensive experience in catering. For a long time he was engaged in this business on the construction of the Volga-Moscow Canal. He will help you. Twenty minutes later, a tall, handsome commander of the NKVD troops, with three rhombuses in the buttonholes of his tunic, entered the secretary's office. We quickly agreed on everything with him "(Reflections on the past. S. 132-133).
The only pity is that General Kalinin is embarrassed to name the secretary of the Moscow City Conservatory and the slender, drawn-out one with three rhombuses. After the first battles, the 24th Army falls into the right hands: Major General of the NKVD Konstantin Rakutin took command.
And Lieutenant General S.A. Kalinin, on Stalin's personal order, returns to Siberia. No, no, do not command the district. The district remains deserted. Kalinin, on Stalin's orders, forms ten new divisions. Kalinin's word:
"Connections were formed in places where before there were no military units at all. I began my work from visiting these points. My first flight was to one of the cities of Siberia. A few years before the war, there, in the wilderness of the forest, a barracks was built town for lumberjacks. It was used to accommodate parts of the formation being formed. Almost from all sides the town was surrounded by impenetrable taiga "(Ibid., p. 182). Everything about "barrack towns for lumberjacks" - from Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn: "The Gulag Archipelago", all three volumes.
So, ten new divisions (more than 130,000 people) in the Siberian Military District are being formed not in the places where military units used to be, but in "barrack towns." It will be objected that, of course, it is not the prisoners who are being turned into soldiers. It's just that General Kalinin uses the empty barracks to accommodate the arriving reservists, here they are trained and turned into soldiers. Good. Let's agree with this. Where did the "lumberjacks" go in this case? Why is the "town" (and not just one) empty? Yes, simply because General Kalinin equipped the 24th Army with "lumberjacks" BEFORE the WAR began and secretly prepared it for shipment to the west. That is why the regiments and divisions in this army and in all other armies of the Second Strategic Echelon were black: "lumberjacks" were often not even dressed in military uniform. That is why the army, which Kalinin secretly transferred to the west, is not on the payroll of the Logistics Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, but of the Main Directorate of Camps of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. That is why, instead of the semi-Chekist Kalinin, the pure-blooded Chekist Rakutin is assigned to the 24th Army by Stalin. He knows better how to deal with "lumberjacks".
Formed near Moscow in March 1941.
As follows from the Certificate on the training of assigned staff in rifle divisions in 1941 (compiled by the Mobupravlenie of the General Staff of the Red Army no later than 20.05.41), the rifle divisions of the Moscow Military District are the 73rd, 110th, 118th, 137th, 144th , 160th, 172nd, 229th, 233rd and 235th - had staff No. 4/120 (i.e. 5.9 thousand people) in peacetime On May 15, June 1, and 06/10/41, 6,000 reservists per division were called up.
On June 22, 1941, the division is part of 69SK (153, 229 and 233 rifle divisions) 20 A of the High Command Reserve. According to a secret order to transfer the armies of the internal districts to the border of the Dnieper, the corps was transferred in the Smolensk region, where it was supposed to arrive according to pre-war calculations on 25.06-03.07. The administration of the 20th Army from the Oryol Military District also arrived in Smolensk.
The 69th Corps took up defensive positions in the so-called "Smolensk Gates" - the interfluve of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. For a long time, enemy forces invaded Russia along this path. Commanded 69SK Major General E. A. Mogilevchik
On June 22, 1941 was in the Moscow Military District. June 25-28, 1941 parts of the division were loaded into trains in Kubinka and Mozhaisk with the destination Krasnoe near Smolensk.
07/03/1941 The 233rd Rifle Division concentrated in the area of Shnitki, Ponizovye, Sivitsky. By the end of July 4, 31sh was unloaded. out of 33.
07/04/1941 233rd Rifle Division (commander - Colonel G.F. Kotov), without the 716th GAP, who were on the way, two battalions of the 734th joint venture, 68th oiptadn, 383rd special division, 74th ab, - takes up defense at the turn of Shila, Cossacks, Klyukovka. On the right were the positions of 229sd.
On the morning of July 6, in the direction of Lepel-Senno, units of the 5th and 7th MK went on the offensive. The mechanized units operated without the support of the infantry divisions that remained in their positions. The commanders of rifle divisions 69SK were only instructed to allocate at the disposal of the commanders of the mechanized corps one strong detachment of infantry in vehicles with artillery to consolidate their successes. The counterattack was generally unsuccessful. Our troops failed not to defeat the German troops that had rushed forward, not to delay the German offensive for a long time. July 7 69SK (153, 229, 233 rifle divisions), continued to hold and strengthen the line along the river. Luchesa, st. Flocks. The task of the corps was to prevent the enemy from breaking through to Vitebsk and Liozno.
On July 7, the enemy crossed the Western Dvina in the Ulla region and, developing an offensive along the northern bank of the river, broke into Vitebsk on July 9. Despite the counterattack on Vitebsk, in which the right-flank formations of 69SK were also taken on July 11, Vitebsk was captured. In the "Smolensk Gates" on July 12, the 12th division of the enemy broke through at the junction of 229th and 233rd divisions in the direction of Babinovichi, where the headquarters of the 69th Rifle Corps was located. The 233rd Rifle Division continued to hold the Kolenki line, Art. Flocks.
On July 15, an order is received 233rd Rifle Division to withdraw at least a rifle regiment with reinforcements to the area of Lyndino, Dobromysl. The fact is that the German tank divisions from the Vitebsk region broke deep into the rear of the troops of the Western Front, trying to surround its units that were still operating in the Vitebsk and Orsha regions. On July 15-16, German troops captured Smolensk and cut the Minsk-Moscow highway in the Yartsevo area. Parts of the 19th, 20th and 16th armies found themselves in an operational encirclement to the west, north and east of Smolensk. However, the infantry divisions of the Army Group Center were still far away and it was impossible to eliminate the boiler with the forces of one motorized formation scattered over a vast area. Communication with the semi-encircled troops existed through crossings across the Dnieper in the area of Ratchino and Solovyevo.
Since July 16, under the blows of infantry divisions 5AK (5 and 35pd), units of 69SK retreated to Smolensk through Rudnya. On July 18, the division was withdrawn to the army reserve in the Dvorishche, Lemyashi area.
On July 21, 69SK (229 and 233rd Rifle Division) held the line of Urochishche, Bolshoy Chastik, r. Mal. Berezina, r. Radomsky Moss, Dubrovka.
On July 23, the division was withdrawn to the army reserve in the area northwest of Smolensk, and on July 25 received an order to move out of the reserve and prevent the enemy from breaking through from the north to Smolensk in the Penisnar area. Until July 30, it operated in the Smugulino, Porfilovo area (north of Smolensk).
In connection with the decision to withdraw units of the 16th and 20th armies beyond the Dnieper, from August 2, the division breaks through to the crossings in the Ratchino area, because. it was not possible to break through to Yartsevo along the Minsk highway. During the breakthrough to the crossings and the crossing itself across the Dnieper on August 3-5, the division suffered heavy losses. The division commander, Colonel Kotov, was taken prisoner (according to other sources, he went missing).
^ 7th Mechanized Corps
At the beginning of October 1940, this mechanized corps had 689 tanks 00, and on 20.02.41 - 792 tanks 000. 14th Panzer Division, stationed in Naro-Fominsk 0000, the basis of the tank fleet had high-speed BT tanks (there were 179 BT-7 vehicles on 1.06.41) 00000. Into the division
** all divisions - without tank battalions (ibid., p. 274); about the 3,000th divisions of the formation of the summer of 1940, see: "1941". Book 1, p. 87 (in the Moscow Military District in July 1940 - March 1941, the 160th Rifle Division and, possibly, the 118th and 137th Rifle Divisions were kept in this state) *** V.A. Anfilov. The failure of the "blitzkrieg", M, Nauka,! 974, p. 118
see footnote tt
***** in July 1940. brigade commander-39 took command of the 1st honey ("Moscow proletarian", p. 17)
X 2nd ltbr at the end of 1939. was introduced into Lithuania (“The classification was removed”, VI, 1993, p. 126); the 27th ltbr brigade was deployed to Latvia later (see V.M. , p.3)
Xx A.G. Khorkov. Thunderstorm June. VI, 1991, p. 17; the commander of the 7th mechanized corps was appointed in June 1940 ("WWII". SE, 1985, p. 130)
XXX "Moscow Proletarian", p. 17 xxxx in Gulyaev A man in armor. VI, 1964, p. 12 ххххх ibid., p.29
Armor collection, 5.96, p.27 Armor collection, 1.96, p.3O
02/23/41 The Special Cavalry Brigade was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of War, and in March 1941. on its basis, the formation of the 46th tank division began (S. Pogrebov. Not subject to oblivion. L, 1980, p. 88); see also 1941. Book 1, M., 1998, p.677.
""" A.G. Khorkov. Thunderstorm June. VI, 1991, p. 20; "1941". Book 2. M. 1998, p. 105, 123, 245. "" VIZh-93-11-77
"WWII", SE, 1985 p. 469; The 61st sk had, for example, the 601st howitzer ap. A.I. Eremenko. At the beginning of the war. M, Science, 1964, p. 141) 00 1941. Book 1, M., 1998, p.296 (document) 000 ibid., p.677 (document).
0000 A.I.Gribkov, Lieutenant's Confession. ML 999, p.71 ooooo Br ONEcollection; 5.96, p.26.
included the 27th and 28th tank regiments (of three battalions) 000000, the 14th howitzer artillery regiment (two divisions - 6 batteries) *, the 14th motorized rifle regiment **.
^ 18th Panzer Division, stationed in Kaluga ***, was equipped mainly with T-26 tanks **** and included the 35th and 36th tank regiments, the 18th howitzer and the 18th
motorized rifle regiment
^ 1st Moscow Proletarian honey had two motorized rifle regiment(6th and 175th), 13th
^ ^ -. L V, ^ ****** gr
artillery and 12 tank regiments. The equipment supplied to this division, which participated in parades on Red Square in Moscow, has always been the most modern. The personnel of the motorized rifle regiments were armed with automatic (PPD) and self-loading small arms x. Tank regiment 1st honey in 1940. was armed with the latest BT-7M XX, and on May 1, 1941. represented the KV and T-34 XXX tanks at the parade in Moscow. By the beginning of hostilities, the 1st medical division on the Western Front had 40 KV and T-34 XXXX in its tank fleet.
Among the corps units of the 7th mechanized corps were the 9th motorcycle regiment xxxxx and the 471st
»-* *-* *-* XXXXXX *-*
cannon artillery regiment, and in tank and motorized divisions there was a division of 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns (12 guns each) xxxxxxxx.
To the beginning of the Great Patriotic War The 7th mechanized corps had about 1000 tanks +, up to 500 guns and mortars 4 ", and regarding the staffing, it can be noted that on 15.06.41 the assigned contingent +++ began to gather in the corps.
As for the plans for the use of the 7th mechanized corps, according to the final calculations of the last pre-war days in the period from June 24-28 to July 3-5, 1941, it should have been concentrated in the Orsha area, entering the 20th Army of the High Command Reserve ++++ .
In the first decade of June 1941, acting in a counterattack in the Lepel-Senno area without the 1st motorized rifle division (remaining near Orsha), the 7th mechanized corps had to
/- v ^ -7 1 With -Н-+++
the beginning of hostilities with 715 tanks
21st Mechanized Corps
Formed in the spring of 1941. in the Idritsa-Opochka area according to the state, which provides for the presence of more than 400 combat vehicles ++++ "4 in the corps, with a planned completion date for new equipment in the middle of 1942. * As of February 20, 1941, there were 120 tanks for the corps being formed **.
Selected personnel were sent to recruit the 42nd and 46th tank divisions formed in the corps, mainly from the 1st Moscow Proletarian Medical Corps and disbanded in March 1941. Special Cavalry Brigade ***.
000000 see V.G. Gulyaev, op. cit. with. 12.
* A. Kolesnik. Myths and truth about Stalin's family. Kharkov, 1991, p.77 (document).
** V.G. Gulyaev, cit., p. eighteen.
the division was deployed on the basis of the 39th ltbr brigade, which, after participating in the SPV, was deployed in the Opochki-Sebezh region, 06/17/40 was introduced into Latvia, and returned to the Moscow Military District, to Kaluga, in September 1940 (A.I. .Gribkov, cit., p.61, 63-64,71).
**** The "initial" for the formation of the 18th TD 39th Ltbr had 5 battalions of T-26 tanks (A.I. Gribkov, op. cit., p. 32) ***** see "Order of Lenin Moscow Military District", p.210; V.A. Anfilov. The failure of the "blitzkrieg", p.400. ****** SVE, v.6, p.568
X see, for example, Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990, No. 5, p. 203 (document) xx see “Armored Collection” 5.96, p. 15 (photo) xxx “Enlisted forever.” Book. 1, p. 149 chxxx V.A.Anfilov. The failure of the "blitzkrieg" p.400
see V.I. Kazakov. "At the turning point." VI, 1962, p.5, as well as I. Drogovoz and others. "Iron Fist of the Red Army". M., 1999, p.21. V.I.Kazakov. "Artillery-fire!". M., 1972, p.21. chxxxxxx V.I. Kazakov. "At the turning point", p.7.
+ ibid., p.5; according to the book "Iron Fist of the Red Army" (see footnote xxxxxx above), the 7th and 21st mechanized corps had 1134 tanks, of which the 21st MK - 98 tanks (decree, book, p. 22.76). F+ V.I.Kazakov "At the turning point", p.5. ++ ibid., p.6.
41 " M.V. Zakharov. General base in the prewar years. VI, 1989, p.260.
^ ++++ V.I.Kazakov. At the break, p. 17; S.P. Ivanov. Army headquarters, front-line headquarters. VI, 1990, p.95. +++,^ d d elyushenko Dawn of Pobedy.VI, 1966, p.4
* G.I. Khetagurov. Fulfillment of duty. VI, 1977, p. 49
** 1941. Book 1, p.677 (document).
The 185th motorized division was reorganized from the 185th rifle division of the Moscow Military District (formation of the autumn of 1939) ****.
According to the directive of the General Staff of the Red Army of 16.05.41 in June 1941. in addition to the artillery equipment received for the artillery regiments of the divisions, the corps received 95 anti-tank guns for armament
tank regiments (mainly caliber 76 mm)** **. In addition, the corps had two divisions of new
~>
P
****** ~ ,- *******
37 mm automatic anti-aircraft guns, motorcycle battalion
Tanks by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the 21st MK had 98 vehicles of the combat training fleet (BT-7, T-26) °.
Staffed by 70-80% ° °, having artillery, tanks (in wartime, the corps was reinforced by two tank battalions of the Armored Academy 000, and in the third decade of June 1941 it was supposed to receive several echelons of T-34 0000), 21st mechanized corps operationally was directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Red Army 00000.
From the middle of June 1941 the command of the mechanized corps was busy reconnoitering the routes of advance to the Daugavpils region x.
^ 20th Rifle Corps
In accordance with the updated calculations of the last pre-war days, the corps consisting of the 137th, 144th, 160th rifle divisions (137th and 160th - "Gorky") xx was to be concentrated in the period 06.28.-07.04.41 in the Krichev-Chausy area, entering the 20th Army of the High Command Reserve in Belarus xxx. At the same time, the "Ivanovskaya" 144th rifle division was earlier
l l XXXX
documents were supposed to have a connection of the 41st sk
41st Rifle Corps
In accordance with the updated calculations of the last pre-war days, he was supposed to arrive in the period from 29.06. - 07/05/41 to the Dorogobuzh region as part of two rifle divisions xxxxxx: 118th Rifle Division and 235th Rifle Division (divisions from Kostroma and Ivanovo, respectively) xxxxxxx, entering the 20th Army of the High Command Reserve in Belarus xxxxxxx.
In the second half of the third decade of June 1941. the 111th Rifle Division was included in the 41st Rifle Division (from the ArchVO, relocated through Yaroslavl), and the corps itself was sent to the Ostrov region to take up defense in the Ostrovsky and Pskov fortified areas.
61st Rifle Corps
In accordance with the updated calculations of the last pre-war days, it was supposed to be unloaded on 26.06-03.07.41 in the Mogilev area, as part of two rifle divisions: 110th sd, 172nd
SD ("Tula"), entering the 20th Army of the Reserve of the High Command in Belarus.
*** G.I. Khetagurov, cit., p.49.
A.I. Eremenko. At the beginning of the war. M., "Nauka", 1964 p. 167. ***** G. I. Khetagurov, op. cit., p. 49-50, and A. G. Khorkov, op. ****** G.I. Khetagurov, op. cit., p. 50 ******* D. D. Lelyushenko, op. cit. 17
0 D.D. Lelyushenko, cit., p.4; in addition to these types of vehicles, there were small amphibious tanks (ibid., p. 13) 00 70% of the fighters were spring call 1941, the rest - old-timers (V, A, Anfilov. The failure of the "blitzkrieg", p. 346) ° ° ° arrived at the corps on 06/24/41, were armed, mainly with BT-7 tanks (D.D. Lelyushenko, decree. cit., p. 6), there were also 2 T-34s (G.I. Khetagurov, op. cit., p. 53)
0000 on the evening of 06/22/41, three echelons of T-34 were delivered to the 21st mechanized corps, but a command was immediately received to redirect this equipment to Minsk, at the disposal of the ZapOVO (G.I. Khetagurov, op. cit., pp. 52-53) 00000 D.D. Lelyushenko, op.cit., p.5 x ibid.
Xx see according to the text of the MVO, above
XXX M.V. Zakharov, op. cit., p. 260; V. Zolotarev. Military security of the Fatherland. M, 1998, p.
Xxxx 1941. Book 2, p.359 (document), xxxxx M.V. Zakharov, op.cit., p.260. xxxxxx VIZh-93-6-18
xxxxxxxx M.V. Zakharov, op.cit., p.260 with his arrival in the Rogachev district.
* see VIZh-93-6-18; Initially, this division of the ArchVO was intended to be part of the 28th Army (see "1941", Book 2, pp. 359-360).
see, for example, A.I. Eremenko. At the beginning of the war. M., "Nauka", 1964, p. 137. *** M.V. Zakharov, decree, op., p.260; V.Zolotarev, op.cit., 295 (document).
113 69th Rifle Corps
Corps consisting of three rifle divisions: 73rd("Kalininskaya"), 229th, 233rd according to updated calculations of the last pre-war days, in the period 06/25/07/03/41, following the marching order, he was supposed to concentrate in the Smolensk region, where the 20th army command (allocated by the Oryol military district) also arrived
As follows from the Certificate on the training of assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941 (compiled by the Mobupravlenie of the General Staff of the Red Army no later than 20.05.41), the rifle divisions of the Moscow Military District are the 73rd, 110th, 118th, 137th, 144th , 160th, 172nd, 229th, 233rd and 235th - had staff No. 4/120 (i.e. 5.9 thousand people) in peacetime 05.15., 01.06 and 06.10.41, 6 thousand reservists were called up per division
Accordingly, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the formations intended to move west as part of the MVO rifle corps were in the prescribed degree of readiness in the camps and their deployment to the state of wartime did not require
lengthy events. Thus, the 172nd Rifle Division of the 61st Rifle Division, as planned, departed on June 26, 1941 for
designated area with manned compound
Oryol Military District
I. The Orel Military District was separated from the Moscow Military District by order of the NPO of the USSR dated July 28, 1938 and covered the Oryol, Voronezh, Kursk, and since October 1939 also the Tambov Region^.
The divisions stationed since the 1920s in the respective territory were the 6th Oryol, 19th Voronezh, 55th Kursk rifle divisions++.
Stationed in the 1920s - early 1930s in Tambov, the 14th cavalry division named after Parkhomenko in the spring of 1932 was relocated to Ukraine +++ .
As part of the "organizational measures" of the summer-autumn of 1939, additional rifle divisions were formed in the ORVO, and in connection with the liberation campaign in Western Belarus, the following were sent to the Belarusian Front in August-September 1939 from the ORVO: 6th and 55th I ++++, 113th (formed in Rylsk) +++++, 122nd (formed in Yelets) "1" * 4 "4 "1" rifle divisions.
For reasons of the NPO of the USSR dated 10/23/39, in the OrVO it was further supposed to have 6 rifle divisions, contained in the number of 3 thousand people. each (without tank battalions) and one directorate of the rifle corps x, while due to the change in the boundaries of the district (see above), the 89th rifle division xx was transferred to the ORVO from the Moscow Military District.
However, in April 1940, only 4 rifle divisions remained in the ORVO - all formations that "left" in August-September 1939 to the west, xxx dropped out of the control of the ORVO.
K. Simonov. 100 days of war, p.356.
the composition and belonging of the corps to the Moscow Military District, see: "1941". Book 2, M. 1998, p.245 and p.359 (documents), about redeployment - M.V. Zakharov, op.cit., p.260. ****** - 1941 years". Book 2, M., 1998, p. 245 (document).
see A.I. Eremenko. At the beginning of the war. M., "Nauka", 1964, p. 137. ^SVET.6, p.118.
for more details about these divisions, see MVO. """ see about MVO.
The 55th Rifle Division was stationed in Kursk until 1939, and in August-September 1939, having departed for the BOVO, it acted in a liberation campaign in Western Belarus; in the summer of 1940, both the 55th and 6th SDs were part of the 4th Army of the ZapOVO (D.A. Morozov. They were not mentioned in the reports. VI, 1965, p. 6.8; L.M. Sandalov, On the Moscow Direction, Moscow, Nauka, 1970, pp. 49, 51)
1--G "take us, Suomi-beauty", chL. St. Petersburg, 1999, p.251. ++ "m "Winter War 1939-1940". Book 2, M., "Nauka", 1999, p. 116 (document). x VIZH-96-3-22. xx see MVO.
XXX The 6th, 55th and 113th rifle divisions came under the control of the BOVO (while the last of them participated in the Soviet-Finnish war, to the front of which it was sent from the BOVO), and the 122nd rifle division, deployed in the first half of November 1939 city in the Kandalaksha region, also after participating in the Soviet-Finnish war, remained subordinate to the LVO ("Winter War 1939-1940". Book 2, p. 116, 192).
At the same time, according to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 21, 1940, the minimum number of
The decisions of the beginning of July 1940 in the ORVO also provided for the formation of an additional two rifle divisions of a 3,000-strong staff xxxxx.
II. By the middle of May 1941 in rifle troops ORVO had 5 rifle divisions of the formation of the 1920s - 1940s; 19th [Voronezh], 89th, 120th (formed in the summer of 1940)**, 145th*", 149th".
From the spring of 1941, staff No. 4/120 (5.9 thousand people) + was established as a single reduced staff for the rifle divisions of the Red Army (including 3,000th divisions of the formation of the summer of 1940).
Of the newly formed rifle divisions in the spring of 1941, the Orel Military District had the 217th and 222nd rifle divisions ++ (two more divisions of the new formation, in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 04.23.41 No. 1112-449ss, applied for the formation of anti-tank and airborne brigades of the Red Army) 4++.
As part of the covert mobilization ("large training camps") ++++, 6 thousand reservists +++++ were called up to all rifle divisions of the ORVO by 1.06.41.
In addition to rifle formations, in the spring of 1941, the 23rd mechanized corps was formed in the ORVO as part of the 48th and 51st tank, 220th motorized divisions. The corps in February 1941 was planned as a "reduced" mechanized corps of the "second stage" 00.
As of June 1, 1941, ORVO had 321 tanks, incl. combat-ready 199 (of which new, not used - 23), requiring repair in the district workshops 78, requiring major repairs 44 ° ° °. There were 56 vehicles (25 BT-7 and 31 BT-5) 0000 in the OrVO tank fleet as of January 1, 1941.
By the beginning of World War II, the ORVO had the following formations 00000.