One of the most famous episodes of the First World War was the defeat of units of the 2nd Russian Army during the East Prussian operation. This battle was included in the Battle of Tannenberg (August 26 - 30, 1914).
On August 20, the 8th German Army under the command of Colonel General Prittwitz was defeated in the battle near Gumbinen by the 1st Russian Army. On August 21, the German border was crossed by the main units of the 2nd Russian Army under the command of General Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov. It should be noted that the headquarters of the army was assembled “from the world on a string”, since the headquarters of the Warsaw district became the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and the headquarters of the Vilna district became the headquarters of the 1st Army. A. V. Samsonov was appointed commander of the army (1859 - August 30, 1914). Samsonov was a member Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, he showed himself well in the Japanese campaign, commanding the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade and the Siberian Cossack Division. But most of his career was associated with staff and administrative positions, so, from 1896 he was the head of the Elisavetgrad cavalry cadet school, from 1906 - the chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District, from 1907 he was the chief ataman of the Don Army, from 1909 - Turkestan Governor General and Commander of the Turkestan Military District. In addition, since March 1909 he was also the chief ataman of the Semirechensk Cossack army. Samsonov was sick with asthma and in 1914 he was treated in Pyatigorsk. In the process of mobilization measures, they remembered that Samsonov was the head of the headquarters of the Warsaw district, and he was entrusted with the command of the army. Although his "ceiling" was the command cavalry division. The commander of the front, Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky, who before the war held staff and administrative positions, was engaged in military research activities, and was a military diplomat, could not help him, adjust his activities.
The second army had 5 corps (1st Army Corps, 6th AK, 13th AK, 15th AK, 23rd AK), they had 12.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. Army units deployed from left to right along the Mlava-Myshinets line: 1st Corps, 15th and part of the 23rd Corps, 13th, 6th Corps. I must say that initially the army was stronger - it had 7 corps (14.5 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions), but a number of units were withdrawn to form the 9th army, and the 2nd AK was transferred to the 1st army. This weakened the striking power of the 2nd Army. In addition, it was difficult to transfer units to this sector of the front - the railway approached only the left flank of the army, the units had to make long marches even before the start of the war.
According to the plans of the command, the 2nd Army was supposed to cut off the troops of the 8th German Army from the Vistula, they wanted to take the Germans into the "boiler". The 1st Army of Rennenkampf was doing well, so that the defeated german army did not run away at all, he was ordered to stop. And the 2nd army was driven. Parts walked for 12 hours, breaking away further and further from the rear. By August 23, 1st Army Corps of General Leonid Konstantinovich Artamonov occupied the border town of Soldau. As already mentioned, there was a railway on the left flank, and other units accumulated here - an infantry division from the 23rd corps, two cavalry divisions, and artillery. Samsonov reassigned them to Artamonov, as a result, the left flank was strengthened, while other directions were weakened. To the right of 1 AK, the 2nd Infantry Division of I. Mingin from the 23 AK was advancing, it lagged behind the main forces, but overtook 1 AK. The 15th army corps of Nikolai Nikolaevich Martos penetrated into the center, deep into the territory of the enemy. The 15th corps defeated the 37th German division in a border battle and occupied the city of Neidenburg. Then 13 AK moved under the command of Nikolai Nikolaevich Klyuev, he advanced in the direction of Allenstein. On the right flank, the 6th Corps of Alexander Alexandrovich Blagoveshchensky advanced. The army headquarters lagged behind the advancing formations by 120 km, being in Ostrolenka, where there was a telephone line connecting the headquarters with Bialystok (front headquarters).
Not all corps commanders were "combat officers". Artamonov was more of a military diplomat, intelligence officer, "general for assignments", in Russo-Japanese War Kuropatkin tried to remove him from his post for panic and retreat during the onslaught of the enemy. Klyuev was the “general for assignments,” Blagoveshchensky was also considered a “civilian”. The real combat commander was Martos. The 15th and 13th Corps advancing in the center were considered well-trained combat formations. The 6th Corps (right flank) was "prefabricated", created from reserve units.
Big mistake Russian command was the fact that intelligence was not organized at all. They used the data that was transmitted from the headquarters of the North-Western Front (and the headquarters of Zhilinsky himself did not know much). Samsonov aggravated the situation by deciding to turn the troops to the northwest, fearing that the Germans would leave. And the front headquarters ordered to advance to the northeast, towards the army of Rennenkampf. There was no telephone communication with the buildings, the Germans destroyed the lines. Communication was kept by radio (the Germans intercepted these messages), and more often by horse relay races, this led to a large delay in information. As a result, the corps were left to themselves, having lost a single command.
It should be noted that the Germans were doing well with intelligence, often local residents reported on Russian troops, it happened just by phone. As a result, the German command had a good picture of the movement of the Russian army. In addition, the Germans prepared the territories well for the invasion - supplies were taken out, hay was burned, and warehouses in Neidenburg were set on fire.
First clashes
On August 23, reconnaissance of the 15th AK Martos discovered German positions north of Neidenburg, near the villages of Orlau and Frankenau. The 20th corps of General Scholz, reinforced by landwehr units, was on the defensive there. In terms of numbers, it corresponded to two Russian corps: two infantry divisions, 1 reserve division, 1 landwehr division, 1 cavalry division, 2 landwehr brigades.
At Orlau and Frankenau, two divisions held the defense with 16 artillery batteries. Martos deployed his units and, after artillery preparation, attacked. The Russian units broke into Orlau, but the Germans counterattacked and brought the reserve into battle. The battle was fierce, one regiment was surrounded, but was able to break through to its own. In the morning, Martos regrouped his forces and resumed the offensive, an artillery strike was launched on the identified German positions. The infantry, still in the dark, crept up to the German positions and attacked in unison. The Germans could not stand it and fled. The 37th Infantry Division was completely destroyed. The fierceness of the battle is evidenced by the losses of 15 AKs: 2.5 thousand people were killed and wounded, including 2 brigade commanders and 3 regimental commanders.
Reports of defeats at Gumbinnen and Orlau caused panic in Germany. It was the result of an information campaign that was carried out before the war, talking about "Russian barbarians." Newspapers and other propaganda materials talked about wholesale rapes, murders of babies, etc. In Berlin, they decided to transfer to Eastern front two and a half corps (Moltke initially thought even about 6 corps), replacing the command of the 8th Army with Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
At this time, the Russian command makes fatal mistakes. The command of the Northwestern Front, having learned about the rapid retreat of German troops in front of the front of the 1st Army, decided that the German command was withdrawing troops beyond the Vistula, and considered the operation completed. The main tasks for the 1st Army were changed: the main forces of the Rennenkampf army were not directed towards the 2nd Army, but to cut off Koenigsberg, where, according to Zhilinsky, part of the 8th German Army took refuge, and to pursue the "retreating to the Vistula" Germans. The commander of the 2nd Army also decided to intercept the Germans "retreating to the Vistula" and insisted on transferring the main attack from northeast direction to the northwest. As a result, the 1st and 2nd armies began to advance in divergent directions, and a large gap of 125 km formed between them. The headquarters also considered the operation in East Prussia basically completed and began to work out a plan of attack deep into Germany, so Zhilinsky was refused to reinforce the 2nd Army with the Guards Corps.
The plan of the German command, the regrouping of forces
After the initial plan failed (to defeat first the 1st Army, and then the 2nd), the command of the 8th Army, even before the arrival of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, began to implement new plan: break away from the 1st army and break the 2nd. In principle, this plan was worked out even before the war.
There were also infrastructural prerequisites for this. Three parallel railways passed through Prussia: along the sea through Marienburg and Königsberg, to the south the road went through Osterode and Allenstein, and the third was near the border - it passed through Soldau and Neidenburg. The roads were connected by cross branches.
Against the 1st Army, 1.5 divisions of the Koenigsberg garrison, 1 cavalry division and a Landwehr brigade were left. All other troops - 11.5 divisions - were concentrated against Samsonov's 2nd Army. The 1st AK François was sent to Königsberg, put in trains and transferred in a roundabout way to Marienburg, and from there to Soldau, on the left flank of the 2nd Army. The 1st reserve AK Belov and the 17th AK Mackensen were taken to the right flank of the 2nd Russian army.
The question was what was worth doing: inflicting a flank attack and simply pushing back the Russian troops, or it was necessary to decide to arrange "Cannes" - to crush the flanks and surround the Russian army. The command of the 8th Army doubted that the encirclement operation was very risky. If the 1st Army continued to move west, the German 8th Army was in danger of complete defeat. Max Hoffmann, head of the operational department of the headquarters, argued that there was no need to be afraid, it was necessary to act more decisively. There were 125 km between the 1st and 2nd armies, and the army of Rennenkampf would not have been able to intervene with a quick strike. He even launched a story that Rennenkampf would not help Samsonov, because he insulted him during the Japanese campaign - he hit him in the face. So this myth began to walk in literature. But the intercepted radiograms (they were not encrypted then) became the decisive argument. In them, the commander of the 1st Army informed Samsonov about his location, and spoke about the order of the commander of the 2nd Army to continue the offensive.
The Germans decided to push back the flank corps of the 2nd Army and surround the units located in the center. In the center, so that the Martos corps would not break through further, they decided to strengthen 20 AK Scholz. He was given 1 reserve and 1.5 landwehr divisions to help him.
Max Hoffman.
On the way to destruction
Samsonov received news of the battle of Orlau only on 24 August. At the same time, information was received from 1 AK that the enemy was accumulating on the left flank (echelons with parts of Francois' 1 corps began to approach). The army commander suggested that the front headquarters stop, pull up the rear, and conduct additional reconnaissance. The front commander not only refused to do this, but also accused Samsonov of cowardice: “To see the enemy where he is not is cowardice, and I will not allow General Samsonov to be cowardly. The commander of the 2nd Army did not insist and abandoned all caution. He confirmed the order to the troops - "forward" and decided to move the headquarters to Neidenburg. On the left flank, the 15th cavalry division of Lyubomirov, attached to 1 AK, captured the city of Uzdau. The 15th corps, pursuing the Germans, turned to the west, the 13th AK, without meeting resistance, went to Allenstein. On the left flank, 6 AK occupied Bischofsburg and turned to the northeast. The corps continued to fan out on a 200 km front.
The 2nd infantry division of Mingin from 23 AK entered the position of Scholz's corps, reinforced with reserve and landwehr formations. The divisional commander decided to attack the Germans on the move. The right wing of the division advanced successfully and wedged into the enemy positions, but the left flank was defeated. The commander of the 15th AK Martos learned about the battle and the appearance of the enemy and at the same time received an order to move to the northeast, to Hochstein. Thus, the corps exposed the rear to the enemy. Based on the situation, he ordered the main forces to turn to the west, sent two regiments to Hochstein. Martos asked the commander of the 13th AK Klyuev to help, and Samsonov offered to send the entire 13th corps to him in order to defeat the enemy. If this plan was carried out, the enemy’s plan would have collapsed - the defeat of Scholz’s corps could lead to a very difficult situation for two German corps. Klyuev allocated one brigade to Martos.
Defeat of the 6th Corps. At this time, the front command realized it and decided to assemble the corps. We focused on the AK 13 that had pulled ahead. He was ordered to move 15 AK advancing on the left and 6 AK on the right. Then they realized it, realizing that the eastern flank would remain uncovered and 6 AK left their previous task, to be at Bischofsburg. But the order was late, on August 26, 6th AK had already set out for Allenstein. They went in two columns - the divisions of Komarov and Richter. Intelligence of the 4th Infantry Division Komarov reported that enemy troops were moving in the rear. The divisional commander decided that these were the Germans, who were fleeing after the defeat, from the 1st Army and decided to strike. And it was 17 AK Mackensen, who was preparing for a flank attack. Near the village of Gross-Bessau there was an oncoming battle. Komarov, fighting off the attacks of the enemy corps, called for help the 16th infantry division of Richter, who had already left for 14 km. Richter turned and on the way to Komarov collided with Belov's 1st reserve AK. At this time, Komarov's division lost 4 thousand killed and wounded and began to retreat, Richter's units also began to retreat.
The Germans could not pursue them, because they met the resistance of the rearguard under the command of Nechvolodov (2 regiments, 7 hundred Cossacks, mortar division). They felt that the whole corps was standing against them. Komkor Blagoveshchensky was unable to regroup his forces in Bischofsburg and the frustrated mass continued to retreat to the border.
The headquarters showed concern. August, 26th Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich visited the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and ordered the 1st Army to be sent to establish contact with the 2nd Army. The Rennenkampf army at that time captured Insterburg and cut railway to Memel (Klaipeda) and went to the Baltic Sea near Labiau, 50 km from Königsberg. But Zhilinsky stood by his delusion and ordered the siege of Königsberg to begin. The headquarters of the 2nd Army, having reached Neidenburg and not representing general situation, refused Martos to support 13 AK.
Retreat of the 1st Corps. On August 27, the situation became even more complicated. German air reconnaissance discovered that 6 AK had retreated far to the south, a large hole had formed in the Russian front. Mackensen's corps continued its offensive to the south, and Belov's corps continued to advance west, towards Allenstein.
1st AK Francois struck at Uzdau. The blow was well prepared: after an hour of shelling, the German divisions went on the attack. To encircle the Russian troops, they prepared a flying detachment (cavalrymen, motorcyclists, cyclists, infantry on vehicles), which they planned to throw at Neidenburg. But the attack failed, brigade commander Savitsky and Colonel of the General Staff Krymov organized the defense. German thick chains were simply mowed down by the fire of artillery, machine guns and rifles. Petrovsky and Neyshlotsky regiments hit with hostility. The enemy was defeated, there was even a panic, one of the German units managed to retreat 45 km.
But the human factor broke the brilliant opportunity to complete the defeat of Francois's corps. Commander Artamonov got scared and ordered to retreat to Zoldau. He also lied to Samsonov: “All attacks are repulsed, I hold on like a rock. I will complete the task." Francois occupied the abandoned Uzdau, but did not believe in the retreat of the Russians and dug in, preparing for defense.
At the same time, the corps of Martos, inferior to the Germans in strength by 1.5 times, fought with the forces of Scholz. Moreover, the whole day the battle went in favor of the Russians. The German defense was broken through, the Germans were thrown back, in order to restore the situation, the German command had to transfer a new division. It was not possible to encircle Martos' corps from the flanks either, the Russians repelled all enemy attacks.
Fatal mistake commander. Warning messages poured into the headquarters from all sides. The threat of "ticks" has been identified. But Samsonov again ordered to advance. Only after learning about the defeat of the regiments of the Mingin division, the commander ordered the 13th AK to go to the aid of the 15th Corps of Martos. Random cavalrymen reported the surrender of Uzdau by the Artamonovs. Enraged Samsonov removed Artamonov from his post and appointed Dushkevich in his place.
In principle, the situation was not yet critical. It could even be turned to your advantage. If it were possible to regroup the forces on the left flank (there were up to a third of all the forces of the army), which were inactive, it would be possible to defeat the François corps. After that, support the forces of the left flank of the center corps (15 and 13). It was possible not to take risks at all and take the 15th and 13th corps back.
But Samsonov could not properly dispose of his forces. He made the most wrong decision - he went to the front line (to the headquarters of the 15th AK) to deal with the situation, as a result, the control of the army was completely lost. This was his last message to the front headquarters.
By the evening of the 27th, the front headquarters realized that the Germans were not retreating beyond the Vistula, but were attacking the 2nd Army. The 1st Army is ordered to send cavalry units and establish contact with the 2nd Army. On August 28, units of the 1st Army set out, but time was lost - they did not have time to overcome a gap of 100 km.
Nikolai Nikolaevich Martos.
13 building. Corps Klyuev entered Allenstein. The corps headquarters did not know about the retreat of 6 AK. When air reconnaissance reported that troops were coming from the east, they considered that these were parts of Blagoveshchensk. Therefore, the corps calmly went to 15 AK, leaving only two battalions in the city. The Russian units were crushed almost instantly, besides, the townspeople hit from the rear. Corps Belov continued the pursuit.
Klyuev, having found the Germans in the rear, decided that these were small auxiliary detachments and put one regiment in the rear guard - Dorogobuzhsky 143rd infantry regiment(weakened, one of his battalions was left in Allenstein). In addition, without artillery and with a limited supply of ammunition. The regimental commander Vladimir Kabanov took up a position between the lakes and repulsed the attacks of the enemy division. It helped that the Germans could not bypass the regiment. The cartridges soon ran out, the Germans were driven back by bayonet attacks. Kabanov died, the battalions were bleeding, but they held out until nightfall. At night, the remnants of the regiment withdrew, taking the body of the commander.
15 and 13 buildings. On August 28, the Russian corps was already repulsing the attacks of the Germans. A particularly fierce battle took place at the positions of the 13th AK brigade - at Hochstein, which Klyuev sent to help first. The Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment and the Koporsky 4th Infantry Regiment were in a semi-encirclement, but they stood firm, pushing the Germans back over and over again. The ammunition of the corps came to an end, and it was no longer possible to continue the battle.
Klyuev’s corps that day went to Hochstein, but the commander did not dare to attack without the order of the army commander and missed the opportunity to strike the Germans with a strong blow. Only one regiment (the Nevsky 1st Infantry Regiment) was sent forward, and its sudden blow put an entire German division to flight. But success was not developed, Klyuev ordered to retreat.
Samsonov arrived in the evening. After discussing the situation, we realized that we had to retreat. A “sliding shield” plan was developed: first the convoys departed, then the formations of 13 AK, then 15 AK, and the last were units of 23 AK. They planned to retreat to Neidenburg. Martos was instructed to equip the positions at Neidenburg, removing the most combative commander from the front line - he was captured by a soldier who went to the rear German cavalry. Samsonova also went to the rear, his illness worsened. As a result, the retreating troops were actually beheaded. Klyuev, who was assigned to lead the retreat, could not organize it. Parts fell off on their own.
True, the Germans in the center were not able to organize the persecution. So, advancing behind the corps of Martos, they ran into an ambush at night, which was organized by the Aleksopol 31st Infantry Regiment and the Kremenchug 32nd Infantry Regiment. The enemy column was shot. Hindenburg, having learned about the movement of the 1st Army, ordered the corps of Belov and Mackensen to turn around. But Mackensen did not fulfill it, angry with conflicting instructions, and led the corps towards Francois, who, seeing that he was not in danger, resumed the offensive. The center of the 2nd Russian army was surrounded.
rout
On August 29, Zhilinsky was informed of the withdrawal of part of the headquarters of the 2nd Army, and he decided that the army was retreating, so there was no need for the movement of parts of the 1st Army. Rennenkampf is ordered to stop traffic. But he refuses, giving his troops the order to go to the aid of the 2nd Army.
The Russian rearguard - the Kashirsky 144th Infantry Regiment of Kakhovskoy and units of the Narva 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 13th Army Corps - took the fight at Hochstein. There were 86 German guns against 16 Russian guns, the regiment fought until 2 pm in complete encirclement. The regimental commander Kakhovsky fell in hand-to-hand combat at the banner of the regiment. The rest of the regiment fought until the evening. The Sofia 2nd Infantry Regiment, which covered the withdrawal of 13 AK, fought until 15 o'clock, then withdrew.
Although, in general, there was no dense environment - outposts, patrols, armored vehicles on the roads. With good organization, it was possible to break through with a concentrated blow. But at night, the retreating mixed up, people were tired - several days of fighting, constant marches, food ran out, ammunition was running out. There was no supreme command. Klyuev decided to surrender - part of the corps followed him, the majority refused and broke through to their own. Martos ran into the Germans and was captured. Samsonov tried to command the retreating, then fell into prostration, he was tormented by asthma and conscience. With small group he almost got out of the encirclement, but his conscience finished him off: “The king trusted me. How will I meet him after such a debacle? He shot himself. A few hours later, his companions went out to their own.
The main reasons for the defeat
Major miscalculations and errors of command. First of all, the commander of the North-Western Front Zhilinsky, his headquarters, Samsonov and the headquarters of the 2nd Army. Mistakes and incompetence of most corps commanders of the 2nd Army.
The operational actions of the German command, well-established intelligence, the speed of movement of troops (the country's developed road infrastructure).
Results
The Germans inflated the scale of victory. They talked about 70-90 thousand prisoners, 20 thousand killed, 300-600 captured guns. In reality, 5 incomplete divisions were surrounded - at the time the offensive began, they numbered up to 80 thousand people and 200 guns. Up to 6 thousand people died in the battles, about 20 thousand more were wounded, more than 20 thousand were able to break through or get out of the encirclement. Therefore, up to 50 thousand people were captured, along with the wounded. Yes, and guns, less than 200 were captured - some were damaged in battle, some were destroyed by artillerymen.
The 8th German Army also suffered serious losses: up to 30 thousand killed and wounded. Were defeated or heavily bled - 4 infantry, 1 landwehr divisions, 2 landwehr brigades.
The Germans managed to prevent the fall of East Prussia and defeat 2.5 corps. But this success was achieved at the expense of a strategic defeat on Western front.
Contrary to German propaganda, the Russian 2nd Army was not completely defeated and destroyed. Most of it just retreated. The army was headed by an energetic and experienced combat officer - S. M. Sheideman. He quickly put the army in order, and already in early September it was actively fighting.
As a result of the investigation, Zhilinsky's attempt to blame Rennenkampf failed. Zhilinsky and Artamonov were removed from their posts. Kondratovich, Blagoveshchensky. The actions of the commanders and soldiers of the 15th corps Martos and divisional commander Mingin (2nd Infantry) were highly appreciated, who "fought as heroes, valiantly and steadfastly withstood the fire and onslaught of superior enemy forces", withdrew only after the complete depletion of their reserves.
EAST PRUSIAN OPERATION of 1914, an offensive operation of the Russian North-Western Front (commander - cavalry general Ya. G. Zhilinsky; over 350 thousand people, over 1.1 thousand guns, 54 aircraft) against the German 8th Army [General M Prittwitz, since August 10 (23) General P. von Hindenburg; over 290 thousand people, over 1 thousand guns, 56 aircraft and 2 airships] in the 1st World War. Carried out on August 4 (17) - September 2 (15) at the insistence of the French command until the end of mobilization and concentration Russian army. The goal is to capture East Prussia and disrupt the offensive of the main forces of the German army against France. According to the plan of the front command, the Russian 1st Army (Cavalry General P.K. von Rennenkampf) was supposed to strike around the Masurian Lakes from the north, and the Russian 2nd Army (Cavalry General A.V. Samsonov) - around these lakes from the west. The successful offensive of the Russian 1st Army at first created the conditions for organizing the pursuit and complete destruction of parts of the German 8th Army, but the slowness (for 2 days the Russian troops stood still) and the movement not to join the Russian 2nd Army, but towards Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) allowed the German troops to get out of the blow. A gap formed between the Russian armies, which was used by the German command. Leaving a barrier of 2 divisions against the Russian 1st Army, the main forces of the German 8th Army, concentrating on the flanks of the Russian 2nd Army, attacked the Russian troops on August 13 (26) and practically destroyed them by August 17 (30) ( only over 50 thousand people were captured, General Samsonov shot himself), throwing the remnants of the troops across the Narew River. During August 25 (September 7) - September 2 (15), the German 8th Army launched an offensive against the Russian 1st Army and forced it to retreat across the Neman River.
East Pomeranian operation ended in failure, losses Russian troops amounted to about 250 thousand people (killed, wounded, captured and missing), German troops - over 25 thousand people (according to other sources, about 37 thousand people). The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian army were the weak leadership of the troops by the commander of the front and the Russian 1st Army. But, despite this, the operation had important strategic results: the German command was forced to transfer 2 infantry corps and 1 cavalry division from the Western theater of operations, which weakened the German strike force in the west and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the German troops in the battle on the Marne River in September 1914. This saved France from defeat and forced Germany to be drawn into a disastrous war for her on two fronts.
Lit .: Zaionchkovsky A. M. World War 1914-1918 3rd ed. M., 1938. T. 1-2; Kolenkovsky A.K. The maneuvering period of the world imperialist war of 1914. M., 1940; Strokov A. A. Armed forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; Rostunov I. I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976.
BAGRATION Petr Ivanovich (1765-1812), Georgian, prince, Russian general from infantry (1809). Member of the Italian and Swiss campaigns of A. V. Suvorov, wars with France, Sweden and Turkey (in 1809-10 commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army). AT Patriotic war 1812 commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, mortally wounded in the Battle of Borodino.
Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration came from the Georgian princes of the royal family of Bagration. He was distinguished by his hot temper, courage and bravery, caring for his subordinates, which, taken together, contributed to his popularity among the troops. On the military service Bagration was recorded on May 1, 1783 as a private in the Astrakhan Infantry Regiment and in the same year received the rank of ensign. Family ties among the highest imperial aristocracy and the personal courage of the young officer contributed to the rise of his quick military career. For about 12 years, his service was held in adjutant positions with prominent commanders and famous Russian military leaders, and a long stay with them became a good school for gaining experience in commanding troops. For his bravery and military merits during the assault on the Turkish fortress of Ochakov in 1789, Bagration was promoted from second lieutenant to captain, having distinguished himself in the capture of Prague (a suburb of Warsaw), in 1794 he attracted the attention of A. V. Suvorov himself. During the reign of Emperor Paul I, Peter Ivanovich enjoyed the great favor of this monarch, married Countess E. P. Skavronskaya, who had family ties with the royal family (the emperor himself was the best man at the wedding), and on February 4, 1799, he was granted the rank of Major General.
In 1799-1800 he was in the Italian and Swiss campaigns, took an active part in many major battles, brilliantly commanded the vanguard. This strengthened his reputation as one of the most combative generals in the Russian army, he was considered the favorite student of the famous Suvorov. Bagration confirmed his military prowess in the 1805 campaign against the French in the battle of Shengraben, where the Russian rearguard led by him repulsed all attacks and delayed the advance of the superior enemy, and then broke through and joined with the main forces. For this feat, he received the rank of lieutenant general and was awarded the order St. George 2nd class. In the unsuccessful Austerlitz battle for the Russians, the column led by them was able to break through the enemy ranks with minimal losses and break away from the Napoleonic troops. 
In the campaigns of 1806-07, he commanded the 4th division and the main vanguard, took part in all the main military clashes with the French. During the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-09, Bagration commanded the 21st division, which cleared the Swedes from South coast Finland, and in 1809 he led a large detachment that crossed the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia to the Aland Islands, for which he was promoted to general of infantry. In 1809 Bagration was appointed commander in chief of the Moldavian army; under his leadership, Russian troops captured a number of fortresses on the Danube and were able to inflict defeat on the Turks near Rassevat and Tataritsa.
In 1812, despite the personal reluctance of Alexander I, he took the post of commander in chief of the 2nd Western Army, which covered the central direction. During the invasion of Napoleon into the territory of Russia, having received an order not to clash with superior enemy forces, Bagration managed to brilliantly organize the retreat of his troops and, after the battles near Mir and Saltanovka, using the inconsistency of the actions of the French military leaders, was able to break away from the pursuit and connect with the 1st Western army near Smolensk. During this period, the military opposition among the generals and the officer corps, relying on the high popularity of Bagration among the troops and the fame of his beloved Suvorov student and associate, began to use his name in the fight against M. B. Barclay de Tolly and his retreat tactics, nominating his candidacy to the post of commander-in-chief. But before the arrival of M. I. Kutuzov, despite significant differences in views on the methods of warfare, Bagration was forced to nominally obey Barclay, since he was younger and commanded a smaller army. In the battle of Borodino, his troops defended the left flank of the Russian position and took over at the beginning of the battle main blow superior forces of Napoleon. Steadfastly defending the occupied lines, Bagration repeatedly personally led his units into counterattacks. In one of the attacks, Pyotr Ivanovich received a severe wound from a grenade fragment in the tibia of his left leg and was taken from the battlefield, first to Moscow, and then to the village of Simy, where he died during treatment and was buried. Moreover, an interesting fact is that at first the wound began to heal, and Bagration began to recover, however, with the news of the surrender of Moscow, the hot commander abruptly jumped out of bed, which led to the rupture and inflammation of the wound, and the subsequent death of the hero. In 1839 Bagration's ashes were solemnly reburied on the Borodino field. Bagration was rightfully considered one of the best Russian commanders of the Suvorov school, he was distinguished by personal courage in battle, was famous for his energy and assertiveness in achieving his tasks, was loved by ordinary soldiers and officers. 
East Prussian operation of 1914 4 (17) August - 2 (15) September. Offensive Russian troops, who were tasked with defeating the 8th German Army and capturing East Prussia in order to develop an offensive directly into the depths of the territory Germany . First Russian Army (General Rennenkampf ) was supposed to advance around the Masurian Lakes from the north, cutting off the Germans from Koenigsberg. The second army (of General Samsonov) was to lead an offensive around these lakes from the west. The main idea of the operation was to cover the German army grouping from both flanks.
The Russian North-Western Front included 17.5 infantry and 8.5 cavalry divisions, 1104 guns, 54 aircraft. The German 8th Army had 15 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions, 1044 guns, 56 aircraft, 2 airships.
The operation began on August 4 (17) with the offensive of the 1st Russian Army, during which the enemy was defeated at Gumbinnen. The German command decided to leave East Prussia. However, instead of developing the operation and completing the defeat of the German troops, General Rennenkampf ordered the withdrawal of the Russian units. Under these conditions, the Germans changed their plans and attacked the 2nd Army of General Samsonova . The unsatisfactory leadership of the Northwestern Front (commander-in-chief, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky) and the inaction of General Rennenkampf ultimately led to the defeat of the Russian troops, the death and capture of 50 thousand soldiers (General Samsonov also died) and the withdrawal of Russian units from East Prussia. At the same time, the Germans were forced to transfer from France to the Russian front 2 army corps and 1 cavalry division, which ensured the victory of the French in the Battle of the Marne and saved Paris from surrender to the Germans.
East Prussian operation of 1914, Offensive operation of the troops of the Russian North-Western Front (commands, General Ya. G. Zhilinsky), carried out on August 4 (17). - 2(15) Sept. 1914 at the beginning of the 1st World War. At the insistence of the Anglo-French. command The offensive was undertaken before the end of the Mobilization and the concentration of Russian. army in order to disrupt the offensive Ch. forces of Germany against France. The immediate goal of the operation was to defeat the 8th Nem. army and take over Vost. Prussia. According to the plan of the front command, the 1st Rus. army of Gen. P. K. RennenKampf (6.5 infantry divisions, 5.5 cavalry divisions, 492 op.) was to strike around the Masurian Lakes from the north, the 2nd Army under the command of General. A. V. Samsonov (11.5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions, 720 op.) bypassing these lakes from the west. The offensive began on 4 (17) Aug. invasion of the East. Prussia of three army corps of the 1st Army. 6(19) Aug. in the battle at Shtallupönen he was defeated and the 1st German army retreated. corps, on the trail, a day on the Gumbinnen-Goldap front, a head-on battle broke out between Ch. by the forces of the 1st Russian. and 8th German. armies. German the troops were defeated and began to retreat to 3. Favorable conditions were created for organizing the pursuit and complete defeat of the units of the 8th German army, however, on August 8-9 (21-22). The 1st Army was inactive. Its further offensive was carried out slowly and not to connect with the 2nd Army, but towards Koenigsberg, which allowed the troops of the pr-ka to get out of the blow. Taking advantage of the gap between Russian armies and knowing from the intercepted Russian. radiograms about their plan of action, German, command 8 (21) Aug. suspended the retreat and directed against the 2nd Rus. army that crossed the border on August 7 (20), almost all the forces of the 8th army. Pr-to, using the developed railway. network, regrouped troops and, leaving a barrier of 2 divisions against the 1st Army, concentrated Ch. forces on the flanks of the 2nd Army, operating app. Masurian lakes. Deprived of the help and assistance of the 1st Army, the 2nd Army was defeated and on 17 (30) Aug. was forced to move beyond the river. Narew. During 25 Aug. (7 Sept.) - 2(15) Sept. 8th German the army launched an offensive against the 1st Rus. army, dropping it to 9 (22) Sept. for the river Not man. An attempt to surround the 1st Rus. the army failed. Offensive operation North-West. front in East. Prussia ended in failure. The Russians lost approx. 250 thousand soldiers and a large number of weapons. The reasons for this were the unsatisfactory leadership of Zhilinsky and the actual betrayal of Rsnpenkampf. Despite this, the operation had important strategists, results: it. command was forced to transfer from the French. front in East. Prussia 2 corps and 1 cav. division. In addition, the 1st Corps, located in the Metz region, was also prepared for the transfer, which weakened the shock group of German troops in the west and was one of the reasons for the defeat of the Germans. army in the battle of the Marne at the beginning of Sept. 1914 (see Battle of the Marne 1914). Active actions troops in the initial period of the war thwarted the plan of it. command - beat the allies one by one.
M. A. Alekseev.
Used materials of the Soviet military encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2.
First major defeat
East Prussian operation (First World War, 1914-1918) - fighting in East Prussia on August 4 - September 2, 1914 1st (General P.K. Rennenkampf) and 2nd (General A.V. Samsonov) Russian armies against the 8th German army (Generals M. Prittwitz, then P. Hindenburg). On August 4, 1914, the Russians, without completing their mobilization, went on the offensive in East Prussia. Such haste was explained by persistent requests for help from allied France, which was suffering a strong onslaught of the Germans.
In the battles of August 4 and 7 at Shtallupönen and Gumbinnen, the 1st Army defeated the Germans. At this time, the 2nd Army was advancing from the south, bypassing the Masurian Lakes, to cut off the escape route for the German troops. Rennenkampf did not pursue the Germans and stood still for two days. This allowed the 8th Army to get out of the attack and regroup forces. Not having accurate information about the location of Prittwitz's troops, the commander of the 1st Army then moved it to Koenigsberg.
Meanwhile, the German 8th Army withdrew in a different direction (to the south of Koenigsberg). While Rennenkampf was slowly advancing towards Koenigsberg, the 8th Army, led by General Hindenburg, was able to carry out a successful operation that decided the outcome of the battle in East Prussia. Despite the risk of being hit in the rear by the 1st Army, Hindenburg turned his forces south against Samsonov's army, who was unaware of such a maneuver. The Germans, thanks to the interception of radio messages, knew everything about the plans of the Russians.
On August 9, Samsonov's 2nd Army crossed the East Prussian border and began to move in a northwestern direction with the forces of 4 corps. The offensive was carried out on a front stretched 120 km without proper preparation and interaction of units. In fact, there were no rear services, and the troops did not receive food for several days.
Meanwhile, Hindenburg, having transferred the main forces to this direction, on August 13 delivered powerful blows to the flank corps of the 2nd Army (1st and 6th). The central corps of the 2nd Army (13th and 15th), due to the lack of close communication between the Russian units, did not find out in time about the change in the operational situation and continued to advance, deepening into the prepared bag. Under the onslaught of German formations, the 1st Corps began to withdraw, exposing the flanks and rear of their neighbors in the center to attack.
In the battles of August 16-18, the central (13th and 15th) corps, which had lost contact with their neighbors and with each other, were surrounded and defeated. Samsonov, having lost command of the troops, shot himself. According to German data, the damage of the 2nd Army amounted to 120 thousand people. (including more than 90 thousand prisoners). The Germans lost 15 thousand people in battles with her. Then they attacked from the south, from the side of the Masurian Lakes, the 1st Army. Fearing to be cut off, she withdrew beyond the Neman on September 2.
The East Prussian operation had severe tactical and especially moral consequences for the Russians. This was their first ever such a major defeat in battles with the Germans. However, tactically won by the Germans, this operation strategically meant for them the failure of the blitzkrieg plan. To save East Prussia, they had to transfer considerable forces from the Western theater of operations, where the fate of the entire war was then decided. This saved France from defeat and forced Germany to be drawn into a disastrous struggle for her on two fronts. The Russians, having replenished their forces with fresh reserves, soon again went on the offensive in East Prussia (see August operation).
Used materials of the book: Nikolai Shefov. Russian battles. Military History Library. M., 2002.
Literature:
East Prussian operation (Collection of documents). M., 1939;
History of the First World War 1914-1918. T. 1. M., 1975, p. 316 - 329;
Verzhkhovsky D. V., Lyakhov V. F. The First World War 1914-1918. Military-ist. feature article. M. 1964;
Zaionchkovsky A. M. World War 1914 - 1918. Ed. 3rd. T. 1-2. M., 1938;
Kolenkovsky A. K. Maneuverable period of the first world imperialist war of 1914. M., 1940
Talensky N. A. The First World War 1914 - 1918. M., 1944.
We will analyze the total combat losses of the parties (in this article - the Russian armies), attracting authoritative sources and opinions of prominent experts, as well as participants in this one of the most important battles of the First World War, which contributed to the collapse of German pre-war strategic planning and was a prerequisite for a victorious end to the war for the Entente.
The cavalry of the 1st and 2nd armies (and the 5th rifle brigade interacting with the 1st cavalry division) from July 20 to August 1 (Beltsonen, Soldau-Neidenburg, Stallupenen, Markgrabov) lost about 500 people [Collection of documents. S. 117; 122-123; Rogvold V. Enhanced reconnaissance of Markgrabov on August 14/1, 1914. M., 1926. S. 29; Evseev N. August battle. S. 69].
In the battle near Stallupenen, the 1st Army lost 7467 people (619 killed, 2382 wounded, 4466 missing, mostly captured). The Reichsarchive noted over 1000 prisoners from the 27th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army Corps. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd. 2. S. 75. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the 25th, 27th infantry divisions of the 3rd corps and the 29th infantry division of the 20th AK equal to 6600 people. S. 76). Kaushen cost the Russian cavalry 396 people (and from August 3 to August 6, the cavalry group lost 45 officers and 429 privates killed and wounded) [Rogvold V. Cavalry of the 1st Army in East Prussia (August-September 1914). M., 1926. S. 63].
Head of the 27th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General A.-K.-M. M. Adaridi
Fatal for Germany, the Gumbinnen case led to the loss of 16,500 Russian people (mainly due to the 3rd and 20th army corps). So, the losses of the 28th Infantry Division - 104 officers, 6945 privates, 23 machine guns, 8 guns [ Vatsetis I.I. fighting in East Prussia. S. 41]. An eyewitness recalled seeing whole chains of dead infantry on the Gumbinnen field - companies and battalions lay with their officers, including battalion commanders, and the soldiers froze in those poses in which they were overtaken by death [Radus-Zenkovich L. Decree. op. S. 53]. The 3rd Army Corps, which played the main role in the battle (25th and 27th Infantry Division), lost 87 officers and 6117 lower ranks [Vatsetis I. I. Operations on the eastern border of Germany. S. 130]. The 40th Infantry Division of the 4th Army Corps lost 2,050 men.
Field infirmary in Suwałki
The cavalry group that tried to establish contact with the army of A.V. Samsonov lost about 70 people on August 18-19 [Rogvold V. Decree. op. S. 101].
The first battle at the Masurian Lakes, which turned out to be unsuccessful for the 1st Army, led to the loss (with some units of the 10th Army) of 19,000 killed and wounded and 43,000 missing (mostly prisoners), 150 guns. General E. Ludendorff wrote about 45,000 Russian prisoners . British military agent A. Knox confirmed these figures, citing German estimates total Russian losses in the Battle of Masuria - up to 60,000 people and 150 guns . General G. von François wrote after the war: “The booty in this battle, according to the Hindenburg report, was expressed in 30,000 prisoners and 150 guns” [ Khramov F. Decree. op. S. 94].
Head of the 30th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General E. A. Kolyankovsky
N. N. Golovin, comparing the number of soldiers in the army of K.-G. Rennenkampf at the beginning of the invasion of East Prussia and those remaining in these formations after the withdrawal from it by September 1 (the army did not receive staffing during this period, only secondary formations and units were introduced), estimated (including by studying objective German data) the general the losses of the 1st Army for the East Prussian campaign and the battle at the Masurian Lakes - up to 100 thousand people, of which 30 thousand prisoners, noting a high percentage of wounded and non-combatants among the prisoners [ Golovin N. N. From the campaign of 1914 on the Russian front - the beginning of the war and operations in East Prussia. Prague, 1926. S. 408].
Russian prisoners of war in East Prussia
Thus, the total losses of the 1st Army in July-August amounted to at least 90,000 people. The largest losses occurred (in ascending order) in the battles at Stallupenen, Gumbinnen and the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes. Moreover, the losses in the latter amounted to two-thirds of the losses of the army and more than 2 times exceeded the rest of the losses of the operational formation combined - and fell mainly on insufficiently combat-ready secondary divisions that first appeared in battle, and army rear structures (caught during the retreat from East Prussia attacked by the advancing Germans).
On the front of the 2nd Army, during the victorious battle at Orlau-Frankenau, the 15th Army Corps lost up to 3,000 people. This is an average figure from those indicated in sources and studies. The materials of the commission of General Panteleev indicate the figure of 2500 lower ranks and 50 officers [Cm. Collection of documents. S. 581]. The same figure is given by N. Evseev [Evseev N. Decree. op. pp. 103 - 104]. The memoirs of General N. N. Martos, quoted by N. N. Golovin, spoke of the loss of many officers and 3,000 privates. In the notes to the work of A. A. Kersnovsky, the figure of the losses of the 15th AK was 4067 wounded and killed, but the source was not named [Kersnovsky A. A. History of the Russian army. T. 3. M., 1994. S. 340]. These are probably the materials of the Reichsarchive (in it, the total Russian losses were estimated at 4,000 people, of which 2,900 people were in the 2nd brigade of the 6th infantry division at Frankenau. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd. 2. S. 129). Given that the Russians won in these battles (respectively, the battlefield was left to them), we will take as a basis the weighted average figure for the losses of the 15th Corps, indicated by domestic experts and indicated above.
The losses of the regiments of the 2nd Infantry Division of the 23rd Corps participating in the battle near Mühlen are unclear. It is known that the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Kaluga Infantry Regiment, which was part of the 2nd Division, lost 6 officers and 300 lower ranks [Cm. Bogdanovich P. N. The invasion of East Prussia in August 1914. Memoirs of an officer general staff army of General Samsonov. Buenos Aires, 1964, p. 172; Buchinsky Yu.F. Tannenberg disaster. Sofia, 1939. S. 33]. Eyewitness of the "Samson catastrophe" lieutenant colonel - commander of the 2nd battalion of the 5th regiment Yu. F. Buchinsky estimated the loss of his regiment for the day on August 14 at about 25%, which is about 1000 people [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. op. S. 25]. The losses of the regiment in the battle on August 15, in his opinion, amounted to 40%. Parts of the 15th AK also suffered losses. So, 215 recorded graves belonged to the soldiers of the 29th and 30th infantry regiments of the 8th infantry division [ Bogdanovich P. N. Decree. op. S. 163. The total losses of the 30th Infantry Regiment amounted to 34 officers and more than 1500 lower ranks. Collection of documents. S. 584].
The total losses of the 2nd infantry division and units of the 15th AK in the victorious battles on August 15 near Waplitz-Mühlen amounted to at least 2,000 people.
In the unsuccessful battles of the flank corps (Uzdau-Soldau, Gross Bessau, Bischofsburg), which ended with the withdrawal of these formations, which allowed the Germans to proceed to encircle the central core of the 2nd Army, the Russians lost at least 13,000 people.
So, the 6th Army Corps in the battle on August 13 at Bischofsburg lost 73 officers and 5283 lower ranks in the 4th Infantry Division [Up to 1.7 thousand prisoners - trophies of the 1st reserve corps.Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd. 2. S. 174], 18 machine guns and 16 guns [Collection of documents. S. 290]. The total loss in the 16th Infantry Division in the period of August 13-18 - 523 people (including on August 16 and 18, the division lost 381 people wounded, killed and missing [Ibid. S. 570]. According to German sources, the 1st Reserve Corps buried 310 German and 220 Russian soldiers on the battlefield, and the 17th Army Corps buried another 116 Russian soldiers.
Field military ambulance train for first aid
According to the report of General P. I. Postovsky to the headquarters of the front on September 3, the losses of the 1st Army Corps are as follows: 24th Infantry Division - 4374 people; 22nd Infantry Division - 1852 people; 1st rifle brigade - 1970 people; mortar and heavy artillery battalions and engineer battalions - 212 people [Collection of documents. P. 320. But the losses of the regiments of the 3rd Guards Infantry Division, which also participated in the battles, are not mentioned]. Thus, the total losses of this corps amounted to 8408 people.
During the breakthrough and surrounded, the Russian troops of the central corps of the 2nd Army suffered heavy losses. Information about losses in environments is always controversial. Thus, the Russian military agent in France, Count A. A. Ignatiev, mentioned a German radiogram intercepted by the French, which spoke of the defeat of the 2nd Army and the capture of 60,000 Russian soldiers [Ignatiev A. A. Decree. op. S. 48]. The Austrian W. Rauscher wrote about 60,000 prisoners and 30,000 dead and missing soldiers of the 2nd Army [Rauscher V. Hindenburg. Field Marshal and Reich President. M., 2003. S. 48, 49]. Etc.
Html) we touched upon the situation with losses in the Tannenberg pocket, which included 5 divisions, and not at full strength (13th and 15th corps, 2nd division of the 23rd corps). The map of the Reichsarchiv indicates 44,000 fighters who fought in the Tannenberg "cauldron" and mostly captured . As the historian general N. Golovin noted [Decree. op. S. 337], among the prisoners, a large percentage was given by guards and non-combatants - after all, carts of 3 corps fell into the hands of the Germans at once, and the most determined fighters who wanted to get out of the encirclement broke through to their own.
In the period of August 16 - 18 (the "Samson catastrophe" in the Grunflis forest - battles, attempts to break through and the death of the central group of the 2nd Army), the Germans count up to 7,000 dead Russian soldiers. That is, the total losses of the core of the 2nd army in the environment reached 50,000 people.
The bodies of Russian soldiers who fell in the rearguard battle during the withdrawal from East Prussia
The document recorded that 171 officers and 10,300 privates went out of the 13th and 15th corps to their own (not counting the soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Division - there is no information on it) [Tsikhovich, Ya. K. Operation of the 2nd Army in East Prussia in August 1914 // Military Historical Collection. Issue. 3. M., 1919. S. 159]. But the battalion commander of the 5th regiment of the 2nd division, Yu. Buchinsky, noted that only from the soldiers of his brigade, who left the encirclement, it was possible to form a whole battalion (2 companies of the 5th and 6th regiments) - i.e. 1/8 brigade. The lieutenant colonel recalled that the fighters continued to leave the encirclement later. He also noted that personnel his brigades, after leaving East Prussia, were replenished to such an extent with people (both those who had left the encirclement, and those who had been on various business trips before the operation - the shortage due to the diversion of people to extraneous tasks was very large) that the regiments already had personnel command staff and started teaching [Buchinsky Yu. F. Decree. op. S. 50]. In total, up to 3,000 soldiers and officers left the encirclement from the 23rd Corps (and this is mainly the 2nd Division). [Vatsetis I. I. Decree. op. S. 213]. To this must be added up to 20,000 wounded soldiers who were evacuated after previous battles.
As F. Khramov noted, on August 16-18, the Germans managed to capture about 30,000 people, while they themselves call the figure 90,000 prisoners. The latter, as the colonel noted, is absolutely untrue - after all, in the 13th, 15th corps and the 2nd division there were up to 80,000 people in total - and up to 20,000 of them broke through from the encirclement, up to 6,000 died and up to 20,000 wounded remained on battlefields. If, as F. Khramov noted, the encircled troops were led by a more courageous general than Klyuev, then they would be able to break through the ring and retreat to the south - evidence of which is a number of remarkable tactical victories that the Russian troops won in the East Prussian operation [Temples F. Decree. op. S. 69].
Thus, the total losses of the 2nd Army in the operation (offensive-defensive battles and encirclement losses) are up to 70,000 people(3000 and 2000 - Orlau-Frankenau and Waplitz, respectively, 13,000 - losses of flank corps and 50,000 - "Samson catastrophe") - and more than two-thirds of this figure falls on the battles in the environment, i.e., "Samson catastrophe" core 2- th army.
We see that the East Prussian operation (incl. the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes) inflicted Northwestern Front total losses of approximately 160,000 people (the bulk are wounded and captured, and some of them later returned to duty). Or 64% of the initial number of front troops.
The heaviest losses were suffered during the fighting in the retreat and the fighting in the encirclement (the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes and the "Samson catastrophe"). The main losses in the first case fell on the secondary units and rear units of the 1st Army, in the second case - on the personnel regiments of the 15th, 13th Army Corps and the 2nd Infantry Division. That is, in the latter case, first-class troops, the shock group of the 2nd Army, suffered, and therefore the resonance from the “Samson catastrophe” exceeded the defeat of the 1st Army, although the loss figures are comparable.
The 2nd Army, which lost up to 70,000 people, immediately lost half of its original composition (half of the army - 2.5 corps - did not get into the environment). The 1st Army suffered the heaviest losses (60,000 people, two-thirds of all the losses of the operational association) in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, fighting with superior enemy forces, and then rapidly retreating from East Prussia - the bulk of them, as noted, fell on the insufficiently combat-ready secondary divisions.
With the damage of the 2nd Army in the “Samson catastrophe” or “Tannenberg”, only the damage of the 1st Army in the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes is comparable.
Counter and offensive battles cost the front much cheaper. The losses of the opponents in these battles are comparable - for example, the British agent in the Russian army A. Knox estimated Russian losses at 4000 people in the battle at Orlau-Frankenau, and German losses at 6000, etc. - which says, among other things, about the equal fighting qualities of the enemy troops.