Journal of military operations 323 sd. The war will ask for everything. From the Bulletin of the German Army

Mishin Ivan Timofeevich

Short biography.

Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, born in 1901, was born and lived in the village of Muchkap, Muchkap District, Tambov Region.

He was married and had three daughters: Paradise, Zina and Yulia. Julia - this is Igor Sukhinin's mother - was the smallest.
She was only two years old when her father went to the front.

Ivan Timofeevich was known as a jack of all trades. He made felt boots best of all in the village - this helped the family to live.

As Igor's grandmother, Ivan Timofeevich's wife, said, they lived very well. He loved her and her daughters very much.

In 1941, at the age of 40, he was drafted into the Red Army to defend the Motherland by the Muchkap RVC of the Tambov Region.

In 1943, the wife received that her husband, Red Army soldier Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, a native of the Muchkapsky district of the Tambov region, while at the front of the Great Patriotic War, went missing in December 1942.

In 1945, a man came to the Mishins' house.
It was a fellow soldier of Ivan Timofeevich. He did not stay long, hurrying home from the front.
He gave the wife of Ivan Timofeevich something from her husband's documents, which Ivan Timofeevich accidentally left somewhere.
It turns out that they knew each other, at the front at that time they were not quite close, but then, before those last battles of Ivan Timofeevich, they met ...
The wife of Ivan Timofeevich, of course, asked him about her husband. He answered evasively that, they say, he himself did not see among the dead ...
He said that after those battles, only a few remained alive ...
And he himself did not die then only because before those battles he was in the hospital ...

Many years later, the grandmother told her grandson that only later she realized that her husband's fellow soldier simply felt sorry for her when he saw her with two small children in her arms, and therefore did not tell her directly about the death of her husband.

Until her death, Ivan Timofeevich's wife never married, she was still waiting for her husband.
For the rest of her life, she lived in ignorance of the difficult fate of her husband, raising three daughters alone.

On May 24, 2007, from the military commissariat of the city of Uvarovo, Uvarovsky and Muchkapsky districts of the Tambov region, at the request of relatives of Mishin I.T. received, issued on the basis of the Book of Memory, confirming that Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, born in 1901, went missing in December 1942.
And only after the appearance on the Internet of the Joint Database "Memorial" on the basis of scanned documents of the TsAMO military archive, the grandson of Mishin Ivan Timofeevich - Igor Vladimirovich Sukhinin - was able to find out the real truth about the fate of his grandfather. And together with the grandson, the daughters of Ivan Timofeevich also learned the truth.

In fact, Mishin I.T. died in January 1942, serving in the 2nd rifle battalion of the 1086th rifle regiment of the 323rd (1st formation) rifle division in the 10th Army.

Report of the 323rd Rifle Division dated 08/16/1942

In total, this report consists of 13 pages.

Report about irretrievable losses received from the headquarters of the 323rd Rifle Division on 08/16/1942 to the Staffing Department of the 10th Army. It was the first page of the report.

On the second page The headquarters of the 323rd Rifle Division dated August 9-10, 1942 reports that the personal lists compiled for 70 dead and 53 missing soldiers of the 1086th Rifle Regiment were received late due to heavy fighting.

On the fourth page , fifth page and page six already the 1086th rifle regiment informs the headquarters of the 323rd Rifle Division on August 5, 1942 that starting from January 1942, the regiment was not able to timely send data on irretrievable losses of personnel, as it took part in heavy battles.

These heavy battles began with an offensive near vil. Perevles on December 4-5, 1941. This means that these 70 dead and 53 missing soldiers died between December 4, 1941 and August 5, 1942.
The fighting was so heavy that it was not possible to timely keep records of personnel, and sometimes there was no one. Even clerks fought with the enemy in the same ranks as ordinary soldiers. Sometimes, during the battles, already compiled lists were destroyed.
In the lists compiled later, the fighters did not have social data, since for obvious reasons there was no one to know them from.
Some of the fighters from the list, therefore, did not even have a name and patronymic.

Further in the report to seventh page there is a heading saying that further (on the 8th page) there is a nominal list of 70 dead fighters of 1086 joint ventures, whose addresses are not known, all for the same reasons.

And now we can see page nine, on which we see among the dead fighters of the 2nd rifle battalion at number 39 Mishin Ivan Timofeevich is recorded.

A bit of history combat way 1086th Infantry Regiment
323rd Red Banner Bryansk named after. Suvorov 2nd degree rifle division.
(from the site http://www.rkka.ru/docs/spv/SPV15.htm)

FROM THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 1086th FIRE REGIMENT OF THE 323rd FIRE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

December 20
Secret

To the head of the political department of the 323rd [rifle] division

Being in battles from 12/17/41 to 12/19/41, the regiment suffered heavy losses, especially in command staff. Only one battalion commander and his deputy remained in the first battalion. Same with other battalions. In addition to them, the battalions have 2-3 commanders.

Commissar 1086 from [rifle] regiment [regiment]
[signature illegible]

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 47

FROM THE REPORT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT ON LOSSES IN OFFENSIVE BATTLE FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 19, 1941

[To the headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division]

During the offensive from 17 to 19.12.41:

	Beginning composition	ml. early composition	privates
Killed [persons]	38	72	386
Injured [persons]	110	230	954
Got sick [person]	8	3	59
missing [persons]	19	97	1084
Total [persons]	188	452	3498

<...>
Chief of Staff of the 323rd Rifle Division
[signature illegible]

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 48

---- *** ----

(from the site http://www.megatula.ru/site/tulskii_krai/raionnye_centry/63/)

At 10 am on November 23, 1941, the troops of the Nazi invaders captured the Epifan railway station and the village of Mikhailovka. Only 17 days the Nazis were in charge in our village, but even during this time they managed to inflict enormous damage on the economy. The post office, hospital, canteen and all residential buildings on Sovetskaya Street were burned, all public buildings were looted. Three residents of the village were killed: a groom, for not quickly giving a harness, a Komsomol member Zhukov and a sick old man (deaf) - for not turning around at the shout of a German.

Details about the damage caused to the village and the railway station of Epifan can be found in the acts of the commission for recording the damage caused to the village and the region by the Nazi invaders during the occupation. In such a difficult time, the Kimovites remained faithful to their people, their homeland. Take at least one such example. During the retreat, our troops were forced to leave their wounded comrades behind. The population hid them from the Nazis, but those who hid the wounded were threatened with certain death by order of the invaders. The doctor of the district hospital Emma Nikolaevna Vorobieva made dressings at night. She knew well how this could end, because her close friend from the Grankovskaya hospital - Valeria Alexandrovna Efremova - was hanged for this.

On December 10, 1941, the fascist barbarians retreated under the blow of our troops. The Epifan station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated by the troops of the 10th Army, the 1086th regiment of the 323rd rifle division. He commanded the regiment A.A. Bogdanov (colonel at the end of the war).

On the 1st photo: The memorial on the outskirts of the Karachevsky forest near the road to Epifan.
On the 2nd photo: A stone-monument in the square behind the building of the former cinema "Victory".

Here is how Alexander Alexandrovich said: “At midnight on December 9, the headquarters of the regiment I commanded stopped in the village of Urusovo, which is three kilometers from the Epifan station. There were Germans at the railway station. To find out what forces the enemy had, I sent intelligence At about three o'clock in the morning, already on December 10, I was informed that there were only a few dozen Germans at the station and that there were three cars near the house where they were located. We established for sure that the Germans could only retreat in the direction of Epifan. It was necessary to block the path For this purpose, the task was given to the third battalion of the regiment under the command of senior lieutenant GA Zotov: to bypass the Karachev forest from the east, go to its south side and occupy the highway leading from the railway station to the city of Epifan.

Since there were few Germans at the railway station, I decided not to use artillery so as not to destroy the station and the houses of civilians. As soon as it began to dawn, we fired several shots at the Germans from a 120-millimeter mortar and went on the attack.

2nd Battalion under the command of Art. Lieutenant S. Kharlampovich advanced from Dvorikov along railway towards the station. And the first battalion under the command of Art. lieutenant Chernykh advanced north, bypassing Train Station from the west.

The Germans did not expect such a swift offensive, they ran out of a two-story house, got into cars and began to retreat towards Epifan, as we expected."

And here is what the GA told us at a meeting in Leningrad. Zotov, who lived there last years of our life: “We went around the Karachev forest and ambushed the highway near some houses. When three German cars with soldiers drove up the highway in the Karachev forest, we fired at the head of the 45-millimeter gun and hit the engine directly. The second car "I tried to go around it on the left side, but rolled over into a deep ditch. (There, local residents took sand for construction). The Germans abandoned the third car and tried to escape into the forest. But there was our ambush. The German detachment was completely destroyed."

Among the killed Germans, according to A.A. Bogdanov, was a German colonel, apparently from Guderian's entourage, as Marshal F.I. Golikov in his book "In the Moscow battle".

Thus, the Epifan railway station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated.
The commander of the 2nd battalion, Sergei Kharlampovich, who liberated the Epifan station, died on the second day during the liberation of the village of Lutorichi.

About the 323rd Red Banner Bryansk named after. Suvorov 2nd degree rifle division.

66 years ago, in August-September 1941, the 323rd Rifle Division was formed in Tambov at the Tregulay station, consisting mainly of Tambov residents, and in November it was sent by echelons to the Western Front.

In December, the division participated in the battles for Moscow, and then liberated the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo.
In the battle for Moscow, the division suffered heavy losses.
The fact that these were battles is evidenced by the losses of the division in personnel.
By the beginning of February 1942, it consisted of: in the 1086th regiment - 29, in 1088 - 44, in the 1090th - 64 bayonets.

After completion in 1942, she operated in the Kaluga region as part of the 1086th Infantry Regiment.

For the successful conduct of hostilities, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in the spring of the same year.

For the operation to liberate Bryansk, the 323rd Infantry Division was given the name "Bryansk".

In 1944-45, the division freed from fascist invaders Belarus, Poland, Germany.

The 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class, Rifle Division completed its combat path in Germany near the city of Luckenwalde.

The battle banner of one of the regiments - 1086th - is stored in the regional Tambov Museum of Local Lore.
To the 55th anniversary Great Victory the name of the division was immortalized on a stele installed at the Tregulay station of the Tambov region.

Marshal's memories Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, former commander of the 10th Army.

G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs "Memoirs and Reflections" repeatedly mentions the actions of the 10th Army, which included the 323rd Rifle Division.

“Few Muscovites probably know what role the 10th Army played in the Battle of Moscow.
Yes, this is not surprising.

The 10th Army fought at the furthest distance from Moscow of all the armies Western front(from 250 to 400 kilometers).
Yes, and she arrived on the Western Front as the last of the ten armies that were part of it, she arrived literally in the very last days, even hours before the start of the December counteroffensive.
Its concentration was carried out very secretly: from the depths of the country, from the Volga, bypassing Moscow from the south, to Ryazan and Ryazhsk.

An army was formed in the Volga region.
The vast majority of army soldiers came from the reserve.

We had only three weeks to prepare. Of these, only 14-15 days could be used for planned studies. Therefore, we immediately introduced a twelve-hour school day.
Night classes were held three times a week.

It was not easy in the short days of the formation of the army to achieve the dexterity and speed of action of the fighters, to teach them active actions in battle under enemy fire.
In addition, November in the Volga region turned out to be very cold, and the army units were still in summer uniforms.

A large shortage of weapons also hampered the classes.
To what impatience and longing for armament things came, can be seen from the fact that, receiving guns and machine guns, the Red Army literally rushed to kiss them.
There was a lack of both automobile and horse-drawn transport.

The army received winter uniforms, a significant part of weapons and ammunition already on the way, in the areas of unloading and on the days of the advancement of troops to positions ...

Until the end of its offensive, the 10th Army actually had no tanks, remained almost completely without the help of aviation, was not replenished with either anti-aircraft or anti-tank weapons, did not have heavy artillery at all, not a single mortar regiment.

"... as for the 10th Army, its task was to liberate Kozelsk and Sukhinichi
But even earlier, Belev lay in our path ...

Meanwhile, on December 28, the 323rd division of Colonel I. A. Gartsev, without meeting enemy resistance, crossed the Oka in the Snykhov area (north of Belev) and successfully moved west.

"... The Military Council of the Army met the New Year at the command post in Kozelsk.
The 10th Army contributed to the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow.
From December 6, she advanced more than 250 kilometers, leaving behind the rivers Pronya, Don, Upa, Plav and Oka, and by December 31, part of her forces were already near Sukhinich, that is, another 50-60 kilometers further.

Fulfilling one after another the combat orders of the front, the army divisions fan-shaped moved to Meshchovsk, Mosalsk, Sukhinichi, Baryatinsky, Kirov, Lyudinovo, Zhizdra, Ktsyn.
Only the main forces of the 328th division remained in the army reserve.

All divisions, already accustomed to independent operations in separate directions, completed their tasks in a short time, liberating all the listed settlements, except for Sukhinichi and Zikeev (near Zhizdra), which they only managed to surround and block.
With the occupation of Kirov and Lyudinov, the army troops cut the railway line between Vyazma and Bryansk, which is very important in operational and strategic terms, thereby dividing the northern and southern groupings of the enemy Army Group Center.

“As I said, Sukhinichi and Zikeevo only managed to block. They turned out to be occupied by fresh enemy forces that arrived from Western Europe.

The 324th division managed to occupy Sukhinichi only on the morning of January 29th. But this was preceded by a stubborn struggle of the main forces of the 10th Army against an enemy counterattack from the Bryansk - Zhizdra - Lyudinovo region to Sukhinichi.

The enemy began his actions on January 10 - 11 with a strong blow to units of the 322nd division and pushed them away from Zikeev, releasing his garrison in this settlement.
Then, on January 15, 16 and 17, the enemy inflicted heavy blows with aircraft and tanks with infantry on the 323rd division and captured the city of Lyudinovo.

The 10th Army repulsed the enemy's Bryansk counterattack until January 29th. During these days, the troops of the enemy group, advancing from Lyudinov to Sukhinichi, advanced no more than 50 kilometers, and those advancing from Zhizdra, no more than 40 kilometers.

In total, during the period of its offensive from December 6 to January 11, the 10th Army advanced a distance of about 400 kilometers.
The liberation of the cities of Mosalsk, Kirov, Lyudinovo, the encirclement of Zikeev near Zhizdra and access to the Ktsyn area were the limit of its offensive success.
The serious operational-strategic significance of the operations carried out by the 10th Army is obvious.
During the fighting, we captured 57 tanks, 31 aircraft, up to 300 guns, 200 mortars, 500 machine guns, 2,500 vehicles and tractors, 2,500 motorcycles and bicycles, two and a half million shells, many enemy rifles, machine guns, cartridges and hand grenades.

These victories did not come easily to the 10th Army.

Much sweat and blood was shed.

And in conclusion, I would like to say a great thank you to all the participants in the battles and bare my head in front of the blessed memory of our fallen comrades.
Their feat will never fade...
This is about them, who gave their lives for the great cause of Victory, is sung in the song:

The grandson himself found the place of death of his grandfather.

Thanks to the information base of the site www.soldat.ru, as well as as a result of research on the chronicles, memoirs, memoirs of the Great Patriotic War and with the help of the OBD-Memorial website (http://www.obd-memorial.ru/), Mishin's grandson Ivan Timofeevich - Igor Sukhinin - he himself found the place of death of his own grandfather.

According to documents and memoirs, it turns out that Ivan Timofeevich Mishin died in January 1942 near the village of Slobodka in the Lyudinovsky district of the then Smolensk region.
At this time, his 1086th rifle regiment was fighting in the same place.

The village of Slobodka "surfaced" according to the story of the same fellow soldier Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, who survived and on the way home from the front stopped by Ivan Timofeevich's wife to give the documents he had left from the deceased.
It was he who told the wife of I.T. Mishin that he had seen her husband the day before the battle, and it was near the village of Slobodka, then still in the Smolensk region.
After those battles, almost no one was left alive from the regiment.

In addition to what he knew from his grandmother from the story of a fellow soldier, the grandson also found his full name. those fighters from the grandfather’s battalion who were with the grandfather in the same nominal list of reports on irretrievable losses among the dead of the 1086th joint venture of the 323rd rifle division, on an obelisk near the village of Slobodka.
True, there were only 88 fighters listed on the obelisk, and only about 300 fighters were buried there (according to the records of the Kaluga Department of Internal Affairs and the story of a resident of the village of Slobodka, who participated in the burial).

After establishing the place of death of his own grandfather, Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, Igor Sukhinin brought his mother, Yulia Ivanovna, and her sister to the grave of their father near the village of Slobodka, Lyudinovsky district, now the Kaluga region.

So, after 66 years of separation, two daughters met their father again...

BATTLE ROUTES OF THE TAMBOV MILITARY FORMATIONS 2nd Guards Army Formed in the Tambov region in the autumn of 1942 on the basis of formations and units that had already taken part in the battles as a reserve of the Stavka Supreme High Command. The army included the 1st and 13th Guards rifle corps and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps. As part of the Don and Stalingrad fronts, the army participated in Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the Rostov region, on the defensive along the Mius River. In August - early November 1943, as part of the Southern (from October 20, 1943 - 4th Ukrainian) Front, the 2nd Guards Army participated in the Donbass and Melitopol offensive operations. After relocation to the area of ​​the Perekop Isthmus in April - May 1944, they took part in the liberation of the Crimea and the storming of Sevastopol. In May - June 1944, the army was redeployed to the area of ​​​​the cities of Dorogobuzh and Yelnya and on July 8 was included in the 1st Baltic Front. Having in its composition the 11th and 13th guards and 54th rifle corps, the 2nd guards army participated in the Siauliai and Memel offensive operations. In December 1944, the army was transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front and participated in East Prussian operation. Formed on the basis of the 22nd Guards Rifle Division as the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, which became part of the 2nd Guards Army, as part of the troops of Stalingrad, Southern, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian fronts participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, in the battles for the liberation of Rostov, in the Donbass, Melitopol, Nikopol, Krivoy Rog, Odessa, Budapest, Vienna, Bratislava-Brnov and Prague operations. For military merit, the corps was awarded the honorary title "Nikolaev" (April 1944) and "Budapest" (April 1945), awarded the Order of the Red Banner and Suvorov 2nd degree. 24 thousand soldiers of the corps were awarded orders and medals, 28 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps is noted in the encyclopedia "The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" among the formations that particularly distinguished themselves during the Great Patriotic War. Commanded the troops of the 2nd Guards Army: Major General Ya. G. Kreizer (since February 1943 Lieutenant General, October-November 1942), Lieutenant General R. Ya. Malinovsky (November 1942 - February 1943 g.), Major General G. F. Zakharov (July 1943 - June 1944), Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze (June 1944 - May 1945). 323rd Rifle Division The division was formed in August-September 1941 in the Tambov region (area of ​​the city of Tambov). At the end of November 1941, she arrived on the Western Front and participated in the battles for Moscow as part of the 10th Army. She entered the battle on December 7 near the city of Mikhailov, Ryazan Region, then participated in the liberation of the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo. As part of the 16th Army, she fought defensive battles in the winter of 1941-1942. In the battle for Moscow suffered heavy losses. By February 1, 1942, active bayonets remained in the regiments of the division: 29 in the 1086th rifle regiment, 44 in the 1088th, and 62 in the 1090th. After heavy fighting and losses, it was withdrawn to the reserve of the Western Front. For the successful conduct of combat operations, the 1086th Infantry Regiment of the Division on March 31, 1942 awarded the order Red Banner. In the summer of 1943, the 323rd Rifle Division, as part of the Bryansk Front, participated in the liberation of the city of Bryansk, for which it was given the honorary name "Bryansk". In the summer of the same year, the division took part in the liberation of the cities of Pochep, Unecha, Klintsy, Novozybkov. In 1944, during the Belarusian offensive operation The 323rd Rifle Division takes part in the liberation of the cities of Gomel, Zhlobin, Rogachev, Bobruisk, Minsk and others. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 9, 1944, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On August 9, 1944, the 1088th Infantry Regiment of the division was given the honorary name "Bialystok" by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In 1944 and 1945, as part of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the division took part in the liberation of Poland, crossed the Oder and Vistula rivers, and ended its combat path in Germany near the city of Luckenwalde near Berlin. On February 19, 1945, the division was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd class. The full name of the division is the 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class Rifle Division. The banner of one of the regiments of division 1086 is stored in the Tambov Regional Museum of Local Lore. Division commanders: Major General I. A. Gartsev (1941 - May 1942), then Colonels I. O. Naryshkin, A. M. Bakhtizin (killed on August 11, 1942), S. F. Ukraintsev, A M. Chernyak, Major General Hero of the Soviet Union V. T. Maslov (1944 - 1945). 325th Rifle Division

323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov Rifle Division

In August-September 1941, in Tambov, at the Tregulay station, the 323rd Rifle Division was formed, consisting mainly of Tambov residents.
On October 21, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive on the formation of the 10th Reserve Army by December 2, 1941, with its direct subordination to the Headquarters. The army included: 326th Rifle Division - Penza; 324th - Penza; 322nd - Kuznetsk; 330th - Syzran; 323rd Infantry Division Petrovsk. In addition, two rifle brigades were supposed to arrive from the Urals military district. The army headquarters was deployed in the city of Kuznetsk.
On November 29, 1941, units of this army (according to the directive of November 24, 1941 No. op / 2995) were redeployed to the following points: 328th Rifle Division - Turlatovo, Vygorodok; 322nd Rifle Division - Rybnoe; 330th Rifle Division - Ryazan; 323rd Rifle Division - Spassk-Ryazansky; 326th Rifle Division - Shilovo; 57th cavalry division- Kanino (northeast of Ryazhsk); 75th Cavalry Division - Ryazan.
The army headquarters and communications units were located in Shilovo. It was ordered to complete the concentration of the army by the evening of December 2, and on December 4 (according to Directive No. 0044 / op) to apply main blow in the direction of Mikhailov, Stalinogorsk.
The 10th reserve army of General Golikov, included in the front, went to the front on December 6: 322nd rifle division - Klemovo, Okunkovo, Rybkino (5 km east of Okunkovo); The 330th Rifle Division fought around Mikhailov from the north; The 328th Rifle Division fought near Mikhailov, on its eastern side; The 323rd Rifle Division, from the line north of Slobodka, advanced on Mikhailov from the southeast; 324th Rifle Division - Slobodka, Pecherniki; 325th Rifle Division - Pecherniki, Berezovo; 326th Rifle Division - Durnoe, Semenovskoe; The 41st Cavalry Division from the Vysokoye area was moving towards Katino; The 239th Rifle Division, remaining in the army reserve, had the task of reaching the Durnoye, Telyatniki area by the end of December 6 (2 km northwest of Durnoy); The 57th cavalry division, remaining in the army reserve, was supposed to reach the area of ​​​​Mamonovo, Bulychevo by the end of December 6; The 75th Cavalry Division was in Ryazan, and after December 6 it was transferred to the left flank of the army.
On December 10, 1941, the Epifan station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated by the troops of the 10th Army, the 1086th regiment of the 323rd rifle division. He commanded the regiment A.A. Bogdanov.
In December, the division participated in the battles for Moscow, and then liberated the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo. [Photo of Tambov residents from the 323rd Rifle Division in November 1941. before being sent to the front.]
In the battle for Moscow, the division suffered heavy losses.
The fact that these were battles is evidenced by the losses of the division in personnel.
By the beginning of February 1942, its rifle regiments included:
in the 1086th regiment - 29,
in 1088 - 44,
in 1090 - 64 bayonets.
Thus, from the staffing of the rifle regiments of the division (excluding the divisional artillery regiment and other structural divisions) only 139 people remained in the ranks, i.e. a total of less than two rifle companies, which were later reduced to the staff of 1086 joint ventures. For the successful conduct of hostilities 1086 joint ventures in the spring of 1942, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
After the division was completed to full strength in 1942, it operated in the Kaluga region. For the operation to liberate Bryansk, the 323rd Infantry Division was given the name "Bryansk".
In 1944-45, the division liberated Belarus, Poland, and Germany from fascist invaders.
On February 19, 1945, she was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd class.
The 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class, Rifle Division completed its combat path in Germany near the city of Luckenwalde.
The battle banner of one of the regiments - 1086th - is stored in the regional Tambov Museum of Local Lore.
On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Great Victory, the name of the division was immortalized on a stele installed at the Tregulay station of the Tambov region.

19.09.1907 - 22.06.1968
The hero of the USSR

M atveev Ivan Stepanovich - commander of the 1086th Rifle Regiment of the Red Banner (323rd Rifle Bryansk Red Banner Division, 33rd Army, 1st Belorussian Front),

lieutenant colonel.

Born on September 19, 1907 in the village of Egorievo, now the Laishevsky District of the Republic of Tatarstan in peasant family. Russian. He graduated from the 8th grade, then in 1927 the Soviet party school in the city of Chistopol. He worked as chairman of the Yegorievsk village council. In 1929 he was chairman of the first agricultural commune named after Karl Marx in the region.

Drafted into the army in 1929. Member of the CPSU (b) / CPSU since 1930. He graduated from the school of political instructors. He served as a Komsomol organizer of a company, deputy company commander for political affairs, after 1937 - party organizer, battalion commissar. By 1941 he was a 2nd year student at the Military-Political Academy.

During the Great Patriotic War in active army since June 1941. Fought on the Western Front. He was shell-shocked on October 5, 1942. In 1943, he graduated from the Higher Tactical and Rifle Courses for Command Staff "Shot", where he was retrained for a combat position.

Major I.S. Matveev was sent to the front, where he received the 1086th Infantry Regiment of the 323rd Infantry Division. In this division he fought on the Bryansk, Belorussian, 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, again 1st Belorussian fronts.

Particularly distinguished himself during the Vistula-Oder strategic operation in Poland.

During the offensive of the 33rd Army from the Pulawski bridgehead on the Vistula in battles in the area settlements Gnezdkow, Nemyrichuv (15 km southeast of the city of Zvolen) on January 14-17, 1945, he skillfully organized a breakthrough of three lines of the enemy’s heavily fortified long-term defense to its entire depth. At the same time, his regiment inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and captured large trophies.

At Kazom of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 27, 1945 for the skillful command of the regiment, courage and heroism shown in the Vistula-Oder operation, Matveev Ivan Stepanovich He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

After the end of the war, he continued to serve in the Armed Forces. In 1946 he graduated from the "Shot" courses for the second time, in 1952 - in absentia from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. Since 1955, Colonel I.S. Matveev has been in reserve. Lived in Kharkov, worked in the experimental design bureau of automation.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin (02/27/1945; 03/24/1945; ...), 2 Orders of the Red Banner (03/07/1944; ...), Orders of Alexander Nevsky (10/3/1943), Patriotic War 2nd degree (12/29/1944), Red Stars, medals.

On the Bryansk Front, Major I.S. Matveev participated in the 11th Army in the Oryol offensive operation (July 12 - August 18, 1943) - the final stage Battle of Kursk, including the liberation of the city of Karachev; then in the Bryansk offensive operation (September 1 - October 3, 1943), including the liberation of the city of Bryansk.

During the fighting in July 1943, commanding the regiment, he completed all the combat missions assigned to the regiment. With small losses, he captured the settlements of Resset, Mokrye Dvory and others (Khvastovichsky district of the Kaluga region).

He repulsed counterattacks of superior enemy forces with heavy losses for him near the village of Kolodyassy, ​​Khvastovichi district. During the offensive, he skillfully maneuvered on the battlefield, established interaction with other branches of the military. He occupied the settlements of Terebilovo, Krasny Pakhar, Pesochnaya, participated in the capture of the city of Karachev.

The regiment of Major I.S. Matveev, under heavy fire from the retreating enemy, pursued him, inflicting losses on him and pushing him to the west.

On the night of September 16-17, 1943, the 1086th Regiment crossed the Desna River with a swift attack and, together with other parts of the division, broke into the northern part of the city of Bryansk.

For the difference in these battles, I.S. Matveev was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky.

On the Belorussian Front, as part of the 11th Army, he participated in the Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation (November 10 - 30, 1943) to defeat the Gomel-Rechitsa enemy grouping in the Gomel region (Belarus).

On the 1st Belorussian Front, as part of the 3rd Army, he participated in the Rogachev-Zhlobin offensive operation (February 21-26, 1944) and subsequent battles in the Bobruisk direction.

The 1086th Rifle Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Matveev, after a 6-day march on March 1, 1944, entered the battle and, under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire, broke through its defenses in the direction of Gorokhov, Yurkov, Bushmarenkovo. On the sector of the regiment, the enemy was pushed back. The regiment, together with other units of the 323rd and 129th Rifle Divisions (40th Corps of the 3rd Army), crossed the Drut River on the ice northwest of the city of Rogachev and captured a bridgehead near the village of Bolshie Konoplitsy (now Konoplitsy) of the Rogachev district of the Gomel region south of the village of Ozerany. On March 2 and 3, the enemy launched counterattacks up to an infantry regiment with the support of 30 tanks and artillery. All of them were repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy. He lost more than 200 soldiers and officers killed, 3 tanks burned, 5 tanks knocked out, 6 prisoners taken.

IS Matveev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

The regiment of Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Matveev was on the bridgehead near the Drut River until June 1944.

As part of the 3rd Army, I.S. Matveev participated in the Belarusian strategic operation "Bagration" - Bobruisk (June 24 - June 29, 1944) and Minsk (June 29 - July 4, 1944) offensive operations on the 1st Belorussian Front; Bialystok offensive operation (July 5 - 27, 1944) on the 2nd Belorussian Front.

During the Bobruisk operation, acting from a bridgehead on the Drut River, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev skillfully led the regiment. Being at the forward observation post, he organized the interaction of units and attached units, thanks to which the defense in depth was broken through. This made it possible to expand the foothold and build on the success achieved.

The regiment, led by I.S. Matveev, liberated dozens of settlements in Belarus in 4 days of fighting and advanced 50 kilometers with battles, pursuing and destroying enemy manpower and equipment. During this time, they destroyed up to 1150 soldiers and officers, took 35 prisoners, 15 guns, 10 tractors, 28 mortars, 2 tanks, 8 vehicles, 6 easel and 28 light machine guns and other military property of the enemy.

I.S. Matveev was awarded the Order of Lenin.

During the Bialystok operation, the 1086th Infantry Regiment entered the territory of Poland and fought stubborn battles in a marshy and forested area on the outskirts of the city of Bialystok, cut the Sokulka-Bialystok highway.

The regiment's battalion was the first to cross the Narew River near the village of Bokiny and won a bridgehead, enabling the regiment and division to develop a further offensive.

Throughout the summer offensive, the regiment carried out important combat missions, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. He captured more than 1,500 prisoners, a large number of weapons and military equipment.

I.S.Maslov was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree.

At the final stage of the war, I.S. Matveev again on the 1st Belorussian Front as part of the 33rd Army took part in the Warsaw-Poznan offensive operation (January 14 - February 3, 1945 - an integral part of the Vistula-Oder strategic operation); then in the Berlin strategic offensive operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945).

From the award sheet for conferring the title of Hero of the Soviet Union

The commander of the 1086 Red Banner Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, in combat operations from January 14 to 18, 1945, proved himself to be an experienced, combative, courageous and courageous commander, fearlessly and skillfully leading his regiment from one victory to another.

On January 14, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, to the sounds of an orchestra, with an unfolded banner, raised the regiment on the attack and, on the bridgehead in the Gnezdkuv area, with a swift blow broke through the long-term defense of the enemy and in an hour and a half passed 4 lines of trenches, overcame all artificial obstacles and captured the first position of the enemy.

Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, on his shoulders the 1086th Rifle Regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, also broke through the second fortified position of the enemy, captured his artillery positions and, without stopping, proceeded to pursue and broke through the third position of the enemy in the Nemyrichuv region.

Common truth - the professional preparedness of the commander and the training of the soldier decide the success of the battle. The number of casualties also depends on the ability to fight. Therefore, the neglect of military experience and any "savings" on the combat training of the army turn into serious misfortunes and tragedies in a war. This is where the price of big and small victories begins to grow.
Trouble came to the ranks of the Red Army long before the war. From the mid-1930s, its officer corps was mowed down by repression. By 1940, the ground forces lost about 48773 people, the Air Force - 5616 people and Navy- over 3 thousand command personnel (TsAMO USSR. F. 32. Op. 65584. D. 11. L. 11, 12; F. 1. Op. 78426. D. 16. L. 24. GSHVMF. F. 34 578. D. 2. L. 237). Many military leaders and the main part of the leadership of the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and military districts, as well as 27 corps commanders, 96 division commanders, 184 regiment commanders, 11 air force commanders of districts and fleets, 12 air division commanders, 4 fleet commanders and hundreds of other commanders were arrested. and political workers. Their fate is known.
The personnel cycle began in the Red Army. During the period from 1938 to 1940, all the commanders of the military districts were replaced, their deputies, assistants, chiefs of staff, heads of military branches and services were updated by 90%, by 80% - management team corps directorates and divisions, 91% - regimental commanders, their assistants and chiefs of staff of regiments. In most military districts, up to half of the officers had command experience from 6 months to 1 year, and about 30-40% of mid-level commanders were reserve officers with insufficient military training.
Pre-war attempts to overcome the personnel crisis did not give the desired effect. Command staff in schools and academies were trained in conditions of an acute shortage of military teachers, on a weak educational and material base and on reduced programs. Before the start of World War II, the current shortage of wartime staff in the border and internal districts reached more than 36,000 officers, and about 55,000 reserve commanders were missing to cover the mobilization needs of the troops.
But the soldier's troubles originate even deeper - in the days of the so-called "Frunze military reform"1924-1928. Then, out of devastation and economic hopelessness, the Red Army was reduced from 5.5 million to 562 thousand people. Meanwhile, the annual number of conscripts in the country, without prejudice to National economy and education, at that time there were more than 900 thousand people, but due to the limited draft capacity, the army and navy could only accept about 300 thousand Red Army and Red Navy soldiers. It turned out that every year up to 600 thousand people were left out of military training. By the summer of 1941, millions of people who were not trained in military affairs made up a significant part of the conscripts.
For many commanders and fighters, the first lessons of the merciless "literacy campaign" of the war were the last. I had to learn to fight on a lot of blood.

ORDER TO THE UNITS OF THE 50TH RIFLE DIVISION

In parts of the division, there was an incorrect use of command personnel, such as: there were personnel left for one platoon in the companies, and the command personnel participated in the battle of the entire company, which led to unnecessary losses of command personnel, command personnel are not protected, as a result of which, during the period of hostilities from August 16 with. a large percentage of the commanding staff dropped out.
The commanders in the units of the division are not used according to their specialty, as, for example, in 359 with a [rifle] regiment there was a case when artillerymen were sent into battle with rifle companies.
Junior [command] and rank and file, who distinguished themselves in battles with German fascism, are not promoted to the positions of command staff.
In pursuance of the order to the troops of the Western Front No. 057 of August 18, 1941, I ORDER:
1. In parts of the division, when personnel go out of action, create full-blooded platoons, companies, battalions. Do not send commanders into battle without personnel.
The entire command staff, after staffing full-blooded units that do not have units, should be sent to the divisional reserve.
2. Stop the practice of using command personnel not in their specialty.
3. Junior commanders and Red Army men who distinguished themselves in battle should be more boldly promoted to the positions of command personnel, regardless of whether there are full-time vacancies, those who do not have full-time positions should be sent to the divisional reserve.
For junior commanders and Red Army soldiers promoted to medium command positions, submit nominal lists in the form No. 3 of order NPO No. 450 for approval by order of their division in the positions of medium command staff by September 2 of this year. G.
4. By September 2 p. d. submit a draft order for the promotion of command personnel to higher positions:
platoon commanders to company commanders, etc.
5. Explain to the Red Army and ml. commanders that after they are approved by order for the division in the positions of middle command staff, they are credited for all types of allowances as middle command staff and [they] will be awarded the military rank of middle command staff.
On the execution to report on September 3.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5864. D. 1. L. 400

FROM THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 325th SHIELD DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE RESERVE STATE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

<...>
The combat training of the division was carried out according to an accelerated program from September 1 to October 29, 1941.

There were shortcomings in the course of study. Sometimes commanders teach what is not on schedule, namely: regulation of the front step, turns on the spot, and not what will be faced in the war.
Parts of the compound did not complete the accelerated program, the quality of training is low. Improvement required.
<...>The lack of training and combat weapons, ammunition does not allow to study the material part, does not make it possible to prepare personnel for the fight.
The division has:
- training rifles - 143;
- hand grenades (training) - 35;
- st [ankovy] machine guns (training) -3;
- light machine guns (training) - 2;
- small-caliber rifles-21.
There is nothing from the property of communications and artillery.
<...>Made by hand:
- hand grenades (blanks) - 7037;
- rifles (wooden) - 130;
- machine guns (wooden models) -7;
- tanks (dummy) - 5.
Classes are conducted by the personnel with the use of homemade wooden weapons.
There is no winter uniform. For this reason, only on November 10, 1941, 8 people deserted. A total of 82 people deserted. Investigated and brought to trial by the Military Tribunal - 16.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5873. D. 11. L. 7.9

FROM THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 1086th FIRE REGIMENT OF THE 323rd FIRE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

To the head of the political department of the 323rd [rifle] division

Being in battles from 12/17/41 to 12/19/41, the regiment suffered heavy losses, especially in command staff. Only one battalion commander and his deputy remained in the first battalion. Same with other battalions. In addition to them, the battalions have 2-3 commanders.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 47

FROM THE REPORT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT
ON LOSSES IN OFFENSIVE BATTLE FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 19, 1941

[To the headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division]

During the offensive from 17 to 19.12.41:

<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 48

FROM THE POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

To the political department of the Western Front

<...>The largest number of crimes was noted in units of the 385th [rifle] division due to the fault of the division commander, who criminally led the troops entrusted to him, unable to organize combat operations not only by the unit as a whole, but also by individual units, due to which not a single combat order of the Military Army Council.
Division commander Colonel Savin and military commissar Nesteruk did not organize a systematic reconnaissance of the enemy forces, the location of his firepower, a thorough study of the terrain and approaches to the enemy’s location, and sometimes, without having timely data on the enemy’s forces, they appointed blind attacks, from which the units carried big losses.
Due to the lack of commanding will and Bolshevik perseverance, high political consciousness, iron military discipline, contempt for death, offensive impulse, vigor and confidence in victory over the enemy were not introduced into the consciousness of the mass of fighters and commanders.
Because of this, during the conduct of military operations, individuals of the commanding staff and fighters criminally did not follow orders, showed disorganization, confusion, cowardice and panic, threw down their weapons and fled from the battlefield.
For example:
The commander of the 2nd company of the 1st battalion 1268 from the [rifle] regiment Borodin, following the combat order to master the village. Loshchihino, along with other units of the regiment, broke into the outskirts of the village. At this time, the battalion commander was wounded and Borodin was ordered to take command of the battalion. Borodin did not comply with this order, he did not lead the battalion, thanks to this, people deprived of leadership began to flee in panic from the village. Due to the fact that the flanks of the battalion were not covered (which Borodin was obliged and had the opportunity to do), the battalion suffered heavy losses.
Borodin was sentenced to death by the court of the Military Tribunal on the basis of NPO order No. 270.
<...>A number of officers of the 385th [rifle] division have poor military training. For example, the head of the 1st department of the [operational] staff, Major Spiridonov.
In 1917, under Kerensky, he completed an accelerated course for ensigns, then for some time he participated in the civil war in the ranks of the Red Army and was demobilized, was in the reserve and, working recently as an economist, was involved 2-3 times training fees command staff.
In 1941, he was called up for mobilization and headed the 1st branch of the shtadiva (essentially the operational center of the division).
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 177. L. 173

EXTRACT FROM THE HISTORICAL FORM OF THE 376th PSKOV RED BANNER DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD OF BATTLE ON the river. VOLKHOV FROM DECEMBER 30, 1941 TO JANUARY 1, 1942

<...>
The battle, organized on the night of 12/30/41, had no means of suppressing the enemy's defenses (mortars and artillery) and could be calculated on surprise and night cover. As a result, at the beginning of the battle, it was possible to reach the western bank of the river. Volkhov and overcome the forefield, come close to the main line of defense of the enemy.
The following days continued senseless attacks without success, inflicting heavy losses on the division. During the four days of the offensive, they made up 50 percent of the personnel.
The reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the division were the following:
<...>
3. Lack of intelligence about the enemy during the hasty entry of the division from the march straight into battle.
4. Ignorance of the enemy led to an incorrect assessment of the enemy and hence to an unbearable setting of tasks for units and subunits.
5. Our lack of mortars, artillery and aviation, which undermined the confidence of the fighters and commanders in our success.
<...>
7. The predominant number of commanders are called up from the reserve, with low military training. This greatly affected the combat operations of the troops.
8. Poor training of staff officers, incompetence of staffs and lack of means of communication.
<...>
The losses of the division from 12/29/41 to 1/24/42 amounted to 15,000 people. During this period, the division was withdrawn four times for understaffing and received a total of 12,000 reinforcements.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 317. Op. 4306. D. 36. L. 41

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 20TH ARMY

active army

Contents: About the organization of the battle
Observation and verification of the organization of the battle by the commanders of formations and units show that commanders of all levels organize the battle poorly, sometimes limiting themselves only to issuing a verbal order. This can explain that for several days the troops of the army have been fighting on the previously reached lines, having little success on the right flank.
Before an offensive, commanders do not conduct reconnaissance, they do not coordinate interaction on the ground with other branches of the military, as a result of which units and formations act blindly. The infantry does not know the tasks of the artillery, the artillery does not know where the infantry is operating. Infantry commanders (company commanders, battalion commanders), as a rule, do not give applications for artillery. Military sappers for reconnaissance of the front line are not used.
The command posts of division commanders and battalion commanders are not combined, and assault and blocking groups are not created.
During the battle, the commanders of units and formations do not sufficiently study the situation, therefore, as a rule, they do not know what is happening on the battlefield. As a result, the commanders of companies and batteries are presented to themselves.

I ORDER: 1. When organizing an offensive, the commanders of formations and units conduct personal commander's reconnaissance, determining the tasks of the offensive on the ground. On the ground, establish interaction with artillery and tanks in time and lines.
2. Create assault and blocking groups, set specific tasks for them to capture settlements.
3. Do not disperse your forces and means on a broad front, but strive to beat the enemy on a narrow front with the entire mass of artillery fire, mortars and manpower. Strive to bypass the fortified settlements of the enemy - in no case hit him in the forehead, but hit where he does not expect.
4. To have artillery O[observation] P[points] of battalions directly at the Command [command] P[points] of battalion commanders with the expectation of fulfilling the requests of the latter in terms of fire impact on the enemy.
5. Bring the headquarters of divisions and brigades as close as possible to the troops (3-4 km).
6. Commanders of all levels continuously monitor the situation in battle and, if necessary, respond to it immediately, using, if necessary, the fire reserve and manpower allocated for this.

TsAMO USSR. F. 373. Op. 6631. D. 19. L. 2.3

FROM THE BULLETIN OF THE GERMAN ARMY

Experience of the war in the East General provisions.
The Bolsheviks are the most stubborn and cunning of all the opponents we have had to face in this war. As a rule, they fight not for some ideal, not for their homeland, but out of fear of the boss, especially the commissar.
Russian attacks are, as a rule, according to this scheme once and for all - in large masses of people and are repeated several times without any changes. The advancing infantry leaves their infantry positions in compact groups and rushes to the attack from a long distance with a shout of "Hurrah". Officers and commissars follow behind and fire on the stragglers.
In most cases, an attack is preceded by reconnaissance in force on a wide front, which, after breaking through [the defense] of the enemy or infiltrating our position, turns into a decisive attack from the rear and flanks.
Artillery preparation for an attack is rarely used, but they are very willing to use at night, before an attack, short, but strong harassing fire from long distances, constantly changing their firing positions.
The Russians begin their attacks at dusk or at dawn. Taking advantage of the darkness, fog, blizzard or rainy weather, the Russians take up initial positions for the attack before this. Repulsed attacks are repeated again, sparing no effort and changing nothing. It is difficult to assume that during one combat day of the offensive, the [attacking] unit will in any way change the scheme of the attack.
Thus, to repel Russian attacks, strong nerves and the consciousness that our excellent small arms are able to withstand a massive Russian offensive are needed.
The artillery and heavy weapons of the infantry have the task of pinning down the support of the [Russian] attack by delivering massed fire on the discovered starting positions. Since they are most often located in hollows, the fire of grenade launchers, which the Russians are especially afraid of, has a great effect. Infantry suppresses close-range attacks with automatic weapons.
The morale impact of the Russian "Hurrah" roar can be dampened by their own "Hurrah" calls, giving the Russians the impression that the Germans themselves are going on the attack. It is not recommended to organize local spontaneous counterattacks in the presence of weak forces. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Russians do not withstand systematic counterattacks, especially from the flanks.
<...>Carrying out constant harassing attacks with small forces aims to wear down parts of the enemy, to repel his attack even before he is attacked by the main forces.
Repulse of enemy reconnaissance actions should be carried out in a variety of ways, since in the case of a monotonous repetition of the organization of defense, enemy reconnaissance activities are facilitated. It is advisable to start repulsing [the attack] with a small number of weapons in order to prevent the enemy from organizing an attack from the very beginning.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 107. L. 262. Translation from a German captured document

DIRECTIVE OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT

№ 3750

To all commanders, commissars of divisions and brigades

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the front receive numerous letters from Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers, testifying to the criminally negligent attitude of command of all levels to saving the lives of Red Army infantrymen.
Hundreds of examples are cited in letters and stories when commanders of units and formations kill hundreds and thousands of people during attacks on undestroyed enemy defenses and undestroyed machine guns, on unsuppressed strongholds, with a poorly prepared offensive.
These complaints are certainly true and reflect only part of the current frivolous attitude towards replenishment savings.<...>.
I demand:
1. Each abnormal loss of people should be thoroughly investigated within 24 hours and, based on the results of the investigation, immediately make a decision, reporting to the highest headquarters. Commanders who have criminally thrown units into the enemy's unsuppressed fire system should be brought to the strictest accountability and appointed to a lower position.
2. Before an infantry attack, the enemy's fire system must necessarily be suppressed and neutralized, for which each commander organizing an attack must have a carefully developed plan for destroying the enemy by fire and attack. Such a plan must be approved by the senior commander, which at the same time should serve as control for the senior commander.
3. Attach a personal explanation to the loss reports on the merits of the losses, who is responsible for the abnormal losses, what measures have been taken against those responsible and to prevent them [losses] in the future.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 174. L. 390