The Art of War is one of the first treatises on military strategy, tactics, and the very philosophy of war. The author of the book was the Chinese commander and philosopher Sun Tzu, who lived in the 6th century BC. e. His concepts and recommendations formed the basis of the military practice of most Asian countries. At the beginning of the 18th century, The Art of War began to be translated into European languages. It is known that the treatise was the reference book of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the ideas presented in The Art of War interested the leadership of Nazi Germany. And today, Sun Tzu's work is used to train officers in the US Army.
The personality of Sun Tzu and the history of writing the treatise
Until the 3rd century BC. e. China was not single state. On the territory of the Celestial Empire there were several independent kingdoms that were in a state of permanent war with each other. Sun Tzu was born around the middle of the 6th century BC. e. in the kingdom of Qi. He made a brilliant military career and became a mercenary commander under Prince Helui, who headed the kingdom of Wu. At the court of Prince Sun Tzu, he became famous for his wisdom and insight. At the request of Khelyuy, the commander wrote The Art of War, where he outlined all his knowledge.
However, Sun Tzu became famous not only as a theoretician, but also as a practitioner. Thanks to his talent, the kingdom of Wu managed to subjugate the neighboring principalities.
Key Ideas
Sun Tzu's ideas about war are distinguished by their integrity. His work is very consistent and thorough. Single, complete ideas permeate each chapter of the text. Sun Tzu's main thoughts are as follows:
- War is always loss. Therefore, any conflict must be resolved, first of all, diplomatically.
- Haste and emotions are a sure way to death. A military leader must be restrained and rely only on common sense.
- The main task of the commander is to achieve control of the enemy.
- The main thing in war is not luck, but the possession of information.
- A combat-ready army is one in which the soldiers are provided with everything necessary, clearly know their purpose and strictly obey their commanders.
The Art of War consists of 13 chapters, each of which deals with various aspects of preparing for war and conducting combat.
Preliminary calculations
Sun Tzu emphasizes that it is impossible to win a war without careful preparation. Before starting a war, the ruler and commander must analyze the five main elements of war.
- First, you need to evaluate the "Way" - that is, the state of society, the attitude of the people to power and possible military actions.
- The second important component is "Heaven" - the time that the belligerent side can have.
- The third element is "Earth" - the terrain on which the war will be fought, the time of year and weather conditions.
- The fourth component is the "Commander" himself. It is necessary to understand how talented the person leading the army is, whether he is able to act reasonably and impartially.
- And finally, the fifth important element is “Law”. This includes everything related directly to the army (the level of training of soldiers and officers, provisions, weapons, uniforms, and much more).
Waging war
The commander must not only anticipate the possible tactical moves of the enemy, but also calculate the losses that the war will entail and the potential gains. It is impossible to start a war without a detailed estimate, which would take into account the expenses for the needs of the army. At the same time, a talented military leader will be able to avoid unnecessary prolongation of hostilities and, thereby, save the state from additional expenses, and the soldiers from hunger, disease and deprivation.
Attack planning
Sun Tzu advises commanders not to rush into hostilities. Battle is the last means of warfare. Diplomacy, bribery, intimidation, disinformation, and espionage must be tried before going to battle. The enemy must be deprived of allies and confused. Only then can you move on to a quick and decisive attack.
In order for the war to end in victory, every person on the battlefield, from a simple soldier to a ruler, must pursue a common goal.
The form
The commander must be able to find the point on which he can gain a foothold in case of failure. As soon as his army is strong enough, it will be possible to start moving forward.
Power
The task of the commander is to seize the strategic initiative and force the enemy to move in the right direction. In order to master this initiative, the military leader must be able to properly conduct the battle and maneuver. Each maneuver brings the enemy closer to the trap, more and more confusing the enemy army.
Fullness and emptiness
In this chapter, Sun Tzu again recalls the importance of preliminary calculations. Victory will be guaranteed to whoever arrives first on the battlefield. Being late is a disaster. The commander must have time to explore the area, take more advantageous positions, build fortifications and give rest to his soldiers.
Also, the commander-in-chief must understand the logic that guides the enemy, know all the weak and strong points of the enemy. The offensive plan and all subsequent maneuvers of the army directly depend on this information.
Fight in the war
Even the fastest and most powerful attacks will not give anything if order and discipline reign in the camp of the enemy. The commander must be able to wear down and demoralize his opponent. Only then will the offensive succeed.
Excessive haste in war usually leads to death. It is better to spend time studying the roads and talking with the locals than to go on an attack that will quickly break against the enemy’s fortifications.
At the same time, the commander must also keep order in his camp. Only unity and discipline will lead to the goal.
nine changes
In this chapter, Sun Tzu notes that the reasons for the defeat can be not only the successful actions of the enemy or an unsuccessful location, but also the inability of the commander to control his emotions.
Some commanders behave on the battlefield too desperately and recklessly, striving for death, and some are cowardly and as a result are captured. Some generals are too hard on their soldiers, and some are too gentle with them. In both cases, the army ceases to obey its commander. Also destructive is the excessive ambition of the commander in chief. This feeling can cause the commander to forget himself during the battle and lose his composure.
hike
In this purely practical section, Sun Tzu, based on his own experience, tells how to conduct military operations on different types terrain, cross the river correctly, move through the mountains, which points should be chosen to start the battle. He also pays attention to the behavior of the enemy and explains how to interpret certain actions of the enemy.
Terrain Shapes
Sun Tzu supplements the previous chapter a little, talking about the conduct of combat in various natural conditions. But most of the section is devoted to the relationship between the commander and the soldiers. Sun Tzu believes that a commander must be able to maintain a balance when communicating with his subordinates. Usually soldiers are ready to die for a general who loves and cares for them. But with a too soft commander in chief, the army can easily get out of control.
nine localities
This chapter reveals the specifics of conducting combat on one's own and enemy soil. Sun Tzu talks about when it is better to capture new territories, and when it would be more rational to retreat. Also in the text there is a description of the areas most suitable for attack, retreat or encirclement.
fire attack
The chapter deals with the destruction of warehouses, fields, supplies and armed forces enemy. At the same time, Sun Tzu calls to be guided not by malice and a thirst for revenge, but exclusively by prudence.
Use of spies
Sun Tzu emphasizes that even the best tactical offensive plan is worthless if the commander has no information about the enemy. The use of spies is necessary not only to know everything about the camp of the enemy, but also to ensure that the enemy himself receives false information.
Recently, Sun Tzu, the legendary Chinese military leader, has been often quoted. It is believed that his treatise The Art of War, written in the 5th century BC, is a masterpiece of military thought, that it is still relevant today. This opinion, albeit with some reservations, is also reflected in the corresponding Wikipedia article. In particular, it says that “in many East Asian countries, the Art of War was part of the examination program for potential candidates for military service". That in Japan during the Sengoku era, the commander Takeda Shingen (1521-1573), precisely because he studied the "Art of War", almost never knew defeat. That this treatise had a significant impact on Mao Zedong - the ideas of Sun Tzu were reflected in Mao's work "On Guerrilla Warfare". That The Art of War was a subject of study among Viet Cong officers who "could recite whole sections of the book by heart". And the victory over the French in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu was largely predetermined by the fact that the Viet Cong general Vo Nguyen Giap successfully applied the tactics described in The Art of War.
However, if we seriously talk about the same battle at Dien Bien Phu, the question cannot but arise: could it be that Vo Nguyen Giap would not have achieved his goal if he had not known anything about Sun Tzu’s treatise, but simply acted in accordance, say, with "Combat Regulations" ground forces» (BUSV) USSR?
And further. Paying tribute to this treatise, one cannot fail to see that by the middle of the 20th century, military issues had been enriched with new facts and circumstances, in respect of which Sun Tzu's recommendations no longer look so universal and effective. And it's not just the emergence of weapons of mass destruction, which has radically changed the nature of modern warfare. In the conditions of the war of technologies, including information technologies, the general philosophical “universals” of the treatise, even if we proceed from the fact that they have not lost either justice or relevance, should be filled with new content - adequate to both these technologies and the scale of the problems of modern warfare.
The response to new challenges was the emergence of new industries scientific knowledge, to some extent related to military construction and direct combat operations. Among them - scientific discipline titled "System Analysis".
In the late sixties, the attention of the Soviet reader was presented to the book by E. S. Quaid "Analysis of complex systems: Methodology of analysis in the preparation of military decisions", which is a revised presentation of a course of lectures on systems analysis delivered by leading employees of the RAND Corporation for senior officials of the US Department of Defense and Industry . In particular, it says:
“The survival of a nation may depend to a large extent on its ability to deal with the problems of modern warfare ahead of time, bearing in mind that the experience of previous wars is unlikely to become solid foundation to solve these problems. Much of what may be connected with a future conflict cannot be resolved in any other way than by calculation. There is no other way to determine the number of missiles needed to destroy a group of targets, or to determine how to maintain a communications center when a bomb with a charge equivalent to 20 megatons of TNT explodes nearby, or to carry out reliable disarmament.
Defining defense policy, Quaid says, required "systematic quantitative research by physicists, sociologists, engineers, in collaboration with military specialists." The results of these studies are recommendations to those "who make decisions on the broadest issues of national security." Such studies constitute the content of the discipline "Analysis of Systems". The circumstances that prompted us to turn to studies of this type are not without interest. Quaid writes:
“At the time of the catastrophic martial law that developed in England during the Second World War, those responsible for the defense of this country decided to involve physicists, biologists, mathematicians and other highly educated specialists in solving purely military problems. The involvement of specialists was caused not only by the depth of the crisis experienced at that time, but also by the emergence of new weapons based on new production methods that were not known from past military experience. These weapons and weapon systems (radar being a prime example) were so new in concept and design that their use could not be planned on the basis of ordinary military experience alone. New methods of analysis were required, which were developed during the Second World War and laid the foundation for a field of knowledge called operations analysis at that time, and later, depending on the application, operations research, systems engineering, cost-benefit analysis and systems analysis. The success of a small but well-organized effort in England served as an impetus for development-activity in this direction, and, as might be expected, the involvement of scientists contributed to the solution of problems that were usually considered outside their competence.
The first chapter of Sun Tzu's treatise is called Preliminary Calculations. Here are some excerpts from it:
1. Sun Tzu said: war is a great thing for the state, it is the soil of life and death, it is the way of existence and death.
4. Therefore, the war is weighed in seven calculations and in this way the position is determined.
9. Who - even before the battle - wins by preliminary calculation, he has many chances; who - even before the battle - does not win by calculation, he has little chance. Who has a lot of chances - wins; who has few chances - does not win; especially the one who has no chance at all. Therefore, for me - at the sight of this one - victory and defeat are already clear.
This is wisdom believed by some to be at least two and a half millennia old.
But, for example, the real situation of the late forties - early fifties. Let me remind you that on December 19, 1949, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (CNS) approved the Dropshot plan for the war against Soviet Union and its allies, suggesting the use of the US nuclear monopoly that still existed at that time to organize large-scale atomic bombings of the cities of the Soviet Union and an unprecedented mass destruction of civilians in history. However, such structures as the KNSh exist in order to develop a variety of scenarios for the conduct of hostilities - if possible, for all occasions. The date of approval of the document is also interesting here - several years remained before the appearance of Soviet (and American) intercontinental ballistic missiles. The main means of delivering nuclear weapons at that time were strategic bombers.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the US Air Force suggested that the RAND Corporation conduct "study of the problem of choosing air bases on other continents". In other words, to make those very “seven calculations” (“Measure this time”?), Which Sun Tzu speaks about. And then the specifics and special circumstances that reflect the specifics of cold war. Quaid writes:
“However, a preliminary study of this issue soon showed that the main problem was not how to acquire, build and operate air bases on the territory of other countries, but where and how to base strategic air forces and how to operate these forces in interaction with the chosen system of bases. It became clear that the choice of bases could decisively affect the composition and strike power of strategic aviation, as well as the total cost of it. Thus, it was unwise to consider the issue of bases only depending on the savings on their cost. It was necessary to take into account how the decision on bases affects the overall cost of all strategic aviation, how, for example, it will affect costs due to the increase in the range of bombers that cannot reach the target without refueling, or on the routes that aircraft must fly over enemy territory, on the losses that they may have from enemy air defense fire while flying along these routes, as well as on the difficulties that may arise when restoring bases after an enemy attack on them ".
And again we turn to the wisdom of Sun Tzu. The third chapter of the treatise "Strategic attack" says: "Win if they know when to fight and when not". And further:
"nine. Therefore, it is said: if you know him and know yourself, fight at least a hundred times, there will be no danger; if you know yourself, but you don’t know him, you will win once, you will fail another time; if you don’t know yourself or him, every time you fight, you will be defeated.”
In his book, Quaid devotes more than a dozen pages to research prior to the adoption of the required decision, on which both the actions of the US military and the alleged actions of the command of the USSR Armed Forces are analyzed in detail. And comes to the following conclusions:
“To my knowledge, this was the first study in which, as major problem the vulnerability of US strategic aviation, the most powerful aircraft in the world, was raised, and it was pointed out that it could be destroyed as a result of a sudden enemy strike. Researchers have considered many means and ways to counter this threat, and subsequent discussions have made recommendations to the US Air Force for other measures. As a result, the necessary measures were approved to protect US strategic aviation from the combined threat from aircraft and ballistic missiles, and the role of active air defense systems was revised.
It is common for the “sophisticated” reader of our days to believe that many of the provisions of Sun Tzu’s treatise look quite obvious to themselves (“Thank you, they say, Cap”). Interestingly, the RAND analysts were also faced with a very similar assessment of their own performance - albeit several years after the completion of the study commissioned by the Air Force command. Let's give the floor to Quaid again:
“Today, critics believe that the results of the analysis should have been obvious before it was carried out and that no careful analysis was required. They argue that it is absurd not to take all reasonable steps to protect one's offensive forces, especially when it is assumed that the enemy will strike first, and that it is also absurd to transport propellant by air during combat when it can be transported by sea at low cost to Peaceful time and store it where it is likely to be needed. However, these "absurdities" were not obvious at the time and became obvious a number of years after our analysis..
Apparently, attempts at such criticism of Sun Tzu's book should be treated with some caution.
Yes, times are different now. Only within the framework of the rapidly developing discipline "System Analysis" have new methods been developed, including mathematical ones. And development information technologies has created completely new opportunities for collecting and processing information, managing complex and highly complex systems. What Sun Tzu says in the very general view, almost in philosophical categories, in modern implementation reflected in working computer programs, database and knowledge storage systems. And, not without interest, the developers of all this "good" could well not know anything about either Sun Tzu himself or his treatise.
Some idea of the modern methods of studying systems as applied to the organization of hostilities is given by the monograph by V.I. Novoseltsev "System Analysis: Modern Concepts". The editor's preface notes that the book is not cluttered with mathematical symbols, which "allowed a rather difficult, but interesting subject to be made accessible to a wide range of readers, it is said:
“The book advances and discusses three utilitarian imperatives of systems research in their dialectical unity:
- dominance of the essence of the problem over the formal methods of its solution;
- the constructiveness of the conflictological view of the nature of things;
- unconditional priority of model methods for substantiating decisions over empiricism and speculation.
Modern methods of systems analysis involve, in particular, the use of logical-linguistic methods of solution.
For example, to describe situations, the so-called situational management language (SCM) is used, the vocabulary of which is formed by sets of: basic concepts (v), basic relations (r), names (i), elementary solutions (p) and ratings (o). From the elements of these sets, according to certain grammar rules of the YaSU, texts are constructed that describe the input situations S(t). An example illustrating the possibilities of this language is the description of the following situation:
The tenth motorized rifle battalion (MSB) of the "greens" is defending the settlement "O". The Fifth Mechanized Brigade (MBR) of the Blues, reinforced by fire support helicopters, was tasked with capturing locality"O". The first motorized rifle (MSB) and the second tank (TB) battalions of the fifth MBR of the "blue" are on the march and are approaching the zones of mortar and anti-tank weapons of the "greens". Fire support helicopters of the "blues" entered the zone of action of the "green" anti-aircraft missiles.
The use of such structures eliminates the ambiguity of understanding the described situations (characteristic of natural language). They are “comprehensible” to the computer, that is, they can be easily recorded, stored and processed, forming a base of subject knowledge. Such texts allow formal transformations of their constructions, in accordance with the grammar given language, which allows you to derive new concepts and generalize situations (divide the set of situations into subsets-classes).
So what is the value of Sun Tzu's treatise for our contemporary?
It would seem that for the conduct of modern military operations, the combat regulations of various branches of the armed forces are much more useful. For planning military operations of any scale, the tools of modern systems analysis are very effective. Why do we need this Sun Tzu then? Is it worth the time to study it?
It seems to me that the answer to this question follows precisely from the universal, philosophical nature of this work. Precisely as a carrier of certain philosophical ideas - in relation to all areas human activity in which there is rivalry, confrontation. In this sense, the point of view of Novoseltsev is personally close to me:
“At all times, philosophical knowledge is music for the soul, the harmony of the mind coming from above. Our time is no exception. Any educated person, turning to the thoughts of great philosophers, can get pleasure similar to the one you experience when listening to the divine creations of Bach, Vivaldi, Tchaikovsky. In philosophy, as in life, there is everything: tragic and funny, eternal and transient. You just need to learn to understand the music of philosophy - then life will be different, professional and everyday problems will be resolved in a completely different way.
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Translation from Chinese, foreword, academician's comments Nicholas Conrad
© N. I. Konrad (heir), translation, preface, comments, 2017
© AST Publishing House LLC, 2017
From the translator
Among the vast and varied literature left to us by old China, a special place is occupied by literature on the art of war. At the same time, like the well-known classics of philosophy, this literature also has its own classics: the ancient Confucian "Pentateuch" and "Tetrabook" here correspond to its own "Septateuch".
This "Septateuch" was formed as a result of a selection that lasted for many centuries from a very large military literature those works that gradually gained authority in matters of war and military affairs. This selection received its final form under the Sung dynasty in the last quarter of the 11th century. Since then, these works have taken the position of universally recognized classics.
These treatises are seven, but highest value have two of them, put in the first place: "Sun Tzu" and "Wu Tzu", named after the names of those ancient strategists to whom tradition ascribes the authorship, if not of these works themselves, then, in any case, of those provisions, which are expressed there. If the "Septateuch" as a whole is considered "the canon military science”(wu-jing), then these two treatises form the basis of this canon. By the way, they are also the most ancient: the historical tradition believes that Sun Tzu's activity as a commander falls at the end of the 6th and the beginning of the 5th century. BC e.; the activity of Wu-tzu - at the beginning of the 4th century. BC e. The reputation of these two treatises is such that for a long time, both in China and in Japan, it was generally accepted that the military art of old China was “the military art of Sun-Wu” (Sun-Wu bing fa).
However, it is not for nothing that Sun Tzu is placed in the first place among these two treatises. This treatise laid the foundations for the military science of old China. At the end of the Ming era, i.e., in the first half of the 17th century, Mao Yuan-yi said that perhaps there were treatises on the art of war before Sun Tzu, but, firstly, they did not reach us, but secondly, the most essential thing that they had, became part of the teachings of Sun Tzu; after Sun Tzu, a number of works in this area appeared, but all of them ultimately either directly develop certain ideas of Sun Tzu, or are under his influence. Therefore, Mao concludes, strictly speaking, all military science in China is entirely contained in Sun Tzu.
These words testify, first of all, to the halo of indisputable authority that surrounded the name of Sun Tzu even in such late times, i.e., when military science in China already numbered many works. Of course, Mao is wrong: not all treatises of the "Septateuch" repeat "Sun Tzu" or come from it. The treatises "Wu Tzu", "Wei Liao Tzu", "Sima Fa" and some others can be recognized as quite original in content, but it is absolutely indisputable that no one, even the famous "Wu Tzu", can be next to Sun Tzu.
Under the sign of "Sun Tzu" goes all the latest, at least from the III century. n. e., military-theoretical literature of old China.
This role of "Sun Tzu" is not limited to China alone. Sun Tzu's treatise occupied exactly the same position both in the former Korea and in feudal Japan: and there it was the authority in all basic questions concerning the war.
The new time did not reject Sun Tzu. And in the XIX and XX centuries. both in China and in Japan, Sun Tzu is studied by military specialists along with the old classics of the military scientific and theoretical thought of other peoples.
The study of Sun Tzu's treatise has always been a necessary element of higher military education in these countries. The events of the last 20–25 years 1
The work was published in 1950 - Note. ed.They awakened a new, even wider interest in this monument. In his homeland, China, Sun Tzu's treatise found itself in the sphere of attention of the direct leaders of the struggle of the Chinese people against their oppressors and foreign invaders.
On the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that over the past decades, Sun Tzu's treatise has attracted increased attention in the opposite camp, primarily among Japanese reactionary military figures. Evidence of this are the new editions of the treatise, published in 1935, 1940 and 1943. and intended for the general reader. Since this popularization of the ancient monument took place in those years when Japanese imperialism waged (since 1931) a predatory, predatory war in China and was preparing to attack the USSR, it is clear that the ruling circles of imperialist Japan sought to use many of the views of Sun Tzu in their goals and turn Sun Tzu's treatise, commented accordingly, into one of the means of militaristic propaganda.
Undoubtedly, in the teachings of Sun Tzu, due to its historical era, there are many features that attracted to him those who waged wars of conquest. The military ideology, which found its vivid expression in the treatise of Sun Tzu, was the ideology of the ruling classes of Ancient China and later firmly entered the military-ideological arsenal of the feudal rulers of China and Japan. This military ideology - if we consider its historical role for many centuries - was the ideology necessary for those who waged unjust, predatory, predatory wars. But at the same time, this doctrine would never have outlived its age to such an extent if it did not contain other features that make it possible for those who waged and continue to fight against the invaders to turn to it. A liberation struggle of such a nature and scope, which has never been observed in the history of China and which led to the victory of the people's democratic forces, testifies that a number of Sun Tzu's provisions, critically assimilated in relation to a different historical situation and other goals of armed operations, turned out to be suitable and in the struggle of the people against their oppressors. These aspects of Sun Tzu's teachings are undoubtedly of particular interest to us.
Thus, there is every reason to translate this ancient work on military art into Russian. Thus, Sun Tzu's treatise, the oldest and at the same time one of the most widely known works of military literature in China, Korea, and Japan, is brought to the attention of specialists studying the monuments of military science. Thus, a kind of military-theoretical commentary on military history of these countries, facilitating the study - from the point of view of the strategic and tactical art characteristic of a number of countries of the Far East - major wars and the battles that were fought there. In view of the fact that Sun Tzu, both in China and Japan, has not been discarded by the new military science, which seeks to extract their rational grain from his views, knowledge of this treatise may be useful for understanding some aspects of the strategy and tactics of the armies of these countries, not only in the past but also in modern times.
There is one specific aspect of this treatise, to which it owes much of its wide popularity. Many of his general provisions always easily transferred from the field of war to the field of politics and diplomacy. Therefore, Sun Tzu's treatise is of certain importance for understanding the actions of not only military leaders, but also politicians of the countries mentioned.
Far East, and, moreover, not only in distant historical times.
The translation of the treatise, intended for the modern Soviet reader, must inevitably be accompanied by a commentary. This is necessary, first of all, in order to reveal the thought of Sun Tzu, often dressed in such a form that makes it incomprehensible to a person of the 20th century. It should not be forgotten that the manner in which Sun Tzu expresses his thoughts differs from the style in which theoretical works are written that are familiar to us. Sun Tzu does not prove, does not explain. He only expresses his position, and usually expresses it in a concise, aphoristic form. Therefore, it is often difficult to understand his thought from its literal expression, and the translator, who does not want to turn the translation into a widespread paraphrase, often has to provide an explanation of this thought to the commentary. Further, it must be remembered that Sun Tzu used words and expressions of his time, in many cases incomprehensible even to his Chinese readers of later times. Therefore, the translator, who does not want to Europeanize and modernize the language and style of the ancient Chinese strategist, is faced with the need to leave the words and expressions in the translation as they are in the original, to explain them in a special commentary. And finally, Sun Tzu's treatise belongs to ancient Chinese culture: its entire content fits into the circle of concepts of this culture, is associated with a certain historical situation. The Soviet reader may not be aware of this situation, and without this knowledge, Sun Tzu's treatise cannot be fully understood. And this means that the translator must present certain provisions of Sun Tzu in the light of the Chinese history of that era.
All these reasons led to the fact that an extensive commentary was attached to the Russian translation, explaining the entire text of the treatise phrase by phrase. The translator sought to clarify the meaning of its individual concepts, the meaning of its provisions and rules, and also to establish an internal connection between individual statements and parts of the treatise as a whole.
In compiling his commentary, the author tried to reveal the thought of Sun Tzu, as it should have been presented in his time. The key to the ideas and positions of Sun Tzu, of course, had to be sought, as has just been said, primarily in his era. This epoch, according to the author, was the so-called period of the "Five hegemons" (U ba), i.e., the 7th-6th centuries. BC e., more precisely, the end of the VI - the beginning of the V century, that is, the time when the ancient slave-owning China consisted of independent kingdoms that fought among themselves. It was then that the doctrine of Sun Tzu was formed as a doctrine of an aggressive war in the interests of slave owners.
The specific historical content of that era, the general course historical process of the time when it is revealed in the light of our historical science, and determined the understanding of the main provisions of the treatise. When studying this era, the author turned to a special, hitherto unused material: to the writings on the art of war that arose in the times closest to the Sun Tzu era - in the Zhangguo period (403–221), namely, to the treatises "Wu Tzu" , "Wei Liao-tzu" and "Sima fa", as well as to literature, although much later, but closely related to Sun Tzu's treatise, such as the famous "Dialogues" by Li Wei-gong. Therefore, the reader will find in the book a number of quotations from these, as well as other treatises of the "Septateuch", quotations designed to illuminate this or that position of Sun Tzu in many ways.
The era of Sun Tzu, considered with the help of the indicated special literature, served as the first material for the Russian commentary on the treatise. The Chinese commentators, of course, also rendered great help in clarifying the treatise. As is known, commentaries on Sun Tzu's treatise began to appear already in antiquity; there is evidence of the existence of such commentaries already in the Han era (206 BC - 220 AD). They have not reached us, and the earliest known to us - the commentary of Tsao-gong dates back to the beginning of the 3rd century BC. n. e. Commenting intensively continued further, so that the treatise gradually acquired a whole explanatory literature. Finally, in the eleventh century a list of the most important and authoritative commentaries from among those that appeared from the 3rd to the 11th centuries was finally established. inclusive. There were ten of them, the authors of which were: Tsao-gong, Du Mu, Mei Yao-chen, Li Quan, Wang Zhe, He Yan-si, Meng-shi, Chen Hao, Chia Lin, Zhang Yu. They are usually joined by the eleventh one - Du Yu. These comments began to accompany any edition of the treatise in the future, since without them it was already in many ways incomprehensible to the Chinese reader of later times.
These comments are of great value. Their authors - experts in military affairs - provide the richest material for understanding one or another thought of Sun Tzu. Therefore, every translator, when compiling his commentary, is obliged to use this material. At the same time, commenting on the treatise was carried out not only in China; Sun Tzu, who became a classic of military art on everything Far East, attracted the attention of Japanese military writers. It was in feudal Japan, it is observed in modern Japan.
The translator drew on only one of the Japanese commentaries: the old interpretation of Opo Sorai (1750). The author did not use the latest Japanese commentaries, since, in his opinion, there is nothing in them that would deserve attention from the point of view of revealing the true content of Sun Tzu's teaching. Therefore, the reader will not find any references to these commentators in the present work, although they are well known to the author.
In compiling the Russian commentary on the treatise, the author in no way proceeded from any one of these commentators. To proceed from one would be to submit to its concept. But the concept of each commentator always reflects his era, his personality. The author, however, sought, as mentioned above, to understand the thought of Sun Tzu adequately to the era in which Sun Tzu lived and acted, and that social environment, whose interests and aspirations he represented - to the extent, of course, our historical knowledge make it possible to solve such a problem. The author tried to expand this knowledge by attracting the new material indicated above: the ancient Chinese literature on military art listed above. The old Chinese commentators were involved only in the philological study of the text, which was necessary for the Russian translation. As already mentioned, many words and expressions of the treatise are very difficult to understand, and not only for the modern reader: let's not forget that already in the era of Wei Cao Gong, i.e. in the 3rd century, a commentary was needed, without which this treatise was obviously obscure even then. At the same time, the most cursory acquaintance with commentary literature convinces us that various commentators differently, sometimes directly opposite, understood certain words and expressions of the treatise, interpreted the meaning of many of its phrases in their own way. The translator could, of course, offer the kind of translation that at first glance seems to be self-evident. However, the long experience of working on the Chinese classics convinced me how easy it is, with such a careless approach, to put into the text under study the content that it never had. Therefore, each version of the proposed translation had to be checked at all times. The main method of checking the correctness of the translation of a particular passage of the treatise was to compare this translation with the translation of other passages that are in contact with the topic, material, thought. In addition, the possibility of such a translation was assessed in the light of the general concept of the treatise, the system of views that, according to the researcher, is embedded in it. But the translator compared each understanding established in this way with the data of various Chinese commentaries, trying to check the admissibility of the lexical and grammatical interpretation given by him in general. However, for the fruitfulness of this work, it was necessary to subject these Chinese commentators to a serious critical examination, which was reflected partly in the main part of the work - an analysis of the teachings of Sun Tzu, and partly in the Notes. If we bring all the work done in full, we would get a work of a highly specialized Sinological nature. Namely, this is what the author did not want to do, since he turns first of all to a military specialist in general, to a historian of military-theoretical thought. At the same time, as already mentioned, Chinese commentators understand their author differently in many ways, very often they do not agree with each other. Their works represent a kind of discussion on issues of military science that has unfolded in the history of Chinese military-theoretical thought, as well as a kind of history of the development of this thought in China in general. But the study of this history is a special task, which is not included in the scope of this work.
Many of Sun Tzu's provisions are likely to evoke associations in the specialist reader with individual thoughts and even with the general views of certain writers on military art or generals. various countries. But the author of this work does not touch on this: firstly, this is a special topic that goes beyond the scope of this work, and secondly, the author is not a specialist in the history of military-theoretical thought and does not consider himself entitled to make any comparisons. and findings in this area. In his opinion, this can be done and, as the author hopes, our military experts will do, thus highlighting the place of Sun Tzu in the history of ancient military-theoretical thought and ancient military art. It is for such a very special work that the author gives his material.
The author also did not have the opportunity to indicate how Sun Tzu's treatise was studied in the circles of military specialists in China and Japan in Newest time. The author knows that Sun Tzu's treatise was part of the system of military education in these countries, and draws the attention of his specialist readers to this fact. Moreover, it was this fact that forced the author to take up the study of this ancient monument. But it was not the author's task to study what exactly from the views of Sun Tzu entered the military doctrine of the ruling circles of imperialist Japan, old imperial and Kuomintang China, since this is also the topic of a special work that requires special knowledge for its coverage. which the author does not have. But it was precisely in order to help the relevant specialists to understand this issue that the author did his historical and philological work.
These explanations are necessary in order to warn the reader in advance about what exactly the author considered to be the task of his work and what he could give in it to the best of his ability.
In conclusion, the author takes the liberty of expressing the hope that the proposed material will prove useful to the historian of military-theoretical thought. And if Sun Tzu is included among our authors, who are studied in more detail in terms of the history of military science, the goal of this work will be achieved. Sun Tzu has the right to do this not only because he is the founder and most important classic of the old military science in China and Japan, who has not lost his significance in our time, but also because he is the most ancient of the military writers of the world, whose thoughts have reached to us in the form of a more or less complete treatise.
N. Konrad
June 1949
Introduction
1. Treatise by Sun Tzu
As you know, the main and, in essence, the only source of our information about Sun Tzu is his biography, placed by Sima Qian (145–86/74) in his Shih Tzu - Historical Notes. They say that Sun Tzu's name was Wu, that he was born in the kingdom of Qi, served at one time in the kingdom of Wu as a military commander, then returned to his native kingdom and soon died there.
This biography is not of particular importance for science, since the stories about Sun Tzu, which are given in it, are by their nature more historical anecdotes that have been created around the name of the famous strategist of antiquity than historical facts. As a matter of fact, only one well-known story is given: about the demonstration of Sun Tzu - during his stay in the kingdom of Wu - of his art at an exemplary battle of two detachments made up of royal concubines. This story is set forth in the commentary to Chapter VIII and, of course, is only interesting as an illustration of how the followers of Sun Tzu imagined some of the provisions of his teaching, in this case- the provision on the absolute power of the commander when he is at war - an illustration, for the sake of greater significance, combined with the name of the author. Whether this incident actually happened is irrelevant. For science in this biography, it is only important that we learn from it about the time of Sun Tzu's life, that he was a strategist - a commander or military adviser in the service of the kingdom of Wu, and that he was, in addition, the author of a treatise included in into the history of Chinese culture under his name.
The lifetime of Sun Tzu is determined by the data of this biography of him. According to Sima Qian, main activity Sun Tzu flowed in the kingdom of Wu at the time when Ho-lui ruled there. If you follow the accepted chronology, the reign of Ho-lui falls on 514-495. BC e. Thus, we can establish the most important for us - the era in which Sun Tzu lived: this is the end of the so-called Chunqiu period (770-403).
This circumstance in itself sheds light on his personality. Sun Tzu was in the service of Prince Ho-lui, according to Sima Qian, as a commander, and as such he acted with great success. Sima Qian reports that Sun Tzu defeated the kingdom of Chu, located to the west of Wu, even captured its capital, the city of Ying; in the north he defeated two other kingdoms - Qi and Jin. It was to his victories that the kingdom of Wu owed the strengthening of its power and the strengthening of its position among other kingdoms. Located on the southeastern outskirts of what was then China, this possession was considered “barbarian” and at first was not included as a full member in the system of possessions that formed the state of that time, headed by the kings of the Zhou dynasty. Only after the victories of Sun Tzu did the ruler of this kingdom become part of the "zhuhou", that is, the officially recognized rulers of independent possessions.
notation
“There was a man who had only 30,000 troops, and no one in the Celestial Empire could resist him. Who is it? Answer: Sun Tzu. - so it is said about the most famous of the commanders of China in the treatise "Wei Liao-tzu". According to the "Notes" of Sima Qian, Sun Tzu was the commander of the principality of Wu during the reign of Prince Ho-lui (514-495 BC). It is to the merits of Sun Tzu that the military successes of the principality of Wu are attributed, which brought his prince the title of hegemon - “ba”. According to tradition, it is generally accepted that it was for Prince Ho-lui that the “Treatise on the Art of War” was written.
Sun Tzu's treatise had a fundamental influence on the entire military art of the East. Being the first of all treatises on the art of war, and yet containing clearly expressed general principles of both strategy and tactics, Sun Tzu's treatise is constantly cited by Chinese military theorists, from Wu Tzu to Mao Tse-tung. A special place in the military-theoretical literature of the East is occupied by comments on Sun Tzu, of which the first appeared in the Han era (206 BC - 220 AD), and new ones continue to be created to this day. Although Sun Tzu himself did not bother to accompany his treatise with examples and explanations, generations of commentators have provided us with a huge number of episodes from Chinese and Japanese military history that illustrate his points.
R.A. Ismailov, F.I. Delgyado (appendix to Liddell Hart "Strategy")
The book includes detailed commentary by the translator.
Sun Tzu The Art of War (translated by Academician N.I. Konrad)
Translator's Preface
Of all the "Seven Military Canons," Sun Tzu's "Military Strategy," traditionally known as "The Art of War," is the most widespread in the West. First translated by a French missionary about two centuries ago, it was constantly studied and used by Napoleon, and possibly by some of the Nazi high command. For the last two millennia, it has remained the most important military treatise in Asia, where even the common people knew its name. Chinese, Japanese, Korean military theorists and professional soldiers were sure to study it, and many of the strategies played an important role in the legendary military history of Japan, starting from the 8th century. For more than a thousand years, the concepts of the book have generated continuous discussion and passionate philosophical debate, attracting the attention of highly influential figures in various fields. Although the book has been translated into English many times, and translations by L. Giles and S. Griffith have not lost their significance so far, new ones continue to appear.
sun tzu and text
It has long been considered that The Art of War is China's oldest and most profound military treatise, and all other books are second-rate at best. Traditionalists attributed the book to the historical character Sun Wu, who was active at the end of the 6th century. BC, starting from 512. BC, recorded in "Shi Ji" and in "Springs and Autumns of Wu and Yue". According to them, the book must date from this time and contain the theories and military concepts of Sun Wu himself. However, other scholars first identified numerous historical anachronisms in the surviving text, such as: terms, events, technologies, and philosophical concepts; secondly, they emphasized the absence of any evidence (which should have been in Zuo Zhuan, the classic chronicle of the political events of that time) confirming the strategic role of Sun Wu in the wars between Wu and Yue; and thirdly, they drew attention to the divergence of the concept of large-scale war discussed in The Art of War, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, remembered only as an atavism of the battle of the late 6th century.
If a state goes to war, it fights for its survival. Every effort must be made to understand the art of war. This knowledge should be used for planning. A general who plans carefully before a battle will defeat one who does not. Before the battle, think and plan everything. You can predict victory or defeat in advance. Compare the opposing armies point by point:
- Which of the two rulers of the warring states achieves such complete consent and obedience from his people that they will follow him until death?
- Which of the two generals is the most talented?
- Which side has the advantage in circumstances such as weather, terrain, and distances to be covered?
- Which side enforces discipline more strictly?
- Which side has the stronger army?
- Which side has better trained soldiers and officers?
- Which side is more consistent in the system of rewards and punishments that enforces discipline?
Compare the enemy army with your own, find out the strengths and weak sides enemy. Plan according to circumstances. If you know the enemy and know yourself, you will always be victorious.
Protect yourself from defeat and wait for the opportunity to win
A successful strategist participates in battles only if he is sure of his victory - this protects him from defeat. And the unlucky one enters the battle and only then begins to think how he can win. But even the most brilliant commander cannot say exactly when he will win. He must wait until the enemy makes a mistake and give him the opportunity to win.
To achieve victory, there are rules:
- You must know when to fight and when not to.
- You must know how to deal with stronger and weaker opponents.
- Your army must have a strong, unified morale and discipline.
- You must start the battle at the moment when you are ready and the enemy is not.
- You must have military power and the right to command your troops without interference from the ruler.
Be careful - attack when you have the advantage. Avoid your enemy where he is strong and attack where he is weak. Avoid the enemy army when its morale is high, columns and banners are properly placed, or when it has a better position, such as on high ground. Don't fight out of anger; there is always something to fight for. Your anger will disappear, but the ruined state will not be reborn. Avoid the enemy's traps: do not lead your army into territory where supplies cannot be delivered, or the landscape of which you do not know. Do not associate with unfamiliar allies.
Rulers and generals can themselves cause defeat
The army is commanded by a general, and the general by the ruler. With his commands, the ruler can prevent the army from acting smoothly. He may give the command to attack or retreat at the wrong time; try to run the army as carelessly as the state; assign officers to inappropriate positions. Mistakes can undermine the trust of soldiers and cause defeat.
Seven possible causes defeats due to the fault of the general:
- An order to attack an enemy army ten times larger than one's own, forcing one's own army to flee the battlefield.
- Rudeness of soldiers in relation to officers, violation of subordination.
- The weakness of the soldiers is disrespect on the part of the officers and a drop in morale.
- Indiscipline of senior officers, unauthorized attack without orders.
- The weakness and indecision of the general is a weak, disorganized army.
- The inability to correctly assess the strength of the enemy.
- An over-concern for the comfort of one's own men, which hinders military tactics.
Save your resources with military stratagems, foraging and espionage
Food, vehicles, clothing, weapons and ammunition for the army are expensive. A prolonged war can exhaust the resources of any state, making it weak and vulnerable. Aim for quick and decisive victories, not protracted military campaigns. Do not lay siege to fortified cities - it takes months of preparation.
The best way to reduce the cost of waging war is to capture enemy lands, cities, or armies intact, rather than destroy them in costly battles. To do this, you need much more power than the enemy. The triumph of a skilled general is to subdue his enemies without a fight, thanks to military tricks. Great fighters are distinguished not just by victory, but by an easy victory.
Save state resources by borrowing them from your enemy through local foraging and multiply your own forces with enemy weapons, armor and soldiers. This saves the cost of supplying the army.
Engage scouts: they get the most important information about the enemy, and also give them false secrets. Maintain friendly relations with your spies, generously reward them. Such a cost would be very small compared to the protracted war they could help avoid. If you are building a ploy on a secret that a spy has told you, kill him, as well as anyone he told this secret to, so that your ploy does not lose its power.
Deceive the enemy and impose your will on him
The art of war is based on deception. Disguise strength with weakness, courage with timidity, and order with disorganization. Confuse your opponent and let him act recklessly.
Let your troops feign confusion when in reality they are very disciplined. When you get close to the enemy, pretend that you are far away. When you are able to attack, pretend that you are not. Play with your enemy: if he is quick-tempered, irritate him, behave at ease, disturb him constantly. The enemy has a lot of supplies - make him starve; he calmly set up camp - make him leave.
If you want the enemy to go on the attack, throw him a bait; if you want to force the enemy to retreat, defeat him. A smart fighter seizes the initiative and imposes his will on the enemy. Attack the enemy in weakly protected places so that he rushes to defend himself. Make him open up so you can discover his vulnerabilities. Numerical weakness depends not only on numbers, but also on the need to be ready to attack on many fronts.
Study the terrain and your enemy, then adapt
There are always positions that cannot be taken, roads that should not be taken, and commands from the government that should be ignored. Adapt to the situation, terrain and enemy disposition. Study the area to take advantage of your natural advantages and avoid interference. To fight, do not climb the heights, go upstream or move away from water and shelters. Avoid sheer cliffs, narrow passages or bogs - in them a small army can destroy an entire army. Look for frightened birds or beasts; they point to an ambush.
Study the enemy. When soldiers stand leaning on their spears, it means they are suffering from hunger. When the soldiers go to fetch water and first drink themselves, they suffer from thirst. And when they start eating their own livestock, forget to hang pots over their campfires, and act like they won't go back to their tents, know they're ready to fight to the death.
Adapt your tactics to the circumstances and seize every opportunity as it presents itself.
Be hard on the troops, keep them in obscurity and make them fight to the death
Managing and controlling a huge army is no different from managing a small one: you need to divide people into smaller groups, and then control your forces with the help of signals: gongs, drums, banners, signal fires. They will act as one: the coward will not dare to retreat, the brave will not watch alone.
An experienced general leads his army as if he were leading one man by the hand. Treat your soldiers like sons and they will fight to the death for you. But if you are unable to command them with authority, they will be as useless as spoiled children. You need iron discipline among your soldiers. It is effective if your soldiers are attached to you. Treat them humanely, but keep them under control with discipline and punishment.
Keep your soldiers in the dark, and change plans frequently to keep them and the enemy guessing. Change camp locations and take long detours instead of short and direct ones. Only reveal your cards when you are deep in enemy territory.
When the situation looks rosy, report it to your soldiers; deplorable - do not talk about it. The further you penetrate into hostile territory, the more the soldiers will feel cohesive. Put them in a desperate and hopeless situation, and they will lose their sense of fear and fight at the limit of their capabilities, to the death.
The most important thing
How to protect yourself from defeat and win?
- Planning, calculating and comparing armies leads to victory.
- Protect yourself from defeat and wait for the opportunity to win.
- A war can be successful for a country only if the defeat is not the result of the actions of its rulers and generals.=== How to gain an advantage over the enemy? ===
- Conserve your resources with military stratagems, foraging and espionage.
- Deceive the enemy and impose your will on him.
- Study the terrain and your enemy, and then adapt accordingly.=== How to manage troops? ===
To successfully wage war, be strict with the troops, keep them in obscurity and make them fight to the death.