Northwestern Front. Western Military District - troops and commander

7. Peculiarities of recording personnel and their losses on the North-Western Front in the summer of 1941

8. Features of accounting for personnel and their losses in the USSR Armed Forces The cost of repelling the first enemy strikes in the summer of 1941 Why did N. Vatutin and V. Kashirsky draw up a loss report in this way? Until February 4, 1944, the "Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army" was in force,

10. Analysis of the losses of the North-Western Front as a whole for 1941 as an example of the unreliability of official information about the losses of troops Let's return to the topic of accounting for personnel in military units on the North-Western Front. Did the command take measures to improve it? Undoubtedly.

12. Tsushima from the point of view of eternity Bird cherry crept past like a dream. And someone - "Tsushima!" Said on the phone. Hurry, Hurry - The term is ending: "Varangian" and "Korean" Let's go to the East... A. Akhmatova. March 10–12, 1940 Deadline for the end They say that great poets do not compose, but

From Stalin's point of view Memoirs of A.A. Gromyko ("Memorable") are of particular interest: the plenipotentiary, and then the USSR ambassador to the United States under President Roosevelt (since 1939), Gromyko was next to Stalin at conferences in Tehran (November-December 1943), Yalta (February

From Churchill's point of view On a very large number of issues Churchill's view of the development and goals of these bilateral and trilateral Soviet side. Common ground, as well as suspicions and the conflict zones mentioned above, were

From the point of view of Roosevelt (355) Leaving Yalta, Roosevelt remarked to his adviser Adolf Burley - one of the three members of his "brain trust": "Adolf, I did not say that the result is good. I said that he is the best of what I could achieve ”(356). Of course, the trial that he

From Chiang Kai-shek's point of view, Chiang Kai-shek was not invited to Yalta. However, he met with Roosevelt and Churchill in Cairo, before the Tehran conference. In his absence, the fate of East Asia was still discussed in Yalta. And Roosevelt ceded Chinese territories to Stalin. Consequently,

CHAPTER 10 Soviet and American Perspectives and End-Lease (End-Lease) Immediately after the Nazi attack, England and the United States spoke of helping the Soviet Union, but did very little, as the Western powers were afraid that Russia would not be able to withstand the blow. Germany. how

Museum of the North-Western Front and monuments in Staraya Russa and Parfino Staraya Russa… The name of this small town in the Novgorod region speaks for itself. Over its thousand-year history, Staraya Russa has seen a lot. But the Great

,
Lithuanian SSR,
Latvian SSR,
Estonian SSR,
Kaliningrad region

Red Banner North-Western Border District(abbreviated KSZPO) is a military-administrative operational association (border district) of the border troops of the KGB USSR and the FSB of Russia.

This association, in different historical periods under various names, carried out the task of protecting the northwestern and northern borders of the USSR and Russia from the Kaliningrad region to the Arkhangelsk region of the RSFSR.

In view of the fact that the association was divided into separate formations during numerous reforms, and then re-united into a single formation, the article discusses the general history of all the formations that were part of it.

History of formation

Predecessors of formation in the Russian Empire

On August 5, 1827, the Customs Border Guard was created. In 1835 it was renamed the Border Guard.
By the second half of the 19th century, the Russian Empire, in its northwestern and northern tip, included Finland and the former Baltic principalities that were part of the Vilna and Kovno provinces. .

The task of these districts was to protect the coast of the Barents, White and Baltic Seas, the river and land borders with East Prussia and Finland.

With the outbreak of World War I, all border brigades on the northwestern borders were reassigned to the Ministry of War, additionally deployed to wartime states and partially participated in hostilities.

Interwar period

In January 1918, the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs assigned the Department of the Separate Frontier Corps the task of drawing up a project to organize border protection. Soviet Republic. According to the presented project, it was planned to create 9 border districts, which required the allocation of 35 thousand people and 10,488 horses. But in connection with the abolition of the Separate Frontier Corps, the project was not completed.

To organize the protection of the border on March 30, 1918, the Main Directorate of the Border Guard (GUPO) was formed as part of the People's Commissariat for Finance. On April 1, 1918, under the leadership of the GUPO, the creation of the Petrograd District of the Border Guard began. Until May 16, 1918, the following territorial formations were created as part of the Petrograd District of the Border Guard:

• Belomorsky district - 2 subdistricts for 12 border outposts
• Olonetsky district - 3 subdistricts for 10 outposts
• Finlandsky district - 3 sub-districts for 52 outposts
• Petrogradsky district - 2 subdistricts for 6 outposts
• Chudsky district - 3 sub-districts for 6 outposts

On March 29, 1918, by decision of the Military Council of the RSFSR, the Western section of the curtain detachments was created, which was a unit to protect the border from the invasion of German troops, which, according to military historians, should be considered an association that performed the functions of border troops.

On July 1, 1918, the Border Guard of the RSFSR was transferred from the People's Commissariat for Finance to the People's Commissariat of Trade and Industry.

On February 1, 1919, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, the border guard was transformed into border troops. Border districts were renamed into border divisions, districts - into border rifle regiments, sub-districts - into battalions, distances - into companies. In total, three border divisions were formed, each of which had five regiments and five cavalry divisions.

Due to the difficult situation on the fronts of the Civil War, on July 18, 1919, the Council of Labor and Defense included the border troops in the army.

In 1937-38, the Directorates of the Border Troops were created under the districts of the NKVD.

These formations for this historical period were engaged in the protection of the sea and land borders with Estonia, Latvia and Finland.

Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940)

By the end of the autumn of 1939, the leadership of the USSR faced the need to resolve the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad as soon as possible. The second largest and most populated Soviet city, which was a large and practically the only naval base on the Baltic Sea, was exposed to a potential threat due to its proximity to the state border.

After the hostilities unleashed by the Soviet side, which took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940, the USSR Armed Forces managed to significantly move the state border north of Leningrad and west of Murmansk.

Active participation in hostilities, along with parts of the Red Army, was taken by the border troops of all three border districts (Murmansk, Leningrad and Karelian). By order of the NKVD of the USSR of December 12, 1939, No. 001478, 7 border regiments were formed from the districts, each numbering 1,500 people.

The main task assigned to the border regiments was to ensure the security of the rear of the advancing armies from Finnish sabotage groups. Following the results of the hostilities, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 26, 1940, 4 formations were awarded the Order of the Red Banner:

• 4th Border Regiment of the Karelian District
• 5th Border Regiment of the Leningrad District
• 6th Border Regiment of the Leningrad District
• 73rd Rebolsky Border Detachment

By the same decree, 13 border guards of the Karelian District were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union.

March 1940 - June 1941

In connection with the transfer state border USSR to new frontiers deep into the former territory of Finland, from January to March 1940, new border detachments were formed, and the Karelian district was renamed the Karelian-Finnish district. There was also a redeployment of some of the former detachments to the northwest.

As part of the Directorate of Border Troops of the Murmansk District, the following were created (names with georeferenced were found in official documents of that time):

• 100th Ozerkovsky border detachment - n. Ozerko settlement (from 01/21/1940 to 03/17/1940 - 27th border detachment)
• 101st Kuoloyarvinsky border detachment - n. Kuolojärvi village

As part of the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Leningrad District, the following were created:

• 102nd Elisenvaara border detachment named after S. M. Kirov - n. Elisenvaara
• 103rd Alakurtta border detachment - n. p.Rempetti

The Great Patriotic War

First stage

The border troops of the NKVD guarding the western border of the USSR, on June 22, 1941, were the first to take the blow from the invasion of the Wehrmacht ground forces. This mainly affected the formations of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Baltic districts.

Unlike these districts, on the first day of the war in the zone of responsibility of the Murmansk, Karelian-Finnish and Leningrad districts, only air raids by the Luftwaffe and the Finnish Air Force were carried out. Soviet border guards visually observed on the Finnish side the arrival and accumulation of enemy forces, the implementation of engineering field work and the evacuation of the civilian population from the border strip, which indicated that the enemy was preparing for an invasion.

The invasion of the Finnish and German ground forces into the territory of the USSR in the northwestern and northern direction was recorded only at 8.40 am on June 29, 1941 (a week after the start of the war). The enemy attacked the border outposts of the 5th and 102nd detachments with several battalions. In the northern direction, also on July 29, enemy ground units attacked the outposts of the Restikent border detachment of the Murmansk district. On July 30, the enemy, with the help of two infantry divisions, broke through the defenses of the border in the area of ​​​​the city of Enso in the zone of responsibility of the Karelian-Finnish district.

Due to the fact that the small units of the border guards on the western border were almost completely destroyed in the border battles and it was physically impossible to carry out statistics of losses, over 90% of the irretrievable losses are missing. On April 1, 1942, 3,684 people were killed and died from wounds in the border troops, 35,298 people were missing, 136 people were captured, 8,240 people were wounded and frostbite, and 956 people left for various reasons. The biggest losses were at the border parts of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Baltic districts.

In turn, on the northern border and northwestern border, the enemy did not create a significant predominance in manpower and equipment as on the western border. Therefore, the intensity of the battles was not of such a difficult nature. This is evidenced by the losses of the Murmansk district in the period from June 22 to August 20, 1941: 253 people were killed and died from wounds, 571 people were wounded.

This alignment of forces is explained by the fact that the territories north of Leningrad were hard-to-reach terrain on which enemy advancement was possible only in 8 directions on a relatively wide front of 1,500 kilometers: Olonets, Petrozavodsk, Medvezhyegorsk, Rebolskoye, Ukhta, Loukhskoye, Kandalaksha, Murmansk.

Reforming the border troops

With the further retreat of Soviet troops to the east, the Belarusian, Ukrainian, Moldavian and Baltic districts actually ceased to exist. It was necessary to take urgent measures to reorganize the remnants of the NKVD border troops in the western direction. It also required the reorganization of the formations of the Crimean district in the southern direction, and the Leningrad, Karelian-Finnish and Murmansk districts in the northern and northwestern direction, in the zone of responsibility of which fighting on land have not yet begun.

By order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for the Border and Internal Troops, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov dated June 26, 1941, the remnants of the surviving units of the border detachments were withdrawn to the rear of the Red Army and reorganized into border regiments of the NKVD with the preservation of the serial number. They were given the task of protecting the rear of the army, which they carried out jointly with the internal troops of the NKVD. By this order, the remnants of the border troops of the former border districts in the western direction were transferred to operational subordination to the chiefs of the rear guard of the following fronts:

• troops of the Moldavian district - guarding the rear of the Southern Front.
• troops of the Ukrainian district - guarding the rear of the Southwestern Front
• troops of the Crimean district - guarding the rear of the Separate Primorsky Army of the Southern Front.
• troops of the Belorussian district - guarding the rear of the Western Front. Parts of the border troops of the Byelorussian border district, stationed on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, were transferred to the rear guard department of the North-Western Front.
• troops of the Baltic District - guarding the rear of the North-Western Front and the Northern Front.
• troops of the Leningrad, Karelian and Murmansk districts were transferred to the control of the security of the rear of the Northern Front.

August 23, 1941 on the basis of the directive VGK rates divided into Leningrad and Karelian fronts.

On September 30, 1941, the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Karelian-Finnish District was reorganized into the Directorate for the Protection of the Military Rear of the Karelian Front.

On June 26, 1942, the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Murmansk District was transformed into the Operational Group of the Directorate of the NKVD Troops for the Protection of the Rear of the Karelian Front.

The final decision on the complete withdrawal of all formations of the border and escort service of the NKVD from the army was made by decision of the Headquarters Supreme High Command on December 15, 1941. Also, from the border guards withdrawn to the rear, fighter battalions were formed to combat saboteurs. The tasks of protecting the rear of the army in the field and combating saboteurs were carried out by border formations until the end of hostilities.

Parts of the Directorate of the Border Troops of the Leningrad District, together with the troops of the Leningrad Front, went over to the defense of Leningrad. The formations of the Baltic District located on the eastern flank of the district were also reassigned to the Leningrad Front: the 99th separate border detachment of the coast guard and the division of border ships stationed on the peninsula Hanko, and the 6th Rakvere and 8th Haapsalu border detachments withdrawn from the territory of the Estonian SSR.

Parts of the Karelian and Murmansk districts, together with parts of the Karelian Front, began to implement the Strategic  defensive operation in Arctic and Karelia, the successful completion of which eventually forced the advancing enemy to switch to a long-term defense of the occupied lines for 2 years and 10 months.

In fact, the border guards on the northern and northwestern borders, in addition to the tasks directly assigned to them to protect the rear of the army in the field, were involved in positional battles with the enemy and carrying out raids behind enemy lines.

Exit to the border

As the Red Army liberated the occupied Soviet territories, by the middle of 1944 the front moved westward in many areas to the line of the pre-war state border of the USSR.

By GKO Decree No. 5584ss of April 8, 1944, the NKVD troops were ordered to restore the protection of the western border. For this purpose, the border regiments of the NKVD, which performed the tasks of protecting the rear of the active Red Army, were sent to form the previously existing Directorates of the Border Troops of the NKVD districts.

40% of the rank and file and commanders of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear were transferred to the border troops, which made it possible to form 11 Border Troops Directorates (UPV) of the NKVD districts as part of 34 border detachments.

post-war period

With the end of the war, the territory of East Prussia partly ceded to the USSR, which became the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR. Its border with Poland entered the zone of responsibility of the Belarusian border district.

Also, under the terms of international negotiations, Finland lost access to the Northern Arctic Ocean, and the USSR received a small section of the land border with Norway.

On October 17, 1949, the border troops were reassigned from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.

On June 2, 1953, the Karelian-Finnish District and the Murmansk District were merged into the Northern District with administration in Petrozavodsk.

In 1953, by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 00320, the Directorate of Border Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian District was transformed into the Directorate of Border Troops of the Baltic Border District. By this order, the management of the border troops in all the Baltic republics became one.

On February 19, 1954, the Baltic border district was abolished. His troops and area of ​​responsibility moved to the Leningrad border district.

In June 1955, the Baltic District was recreated from the Leningrad District.

On March 10, 1956, the Baltic District was renamed into Western District with management in Riga.

On April 2, 1957, the border troops were transferred to the KGB USSR.

On June 28, 1957, the Western District was renamed back to the Baltic District. Also, the border of the Kaliningrad region and the border of the Lithuanian SSR with Poland, which in the pre-war period was part of the area of ​​responsibility of the Belarusian border district, was included in the zone of responsibility of the Baltic Military District.

On January 22, 1960, the Baltic District was disbanded with the transfer of troops and areas of responsibility to the Leningrad District.

On September 13, 1963, the North-Western Border District was created by the merger of the Leningrad and Northern border districts, whose area of ​​​​responsibility included the land and sea border of the USSR from the Kaliningrad region to the Arkhangelsk region.

On May 27, 1968, the North-Western Border District was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On October 23, 1975, the Baltic border district was separated from the North-Western border district, whose area of ​​​​responsibility included the Latvian SSR, the Estonian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR and the Kaliningrad region.

As a result of the last division, the North-Western Border District received the Baltic Sea coast within Leningrad region, land border with Finland and Norway, the coast of the Barents and White Seas within the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions.

In this form, the border district existed until the collapse of the USSR.

District in the Russian Federation

In view of the need to rationalize the management of the border troops in the conditions of the changed world situation and the internal structure of Russia, a restructuring of the former system of border districts was required. By Decree of the President of Russia dated August 1, 1998, the North-Western Border District was renamed into North-West Regional Directorate of the FPS Russia .

Subsequently, this organization was renamed to Regional Border Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the North-Western Federal District. This organization had a large area of ​​​​responsibility, unlike KSZPO, since sections of the land and maritime borders Kaliningrad and Pskov regions with the Baltic states and Poland. This regional office was abolished on April 1, 2010.

On the this moment control border service in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the former KSZPO, it is divided into separate subjects (regions) and is carried out by the Border Directorates of the FSB.

District Composition

Composition of the Western Border District before the collapse of the USSR. Units are listed by location along the border from east to west and from north to south:

• District Office - Leningrad
  • Commandant's office of the district administration (military unit 2448) - Leningrad
• 4th Arkhangelsk border detachment (military unit 9794)
• 82nd Murmansk Red Banner Border Detachment (military unit 2173)
• 100th Nikel Border Order of the Red Star Detachment (military unit 2200)
• 101st Alakurtta border detachment (military unit 2201)
• 72nd Kalevalsk Border Order of the Red Star Detachment (military unit 2143)
• 73rd Rebolsky Red Banner Border Detachment (military unit 2146)
• 80th Suoyarvi Red Banner Border Detachment (military unit 2150)
• 1st Sortavala Border Red Banner Detachment (military unit 2121)
• 102nd Vyborg Red Banner Border Detachment named after S. M. Kirov (military unit 2139)
• 5th Leningrad border detachment named after Yu. A. Andropov (military unit 9816) - Sosnovy Bor
• 107th separate three times orders of the Red Star and Alexander Nevsky communications battalion (military unit 2209) - Sestroretsk
• 4th interdistrict school for sergeants (military unit 2416) - Sortavala
• 14th separate aviation regiment (military unit 2397) - Petrozavodsk
• 1st Separate Red Banner Border Guard Brigade patrol ships(military unit 2289) - Kuvshinskaya Salma
• 2nd separate brigade border patrol ships (military unit 2241) - Vysotsk
• Separate checkpoint "Vyborg"
• Separate checkpoint "Leningrad"
• District military hospital (military unit 2517) - Petrozavodsk
• District military hospital (military unit 2518) - Sestroretsk
• 51st separate engineering and construction company (military unit 3339) - Petrozavodsk

District commanders

The list of district commanders (chiefs of troops) is given for the period from September 13, 1963 to 1991:

• Ionov, Pyotr Ivanovich - March 1963 - December 1968
• Secretaries, Konstantin Fedorovich - December 26, 1968 - November 6, 1975
• Viktorov, Alexander Grigoryevich - November 1975 - 1992

Servicemen of the border troops of the NKVD of the Karelian District, awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for participation in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940) (all awarded one decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 26, 1940):

• Zagarinsky Alexander Grigorevich (Russian). Site "Heroes country".- machine gunner of the 4th border regiment.
• Zinoviev Ivan Dmitrievich (Russian). Site "Heroes country".- company commander of the 4th border regiment.
• Kiselyov Semyon Sergeevich (Russian). Site "Heroes country".- Military Commissar of the 5th Border Regiment.

In the absence of a land front in Europe, the German leadership decided to defeat the Soviet Union during a short-term campaign in the summer and autumn of 1941. To achieve this goal, the most combat-ready unit of the German armed forces 1 was deployed on the border with the USSR.

Wehrmacht

For Operation Barbarossa, out of the 4 headquarters of army groups available in the Wehrmacht, 3 were deployed ("North", "Center" and "South") (75%), out of 13 headquarters of field armies - 8 (61.5%), out of 46 headquarters of army corps - 34 (73.9%), out of 12 motorized corps - 11 (91.7%). In total, 73.5% of the total number of divisions available in the Wehrmacht was allocated for the Eastern Campaign. Most of the troops had combat experience gained in previous military campaigns. So, out of 155 divisions in military operations in Europe in 1939-1941. 127 (81.9%) participated, and the remaining 28 were partially manned by personnel who also had combat experience. In any case, these were the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht (see table 1). The German Air Force deployed 60.8% of the flying units, 16.9% of the air defense troops and over 48% of the signal troops and other units to support Operation Barbarossa.

German satellites

Together with Germany, its allies were preparing for a war with the USSR: Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Italy, who allocated the following forces for waging war (see table 2). In addition, Croatia provided 56 aircraft and up to 1.6 thousand people. By June 22, 1941, there were no Slovak and Italian troops on the border, who arrived later. Consequently, there were 767,100 men, 37 calculated divisions, 5,502 guns and mortars, 306 tanks, and 886 aircraft in the German allied troops deployed there.

All in all, the forces of Germany and its allies on Eastern Front consisted of 4,329.5 thousand people, 166 settlement divisions, 42,601 guns and mortars, 4364 tanks, assault and self-propelled guns and 4795 aircraft (of which 51 were at the disposal of the Air Force High Command and, together with 8.5 thousand personnel The Air Force is not taken into account in further calculations).

Red Army

Under the conditions of the outbreak of war in Europe, the armed forces of the Soviet Union continued to increase, and by the summer of 1941 they were the largest army in the world (see Table 3). In the five western border districts, 56.1% of the ground forces and 59.6% of the air force were stationed. In addition, since May 1941, the concentration of 70 divisions of the second strategic echelon from internal military districts and from Far East. By June 22 at western counties 16 divisions arrived (10 rifle, 4 tank and 2 motorized), in which there were 201,691 people, 2,746 guns and 1,763 tanks.

The grouping of Soviet troops in the Western theater of operations was quite powerful. The general balance of forces by the morning of June 22, 1941 is presented in Table 4, judging by the data of which the enemy outnumbered the Red Army only in terms of the number of personnel, because his troops were mobilized.

Mandatory clarifications

Although the above data gives a general idea of ​​the strength of the opposing factions, it should be borne in mind that the Wehrmacht completed the strategic concentration and deployment in the theater, while in the Red Army this process was in full swing. How figuratively described this situation A.V. Shubin, "a dense body was moving from the West to the East at high speed. From the East, a more massive, but looser block was slowly moving forward, the mass of which was growing, but not at a fast enough pace" 2 . Therefore, the correlation of forces at two more levels should be considered. Firstly, this is the balance of forces of the parties in various strategic directions on the scale of the district (front) - army group, and secondly, on individual operational directions in the border zone on the scale of the army - army. In the first case, only ground troops and the Air Force, and for the Soviet side also the border troops, artillery and aviation of the Navy, but without information on the personnel of the fleet and internal troops NKVD. In the second case, only ground forces are taken into account for both sides.

Northwest

In the North-West direction, the troops of the German Army Group "North" and the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) opposed each other. The Wehrmacht had a rather significant superiority in manpower and some in artillery, but was inferior in tanks and aircraft. However, it should be borne in mind that only 8 Soviet divisions were located directly in the 50 km border strip, and another 10 were located 50-100 km from the border. As a result, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the Army Group "North" managed to achieve a more favorable balance of forces (see Table 5).

Western direction

In the Western direction, the troops of the German Army Group Center and the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) with part of the forces of the 11th Army of PribOVO confronted each other. For the German command, this direction was the main one in Operation Barbarossa, and therefore Army Group Center was the strongest on the entire front. 40% of all German divisions deployed from the Barents to the Black Sea (including 50% motorized and 52.9% tank) and the largest air fleet of the Luftwaffe (43.8% aircraft) were concentrated here. Only 15 Soviet divisions were located in the offensive zone of Army Group Center in the immediate vicinity of the border, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In addition, troops of the 22nd Army from the Ural Military District were concentrated on the territory of the district in the Polotsk region, from which, by June 22, 1941, 3 rifle divisions arrived at the place, and the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow Military District - with a total number of 72,016 people, 1241 guns and mortars and 692 tanks. As a result, the troops of the ZapOVO contained in the states of peacetime were inferior to the enemy only in personnel, but surpassed him in tanks, aircraft and slightly in artillery. However, unlike the troops of Army Group Center, they did not complete their concentration, which made it possible to smash them piece by piece.

Army Group Center was supposed to carry out a double envelopment of the ZapOVO troops located in the Bialystok ledge, with a blow from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk, so the main forces of the army group were deployed on the flanks. From the south (from Brest) applied main blow. On the northern flank (Suwalki) the 3rd Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was deployed, which was opposed by units of the 11th Army of PribOVO. Troops of the 43rd Army Corps of the 4th German Army and the 2nd Panzer Group were deployed in the zone of the Soviet 4th Army. In these areas, the enemy was able to achieve significant superiority (see table 6).

Southwest

In the South-Western direction, Army Group South, which united German, Romanian, Hungarian and Croatian troops, was opposed by parts of the Kyiv Special and Odessa Military Districts (KOVO and OdVO). The Soviet grouping in the South-Western direction was the strongest on the entire front, since it was she who was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. However, even here the Soviet troops did not complete their concentration and deployment. So, in KOVO in the immediate vicinity of the border there were only 16 divisions, and 14 were located 50-100 km from it. In the OdVO, there were 9 divisions in the 50-km border zone, and 6 were located in the 50-100-km zone. In addition, troops of the 16th and 19th armies arrived in the districts, from which by June 22 concentrated 10 divisions (7 rifle, 2 tank and 1 motorized) with a total number of 129,675 people, 1,505 guns and mortars and 1,071 tanks. Even without being staffed according to the wartime staff, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping, which had only some superiority in manpower, but was significantly inferior in tanks, aircraft, and somewhat less in artillery. But on the direction of the main attack of the Army Group "South", where the Soviet 5th Army was opposed by units of the 6th German Army and the 1st Panzer Group, the enemy managed to achieve a better balance of forces for himself (see Table 7).

The situation in the North

The most favorable for the Red Army was the ratio on the front of the Leningrad Military District (LVO), where it was opposed by Finnish troops and units of the German army "Norway". In the Far North, the troops of the Soviet 14th Army were opposed by the German units of the mountain infantry corps "Norway" and the 36th Army Corps, and here the enemy had superiority in manpower and insignificant in artillery (see Table 8). True, it should be borne in mind that, since hostilities on the Soviet-Finnish border began in late June - early July 1941, both sides were building up their forces, and the data given do not reflect the number of troops of the parties by the start of hostilities.

Results

Thus, the German command, having deployed the main part of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, was unable to achieve overwhelming superiority not only in the zone of the entire future front, but also in the zones of individual army groups. However, the Red Army was not mobilized and did not complete the process of strategic concentration and deployment. As a result, units of the first echelon of covering troops were significantly inferior to the enemy, whose troops were deployed directly at the border. Such an arrangement of Soviet troops made it possible to smash them piece by piece. On the directions of the main attacks of the army groups, the German command managed to create superiority over the troops of the Red Army, which was close to overwhelming. The most favorable balance of forces developed for the Wehrmacht in the zone of Army Group Center, since it was in this direction that the main blow of the entire Eastern campaign was dealt. In other directions, even in the bands of the covering armies, the Soviet superiority in tanks affected. The overall balance of forces allowed the Soviet command to prevent the enemy's superiority even in the directions of his main attacks. But in reality the opposite happened.

Since the Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the degree of threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 the strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater of operations, which was to be completed by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and did not have neither offensive nor defensive grouping. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and were only completing the creation of command and control bodies in the theater of operations. On the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of the Red Army covering forces in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of permanent deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If, however, we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions into the offensive, it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a solid front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. By preempting the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, by creating powerful operational groupings of their fully combat-ready forces in the chosen directions of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing the strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.

Notes
1. For more details, see: Meltyukhov M.I. Stalin's missed chance. Scramble for Europe 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments). 3rd ed., corrected. and additional M., 2008. S. 354-363.
2. Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004. S. 496.

Requisites

One of the little-studied pages of the history of the Great Patriotic War is the activity of barrage detachments. In Soviet times, this issue was covered with a veil of secrecy. According to the "Rules for the preservation of military secrets in the press of the Red Army (for wartime)", approved by the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky No. 034 dated February 15, 1944:

14. All information about the barrage detachments, penal battalions and companies "

This arrangement continued even after the end of the war. It is not surprising that with the beginning of perestroika "revelations" in public opinion a certain ominous image of "executioners from the NKVD" was formed, who shot the retreating Red Army soldiers from machine guns.

In the last decade, a number of publications have been published with an attempt to analyze the history of barrage detachments based on archival documents (for example). However, the issue remains understudied. Thus, the erroneous opinion is widespread that the barrage detachments appeared only after the release of the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.

Due to the vastness of the topic, it is impossible to consider it within the framework of one publication. In this article, we will limit ourselves to the history of the creation and use of barrage detachments in the North-Western theater of operations in 1941. Thus, the scope of the study includes:

Northwestern Front, formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the administration and troops of the Baltic Special Military District.

Northern Front, formed on June 24, 1941 on the basis of the administration and troops of the Leningrad Military District. By Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001199 of August 23, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into the Karelian and Leningrad fronts.

The Baltic Fleet, which was operationally subordinate to the Northern Front from June 28, 1941, and from August 30, 1941, was operationally subordinate to the Leningrad Front.

Volkhov Front, formed on December 17, 1941, i.e. two weeks before the end of the period under review is outside the scope of this article.

In early February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD proper and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the people's commissariats of defense and Navy USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.

On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issued Directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. Among other things, it provided for “the organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command with the inclusion in their composition of operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks of:

a) detention of deserters;

b) detaining the entire suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;

c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operatives of the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material along with the detainees under jurisdiction.

In pursuance of this directive, already on June 28, a control and barrage detachment of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear was created on the North-Western Front. Active Army. On July 2, 1941, it was disbanded, and instead, the 1st barrage detachment of the NKVD troops was created to guard the rear of the Active Army.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB united. On July 17, 1941, by the decision of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NPO were transformed into special departments and also transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. This contributed to the establishment of a closer relationship between them and the territorial bodies of state security. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them on the spot.

The next day, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his directive No. 169, explained the tasks of special departments as follows: “The meaning of transforming the organs of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs , deserters and all sorts of alarmists and disorganizers.

The merciless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and discredit the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage.

To ensure operational activities, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed with special departments of divisions and corps, with special departments of the armies - separate rifle companies, with special departments of fronts - separate rifle battalions, staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops .

In carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, put up barrage detachments in the rear of our troops, as evidenced, for example, by the “Instruction for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front on combating deserters, cowards and alarmists”:

Special departments of the division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities:

a) organize a barrier service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other movement routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who arbitrarily left their combat positions;

b) carefully check each detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and an investigation is conducted to bring them to trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within a 12-hour period;

d) all servicemen who stray from the unit are organized by platoon (port) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, are sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires the adoption of decisive measures for the immediate restoration of order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to execute deserters on the spot. On each such case, the head of the special department informs the special department of the army and the front;

f) carry out the sentence of the military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, before the formation;

g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to units and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) report daily to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrests, convicted, as well as about the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and materiel transferred to the unit.

The next document is the directive of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR No. 39212 dated July 28, 1941 on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line. In particular, it says: “One of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us are organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all military personnel, without exception, making their way from the front to the front line in an unorganized manner, as well as military personnel, in groups or alone falling into other parts.

However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is still insufficiently organized, the checks of detainees are carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel.

In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in the Red Army, I propose:

1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose allocate experienced operational workers to the detachments. To establish, as a rule, that the questioning of all detainees without exception should be carried out only by security officers.

2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments, and identified by undercover and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity.

If the investigation does not obtain data on their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons should be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, establishing constant monitoring of them both by the organs of the special department and by the commissar of the unit.

The memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Divisional Commissar Lebedev No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941 to the Military Council of the KBF gives an idea of ​​​​the daily work of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war. The barrage detachment under the 3rd division of the Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a mobile company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd department, two home-made armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.

Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were put up on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that moment passed far enough, there were few cases of desertion in the area of ​​​​responsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the detachment and the group of operational workers attached to it were aimed at fighting the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps. A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Defense League organization, operated on highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel.

As a result of the work of the detachment in the first days of the war, six bandits were caught in the Loksa area, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence data, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding bandits.

Practice has shown that in areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens in small towns, since bandit groups from time to time had to buy food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the detachment. Despite the numerical superiority, the latter tried to detain them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, while the fourth, although, as it turned out, he was the Estonian running champion in the past, failed to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd Division.

The raids carried out by the detachment, combing the area, secrets and outposts significantly hampered the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in those areas that the detachment controlled were sharply reduced.

When the Virtsu Peninsula was liberated as a result of a counterattack by the 8th Army in mid-July 1941, a detachment platoon and a group of operational workers went to this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons who were hostile to the Soviet regime and assisted the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a platoon of a detachment suddenly crashed into a German outpost, located at the fork in the roads Virtsu - Pyar-nu, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by rifle-machine-gun and mortar fire of the enemy, dismounted and accepted the battle. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving an anti-tank gun, a machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The losses of the detachment amounted to 6 people killed and 2 wounded.

Having handed over the defense of the recaptured area to regular units, the platoon of the detachment arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately began work, as a result of which the head of the local organization "Defense League" was detained, two former members of this organization, who were members of the established German command formation of "self-defense", the owner of a local restaurant, used by the Germans as an interpreter, as well as a provocateur who betrayed two agents of our border guard to the fascist authorities. Among the population of Virtsu, 6 informants were recruited.

In the same period, an operation was carried out to clear the gangs of m. Varbla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovo County. Two platoons of the detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with the fighter battalion, captured the indicated settlements, defeating the headquarters of "self-defense" and capturing an easel machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephone sets, several hunting rifles and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded, captured 4 bandits were shot on the spot. Our losses - 1 killed.

In Tallinn, a detachment of detachments uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization engaged in recruiting the local population into gangs. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.

In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the detachment launched work to send our agents to the German rear. Of the abandoned three agents, two returned. Having penetrated into the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military installations. Using this information, the aircraft of the Baltic Fleet successfully bombed enemy targets. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the invaders from among the Estonian nationalists.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned to the front the retreating, but also held defensive lines. A particularly difficult situation developed on the afternoon of August 27. Separate units of the 8th Army, having lost their leadership, leaving the last line of defense, took to flight. To restore order, not only the detachment was thrown, but the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. Retreating under the threat of weapons, they stopped and as a result of a counterattack they threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.

The fact that the NKVD soldiers did not hide behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses incurred by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.

Arriving in Kronstadt, the detachment immediately began to resupply and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operatives to serve on south coast Gulf of Finland, and by September 18, the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.

In 1941, over 900 people were detained by the detachment, of which 77 were arrested and convicted. At the same time, 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the line.

Their "ground" colleagues operating in the vicinity of the Baltic Fleet detachment also fought against the Estonian nationalists. From the special message of the special department of the NKVD of the Northern Front No. 131142 dated July 24, 1941 to the Military Council of the Front about the activities of the special department of the NKVD of the 8th Army to eliminate bandit groups in Estonia: “On July 15, 1941, two spy from the local population, who informed the enemy about the location of our units. The spies were shot on the spot.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, granted the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko: “The Headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of flight, stop them, using weapons if necessary.

A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. "Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 to the commander of the troops of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions" read:

The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are quite a few panicky and directly hostile elements who, at the first pressure from the enemy, drop their weapons and start shouting: “We are surrounded!” and drag the rest of the fighters with them. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes to flight, abandons its materiel, and then, alone, begins to leave the forest. Similar phenomena take place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, alarmist and hostile elements could not gain the upper hand in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.

In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. In each rifle division, have a barrage detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculated as 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.

2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to be considered direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting honest and combat elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.

3. To oblige employees of special departments and political staff of divisions to provide all possible assistance to division commanders and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.

4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.

5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the troops of the fronts and armies.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

B. Shaposhnikov ".

Unlike the barrage detachments that continued to exist under special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on detaining deserters and suspicious elements, army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (a battalion per division instead of a platoon), and their personnel were recruited not from NKVD soldiers, but from ordinary Red Army soldiers. So, according to the staff of the barrage battalion of the 10th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Front, it should have 342 people (commanding staff - 24, junior commanding staff - 26, enlisted personnel -292). However, the actual number of detachment battalions, as a rule, was much lower.

As can be seen from Table. 1, only in one of the nine divisions the size of the barrage battalion corresponded to the regular one.

Table 1

The number of barrage battalions of rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front and their equipment with automatic weapons

A very indicative example is the 43rd division, which suffered heavy losses in the December battles (as of January 1, 1942, its personnel numbered only 1165 people). It is obvious that the division's defensive battalion, whose number fell to 64 people, did not escape serious combat losses.

Simultaneously with the creation of defensive battalions of divisions, a resolution of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 “On intensifying the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad” was issued. In this document, signed by the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and members of the military council of the front, 1st secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city committee of the CPSU (b) A.A. Zhdanov and 2nd Secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in particular, ordered:

"5. Head of the OVT (Protection of the military rear. - I.P.) Leningrad Front Lieutenant General Comrade. Stepanov to organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all servicemen detained without documents.

The head of the rear of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade. Mordvinov to organize nutrition points at these barrage detachments. And indeed, these four barrage detachments were immediately created.

Now it is often asserted that the detachments were only engaged in shooting at their own. In this case, it is completely incomprehensible why they organize nutrient points with them? To feed those who were shot before execution?

In October 1941, the Northwestern Front, together with the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts, thwarted the plan of the enemy command to bypass Moscow from the north. At the same time, according to a special report by the head of the special department of the NKVD of the North-Western Front, the commissar of state security of the 3rd rank V.M. Bochkov dated October 23, 1941 in the name of the head of the Department of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank V.S. Abakumov, during the fighting near the village of Lobanovo, a number of servicemen fled from the battlefield. During October 21, 27 people were detained by the detachment. In another area near the village of Lobanovo, the detachment detained 100 people, including 5 junior commanders. Malicious deserters were arrested, one was shot in front of the ranks.

According to a note prepared by Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank S.R. Milshtein for the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, “from the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front.

Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.

Of the detainees, 25,878 people were arrested by the Special Departments, the rest

632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.

According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3,321 people were shot in front of the line.

On the fronts, this data is distributed:

Leningrad: arrested - 1044 shot - 854 shot in front of the line - 430 Karelian: arrested - 468 shot - 263 shot in front of the line - 132 Northern: arrested - 1683 shot - 933 shot in front of the line - 280 North-West: arrested - 3440 shot - 1600 shot before the formation - 730 ... "As we can see, the vast majority of servicemen detained by special departments and barrage detachments were not subjected to repressions, but were sent to the front. Only about 4% of them were arrested, including 1.5% were shot.

Thus, under the name "protective detachment" in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, formations of different subordination operated. Barrage detachments detained deserters and a suspicious element in the rear, and stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they themselves engaged in battle with the Germans, often suffering heavy losses in the process.

Bibliography:

Kokurin A., Petrov N. NKVD: structure, functions, personnel. Article two (1938-1941) // Free Thought. - 1997. - No. 7.

Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: Materials of the state security organs of the USSR from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia / Comp. A.T. Zhadobin and others - M .: Publishing house "Belfry", 2002. - 480 p.

RGANI. F.89. Op.18. D.8. L.1-3. Cit. by: Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's Archive. Documents of the highest bodies of the party and state power. - M.: International Fund "Democracy", 2006. - S. 317-318. (636 p.)

State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 717 p.

State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T.2. Start. Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. - M.: Publishing house "Rus", 2000. - 699 p.

Appendix No. 1 to the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 0205-1956. List No. 1 of departments, formations, units, divisions and institutions of the NKVD troops that were part of the Army in the period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - B.M., 1956. - 100 p.

Pykhalov I.V. Great slanderous war. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. - 480 p.

Russian archive: Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR (1943-1945). - T. 13 (2-3). - M.: TERRA, 1997. - 456 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 2 / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1976. -639 p.

Soviet military encyclopedia: in 8 volumes. T. 7 / Ch. ed. commission N.V. Ogarkov. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1979. -687 p.

Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). F.217. Op.1221. D.5.

TsAMO. F.217. Op.1221. D.94.

8th Army

12th mechanized corps - 23rd and 28th TD, 202nd MD;

3rd mechanized corps - 2nd and 5th TD, 84th MD;

10th Rifle Corps - 10th and 11th Rifle Divisions;

11th Rifle Corps - 48th and 125th Rifle Divisions;

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps;

22nd Infantry Division of the NKVD.

11th Army

1st mechanized corps - 3rd TD, 163rd MD, 5th MCP;

16th Rifle Corps - 5th, 33rd and 188th Rifle Divisions;

Thus, the front commander suggested urgently beginning the transfer to the Pskov and Ostrov region of the 22nd Latvian and 24th Estonian territorial corps, which had not yet been put into battle because of their unreliability. Here, the 1st mechanized and 41st rifle corps transferred to the front were supposed to take up defense along the line of the old fortified areas. Under their cover, it was supposed to deploy troops withdrawn from the Dvina line. At the same time, Kuznetsov proposed to begin the evacuation of the Moonsund Islands and the withdrawal of the troops of the 8th Army from Riga to a new line of defense along the southern border of Estonia.

“You did not understand the order of Headquarters 0096. The current situation requires, over the next three to four days, to detain the enemy at the line of the West. Dvina. The headquarters requires the execution of order 0096. Take all measures to prevent the spread of the enemy on the northern coast of the West. Dvina. Use all aircraft for systematic bombardment, day and night, of enemy crossings and crossing units. Report on performance.

As we can see, the retreat of the troops of the front from the line of the Western Dvina was not prohibited at all - but it should have been more organized, while simultaneously holding the defensive line along the river by the covering forces. After all, it is no secret that it is the retreat that is the most difficult type of military operations, where it is important to maintain both the controllability of the troops and the morale of the fighters and commanders. While the enemy's tank and motorized divisions were pinned down by counterattacks near Dvinsk and Krustpils, the Northwestern Front had time to create a new line of defense at the turn of the old fortified areas and along the lines of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers.

However, there was another reason why it was impossible to retreat from the Dvina. On the southern bank of the river there was still a large number of scattered Soviet units, randomly retreating to the river. They had no connection with the command, and, apparently, Kuznetsov simply counted them as already dead - so in a report to the People's Commissar of Defense dated June 28, he reported: "2nd tank division apparently died. The 11th Army does not exist as a formation. I don’t know the provisions of the 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th, 23rd and 126th rifle divisions, the 5th tank division and the 84th motorized division”. Meanwhile, all these troops retreated to the Dvina, trying to cross it; to leave the line of the river meant to doom them to death.

And the situation at the front was not as catastrophic as it seemed to Kuznetsov's headquarters. In addition to Dvinsk, the enemy never managed to capture serviceable bridges across the Dvina anywhere. True, on June 28-29, the Germans managed to cross it in three more places, but such attempts were repulsed on most of the front. Note that at the end of September and the beginning of October 1943, the Soviet troops that reached the Dnieper captured up to a dozen bridgeheads only in the zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts However, only three of them were "opened" - one in October and two in November.

The Germans advanced furthest from the bridgehead near Livany - as we saw above, on July 30, the units of the Guryev group defending here retreated to Lake Luban. However, in fact, the troops of the 6th Panzer Division did not advance to such a depth, by evening it reached only the village of Rudzety, 20 km from the river. The division advanced almost parallel to the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 30 km west of it. On July 1, the forward detachments of the division traveled another 25 km and reached Varaklyany (10 km west of Vilyana).

The forces of the 11th Rifle Corps (48th and 125th Rifle Divisions) and the 12th Mechanized Corps were deployed against the bridgeheads formed on both sides of Jekabpils. On June 30, his 28th Panzer Division with the 10th Motorcycle Regiment took up defense in the area from Koaknese to Plavinas, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division between Plavinasam and Krustpils. The 23rd Panzer Division concentrated in the Ergli region (30 km north of Plavinas) with the task of preparing a counterattack on Plavinas.

During the night of June 30, the enemy tried to cross the river eight times, but all his attempts were repulsed. At 18:00, the headquarters of the corps sent a reconnaissance group consisting of three tanks and a motorized infantry platoon to the Lyegrade region (towards Krustils) with the task of reconnoitering the enemy’s crossing across the Aiviekste River.

By this time, the mechanized corps had about 9 thousand personnel, 50 tanks and 47 guns. As we will see below, in the 11th Rifle Corps on June 4, that is, after a difficult retreat, there were still 8,769 people - that is, on the 1st, the corps numbered at least 10-12 thousand. The 181st division of the 24th Latvian territorial corps was also advanced here from Gulbene. Due to the absence of the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, its troops were subordinated to the headquarters of the 65th rifle corps, which did not have its own troops. Even if the forces available here were not enough to throw units of three German divisions that had managed to cross over into the river, they were quite enough to blockade the bridgeheads.

On the morning of April 30, the enemy managed to capture the bridges in Riga - but a few hours later they were repulsed by a counterattack of units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army and blown up only late in the evening, after crossing the remnants of the 90th Rifle Division and our other troops from the south coast.

By June 30, Soviet troops basically continued to hold the defense on the right bank of the Western Dvina. None of the new bridgeheads gave the enemy the opportunity to quickly concentrate troops and go on the offensive - even part of the rear of the 41st Reinhard motorized corps later had to be transported across the bridges in Dvinsk. On June 1, a counterattack against Krustpils was planned by the forces of the 202nd motorized and 181st rifle divisions.

Manstein, according to his post-war statements, rushed forward - but the command of the army group considered it best to hold the 56th motorized corps until Reinhard could launch an offensive from the bridgeheads at Krustpils.

In such a situation, at 20:45 on June 30, the command of the North-Western Front, having not yet received Zhukov's prohibition directive, ordered his subordinate formations to withdraw from the line of the Western Dvina.

First. The enemy continues the offensive in the Krustpils-Pskov and Dvina-Pskov directions. Large columns of motorized troops and infantry were found moving from the Kaunas region in the directions: Panevezys, Jekabpils; Utena, Daugavpils. The enemy, apparently, is trying to break the front at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and prevent the withdrawal of the 8th army to the east with the simultaneous capture of fortified areas before the withdrawal of our troops.

Second. The tasks of the troops of the North-Western Front are: to prevent a breakthrough of the occupied front from the direction of Krustpils and Daugavpils to the northeast, to firmly consolidate and hold the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified regions with all their forces and prevent the enemy from breaking through to the northeast and east.

Third. 8th Army on the night of 30.6. on 1.7.41, start a withdrawal to a fortified line. Intermediate milestones:

a) by the end of 1.7.41 - Cesis. lake Alauksto, Madona, Buzany, southwestern shore of the lake. Luban;

b) by the end of 2.7.41 - Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi (northern shore of Lake Luban).

In the future, make a withdrawal to the Pskov and Ostrovsky fortified areas.

Include in your composition parts of the 12th mechanized corps in the Madona area. When withdrawing, have the main grouping on your left flank, turning Special attention to communicate with the neighbor on the left.

The border on the left is Jekabpils, (claim.) Lake. Lubana, (claim.) Island.

Fourth. The 27th Army continued to stubbornly hold the enemy at the line they occupied. The withdrawal to the fortified line should be started only with the beginning of the withdrawal of the 8th Army from the Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi line. By the end of 1.7.41, get in touch with the 8th Army about the area of ​​Lake. Luban.

The border on the left is Kraslava, Dagda, (suit.) Opochka.

Fifth. The 41st Rifle Corps should concentrate and occupy Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka for defense on 1 July 1941, continuing to improve the fortifications, build fortified areas, anti-tank guns and field positions. The task is to prevent the enemy through the fortified areas to the east and northeast. Upon occupation of the fortified areas, enter into submission to the commander of the 8th Army.

Sixth. The 24th Rifle Corps (11th, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions) on the night of 1.7.41, start moving to the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev, where to replenish, reorganize and take the defense line (suit.) Ostrov, Opochka ... After concentrating and occupying the defense line, go to the disposal of the commander of the 27th Army.

Seventh. The 1st mechanized corps, arriving from the Leningrad Military District, is to concentrate in the Podlozhye region (40 km northeast of Pskov), (suit.) Porkhov, Borovichi (20 km north of Porkhov). The task is optional.

Eighth. The commander of the 22nd Rifle Corps, by the end of 1.7.41, go to the front of Podseva, Gorki, (suit.) Porkhov. To make parts of the hull for stubborn defense with a front to the southwest and south. Prepare passages in the zone of their defense for the 1st mechanized corps in the direction of Opochka ...

The exact time of the cancellation of this order is unknown - according to some reports, it arrived at the army headquarters only on the morning of June 2. In any case, at 7 am on June 1, the troops of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army, which were defending against the German bridgehead at Plavinas, began to withdraw to the north. Parts of the 48th Infantry Division retreated in the direction of Snyteri, Dukuri Manor, Skuene Manor, Krusta-Krogs, the 125th Division - to Madliena, Rantsiemi Manor, Ramuli Manor, Amata River. By this time, according to the report of its commander, about 700 bayonets remained in the 125th division.

The command of the 12th mechanized corps was not informed about this - apparently, the command of the 11th rifle corps and its divisions decided that since everyone received the order to withdraw, there was no need to warn the neighbor about this. As a result, the enemy struck at the flank of the 202nd Motorized Division, which was defending to the left at the Krustpils-Plyavinas line.

The 28th Panzer Division, located near Plavinas, also found itself in danger of being outflanked after the enemy, advancing from the direction of Krustpils, crossed the Aiviekste River with forces near the infantry regiment with artillery. An attempt to push the Germans back behind Aiviekste was unsuccessful; in addition, around noon, an order was received from the commander of the 8th Army to withdraw in the direction of Madona.

As a result, on the evening of June 1, formations of the 12th mechanized corps, which had previously successfully repelled all enemy attempts to force the river, were also forced to begin a retreat, covering it with counterattacks from the 23rd Panzer Division.

Already in the afternoon of June 1, counter-orders went to the troops. The 8th Army was ordered to attack the enemy troops on the flank, which were spreading from the bridgehead at Krustpils and had already reached Madon. The 27th Army was ordered to take up a strong defense and prevent the German bridgehead near Dvinsk from being "opened". At 17:10, the commander of the 181st rifle division was ordered to leave one rifle regiment with an artillery battalion and two anti-tank batteries in the Madona area, transferring it to the command of the commander of the 202nd motorized division, and the rest of the forced march to move to the Island.

The next day, these orders were confirmed by a new order.

"First. The enemy crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina by force up to one infantry division with tanks in the Dvinsk region and an unexplained number of motorized infantry with tanks in the areas of Jakobshtadt and Friedrichstadt, with the aim of separating the Northwestern Front in the direction of Madona.

Second. The armies of the North-Western Front during 2 and 3.7.41 destroy enemy units that broke through to the north of the river. Zap. Dvina, go out on the entire front to the river. Zap. Dvina and firmly hold this line ...

Fourth. The 8th Army with the 181st Rifle Division, holding the occupied front along the river. Zap. Dvina, with their own forces, from the morning of 2.7.41, destroy the enemy who crossed over in the Friedrichstadt area and prevent it from spreading to the north and northeast, for which purpose to have a strong reserve in the Madona area consisting of the 181st Infantry Division and the 12th th mechanized corps.

In the future, destroy the Jacobstadt group and reach the river on the entire front. Zap. Dvina and firmly defend it.

The border on the left is Jekabpils, Ostrov.

Fifth. The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy the enemy in the Daugavpils region and north-east" .

But the loss of at least two days made this order impossible. "Order - counterorder - disorder". Despite the fact that below Plavinas the right bank of the river was still entirely in our hands, the battle for the Dvina was already lost.

The commander of the 4th Panzer Group, E. Gepner, planned to launch a general offensive at dawn on July 2. In fact, it started a day earlier than planned. On the morning of July 1, the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps began to advance after the retreating troops of the 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army left Riga.

But the 6th Panzer Division and the 56th Motorized Corps were unable to launch an offensive even on July 2nd. Routh explains this very dully: by the poor condition of the roads south of Lake Lubana and the onset of heavy rain. Apparently, the division experienced a shortage of heavy equipment, which still could not be transported across the Dvina. By evening, the division had only reached the line of Zoblev and the Stock Exchange. There was practically no resistance from the Soviet troops in front of her front, but from the east her flank was constantly attacked by the remnants of the 10th airborne brigade.

Manstein at the appropriate place in his memoirs becomes very verbose, but also very vague.

“Finally, on July 2, we were able to speak again after the third mechanized formation arrived in the corps - the SS division “Dead Head”, and to our left the 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Dvina near Jacobstadt ...

However, after a sudden raid on Dvinsk, 6 days have already passed. The enemy had the opportunity to overcome the shock that he received when German troops appeared on the eastern bank of the Dvina ...

Whether it would be possible to preempt the enemy to the same extent again was, at least, doubtful ... This would be possible only if the tank group managed to direct all its forces to carry out one task. Just this, as will be shown, did not happen, although the enemy did not have enough strength to stop the advance of the tank group. .

In any case, Manstein did not manage to break through the defenses of the 27th Army right away. On the morning of June 1, the commander of the 27th Army, N. E. Berzarin (the future commandant of Berlin), received an order from the front command (given at 4:55) - to hold out at the occupied lines until July 5 at any cost. For this purpose, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps, transferred from the Northern Front, was transferred to the army. The division advanced to the Jaunlatgale, Karsava region with the task of covering the gap between the 8th and 27th armies and organizing anti-tank defense along the eastern banks of the Pededze and Aiviekste rivers on the front from Sita station to Lake Lubana, on the probable path of enemy tanks. Thus, even without intelligence data, Soviet command correctly determined the route of the 1st and 6th German Panzer Divisions.

By the evening of July 1, the forward detachments of the 1st Panzer Division had already reached Madon, 50 km from the Dvina. By order of Kuznetsov, one of the regiments of the 181st division of the 24th rifle corps was urgently sent here by the front. Reinforced by an artillery battalion and two anti-tank defense batteries, the regiment was to come under the command of the commander of the 202nd motorized division with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from Krustpils to Madona and further to the northeast. The rest of the division was ordered to move in a forced march to the Ostrov area, where to take up defense. At the same time, another order of the 8th Army prescribed “holding the front of Riga, Jekabpils, with our own forces to eliminate the enemy units that have broken through at Friedrichstadt, ensuring our left flank in the direction of Madona from the enemy’s attack and preventing it from spreading in the northern and northwestern directions ... be ready with a short strong blow from the area of ​​​​st. Luksty in the direction of Plavinas, in cooperation with the 27th Army, to eliminate the enemy units that had broken through from the direction of Jekabpils to Madona " .

For a counterattack towards Madona, it was proposed to use the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps, concentrated in the area of ​​Luksty station; at this point only 35 tanks remained in the corps.

At 0:25 on July 2, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, a pennant was dropped with an order from the army command to stop the withdrawal and restore the situation along the right bank of the Western Dvina. That is, the army headquarters had no other connection with the corps at that moment. Having tried to fulfill this order, at 2:50 the corps command ordered the 28th Panzer Division to take the former line along the Western Dvina coast in the Koaknese, Plyavinas area by 7 o'clock, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division to hold the occupied line of Madon, Meyrany, and the 23rd Panzer divisions from the Medzula, Lyezere area to attack enemy units on the northern bank of Aiviekste in the Lyegrade area. By 2 pm on July 2, parts of the corps were even able to take their starting position for the attack - however, the attack did not take place, since the 181st and 48th rifle divisions, having not received an order to stop the withdrawal, had already retreated to the northeast.

Already during the retreat in the Gulbene area, the vanguard of the 645th motorized rifle regiment of the 202nd motorized division attacked an enemy motorized detachment, capturing two serviceable cars and 7 motorcycles. Documents of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps (?!) were seized in one of the vehicles, as well as an extract from the notorious directive of May 13 “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa zone” - the very one that Manstein allegedly refused to send to the troops...

Meanwhile, the 27th Army was threatened by a detour from the Madona region, so on the evening of July 1, N.E. Berzarin ordered his troops to withdraw to a new line - from Lake Luban to Lake Rezna, bending his right flank to the east. Despite the multiple superiority of the enemy, the retreat of the 27th Army was carried out systematically. By 17:00 on July 1, the army units, according to the operational report of the front headquarters No. 09 / op dated 11:45 on July 2, occupied the following position:

“a) The 10th airborne brigade during the day, fighting with small groups of the enemy, holds the line of Garvatsaynieki, Dekshorn, Prizhevo. Headquarters - Vilani. The 76-mm battery of the 9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade joined the brigade.

Losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 4 people.

b) Parts of the Akimov group on 1.7.41 continued to hold and strengthen the line of Gashish, Bashki, Leitani, Bieshen. Headquarters - Lubana.

c) Parts of the Lelyushenko group during the day of 1.7.41 put themselves in order at the turn: 185th Infantry Division - Bieshen, Kovalev; 42nd Panzer Division - (suit.) Kovaleva, Kolei, Unguri.

In front of the front of the group, the 46th motorcycle regiment and the 44th tank battalion of the enemy were installed in battle. The enemy suffered significant losses. The entire headquarters of the tank battalion was destroyed. The 280th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Infantry Division, which lost many guns, suffered the greatest losses. .

At the same time, new corps arrived at the front, deploying at the turn of the old fortified areas:

“a) the 41st Rifle Corps - continues to concentrate in the Pskov, Ostrov area;

b) the 1st mechanized corps, consisting of one tank division and a motorized division, concentrated in the Pskov region;

c) the 22nd Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area of ​​Porkhov, Podseva, Gory;

d) 24th Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev " .

In the operational report of the headquarters of the front No. 10 / op for July 2, the position of the arriving units looked as follows:

“a) the 1st mechanized corps (without the 1st tank and 163rd motorized divisions) - in the forests and the area of ​​​​st. Toroshino, Podborovye (18–20 km northeast of Pskov).

b) 41st Rifle Corps (118th, 111th and 235th Rifle Divisions) 1.7.41 began to unload at the station. Pskov, st. Cherskaya. Until 18:00 on July 2, 1941, 11 echelons of the 111th Rifle Division, 13 echelons of the 118th Rifle Division and 3 echelons on the way and 6 control echelons of the 41st Rifle Corps arrived. Transportation is very late.

Upon completion of the concentration, the corps has the task of defending the Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka sector.

c) 22nd Rifle Corps: 180th Rifle Division concentrated in the Porkhov area, 182nd Rifle Division from 1.7.41 on the move from the Petseri area to Porkhov.

d) 24th Rifle Corps: 181st Rifle Division - from 1.7.41 on the move from the Gulbene area to the Ostrov area, 183rd Rifle Division - on the move from the Tsesisvraion Ostrov area " .

At that moment, the 1st mechanized corps (3rd tank, 163rd motorized divisions and 5th motorcycle regiment) had 371 tanks - 26 medium three-tower T-28,225 light BTs and 120 flamethrower T-26s, as well as 135 armored vehicles. The corps was staffed close to the staff, that is, it had 20-25 thousand people. However, even earlier, one tank battalion, an anti-aircraft division and a certain amount of vehicles were withdrawn from the corps.

On the afternoon of June 1, the headquarters of the North-Western Front received a directive from the Stavka, signed by G.K. Zhukov, which required “conduct an active operation to eliminate the crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina of the enemy in order to firmly gain a foothold in the future on its northern coast ". For the operation, it was allowed to use the 112th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army of the Western Front, as well as the 163rd Motorized Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, arriving in the North-Western Front.

In pursuance of this directive, at 0:17 on July 2, the front commander gave N.E. Berzarin a new order:

“The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning down the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy enemy in the area of ​​Daugavpils and northeast. By the end of 2.7.41, capture Daugavpils with moving parts and go out. Zap. Dvina .

The corresponding order of the commander of the 27th Army was sent to the troops only at about 8 o'clock in the morning and arrived there by 10 o'clock. The formations of the front holding the defense were extremely few in number; it is unlikely that they had the opportunity to launch a serious counteroffensive. Moreover, the Headquarters, contrary to the belief of some modern historians, did not require this - remember that Zhukov's directive of June 30 ordered Kuznetsov only to detain the enemy for 3-4 days and prevent him from spreading along the northern bank of the Dvina.

Moreover, at 2 a.m., even before the arrival of the order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army ordered the systematic withdrawal of his troops from Dvinsk:

"…4. 27th Army rear guard in parts to firmly hold the enemy on the occupied line and begin to withdraw sequentially, along the lines, only under pressure from a superior enemy, preventing the defeat of the battle formation in parts.

5. Intermediate defensive lines of retreat: the first - Lake. Lubana, r. Malta, r. Rezekne to st. Kazraji, Tiskadi, Malta, lake. Rezna-ezers, oz. Osha-ezers;

the second - r. Iga to Martuzani, Stiglov, Degl-va, Mozuli, Miroeda;

the third - Nosova, Augshpils, Krasny, Opochka.

6. Sequence of withdrawal: to line No. 1 - by the end of 2.7.41; to line No. 2 - by the end of 3.7.41; to line No. 3 - by the end of 4.7.41

7. Guryev's group to retreat in its lane, providing a junction with units of the 8th Army. The concentration area after the withdrawal of Marshavitsa, Soshihino, passing into the subordination of Akimov.

The border on the left - Larks, Augshpils, Bashki, Driceni, (suit.) Preili.

8. Akimov's group, retreating in its lane, cover the highway from a breakthrough of motorized units to the north. The concentration area is Marshavitsy, Soshihino.

The border on the left is (claimed) Maromohi, (claimed) Red, Ludza, Oguretska, Bikernieki.

9. Lelyushenko's group to depart in the indicated lane along the lines; after retreating beyond the UR, concentrate in the area of ​​​​st. Vereshchagin, Vysotskoye…”

This order turned out to be very timely: at 11 o'clock on July 2, Manstein himself launched an offensive. All day long, army formations repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks and infantry in the area of ​​Vilana, Preili and at the line of Aglona station, Leitani, Lake Sivera.

At 8:09, having finally received an order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army, by combat order No. 014, again ordered the troops to advance on Dvinsk. Fortunately, it was already too late - by the time the German offensive began, this order could not get into the troops.

By the end of the day on July 2, the army continued to hold the front from Lake Luban through Vilany, Prizhevo, Preili, the Aglona station, Leitani to Lake Siver. In front of the army front, the non-existent 226th and 18th Infantry Divisions were installed, as well as the very real 3rd Motorized Division. In addition to it, in reality, the 8th Panzer and units of the 290th and 121st Infantry Divisions, as well as the motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" operated here. The reconnaissance detachment of this division, numbering about 200 people, broke through our guard along the highway, moved to Sebezh and broke into the city of Dagda around noon. To the west of the city was the command post of the 42nd Panzer Division and the reserve of the 21st Mechanized Corps - tank and motorcycle battalions. Urgently sent to Dagda, they defeated the German detachment in a short battle; 126 serviceable motorcycles and 34 SS prisoners were captured, including two officers.

The SS men turned out to be extremely talkative - it turned out that the advance detachment of the division was following the reconnaissance detachment to Dagda. The commander of the 42nd Panzer Division, Colonel Voeikov, organized an ambush, as a result of which the reconnaissance battalion of the "Dead Head" was almost completely destroyed, consisting of 10 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers, 18 guns and 200 vehicles.

German sources are very muffled about this defeat. Manstein complains that the SS, despite their courage and excellent equipment, did not have enough experience and suffered too high losses. In popular books on the history of the SS troops and the "Dead Head" division, it is mentioned in passing that the 1st motorized regiment of the "Dead Head" lost about a hundred people in the battle at Dagda. On the contrary, V. Haupt writes that during these battles, the "Dead Head" lost two-thirds of its (apparently combat) composition and was reduced to one regiment.

As a result, despite a significant superiority in strength, during the day of fighting on July 2, Manstein managed to advance only 7-10 km. So far, there has been no talk of any breakthrough in the Soviet defense.

By the end of the day, the units of the 27th Army had 3,200 bayonets, 95 guns and 80–90 tanks. Akimov's group defended on the outskirts of Rezekne, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps (529th and 759th motorized rifle regiments) advanced to the Rezekne area, with its participation and with the support of the left-flank 112th rifle division of the 22nd army, the front command still intended to launch a counterattack in the direction of Dvinsk on the morning of July 3.

During the day, the columns of the 163rd motorized division were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft. The losses were insignificant, but the division's advance was delayed. Only by 20 o'clock the advanced units of the division reached the northern outskirts of Rezekne. Unfortunately, the 25th tank regiment of the division (without the 3rd battalion) was sent from Pskov by rail and, due to the untimely delivery of the train, began to arrive at Rezekne station only by 11 o'clock on July 3, when the main forces of the division were already drawn into a fierce battle south of the city.

On the morning of July 3, the position of the troops of the front was as follows. Parts of the 8th Army occupied the Sigulda line, Luksty station, Madona. On the Pskov direction, the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps retreated through Madona and to the east of it on Gulbene, on the morning of July 3, they defended along the line of Sakstagala, Malta, Luni, Lake Siver. To cover Rezekne, in addition to units of the 163rd motorized division, a front headquarters security battalion was thrown from the west, which repelled enemy attacks and held the Sakstagala area until the morning of July 3.

The left flank and the center of the 27th Army have so far managed to hold their positions, but the right flank was exposed due to the withdrawal of the 12th Mechanized Corps. As early as June 2, after a fierce battle in the Vilyana region, units of the 10th Airborne Brigade, having suffered losses, were dispersed by the motorized infantry of the 6th Panzer Division, operating with the support of a company of tanks. On the evening of July 2, Akimov's group, under the onslaught of tanks and motorized infantry of the 8th Panzer Division, withdrew to the Malta region (12 km southwest of Rezekne) and since then there has been no news from it. The road to Rezekne was open.

By this time, the command of the North-Western Front had finally abandoned plans for a counteroffensive. A combat order dated 02:00 on July 3 ordered the 27th Army to “holding back the enemy and destroying his columns that have gone too far with short counterattacks, preserving manpower and equipment, continue the defense of the direction”. The 163rd motorized division was now planned to be used for a counterattack against the forces of the 41st motorized corps and to restore contact with Akimov's group south of Rezekne.

Meanwhile, on the morning of July 3, troops of the 41st Motorized Corps reached Lake Lubana, units of the 6th Panzer Division bypassed it from the east, and the 1st Panzer Division from the west. The remnants of our 202nd motorized division, after an unsuccessful counterattack in the Madona area, withdrew to the Dzelzava manor area. In total, the combat composition of the 12th mechanized corps by this time remained:

“23rd Panzer Division - 10 tanks, 150 infantry, no shells;

28th Panzer Division - 22 tanks, motorized rifle regiment almost in full force;

202nd motorized division - about 600 people; motorcycle regiment does not exist" .

At 3 pm on July 3, units of the 1st Panzer Division of the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Gulbene, pushing back the remnants of the 202nd Motorized Division defending here. By the evening of the same day, tanks of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps broke into Rezekne, where the headquarters of the 27th Army had recently been located. Two regiments of the 163rd Motorized Division and half of the 25th Tank Regiment, which arrived too late, could not hold back the enemy, although they seriously halted his advance.

Worst of all, on the evening of July 3, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division, bypassing the defenses of the units of the 163rd Motorized Rifle Division near Karsava along country roads, broke from the west into the town of Gauri on the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 55 km from Rezekne and in 20 km north of Karsava. At 16:20, a German reconnaissance detachment of 5-6 tanks was discovered on the highway in the Vilaka (Vyshgorodok) area, just 45 km from Ostrov.

As a result, Soviet troops were thrown off the highway with a side impact. The 163rd Motorized Division had to retreat to eastbound to Krasny Ostrov and the Lie River. The path was open to the enemy along the highway towards Ostrov and Pskov - but, again, there was no merit of the 56th motorized corps in this ...

By evening, the Soviet command identified two main directions of the enemy's offensive: Krustpils - Madonna - Gulbene and Dvinsk - Rezekne. However, it still had no idea that the Germans were "castling" their motorized corps. The 41st, taking advantage of the open flank of the 27th Army and the absence of organized Soviet troops to its right, went to the Pskov highway, while the 56th went east - to Pushkinskiye Gory, Sebezh and Opochka.

The 21st Mechanized Corps, which formed the center and left flank of the 27th Army, was thrown back east of the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and could no longer impede the enemy's advance towards Ostrov. By the end of the day, the 46th Panzer and 185th Motorized Divisions were defending in the Brodaizhe area east and southeast of Rezekne with their front to the west. The 42nd Panzer Division still held Dagda and the area south of Lake Yesha; to the left of it to the Western Dvina and along the line of the river to the city of Drissa, the 122nd rifle division held the front.

On July 4, the enemy's 3rd motorized division, advancing towards Opochka, occupied Ludza. Moving to the right along the highway Kraslava - Sebezh, the SS division "Dead Head" finally captured Dagda and went east of Lake Yesha, finally disconnecting the corps. It was followed by the 121st Infantry Division.

And here the Germans were again unlucky. The withdrawal of the 42nd Panzer Division was covered by its 42nd motorized rifle regiment, Colonel A. M. Goryainov. Feeling the weakness of the German infantry, Colonel Goryainov launched a counterattack - and hit the headquarters of the 121st Infantry Division directly. During a short battle, the headquarters was defeated, the division commander, Major General Otto Lanzelle, died.

By the end of July 5, the 42nd tank and 185th motorized rifle divisions of the 21st mechanized corps retreated beyond the old border line to the Sebezh region and were withdrawn to the front reserve; The 46th Panzer Division continued to operate at Opochka.

By this time, the 24th Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps, which had finally arrived here, had finally been transferred to the army, in fact, before that it had not taken part in the battles. On the afternoon of July 6, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N. E. Berzarin, reported to the Military Council of the front on the state of his troops:

“The existing corps and divisions bear only this name, but in fact it looks like this:

a) The 24th Rifle Corps - completely untrained units that do not have our equipment, armed with all weapon systems - all brands of the world. It is impossible to supply them with ammunition and spare parts.

There are no headquarters, no means of communication, the staffing of the commanding staff is up to 12-15%, the shortage is up to 90%.

Now in this corps (181st plus 128th rifle divisions) there are no more than 8 thousand.

b) The 21st mechanized corps has endured heavy fighting, its special units are dropping out, and in fact the corps is being eaten by the enemy.

c) The 163rd motorized division after heavy fighting is completely unfit for combat, having lost people (up to 60%), lost artillery (up to 70%), lost tanks (up to 50%). All these data are only approximate - they are currently being collected and counted. A division cannot be thrown into battle.

d) The 235th Rifle Division (arrived as one 806th Rifle Regiment) - I don’t know where it is and when it will be at our front.

In short, a rather difficult situation has arisen that can only be rectified by a cardinal decision - to create a strong defensive zone in the depths with fresh units, and to withdraw the entire listed composition behind some kind of barrier and form it for new actions. It must be borne in mind that the army in its composition has thousands of examples of courage and heroism of all and many people. But the trouble is that we do not have a well-established command and control, we do not have aviation, and the enemy, using our weak points, persistently uses them ... aviation literally terrorizes our units, being unpunished.

Lieutenant General Comrade Akimov, whom I am sending to you as having already completed his tasks, can report in detail on the state of affairs.

I and all of us have enough determination to fight and fight by any means, but for the common good of the country, I would like to orient you with this short note. .

Thus, the front of the 27th Army was broken through only on July 3. It should be noted that this happened as a result of bypassing it from the west and the defeat of the right flank by the forces of the 41st motorized corps, which broke through from the Krustpils area into the junction of two Soviet armies. We have already analyzed the reasons for this breakthrough.

It can be stated that the bridgehead at Dvinsk did not play a decisive role in the success of the German offensive. The Soviet defense was broken through by the blow of the 41st motorized corps from the bridgehead at Krustpils - and this success of the Germans, in turn, was due to the untimely withdrawal of two divisions of the 11th rifle corps.

The enemy did not count on success at Krustpils, where he did not have a permanent bridge at his disposal, and made the main bet on the bridgehead in the Dvinsk region. However, during the week Manstein was unable to crush the defenses of the opposing units of the 27th Army, which were significantly inferior in size and capabilities to his 56th Motorized Corps. And only the mistake of the commander of the North-Western Front, combined with the delay in orders caused by poor communications, led to disastrous results.

On June 3, F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from his post and a week later he was appointed commander of the 21st Army. The next day, the former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant-General P.P. Sobennikov, took his place, and Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin became a member of the military council. Even earlier (July 1), Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, assumed the post of chief of staff of the front.

P. P. Sobennikov recalled:

“On July 3, 1941, already on the retreat from the city of Riga, which was occupied by small units of the Germans, I received an order from the front commander, Colonel General Kuznetsov, to assume the post of commander of the North-Western Front. I received this prescription from a motorcyclist. On July 3, I met, having arrived in Pskov, at my reserve command post, General Ivanov, appointed in my place, oriented him on the move in the situation known to me and, having arrived at the headquarters of the front near the city of Pskov, took command of the troops of the front of the same date " .

From that moment on, the fate of the North-Western Front depended on whether the unfired troops of the 41st, 24th, and 1st Mechanized Corps would manage to take defensive lines along the old border line and the Velikaya River in time, and on the number of front forces that could be withdrawn to these lines.

According to the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front to the General Staff of the Red Army dated July 4, 1941, in total there were:

8th Army:

10th Rifle Division: commanders- 52, junior officers - 81, privates - 429. Total - 562. Horses - 10. Ordinary rifles - 257, automatic - 76, light machine guns - 5, easel - 3, DP - 6, cars - 9, carts - 3, kitchens - 1.

11th rifle division: personnel -1450; easel machine guns - 6, 45-mm guns - 1, 122-mm - 3, armored vehicles - 1.

48th Rifle Division: officers - 336, junior officers - 348, privates - 1365. Total - 2049. Horses - 765. Ordinary rifles - 1445, automatic - 198, light machine guns - 45, easel - 26, large-caliber - 3 , anti-aircraft guns - 6, DP - 89, guns 45 mm - 15, 76 mm - 12, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 3.122 mm - 23.152 mm - 1, motor vehicles - 91, radium - 14, tractors - 15.

67th Rifle Division - no information.

The 125th Rifle Division, together with the corps units of the 11th Rifle Corps: officers - 681, junior officers - 550, privates - 5489. Total - 6720. Horses - 501. Ordinary rifles - 6496, automatic - 35, light machine guns - 80, easel - 25, anti-aircraft guns - 23, DP - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 12, 122 mm - 10, 152 mm - 46, cars - 292, motorcycles - 1, tractors - 87.

10th rifle corps with corps units: officers - 170, junior officers - 246, privates - 1439. Total - 1855. Ordinary rifles - 850, light machine guns - 63, easel -11, anti-aircraft guns - 2, walkie-talkies - 5, guns 45 mm - 1, 76 mm -2, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns -26.122 mm - 26, 152 mm - 9, vehicles - 61, tractors - 42.

12th Mechanized Corps:

Management and corps: personnel - 1550, tanks - 32.

23rd Panzer Division: officers - 384, junior officers - 347, privates - 2467. Total - 3198. Rifles - 2008, light machine guns - 42, 37-mm guns - 12, 45-mm - 10, 122- mm - 7, tanks - 11, armored vehicles - 2, vehicles - 167.

28th Panzer Division: officers - 464, junior officers - 578, privates - 2692. Total - 3734. Ordinary rifles - 2276, automatic - 2, mortars -2, light machine guns - 59, anti-aircraft guns - 2, DP - 41 , guns 45 mm - 0.37 mm - 6, 76 mm - 1.122 mm -2.152 mm - 1, tanks - 3 , cars - 384.

9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade: officers - 226, junior officers - 356, privates - 1549. Total 2131. Ordinary rifles - 1686, automatic - 6, light machine guns - 27, DP - 3, 76-mm guns - 13.85 mm - 7, cars - 64, radios - 12, motorcycles - 3, tractors - 3.

Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps: officers - 63, junior officers - 245, privates - 245. Total - 553. Ordinary rifles - 286, manual - 3, vehicles - 30, radios - 3.

No information was received on the 2nd Panzer Division, the motorcycle regiment of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

202nd motorized division: officers - 114, junior officers - 46, privates - 875. Total - 1035. Rifles - 306, light machine guns - 22, DP - 2, 76-mm guns - 2, 122-mm - 6 , tanks T-26 - 5, T-38 - 1.

27th Army:

Army Directorate, 5th Airborne Corps, 112th tank and 163rd motorized divisions of the 1st mechanized corps: commanders - 3715, junior officers - 6088, privates - 22181. Total - 31,984. Horses - 94. Rifles - 16971, automatic rifles - 1016, mortars -243 , light machine guns - 660, easel - 151, large-caliber - 36, anti-aircraft - 23, DP -1747, 37-mm guns - 20, 45-mm - 95, 76-mm - 48, 76-mm anti-aircraft guns - 4, 122- mm - 12, 152-mm - 12, tanks - 360, armored vehicles - 73, vehicles - 3632, radios - 7.

Management of the 22nd Rifle Corps and corps units: officers - 400, junior officers - 340, privates - 1432. Total - 2172. Guns 107-mm - 53, 152-mm - 9.

180th Rifle Division: officers - 1030, junior officers - 1160, privates - 9132. Total - 11 322. Horses - 3039. Rifles - 11 645, mortars - 35, light machine guns - 535, easel - 212, large-caliber - 3, anti-aircraft - 24, DP - 5, walkie-talkies - 0, 37-mm guns - 31, 45-mm - 58, 76-mm - 74, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 4, 122-mm - 14, 152-mm - 12, armored vehicles - 6, vehicles - 72.

182nd Rifle Division - no information received.

(From) 24th Rifle Corps, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions, 41st Rifle Corps, 111.48 and 235th Rifle Divisions no information was received.

Management and body parts1st Mechanized Corps: officers - 216, junior officers - 250, privates - 1255. Total - 1721. Rifles - 193, automatic - 1, mortars - 24, light machine guns - 162.

3-tank division: officers - 1096, junior officers - 1652, privates - 6455. Total - 9203. Ordinary rifles - 4847, automatic - 946; mortars -39, light machine guns - 161, easel - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 4.152 mm - 12.203 mm - 12, tanks T-26 - 16, T-38 - 27, BT-7 - 121, others - 36, armored vehicles - 81, motor vehicles - ... 10 .

17th Communications Regiment: officers - 92, junior officers - 205, privates - 468. Total 765. Rifles - 516, light machine guns - 7.

25th Engineer Regiment: officers - 14, junior officers - 29, privates - 187. Total - 230. Vehicles - 2.

402nd howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 155, junior officers - 266, privates - 885. Total - 1306. Rifles - 1962, automatic - 4, light machine guns - 5, 122-mm guns - 2, 203-mm - 24, armored vehicles - 0, cars - 112, motorcycles - 12, tractors - 104.

110th howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 143, junior officers - 190, privates - 1205. Total - 1538. Rifles - 1862, guns of the 203rd - 22, vehicles - 112.

10th brigade air defense: command staff - 176, junior command staff - 272, private - 1774. Total - 2222. 85 mm guns - 24, 76 mm - 37, 40 mm - 16.37 mm - 16, heavy machine guns - 2, quad installations - 16, cars - 95, motorcycles - 8, tractors - 27, radio stations - 9.

12th air defense brigade: officers - 114, junior officers - 85, privates - 479. Total - 678. No guns, quad installations - 1, vehicles - 30.

14th air defense brigade: officers - 81, junior officers - 37, privates - 252. Total - 370. 85-mm - 4.37-mm guns - 3, heavy machine guns - 3, quad installations - 7, cars - 34.

306th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 22, junior officers - 39, privates - 256, 85-mm guns - 8, quadruple installations - 3, vehicles - 13.

362nd separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 38, junior officers - 57, privates - 329. Total - 424. 76-mm guns - 7, quad installations - 8, vehicles - 33, tractors - 3.

Air Force:

6th mixed aviation division: officers - 577, junior officers - 1345, privates - 1378. Total - 3300. Rifles - 2723, aircraft - 69.

7th mixed aviation division: officers - 536, junior officers - 1422, privates - 1260. Total - 3218. Rifles - no data. Aircraft I-16 - 2; I-15bis - 19; I-153 - 2; Sat - 3. Total - 26.

8th mixed aviation division: officers - 804, junior officers - 678, privates - 846. Total - 2328. MiG-3 aircraft - 14, I-153 - 8, I-16 - 1, I-15bis - 6 Total - 29.

57th mixed aviation division: officers - 781, junior officers - 667, privates - 693. Total - 2141. I-16 aircraft - 6, I-153 - 18, SB - 5. Total - 22.

By 11th Army (16th rifle corps, 29th rifle corps, 179th and 184th rifle divisions, 5.33, 128, 188,126,23rd rifle divisions, 84th motorized division, 5th tank division, 10 -I anti-tank defense artillery brigade, 429th howitzer artillery regiment, 4th and 30th pontoon regiments) no information .