... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of the macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of our ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces.
The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensives of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors involved.
First of all, the failures of large-scale VDOs somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, with the existing material and technical base and the general level of organization).
Secondly, the very idea of small landings probably seemed wrong; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were envisaged by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).
Thirdly, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to manage with tried and tested purely ground-based methods.
But this is all just speculation. Personally, it seems to the author quite possible to single out several dozens of excellent Li-2 and S-47 military transport aircraft from the many hundreds already available by 1944 (more than 1000 in 1945) and throw them along the same paths along the parachute battalion supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - in some cases this could already significantly facilitate the actions of ground forces. But what was, was.
In the late 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just burst onto the scene - a new class aircraft. Helicopters (which at this point reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) successfully proved themselves in the Incheon amphibious assault operation (MDO) and in subsequent actions of American troops in Korea. Hurrying domestic designers present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. enlist in the army en masse.
Already in 1954, the first large-scale experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also carried out (including with the real use of nuclear weapons) to land battalion and regimental-scale helicopter assault forces behind enemy lines ... However, the matter died out. That is, no organizational measures to create specialized formations were taken.
Causes:
First of all, the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played a negative role.
Secondly, the overdimension of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. have as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already impudence, especially since the "Khrushchev" general reduction of the Armed Forces has begun.
Thirdly, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without the protection of armored personnel carriers) riflemen-infantry; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" compared to the armored personnel carrier.
Fourth, in addition to the airborne units of the Airborne Forces, until 1957 there were in abundance and rifle divisions, units of both, could, if such a task was set, be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.
Fifth, brought up on the power of tank armored fists to Soviet military leaders, lurid, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on top (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swift licked aerodynamics!) Did not seem to be the means that could give the troops new hitherto unseen opportunities.
^
Capitalists
In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the theory of VDO. The best illustration is the following phrase of the US Airborne Forces General James Gavin from his book "Airborne Warfare": "... troops should be used massively, and not in small groups. And only where their actions can have a decisive impact, and not in many points where they can only achieve local tactical success." However, their experience of the war on what later became known as "poorly equipped theater of operations", i.e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think and act more flexibly. The helicopter proved to be a very promising means of transportation in mountainous and wooded areas and lack of roads. The number of helicopters jumps strongly - by the end of the war, there were already 1140 units in the army aviation, while at the beginning there were only 56 units. The American command is also creating an experimental formation - the 11th Air Assault Division (Air Assault Division). On its basis and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). A significant innovation was the fact that helicopters were also introduced into the composition of its combat units for the first time as a transport and combat vehicle. total number up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was deployed to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of a proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was ok. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!
Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived rather as a kind of exotic, purely auxiliary purposes. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from aircraft) landing as such.
In Russia
Such an active and such a successful use of helicopters made an impression on Soviet command. The idea is being revived - in the course of the strategic exercises "Dnepr-67", mainly on the basis of the 51st city, an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade is formed under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training of the Airborne Forces Major-General Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion deployed by helicopters with attached self-propelled guns also participates. In a specially created working group at the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades. Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FAR) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other data, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).The brigades were formed, as they say, from scratch. Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (VDS) and to the positions of brigade commanders.
But even here, a number of subjective factors of the peculiarities of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, the underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to operate on EuroTVD. That is why they were deployed in areas with a lesser threat compared to the western one - it was considered expedient to have them only for operations on mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground equipment, where the focality of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster of visual propaganda with a somewhat surreal inscription: "Attack paratrooper - time limit.") The aviation component of each of the brigades was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Army, and the air - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.
For the implementation of air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to attract ordinary paratroopers or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of airborne and combined arms divisions.
A little about terminology should also be said here. It is not good to use the terms created by the capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms "air assault" and "airmobile" gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet DShCh and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.
By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OShS).
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 11 odshbr | July 1968 | Trans-Baikal Military District | gg. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* |
| 13 odshbr | July 1968 | Far Eastern Military District | Magdagachi city (Amur region)* |
| 21 odshbr | 1973 | Transcaucasian Military District | gg. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany | Cottbus (GDR)** |
| 36 odshbr | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District | town Garbolovo (Leningrad region) |
| 37 odshbr | December 1979 | Baltic VO | |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | December 1979 | Belarusian VO | Brest (Belarus) |
| 39 odshbr | December 1979 | Carpathian MD | Khyriv (Ukraine) |
| 40 odshbr | December 1979 | Odessa Military District | |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District | |
| 57 odshbr | December 1979 | Central Asian VO | |
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 48 odshb | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District, 1st AK / 40th OA (*) | unknown |
| 139 odshb | December 1979 | Baltic VO, 11th Guards. OA | |
| 145 odshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 5th OA | |
| 899 odshb | December 1979 | 20th Guards OA | Burg (GDR) |
| 900 odshb | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 8th Guards OA | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) |
| 901 odshb | December 1979 | Central Group of Forces | |
| 902 odshb | December 1979 | Southern Group of Forces | Kecskemét (Hungary) |
| 903 odshb | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 28th OA | Brest (Southern), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus) |
| 904 dshb | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 13th OA | |
| 905 odshb | December 1979 | Odessa Military District, 14th OA | Bendery (Moldova) |
| 906 dshb | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 36th OA | |
| 907 dshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 43rd AK / 47th OA | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) |
| 908 odshb | December 1979 | Kyiv Military District, 1st Guards OA | Konotop, since 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) |
| 1011 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards TA | |
| 1044 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 1st Guards TA | |
| 1156 slut | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 8th TA | |
| 1179 slut | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District, 6th OA | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) |
| 1151 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 7th TA | Polotsk (Belarus) |
| 1185 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 2nd Guards TA | Ravensbrück (GDR) |
| 1604 slut | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 29th OA | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) |
.
In 1984, 83 odshbr and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th odshp for full-time Operational-Maneuvering Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate army corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.
|
Thus, at the end of 1986, the Soviet Army had 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total staffing of the DShCh for wartime was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.
Subordination
Many are interested in the question - were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn't. DShCh were part of the High Command of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the military personnel of the DShCh are not airborne paratroopers? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the GK SV DShCh, they were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with parts special purpose- there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was the command of the commander of the tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no command of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the SV. The "second-class" (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the secret intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruiting and training, etc. In the minds of the officers of both the Airborne Forces and the SV, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "link" (perhaps with the exception of units in groups of troops - there, all places, of course, were valued higher).In operational terms (combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of the DShV units and their training was managed by the combat training department of the Civil Code of the SV together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces command. The general principles of the combat use of the DShV lay on the conscience General Staff USSR Armed Forces.
In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.
This had two opposite consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that DShCh thus found a "father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, broken close interaction headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of combined arms formations. DShV, designed to act in the interests of combined arms formations, ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, drastically reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a subordination scheme: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (staffing, development of methods and forms of action, armament and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - by the commander of operational and operational-strategic formations in whose interests this formation is supposed to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces All this played little role. But that is another story…
^
Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DShV
If, according to the established opinion, the Airborne Forces are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (ADO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km and more) , then the idea of \u200b\u200busing DShV lies in the field rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not tough, they are thrown out in the interests of at least the front (group of fronts), or even Supreme High Command(VGK), then for DShV it is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They operate within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro-target" determines the "micro-target" of the landing forces, it also determines the task, composition of forces, method of application.) produced in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the level of the army-corps, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command instance, the smaller, as a rule, the scale of the forces involved by the LH. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the DShV - in companies and battalions, less often - in a brigade / regiment.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Gayzhunay pupils.
^
Outfit and equipment
Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowances almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment with the landing specifics, it did not take into account the moral factor either. In general, until ser. 1983, all l / s DShV went to regular form motorized riflemen - however, for a very obvious discrepancy, standard duffel bags-sidors were replaced with RD-54 landing backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also "hazing" deviations from this rule. So, one could see airborne "birds" on red buttonholes, and those who were dismissed from active service tried to get a "normal" paratrooper uniform - with a vest and a beret - and in this form go "for demobilization". For parachute jumps, so-called. "Jump" overalls of the Airborne Forces.
In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DSHV to supply standards and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the hateful and despised "red color".
For a combat situation, you can outline the standard view of a Soviet paratrooper as follows. Underwear incl. and a vest (a T-shirt, with a long sleeve and a double-knit vest, that is, insulated); so-called greenish-olive jumpsuit; a head-hugging cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with a lining), boots with side lacing (or, less often, with belts); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit was worn, consisting of a short jacket and trousers; all khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - the backpack of the paratrooper RD-54. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for magazines for SVD sniper rifles, cases for carrying shots for RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases for small arms and a cargo container GK-30 were used.
Also, in Ser. In the 80s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed that was structurally reminiscent of the GeDeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
^
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS
Speaking about the organizational and staffing structure (OShS) and the equipment of subunits and units of the DShV with weapons and equipment (AME), the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OShS and equipment of weapons and military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied both to the lower divisions and the general structure of the units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSH with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local features; which is connected with the notorious regime of secrecy in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OShS DShV quite problematic and requires a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the ODSHBR and ODSHB.
Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we will have to limit ourselves only to the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three paratroopers (airborne standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault (the airborne assault had the original OShS reinforced compared to the airborne assault rifle) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not typical for the Soviet landing units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.
Some brigades had a structure different from the one presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratroopers (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three airborne assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one paratrooper (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization to the organizational structure odshp differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: the 1st airborne (foot) and 2nd airborne assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the regimental units. The total number of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.
organizational structure odshb in the European theater of operations and the Far East theater of operations, it was generally similar to the OShS of the infantry brigade, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault (on BMD) and a platoon (either from BMD or UAZ-469), and in the mortar battery the number of barrels increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in wartime states reached 650-670 people.
In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began, which were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time when the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.The overall picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.
| Number | | Transformations |
| 11 odshbr | Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by 1 Aug. 1990 transferred to the states air-dec. brigades. |
| 13 odshbr | Magdagachi city (Amur region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. |
| 21 odshbr | Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) | |
| 23 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | Cottbus (GDR)** | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 36 odshbr | village Garbolovo (Leningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 37 odshbr | Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | Brest (Belarus) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 39 odshbr | Khyriv (Ukraine) | In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Training Center. |
| 40 odshbr | with. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the state air-dec. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev. |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | settlement Azadbash (district, Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** | In the winter of 1989, it was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 57 odshbr | town Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) | Transferred to s. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989. |
| 58 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | Disbanded December 1989. |
| 83 odshbr | Bialogard (Poland) | Transferred to the city of Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990, transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 128 odshbr | Stavropol (Stavropol AK) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 130 odshbr | Abakan (Khakas Autonomous Okrug) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 1318 slut | Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus) | Disbanded in August 1989. |
| 1319 slut | Kyakhta (Chita region) | Disbanded in March 1988. |
With individual battalions, they acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.
| Number | Point of permanent deployment at the beginning of transformations | Transformations |
| 139 odshb | Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) | |
| 145 odshb | settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 899 odshb | Burg (GDR) | In 1989 he was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991. |
| 900 odshb | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) | Withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded. |
| 901 odshb | in the district of n.p. Riechki (Czechoslovakia) | In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. In 1991, disbandment began, but soon the battalion was redeployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (the city of Gudauta). |
| 902 odshb | Kecskemét (Hungary) | In 1989 he was transferred to Grodno (Belarus). |
| 903 odshb | Grodno (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 904 dshb | Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 905 odshb | Bendery (Moldova) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 906 dshb | settlement Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 907 dshb | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 908 odshb | town Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1011 slut | Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1044 slut | Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück) | Translated in 1989 in Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1156 slut | Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1179 slut | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1151 slut | Polotsk (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1185 slut | Ravensbrück (GDR) | Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1604 slut | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) | Disbanded no later than 1989 |
Notes:
* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply.
Official historical reference of the part:
I. HISTORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION
56th Guards Separate Order Patriotic War First degree Don Cossack Airborne Assault Brigade originates from the 351st Guards Landing Airborne Regiment, formed from June 3 to July 28, 1946 on the basis of units of the 351st and 355th Guards Rifle Regiments and included in the 106th Guards Airborne Division of the 38th Guards Airborne Corps of Vienna.
The annual holiday of the brigade set the date of the formation of the 351st Guards rifle regiment- January 5, 1945.
In 1949, the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment was renamed the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment.
In 1960, the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment was transferred from the 106th Guards Airborne Division to the 105th Guards Airborne Division.
In 1979, the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade.
In 1989, the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War First Class Airborne Assault Brigade was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War First Class Airborne Brigade.
In 1997, the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, the Don Cossack Airborne Brigade was reorganized into the 56th Guards, Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, the Don Cossack Airborne Assault Regiment, which became part of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
In 2009, the 56th Guards Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, the Don Cossack Airborne Assault Regiment, was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, the Don Cossack Airborne Assault Brigade.
On July 1, 2010, it was reorganized into the 56th Guards Separate Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree, the Don Cossack Airborne Assault Brigade (light).
II. PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGNS, BATTLE, OPERATIONS
From February 20 to 25, 1945, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment as part of the 106th Guards Rifle Division of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps was transferred to Hungary, where it fought as part of the 9th Guards Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
March 30, 1945, pursuing the retreating units of the enemy, the regiment crossed the Austro-Hungarian border. Acting on the left flank of the corps, in cooperation with other parts of the corps, he captured several cities and took part in the battles to capture the capital of Austria, the city of Vienna.
On April 23, 1945, the regiment was relieved by units of the 4th Guards Army and taken to rest on the outskirts of the city of Vienna.
On May 5, 1945, the regiment entered the territory of Czechoslovakia with a forced march and participated in the encirclement and defeat of a significant group of Germans.
On May 11, 1945, the regiment went to the banks of the Vltava River (Czechoslovakia), where it met with American troops. Here the combat path of the unit in the Great Patriotic War ended.
During the fighting, the regiment killed 1956, captured 633 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 26 tanks, 255 self-propelled guns and guns of various calibers, 11 armored personnel carriers, 1 aircraft and 18 enemy vehicles. 10 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns and guns of various calibers, 3 aircraft, 4 armored personnel carriers, 115 vehicles, 37 warehouses with military equipment were captured.
From June 1945 to November 1979, the regiment (brigade) did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
1979 opened new page in combat way connections: Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to provide military aid the Afghan government in the fight against rebel gangs.
On December 28, 1979, the 4th airborne infantry brigade as part of the 40th army was introduced into the territory of Afghanistan with the task of guarding and defending the Salang Pass and the Salange-Somalia tunnel to ensure the advance of Soviet troops into the southern regions of Afghanistan.
In January 1980, the entire brigade was introduced into the territory of Afghanistan. It is deployed in the area of the city of Kunduz, leading fighting throughout Afghanistan.
During the period from January 1980 to December 1981, about 3000 rebels, 3 guns, 6 mortars, 12 cars, 44 pillboxes were destroyed during the fighting. More than 400 rebels were captured, more than 600 small arms were captured.
From December 1 to December 5, 1981, the brigade was relocated to the area of the city of Gardez, from where it continued to conduct military operations throughout Afghanistan.
During the period from January 1982 to June 1988, about 10,000 rebels, over 40 fortified areas and strongholds, more than 200 guns, rocket launchers and mortars, 47 vehicles, 83 pillboxes, 208 warehouses with military equipment, were destroyed during the hostilities, 45 caravans. More than 1,000 rebels were captured, more than 1,200 small arms and grenade launchers, about 40 guns and mortars, 7 cars, 2 tanks, 85 warehouses with military equipment were captured.
From June 12 to June 14, 1988, the brigade, after fulfilling its international duty, returned to its homeland.
For the successful completion of combat missions, many paratroopers were awarded government awards from the Soviet government and the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, and the commander of the paratrooper company of the guard, Senior Lieutenant Sergey Pavlovich Kozlov, was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.
From July 1988 to December 1989, the brigade did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
During 1990, the brigade performed special tasks in a state of emergency: from January 12 to March 26 - to maintain order in the cities of Baku, Meghri, Lankaran, Kurdamir of the Azerbaijan SSR; from June 5 to August 21 - to maintain order in the city of Uzgen, Kirghiz SSR.
From September 1990 to November 1994, the brigade did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
From December 11, 1994 to October 25, 1996, the battalion tactical group of the brigade carried out combat missions to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic.
From November 1996 to July 1999, the brigade (regiment) did not take part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
From August 1999 to June 2000, the regiment, and from June 2000 to November 2004, the battalion tactical group of the regiment carried out combat missions during the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen Republic.
For courage and heroism shown in the performance of combat missions, three servicemen of the unit were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation:
the commander of the reconnaissance company of the guard, Sergeant Vornovskoy Yuri Vasilyevich (posthumously);
Deputy Commander of the Airborne Battalion of the Guards, Major Cherepanov Alexander Leonidovich;
the commander of the reconnaissance company of the guard, Captain Petrov Sergey Vasilievich.
From November 2004 to the present, the regiment (brigade) has not taken part in campaigns, battles, or operations.
III. AWARDS AND DIFFERENCES
The name "Guards", previously assigned to the 351st Rifle Regiment, when it was reorganized into the 351st Landing Airborne Regiment, was also retained by this regiment.
By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces No. 034 dated November 21, 1984, the brigade was awarded the challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the Ground Forces for high results in combat and political training and strengthening military discipline.
By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 4, 1985, for great merits in the armed defense of the Socialist Motherland, successes in combat and political training, and in connection with the 40th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the brigade was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, I degree.
By order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 0139 dated July 11, 1990, the brigade was awarded the Pennant of the Minister of Defense of the USSR for courage and military prowess shown in carrying out the tasks of the Soviet government and the Minister of Defense of the USSR.
By Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 353-17 of April 22, 1994, the brigade was given the name Don Cossack.
IV. DISPOCATION CHANGES
From January to March 1945 - metro Starye Dorogi of the Byelorussian SSR (Belarusian Military District).
From March to June 1945 - Pisek, Czechoslovakia.
From June 1945 to January 1946 - Budapest, Hungary.
From March to May 1946 - the city of Teikovo (Obolsunovo camp) of the Ivanovo Region (Moscow Military District).
From May to October 1946 - Tesnitskoye camp in the Tula region (Moscow military district).
From October 1946 to August 1960 - the city of Efremov, Tula Region (Moscow Military District).
From August 1960 to December 1979 - the city of Chirchik, Tashkent region of the Uzbek SSR (Turkestan military district).
From December 1979 to January 1980 - the Kokaity airfield of the Jarkurgan district of the Surkhan-Darya region of the Uzbek SSR (40th army).
From January 1980 to December 1981 - Kunduz airfield, DRA (40th Army).
From December 1981 to June 1988 - the city of Gardez, DRA (40th Army).
From June 1988 to October 1992 - the city of Iolotan, Mary region of the Turkmen SSR (Turkestan military district, Airborne Forces).
From October 1992 to June 1993 - art. Zelenchukskaya, Karachay-Cherkessia (VDV).
From June 1993 to August 1998 - the city of Volgodonsk, Rostov Region (VDV, North Caucasian Military District).
From August 1998 to the present - the city of Kamyshin, Volgograd Region (North Caucasian Military District).
The main purpose of the light assault brigade is the combined arms reserve. To increase mobility and speed of movement, the brigade has been completely re-equipped with vehicles. The main method of movement is the transfer of personnel and light weapons by air (helicopters), while equipment arrives under its own power. In the presence of a sufficient number of heavy helicopters, the transfer of equipment by air is also possible. In particular, this method of transportation was practiced in 2008 during exercises at the Ashuluk training ground, when GAZ-66 vehicles and D-30 howitzers were transferred to Mi-26s.
The issue of giving helicopters to the brigade is being worked out.
The main type of equipment - UAZ cars
2.
No automatic tire inflation
46.
Side door
47. 
Let me remind you once again that the car was undergoing trial operation, the task of which was to identify shortcomings, which would then be corrected. One of the main problems is the awning: cool in winter and dusty in summer. At the beginning of this year, the next batch of Scorpion hard-top vehicles is expected to be delivered to the brigade for trial operation. What specific model it will be, they could not tell me.
Almost all of the brigade's vehicles are new, received in 2009-2010.
KAMAZ-5350 with a set of additional protection
48.
Staff vehicle based on KAMAZ-5350
49.
With staff trailer for officers' rest
50.
The interior of the headquarters module
51.
52. 
Camp trailer for recreation
53.
On the left side of the entrance is a washbasin.
56. 
Technical assistance vehicle MTP-A2
57.
Repair and mechanical workshop MRM-MZR
62.
In the foreground is the MTO-AM maintenance vehicle
67.
VCh 74507 - The 56th airborne assault brigade is located in the city of Kamyshin, located in the Volgograd region. The brigade does not belong to the ground forces and is subordinate to the Airborne Forces Directorate under the Ministry of Defense.
56 ODSHBR does not have an official website. Up-to-date information on the order of passage military service, living conditions, reviews of conscripts and other information you can get here.
The formation was created in 1943, then it was transferred to the Moscow region, then to the Mogilev region, and from there it continued to move around the countries of Europe. The next destination was Hungary, Budapest. The military unit participated in the Vienna operation, fought with the 11th German division, liberated the Hungarian city of More. For the entire duration of its personnel fought about 300 km., sometimes the military had to overcome up to 25 km. per day.
The military unit took part in the Prague operation, having crossed the border of Czechoslovakia, it captured the city of Znojmo. The combat path of the connection ended in the village of Oleshnya.
In 1979, the military personnel of the brigade performed their international duty in Afghanistan, then in Chechnya. In 1998, the formation was transferred to Kamyshin.
Awards
- For the capture of the city of Mor and the defeat of the 11th division, the brigade was awarded the Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree, as well as the gratitude of the Supreme Commander.
- Guards Battle Banner;
- Order of the Red Banner;
- Order of the Patriotic War 1st class.
Locations
There is only one HF, but there are two military camps located in different parts of the city:
- Petrovskaya street - "Red roofs". Parts of the Airborne Forces and the RHBZ are stationed there;
- Gorokhovskaya street - "Grey roofs". There are only units of the Airborne Forces.
Accommodation
Conscripts live in cabins, each of which is designed for four. For the period of the course of a young soldier, recruits are accommodated separately from the "old-timers", then they are all united in one barracks. The conditions do not differ, except that at first the shower can be on the floor, and not in the cockpit.
The room has a standard set of furniture: beds (each has a socket), bedside tables, a desk, a wardrobe for uniforms. There is a bathroom in the cubicle.
Meals in the dining room, prepared by civilian staff. There is also a shop on the premises. According to reviews, prices there are slightly higher than in the city, but the assortment is varied. You can add food or hygiene items, as well as other things.
Service
Those who served in the unit note the presence of intensive physical training. Considering that the unit is an airborne unit, all military personnel are obligatory trained to perform parachute jumps from an airplane and a helicopter. Contract soldiers jump more often than conscripts.
In addition to physical training, military personnel receive other skills. For this, trips to the landfill are organized. The exercises take about a month and are held quite often. Accommodation during the period of stay at the training ground - in tents, meals are organized by the field kitchen. According to servicemen, the food is of decent quality and taste, there are borscht, a variety of soups, even kebabs.
contentment
The allowance is standard, since there are no special conditions. For contractors and officers, you can increase the salary by passing on excellent physical training.
Mail and parcel addresses
You cannot send medicines in the parcel. If they see it, they will take it away for obvious reasons. Only an inhaler is allowed. If vitamins are required, they are taken, and then received every day in the prescribed dosage.
Parcels are recommended to be tracked by track number and reported when it arrives at the department. Most often, notices are not brought to the unit, therefore, in order to receive the dispatch, the soldier must be notified that it is ready for delivery. After that, the conscript agrees with the contractor to be escorted to the department, where he receives his package.
In the "Grey Roofs" the post office is located in the unit, in the "Reds" you will have to go for a parcel with a contract soldier.
Postal addresses:
- "Grey roofs" on the street. Gorokhovoy: 403880, Volgograd region, Kamyshin-10, military unit 74507, division, battery, platoon, full name.)
- "Red roofs" on the street. Petrovskaya: 403871 Volgograd region, Kamyshin-1. On demand full name.
Telephone communications
The phone can be taken away or left. If the soldier does not abuse the telephone, then no one will notice and will not confiscate. It is recommended not to call yourself, it is better to write messages. When there is time and opportunity, the soldier himself will make the necessary call.
If the phone is taken away, then they give it out twice: once in the middle of the week, the second on the weekend. If unauthorized use of the phone is detected, it can be taken away or completely broken. You should not be outraged about this, because telephones are not allowed in the military unit.
visit
Soldiers are released on leave only with their parents, with girls and friends they may not be allowed. Arrival must be coordinated with the management.
Oath
The oath is usually held on weekends, usually on a Sunday. The time for this event is chosen in the morning - 8-9 hours. Then they give a dismissal for a day, if agreed, then communication can be extended until Tuesday.
How can I get to
Kamyshin is located between Saratov and Volgograd. The distance from both cities is approximately the same (about 200 km.). Therefore, you can go to any of them. Each one has Train Station and airport.
Arriving in Kamyshin, you can take a taxi to the unit or hotel so as not to understand the local city routes.
- +7 84457 55-555;
- +7 84457 45-555.
Bus
There are many buses from Volgograd to Kamyshin, both passing and going only to Kamyshin. Buses run quite often, several times an hour. The availability of tickets can be checked on the website of the bus station or by calling +7 8442 377-228. The central bus station in Volgograd is located on Balonina street, 11.
Buses from Saratov also run frequently. You can buy a ticket for a passing bus to Volgograd, Rostov-on-Don, Elista. There are two routes going to Kamyshin. You can get information about flights and free seats on buses on the bus station website, order a ticket there, or call +7 8452 246-222. The bus station is located on the street. Moscow, 170.
Accommodation
Finding an apartment in Kamyshin is not difficult. To do this, you can refer to the relevant sites, which posted ads for renting apartments (such as Avito). However, you should be careful not to get caught by scammers. There are situations when the owner of the apartment, having promised housing, disappears.
It is safer, but more expensive, to book hotel accommodation. There are enough hotels and hostels in Kamyshin:
- "Easily", st. Proletarskaya, 49;
- Gloria, st. Kranostroiteley, d. 3;
- Opava, st. Oktyabrskaya, 4.
The unit has its own hostel. For accommodation in it, it is better to clarify in the part itself.
History of formations and units of the 40th Army56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade
(56 guards odshbr)
Military unit of the Airborne Troops of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Russian Armed Forces.
The formation's birthday is June 11, 1943, when the 7th and 17th Guards Airborne Brigades were formed.
Battle path during the Great Patriotic WarA strong grouping of the Airborne Forces was deployed on the 4th Ukrainian Front as part of the 4th, 6th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigades. It was planned to be used during the liberation of the Crimea.
In December 1943, the 4th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigades were redeployed to the Moscow Military District.
By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander No. 0047 dated 12/18/1944, the 16th Guards Airborne Division was reorganized into the 106th Guards Rifle Division of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps. The 4th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade was reorganized into the 347th Guards Rifle Regiment, the 7th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade - into the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment, the 17th Guards Separate Airborne Brigade - into the 355th 1st Guards Rifle Regiment.
The 106th Guards Rifle Division included:
347th Guards Rifle Regiment;
351st Guards Rifle Regiment;
356th Guards Rifle Regiment;
107th Separate Guards Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion;
193rd Separate Guards Communications Battalion;
123rd separate guards anti-tank division;
139th separate guards sapper battalion;
113th separate guards reconnaissance company;
117th separate guards chemical company;
234th separate guards medical battalion. The 57th artillery brigade of three regiments was also introduced into the division:
205th cannon artillery regiment;
28th howitzer artillery regiment;
53rd mortar regiment. In January 1945, the division as part of the 38th Guards Rifle Corps was redeployed by rail to Hungary, by February 26 it concentrated east of the city of Budapest in the area: Szolnok - Abon - Soyal - Teriel and in early March became part of 3rd Ukrainian Front.
On March 16, 1945, having broken through the German defenses, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment reached the Austro-Hungarian border.
In March-April 1945, the division participated in the Vienna operation, advancing in the direction of the main attack of the front. The division, in cooperation with the formations of the 4th Guards Army, broke through the enemy defenses north of the city of Szekesfehervar, went to the flank and rear of the main forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army, which wedged into the defense of the front troops between the lakes Velence and Balaton. In early April, the division struck in a northwestern direction around Vienna and, in cooperation with the 6th Guards Tank Army, broke the enemy’s resistance, advanced to the Danube and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the west. The division successfully fought in the city, which continued until April 13. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of March 29, 1945, for participation in the defeat of eleven enemy divisions southwest of Budapest and the capture of the city of Mor, the division was awarded the Order of Kutuzov II degree.
For breaking through the fortified line of defense and capturing the city of Mor, all personnel received gratitude from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 04/26/1945 "for participation in the capture of Vienna", the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since then, April 26 has been considered the unit's annual holiday.
On May 9, the division continued combat operations in pursuit of the enemy and successfully developed the offensive on Retz, Pisek. The division made a march, pursuing the enemy, and in 3 days fought 80-90 km. At 12.00 on May 11, 1945, the division's advance detachment reached the Vltava River and met with the troops of the American 5th Tank Army near the village of Oleshnya. Here the combat path of the division in the Great Patriotic War ended.
History 1945-1979At the end of hostilities, the division from Czechoslovakia returned to Hungary under its own power. From May 1945 to January 1946, the division was camped in the woods south of Budapest.
Based on the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1154474ss of 06/03/1946 and the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR No. org / 2/247225 of 06/07/1946, by June 15, 1946, the 106th Guards Rifle Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division was reorganized into 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division.
From July 1946, the division was stationed in the city of Tula. The division was part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps (corps headquarters - Tula).
On December 3, 1947, the division was awarded the Guards Battle Banner.
Based on the directives of the General Staff of September 3, 1948 and January 21, 1949, the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division as part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps became part of the Airborne Army.
In April 1953, the Airborne Army was disbanded.
On the basis of the directive of the General Staff of January 21, 1955, by April 25, 1955, the 106th Guards Airborne Division withdrew from the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps, which was disbanded, and moved to a new staff of three regimental personnel with cropped battalion (not full strength) in each parachute regiment. From the disbanded 11th Guards Airborne Division, the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment was accepted into the 106th Guards Airborne Division. The point of deployment is the city of Ryazan.
The personnel of the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment participated in military parades on Red Square in Moscow, took part in large exercises of the Defense Ministry and in 1955 parachuted near the city of Kutaisi (Transcaucasian Military District).
In 1956, the 38th Guards Airborne Corps of Vienna was disbanded and the division became directly subordinate to the commander of the Airborne Forces.
In 1957, the regiment conducted demonstration exercises with landing for the military delegations of Yugoslavia and India. Based on the directives of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of March 18, 1960 and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of June 7, 1960 to November 1, 1960:
the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment (the city of Efremov, Tula Region) was accepted into the 105th Guards Airborne Red Banner Vienna Division from the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division;
The 105th Guards Airborne Division (without the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment) was redeployed to the Turkestan military district in the city of Ferghana, Uzbek SSR;
The 351st Guards Airborne Regiment was deployed in the city of Chirchik, Tashkent region. In 1961, after the earthquake in Tashkent, the personnel of the 351st Regiment provided assistance to the residents of the city affected by the disaster, helped the local authorities to maintain order.
In 1974, the 351st regiment parachuted into one of the regions of Central Asia and participated in the large-scale exercises of the TurkVO. Being the advanced part of the Airborne Forces of the Central Asian region of the country, the regiment participates in parades in the capital of Uzbekistan in Tashkent.
On the basis of the Directive of the General Staff of August 3, 1979, by December 1, 1979, the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division was disbanded.
From the division remained in the city of Ferghana the 345th separate guards parachute landing regiment of the Order of Suvorov, much larger than the usual and the 115th separate military transport aviation squadron. The rest of the personnel of the division turned to replenish the shortfall in other airborne formations and to resupply the newly formed airborne assault brigades.
The 56th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade was formed on the basis of the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Vienna Red Banner Division in the village of Azadbash (a district of the city of Chirchik) of the Tashkent Region of the Uzbek SSR.
For the formation of the brigade, the military reserve - the so-called "partisans" - from among the inhabitants of the Central Asian republics and the south of the Kazakh SSR were urgently mobilized. They will subsequently make up 80% of the personnel of the brigade when troops enter the DRA.
The formation of brigade units will be simultaneously carried out in 4 mobilization points and will be completed in Termez:
Wars, stories, facts.:
“... Formally, the brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of the 351st Guards PDP. However, de facto, its formation was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagai, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought together into a single whole just before entering Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as formally its cadre, apparently was originally stationed in Chirchik ... "
On December 13, 1979, the units of the brigade plunged into trains and were redeployed to the city of Termez, Uzbek SSR.
Participation in the Afghan War In December 1979, the brigade was introduced to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and became part of the 40th Combined Arms Army.
On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 4th infantry brigade was the first in the 40th Army to be introduced into Afghanistan.
to guard the Salang Pass.
From Termez, the 1st infantry brigade and the 2nd infantry brigade by helicopters, and the rest in the convoy, were redeployed to the city of Kunduz. The 4th Airborne Battalion remained at the Salang Pass. Then, from Kunduz, the 2nd infantry brigade was transferred to the city of Kandahar, where it became part of the newly formed 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade. In January 1980, the entire composition of the 56th Guards was introduced. odshbr. She was stationed in the city of Kunduz.
In Gardez
Since the transfer of the 2nd dshb to the 70th brigade, the brigade was actually a three-battalion regiment.
The initial task of the brigade units was to guard and defend the largest highway in the Salang Pass area, to ensure the advance of Soviet troops in the central and southern regions of Afghanistan.
From 1982 to June 1988, the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade is deployed in the area of the city of Gardez, conducting combat operations throughout Afghanistan: Bagram, Mazar-i-Sharif, Khanabad, Panjshir, Logar, Aliheil (Paktia). In 1984, the brigade was awarded the challenge Red Banner of the TurkVO for the successful completion of combat missions.
By order of 1985, in mid-1986, all standard airborne armored vehicles of the brigade (BMD-1 and BTR-D) were replaced with more protected armored vehicles with a large motor resource (BMP-2D for reconnaissance, 2nd, 3rd and 4th battalions and BTR-70 for the 1st battalion 2 and 3 pdr) 1 pdr left the BRDM. Also a feature of the brigade was the increased staff of the artillery battalion, which consisted not of 3 firing batteries, as was customary for units stationed on the territory of the USSR, but of 5.
May 4, 1985 - by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces, the brigade was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, No. 56324698.
From December 16, 1987 to the end of January 1988, the brigade took part in Operation Magistral. In April 1988, the brigade took part in Operation Barrier. The paratroopers blocked the caravan routes from Pakistan in order to ensure the withdrawal of troops from the city of Ghazni.
The number of personnel of the 56th Guards. odshbr on December 1, 1986 was 2452 people (261 officers, 109 ensigns, 416 sergeants, 1666 soldiers). After fulfilling the international duty, on June 12-14, 1988, the brigade was withdrawn to the city of Yolotan, Turkmen SSR.
Regarding the organizational structure. The picture shows that the brigade had only 3 BRDM-2 units that were in the reconnaissance. However, another BRDM-2 was in the chemical platoon and 2 more. in the OPA (propaganda and agitation detachment).
From 1989 to the present At the end of 1989, the brigade was reorganized into a separate airborne brigade (OVDBR). The brigade passed "hot spots": Afghanistan (12.1979-07.1988), Baku (12-19.01.1990 - 02.1990), Sumgayit, Nakhichevan, Meghri, Julfa, Osh, Fergana, Uzgen (06.06.1990), Chechnya (12.94-10.96, Grozny, Pervomaisky, Argun and since 09.1999).
On January 15, 1990, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, after a detailed study of the situation, adopted a decision "On declaring a state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and some other regions." In accordance with it, the Airborne Forces began the operation, which was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, from January 12 to 19, units of the 106th and 76th airborne divisions, the 56th and 38th airborne brigades and the 217th airborne regiment landed on the airfields near Baku (for more details, see below). article Black January), and in Yerevan - the 98th Guards Airborne Division. The 39th separate air assault brigade entered Nagorno-Karabakh.
On January 23, airborne units began operations to restore order in other parts of Azerbaijan. In the area of Lankaran, Prship and Jalilabad, they were carried out jointly with the border troops, who restored the state border.
In February 1990, the brigade returned to the place of permanent deployment.
From March to August 1990, units of the brigade maintained order in the cities of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
On June 6, 1990, the landing at airfields in the cities of Fergana and Osh of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th airborne division, the 56th airborne brigade began, and on June 8 - the 137th parachute regiment of the 106th airborne division in the city of Frunze. Having made a march on the same day through the mountain passes of the border of the two republics, the paratroopers occupied Osh and Uzgen. The next day, the 387th separate airborne regiment and units of the 56th airborne brigade took control of the situation in the area of the cities of Andijan, Jalal-Abad, occupied Kara-Suu, mountain roads and passes throughout the conflict.
In October 1992, in connection with the sovereignization of the republics of the former SSR, the brigade was redeployed to the village of Zelenchukskaya, Karachay-Cherekessia. From where it marched to the place of permanent deployment in the village of Podgori near the city of Volgodonsk, Rostov Region. The territory of the military camp was a former shift camp of the builders of the Rostov nuclear power plant, located 3 kilometers from the nuclear power plant.
From December 1994 to August - October 1996, the combined battalion of the brigade fought in Chechnya. On November 29, 1994, an order was sent to the brigade to form a combined battalion and transfer it to Mozdok. The artillery division of the brigade took part in late 1995 - early 1996 in the operation near Shatoi. In October-November 1996, the combined battalion of the brigade was withdrawn from Chechnya.
In 1997, the brigade was reorganized into the 56th Guards Air Assault Regiment, which became part of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division.
In July 1998, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in connection with the resumption of the construction of the Rostov NPP, the regiment began redeployment to the city of Kamyshin, Volgograd Region. The regiment was stationed in the buildings of the Kamyshin Higher Military Construction Command and Engineering School, which was disbanded in 1998.
On August 19, 1999, an air assault detachment from the regiment was sent to reinforce the combined regiment of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and was sent by a letter military echelon to the Republic of Dagestan. On August 20, 1999, the air assault detachment arrived in the village of Botlikh. Later he took part in hostilities in the Republic of Dagestan and the Chechen Republic. The battalion tactical group of the regiment fought in the North Caucasus (the place of deployment is Khankala).
In December 1999, units of the regiment and the DShMG FPS covered the Chechen section of the Russian-Georgian border.
On May 1, 2009, the air assault regiment again became a brigade. And from July 1, 2010, she switched to a new state and became known as the 56th separate airborne assault brigade (light).
It should be noted that over all these years, the Battle Banner of the 56th separate air assault brigade, despite all 4 renaming and 4 reorganizations of the regular structure, has remained the same. This is the Battle Banner of the 351st Airborne Regiment.
Previously, the 11th, 56th and 83rd airborne assault (airborne) brigades were operationally subordinate to the military districts (Southern Military District and Airborne Military District), but on October 21, 2013 they became part of the Russian Airborne Forces.
Notable fighters and commanders
Leonid Vasilyevich Khabarov - battalion commander-4 from the moment the brigade was created until April 1980. NSH brigade from October 1984 to September 1985. Years of service 1966-1991
Rank Colonel of the USSR Air Force
He commanded the 100th orr of the 105th guards. airborne division, 1st infantry brigade of the 351st guards. PDP 105th Guards. vdd,
4th dshb 56th guards. odshbr, ssp (k) TurkVO
Battles/wars War in Afghanistan
State awards:
Order of Military Merit
Order of the Red Banner
Medal for Distinction in Military Service, 1st Class
Medal for Distinction in Military Service, 2nd Class
Medal "Veteran of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Medal "60 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Jubilee medal "70 years of the Armed Forces of the USSR"
Departmental awards and distinctions:
Medal "Army General Margelov"
Medal For Strengthening the Combat Commonwealth (Ministry of Defense)
For impeccable service 1st class
For impeccable service 2nd class
For impeccable service 3rd class
Badge for two serious wounds
Skydiver-instructor (over 400 parachute jumps)
Honorary Worker of the Higher vocational education Russian Federation
Regional Awards:
Badge of Honor "For services to the city of Yekaterinburg"
Awards of other states:
Medal "From the grateful Afghan people" (Afghanistan)
Public awards:
Order of Merit (RSVA)
Retired
from 1991 to 2010 leads in turn:
military department;
Faculty of military training;
Institute of military technical education
Ural State Technical University.
Evnevich, Valery Gennadievich Chief of Staff, and since 1987 - brigade commander.
Awards and titles
Hero of the Russian Federation
(October 7, 1993) - "for courage and heroism shown in the performance of a special assignment"
Order of Military Merit
Order of the Red Banner
2 Orders of the Red Star
Medal "For Military Merit"
Zhukov medal
Medal "Participant in emergency humanitarian operations" (EMERCOM of Russia)
56th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Order of the Patriotic War, First Class, Don Cossack Brigade ( 56th Army Brigade) - military formation of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Russia and the Airborne Forces of Russia. The formation's birthday is June 11, 1943, when the 7th and 17th Guards Airborne Brigades were formed.
Battle path during the Great Patriotic War
On January 15, 1944, in accordance with the order of the commander of the Airborne Forces of the Red Army No. 00100 of December 26, 1943, in the city of Stupino, Moscow Region, on the basis of the 4th, 7th and 17th separate guards airborne brigades (the brigades were stationed in the city of Stupino). Vostryakovo, Vnukovo, Stupino) the 16th Guards Airborne Division was formed. There were 12,000 people in the state division.
In August 1944, the division was relocated to the city of Starye Dorogi, Mogilev Region, and on August 9, 1944, became part of the newly formed 38th Guards Airborne Corps. In October 1944, the 38th Guards Airborne Corps became part of the newly formed separate Guards Airborne Army.
On December 8, 1944, the army was reorganized into the 9th Guards Army, the 38th Guards Airborne Corps became the Guards Rifle Corps.
On March 16, 1945, having broken through the German defenses, the 351st Guards Rifle Regiment reached the Austro-Hungarian border.
In March-April 1945, the division took part in the Vienna operation, advancing in the direction of the main attack of the front. The division, in cooperation with the formations of the 4th Guards Army, broke through the enemy defenses north of the city of Szekesfehervar, went to the flank and rear of the main forces of the 6th Panzer Army SS, wedged into the defense of the front troops between the lakes Velence and Balaton. In early April, the division struck in a northwestern direction around Vienna and, in cooperation with the 6th Guards Tank Army, broke the enemy’s resistance, advanced to the Danube and cut off the enemy’s retreat to the west. The division successfully fought in the city, which continued until April 13.
For breaking through the fortified defense line and capturing the city of Mor, all personnel received the gratitude of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 04/26/1945 "for participation in the capture of the city of Vienna", the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Since then, April 26 has been considered the unit's annual holiday.
On May 5, the division was alerted and marched to the Austro-Czechoslovak border. Coming into contact with the enemy, on May 8, she crossed the border of Czechoslovakia and captured the city of Znojmo on the move.
On May 9, the division continued combat operations in pursuit of the enemy and successfully developed the offensive on Retz, Pisek. The division made a march, pursuing the enemy, and in 3 days fought 80-90 km. At 12.00 on May 11, 1945, the division's advance detachment reached the Vltava River and met with the troops of the American 5th Tank Army near the village of Oleshnya. Here the combat path of the division in the Great Patriotic War ended.
History 1945-1979
At the end of hostilities, the division from Czechoslovakia returned to Hungary under its own power. From May 1945 to January 1946 the division was encamped in the woods south of Budapest.
On the basis of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1154474ss of 06/03/1946 and the directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR No. org / 2/247225 of 06/07/1946, by June 15, 1946, the 106th Guards Red Banner Rifle Division, Order of Kutuzov, was reorganized to the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division.
From July 1946, the division was stationed in the city of Tula. The division was part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps (corps headquarters - Tula).
Based on the directives of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of September 3, 1948 and January 21, 1949, the 106th Guards Airborne Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division as part of the 38th Guards Airborne Vienna Corps became part of the Airborne Army.
The personnel of the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment participated in military parades on Red Square in Moscow, took part in large exercises of the Defense Ministry and in 1955 parachuted near the city of Kutaisi (Transcaucasian Military District).
- the 351st Guards Airborne Regiment (the city of Efremov, Tula Region) was accepted into the composition of the 106th Guards Airborne, Red Banner, Order of Kutuzov Division;
- (without the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment) was relocated to
In addition to paratrooper units and formations, in airborne troops ah, the ground forces (SV) of the USSR Armed Forces also had air assault units and formations, but they were subordinate to the commander of the troops of military districts (groups of troops), armies or corps. They did not differ in anything, except for tasks, subordination and OShS. Methods of combat use, combat training programs for personnel, weapons and uniforms for military personnel were the same as for paratrooper units and formations of the Airborne Forces (central subordination). Air assault formations were represented by separate air assault brigades (ODSHBr), separate air assault regiments (ODSHP) and separate air assault battalions (ODSHB).
The reason for the creation of air assault units in the late 60s was the revision of tactics in the fight against the enemy in the event of a full-scale war. The stake was placed on the concept of using massive landings in the near rear of the enemy, capable of disorganizing the defense. The technical possibility for such a landing was provided by the fleet of transport helicopters in army aviation, which had significantly increased by this time.
By the mid-80s, the USSR Armed Forces included 14 separate brigades, two separate regiments and about 20 separate battalions. The brigades were deployed on the territory of the USSR according to the principle - one brigade per one military district, which has land access to the State border of the USSR, one brigade in the inner Kiev Military District (23 ODSHBr in Kremenchug, subordinate to the High Command of the southwestern direction) and two brigades for groups of Soviet troops abroad (35 ODShBr in the GSVG in the city of Cottbus and 83 ODShBr in the SGV in the city of Bialogard). 56 Guards. The ODShBr in OKSVA, stationed in the city of Gardez of the Republic of Afghanistan, belonged to the Turkestan Military District, in which it was formed.
Individual air assault regiments were subordinate to the commanders of individual army corps.
The difference between the parachute and airborne assault formations of the Airborne Forces was as follows:
- In the presence of standard airborne armored vehicles (BMD, BTR-D, self-propelled guns "Nona", etc.). In the airborne assault units, only a quarter of all units were equipped with it - in contrast to 100% of its staffing in the paratrooper units.
- In the subordination of the troops. Airborne assault units, operationally, were subordinate to the command of military districts (groups of troops), armies, and corps. The parachute units were subordinate to the command of the Airborne Forces, whose headquarters was in Moscow.
- In the assigned tasks. It was assumed that the air assault units, in the event of the start of large-scale hostilities, would be used to land in the enemy's near rear, mainly by landing from helicopters. Parachute units were supposed to be used in a deeper rear of the enemy with a parachute landing from VTA aircraft. At the same time, airborne training with planned training parachute landings of personnel and military equipment was mandatory for both types of airborne forces.
- In contrast to the guards airborne units of the Airborne Forces deployed along full staff, some air assault brigades were cadre (special staff) and were not guards. The exception was three brigades that received the names of the Guards, created on the basis of the 105th Vienna Red Banner Guards Airborne Division disbanded in 1979 - the 35th, 38th and 56th.
In the mid-80s, the following brigades and regiments were part of the Airborne Forces of the USSR Armed Forces: 9
- 11 ODShbr in Zabaykalsky IN ( Zabaykalsky Krai Mogocha and Amazar),
- 13 ODShBr in the Far Eastern Military District (Amur Region, Magdagachi and Zavitinsk),
- 21 ODShBr in the Transcaucasian Military District ( Georgian SSR, Kutaisi),
- 23 ODShbr of the South-Western direction (on the territory of the Kyiv Military District), (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 35gv. ODShBr in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (German Democratic Republic, Cottbus),
- 36 ODShBr in the Leningrad Military District ( Leningrad region, village Garbolovo),
- 37 ODShbr in the Baltic VO (Kaliningrad region, Chernyakhovsk),
- 38 Guards. ODSHBr in the Belorussian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Brest),
- 39 ODShBr in the Carpathian Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Khyriv),
- 40 ODSHBr in Odessa Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Nikolaev),
- 56 Guards. ODShBr in the Turkestan Military District (formed in the city of Chirchik, Uzbek SSR and introduced into Afghanistan),
- 57 ODShBr in the Central Asian Military District (Kazakh SSR, Aktogay township),
- 58 ODSHBr in the Kiev Military District (Ukrainian SSR, Kremenchug),
- 83 ODShBr in the Northern Group of Forces, (Polish People's Republic, Bialogard),
- 1318 ODSHP in the Belarusian Military District (Belarusian SSR, Polotsk) subordinate to the 5th separate army corps.
- 1319 ODSHP in the Trans-Baikal Military District (Chita region, Kyakhta) subordinate to the 48th separate army corps.
These brigades had in their composition management, 3 or 4 air assault battalions, one artillery battalion and units of combat support and logistics. The personnel of the deployed brigades reached 2,500 military personnel. For example, the staff strength of the 56th Guards. On December 1, 1986, the ODShBr consisted of 2,452 military personnel (261 officers, 109 ensigns, 416 sergeants, 1,666 soldiers).
The regiments differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: one paratrooper and one air assault (on the BMD), as well as a slightly reduced composition of the regimental units.
In the Afghan war, one airborne division (103rd Guards Airborne Division), one separate airborne assault brigade (56th Guards Airborne Brigade), one separate paratrooper regiment (345th Guards OPDP) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (66 separate motorized rifle brigade and 70 motorized rifle brigade). In total, for 1987, these were 18 "linear" battalions (13 paratroopers and 5 airborne assaults), which accounted for a fifth of the total number of all "linear" OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions) .
Training of officers for the airborne troops.
Officers were trained by the following military educational institutions in the following military specialties (VUS):
- Ryazan Higher Airborne command school- commander of an airborne (airborne assault) platoon, commander of a reconnaissance platoon.
- Landing Department of the Ryazan Higher Military Automobile Engineering School - commander of an automobile / transport platoon.
- Landing Department of the Ryazan Higher Military Command School of Communications - commander of a communications platoon.
- Airborne Faculty of the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms School - Deputy Company Commander for Political Affairs ( educational work).
- Landing Department of the Kolomna Higher Artillery Command School - commander of an artillery platoon.
- Airborne Department of the Leningrad Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School - commander of an anti-aircraft missile platoon.
- Landing department of the Kamenetz-Podolsky Higher Military Engineering Command School - commander of an engineering platoon.
In addition to the graduates of these educational institutions, in the Airborne Forces they were often appointed to the positions of platoon commanders, graduates of higher combined arms schools (VOKU) and military departments, who prepared for the commander of a motorized rifle platoon. This was due to the fact that the specialized Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School (RVVDKU), which produced an average of about 300 lieutenants every year, was not able to fully meet the needs of the Airborne Forces (at the end of the 80s they had about 60,000 personnel ) in platoon commanders. For example, the former commander of the 247th Guards. PDP, Hero of the Russian Federation Em Yuri Pavlovich, who began his service in the Airborne Forces as a platoon commander, graduated from the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School.
For a long time, military personnel of units and units of the Special Forces (the so-called now army special forces) were mistakenly and deliberately called paratroopers. This is due to the fact that in the Soviet period, as now, the Russian Armed Forces did not have and do not have special forces, but there were and are units and units of the Special Forces (SpN) of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The phrase “special forces” or “commandos” was mentioned in the press and in the media only in relation to the troops of a potential enemy (“Green Berets”, “Rangers”, “Commandos”).
Starting from the emergence of these units in the USSR Armed Forces in 1950 until the end of the 80s, the existence of such units and units was completely denied. Up to the point that conscripts learned about their existence only when they were accepted into the personnel of these units and units. Officially, in the Soviet press and on television, units and units of the Special Forces of the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces were announced either as parts of the Airborne Forces - as in the case of the GSVG (officially there were no Special Forces units in the GDR), or as in the case of OKSVA - separate motorized rifle battalions (OMSB). For example, the 173rd Separate Special Forces Detachment (173 OOSpN), stationed near the city of Kandahar, was called the 3rd Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (3 OMSB).
In everyday life, servicemen of subunits and units of the Special Forces wore full dress and field uniforms adopted in the Airborne Forces, although they did not belong to the Airborne Forces either in terms of subordination or in terms of the assigned tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage activities. The only thing that united the Airborne Forces and units and units of the Special Forces was most of the officers - RVVDKU graduates, airborne training and possible combat use behind enemy lines.
Acquisition
To create and staff the "second wave" of air assault units, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards Airborne Division and the 80th Guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards infantry regiment (it was cadre), which allocated officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the officers of the headquarters of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the air assault units of the military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the airborne troops, only commanders were selected from the airborne forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To staff the newly created units, in 1979, in military schools training officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces.
With regard to the recruitment of conscripts, the same medical requirements and other selection rules were applied to the DShCh as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173 cm; physical development- not below average; education - not lower than secondary, the absence of medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShV were staffed with junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, from the Gaizhunai "training school", the air assault battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade was also replenished from the Fergana "training school, military unit 52788
Hello dear!
Please do not judge me for the text, I'm not a writer - I'm a reader.
At one time, under the USSR, and then in Ukraine ..., he had the honor to serve as an officer in the military unit A0224 (40th separate airborne assault brigade). The brigade was directly subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the servicemen will understand what this means. Under the USSR, the brigade was fully secured, in every sense. Starting from 1992-93, the provision, to put it mildly, began to limp ... I will not describe all the moments. It got to the point that a sign "kuren commander" (platoon commander) was hung on the doors of the officer's room. The brigade commander looked like ...., looked at this and at the next morning divorce on the parade ground announced:
Return the old signs to their place, we do not breed chickens, we are defending the Motherland!
In 1995, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry decided to create an elite unit - the National Guard of Ukraine and place one of these units on the basis of our unit. By the way: on the territory there was absolutely everything that is necessary for the VDP (airborne training), including repair shops for the maintenance of domes.
And the entire composition of the landing unit was transferred to Salt (Nikolaev) to the base of the military communications unit ...., i.e. I mean, of course, there were neither VDP nor VDK (airborne complex) on the territory of signalmen, and no one was going to build it ...
After the 40th Airborne Brigade, the 79th Airborne Regiment (Khmelnitsky) was attached, and as such, my unit ceased to exist.
Let's go back to the national guards of Ukraine, which, starting from 1995, began to be formed on the basis of paratroopers in B. Korenikh. This elite did not last long, if I'm not mistaken for a year and a half, and then .........
By chance, yesterday, December 28, 2017, I was on the territory of my landing unit, or rather, in the place that was left of it .....
I'll start in order of my detour:
there was a park of equipment (shishariks, Urals, BMD-shki, D-30, etc., etc.), a fuel and lubricants warehouse. Of course, all the boxes were capital execution.
Checkpoint part (central entrance/entrance)
to the right of the checkpoint there was a 2-story building, on the 1st floor - an officer's canteen (in which we, among other things, held festive events), on the second floor - an officer's hostel, where I lived.
at this place there were capital barracks, which housed the parachute battalion, attached - a division of artillerymen on the D-30 and mortars.
this is what these barracks looked like from the side of the parade ground.
the platform itself ......
as it was (in the background a soldier's canteen), preparations for building on the parade ground, morning divorce.
this is how the left side entrance to the soldier's canteen looks now (for loading food)
and here is our own shooting range for firing automatic weapons and pistols, which was equipped with two long steel turrets, an automatic target control point. In the last photo - probably even God does not know how much lead is buried in this hill.
what was left at the location of the VDK .....
as it was ... (repair shops for maintenance of domes are in the background, a sports complex begins on the right and further behind it, to the right, the same VDK was located)
places for tactical training, which were equipped with concrete trenches and trenches for throwing live grenades.
Central checkpoint (took an angle to grab a road sign)
Opposite the checkpoint is a field where Kherson turntables (6-ki and 8-ki) came to us for parachute jumps.
In this article, the author tried to summarize his knowledge of the airborne assault units of the Soviet Army and, briefly formulating, lay them out for public viewing and study. Please note that this study is not definitive. First of all, this is due to the fact that there is still not a single official open (i.e. not secret) publication on the history of the DShV, their combat strength, not to mention their organizational and staffing structures, methods and methods of combat use and etc. Everything that you read here was naturally collected bit by bit, from many different sources - the overwhelming majority of the work is based on surveys of veterans of the DShV, people who came into contact with them by occupation, as well as a number of official documents.
Therefore, I ask you to judge me strictly, but fairly, because "... if in this book it is written by my rudeness or negligence, I beg you: do not look down on my reproach, do not curse, but correct, it was not an angel of God who wrote, but a sinful person and full of ignorance..."
The author expresses his deep gratitude to everyone who helped him by providing his memory and took the time to answer.
The author will be grateful to everyone who will express their opinion about the article, point out inaccuracies, inaccuracies, or vice versa, will be able to confirm the author's analysis (which was indispensable).
Below is the third edition of the article.
- ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING.
- BACKGROUND.
- TRIAL STEP.
- The capitalists.
- We have.
- THE IDEA PAVES THE WAY FOR ITSELF.
- "Volumes"
- New wave.
- Subordination.
- Acquisition.
- Outfit and equipment.
- ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS.
- Organizational structure of 11, 13 and 21 odshbr for the 1970s
- Organizational structure of the 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th Guards for 1979-88
- Organizational structure 11, 13 and 21 odshbr for 1979-88.
- Organizational structure of the 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th guards, 36th, 37th, 38th guards, 40th, 56th guards, 83rd air brigade for 1990-91
- Organizational structure of 224 UTs for 1990-91.
- HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM.
- Quantity.
- Quality
- RESULTS.
- Brigades and regiments in the period 1988-91
- Separate battalions in the period 1988-91.
"... The nature of war can have a significant impact on the ratio of various branches of the military."
K. Clausewitz, "On War"
ON THE ESSENCE OF AIRDRESSING
It is not known when the idea of airborne assaults appeared, as the sending of military formations to the rear of the enemy by air, arose no one knows when. However, for a long time it had a strictly fantastic character, and only during the First World War, was it able to receive at least some kind of material basis in the form of the creation of an air vehicle - an airplane-airplane. And if at first, the idea was exclusively of a sabotage and reconnaissance nature, then soon, in connection with the rapid development of aviation during the war years, with the creation of sufficiently reliable and capacious aircraft, it began to take on a larger-scale logical form, which led to Mitchel's idea of landing in the rear of the German troops first divisions, and then the whole "airborne" army. However, we can only guess whether this project would have been realized, whether the war would have lasted another year or two, or not. In any case, after the end of the war, although this idea did not receive a serious material implementation, it continued to soar in the air, exciting minds. "Positional Nightmare" Western front was on everyone's mind, and many innovative military theorists (or who consider themselves so) were persistently looking for innovative ways to prevent such a situation in the future.
Thus, for the airborne troops (VDV), the main, defining goal was immediately revealed - to assist the advancing groupings of ground forces. Almost the entire subsequent history of the use of airborne assaults (AD) confirms this thesis *.
* A special position is occupied by the VD to the islands. As a rule, they are carried out as part of assistance to amphibious assaults or in general as part of various-scale military operations at sea. That is, the role of the Ground Forces in this case is played by the Navy.
The absolute exception is the scandalous Cretan VD operation (VDO), which did not have a rigid link with the actions of either ground or sea forces; thus having a strictly independent character. However, if linkage with the Ground Forces was not possible for completely understandable and objective reasons, then weak communication with the fleet was forced.
Within the framework of such a goal, the Airborne Forces were also tasked with the task, which consisted, as a rule, in capturing a certain area of \u200b\u200bthe terrain (usually behind the line of contact) and then holding it for a while (for example, until the approach of advancing ground forces).
A specific combat mission determines the methods and methods of action of the Airborne Forces, which consist in landing (dropping, disembarking), offensive (attack, assault) and defense.
This leads to a general definition of the combat capabilities of the VD formation, which are:
- in the ability to capture a certain territory (a piece of land, an object), incl. attack and destroy (knock out) the enemy located there;
- in the ability to organize an effective defense of the captured territory (object) for a certain period;
- but, all this is subject to the condition of having the ability to be airlifted.
I needed such a lengthy introduction so that the reader (perhaps a completely outsider, but interested in the issue) immediately grasped the essence of the combat use of airborne assault forces.
Now, let's turn to the actual topic of the article.
BACKGROUND
The appearance of DShV is tightly linked with the appearance of helicopters, more precisely, with the creation of samples with the necessary set of properties. This has already happened in military history, when technological progress brought new types and types of armed forces to the arena of battles. However, there was another forerunner, which consisted in the peculiarities of the forms of combat use of the VD, expressed in their use as an integral part of operations on an operational-tactical scale.
... Alas, but apparently it is worth recognizing that the first air assault operations (actions) associated with the landing of relatively small landing forces were carried out by the Germans during the Second World War. Here is their list of some of them: Vordingborg Bridge (Denmark, 1940), Fort Eben-Emael (Belgium, 1940), bridges over the Albert Canal (Belgium, 1940), a complex of bridges across the Meuse (Holland, 1940), bridges through Zap. Dvina and Berezina (USSR, 1941). All of them fully fall under the definition of air assault operations, although they were carried out by the forces of the German Airborne Forces and special forces. All of them were carried out within the framework of the macro goal - to ensure the fastest possible advance of our ground troops, to block (detain) enemy troops in their positions, etc. The methods of landing at the same time were very different: parachute, landing on gliders, landing on airplanes. But in the subsequent years of the war, such landings were not actually used. The belligerents became interested in larger-scale VDOs, which, by themselves, are capable of influencing the overall operational-strategic situation at the front. In the same vein, post-war development continued, incl. and Soviet, the theory of the use of the Airborne Forces.
The reasons why the Soviet military command did not conduct tactical airborne assaults during the offensives of 1944-45. are not clear. There are likely three main factors involved.
First of all, the failures of large-scale VDOs somewhat undermined faith in the effectiveness of landings in general (in any case, with the existing material and technical base and the general level of organization).
Secondly, the very idea of small landings probably seemed wrong; their possible results were not seen as effective (although such were envisaged by the "Instructions for the Combat Use of the Airborne Forces" of 1943 *).
Thirdly, the command simply did not consider it necessary to use them - i.e. believed that it was better to manage with tried and tested purely ground-based methods.
But this is all just speculation. Personally, it seems to the author quite possible to single out several dozens of excellent Li-2 and S-47 military transport aircraft from the many hundreds already available by 1944 (more than 1000 in 1945) and throw them along the same paths along the parachute battalion supplies or to capture river bridgeheads - in some cases this could already significantly facilitate the actions of ground forces. But what was, was.
... In con. In the 1940s, unexpectedly for everyone, helicopters just burst onto the scene - a new class of aircraft. Helicopters (which at this point reaches a level of technical excellence sufficient for combat use) successfully proved themselves in the Incheon amphibious assault operation (MDO) and in subsequent actions of American troops in Korea. Hurrying domestic designers present a rather successful car - the Mi-4 - which starts from 1953. enlist in the army en masse.
Already in 1954, the first large-scale experimental landing was carried out from 36 infantry helicopters with vehicles and artillery. A number of experimental exercises were also carried out (including with the real use of nuclear weapons) to land battalion and regimental-scale helicopter assault forces behind enemy lines ... However, the matter died out. That is, no organizational measures for the creation of specialized formations were adopted.
The reasons for this appear to be the following:
First of all, the "Khrushchev-rocket" factor played a negative role.
Secondly, the overdimension of the Airborne Forces - they were in the first half of the 1950s. have as many as 15 divisions; and to have some other airborne units is already impudence, especially since the "Khrushchev" general reduction of the Armed Forces has begun.
Thirdly, the nuclear paranoia that had finally struck the world by this time did not leave a place in the battle formations for clean (without the protection of armored personnel carriers) riflemen-infantry; the helicopter was seen as too "fragile" compared to the armored personnel carrier.
Fourth, in addition to the airborne units of the Airborne Forces, until 1957 there were in abundance and rifle divisions, units of both, could, if such a task was set, be parachuted from helicopters behind enemy lines.
And finally fifth, brought up on the power of tank armored fists to Soviet military leaders, lurid, slow and poorly protected flying cuttlefish with a propeller on top (this is in the age of "jet speeds" and swift licked aerodynamics!) Did not seem to be the means that could give the troops new hitherto unseen opportunities.
TRIAL STEP
Capitalists
In general, the Americans had a similar situation with the theory of VDO. The following phrase of the American Airborne Forces General James Gavin from his book "Airborne Warfare" can serve as a better illustration: "...<воздушно-десантные>troops should be used en masse, not in small groups. and only where their actions can have a decisive influence, and not in many points where they are able to achieve only local tactical successes. "However, their experience of the war on what later became known as" poorly equipped theater of war, i.e. e. on the Korean Peninsula, forced the American command to think about it and act more flexibly.The helicopter proved to be a very promising means of transportation in conditions of mountainous wooded terrain and lack of roads.The number of helicopters jumps greatly - by the end of the war, there were already 1140 units in the army aviation., while at the beginning there were only 56 units.The American command is also creating an experimental formation - the 11th Air Assault Division. Based on it and on the basis of two more formations (10th Air Transport Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division) in July 1965, the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division - Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was created (more precisely, reorganized from the existing one). the fact that helicopters were introduced for the first time into the composition of its combat units as a transport and combat vehicle with a total number of up to 434 (428 according to other data) units. The division was deployed to Vietnam at the end of the same month. And even despite the lack of a proper theoretical study of airmobile (helicopter-landing) operations, not to mention the corresponding practical exercises, it showed itself from the best side. Of course, not only this division had helicopters. All American divisions in Vietnam had a large number of helicopters. So if in ser. 1967 was ok. 2000 units, then in 1968 their number reached 4200 units!
Generally speaking, if in Korea helicopters only announced their existence and their prospects were rather vague, then the Vietnam War elevated the helicopter to the zenith of fame and popularity. Until that time, they were still perceived rather as a kind of exotic, purely auxiliary purposes. The Americans fell in love with helicopters so much that some hotheads began to argue about the decline of parachute (from aircraft) landing as such.
We have
Such an active and such a successful use of helicopters made an impression on the Soviet command. The idea is being revived - in the course of the Dnepr-67 strategic exercises, mainly on the basis of the 51st Guards. PDP formed an experimental consolidated 1st airborne brigade under the command of the beginning. Department of Combat Training of the Airborne Forces Major-General Kobzar. It is used to capture a bridgehead across the Dnieper, where a motorized rifle battalion deployed by helicopters with attached self-propelled guns also participates. In a specially created working group at the General Staff, theoretical developments and experiments are carried out. And now, according to the results of these works, no later than the end of 1967. a decision is made to form completely new military formations for the Soviet Army - separate air assault brigades (ovshbr). Based on the directive of the General Staff of May 22, 1968. in June 1968, the formation of the 11th (ZBVO) and 13th (FAR) brigades begins. By mid-July, the brigades had already been formed. (According to other data, the 13th brigade was finally formed only by July-August 1970). In 1973, a third brigade was added to them - the 21st in Kutaisi (WKVO).
The brigades were formed, as they say, from scratch. Officers and soldiers from the districts were sent to staff them, and officers from the Airborne Forces were appointed only to the positions of specialists in the airborne service (VDS) and to the positions of brigade commanders (for example, the former commander of 51 1st Guards PDP Colonel Reznikov).
But even here, a number of subjective factors of the peculiarities of Soviet military thought played a role. Due to the distrust of the Soviet military leadership in the infantry, the underestimation of its combat capabilities, especially on an operational scale, such brigades were considered not strong enough to operate on EuroTVD. That is why they were deployed in areas with a lesser threat compared to the western one - it was considered expedient to have them only for operations on mountainous-wooded (taiga) terrain, difficult for ground equipment, where the focality of hostilities was inevitable. Both Far Eastern brigades were intended not so much to carry out landings behind enemy lines in the usual way, but to cover a large section of the Soviet-Chinese border. (There was even a poster of visual propaganda with a somewhat surreal inscription: "Attack paratrooper - time limit.") The aviation component of each of the brigades was represented by an air group consisting of two full-time helicopter regiments. At the same time, the air and ground components had different administrative subordination: the ground component - to the High Command of the Army, and the air - to the High Command of the Air Force; which inevitably created a number of serious problems in the organization of interaction.
For the implementation of air operational-tactical and tactical landings on EuroTV, it was planned to attract ordinary paratroopers or motorized rifle units (companies and battalions), pulling them out of airborne and combined arms divisions.
A little about terminology should also be said here. It is not good to use the terms created by the capitalists, and by 1971, domestic names and terminology were selected; brigades and their battalions; as well as the methods of their combat use were renamed air assault. Thus, the American terms "air assault" and "airmobile" gradually ceased to be applied to the Soviet DShCh and began to be mentioned in official documents only in relation to foreign formations of this type.
By the end of 1971, all existing brigades were reorganized into air assault brigades with changes in the organizational and staffing structure (OShS).
IDEA PAVES THE WAY
"Volumes"
In the 70s. behind the thick walls of the buildings of the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense and research institutions, a clearly serious in intensity and extremely important in its consequences unfolded scientific discussion in combination with the carpet and undercarpet struggle of opinions, calculations and ambitions ...
In 1975, working group under the leadership of Lieutenant General I. Yurkovskiy, she put forward the idea of creating a new type of operation - the so-called. "bulk operation" instead of, as they claimed, the obsolete concept of "deep operation". Its essence was not to "gnaw through" the enemy's defense, but to "jump" over it, bypassing the infection zones and defense nodes - thus the pace of the offensive increased sharply. The idea was supported by some military leaders (lieutenant generals I. Dzhordzhadze and G. Demidkov) and deepened. The question was raised about the global change of the entire theory of operations; the creation of a fundamentally new "air echelon" of ground forces.
The implementation of such an idea required a radical change in priorities in military development and fundamentally pushed back the positions of the supporters of armored armadas who dominated the military leadership. However, instead of an objective assessment of the military perspective, instead of an understanding of the dialectics of development, departmentalism and inflexibility prevailed, and the "volumes" were crushed...
New wave
And yet, the "traditionalists" still had to make room a little - painfully interesting arguments were presented by the "volumizers". In the middle of 1978 the new head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, it was decided to form, in addition to the already existing three brigades (11th, 13th and 21st), a second wave of air assault units of two types.
First of all, eight separate air assault brigades of district (group) subordination:
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 11 odshbr | July 1968 | Trans-Baikal Military District | gg. Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* |
| 13 odshbr | July 1968 | Far Eastern Military District | |
| 21 odshbr | 1973 | Transcaucasian Military District | gg. Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany | Cottbus (GDR)** |
| 36 odshbr | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District | town Garbolovo (Leningrad region) |
| 37 odshbr | December 1979 | Baltic VO | |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | December 1979 | Belarusian VO | Brest (Belarus) |
| 39 odshbr | December 1979 | Carpathian MD | Khyriv (Ukraine) |
| 40 odshbr | December 1979 | Odessa Military District | |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District | |
| 57 odshbr | December 1979 | Central Asian VO |
Notes:
- * Elements of the air groups of these brigades could be deployed separately.
- ** Literally ok. month, the brigade was originally referred to as the 14th Guards, and only in January 1980 received the 35th number.
- *** Formally, the 56th Guards. the brigade is considered to be formed in Chirchik on the basis of 351 guards. pdp. However, de facto, its deployment for entry into Afghanistan was carried out separately in four centers (Chirchik, Kapchagay, Fergana, Iolotan), and brought together into a single whole just before the entry into Afghanistan in Termez. The headquarters of the brigade (or officer cadre), as its formal cadre, was originally stationed in Chirchik.
Secondly, twenty separate LH battalions:
| Number | Formation date | Operational subordination | Point of permanent deployment |
| 48 odshb | December 1979 | Turkestan Military District, 1st AK / 40th OA (*) | unknown |
| 139 odshb | December 1979 | Baltic VO, 11th Guards. OA | |
| 145 odshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 5th OA | |
| 899 odshb | December 1979 | 20th Guards OA | Burg (GDR) |
| 900 odshb | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 8th Guards OA | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) |
| 901 odshb | December 1979 | Central Group of Forces | |
| 902 odshb | December 1979 | Southern Group of Forces | Kecskemét (Hungary) |
| 903 odshb | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 28th OA | Brest (Southern), since 1986 - Grodno (Belarus) |
| 904 dshb | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 13th OA | |
| 905 odshb | December 1979 | Odessa Military District, 14th OA | Bendery (Moldova) |
| 906 dshb | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 36th OA | |
| 907 dshb | December 1979 | Far Eastern Military District, 43rd AK / 47th OA | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) |
| 908 odshb | December 1979 | Kyiv Military District, 1st Guards OA | Konotop, since 1984 - town. Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) |
| 1011 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 5th Guards TA | |
| 1044 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 1st Guards TA | |
| 1156 slut | December 1979 | Carpathian MD, 8th TA | |
| 1179 slut | December 1979 | Leningrad Military District, 6th OA | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) |
| 1151 slut | December 1979 | Belarusian Military District, 7th TA | Polotsk (Belarus) |
| 1185 slut | December 1979 | Group of Soviet troops in Germany, 2nd Guards TA | Ravensbrück (GDR) |
| 1604 slut | December 1979 | Transbaikal Military District, 29th OA | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) |
Notes:
* Literally a few months after the formation, 48 odshb (or, presumably, the 148th) was merged into the 66th brigade (omsbr) in Afghanistan. In general, within Limited contingent The Soviet troops (OKSV) in Afghanistan had two brigades of a special organization known "to the people" as the 66th and 70th separate motorized rifle (but in reality bearing the name "detachment combined arms brigade" - brigade). In their composition there was one odshb.
During August-December 1979, these units were basically created.
In 1984, 83 odshbr and two separate regiments were formed - the 1318th and 1319th odshp for full-time Operational-Maneuvering Groups (OMG) - they are also the so-called. Separate army corps (UAC). And in 1986, several more brigades were formed - the 23rd, 128th and 130th.
|
Thus, at the end of 1986, the Soviet Army had 16 brigades, 2 regiments and 20 detachments. battalions. The total staffing of the DShCh for wartime was 65-70 thousand people. However, in peacetime, the units were kept in a greatly reduced composition - an average of approx. 31-34 thousand people At the same time, along with well-equipped brigades and battalions, many had only a frame for mobilization deployment.
The principle by which the numbering of brigades and regiments was carried out is not known to me. But, it can be argued with a certain accuracy that it was the same for odshbr, obrSpN and omsbr - i.e. within all SWs. The differences in the numbering of the odshb are due to the three consecutive orders by which they were formed. However, these explanations I have heard seem insufficient.
Subordination
Many are interested in the question - were the DShCh part of the Airborne Forces? In short, no, they didn't. DShCh were part of the High Command of the SV (GK SV). Does this mean in this case that the military personnel of the DShCh are not airborne? Does not mean. The organizational, administrative affiliation of the DShCh to the GK SV is simply a feature of the existing Soviet military organization. Being subordinate to the GK SV DShCh, they were directly subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - corps, armies, fronts in wartime, military districts and groups of troops - in peacetime. Moreover, the same situation was repeated with them as with special forces - there were such combat units, but there were no such troops. There was the command of the commander of the tank troops, motorized rifle, but there was no command of the commander of the air assault troops. Formally speaking, there were no such troops themselves, just as there were no special forces. This situation affected the DShV in the most unfavorable way. They became the stepson of two stepmothers at once - on the one hand, the Airborne Forces, and on the other hand, the Civil Code of the SV. The "second-class" (this was especially true in the first years of its existence) position in the secret intra-army hierarchy also led to corresponding unpleasant consequences: worse attention to problems, worse supplies, less attention to recruiting and training, etc. In the minds of the officers of both the Airborne Forces and the SV, their definition in the DShV was often considered a "link" (perhaps with the exception of units in groups of troops - there, all places, of course, were valued higher).
In operational terms (combat use), parts of the DShV were subordinate to the command of combined arms formations - armies and fronts (districts, groups of troops). The development of methods and forms of their combat use of the DShV units and their training was managed by the combat training department of the Civil Code of the SV together with the BP department of the Airborne Forces command. The general principles of the combat use of the DShV lay on the conscience of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
In December 1989, a decision was made to transfer the LH units to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces command.
This had two opposite consequences.
On the one hand, this had a positive effect in the sense that DShCh thus found a "father" instead of a suspicious stepfather and evil stepmother, and their status immediately increased and acquired a "legitimate" look.
But on the other hand, the close interaction of the headquarters of the DShCh with the previously superior, and now unknown as related, headquarters of the combined arms formations was disrupted. DShV, designed to act in the interests of combined arms formations, ceased to obey their command, which, in my opinion, drastically reduced the effectiveness of their combat use. Apparently the best solution would be such a subordination scheme: administratively - to the commander of the Airborne Forces (manning, development of methods and forms of action, weapons and military equipment, uniforms and equipment), operationally (combat use) - to the commander of operational and operational-strategic formations in whose interests this formation expected to be used.
However, when it began in 1989. In the collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces, all this already played little role. But that is another story…
Differences between the Airborne Forces and the DShV
If, according to the established opinion, the Airborne Forces are characterized by their use in the form of large-scale (1-2 airborne divisions) airborne operations (ADO) with goals and objectives of an operational and operational-strategic nature to a great depth (up to 100-150 km and more) , then the idea of \u200b\u200busing DShV lies in the field rather purely tactical or, at most, operational-tactical. If, for the Airborne Forces, the issue of organizing interaction with the Ground Forces (SV) is not tough - they are thrown out in the interests of at least the front (a group of fronts), and even the Supreme High Command (VGK), then for the DShV this is very urgent. As a matter of fact, DShCh do not even have their own goals, but only a task. (They operate within the framework of the goal set by their senior commander - the combined arms commander. This "macro-target" determines the "micro-target" of the landing forces, it also determines the task, composition of forces, method of application.) produced in accordance with the goals and objectives of the ground combined arms command authority, as a rule, at the level of the army-corps, or, in some cases, even divisions. The hierarchically younger the command instance, the smaller, as a rule, the scale of the forces involved by the LH. If the Airborne Forces operate in divisions, then the DShV - in companies and battalions, less often - in a brigade / regiment.
Acquisition
To create and staff the "second wave" of the DShCh, it was decided to disband the 105th Guards. airborne division and 80th guards. pdp 104th airborne division. Officers and soldiers of military districts and groups of troops were sent for resupplying. So, the 36th brigade was formed on the basis of the 237th guards. PDP (he was framed) who singled out the officers and units of the Leningrad Military District; 38th Vienna - based on the staff officers of the 105th Guards. Airborne Forces, as well as officers and soldiers of the military unit of the Belarusian Military District.
In the DShCh military districts, most of the officers were from the military districts: for the odshb, only commanders were selected from the Airborne Forces, the rest from the districts; in the odshb groups of troops, the deputy battalion commander was added to the battalion commander, as well as, in part, the company commanders. To complete the newly created parts, in 1979. in military schools preparing officers for the Airborne Forces, recruitment was increased, and from 1983-84. already most of the officers went to the DShV being trained under the Airborne Forces program. Basically, they were appointed to the Oshbr of groups of troops, less often - to the Oshbr of districts, and even less often to the Oshb. In 1984-85. officers were shuffled in groups of troops - almost all officers were replaced in the DShV. All this increased the percentage of airborne officers (plus - replacements in Afghanistan). But at the same time, the most prepared graduates of military schools and academies were always distributed in the Airborne Forces. True, it was not without patronage, but this only concerned the distribution into groups of troops - there was a war in Afghanistan, airborne officers went there in the second circle, and the temptation to attach their own away was great.
With regard to the recruitment of conscripts, the same medical requirements and other selection rules were applied to the DShCh as for the Airborne Forces. The most healthy and physically developed draft contingent was singled out. High selection requirements (height - not less than 173 cm; physical development - not lower than average; education - not lower than average, no medical restrictions, etc.) led to fairly high opportunities for combat training.
Unlike the Airborne Forces, which had their own large "Gayzhunai training" - the 44th Airborne Division; The DShVs were staffed by junior commanders and specialists who had mostly graduated from the training divisions of the Ground Forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Gayzhunay pupils.
Outfit and equipment
Due to the fact that the DShV were organizationally part of the Ground Forces, initially their uniforms, equipment and allowances almost completely corresponded to those in the motorized rifle troops. The command did not want to pay attention to the inconsistency of a number of elements of the combined arms uniform and equipment with the landing specifics, it did not take into account the moral factor either. In general, until ser. 1983, the entire l / s DShV went in the usual form of motorized riflemen - however, for a very obvious discrepancy, the standard duffel bags-sidors were replaced with RD-54 landing backpacks. However, at the same time, there were also "hazing" deviations from this rule. So, one could see airborne "birds" on red buttonholes, and those who were dismissed from active service tried to get a "normal" paratrooper uniform - with a vest and a beret - and in this form go "for demobilization". For parachute jumps, so-called. "Jump" overalls of the Airborne Forces.
In the summer of 1983, literally before the death of the Secretary General of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev, it was decided to normalize the situation and transfer the DSHV to supply standards and the form of the Airborne Forces, which was done almost everywhere by the spring of next year. Both soldiers and officers willingly put on blue berets and vests, quickly getting rid of the hateful and despised "red color".
For a combat situation, you can outline the standard view of a Soviet paratrooper as follows. Underwear incl. and a vest (a T-shirt, with a long sleeve and a double-knit vest, that is, insulated); so-called greenish-olive jumpsuit; a head-hugging cloth helmet (in winter - insulated with a lining), boots with side lacing (or, less often, with belts); finally - camouflage KZS (protective mesh suit) or a special camouflage suit. In winter, a warm suit was worn, consisting of a short jacket and trousers; all khaki. Equipment (ammunition) - depending on the specialty. Mandatory for everyone - the backpack of the paratrooper RD-54. In addition to it, there could be: additional combined-arms pouches for AK magazines, a pouch for magazines for SVD sniper rifles, cases for carrying shots for RPGs, etc. For parachute jumps, special cases for small arms and a cargo container GK-30 were used.
Also, in Ser. In the 80s, to supply the DShV, a BVD transport and unloading vest was developed that was structurally reminiscent of the GeDeer landing vest. However, he never entered the army en masse.
ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS
Speaking about the organizational and staffing structure (OShS) and the equipment of subunits and units of the DShV with weapons and equipment (AME), the following reservations should immediately be made. Firstly, the same rules and features apply to the DShV that were characteristic of the entire SA, namely, some differences in the OShS and equipment of weapons and military equipment from part to part. Secondly, changes over time - the OShS and the equipment of weapons and military equipment gradually changed. This applied both to the lower divisions and the general structure of the units. Thirdly, the author has not yet been able to establish the OSH with 100% accuracy in accordance with time periods and local features; which is connected with the notorious regime of secrecy in force in the USSR Armed Forces.
All this makes the problem of restoring the historical OShS DShV quite problematic and requires a separate serious study. Below, I give only the principal structure of the ODSHBR and ODSHB.
Unfortunately, in detail, the initial organization of the air assault brigades is not known to me. Therefore, we will have to limit ourselves only to the general structure. Structurally, the brigade consisted of: an air group consisting of two helicopter regiments - combat (bvp) and transport-combat (tbvp), a total of 80 Mi-8T, 20 Mi-6A and 20 Mi-24A; three paratroopers (airborne standard for the Airborne Forces OShS) and one air assault (the airborne assault had the original OShS reinforced compared to the airborne assault rifle) battalion. The brigades also had artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and special units. It is believed that the brigades had a fairly powerful composition, in general, not typical for the Soviet landing units of that period. The brigade had the status of a tactical association - i.e. was equal to the division.
organizational structure 11th, 13th and 21st odshbr for the 1970s:
- brigade management
-
- three air assault companies (SPG-9D, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS, AKMS)
- anti-tank battery (SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-2M), communications, support, first-aid post.
- air group(until 1977, since this year - only a helicopter regiment), consisting of:
- combat helicopter regiment (Mi-24, Mi-8)
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6)
- a separate battalion of airfield technical support (two companies of communications and RT support, two technical units, a security company)
- mortar battery (120 mm M PM-38)
- anti-tank battery (12 ATGM "Malyutka", later - "Fagot")
- reactive battery (140-mm MLRS RPU-16) - soon disbanded
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- Battalions, air group and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 211 air group consisting of 307 and 329 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 329 helicopter regiments).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... an air group consisting of 825 and ... helicopter regiments (until 1977).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 1171 air groups consisting of 292 and 325 helicopter regiments (until 1977, from this year - only 325 helicopter regiments).
- In addition to those indicated in the brigade, there were also the following units: a company of young soldiers (RMS), a club, a special department of the KGB with a security platoon, economic structures.
organizational structure 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 39th, 40th, 57th, 58th and 128th odshbr for 1979-88:
- brigade management
-
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- one (4th) air assault (in armored vehicles) battalion:
- three air assault companies (BMD-1 / -1P, BTRD, 82-mm M, RPG-16, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- from 1981 - a mortar battery (120-mm M PM-38) was added, and from the beginning. 1983 it is replaced by a self-propelled artillery battery (120 mm SAO 2S9 Nona) *
- platoons: grenade launcher (AGS-17), anti-aircraft missile (Strela-2M / -3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- reactive battery (122-mm MLRS BM-21V Grad-V)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile division (in some brigades since 1982) **:
- two anti-aircraft missile batteries (SZRK Strela-10M)
- anti-aircraft missile battery (MANPADS Strela-3)
- platoons: management, support.
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3) - until 1982.
- anti-tank battery (BTR-RD, Fagot)
- reconnaissance company (BMD-1, BTRD, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- transport and economic company (from 1986 - )
- platoon of radiochemical reconnaissance, and since 1984, in part of the brigades - a company of radiochemical and biological protection
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- * Initially (1979-81), there was no minbatr in the dshb.
- ** The anti-aircraft division was in the majority of the odshbr since 1983. For some time, the ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" was also in the 35th guards odshbr.
The total number of the brigade deployed in wartime states reached 2.8-3.0 thousand people.
Some brigades had a structure different from the one presented above. So, the organizational structure of the 83rd brigade was distinguished by the presence of only two paratroopers (1st and 2nd) and one airborne assault (3rd) battalions. And the organizational structure of the 56th Guards. brigade fought in 1980-89. in Afghanistan, it was distinguished by the presence of three airborne assault (1st, 2nd, 3rd) and one paratrooper (4th) battalions. The brigade had a non-standard organization, moreover, changing over time.
organizational structure 11th, 13th and 21st odshbr for 1979-88:
- brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) separate air assault (foot) battalions:
- three air assault companies (82-mm M, ATGM Fagot, AGS-17, PK, RPG-7D, RPKS-74, AKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: reconnaissance, anti-aircraft missile (MANPADS Strela-3), communications, support, first-aid post.
- transport and combat helicopter regiment (Mi-8 and Mi-6) - until 1988.
- howitzer artillery battery (122-mm G D-30)
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- mountain gun battery (76-mm GP 2A2 arr. 1958)
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- brigade medical center
- repair company
- transport and economic company
- radiochemical reconnaissance platoon
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
Notes:
- * Battalions and helicopter regiments had their own numbers:
- in 11 odshbr: 617, 618 and 619 dep. air assault battalions; 329th Helicopter Regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
- at 13 odshbr: ..., ... and ... dep. air assault battalions, ... a helicopter regiment (at the beginning of 1988 it was withdrawn from the brigade).
- in 21 odshbr: 802, 803 and 804 dep. air assault battalions, 325 helicopter regiment (withdrawn from the brigade at the beginning of 1988).
- For some time there were no ZRVs in the battalions - the ZROs were part of the DSHR.
- The 802nd (1st) odshb 21 odshbr had a different organization from the standard.
organizational structure odshp differed from the brigades in the presence of only two battalions: the 1st airborne (foot) and 2nd airborne assault (on BMD), as well as a somewhat reduced composition of the regimental units. The total number of the regiment deployed in wartime states reached 1.5-1.6 thousand people.
organizational structure odshb in the European theater of operations and the Far East theater of operations, it was generally similar to the OShS of the infantry brigade, but also included a fourth company - an airborne assault (on BMD) and a platoon (either from BMD or UAZ-469), and in the mortar battery the number of barrels increased to 8 units. The total number of battalions deployed in wartime states reached 650-670 people.
In the winter-spring of 1988, organizational changes began, which were completed by the summer of 1990, i.e. by the time when the brigades were renamed airborne and reassigned to the command of the USSR Airborne Forces. The brigade was significantly lightened by removing all armored vehicles from there and removing the airborne assault battalion on the BMD / BTRD from its composition.
organizational structure 11th, 13th, 21st, 23rd, 35th Guards, 36th, 37th, 38th Guards, 40th, 56th Guards, 83rd ovdbr for 1990-91:
- brigade management
- three (1st, 2nd, 3rd) airborne (foot) battalions:
- three airborne companies (ATGM "Metis", 82-mm M, AGS-17, RPG-7D, GP-25, PK, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- mortar battery (82 mm M)
- platoons: anti-aircraft missile (Strela-3 / Igla), communications, support, first-aid post.
- howitzer artillery battalion:
- three howitzer batteries (122 mm G D-30)
- platoons: management, support.
- mortar battery (120 mm M)
- anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- anti-tank battery (ATGM "Fagot")
- anti-aircraft battery (23 mm ZU-23, MANPADS Strela-2M)
- reconnaissance company (UAZ-3151, PK, RPG-7D, GP-25, SBR-3)
- communications company
- engineering sapper company
- paratrooper company
- automobile company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- radiochemical biological protection company
- command platoon of the chief of artillery
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
organizational structure 224 CA for 1990-91:
- brigade management
- 1st Airborne Training Battalion:
- three parachute training companies (RPG-7D, GP-25, AKS-74, RPKS-74)
- training reconnaissance company (PK, AKS-74, SVD)
- 2nd Airborne Training Battalion:
- 1st training automobile company (for Ural-4320)
- 2nd training automobile company (for GAZ-66)
- medical training company
- communications training company
- training artillery battalion:
- training howitzer battery (122-mm G D-30)
- training mortar battery (120 mm M)
- training anti-tank battery (ATGM Fagot, SPG-9MD)
- training anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery (ZU-23, Strela-3/Igla)
- a company of training vehicles (Ural-4320, GAZ-66)
- communications company
- medical company
- repair company
- logistics company
- paratrooper platoon
- commandant's platoon
- orchestra.
HELICOPTERS ARE THE MAIN PROBLEM
Domestic DShV had many problems, both internal and external. One of these third-party problems that directly and most strongly influenced the combat effectiveness of the DShV was to provide them with an aviation component, in other words, helicopters.
Massively formed in 1979 "second wave" DShN consisted only of the ground component - i.e. unlike their older counterparts - the "first wave" brigades - there were no helicopter regiments in their composition. This situation can be explained by several theses.
First of all, this was contrary to the doctrine of the use of helicopters. The Soviet military command believed that helicopter regiments were a means of operational and operational-strategic unification (armies and fronts). This means that organizationally they should be included in their composition for centralized management of them with a concentration of efforts for use in the chosen direction. Theoretically, apparently, the correct desire to give helicopter forces to each association, in fact, led to the dispersion of helicopters over very numerous formations in view of the overall immensity of the SA. Here it was necessary either to eliminate unnecessary (or not superfluous?) associations, or to deprive some of them of a significant number of helicopters, or to force the production of helicopters in order to saturate the troops with them to the maximum.
Secondly, the production of helicopters, like any other type of weapon, depends on the prevailing doctrine at the moment. As mentioned above, the "volumizers" who advocated the creation of a rise in the air of part of the ground forces, and therefore a sharp increase in the number of air vehicles needed for this, were defeated in the fight against the supporters of the traditional doctrine. And although the production of helicopters increased by the beginning. 80s, however, this was a consequence of rather objective prerequisites, the objective course of development of the country's Armed Forces, and not a doctrinal stage-by-stage revolution.
Thirdly, the very fact of combining the air and ground components in a tactical formation caused, apparently, many military leaders objections - and not only subjective, but also quite justified. Being part of such a formation, the helicopters would actually be withdrawn from the reserve of the commander of the operational formation, "attached" exclusively to ensuring the actions of the airborne troops. It seems to the author of the article that the high military command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the airborne troops on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by military aircraft, not paying attention to the specifics expressed in a much closer and mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters without which the effectiveness of the first falls. Moreover, according to operational calculations and the experience of the exercises, it turned out that about 70% of the resource of transport helicopters was supposed to be used for landing missions in any case. And what could prevent the use of these helicopters if they do not participate in the DSHO / DShD?
Finally, fourthly, as it is commonly believed, the number of helicopters themselves was also insufficient in order, like the Americans, to equip all the formations with which they can come in handy, and even have a reserve. However, there seems to be a lot of confusion here. Namely. Consider the production of Mi-8 helicopters in the USSR. According to official figures, 11,000 units were manufactured between 1962 and 1997. Moreover, the absolute majority (up to 90%) in the period 1966-91. According to the authors' calculations, this means that at least 5,500 of these helicopters should have been delivered to the Armed Forces during this period, only counting transport and transport-combat modifications. There is no official domestic data on the Mi-8 fleet in the open press. The authoritative magazine "Military Balance" for 1991 gives the number of transport and transport-combat modifications of the Mi-8 for 1990/91. respectively 1000 and 640 units. Let the losses in Afghanistan and in the disasters amount to 400 units, let 1000 machines that have exhausted their resources be disabled, but then where did the remaining 2500 units go? In general, as they say, the topic is waiting for its researcher.
So, theoretically, air assault brigades, being an ideal means, with a focal (non-linear) nature of hostilities, due to the lack of an aviation component that imparts maneuverability in their composition, sharply reduced their potential, becoming, in fact, parts of light infantry. A fundamental way out of the current situation could be the creation of special operational-tactical formations - air assault corps of brigade-regimental composition - subordinated to front-line departments in wartime. This connection would include a ground component (DShCh from the SV or Airborne Forces) and an air helicopter component (from the DIA). Such a construction scheme would make it possible to achieve high combat effectiveness and, at the same time, all interested departments "keep their own sheep."
Let's look at an example of how helicopters were supposed to be distributed for DShV. We take standard conditions as initial conditions - a front-line offensive operation of four armies. The grouping consists of one transport and combat helicopter regiment (otbvp), six combat helicopter regiments (obvp), as well as one detachment. air assault brigade (3rd battalion) and three det. air assault battalion. In addition, in each of the combined arms divisions, one motorized rifle battalion was trained to act as part of the TakVD. An analysis of the possible content of the operation and the tasks characteristic of airborne assaults in the course of it show that within the framework of the DShD in 10 days it may be necessary to land an airborne brigade as an ATIA and eight to ten TakVD as part of an airborne assault brigade and reinforced small and medium armored personnel carriers.
The average allocation rates for troop-carrying helicopters are: ATS - up to four regimental sorties (p / a) rebvp*; TakVD as part of the odshb - one p / in otbvp; reinforced SSB - one p / a bvp without a squadron (ve). In addition, a detachment of escort combat helicopters is needed.
Estimated composition: otbvp - 40 Mi-8T / MT, 20 Mi-6A; obvp - 40 Mi-24V / P and 20 Mi-8T / MT.
* Here it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the presence of one of the battalions on armored vehicles in the odshbr sharply increased the required outfit of helicopters for transportation, and especially heavy Mi-6A. Transport ok. 60 units BTT occupied the lion's share in the total number of Mi-6A helicopter sorties and in real life Mi-6 squadrons would need to make more sorties. Only mass production of Mi-26 helicopters capable of taking on board 2 units. BTT class BMD / BTRD (for the Mi-6A only 1 unit) changed the situation for the better. In general, the author doubts the possibility of transferring the entire BTT dshb by Mi-6A helicopters.
It would be superfluous to prove that landing three flights, let alone four, of the ATMO is tantamount to suicide. It is necessary to ensure the transfer by no more than two flights (echelons). And here it is impossible to do without the withdrawal of transport and combat helicopters from the air force for the period of its operations (total for 1-2 p / a), i.e., they will have to be left without Mi-8T / MT.
The duration of the disembarkation of the ATC in two flights is, as a rule, 12-16 hours. Taking into account the subsequent training of helicopters, only a day later, one can count on their repeated actions (in the same Afghanistan, helicopters made much more conclusions, but calculations were made based on only two sorties per day). During the specified time, the air defense units remain without the Mi-8 and support the troops without their participation. If during the same day it is required to land at least one or two more TakVDs as part of a battalion, then practically all the air defense forces are left without troop-carrying helicopters. Taking into account the duration of the operation and the recovery time of the combat capability of the odshbr, the re-landing of the airborne division is practically not feasible.
In the remaining nine days of the operation, it is possible to land eight or nine more TakVDs as part of the special air defense unit / us.msb. However modern experience testifies: up to 30% of the flight resource of transport helicopters will have to be spent on solving problems not related to landing. Consequently, only armies in the direction of the main attack will be able to use landings. This was considered an acceptable norm for the decentralized application of TakVD.
Although not quite. Nevertheless, it was necessary to involve transport aircraft of the VTA Air Force for the landing of the DShV - mainly An-12. This created additional inconvenience. So, the dshb on the BTT had to independently follow to such an initial landing area, where there were airfields capable of ensuring the rise of aircraft with troops on board.
Quality
A certain problem was the suitability of domestic helicopters of the Mi-8 and Mi-6 family for air assault operations and, more broadly, for airborne landing in general. In the future, a separate article will be devoted to this.
RESULTS
As mentioned earlier, in 1989-90, in connection with the transfer of LH units to the composition of the Airborne Forces, major changes were made. Most of the air assault brigades are being reorganized into airborne brigades that are greatly lightened in terms of armament (the actual process of lightening was started earlier); at the same time, several brigades are disbanded (the 57th and 58th), and the 39th is transformed into the 224th training center of the Airborne Forces. Separate air assault battalions, it was decided to disband all. In the summer of 1990, all major changes had already been made. The brigades have been reorganized, and most of the battalions have been disbanded. As of November of this year, only 5 battalions remained from the former.
The overall picture of the transformations can be seen in the tables below.
| Number | Transformations | |
| 11 odshbr | Mogocha and Amazar (Chita region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. And by 1 Aug. 1990 transferred to the states air-dec. brigades. |
| 13 odshbr | Magdagachi city (Amur region)* | In 1988, the helicopter regiment was withdrawn from the composition. |
| 21 odshbr | Kutaisi and Tsulukidze (Georgia) | |
| 23 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 35 Guards. odshbr | Cottbus (GDR)** | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 36 odshbr | village Garbolovo (Leningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 37 odshbr | Chernyakhovsk (Kaliningrad region) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 38 Guards. Vienna odshbr | Brest (Belarus) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 39 odshbr | Khyriv (Ukraine) | In the spring of 1990, it was reorganized into the 224 Airborne Training Center. |
| 40 odshbr | with. Velyka Korenikha - Nikolaev (Ukraine) | In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the state air-dec. brigades. And completely relocated to Nikolaev. |
| 56 Guards. odshbr | settlement Azadbash (district, Chirchik, Uzbekistan) *** | In the winter of 1989, it was withdrawn from Afghanistan to the city of Yolotan (Turkmenistan). In the summer of 1990, it was transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 57 odshbr | town Aktogay (Taldy-Kurgan region, Kazakhstan) | Transferred to s. Georgievka, Semipalatinsk region (Kazakhstan) and disbanded there in 1989. |
| 58 odshbr | Kremenchug (Ukraine) | Disbanded December 1989. |
| 83 odshbr | Bialogya RD (Poland) | Transferred to the city of Ussuriysk (Primorsky Territory) in 1989. In the summer of 1990, transferred to the states of air-dec. brigades. |
| 128 odshbr | Stavropol (Stavropol AK) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 130 odshbr | Abakan (Khakas Autonomous Okrug) | Disbanded at the beginning 1990. |
| 1318 slut | Borovuha-1 - Borogla (Polotsk region, Belarus) | Disbanded in August 1989. |
| 1319 slut | Kyakhta (Chita region) | Disbanded in March 1988. |
With individual battalions, they acted as follows: in 1989 (maximum beginning of 1990), all battalions with PPD on the territory of the USSR were disbanded while simultaneously redeploying to the USSR those in groups of forces in Europe. Then, before the beginning 1991 they were also disbanded. Only the 901st battalion survived.
| Number | Point of permanent deployment at the beginning of transformations | Transformations |
| 139 odshb | Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region) | |
| 145 odshb | settlement Sergeevka (Primorsky Territory) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 899 odshb | Burg (GDR) | In 1989 he was transferred to the village. Bear Lakes (Moscow region). Disbanded no later than early 1991. |
| 900 odshb | Leipzig - Schinau (GDR) | Withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in 1989 and disbanded. |
| 901 odshb | in the district of n.p. Riechki (Czechoslovakia) | In 1989 he was transferred to Aluskene (Latvia). In the beginning. In 1991, disbandment began, but soon the battalion was redeployed * and in May 1991 was transferred to Abkhazia (the city of Gudauta). |
| 902 odshb | Kecskemét (Hungary) | In 1989 he was transferred to Grodno (Belarus). |
| 903 odshb | Grodno (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 904 dshb | Vladimir-Volynsky (Ukraine) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 905 odshb | Bendery (Moldova) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 906 dshb | settlement Khada-Bulak (Chita region, district of Borzya) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 907 dshb | Birobidzhan (Jewish Autonomous Region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 908 odshb | town Goncharovo (Ukraine, Chernihiv region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1011 slut | Art. Maryina Gorka - Pukhovichi (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1044 slut | Neuss-Lager (GDR, in the region of Königsbrück) | Translated in 1989 in Tuarage (Lithuania). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1156 slut | Novograd-Volynsky (Ukraine, Zhytomyr region) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1179 slut | Petrozavodsk (Karelia) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1151 slut | Polotsk (Belarus) | Disbanded no later than 1989. |
| 1185 slut | Ravensbrück (GDR) | Transferred in 1989 to Võru (Estonia). Disbanded no later than Jan. 1991. |
| 1604 slut | Ulan-Ude (Buryat Autonomous District) | Disbanded no later than 1989 |
Notes:
* By this time, it was already referred to as a separate paratrooper battalion.
Thus, at the beginning of 1991, the former airborne assault units as part of the Airborne Forces were represented by eleven separate airborne brigades.
In 1989, it was decided to transfer the main part of the helicopters from the Air Force to the SV and, thus, significantly improve the capabilities of the air assault troops. However, following this, at the beginning of December 1989, an order was issued to reassign the DShV to the command of the Airborne Forces, thus leveling the formation of army aviation that was positive for the DShV. Coordination between the air assault formations and the command of the combined arms formations in the interests of which they were supposed to act turned out to be broken. The reasons for the transfer of the Airborne Forces to the administrative and operational subordination of the Airborne Forces are not clear. Without a doubt, the existing similarity in acquisition and training does not explain everything. It is possible that the reason lies (as often happens) in non-military matters proper. The inattention of the command of the Airborne Forces to the development of the doctrine of the use of helicopter landings in the early and middle stages (60s-early 80s) resulted in a kind of "envy" of the "competitor"; all the more so since the successes of the "helicopter landing" doctrine were on the face, both with us and with NATO. In principle, the logical (and theoretically correct) decision to concentrate all airborne forces under one administrative command was unjustifiably supplemented by their operational unification. The command incorrectly assessed the dependence of the DShV on helicopter support, considering it to be similar to the support of the airborne forces by VTA aircraft and not paying attention to the mandatory symbiosis of the landing force with helicopters, without which the effectiveness of the landing drops sharply.
Abbreviations and abbreviations
- VDV - airborne troops
- SW - ground troops
- SA - Soviet army
- DShV (DShCh, DShF) - air assault troops (units, formations)
- DShD - here, air assault operations
- DShO - here, air assault operation.
- VDO - airborne operation.
- TakVD - tactical airborne assault.
- DIA (AA) - SV aviation ( army aviation)
- AVG - air group
- FA - front-line aviation (fighters, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft)
- RVIA - Missile Forces and Artillery
- vdd - airborne division (avdd - training airborne division)
- odshbr - a separate airborne assault brigade
- odshb - a separate airborne assault battalion
- odshp - a separate airborne assault regiment
- ovdbr - a separate airborne brigade
- ovshbr - a separate air assault brigade
- guards – guard
- minbatr, minv - mortar battery, platoon
- ptbatr, ptv - anti-tank battery, platoon
- VO - military district
- GV - group of troops
- OA and TA - combined arms (tank) army
- G - howitzer
- P - gun (GP - mountain gun)
- M - mortar
- ATGM - anti-tank missile system
- RPG - hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher
- SPG - mounted anti-tank grenade launcher
- AGS - easel automatic grenade launcher
- RKhBZ - radio-chemical-biological protection
- RHR - radio-chemical intelligence
Dnepropetrovsk
December 2003 - July 2004,
additions and changes - as of February 2005.
Page 1 - 7 of 7
Home | Previous | 1 | Track. | End | According to p.
Oleg KOVSHAR