The forces of the Prussian king were distributed as follows:
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King's Prussian army, main army |
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Initially, it included a vanguard division under the command of the Duke of Saxony-Weimar, which was sent to Erfurt, to the Weser. It consisted of 11,000 troops, was not able to connect with the main forces and therefore did not take part in the battle of Jena on October 14. She is accounted for in the Ryuchel army. |
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Division of the Prince of Orange |
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Two infantry brigades, one cavalry brigade and two light battalions. Artillery - two 12-pound batteries, a horse artillery battery and regimental artillery. A total of 11 battalions, 15 squadrons and three artillery batteries. |
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Von Wartensleben's division |
| The composition is the same plus an additional battery of 12-pounder guns. |
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Division von Schmettau |
| Had one additional battalion. |
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Reserve (Commander von Kalkreith) |
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Von Kunheim's division |
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It included the Prussian Guard and had 8 battalions, 15 squadrons and three batteries, of which one was horse artillery. |
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Von Arnim's division |
| 10 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons, 2 foot and 1 horse artillery batteries |
| During the battle, Blucher was connected with this army. |
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Corps of the Prince of Württemberg |
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The corps consisted of 15,000 people and was a reserve stationed in Magdeburg. He moved along the Galle road, but too late to affect the outcome of the battle. |
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Army of Prince Hohenlohe |
| The army that opposed Napoleon at Jena. At the end of the battle, Ruchel's corps joined her. Includes: |
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| The first part of the vanguard of the army. 9.5 battalions, 18 squadrons and 3 artillery batteries, of which 1 was mounted. |
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Tsetseschwitz Division (Saxon) |
| 12 battalions, 16 squadrons and 4.5 batteries of artillery, of which 1.5 batteries are mounted |
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Von Grawert's division |
| 11 battalions, 25 squadrons, 3.5 artillery batteries. |
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Tauenzin Corps |
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The second part of the vanguard of the army. Covered the left flank. 9 battalions, 9 squadrons and a mortar battery. |
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Von Pritzwitz Division |
| Reserve part. 8.5 battalions, 9 squadrons, 2 foot and 1 horse batteries |
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This army thus numbered 33,400 infantry, 11,800 cavalry and 15 batteries, approximately 2,000 artillerymen. To this must be added Rüchel's corps, which, although arriving late, actually took part at the end of the battle. |
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Ruchel Corps |
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Some parts of the corps were far away and did not arrive on time. Without taking them into account, it turns out 15 battalions, 13 squadrons and 3 batteries. |
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If we take into account the losses that the corps suffered in preliminary skirmishes and from desertion, Hohenlohe's army consisted of 52,000 people with 15 batteries, including Rüchel's corps. They participated in the battle of Jena, fighting Napoleon, but were scattered at a great distance and arrived on the battlefield one after another. |
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Saxon parts |
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These units were mainly united in the Hohenlohe army, and are taken into account above. However, the Saxons themselves did not like spraying too much, who sought to remain more of an independent combat unit. Many of them were not well versed in the political situation and were reluctant to fight for Prussian interests. |
| 2 cuirassier regiments(4 squadrons each) - Kosice and Elector |
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4 light horse or dragoon regiments(4 squadrons each) - Prince Clemens, von Polenz, Prince John and Prince Albrecht |
| 8 squadrons Saxon hussars |
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9 infantry regiments(2 battalions each) - Elektor ( elector), Clemens, Rechten, Bevilaqua, Lowe, Tümmel, von Nesemenschel, Prince Maximilian and Prince Friedrich-August, along with the grenadier battalions attached to them. |
| Guards grenadiers and 2 infantry regiments remained in Dresden. |
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Artillery It consisted of the Koch mortar battery, the 8-pound batteries of Hausmann and Ernst, the 12-pound battery of Bonniot, the 4-pound battery of Hoer, and the horse batteries of Grossmann and Studnitz. In total, therefore, 15 foot and 2 horse batteries. However, it is still not exactly established which of them participated in the battle of Jena. |
The structure of the Prussian army in 1806
Line Infantry
The regiments consisted of 2 infantry and 1 artillery battalions.
Each battalion consisted of five musketeer companies (120 men each) and a grenadier company (up to 145 men). Both grenadier companies from each regiment were seconded and merged with 2 grenadier companies of another regiment into grenadier battalions, which were named after their boss.
Thus, the regiment consisted of ten musketeer companies total number in 1,200 people. To this must be added for each battalion: officers, drummers (three per company, a senior drummer assigned to the 2nd battalion), 8 sappers and 40 non-combatants - a gunsmith, a surgeon, etc. Each battalion also had 2 artillery crews. The regimental artillery was equipped with 6-pounder guns, the calculation usually consisted of 17 people under the command of a non-commissioned officer.
In addition to the officers, an orchestra of 8 oboists and flute players, plus a bugler, was assigned to the regimental headquarters. Usually 10 men from each company were used as snipers and were armed with rifled carbines. These arrows were used as flankers, that is, in front of the front, or performed independent tasks. However, Prussian military tactics meant fighting in close formation, unlike the French.
To all this we must add officer servants and batmen (280 per regiment) and a large convoy, consisting of both artillery vans and a supply of ammunition, and officer (mainly) and soldier's luggage in carriages and wagons. All this was a big burden for the regiment.
Uniform and equipment
Uniforms of infantry regiments
All infantry wore hats with black cockades.
In the field, the musketeers did not have white plumes, but put on simple pompoms of regimental colors. They wore trousers with buttons at the bottom of the trousers. Pants were gray-beige, gray-yellow or white. The color of the saber harness was different for each company. During the campaign, the arrows and carabinieri did not wear a plume with three black stripes, but a black pom-pom with a black top, like non-commissioned officers. Non-commissioned officers, in turn, did not wear plumes with a black top in field uniforms and left their espantons with the artillerymen. The regiments also differed among themselves in the colors of the edging of uniforms and neckerchiefs.
Sappers wore black plumes like regimental riflemen. The drummers had their own special plumes.
In the campaign, the officers did not wear their white plumes with a black base, nor espantons. They girded themselves with a silver scarf, a hallmark of all Prussian officers. Leggings and overtruses (pants worn over breeches) are blue or gray with buttons on the sides. Hats were sometimes sheathed with waxed cloth in inclement weather. Officer's coat of blue color. The saddle pads were dark blue with a galloon of the same color as the buttons, that is, silver or gold according to the regimental set.
Two banners were relied on each battalion, although some had only one. Three of the four regimental colors had regimental colors; the fourth was the life banner or the banner of the colonel, and it was dominated by white. The embroidery was in the instrument color of the regiment, gold or silver.
The life banner was carried in front of the 1st battalion, which carried its second banner, known as the trailing one, in the third row.
In each regiment, ten young nobles were appointed standard-bearers, and the oldest of them carried the colors.
The banners were of various types and most often had a Maltese cross (Iron Cross), which divided the banner into eight parts; some banners had a flaming cross (with wavy rays). We have used Brier's reconstructions based on Kling's work, which we recommend reading. Some contemporary documents show various types of flaming crosses with rounded edges symmetrical about the axis. Some banners had no cross at all.
Uniforms of the grenadier battalions
The grenadiers did not have banners and were distinguished by a plume on their hats, in the color of the regiment in which they were originally listed. The battalions also included carabinieri and 2 field guns, which also did not have banners.
light infantry
Fusiliers
In 1806, the Prussian army had 24 fusilier battalions (approximately 600 men per battalion). They had neither banners nor artillery. The 3-pounders they were equipped with were taken away.
With the exception of officers who wore hats, the headdress of the Fusiliers was a black cylindrical shako with a white ribbon at the top. On the march, they wore beige or gray breeches over boots and leggings. The battalions were distinguished by the pom-poms on their headdresses, the color of their belts and buttons.
Fusilier battalions did not have grenadiers at all, but they included snipers for support.
huntsmen
They were reduced to 12 companies of 200 people each and armed with rifled carbines. They didn't have banners. The plume is green, as is the uniform. They wore breeches over their boots; the full form implied boots.
Cavalry
It was the pride of the Prussian army and consisted of:
Hussars
The cavalry was based on the same principle as the infantry battalions. Each battalion had five two-company squadrons.
Most of the hussar regiments had 2 battalions, or 10 squadrons. The squadron consisted of 150 horsemen, including 24 carabinieri. Plus 12 spares per squadron and one trumpeter per company.
In 1806, the headdress of the hussars underwent changes, and not all regiments switched to the new shako. Thus, under Jena, one could meet several regiments wearing mirlitons, with or without a sultan. Von Bila's regiment wore a new type of shako. A cockade in the form of a rosette was attached in front; its center was the same color as the blade, and the color of the outer part coincided with the color of the galloon. Each squadron had its own rosette color.
Overtruses, which were not worn by everyone, had a row of buttons on the side and a squadron-colored piping.
Hussars rode small hardy Polish horses. They were armed with blunderbusses hanging from a belt. The hussars did not have standards.
Dragoons
But this kind of troops went into battle with standards. Almost all dragoon regiments consisted of five squadrons, only the famous regiment of the Queen had 10 squadrons.
The uniforms of the dragoons were blue, but differed for different regiments. The non-commissioned officers had galloons on their collars, cuffs and along the edges of the pantalier on the regiment's metal instrument.
The officers had gold or silver patterns and galloons on the lapels.
The trumpeters wore on hats decorated with a red ribbon, a white plume with a red top. The tassels on the brim of the hat were regimental colors. Galun also walked along the edges of the lapels of the coattails and cuffs and along the edges of the baldric.
Dragoons, like hussars, rode Polish horses, but taller.
Cuirassiers
Regiments were formed from five squadrons. They included carabinieri armed with rifled weapons (carbines), which were usually used to cover the flanks.
They wore high hats with long plumes. Cuirassiers, left without cuirasses in 1798, wore a white uniform. Collar, edging along the edges and a double lace on the chest of the uniform, the same double lace on the vest, edging on the leggings - regimental color. The waistcoat, peeking out from under the short uniform, was blue, or again the regimental color.
The cuirassiers were armed with a straight saber - a broadsword, two pistols and a smoothbore gun.
The cuirassiers rode on tall, strong Prussian horses.
Artillery
The uniform of the gunners was black. In the campaign they wore gray-greenish or white leggings. Both foot and horse artillery had such a uniform. The metal parts of the guns were painted black, while the wooden parts were predominantly blue. The main fleet consisted of 6-pounder (with various barrel lengths) and 7-pounder howitzers. There were also short and heavy 12-pounder guns, whose performance was much criticized after the defeat at Jena.
Generals
They wore plain navy blue uniforms with gray or blue overcoats. The embroidery on the collar and along the edges of the uniform indicated the rank.
The distinctive features of the uniforms of the guard regiments will be dealt with later, in the chapter on Auerstedt, as they fought there.
Structure of the Saxon army in 1806
As mentioned above, the Guards Grenadiers and two regiments of infantry (Prince Anton and von Sanger) remained in the Dresden garrison. Other units were transferred and dispersed among Hohenlohe's army.
Line Infantry
The organization of this type of troops was copied from the Prussian. In connection with this, each infantry regiment consisted of two musketeer battalions and riflemen. The grenadiers were organized into independent regiments: each battalion consisted of two companies from one regiment and two companies from another.
Line infantry uniform
The Saxon infantry cockade was white.
Musketeers wore French-style uniforms. The edging, collar and lapels had their own color; scarf red. Leggings are white with high leggings; they were worn even in the field. Her hair is pulled back into a braid with a black ribbon. A saber hung on a white harness. The hat, along the edge of which there was a white galloon, was crowned with a white tassel. The center of the brush had its own distinctive color.
The arrows wore a green plume.
Grenadiers had the right to wear mustaches. The hat was made of bearskin with a leather visor, without a chin strap. The color of the etiquette was determined by a metal device. The saber hung on a sling over the right shoulder, along the sling of the cartridge bag.
Non-commissioned officer hats had a gold or silver headset, depending on the instrument color. With a full uniform, a short white plume with a black top was worn.
The tassels on the drummers' hats were the same colors as the plume. The drums were painted in alternating white and colored stripes, with the color determined by the shelf.
Each battalion had 1 banner. The colonel's banner was a white cloth and belonged to the 1st battalion. The regimental banner, which has distinctions, was carried by the 2nd battalion. Each regiment had its own banner design.
Cavalry
Hussars
Only one regiment of eight squadrons took part in the battle; he did not have a banner. The hussars wore a mirliton with blue and white blades and a white plume on their heads. Overtrusions are white.
The trumpeters were distinguished by a blue-yellow plume.
light cavalry
Four regiments participated in the campaign. Each regiment consisted of four squadrons and consisted of 650 horsemen.
They wore black hats with a white plume. Uniform, neckerchief, piping, red shoulder strap; lapels, cuffs, collar - regimental color. Yellow metal buttons. The officer's hat had a gold lace; he also wore gold epaulettes and a white neckerchief.
Depending on the regiment, the distinctive colors were light green (in the regiment of Prince Clemens), blue (von Polenz), black (Prince John) or dark green (Prince Albert).
Colonel of the 11th Chasseurs (French 4th Corps) noticed that the Saxon light cavalrymen had small chains (probably metal) , embroidered on the sleeves, and as a result gave the order not to cut with sabers on the hands. (!! - Saber coast, or what?)
Cuirassiers
Like light cavalry, cuirassier regiments had four squadrons with a total of 650 horsemen. Their uniform was of the Prussian type, but without the sabretache. They wore a straw-colored uniform trimmed with galloons. The lining of the riding breeches, collar, galloons had a regimental color. The neckerchief for the soldiers is red and black for the officers. The collar, which fell down to the front of the uniform, was framed with regimental-colored galloon. The same galloon, but narrower, was sewn to the sides of the uniform, walked along the edge of the breeches of the cuirassier and the horse's saddle cloth. The scabbard of the saber was made of blackened leather. The distinctive colors of the regiments were scarlet (the Elector's regiment) and yellow (the Koszycki regiment, later known as Castrova).
The trumpeters wore inverted uniform colors and a red plume on their hat. The lapels, collar and trim of the leggings are white. The cordons (braid on which the pipes were hung) were red and yellow in the Elector's regiment and yellow and black in the Koshytsky regiment. Each squadron had its own standard.
Artillery
She wore a green uniform with a red collar, galloons and piping. Buttons in yellow metal, leather details in buckskin. The hat was trimmed with white braid, the plume was black and white. The saddle pads were trimmed around the edges with a yellow silk ribbon. They were armed with 6-, 4- and 12-inch guns and howitzers.
Generals
They wore a blue uniform with red breeches and a waistcoat, a scarf of silver with gold and crimson threads. Numerous patterns and embroidery indicated rank. Their adjutants wore white armbands and golden aiguillettes.
Defeat of the Prussian Army
Friedrich was confident that he would be able to win decisive victory, and again threw his soldiers into the attack, but only to see how they retreat in a panic. On August 12, Friedrich announced his intention to attack Aunersdorf. Preparations for this offensive were somewhat delayed due to several attempts by Russian troops to recapture Mühlberg. Nevertheless, by 13:00 everything was generally ready for the assault on Kunersdorf. The Prussian heavy artillery was moved up to Mülberg to support the attack, and the infantry deployed into line.
While the Prussian army was making this maneuver, Saltykov reorganized the Russian lines. As a base for his defense, he now used a small hollow known as Kuhgrund, located northwest of Kunersdorf. The Russian troops were battered during the successful Prussian attack on Mühlberg, but they were still very far from being defeated. Saltykov's army still outnumbered the enemy, and besides, its commander now knew where the next blow would be delivered. Saltykov fortified the sectors of the front facing the Prussian line, transferring forces here from the western sector of his positions. But more importantly, he ordered Laudon's Austrian corps, which also had strong cavalry, to take the high ground south of Kunersdorf.
Start of the fight
Although the Russians had lost some of their guns at Mulberg, they still had almost 200 pieces of artillery left. From their dominant positions on the Grosser-Spitzberg height, the Russian gunners could easily concentrate their artillery fire on the advancing Prussian infantry formations. Around 14:00, the Prussians again went on the attack, which was preceded by another strong artillery preparation. Clouds of smoke and dust soon closed almost the entire battlefield from observers and commanders, making it impossible to determine where certain units, especially the Prussian cavalry, were advancing. However, based on some documents of that time, the following battle scheme can be drawn up. The first attack of the Prussian troops, led directly by Friedrich, was directed at Saltykov's positions, located just north of Kunersdorf. The Russians recaptured it, and the Prussians had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, parts of Fink's corps launched an offensive through the wetlands to the western section of the Russian positions. The conditions of the terrain made deployment extremely difficult - the Prussians had to break into small groups to cross the wetland, and then, under heavy artillery fire, re-form into line. Russian Shuvalov howitzers and unicorns inflicted heavy damage on the attackers, and Fink was unable to complete his offensive.
The Prussian cavalry, which had arrived from the southern section of the battlefield, tried to support Fink's advance, the fyca-ry of Klest and the dragoons of Platen Jr. maneuvered around Kuhgrund, but they were held back by the Russian cavalry. Seydlitz himself led a massive cavalry charge across the Kuhgrund, but three Russian infantry regiments arrived in time to push back the Prussians. Seydlitz himself was wounded in the arm, forcing him to resign command. His place was taken by the Prince of Württemberg, but he also failed to break through the Russian ranks. One of Frederick's favorites, Major General Puggkamer, died fighting at the head of his regiment of White Hussars.
Prussian attack fails
During the attack, the Prussian infantry was constantly under heavy fire from Russian artillery, and Saltykov had the opportunity to bring fresh troops to these areas. One Prussian officer recalled: “Our infantry marched on sandy terrain. The day was very hot. All suffered from thirst and moved with difficulty. The same battalions that started the battle took part in the offensive, while the enemy continued to bring up fresh troops. The Prussians managed to capture most of the village of Kunersdorf, but the Russians still held the cemetery. Senior commanders advised Frederick to break off the attack, as his army was almost completely exhausted, but the king was determined to win a decisive victory. He personally led the infantry into the attack across the Kuhgrund, ordering Fink to re-launch the attack from the north. Russian artillery still dominated the battlefield, especially those guns that were placed in dominant positions on Grosser-Spitzberg.
Final attacks across the Kuhgrund were blocked by the Austrian troops deployed here. And again, the fact that the Prussians fought hard all day without a break played a role: the exhausted soldiers tried to climb the opposite slope of the Kuhgrund, but the enemy threw them back again and again. Frontal attacks launched to the south against Grosser Spitzberg were also repulsed. Saltykov concentrated Russian infantry there to cover his artillery positions, and the Prussian infantry in this direction also did not succeed. Von Platen decided to attack the Russian positions on Grosser Spitzberg and led his cavalry between the ponds in an attempt to turn around to attack. In front was Schorlemer's dragoon regiment, which was the first to rush into the Russian positions, but was almost completely destroyed by Russian artillery fire even before the rest of the Prussian cavalry had time to turn around to attack.
The decisive moment of the battle has come. The commander of the Austrian troops, Laudon, took advantage of the situation and, at the head of his cavalry (as well as Russian cavalry units), counterattacked the Prussians. Von Platen's cavalry was trapped: it still had not completed its deployment and could not maneuver successfully. The Prussians rushed back in disorder, retreating across the patch of terrain between the ponds. Panic spread to the infantry. The entire southern flank of the Prussian army began to retreat.
Despite several desperate attempts to restore order in the ranks of his army, Frederick was unable to stop the flight of his soldiers from the battlefield. The defeat of the Prussian cavalry in the battle south of Kunersdorf quickly caused panic that engulfed the entire army. First, the infantry stationed south of Kunersdorf ran into the retreating cavalry and fled, trying to break through to the north and cross the Huner Fliess in the opposite direction. Crowds of soldiers fleeing in panic dragged along first the troops fighting opposite the Kuhgrund and, finally, units of Finck's corps.
Attempts to stop the troops
Friedrich showed great personal courage, trying to get in the way of a general retreat. As in the previous year under Zorndorf, he grabbed the regimental standard and began to call on the soldiers to rally around their king. But now it didn't help. He managed to collect only about 600 soldiers from the Ladder regiment on one of the heights (probably on Muhlberg), but the fire of the Russian artillery was so intense that they were overturned. Frederick then ordered Diricke's Fusiliers to move forward from their position to protect the Prussian artillery. They carried out the order, but also failed to stop the flow of soldiers fleeing in a panic to the north. On this day, one horse had already been killed near Friedrich, and now the second was shot in the chest. One of the king's adjutants gave him his horse. An eyewitness recalled: “The king barely had time to jump on his horse, as a musket bullet hit him just above the thigh; she was stopped only by a golden snuffbox, which he carried in his pocket. The Cossacks almost surrounded Frederick, but at the last moment he was saved by a detachment of hussars of Ziten, commanded by Captain von Prittwitz. "Pritgwitz! I'm dying," he shouted. The answer was: “No, while life is still warm in our bodies!” The hussars led the king to safety.
The Prussian army was completely defeated. At night, under torrents of rain and thunder during a thunderstorm, Friedrich crossed the Oder. The king was depressed. Formally, he handed over the command to Fink, who was obliged to report everything to Prince Henry. He himself wrote to Berlin: “My jacket was pierced by musket bullets, two horses were killed under me. I'm not lucky that I'm still alive. Our losses are extremely high, I have only 3,000 soldiers left in reserve from the army, numbering 48,000 the day before. At the moment I am writing these lines, everyone is running and I can no longer control my soldiers.. I will not be able to survive this cruel vicissitude of fate.. I believe that all is lost.
Fortunately for Prussia, the Russian and Austrian troops also suffered heavy losses and did not even attempt to organize the pursuit of the retreating enemy army. Prussian troops gradually began to assemble. In addition to the 3,000 soldiers of General von Wunsch, who, in accordance with the order, remained in reserve and did not take part in the battle, on August 13, about 18,000 people from the broken units were assembled into a kind of army on the eastern bank of the Oder. The next day they crossed to the west coast.
Return of Friedrich
By August 16, Frederick had finally overcome his depression and found it possible to take command of the troops again. To his brother, Prince Heinrich, he wrote: “When I informed you of our failure, the situation seemed desperate. The danger remains, but you know that I will carry my banner high as long as I breathe. On the same day, Saltykov finally crossed the Oder. His troops were now only 65 kilometers from Berlin, and Frederick, in order to defend his capital, had no more than 33,000 soldiers, which he deployed on the Spree River. Saltykov had a significant numerical superiority, but wanted to wait for the arrival of the main Austrian army of Field Marshal Daun.
However, now the Prussian army, located in reserve in Schmotgseiffen, posed a serious threat to the enemy. After Daun moved north to link up with Saltykov, Prince Heinrich moved his army from Schmottseiffen to Görlitz, cutting Daun's lines of communication. In response, Daun withdrew his troops, and Saltykov, believing that his army had done its best and that the ally's maneuvers indicated his refusal to advance on Berlin, withdrew with his troops east of the Oder. He preferred to fortify his position rather than risk trying to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. On October 7, Frederick followed the Russians to the Oder. On October 24, Saltykov went further east, to winter quarters. Paradoxical as it may seem, but the catastrophe near Kunersdorf turned into a strategic success: now the Ots people did not please Beolina.
AT KUNERSDORF the Prussian army lost about 19,000 people killed, wounded and missing, as well as 4599 prisoners. The Russians also captured 172 guns. However, the combined Russian-Austrian army of Saltykov also suffered greatly. The victory cost her almost 28,500 killed, wounded, missing and captured. Due to such significant losses, the Allied troops did not have units that could organize the pursuit of the enemy. Not taking advantage of the current situation, Saltykov made a serious strategic mistake. He was not ready to march on Berlin without the support of a strong Austrian army, and its commander, Count Leopold von Daun, refused to assist the Russians because he was threatened by the army of Prince Henry. The Russian soldiers showed outstanding courage in regaining their lost positions on Mühlberg. Saltykov managed to maintain the "balance" of his army, as well as strengthen key positions. The Russian artillery was also very effective. Although Saltykov allowed the Prussians to withdraw after the battle of Kunersdorf, the strategic situation in which Frederick the Great found himself remained very difficult for the King of Prussia. It was exacerbated by his ill-advised decision later that year to separate a strong corps from the army, which was then forced to surrender to the Austrians at Maxen. Friedrich's actions at Kunersdorf can be described as the worst of his entire career as a commander. He failed to correctly determine the conditions of the landscape of the battlefield, he underestimated the enemy, rejected a reasonable offer to interrupt the battle at a favorable moment for himself. Finally, having been defeated, the king fell into depression and actually abandoned the army.
Prince Henry was very critical of his brother during this period and described him as "controversial and unsure of himself", lamenting that "by joining my army he brought with him disorder and failure". However, Frederick was still a great commander. In August 1760, he defeated the Austrians at the battle of Liegnitz, and then in October at Torgau. In 1761, Frederick outwitted the Russian and Austrian military leaders, who failed to block his vastly outnumbered army. However, in general, the situation was not in favor of Prussia: by the end of 1761, the countries of the anti-Prussian coalition became more active. Frederick's army by that time had become much smaller, and everything went to the fact that during the next campaign the opponents of Prussia would put it on its knees. Frederick was saved by the death of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna on January 5, 1762. new emperor Peter III was a fan of Friedrich. He immediately gave the order to stop hostilities. Already in May 1762, Prussia and Russia signed an agreement, and Peter in the same year sent Russian troops to fight on the side of the Prussians against the Austrians.
the Russian army exactly reflected in itself, as in a mirror, the entire feudal structure of the state. A soldier is a serf peasant who has gone from under the rods of the landowner to the fuchtel and the gauntlets of the officer, showered with slaps and kicks from anyone who is higher than him, starting with the sergeant major, obliged to slavishly obey the authorities; he knows for sure that there can be no question of improving his lot, no matter how bravely and regularly he fights. An officer is only an officer because he is a nobleman, and there were officers who boasted of the cruelty of their treatment of soldiers, seeing in this the true discipline. People became generals either already in old age, or through the patronage and nobility of their origin.
Back in the middle of the 18th century, when these old regimes existed in all armies, and not just in the Prussian, Frederick II could defeat the French, Russians, and Austrians in the Seven Years' War, although he himself suffered terrible defeats from time to time. Frederick II understood that only with unheard-of cruelty could he force the oppressed and embittered soldiers to go into battle. “The most mysterious thing for me,” he once said to one approximate general, “is our safety with you among our camp.” 40 years have passed since the wars of Frederick II, and everything remains the same in Prussia, with only one change: Frederick himself was no longer there, and instead of him the incompetent Duke of Brunswick and other mentally wretched titled generals commanded.
The day after Napoleon's invasion of Saxony, which was allied with Prussia, on October 9, the first battle took place (at Schleitz). The vanguard - Murat and Marshal Bernadotte - approached the Prussian detachment and, on Napoleon's orders, attacked it. The battle was small. The Prussians were driven back with about 700 casualties (of which 300 were killed).
Napoleon assumed that the bulk of the Prussian army was concentrating in the Weimar area in order to continue the retreat to Berlin, and that the general battle would take place at Weimar on October 15th. He sent Marshal Davout to Naumburg and further to the rear of the Prussian army, Bernadotte received an order to join Davout, but could not fulfill it. Napoleon with Marshals Soult, Ney, Murat moved to Jena. By the evening of October 13, Napoleon entered the city of Jena and, looking from the heights of the surrounding mountains, saw large forces retreating along the road to Weimar. Prince Hohenlohe knew that the French had entered Jena, but he had no idea that Napoleon himself, with several corps, was right there. On the night of the 13th to the 14th, Hohenlohe stopped along the road and, unexpectedly for Napoleon, decided to take the fight.
Even before dawn, Napoleon toured the ranks of his army. He told the soldiers that the coming battle would place the whole of Prussia in the hands of the French army, that the emperor hoped for their usual courage, and explained to the soldiers, as he always did, in the most general terms, the main content of his plan for the coming day.
The battle began in the very first hours after dawn; it was long and stubborn, but already at the beginning the French managed to achieve such success that no efforts of the enemy could wrest victory from their hands. At first, the Prussians and Saxons retreated slowly, stubbornly defending themselves, but, having skillfully concentrated and brought into battle the best parts of the corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney and Murat's cavalry, Napoleon carried out his plan exactly. When the Prussian army faltered and fled, the pursuit proved even more disastrous for the vanquished than at Austerlitz. The remnants of the Prussian army rushed to the city of Weimar, pursued to the city and in the city itself by Murat's cavalry. Here they fell especially many; the excited French horsemen cut down, not listening to cries for mercy, not taking captive those who surrendered. The Prussian army was completely defeated. A tiny remnant escaped and retained the appearance of soldiers, the rest were killed or captured, or (the vast majority) went missing.
Hohenlohe managed to escape with a crowd of fugitives and strove to get to Naumburg, where he hoped to find the main part of the army intact, the only one that could now be counted on. With this second part of the army, marching under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, was King Frederick William himself. And suddenly, in the evening and at night, quite unexpectedly, other fugitives began to join the fugitives fleeing from Jena, telling about what a new misfortune had befallen Prussia. The Duke of Brunswick, before reaching Naumburg, stopped near Auerstedt, a little over two dozen kilometers from Jena. It was here that the clash with Marshal Davout took place, and here, during the battle, the distant, then still incomprehensible in all their meaning, the sounds of artillery fire reached the fighters all the time. Despite the lack of forces (Davout had only one corps, since he did not receive support from Bernadotte), the main part of the Prussian army was utterly defeated. The Duke of Brunswick himself fell, mortally wounded, in the midst of the battle. So the remnants of this army mixed in their flight with the fugitives of the first army, who fled from Jena and Weimar.
The king thus learned from the fugitives from Jena that on that one day, October 14, defeated in two battles by Napoleon and Marshal Davout, almost the entire Prussian army ceased to exist. No one in Europe, even among the worst enemies of Prussia, expected this so soon - six days after Napoleon's invasion.
On October 27, 1806, 19 days after the start of the war and 13 days after the battle of Jena and Auerstedt, Napoleon, accompanied by four marshals, horse grenadiers and guards chasseurs, solemnly entered Berlin. The burgomaster of the city handed over the keys to the capital to Napoleon and asked to spare Berlin. Napoleon ordered that the shops be open and that life go on normally. The population greeted the emperor timidly, with respectful bows and rendered unquestioning obedience.
It was quite natural that in these October and November days, living in a kind of iridescent fog, among the daily news that came to him in Berlin and Potsdam about the surrender of fortresses and the last remnants of the Prussian army, among kneeling prayers for mercy, for intercession, among flattering assurances of electors, dukes and kings of loyal feelings. Napoleon decided to inflict a crushing blow on his main enemy, England, which, in his opinion, became possible now, after the conquest of Prussia. Less than two weeks after the surrender of Magdeburg to Marshal Ney, on November 21, 1806, the emperor signed his famous Berlin decree on the continental blockade.
By issuing his Berlin Decree on November 21, 1806, Napoleon not only continued and strengthened the monopolization of the imperial home market in favor of French industry, but also severely beat the entire English economy, tried to condemn it to complete strangulation, state bankruptcy, famine and capitulation.
The first paragraph of the decree read: "The British Isles are declared in a state of blockade", the second paragraph: "All trade and all communications with the British Isles are prohibited." Further, postal and other communication with the British was forbidden and it was ordered to immediately and everywhere arrest all Englishmen and confiscate their goods and their property in general.
From the moment the decree was issued on November 21, 1806, the creation of the "empire of Charlemagne", its expansion and strengthening became a direct requirement, a logical necessity under the economic system of struggle against England chosen by Napoleon.
1806 – 1807
- Battle of Pultusk (December 26, 1806)
- Battle of Prysisch-Eylau (February 8, 1807)
- Friedland (June 14, 1807)
- Peace of Tilsit (June 25 - July 8, 1807)
Polish campaign
This time Alexander's speech was dictated by more substantial motives than in 1805. Firstly, this time Napoleon threatened the Russian borders quite clearly: his troops were already moving from Berlin to the east. Secondly, one delegation of Poles after another appeared in Potsdam to Napoleon, asking him to restore the independence of Poland, and the emperor of the French, king of Italy, protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, was clearly not averse to adding to his three titles another fourth, associated with Poland. And this threatened to take Lithuania and Belarus from Russia, and perhaps even the Right-Bank Ukraine. Thirdly, it was clear that after the decree on the continental blockade, Napoleon would not rest until he somehow forced Russia to join the ranks of the powers implementing this decree, and the break in trade with England threatened with ruinous consequences for the entire sale of Russian agricultural raw materials to England and for the stability of the then very shaky Russian currency.
In St. Petersburg, it was decided to send against Napoleon in the first place 100 thousand people with the main mass of artillery and with several Cossack regiments. The Guard was supposed to move from Petersburg a little later. Napoleon decided to warn the Russian army. Already in November, the French entered Poland.
Napoleon was rather cool about the idea of Poland's independence. He needed the Poles in his huge game only as some kind of outpost or buffer in a clash with Russia and Austria in the east of Europe (he no longer considered Prussia to be anything). At the moment, he needed Poland as a source of replenishment and supply for the army. He achieved the first by using the sympathy for France, which was widespread in the Polish petty nobility and urban bourgeoisie, as the bearer of the ideas of national freedom. By means of strictly enforced requisitions, he managed to pump out quite a lot of local resources from the country.
The movement in the country against the Prussians began to rise gradually. At first, the noble militia predominated among the troops being formed, but already at the end of January 1807, regular regiments appeared at the front on the roads to Danzig, the “legia”, of General Dombrovsky, who had returned from Italy. In February 1807, there were already 30 thousand regular troops with cadres of former non-commissioned officers and officers of the "Polish legions" created by Bonaparte during Italian campaign 1796-1797
At the end of November, Napoleon received the news that the advanced units of the Russian army had entered Warsaw. Napoleon ordered Murat and Davout to go immediately to Warsaw. On November 28, Murat entered the city with cavalry, abandoned the day before by the Prussians, who had gone beyond the Vistula and burned the bridge behind them.
The fight against the Russians began. Leaving Warsaw, Napoleon attacked the Russians. After several skirmishes, on December 26, 1806, the Battle of Pultusk (on the Narva River) took place. The Russians were commanded by General Bennigsen. The French troops were commanded by Marshal Lannes. The battle ended without a clear advantage in one direction or another, and, as always happens in such cases, both sides reported victory to their sovereigns. Lannes reported to Napoleon that the Russians had been thrown back from Pultusk with heavy losses, and Bennigsen reported to Alexander that he had defeated Napoleon himself (who was not in sight either in Pultusk, or even in a distant circle from Pultusk).
The battle of Eylau, one of the bloodiest battles of that time, surpassing in that respect almost all the battles fought by Napoleon so far, ended in a draw. Bennigsen lost more than a third of the army. Napoleon also had huge posterns. Russian artillery in this battle turned out to be much more numerous than the French, and not all marshals approached the scene in time. Almost the entire corps of Marshal Augereau was destroyed by Russian artillery fire.
When the darkness of night enveloped the field, the French considered themselves victorious, because Bennigsen withdrew. Napoleon in his bulletins spoke of victory. But, of course, he was the first to understand that he did not win any real victory on this bloody day, although he lost a large number of people. He knew that the Russians had lost much more than he had (although, by the way, not half of their army, as the French claimed). But Napoleon understood that Bennigsen still retained a formidable, very combat-ready army and did not at all consider himself defeated, but, on the contrary, also trumpeted his victory.
Similar information.
By which Poland ceded the Duchy of Prussia to Brandenburg. The military power of the army contributed to the promotion of Brandenburg-Prussia into the top five European powers of that time.
In 1660, during the demobilization of the army, it was decided, in addition to the garrison units, to keep the field troops in the number of 4 thousand people, which marked the beginning of a standing army.
Under Friedrich Wilhelm, the Prussian army adopted a blue infantry uniform and a yellow battle flag with a black eagle and the inscription Non Soli Sedit (It does not yield to the sun)
Hussar of the Ryusha regiment in 1758
- 1st Army Corps (Prussia): 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th East Prussian regiments), 33rd (East Prussian Fusiliers regiment)
- 2nd Army Corps (Pomerania): 2nd, 9th, 14th, 21st Infantry Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Pomeranian Regiments), 34th ( Pomeranian Fusiliers Regiment)
- 3rd Army Corps (Brandenburg): 8th, 12th, 20th, 24th Infantry Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Brandenburg Regiments), 35th ( Brandenburg Fusiliers Regiment
The reformed Prussian army in 1813-1815 took part in the War of Liberation against Napoleon and played a decisive role in the liberation of the German states from French domination.
In 1815, after the annexation of Posen, North-West Saxony, Westphalia and Rhineland to Prussia, five more army corps, 5 artillery and 5 fusilier regiments were formed:
- 4th Army Corps (Saxony): 26th and 27th (1st and 2nd Magdeburg regiments), 31st and 32nd (1st and 2nd Thuringian regiments) and 36th (Magdeburg Fusiliers Regiment) infantry regiments
- 5th Army Corps (Posen): 6th (1st West Prussian), 18th (1st Posensky), 19th (2nd Posensky) and 37th (West Prussian Fusiliers Regiment) infantry regiments
- 6th Army Corps (Silesia): 10th, 11th (1st and 2nd Silesian), 22nd and 23rd (1st and 2nd Upper Silesian) infantry regiments, 38th (Silesian Fusiliers Regiment)
- 7th Army Corps (Westphalia): 13th, 15th, 16th and 17th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Westphalian)
- 8th Army Corps (Rhineland): 25th, 28th, 29th and 30th (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Rhine), 39th (Lower Rhine Fusiliers Regiment )
6th Prussian Infantry Regiment, 1856
In 1860, the number of infantry regiments in each of the army corps, except for the 5th, was increased from 4 to 8, and the number of guards infantry and guards grenadier regiments was also doubled.
In 1866, after the annexation of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse and Nassau to Prussia, three more army corps were formed:
- 9th Army Corps (Schleswig-Holstein): 86th (Schleswig-Holstein Fusiliers), 84th (Schleswig), 85th (Holstein), 89th (Mecklenburg), 90th (Mecklenburg Fusiliers) , 75th, 76th (1st and 2nd Hanseatic) infantry regiments
- 11th Army Corps (Hesse-Nassau): 80th (Electoral Hessian Fusiliers Regiment), 81st, 82nd, 83rd (1st, 2nd and 3rd Electoral Hessian), 87- th, 88th (1st and 2nd Nassau)
- 10th Army Corps (Hanover): 73rd (Hanoverian Fusiliers), 74th, 77th, 79th (1st, 2nd and 3rd Hanoverian), 78th (East Frisian) infantry regiments
Provision in old age and provision for the disabled
For the Prussian leadership, well-trained and combat-experienced soldiers were of great value. Therefore, it was decided to leave them in the companies. However, only a small part of the soldiers could be a model for young recruits. Most were battered, and were left with the company only for social reasons.
Veterans who could not perform their duties received an allowance in the form of 1 thaler from the disabled person's fund. After the second Silesian War, Frederick II ordered the construction of invalids' homes for retired soldiers in Berlin, the Stop and Karl's harbour. On November 15, a home for the disabled was opened in Berlin. In general, this institution was designed for 631 people, of which 136 officers and 126 women for control and maintenance. These houses provided shelter, supplies and food, clothing, and medical care to wounded non-commissioned officers, commanders and officers free of charge. All nursing homes bore a military imprint - the disabled were required to wear a uniform everywhere (in full) along with the guard.
Officers unfit for military service received the post of governor or commandant's position in the fortresses, if necessary. If there were no places, the king paid the generals 1000 or 2000 thalers from the treasury, the staff officers a few hundred, the captains and lieutenants - much less. However, there were no rules for this. Every supply was the purest mercy.
To facilitate the existence of numerous widows with their numerous children, Frederick II allowed active officers to take patronage over them, or arranged sons, at the appropriate age, mainly in the army. Friedrich Wilhelm I took care of numerous military orphans and even founded an army orphanage in 1724. At first, this house was intended only for orphans of his guard "tall guys". Later, the children of other soldiers found an apartment there. The occupied area of the house grew, so that it had to expand already in 1742 and be replaced in 1771. In 1758, the house received 2,000 orphans.
. .. Friedrich-Wilhelm der Große Kurfürst. Der Sieger von Fehrbellin, edition q Verlag, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-86124-293-1. Prussia. The Prussian army of the 18th century deserves separate consideration. The army of Frederick the Great represents the extreme point of development, the highest achievement of the direction that military art accepted under Moritz of Orange. In some respects, the development of military art along this path was carried to the point of absurdity, and the further evolution of military art became possible only after the most severe shock introduced by the French Revolution, and the setting of evolution on an entirely new path. The very one-sidedness of the army of Frederick the Great, with its contempt for the masses, with a lack of understanding of moral forces, is very instructive, since it gives a picture of almost laboratory experience combat work under the stick of artificial, soulless soldiers. Superficial historians explained the impoverishment of Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries by its ruin in the Thirty Years' War. In fact, the material losses were not at all so significant as to throw back a flourishing country, with an extremely capable population of organization and work, two centuries ago. But as a result of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was politically fragmented by the art of Richelieu and Mazarin into hundreds of small states; the Germans were deprived of the opportunity to take part in trade with the colonies, since the world's routes under the bourgeois system were open only to merchants supported by military squadrons. Holland, owning the mouth of the Rhine, levied a tax for shipping on it; Sweden did the same with regard to the Oder; hundreds of customs blocked all the ways; the markets involuntarily had an almost exclusively local character. On this area of central Europe, mutilated by French policy, a state of a robber type, Prussia, began to take shape and grow. The policy and the whole structure of the harsh predatory state met, first of all, military requirements.By the end of the 30 Years' War, in 1640 Friedrich-Wilhelm, the Great Elector, came to the throne of Brandenburg; this Hohenzollern received the title of great because he learned from Wallenstein his politics and methods of government. Austria inherited from Wallenstein his army, with its anti-national, anti-religious, free traditions of the 16th century, with its non-state, dynastic character. The Hohenzollerns, on the other hand, inherited from Wallenstein the idea of a military enterprise; only now it is not private entrepreneurs who become entrepreneurs, but the Electors of Brandenburg, who, due to the power of their army, are elevated to the rank of Prussian kings by the beginning of the 18th century. The war became their specialty, like a profitable item. The internal administration was organized in the likeness of Wallenstein's occupation administration. At the head of the county was the landrat, whose main task was to ensure that the county properly performed its functions to ensure military needs; the representatives of the population who were with him, as well as in the requisition commissions of Wallenstein, monitored the uniform distribution of duties and, not to the detriment of the requirements of the army, observed local interests. The district collegiums, which stood in the next instance above the landrats, had the same character of the military commissariat, and the nature of the main commissariat department certainly had at first the central department - the general commissariat; commissariat - the mother of the Prussian administration; only over time, in the central administration, cells of purely civilian competence were separated from the military administrative administration.
Growth of a standing army. The income of the Prussian kingdom consisted of taxes squeezed out of its population, as in an enemy country, from income from very significant and exemplary royal estates and from rent for the use of the Prussian army, as the subsidies of wealthy states, mainly Holland and England, for which Prussia agreed to take part in wars outside her interests. So, for the period 1688 - 1697, Prussia is sold to the maritime powers, to fight against Louis XIV, for 6545 thousand thalers. The robber state vigilantly watched misunderstandings between neighbors, intervened in other people's affairs at every opportunity, and gradually rounded its limits. The Prussian cities represented half of the military settlements, since if the number of the garrison in them reached a quarter of the population, then the other quarter was formed either by the families of officers or it found its livelihood by serving military needs.
Acquisition. In 1660, when, during the demobilization of the army after the intervention of Prussia, in the war between Sweden and Poland, it was decided from an army of 14-18 thousand, in addition to the garrison units, to keep field troops in the number of 4 thousand, the issue of a standing army was resolved in principle, and she began to grow gradually; it was completed by voluntary recruitment. But recruitment remained voluntary only in name during the reign of Frederick William I, who began to vigorously increase the army. His predecessor, Frederick I, in 1701 made an attempt to organize, in addition to a permanent recruiting army, a landmilitia on the basis of compulsory conscription of the population. Friedrich Wilhelm I, who could not stand the very word "militia" and even established a large fine for using it in official correspondence, dissolved the landmilitia, but retained the principle of conscription of the population. From the very beginning of his reign (1713), he established that a soldier serves for life, until the king dismisses him. Determination in the Prussian army began to equal civilian death. The composition of the Prussian army became very mature - the average age of non-commissioned officers was 44 years old, more than half of the soldiers were over 30 years old, there were quite a few 50-year-olds, and there were old people over 60 years old. But, despite this lifelong detention of a soldier in the ranks of the army, it was not easy to complete it. The conscription of the population was first carried out in the most disorderly, ugly forms. The instruction of 1708 indicated - to grab without publicity people who are insignificant in social status, whose relatives are not able to make a big fuss, while observing that they meet the requirements of military service, take them to the fortress and hand them over to recruiters. Such orders caused a hunt for people. The peasants began to refuse to carry their products to the city markets, as they were threatened by ambushes of recruiters on the roads. The officers organized the proper human trafficking. One officer released the people he caught for a decent ransom and bought from another an excess of a successful catch. Especially zealous recruiters caused emigration and desolation of their areas. The landowners suffered at the same time; in other states, the protest of the landowners against military service, which deprived them of the laborers necessary for cultivating the fields, was sufficient to put an end to the arbitrariness of state agents, but the Prussian government, acting in its own country as in a conquered region, could take less account of the violation of the interests of the ruling class. In 1733, nevertheless, it became necessary to streamline the attitude of the population towards military service, and the "canton-regulation" was issued.
Canton regulation. This law largely curtailed the arbitrariness of the captains. From now on, each captain had the right to seize people not within the entire regimental district, but only in the manning area assigned to the company. Numerous groups of people were seized in this area at the discretion of the captain. They could not be captured: any person with a fortune of at least 10 thousand thalers, employees in the household of a landowner, sons of clerics, the most important categories of artisans, workers of all industrial enterprises, in the planting of which the state was interested, finally, one of the sons of a peasant who has his own yard and self-employed. After the Seven Years' War, the captain began to perform recruiting functions not on his own, but as part of a commission. The city of Berlin did not form a recruiting station, but all the captains were allowed to recruit people of insignificant origin in it.
Who from among those who were not withdrawn from military service were taken into the troops? The 18th century did not know lottery for recruitment; the role of the lot was played by high growth. In the Prussian army, the requirement to have tall soldiers was especially emphasized. The recruiter passed by the small ones without any attention, but it was not easy for a man of large stature to get rid of the recruitment, even if he was subject to seizure by law. The law itself emphasized that if a peasant has several sons, then the yard and household pass to the son with the smallest stature, so that tall sons do not shy away from military service. If the growth of the boy promised to be outstanding, then from the age of 10 the captain registered him and issued him a certificate that protected him from the assassination attempts of recruiting neighbors. No attention was paid to the moral qualities of the recruited. Prussian. the army, with its cane discipline, was not afraid of any spiritual contagion. In 1780, an order was issued to the courts - to sentence to military service, after serving their sentence, all illegal (underground) writers and persons engaged in rebellion and anti-government agitation. Despite this strain of recruiting work in Prussia and the forced rather than voluntary nature of recruitment, the country was able to supply only 1/3 of the recruits required for the army. The rest were foreigners. Prussian recruiters worked in imperial cities, in small German principalities, in Poland and in Switzerland. In 1768, the Prussian army had 90,000 foreigners and 70,000 Prussians; in other periods the percentage of foreigners was even greater. Where did these foreigners come from, as if voluntarily dooming themselves to that lifelong penal servitude, which was service in the Prussian army? The answer to this question is given by the surviving list of soldiers of the Retberg regiment, dating back to 1744. Of the 111 foreigners who served in one company, against 65 there is a mark on the previous service of their "other potentate"; in another company, for 119 foreigners, the number of soldiers who had already served in other armies was 92. Three-quarters of the foreigners were deserters, either voluntary or lured by Prussian agents! During the war, the number of foreigners increased significantly from the deployment of prisoners of war. Frederick the Great believed that Prussian discipline could make serviceable soldiers out of any physically strong human material, and his contempt for what was going on in the heart of a soldier reached the point that when in 1756 , in the first year of the Seven Years' War, the Saxon army capitulated near Pirna, Frederick the Great did not even bother to distribute the Saxon prisoners of war among the Prussian regiments, but simply replaced the Saxon officers with the Prussian ones, without violating the organization of the Saxon battalions. For this, Frederick, however, was punished by riots, the killing of officers and the transfer of entire battalions to the side of the enemy on the battlefield. The Prussian soldier under these conditions was not spiritually soldered to the Prussian state; when Breslavl capitulated in 1757, the Prussian commandant negotiated with the Austrians the garrison the right to withdraw to Prussia. But 9/10 of the Prussian garrison did not want to take advantage of the benefits provided, but preferred to enlist in the Austrian army, where the service was much more free.
Desertion. The forcibly recruited and retained Prussian soldier sought to use every opportunity to desert. The fight against desertion was the most important concern of the Prussian command. All 14 principles with which Frederick the Great's treatise on the art of war begins, speak of measures to prevent and combat desertion. In 1745, the French ambassador Valory reported that the Prussian army was not allowed to remove patrols more than 200 paces from the main forces. All sorts of outfits - for firewood, water, etc. - were to be sent in teams, in close formation, under the command of officers. In 1735, on the advice of Field Marshal Leopold Dessau, the most distinguished Prussian general, it was even decided to change the direction of operations in order to bypass the rugged terrain on the river. Moselle, where the army was threatened by a large drain of deserters. In 1763, Frederick the Great issued an instruction requiring unit commanders to involve officers in the study of the environs of their garrisons; but the area was studied not from the point of view of the requirements of tactics, but in order to ascertain local data that would facilitate the capture of deserters. Striped Prussia, according to Voltaire, was a kingdom of borders; almost all the garrisons were located no further than two marches from the line, and the fight against desertion became possible only with extensive, systematic measures.
Stick discipline. The firmer the discipline in the troops, the less the goodwill and moral virtues of recruits are valued. The cane discipline of the Prussian army allowed it to process into soldiers the most unwilling to self-sacrifice material. In turn, the disgusting material of staffing the Prussian army - deserters and criminals from all over Europe - could only form a combat-ready army under the condition of unshakable discipline. There were two means of maintaining discipline in the army. Firstly, drill training and drilling were brought to subtlety; while in the French army only recruits were engaged in drill training, and the entire company was taken out for training once a week, in the Prussian army the soldier was busy from morning to night. During the two spring months, from April to June, there were persistent drills in full force. During the rest of the year, the troops were busy with an extensive guard duty, the accuracy of which was paid exceptional attention. Part of the soldiers, about one-third, was released from guard duty and removed from salaries and rations. If these "Freivachters" came from the population of the section that completed the company, then they were fired on a 10-month vacation; among them were foreigners who knew the craft; the latter continued to live in the barracks and supported themselves with their earnings.
In addition to incessant drill training, brought to virtuosity, the main means of maintaining discipline was a stick, which non-commissioned officers were officially armed with. All the demands of humanity, rights, and private interests were sacrificed to discipline. Frederick the Great often said that a soldier should fear his corporal's stick more than an enemy bullet. At first, in his instructions, Frederick pointed out that soldiers were not trained with blows, but with patience and method, and that a soldier should be beaten with sticks, but with moderation, only if he began to resonate or if he did not show diligence. But after the battle of Zorndorf, where, under the influence of a clash between his infantry and the Russians, he experienced disappointment, he directly recommended to the officers to lay on a stick. The soldier was protected from the arbitrariness of the captain, who could stab him to death with sticks, only by protecting the working cattle from maiming by his driver: the captain, who, by the unlimited use of the stick, would maim his soldiers or cause increased desertion among them, would be at a loss, since the company had to be kept in a set, and recruiting new soldiers cost money. Moritz of Saxony insisted that the recruitment of soldiers should by no means be carried out by the state, but should continue to be carried out by the captains, since if the private interest of the captains in preserving the soldiers who fell into their company is excluded, then all the soldiers will die. Indeed, in Prussia, the stick was especially rampant in the guard, which was staffed not by captains, but by the care of the king. Friedrich had to issue an order to the guards, by which he forbade company commanders to say during the punishment with sticks - "send him to hell, the king will send us another to replace him." For guards officers, a fine had to be introduced - for depriving a soldier of health by beatings, preventing further service; an officer for such a mutilation of a soldier paid the king a loss - the cost of recruiting a new soldier, and was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months in the fortress of Magdeburg. In the army, where the captain himself suffered losses from excessive enthusiasm for the stick, there were no restrictions. Coming out of the Prussian cadet corps the officers were rude and poorly educated; until the middle of the 19th century, Prussian officers spoke the vernacular. non-literary language. Frederick the Great treated his officers with almost unbearable contempt, surrounded himself with representatives of an incomparably more refined culture, wrote out French professors for his "noble academy".
General base. The Seven Years' War raised the question of a general staff in all armies. Each commander, even in ancient times, had his own headquarters, his own "home". As the complexity of military affairs and the growing need to make decisions on data that lie outside the actual horizons of the commander, the importance of employees grew. In 1515, near Marignano, the Swiss chiefs were already using maps. Machiavelli already calls the geography and statistics of the theater of operations "imperial knowledge" necessary for the commander; to help him should work General base“from persons of reasonable, knowledgeable and with great character; this headquarters is the reporter of the commander and is responsible for the intelligence service, for the collection and provision of cartographic material and for the provision of food to the troops; intelligence service - military and intelligence - should be organized already in Peaceful time against all possible adversaries. But the advanced views of Machiavelli overtook the actual rate of development of European armies for hundreds of years. The officers of the general staff almost did not stand out from the general mass of adjutants; couriers were columnists, engineers reconnoitered positions and gorges and set up camps, topographers (geographical engineers) performed cartographic work; each army had, in general, ten to twenty specialists of these categories; in war they were its general staff, but their service and training in peacetime were not at all streamlined. Frederick the Great, in spite of the conveniences that linear tactics afforded to single-handed command, felt the need for properly trained assistants so keenly that, after the Seven Years' War, he undertook to personally train them; he himself selected 12 young, capable officers with some knowledge of fortification and surveying. Classes - for two hours - took place weekly in the palace (in Potsdam or Sanssouci); the king began with a short lecture. developing any position of the theory and illustrating it with military-historical examples, and demanded that the officers enter into a discussion, after which he gave everyone a task. The surviving Rüchel notebook contains several tasks on tactics for covering and leading a convoy column, for strengthening a position for a regiment to cover a village, a project for a fortified camp for the army, a description of the Silesian mountains, essays on various military topics, works that have the character of military scientific abstracts - and far from first-class writings. At the end of the 18th century, the Prussian general staff consisted of 15 officers and 15 topographers.
The infantry tactics of Frederick the Great oscillated between pure fire worship and total denial of the significance of fire. Despite maintaining the closeness of the formation and firing exclusively in volleys, at the command of the chiefs, eyewitnesses of the battles of the Seven Years' War (Berenhorst) claimed that the infantry unit that started firing quickly slipped out of the hands of the command; a soldier who started shooting could only be forced by extraordinary efforts to stop firing and move forward. In a real battle, only the first volleys were friendly; then they degenerated into chaotic free fire. On the other hand, decisive fire fighting distances were short; the Austrian charter required that, during defense, fire be opened when the enemy approaches 100 paces. There was a great temptation not to get involved with the enemy in a firefight at such a short distance. Moritz of Saxony therefore insisted on making an attack without firing a shot. By the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great was inclined to the same idea. The infantry was inspired that its own interest dictated not to linger under enemy fire, but to climb on the enemy; "The king takes upon himself the responsibility to every soldier that the enemy will not put his bayonets into action, but will run." Indeed, a bayonet attack met with bayonets is an extremely rare occurrence in military history- one of the parties wins before the blades cross; Prince de Ligne, a participant in many campaigns, testifies that only once in his entire life, in 1757, did he hear the clanging of a bayonet against a bayonet.
The beginning of the Seven Years' War found the Prussian infantry trained but far from educated in this tactic, of which Suvorov is the most famous representative in history. In the battles of 1757 near Prague and Kolin, the Prussian infantry tried to attack almost without a shot, covering the offensive only with the fire of light battalion guns. The results were disappointing: in one case, the Prussians won with difficulty, thanks to cavalry coverage, in the other, they were defeated; The Prussian infantry could not develop a strike, since Frederick, concerned about maintaining closeness and order, even forbade the infantry to pursue the enemy, who trembled and began to run away when the Prussians advanced close. The enemy suffered relatively small losses, was not shocked by the battle; even in those cases when an attack without a shot overturned the enemy, it did not pay for itself without pursuit - since the advancing units suffered heavy losses, especially in the chiefs, and were not suitable for the further development of the battle. At the end of the 1757 campaign of the year - in the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen - the Prussian infantry advanced already with shooting, and at the beginning of the next year, Frederick the Great forbade the production of attacks without shooting. Requirements: Fighting to the bone against superior coalition forces forced both strategy and tactics to evolve towards more economical warfare.
The Prussian soldier gave up to 4 volleys at the shooting range; the combat rate of fire reached 2-3 volleys per minute. The battalion was divided into 8 plutongs and the plutongs fired in turn. Within 20 seconds, volleys of all 8 plutongs followed one after another, starting from the right-flank one, and at the moment of the left-flank plutong volley, the right-flank one was already ready for a new volley. Such an organization of fire was a kind of requirement to keep pace when firing, forced to trim the fire, strain attention, and disciplined the troops. Although in battle this artificial fire could rarely be maintained, still other armies sought to imitate the Prussian in this curiosity.
The infantry formed two lines. In theory, in this era, the idea of \u200b\u200ba oblique battle formation reigned. Already Montecuccoli pointed out the advantages of directing forces against one enemy flank, with a possible envelopment of it, and leaving a passive barrier against the other. Folar, a fanatic of the idea of a column, brilliantly reconstructed the oblique battle formation of Epaminondas in the battles of Mantinea and Leuctra, and Puy-Ségur elevated it to a doctrine. Frederick the Great, a great admirer of Folard and Puy-Segur, for ten years before the Seven Years' War, stubbornly developed the technique of attacking oblique battle formations in exercises. The latter can be characterized as the desire to envelop without sacrificing to the latter either the continuity of the front or the offensive in parallel directions. In the end, Friedrich's oblique order technique resulted in an offensive in concession form, with each subsequent battalion moving 50 paces behind its neighbor. This form of offensive made it easier to maintain order during maneuvering, in comparison with an offensive by a common front that stretched for two versts; but in itself, of course, it did not give advantages and even allowed the enemy to beat the suitable Prussians in parts. It acquired decisive importance from Frederick only because of the concentration of forces on the shock flank, where the king deployed his reserve in the form of a third line and sometimes arranged a fourth line of hussars, but mainly because of the suddenness with which Frederick deployed his oblique battle formation against the flank. enemy. Probably, the Prussian infantry near Leuthen, suddenly brought out to continue the enemy flank, would have won equal success with a simple frontal attack, but all contemporaries saw some mysterious force in the "oblique" maneuvering of the Prussian front; neighbors sought to copy it.
The Prussian infantry of the line was adapted only to combat on the open plain, where the soldier did not escape from the supervision of an officer and where it was possible to maintain close formation to the end. Coppices, villages were extremely unfavorable for the Prussian army; Friedrich, even if he had to defend himself in the countryside, forbade the houses to be occupied by soldiers. The main enemy of Prussia - Austria - had good and numerous light infantry - Croats (Serbs), Pandurs, etc. Austrian border guards, that is, a kind of settled army, Cossacks, who covered the Austro-Turkish border. The Austrian light infantry, manned by militant semi-barbarians, not crushed by the discipline that aroused the desire to desert, fought very skillfully in loose formation, skillfully used the terrain and could have been used even more widely if the general gravity of all the armies of the old regime had not pushed them onto the drill path beaten by the Prussian army. . The pandurs and croats, which the battalions of light infantry and chasseurs in other armies began to imitate, were the forerunners of the differently educated and enthusiastic French revolutionary infantry, which forced the recognition of the right of citizenship for battle in loose formation
In view of the need to combat partisan actions, which were widely developed by the Austrian light troops, Frederick had to increase the number of light infantry battalions from 4 to 6; they received the same staffing as the line Prussian infantry; so that this wretched squad would not scatter, he was not subjected to cane Discipline, was in the position of semi-free servants, and his misdeeds in the war looked through the fingers. As a result, the Prussians got only bandits of robbers, who were despised by their own and others and who robbed the population (. Only jaeger companies, staffed by foresters, showed themselves at high altitude and rendered serious services. But also in other states where light infantry was more successfully organized, it was still not a reformed infantry, but an auxiliary weapon.
The cavalry played an essential role in the army of Frederick the Great. At the beginning of the 16th century, when soldiers in the infantry were already glued into tactical units, and the cavalry still retained a knightly character, the percentage of mounted fighters greatly decreased, armies and their combat operations acquired a pronounced infantry character. But the transition of the entire cavalry, following the reiters, to an organization into tactical units that democratized the type of cavalry soldier, made it possible to greatly increase the percentage of cavalry, and in the first half of the 17th century, armies often consisted of an equal number of infantrymen and cavalrymen. The increase in the size of armies by 3-4 times during the transition to permanent troops in the second half of the 17th century brought to the fore the demands of economy; mainly the cheapest type of troops increased - the infantry, and the cavalry, in percentage terms, in the composition of the armies became smaller. When the Prussian standing army arose, in the troops of the Great Elector, the cavalry made up only 1/7 of the army. The deterioration in the moral qualities of the infantry of the 18th century, its inability to fight for local items, the search for open spaces for battle, the mechanical foundations of a linear battle formation - all this opened up a vast field for cavalry activity in the 18th century, created a "golden age of cavalry". Frederick the Great increased the cavalry in his army to 25%; in peacetime, for every 100-200 people of the population of Prussia, there was one cavalryman - the maximum that the country could support.
Friedrich inherited from his father a well-disciplined; the infantry trained by Field Marshal Leopold Dessau, did not invest anything new in the development of the infantry, so the words of Berenhorst (son of Leopold Dessau) that Friedrich knows how to spend troops, but not educate them, are fully justified in relation to the infantry. But in relation to the cavalry, Frederick was a reformer. In the very first battle that Frederick gave near Molwitz in 1741, his cavalry was beaten by the Austrian and carried him away from the battlefield, but the remaining infantry, alone, on their own, emerged victorious from the battle. Frederick began to rework his cavalry: 400 officers were retired, outstanding commanders were placed at the head, the cavalry was required to attack with wide gaits, first from 700 paces, and then from 1800 paces. Under the threat of dishonor, the cavalry commanders were always obliged to retain the initiative of the attack and be the first to rush to the enemy. All pistol firing was canceled during the attack. On a wide gait, the squadrons had to keep as close as possible - stirrup to stirrup. The outcome of a cavalry clash was not decided by action. weapons, even cold ones, but with a blow to the enemy of a closed, merged into one mass of horsemen. The idea of shock was born - the onslaught of a horse avalanche, running up a full quarry and overturning everything in its path with its living force. If the Serbs have a saying that the battle is won not by weapons, but by the heart of the hero, then the most famous cavalry leader of Friedrich, Seidlitz, owns the idea: the cavalry attack is won not so much with sabers as with whips. During the exercises, the masses of cavalry were trained by Seydlitz extremely vigorously. According to the Prussian charter of 1743, all reorganizations aimed at the deployment of the front, as well as the attack, had to be carried out at a gallop. When Friedrich drew Seydlitz's attention to the large number of injuries that cavalrymen receive when they fall on exercises and to complicate the issue of recruitment, Seydlitz asked the king not to pay attention to such trifles. With the transfer of the center of gravity to shock, the fighting-cavalry of Frederick cast, in general, into the form that was preserved for the actions of the cavalry masses throughout 19th century. The battle order of the cavalry is three-line; linear - the beginning in cavalry tactics lasted long after the infantry switched to deep, perpendicular tactics, due to the preference for supporting the cavalry not from behind, but from a ledge, in view of the importance of the flanks in a cavalry battle; support from behind will either be late to the decisive moment, or, in case of failure, will even be crushed by the first line rushing back. Only the development of dismounted combat and the use of equipment in purely cavalry combat (machine guns, regimental artillery, armored cars) have now forced the cavalry to abandon Friedrich's linear tactics. Since the entire Frederick's army represented one corps on the battlefield, one jointly working collective body, the entire cavalry united into two masses on the flanks of the army, where the cavalry leaders had a lot of room for action and where the cavalry did not suffer from fire until the moment of the attack. This custom of strong cavalry wings persisted until the age of Napoleon.
Hussars. The cavalry of Frederick the Great was equipped with somewhat better elements than the infantry. However, cane discipline in the cuirassier and dragoon regiments was as merciless as in the infantry, and the reliability of the cavalry in relation to desertion was not at a sufficient height to allow small cavalry units, patrols, to be sent to a considerable distance. Therefore, intelligence in the army of Frederick the Great was very unimportant, and there were moments (for example, during the invasion of Bohemia in 1744) when the Austrian light troops completely cut off the Prussians from all sources of information, and it was necessary to act positively blindly. Frederick the Great was looking for a way out in the organization of light cavalry, which would be brought up in the spirit of adventurism, would receive a number of concessions and would not be subject to the general harsh discipline of the army. To this end, Frederick began to develop hussars; their number was increased from 9 to 80 squadrons; Friedrich paid much attention to their training and education. Irregular and semi-regular units succeed, as we have already seen in the example of the early Middle Ages, in cavalry much easier than in infantry, and Frederick's hussars proved to be much more useful for the army than his light infantry. At first, the hussars belonged to the infantry, and only after the Seven Years' War were they assigned to the cavalry. The cavalry was much smaller than in other cavalry units; hussar officers were forbidden to marry, so as not to quench the spirit of enterprising partisans in them. Thus, at the end of the 18th century, the imperfection of the recruitment and organization of forcibly recruited armies forced the division into linear and light troops in the infantry and cavalry. Line infantry and cavalry are the troops of the battlefield, helpless in the theater of war; light infantry and cavalry are theater troops not disciplined enough for regular operations. kind of partisans. Such a division was sharply criticized by prominent writers, but only the French Revolution managed to eliminate the contradictions that prevented in the same parts from combining the merits of light and linear parts.
Artillery. With regard to artillery, the tactics of Frederick the Great are characterized by the desire to form a large battery of heavy-caliber guns (Mollitz, Zorndorf and friend, battles) in front of the strike wing of the battle formation, which, with their fire, prepared a decisive attack. The Germans trace their tradition of using heavy guns in field battles to Frederick the Great. The positional character that the Seven Years' War assumed had a significant effect on the increase in artillery in the armies. The initiative for the increase, however, did not belong to the Prussians, but to the Austrians and partly the Russians, who sought to occupy fortified positions provided by powerful artillery. The extent to which the positional struggle affected the number of artillery can be seen from the following comparison: near Mollwitz (1741), the Prussians had 2.5 guns per 1000 bayonets, the Austrians had 1 gun; near Torgau (1760) - the Prussians had 6 guns, the Austrians had 7 guns. In the 20th century, the development of European armies also deviated in the same direction under the influence of the positional experience of the world war.
Strategy. Frederick the Great with his, compared to the scale of the 19th century, a small army, with a forced break in hostilities for the winter, when it was necessary, in view of the impossibility of bivouacking in the field and the equal impossibility of placing soldiers seeking to desert, in philistine homes, it is imperative to occupy winter apartments - could not set up extensive plans for a deep invasion of enemy territory, for inflicting a mortal blow on the enemy. The battles of the era of Frederick the Great were associated with heavy losses for the winner, as well as for the vanquished. The victory over the Austrians and Saxons at Soor (1745) was bought by the Prussian infantry at the cost of 25% of losses, the success over the Russians at Zorndorf cost the Prussian infantry half of the personnel killed and wounded. The pursuit was hampered by the composition of the army, in which, after a successful battle, it was necessary to establish complete and strict order; under these conditions, even victory did not always pay off losses; there were no modern means for quickly manning the army - each regiment, during the period of winter quarters, played the role of a western battalion for itself. Frederick the Great said that with his troops he could have conquered the whole world if victory had not been as disastrous for them as defeat for opponents. Store allowances made the army extremely sensitive to rear communications. Only once, in 1744, did Frederick the Great invade deeply into Bohemia; Austrian Field Marshal Thrawn, occupying hard-to-reach positions, cutting through the rear of the Prussians with light troops, forced the half-decreased Prussian army to retreat without a fight. Frederick the Great called Thrawn his teacher after this campaign. At the beginning of the war, when Frederick had a fresh, trained army with energetic officers, with in full rows in battalions, he willingly took the risk of battle. But the general attitude of the King of Prussia, when he had matured militarily (1750), is expressed by the following thought from his "Art of War", written in French verse: "Never engage without good reason in a battle where death reaps such a terrible harvest." This idea is very characteristic of the strategy of the 16th-18th centuries and sharply contradicts the doctrine stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, which sees only one goal in a war - the destruction of the enemy’s manpower, and knows only one means to that - a decisive battle. Only when the French Revolution opened up an inexhaustible reserve among the masses of the people to replenish the army, did the commander's mind cease to be afraid of losses, and a shock Napoleonic strategy of crushing was created. Until then, the commander, who worked with limited human material, had to not forget about the "Pyrrhic victories", after which there may not be an army left to continue the victorious march. For Frederick the Great, as for other commanders before the Napoleonic period, the battle was only one of the means to achieve the goal: endurance to the end, which Hindenburg remembered during the world war first of all; it was necessary to strive so that every month of the war inflicted more severe wounds on the enemy in his economic resources (and political consciousness than on us - these are the foundations of the strategy of exhaustion, which by no means refuses, when the need arises, from accepting a decisive battle, but sees in battle only one of the means to achieve victory.Frederick the Great - the greatest master of the strategy of exhaustion, in the Seven Years' War, he achieved his goal - not to return Silesia captured from Austria - in the fight against the powerful coalition of Austria, Russia and France.
The strategy of exhaustion, which correctly takes into account all the political and economic conditions of war, which leads to the disintegration of the enemy’s power not only through military operations of armies, but also knows other means (economic blockade, political agitation, diplomatic intervention, etc.), is always in danger of degenerating in contrast to the Napoleonic strategy - into a strategy of powerlessness, into a strategy of artificial maneuver, an empty threat to the enemy, which is not followed by a blow. Such a barking, but not biting strategy was that of Frederick, when he, already 66 years old, undertook the war for the Bavarian succession (1778-79). The whole campaign passed in fruitless maneuvering; the Austrian commander Lassi turned out to be a worthy partner for the exhausted Prussian king, Frederick the Great in this era, "already tired of reigning over slaves", undoubtedly lost faith in the moral strength of his army, understanding better than all Europe admired its weakness, and was afraid to take risks. The war turned into an armed demonstration; the opponents dispersed without a single battle. Whereas the Russian General Suvorov, with an indomitable impulse to solve military problems by battle, bitterly criticized the "learned Lassian cordon", many writers were carried away by this new type of bloodless war, saw in it a sign of the progress of mankind and its humanity (for example, the future Prussian War Minister Boyen ); and the soldiers, with their immediate instincts, called this war - a laughingstock - "potato war", since only potato crops were affected.
Wars of the 17th and 18th centuries are often characterized as cabinet wars. The term "cabinet war" is used as a concept opposite people's war. The war represented only the business of the government, the "cabinet", and not of the nations, not of the broad masses. From this, however, it would be erroneous to conclude that at that time, along with the armed struggle, there was no agitational struggle front at all. Paper war has always accompanied military operations. Frederick the Great did not despise the fabrication of false documents that would allow him to use any national or religious trumps. However, in the 18th century the front of the struggle, facing the masses, was still purely auxiliary. The government went its own way, and some "diligent jurist" acted as its lawyer before the masses. The behavior of the army in relation to the population had crucial on the propaganda front With his cynical frankness, Frederick the Great instructed his generals in this way: “one must depict the enemy in the most unsightly form and accuse him of all sorts of plans against the country. In Protestant countries, like Saxony, one must play the role of defenders of the Lutheran religion, in the Catholic country, we must constantly repeat about religious tolerance. One should "make heaven and hell serve oneself."
Rosbach. Examples of the tactical art of Frederick the Great from the era of Silesia and the Seven Years' War are numerous and vivid. Near Rossbach, in the late autumn of 1757, in the second year of the war, the combined Franco-Imperial army, consisting of about 50 thousand poorly disciplined soldiers, stood against 25 thousand selected Prussian troops. The allies were commanded by the Prince of Soubise (French) and the Duke of Hildburghausen (Imperial). In another, the most important theater for Prussia, the Austrians, having broken the barrier left against them, completed the conquest of Silesia, which was the goal of the war, and settled there for the winter, Frederick the Great needed to finish off the French as soon as possible in order to drive the Austrians out of Silesia before the onset of winter, without economic resources which he could not continue the war. But the allies stood in a fortified position, on which Frederick could not attack the double forces of the enemy. His position was already becoming hopeless when the enemy, contrary to the situation, pushed by his numerical superiority, went on the offensive. Prince Soubise decided to force the Prussians into retreat by outflanking them from the south and threatening to intercept the escape route of the Prussian army. On November 5th, leaving 1/6 of his forces under Saint-Germain to demonstrate at the front, Soubise moved in three columns. The march took place in an open area, during the day it was - a big halt was made. In front, the movement was covered by the advanced cavalry. Frederick the Great from the Rosbach bell tower watched the movement of the allies and in the morning received the idea that, under the cover of the abandoned rearguard, the French began to retreat; but in the afternoon the enemy's detour was clearly outlined to him. Then Frederick decided to meet the French maneuver with a counter-manoeuvre, falling on the head of the marching columns. Against S.-Germain, an insignificant rearguard was left. 5 squadrons of hussars on the crest of the hills masked the movement of the army behind them. Seydlitz's cavalry knocked over and drove the French cavalry from the battlefield with one blow. At the same time, an 18-gun battery was deployed on Janus Hill, which began shelling the French infantry, which was trying to turn in the direction of movement; the Prussian infantry crossed the ridge and, advancing, opened fire in volleys; only 7 head Prussian battalions managed to take part in the battle, which fired 15 rounds each. By this time, Seydlitz had managed, after the first attack on the cavalry, to collect his squadrons and threw them on the numerous headquarters of the Prince of Soubise and on the French infantry crowding in disarray. Almost instantly it was all over - the French army fled in complete disarray. The danger on this front was eliminated, Frederick was able to turn with his best regiments to the Silesian theater. The success of the evasive maneuver is generally associated with the passivity of the enemy, with the absence of a riposte. According to our modern concepts, in order to get around the enemy, you must first of all make him immobile, tie him up, nail him to the place with a fight. From this point of view, the Saint-Germain screen should have hit bigger; the task of this barrier should not have consisted in a simple demonstration, but in waging an energetic frontal battle, which would have hampered the maneuverability of the enemy, and then the enemy, who had already lost mobility, could be encircled or bypassed, in order to give a decisive turn to the battle. The flank. moving the clumsy army of Soubise in front of an unrestrained, flexible, especially capable of quick maneuvering enemy was an unjustified risk.
Leithen. By a forced march (300 km in 1.5 days), Frederick transferred the army from Rosbach to Silesia. The Austrian army, which captured the most important fortresses of Silesia - Schweidnitz and Breslau, and made a horse raid on Berlin, considered the 1757 campaign already over and was located in winter quarters in the recaptured region. The approach of the Prussian army made it necessary to concentrate 65,000 troops ahead of Breslau. The Austrians took up a position; in order to rest the flanks against local objects, it was necessary to stretch the front for 7 miles. On December 5, Frederick the Great attacked the Austrians with 40,000 troops.
The bushes hid the area in front of the front. Ahead were only the Austrian hussars. As soon as the Prussian cavalry pushed them back, Charles of Lorraine, the Austrian commander of the army, found himself in the dark about what the Prussians were doing. The latter appeared on the road leading to the center of the Austrian location, then disappeared. The Austrians, not assuming that the Prussians would decide to attack the strongest army, striving exclusively for a passive goal and waiting for the Prussians to retreat, did not take any measures and remained in place. Meanwhile, the Prussians having made a flank march 2 versts in front of the Austrian front, they suddenly appeared against the tip of the left flank of the Austrians, which occupied the village of Leiten, and with lightning speed built a front in a perpendicular direction to the Austrian position. The Austrians had to enter the battle simultaneously with the change of front; from a stretched front, the troops did not have time to turn around and piled up, in disorder in depth, forming over 10 lines.Frederick concentrated against the village of Leiten, where he was heading main blow, 4 lines of troops and, moreover, got the opportunity to cover the enemy with both wings. On the right flank, the Prussians succeeded only in fire coverage, on the left flank, the Prussian cavalry of Drizen, after waiting for an opportune moment, overturned Luchesi's Austrian cavalry and fell on the right flank of the Austrian infantry. The Austrians, to their misfortune, in the villages. Leitene did not have light infantry, so suitable for the defense of local objects, and their infantry defended the village just as clumsily as the Prussian attacked it. Despite the complete exhaustion of the Prussian infantry, events on the flank forced the Austrians to retreat, which degenerated into panic. Frederick organized the pursuit only by cavalry, it was not carried out very energetically, but the Austrians hurried to withdraw the remnants of the army to their limits. In the battle of Leuthen, Frederick I repeated the Rosbach maneuver of Soubise, but performed it confidently, quickly, with lightning speed, so that the battle took on the character of a surprise attack on the enemy's flank. If Frederick's maneuver succeeded, this is due not so much to the art of execution as to the passivity of the Austrians, who achieved everything they wanted, who had no will to win and who only looked forward to when the restless enemy would get rid of them and it would be possible to comfortably to be accommodated in good conquered winter quarters. The lethargic always turns out to be beaten by the resolute. If the Austrians had vanguard positions and sentry units in front of the front, which would gain time and space for the subsequent maneuver of the main forces, or, even better, if the Austrians, noticing the deviation towards the heads of the Prussian columns, went on a decisive offensive, without guessing, they maneuver whether the Prussians or simply avoiding the battle - the Prussian army would probably suffer the same defeat as the French at Rosbach (179). The oblique order of battle of Friedrich, used in the attack of the villages. Leuten, in which contemporaries saw some kind of magical power, actually did not play a role in the Leiten victory.
Battle of Kunersdorf. Typical for characterizing the tactics of the Prussian and Russian armies is the battle near Kunersdorf on August 12, 1759. The Russian army, which was joined by the Austrian corps of Laudon, in total 53 thousand, plus 16 thousand irregular troops, in the first days of August gathered near Frankfurt, on the right bank of the Oder , and settled down here fortified camp. The right flank was on the hill with the Jewish cemetery, the center was on Spitzberg, the left flank was on Muhlberg. Muhlberg was separated from Spitzberg by the Kugrund ravine. , the Russians were in this position for 8 days and covered their front with a retransmission, reinforced with notches, which formed a bend on Mulberg. The Austrians stood in reserve behind the right wing, the rear was covered by swamps that went to the Oder.
Friedrich concentrated 37,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry to Mulrose - forces almost equal to the Russian-Austrian regular army. Napoleon, who had only battle in mind and looked only to a decisive victory for a successful end to the war, would probably secure for himself a superiority in numbers by drawing in the screens left to defend Silesia and Saxony. But Frederick fought to the point of exhaustion, the loss of a province was more dangerous for him than a tactical failure, only once, near Prague in 1757, he was in more favorable numerical conditions than now; he decided to attack. A decisive blow would have been possible if it had been possible to cut off the communications of the Russian army and attack it from the east. Frederick the Great made a personal reconnaissance from the heights of the left bank of the Oder. Lebus, he did not have any satisfactory map, he got confused in determining the local objects to which his horizons opened, trusted the testimony of a local resident and came to the conclusion that the Russian army was facing northwest, to the Oder swamps (180 ).
Frederick the Great decided to send the army across the Oder at Geritz, in the passage below Frankfurt, bypass the Russians from the east, strike at them from the rear and overturn into the Oder. The fulfillment of this plan brought the Prussian army, which described an almost complete circle, to the front of the motionless Russians. Since the ponds and gullies threatened to break the Prussian offensive into two parts and create two centers of battle, which was contrary to Frederick's desire to maneuver the entire army together, he decided to concentrate all his forces on the attack of Muhlberg - north of the strip of ponds stretching from Kunersdorf. No link offensive was launched against the rest of the Russian front. Young regiments of the Russian observation corps, a decisive attack by the Prussians. Mühlberg was taken by the Prussians, and Frederick sought, as at Leuthen, to build on his success by rolling his troops along the Russian front. But with Saltykov, the center and the right wing, not connected by anyone, represented a huge reserve. The stubborn battle for Kugrund failed for the Prussians: the attack for Spitzberg was repulsed, Russian artillery brutally mowed down the Prussian army crowded on Mühlberg, a Russian counterattack began, and panic seized the Prussian ranks. In desperation, Frederick ordered Seydlitz to lead a mass of cavalry into the attack. Seydlitz saw the hopelessness of a cross-country attack on the Braga located behind the fortifications, but on repeated orders he threw his squadrons into the attack. They were repulsed by fire, the Russian and Austrian cavalry launched a counterattack; the Prussian army, leaving artillery and carts, fled in complete disarray and dispersed. In the evening, Frederick from the 50,000th army was able to collect only 10,000, including 7,000 left at Geritz on the bridges over the Oder; in a few days it was possible to collect up to 31 thousand. The loss of the Prussians, therefore, is about 19 thousand, the Russians and Austrians - up to 17 thousand. The Prussians suffered a decisive defeat. According to Clausewitz, Frederick the Great near Kunersdorf became entangled in the nets of his own oblique battle formation. A one-point attack on the Russian left flank, since it did not cause the collapse of the entire Russian battle formation, put the Prussians in a very difficult position, crumpling their front, concentrating all the infantry in the cramped space of Muhlberg and depriving them of maneuverability. In this battle, attention is drawn to Saltykov's super-philosophical indifference to the Prussian army circling around him, the passive sitting of the Russians in a convenient (immediately rearward to the enemy) chosen position, their strong tactical restraint, the mistake of such an experienced commander as Friedrich, when reconnoitering the enemy location, and finally , the extreme dependence of the linear battle formation on local conditions, which forced Frederick to narrow the attack area.
Berenhorst - the son of Leopold Dessau, the famous educator and leader of the Prussian infantry, adjutant of Frederick the Great - abandoned military service, because he could not endure the contemptuous attitude of the king towards his retinue. He owns a deep criticism of Friedrich's military art.
Berenhorst completely ignored the geometric part of military art and concentrated all his attention on moral forces, on the human heart. He owns the most severe criticism of the front side of the Prussian army, which blinded so many. The maneuvering art of the Prussians is illusory - there is nothing in it applicable for serious combat work, it causes pettiness (micrology), timidity, service slavery and military rudeness. Pettiness, a fever of detail, dominate the Prussian army. Here the insignificant details of training are valued, if only they are given with great difficulty. Obermaneurists play tactical riddles. Frederick the Great not only did not raise, but belittled the moral strength of the army, did not consider it important to attend to the state of mind, courage and inner dignity of the soldier; this commander knew how to spend better than to educate soldiers. How much thought, diligence, labor and strength is spent on the teaching of the Prussian army - and for the most part it is completely useless, and partly even to the detriment. Oh, the vanity of all artificialities... In the Prussian army, a man is trained faster than a four-legged warrior, Berenhorst ironically, since the Prussian soldier becomes more flexible and more learned from beatings, and the horse kicks with every blow. And just that, over which the masters rack their brains most of all, what costs the officer the rudest remarks, and the soldier gets the heaviest blows - all this is not applicable in a real battle. How does an experienced, brave officer feel, accustomed to meeting with the enemy and calmly disposing during an attack, when he loses distance at a review - he falls behind or climbs 10 steps ...