Potapov concluded on behalf of the brigade. Civil procedural law. Here is her text

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

"Altai State University"

PLANS OF SEMINAR AND PRACTICAL STUDIES

by discipline: labor law

Barnaul 2011

Plans for seminars and practical classes of the academic discipline were developed by PhD in Law, Associate Professor, PhD in Law, Associate Professor, PhD in Law, Associate Professor on the basis of:

1) SES VPO in the direction of training: 030600.62 "Jurisprudence", approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation on March 27, 2000

2) State Educational Standard of Higher Professional Education in the specialty: 030501.65 "Jurisprudence", approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation on March 27, 2000

Plans of seminars and practical classes academic discipline approved at a meeting of the Department of Labor, Environmental Law and Civil Procedure.

dated "___" ______________ 2011, protocol No. _______

Head of Department _______________________________

The plans of seminars and practical classes of the academic discipline were approved at a meeting of the Methodological Commission of the Faculty of Law of AltSU

dated "___" ________ 20__, protocol No. ___

Chairman of the methodological commission _________________________

Signed for printing Format 60*90/16

Paper for duplicators Offset printing

Conv. oven l. Circulation

The Laboratory of Replicating Techniques of the Faculty of Law of the Altai State University.

656099. Barna.

INTRODUCTION

The global changes in political, social and economic life taking place today in Russia have had a significant impact on the regulation of labor relations. They entailed new approaches to the established concepts of labor law, as well as to its individual institutions. This was reflected in the adopted on December 21, 2001 State Duma Labor Code Russian Federation. However, the code was not free from shortcomings, and the practice of application showed many of its shortcomings. In this regard, on June 30, 2006, the Federal Law “On Amendments to the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, Recognition of Certain Normative Legal Acts of the USSR as Invalid on the Territory of the Russian Federation and Repealed Some Legislative Acts (Provisions of Legislative Acts) of the Russian Federation” was adopted, which introduced significant changes to regulation of labor relations.

c) Underage Volin entered into an oral agreement with his neighbors on the cultivation of seedlings, which he later wanted to sell in bulk;

d) Khalilova was denied a part-time job on the grounds that she was already working as a part-time job in another organization;

e) Engineer Goberidze was not hired by the state unitary enterprise, since the head of the relevant department is Goberidze's stepfather;

f) Storekeeper Zhuchkin, who was declared legally incompetent by the court, was fired from his job for stealing an expensive tool.

5. Protection of the rights of trade unions.

6. Other representatives of employees in labor relations.

Regulations:

1. On the protection of the rights of representatives of workers at the enterprise and the opportunities provided to them: ILO Convention of 01.01.01 No. 000 // Conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference. 1T. II.- Geneva : International Labor Office, 1991.

2. On the protection of the rights of representatives of workers in the enterprise: ILO Recommendation 1971 No. 000 // Conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference. 1T. II.- Geneva: International Labor Office, 1991.

3. On insolvency (bankruptcy): Federal Law of 01.01.01 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 2002. - No. 43. - Art. 4190.

4. On trade unions, their rights and guarantees of their activities: Federal Law of December 8, 1995 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 1996. - No. 3. - Art. 148.

2. Released from prison Shishkin, expelled from the 9th grade of the secondary school Svistunov and disabled 3 gr. Kurochkin decided to go to work. After applying for assistance to the employment authorities, they were all sent to the plant. Kurochkin and Svistunov applied for the positions of couriers, Shishkin - for the head of the shop. The head of the personnel department of the plant, having familiarized himself with the submitted documents, refused to hire them, citing the fact that; Svistunov is a minor and it is unprofitable for the plant to hire him; Kurochkin is disabled, and therefore will not be able to cope with the work of a courier; Shishkin was released from prison and it is unlikely that the shop workers will want to work under his leadership. In addition, according to the job description, the head of the shop must have a higher technical education, while Shishkin has a specialized secondary education. To the arguments of the applicants that they were sent by the employment service and therefore they must be hired, the head of the personnel department stated that the enterprise is private and therefore, in conditions of complete economic independence, the directions given by the employment service for employment are not binding on the employer.

3. Karasev applied to the court with a claim for compulsion to conclude an employment contract, recovery of compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In support of the stated requirements, he indicated that from the advertisement placed in the newspaper, he became aware that a driver was required in the specified company. When contacting for employment, they took his documents and asked him to come in two days. When Karasev arrived at the appointed time, he was denied employment. On the demand to motivate the refusal, the plaintiff was verbally explained that he was refused due to the lack of the necessary work experience, and also due to the fact that he did not provide a medical certificate of health. In addition, the head of the personnel department called Karasev's former place of work, and they spoke of him as an irresponsible employee, which also influenced the decision to refuse. In the statement of claim, Karasev asks to oblige the defendant to conclude an employment contract with him and recover compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 5,000 rubles, since, according to the plaintiff, there was discrimination on the part of the defendant, which is expressed in the presentation of additional requirements for persons applying for the position of driver in terms of length of service requirements.

Is Karasev rightfully denied the conclusion of an employment contract? Are his demands to be met?

Give a qualified assessment of the situation. What demands can Mitrokhina make if she decides to go to court?

6. Merchandiser Zhdanova went on parental leave for a year. In her place, Vlasov was accepted, with whom a fixed-term employment contract was concluded for one year. After a year, Vlasov was fired under paragraph 2 of Art. 77 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Disagreeing with the dismissal, Vlasov filed a lawsuit for reinstatement, referring to the fact that Zhdanova never left the parental leave.

How should this case be decided?

7. Kolevatova was hired as a storekeeper, but no employment contract was signed with her. According to the provisions of the order to enroll her, the employee was given a one-month probationary period with a salary of 8,000 rubles. After passing the probationary period, they promised to increase the salary. Four weeks after the start of work, the store manager, inspecting the warehouse, pointed out to Kolevatova that her workplace was in disarray, the boxes were stacked sloppily, blocking the aisles. To this remark, Kolevatova replied that she was not given ancillary workers, and it was not her responsibility to carry boxes, and she was pregnant. A week after the conversation, Kolevatova was fired as having failed the test.

Assess the legitimacy of the employer's actions.

8. Ignatov applied to the store for a job as a food salesman. The following documents were demanded from him: 1) a passport; 2) work book; 3) military ID; 4) diploma of higher education; 5) an insurance certificate of compulsory pension insurance; 6) TIN; 7) reference from the previous place of work; 8) certificate of registration at the place of residence; 9) a medical certificate from a polyclinic on the state of health.

Are these claims correct?

9. When concluding an employment contract with Ivanova on work as the head of the sales department, the director proposed to include the following conditions in the employment contract: on the establishment of a probationary period; on the termination of the employment contract if Ivanova refuses to go on a business trip; Ivanova's commitment not to become pregnant for the next three years; not work part-time for another employer; on non-disclosure of trade secrets. Ivanova signed the contract on the proposed terms.

Are the terms of the employment contract correct?What are the consequences of including conditions in an employment contract that are contrary to labor law?

10. On June 20, 2009, the employment contract with the head of the supply department, Kireev, was terminated in connection with the call to military service. Kabanov was taken in his place. After the end of his service life, Kireev returned to the plant and demanded that he be given his former position. The administration refused him this. Kireev appealed to the court.

How to resolve this dispute?

Lessons 11-12

Subject: Changing the employment contract

1. The concept and grounds for changing the employment contract.

2. The concept of transfer to another job. The difference between transferring to another job and moving. Classification of translations.

3. Changing the terms of the employment contract determined by the parties for reasons related to changes in organizational or technological working conditions.

4. Labor relations in the event of a change in the owner of the organization, a change in the jurisdiction of the organization.

5. Suspension from work.

Regulations:

1. On employment in the Russian Federation: Law of the Russian Federation dated 01.01.2001 No. 000-1 (as amended on 01.01.2001) // SZ RF. - 1996. - No. 17. - Art. 1915.

Literature:

1. Bugrov determined by the parties of the terms of the employment contract for reasons related to changes in organizational or technological conditions // Labor Law. - 2007. - No. 3.

2. Bugrov and general modern rules transfers to another job // Labor in Russia and abroad. - 2011. - No. 4.

3. Bugrov labor contract // Russian legal journal. - 2009. - No. 1.

4. Ivanov, the terms of the employment contract on the place of work: the ratio of the provisions of Article 74 with Articles 72.1 and 81 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation // Labor Law. - 2010. - No. 9.

5. Kostyan of the owner of the property of the organization: legal consequences for the parties to the employment contract // Labor disputes. - 2008. - No. 4.

6. Suspension from work as a way to protect the interests of the employer // Legitimacy. - 2011. - No. 9.

7. Petrov of the employment contract: issues of theory and practice, improvement of chapter 12 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation // Legislation and Economics. - 2009. - No. 5.

8. On the regulation of temporary transfer to another job by agreement of the parties // Journal of Russian law. - 2011. - No. 3.

9. Tikhomirov to another job and other changes in working conditions: Practical guide. M., 2009.

10. Khnykin changes in the employment contract // Legislation. - 2009. - No. 1.

11., Tsypkina contract: the procedure for concluding, changing and terminating / ed. . 3rd ed., revised. and additional M., 2008.

12. Changing the terms of the employment contract (transfer to another job, relocation) // Economy and law. - 2009. - No. 9.

Tasks:

1. Leontiev, accepted into the Alla company as a Ford driver, by order of the deputy. The director of the company was transferred to a Mitsubishi minibus. Leontiev disagreed with the transfer because the minibus was out of order and went on strike. He spent a whole week in the director's office, never showing up at his workplace. For refusal to perform work and a long absence from the workplace, he was fired for absenteeism. Leontyev applied to the court with a request to reinstate him at work as a driver of a passenger car, to recover wages for the time of forced absenteeism and to compensate for moral damage.

Solve the case.

2. Karavaeva filed a lawsuit in court to declare the translation illegal and to compensate for non-pecuniary damage. In the statement of claim, she indicated that as a result of the transfer from gas station No. 5 to gas station No. 8, the terms of the employment contract were violated, since her work volume decreased, since fuel sales at gas station No. 8 were small, and this, in turn, affected the salary - he has shrunk. In addition, she receives a monthly bonus for professional excellence of 15%, while during the period of work at gas station No. 5 this bonus was charged at a rate of 30%. Also, gas station number 8 is too far from her home, and she has to get to and from work for two hours. In court, the defendant's representative explained that the terms of the employment contract were not violated, since it provides for the right of the employer to move the employee from one gas station to another without his consent. When Karavaeva was moved, her functional duties did not change, the terms of the contract were not violated, since the allowances are not included in the mandatory terms of the employment contract.

Solve the case.

3. Upon joining LLC “Terem”, the seller Sidorov, who has an economic education, agreed to the inclusion in the employment contract of the condition that, if necessary, he can be transferred by order of the director to any job requiring economic knowledge, for any period. After 4 months, Sidorov was transferred to the position of an accountant for the period of the latter's illness. A month after the transfer, Sidorov wrote an application addressed to the director with a request to return him to his previous place of work, since he does not have sufficient experience and knowledge to properly perform the duties of an accountant. The director refused the request, citing an employment contract. Then Sidorov promised to go to court with a lawsuit to declare the transfer illegal, since he did not sign a separate written agreement on the transfer. To which the director objected that Sidorov had voluntarily assumed the duties of an accountant, thereby expressing his consent to the transfer.

4. Golovina worked at a garment factory as a seamstress-minder. On April 30, she received a conclusion from the medical advisory commission that her work was contraindicated for her health reasons. In connection with this conclusion, Golovina was transferred without her consent to work on the numbering of the cut. Since she did not start this work, she was fired from work under paragraph 3 of Art. 81 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Golovina went to court with a lawsuit to reinstate her at work as a seamstress-mechanic.

What decision should the court make?

5. Is the current labor legislation observed in the following transfers made without the consent of the employees:

Due to severe frosts in the village of Kerchevo, there was a threat of damage to the heating system of public utilities, in connection with this, the plumber of Bytsnab JSC Nikolaev was transferred for 10 days as a plumber to the municipal repair and construction department;

Sanko, a carpenter of the 5th category of the motor depot, was transferred for three weeks as a spare parts distributor with the wording "to prevent damage to spare parts";

Accountant Seregina was transferred as a temporary replacement to the position of a sick chief accountant for a period of 1 month.

6. Nikolaeva has worked in a budgetary institution as a chief accountant since March 2007. Upon admission to work, a probationary period of 6 months was set, while the employment contract was concluded for an indefinite period. In May 2011, a new structure of the institution was approved. As a result, the name has changed. structural unit where Nikolaeva worked: from “accounting” to “accounting and control sector”. The name of the position has also changed - “Head of the Accounting and Control Sector”. In this regard, Nikolaeva received an offer to conclude a new employment contract with a request to write an application for transfer to the position of head of the accounting and control sector. The proposal also stated that, in accordance with Art. 74 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, she has the right to refuse to work in the new conditions. In the new employment contract provided for review, it was stipulated that it was concluded for 1 year, and that a probationary period of 6 months was established. It also followed from the terms of the contract that there was an increase in duties, official salary and wages.

7. Ledneva worked as a specialist of the second category in the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services". By order of the relevant government agency the functions of the housing and communal services of this branch were transferred to the jurisdiction. Also, the order indicated that it was obliged to accept the transfer of employees of the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services". Since there was no position of a specialist of the second category, Ledneva was acquainted with the warning about the possible termination of the employment contract in connection with the change of ownership of the organization's property. At the same time, she was offered a job as a janitor in office space, which she turned down. By order of the director of the branch of the State Unitary Enterprise "Housing and Communal Services" Ledneva was dismissed under paragraph 6 of part 1 of Art. 77 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation.

Was Ledneva rightfully fired?

8. Klepikov, driving a personal car outside working hours, was deprived of a driver's license for driving a vehicle without state registration plates for a period of 1 month. In this regard, the director of the organization where Klepikov worked as a driver issued an order to transfer him to a laborer for up to 1 month so that Klepikov would not have downtime, referring to Part 3 of Art. 72.2 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Klepikov refused to transfer and did not go to work, for which he was fired from work for absenteeism.

Decide on the legitimacy of the actions of Klepikov and the CEO.

Questions about employment law:

1. The concept of labor, its role in the life of society. Social organization of labor. general characteristics relationships that arise in the course of work.

2. The concept and subject of labor law.

3. Method of labor law: concept and features.

4. The system of labor law.

5. Place of labor law in common system rights. Trends in the development of labor law.

6. Functions of labor law.

7The concept and meaning of the basic principles of labor law. Formulation, system, content and concretization of the basic principles of labor law.

8. The concept and types of sources of labor law.

9. Features of the system of sources of labor law.

10. General characteristics of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation as the main source of labor law.

11. Unity and differentiation of labor law norms.

12. Local regulations in the system of sources of labor law.

13. The role of judicial acts on the regulation of labor relations.

14. The concept of an individual labor relationship, unlike related relations related to labor.

15. Subjects of an individual labor relationship.

17. Grounds for the emergence, change and termination of an individual labor relationship.

18. Legislation on the rights and guarantees of the activities of trade unions.

19. The right of trade unions to represent the interests of workers, to conduct collective bargaining, conclude collective agreements and agreements.

20. The protective function of trade unions and the main directions of its implementation.

21. Basic rights in the field of labor protection.

22. Protection of the rights of trade unions.

23. Other representatives of employees in labor relations.

24. The concept, meaning and basic principles of social partnership in the sphere of work.

25. Parties and bodies of social partnership.

26. System and forms of social partnership relations.

27. Collective agreement: parties, content, procedure for concluding, changing and terminating.

28. Agreement: concept, types, features of acceptance and action.

29. Control over the implementation of collective agreements and agreements. Responsibility of subjects of social partnership.

30. The concept and meaning of the employment contract. Its difference from related contracts related to labor.

32. Types of employment contracts. Fixed-term employment contract.

33. Conclusion and execution of an employment contract.

34. Test when applying for a job.

35. Labor books.

36. The concept and grounds for changing the employment contract.

37. The concept of transfer to another job. The difference between transferring to another job and moving. Classification of translations.

38. Changing the terms of the employment contract determined by the parties for reasons related to changes in organizational or technological working conditions.

39. Labor relations when changing the owner of the organization, changing the jurisdiction of the organization.

40. Suspension from work.

41. General characteristics of the grounds for termination of the employment contract, their classification.

42. Termination of the employment contract at the initiative of the employee.

43. Termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer on grounds not related to the guilty actions of the employee: grounds and procedure.

44. Termination of an employment contract at the initiative of the employer on grounds related to the guilty actions of the employee: grounds and procedure.

45. Termination of an employment contract due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, as well as due to violation of the established rules for concluding an employment contract.

46. The procedure for registration of dismissal and calculation.

47. Legal consequences of illegal transfer and dismissal.

Commander Mikhail Potapov

My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the South Western front started by accident. A few years ago, digging around the Internet, I noticed a map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from some English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the line of the Dnieper from Kremenchug to the mouth.

And only to the south of the Pinsk swamps, a powerful wedge for several hundred kilometers literally pierced into the thickness of the territory occupied by the Nazis. On the tip of this wedge was the laconic inscription "5 POTAPOV". It was the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front under the command of Major General Potapov.

Undoubtedly, the front line could not be uniform, in its different sections, formations that did not match in number and strength opposed each other, and many circumstances influenced success or disaster. In addition, such a wedge could not exist for a long time, since it easily turned into an environment. From the south, the Germans came close to Kyiv, and it was necessary to level the front in order to organize a stable defense of the city. A potential threat was also brewing for the right flank of the 5th Army, after the German troops of Army Group Center, bypassing the marshy Pripyat basin, reached the Gomel-Starodub line. On August 19, the 5th Army received an order to withdraw beyond the Dnieper to a depth of 140-180 kilometers. And yet, the fact that the retreat path of the 5th Army from the western border of the USSR, even for some time, turned out to be almost three times shorter than that of its neighbors, aroused a desire to learn as much as possible about this formation and its commander.

One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer's persistence - he saw the same maps of hostilities that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of the troops under the command of Potapov.

Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which he repeats three times (!) the idea of the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate "as many divisions as necessary" to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the Fuhrer considers the defeat of Potapov's army among the prerequisites for a successful offensive "against the Timoshenko group of troops", that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the way to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.

I learned all these details later, but when I examined the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not tell me anything. Gradually, after getting acquainted with documents and studies, conversations with the widow of the commander Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, an amazing life path this person.

From deacons to generals

Without leaving the limits of the parish, Mikhail received a very worthy for a village boy elementary education. In a rural school, his teacher was the "easier" prince from the Gagarin family, later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The St. Petersburg millionaire book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, acted as a trustee of the temple and the school, so, for sure, they cared about the level of knowledge of the students here.

First World War and the economic crisis did not have the best effect on the Potapov family well-being. As a teenager, Mikhail began to help his father. October revolution The Potapovs met in Kharkov, where they worked as bridgemen in a tram depot.

By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier in the Yukhnov military registration and enlistment office. Formally, Potapov is considered a member civil war, however, he did not take a direct part in the hostilities.

Potapov, after completing cavalry courses in Minsk in September 1922, was appointed commander of a platoon of the 43rd cavalry regiment of the Volga Military District. It was not easy for a 20-year-old young man who did not smell gunpowder to command experienced horsemen from the Cossacks, many of whom had two wars behind them. Oddly enough, a thorough knowledge of church rites contributed to gaining authority among his subordinates - in Putogino, Mikhail not only studied at the temple, but also served for some time as a deacon. From the diaconate, Potapov will have a well-placed luxurious baritone for the rest of his life. Many years later, already being a general in the Soviet army, the former deacon did not shy away from attending church services in full "parade".

Two years later, already in the position of assistant squadron commander, Potapov leaves for Moscow, for military chemical courses. The new place of service is the 67th Cavalry Regiment of the North Caucasus Military District. Since 1931, he has been studying again - now as a student of the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army. The cavalryman becomes a tanker. After graduating from the academy in 1936, his career develops rapidly, which, however, is typical for many future commanders of the Great Patriotic War. It took Potapov exactly four years to go from the chief of staff of the regiment to the commander of the army.

Undoubtedly, a meeting with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov played a significant role in his career. It happened in May 1937 in Belarus, where Potapov commanded a regiment, and Zhukov commanded a division. By the time they met, the future marshal had already received a new appointment, but since then the countrymen have not let each other out of their sight. In the book “Memoirs and Reflections”, Georgy Konstantinovich writes: “Practically during field exercises and maneuvers and in the 3rd and 6th corps, I had to act with the 21st separate tank brigade (brigade commander M.I. Potapov). This commander was my colleague in the past, and we understood each other in a “combat situation”, perfectly.

When in June 1939 Zhukov was asked to lead an operation against Japanese army at Khalkhin Gol, he insisted on appointing Potapov as his deputy.

They flew to the Far East in one plane. Marshal recalled: “Brigade commander Potapov was my deputy. On his shoulders lay a lot of work on organizing the interaction of formations and military branches, and when we launched a general offensive, Mikhail Ivanovich was entrusted with the leadership of the main grouping on the right wing of the front.

In June 1940, Zhukov became the commander of the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District, at the same time Potapov was transferred to the KOVO to the post of commander of the 4th mechanized corps. Six months later, Mikhail Ivanovich becomes army commander. In February 1941, Zhukov, appointed chief of the General Staff, moved to Moscow. To meet again countrymen had a chance only in the post-war years.

It remains to be regretted that the remarkable mutual understanding of the two military leaders could not be used for the cause of Victory. I note that these were very dissimilar personalities, in some ways even opposite, but this circumstance only contributed to their mutual attraction.

Blitzkrieg failed.

In the event of an enemy attack, Potapov's army was responsible for "cover area No. 1", 170 km long from Vlodava to Krystynopol in the north of the Ukrainian section of the Soviet-German border. In the last days of peace, Potapov took a number of measures to increase the combat capability of the army. On the night of June 16-17, units of the 62nd Infantry Division set out from the camp and, after two night marches, reached positions near the border. On June 18, Potapov ordered the 45th Rifle Division to be withdrawn from the firing range. On the same day, the 135th Rifle Division received an order to advance to the border.

But this could not change the general situation, which, with the outbreak of hostilities, developed extremely unfavorably for our troops. On the Sokal ledge, the Germans achieved a threefold superiority in manpower and equipment. The Soviet divisions, stretched along the front, could not hold back the blow of the German army corps, densely built on the directions of the main attack. The mechanized units of the 5th Army were only pulling up to the border from their places of deployment.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov's troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For each destroyed or burned down Soviet tank, the formations of the 1st Panzer Group von Kleist suffered 2.5-3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only defended desperately, but also launched counterattacks on the enemy. “The leadership of the enemy troops in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, its continuous flank and frontal attacks cause us heavy losses,” the commander noted in his notes. general staff ground forces Franz Halder.

On June 26, the counter-offensive of the South-West Front began in the Brody-Lutsk-Dubno triangle, where the first tank battle in the history of World War II took place. Four Soviet mechanized corps (two from the 5th Army) failed to build on the initial success. The inconsistent position of the front command also played its role, which, at the height of the fighting in the triangle, ordered to go on the defensive, and then returned to the offensive plan again.

I will note such a detail: in these days of fierce confrontation, namely on June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he pointed out the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

On July 1, against the backdrop of a general withdrawal of front troops, the 5th Army launched a powerful counterattack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20th tank division threw back enemy units by 10-12 km, destroyed up to 1 thousand enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, 2 batteries.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "The 5th Army ... became, as they say, a thorn in the eye of the Nazi generals, put up strong resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him."

Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees operational management The General Staff of the Red Army had in mind the successful counteroffensive of the 5th Army, undertaken on July 10. Then Potapov's tankers behind compounds III army corps intercepted the highway Novograd-Volynsky - Zhytomyr at a width of over 10 km. What a headache for the Germans was the loss of this most important communication can be judged by the fact that the commander of the Army Group "South" Gerd von Runstedt seriously planned to use aircraft to transfer to the Zhytomyr region infantry regiment"Hermann Göring".

While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kyiv got a breather. 6th Command german army was forced to declare: "The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian army is still such that the indicated threat should be eliminated before the attack on Kyiv." The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed for two months.

German military historian Alfred Philippi also points out that the reason for the slowdown in the advance of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5th Army. “And although this opposition ... was not for German command completely unexpected, nevertheless, from the very beginning of the campaign, it brought tactical successes to the Russians, and then in the area of \u200b\u200bNovograd-Volynsky, Zhitomir, it also acquired operational significance, much more serious than one could have imagined. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the 6th Army command to carry out the main operational task, which was to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv.

In late July - early August, during the battles for the Korostensky fortified area, Potapov's army again not only sought to keep the Germans with a solid defense, but also with decisive counterattacks and pressure on the flanks forced the attackers to weaken the blow. Here the enemy concentrated 11 divisions against the 5th Army. Considering that the staff of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people, then the enemy troops were at least twice as large as the forces available to Potapov. The German military historian Werner Haupt notes that "the 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the 6th German Army and inflicted very heavy losses on it." After the war, it will be calculated that, on average, for every day of hostilities in the zone of the 5th Army, there were from 8 to 10 strikes by our troops against the enemy.

On August 9, Commander von Rundstedt gave the order to suspend the offensive at the Kyiv-Korosten line and temporarily go on the defensive in order to disperse the troops in depth and provide them with the opportunity to rest. In an assessment of the situation presented in the OKH, the command of Army Group South expressed a rather pessimistic opinion about the situation on its northern wing. It was even suggested that the Russians intended to "go on the offensive from the Kyiv region and from the Ovruch region in order to defeat the northern wing of the army group." However, the physical exhaustion and losses that von Rundstedt complained about had no less, if not more, effect on the state of Soviet troops.

fatal triumph?

Thus, Hitler's order of August 21, aimed at the destruction of Potapov's troops, looked quite reasonable. It is impossible to call spontaneous the idea to perform this task to allocate the tank forces of Guderian, who operated in Belarus. A month earlier, in the very first document concerning the 5th Army - Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941, the Fuhrer had already proposed using the southern flank of Army Group Center for an operation north of Kyiv. Perhaps he considered noteworthy the proposal that came the day before from the headquarters of the "southerners": to strike through Mozyr on Ovruch with the forces of the 35th Corps of Army Group Center. On August 9, von Rundstedt again asked for help from his neighbors.

Consequently, by August 21, Hitler had a firm conviction about how the campaign in the East should develop. First, it is possible to start an offensive against Moscow only after the defeat of the 5th Army, which, on the one hand, will ensure the security of the right flank of the troops aimed at the Soviet capital, and on the other hand, will create favorable conditions for operations in Ukraine by the von Rundstedt group. Secondly, to successfully achieve this goal, it is necessary to involve the forces of Army Group Center. Do not forget that for the Fuhrer, the priority was the methodical destruction of enemy forces on the territory, regardless of geographical or political goals. As early as July 13, he declared to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch: "It is not so important to advance quickly to the East as to destroy the enemy's manpower."

Meanwhile, the general staff was almost unanimously inclined to reinforce Army Group Center and strike directly on a narrow front in the direction of Moscow. The Fuhrer's order to turn south caused the greatest displeasure in the key figure of the upcoming operation, the commander of the 2nd tank group, Heinz Guderian: “On August 23, I was summoned to the headquarters of the Army Group Center for a meeting in which the chief of the general staff of the ground forces took part. He told us that Hitler decided to attack first of all not on Leningrad and not on Moscow, but on Ukraine and the Crimea ... We were all deeply convinced that the attack planned by Hitler on Kyiv would inevitably lead to a winter campaign with all its difficulties ... " .

In fact, in the 20s of August 1941, the question was not so categorical: either to Moscow or to Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as an auxiliary one precisely within the framework of the Wehrmacht's decisive offensive against the capital of the USSR.

On August 30, in a conversation between Hitler and Halder, it was noted that the troops of the Army Group "Center" turned to Ukraine not for the "war in the south", but in order to start the "operation against Tymoshenko's troops" as soon as possible. The Fuhrer's order of August 21 notes that the defeat of the 5th Army should guarantee the South Army Group "the possibility of creating a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper in its middle course, so that the center and left wing would then continue the offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Rostov." As we can see, the immediate task looks rather modest, and the capture of Kyiv, let alone the defeat of the South-Western Front, is out of the question at all.

The German generals could not then know for sure that Guderian's turn to the south would lead to a winter campaign, as "fast Heinz" claims in his notes, nor could they know that the fragile building of the Southwestern Front would fall apart and bury under its rubble plans for a quick and smooth transition to an offensive against Moscow. Because it was no longer Hitler's directives, but the rapid development of events - which were developing very favorably for the Germans - dictated the logic of actions to the German command.

On September 1, the following report comes from the headquarters of Army Group South: “If the enemy in Eastern Ukraine is not destroyed, then neither Army Group South nor Army Group Center will be able to attack unceasingly ... Strike at Moskovsky direction earlier than in Ukraine is impossible due to the fact that the operation already begun by Army Group "South" and the actions of the southern wing of Army Group "Center" in support of this operation went too far (highlighted by me. - M.Z.) to transfer the main efforts in another area ... ". The Germans had no other choice but to act according to the situation. The rapid advance of Guderian in the north and the occupation of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug on the southern flank of the South-Western Front prompted von Runstedt on September 4, even without agreement with the high command, to order a decisive offensive.

According to Werner Haupt, the battle for Kyiv was the most important battle of the entire war: “Because of the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German attack on Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern Campaign." But we repeat: everything that happened is the result of a paradoxical situation, when the very real prospect of defeating an entire front made adjustments to the strategy and tactics of the enemy, and the catastrophe of the Soviet troops and the triumph of the Nazi armies in the Kiev pocket took away a whole month from the Germans and moved the date of the decisive attack on Moscow to the beginning the onset of cold weather.

Chronicle of the disaster

Unfortunately, the miscalculations of the command of the Southwestern Front made it easier for the Germans to solve their problems. Together with the 5th Army, the 27th Rifle Corps also retreated beyond the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the corps not only did not obey Potapov, but also made a withdrawal according to its own schedule. An easily predictable inconsistency led to the fact that on August 23 the Germans broke through a weak rearguard curtain at the junction of the army and the corps, reached the Dnieper north of Kyiv near Okuninovo, captured the bridge and occupied a bridgehead on the eastern bank. Parts of the 5th Army and the 37th Army under the command of A.A. Vlasov unsuccessfully tried to eliminate the expanding Okuninov grouping of the enemy.

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time without success. Not surprising, because the 5th Army has ceased to be that formidable force that it was a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Rifle Division and the 5th Artillery Antitank Brigade were transferred to the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps, which entered the front reserve, was also withdrawn from the 5th Army. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Rifle divisions due to heavy losses, they had no more than 20-25% personnel.

Only the immediate withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River made it possible to avoid the danger of encirclement. On the morning of August 30, Potapov addressed the Military Council of the South-Western Front with such a proposal, but it did not meet with due understanding.

On the evening of September 5, Potapov again turned to the front commander Kirponos on the HF with a proposal to withdraw troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder's notes, that Hitler first spoke about the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, Potapov's main forces were securely surrounded. From the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, less than 4 thousand fighters remained, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the withdrawal of the remnants of the army, and delay the advance of superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pushing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army, it became known that even the day before, in the rear of the front in the area of \u200b\u200bLokhvitsa (Poltava region), the troops of the 2nd tank group of Guderian, advancing from the north, had joined forces with the troops of the 1st tank group of Kleist, who had broken through from south. Five have already been surrounded Soviet armies. The Kyiv cauldron has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

Potapov's documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal, and then the commander of the 15th rifle corps 5th Army. “I literally sobbed when they handed over the documents of our army commander to me. I didn’t know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich died.”

The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The trial of captivity began. AT fascist concentration camps Mikhail Ivanovich's paths crossed with Generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, Senior Lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, and defense leaders Brest Fortress Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, the reports and transcripts of Potapov's interrogations were made public, who, when asked whether "the Russian people are ready to wage war if the army retreats to the Urals," replied: "Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist. German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general in the following way: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity”, “he referred to his ignorance on issues of a strategic nature”, “answered questions regarding his future with restraint”. Even the Germans described Potapov as a "Russian nationalist", although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this wording.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with the traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully about Vlasov himself until the end of his life, did not believe in the betrayal of his southern "neighbor" in Southwestern Front, believing that the Germans somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.

However, the homeland met them unkindly. Literally from the gangway of the plane, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the "object" in Golitsino near Moscow. A special check took place for seven months, which left indelible marks in the soul of Mikhail Ivanovich.

Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov grew gloomy and closed at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare scoundrel.

Nevertheless, the results of the check, most likely, turned out to be objective, since Potapov was reinstated in the rank of major general and returned to army service. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again, Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave the following recommendation to his long-time ally: “As for commanding qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov led the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a man of great soul, whom all subordinates loved for his benevolence and understanding. It is difficult to read these lines from an official document without excitement, which came from the pen of a marshal far from sentimental.

Obviously, Zhukov's opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich turned out to be probably the only one of the highest Soviet officers who were captured, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not enchanting, but, given the ups and downs of our post-war history, a completely worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, on Far East, death caught Colonel-General Potapov in January 1965 in the post of first deputy commander of the troops of the Odessa military district.

The place of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov in the peculiar hierarchy of military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, built in the post-war period, clearly does not correspond to his military leadership talent and contribution to the Victory.

But still, it cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was hushed up. His talent as a commander was highly commended in post-war memories and Soviet marshals I.Kh. Bagramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army has become a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. Even during Potapov's lifetime, A. Filippi's book "The Pripyat Problem" was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was studied in detail.
And yet, the name of Potapov over the past 70 years after the victorious May 45 did not become public knowledge. So, today the memory of Mikhail Ivanovich is immortalized only in Ukraine, where streets in Kyiv and Zhitomir are named after him. How long? I think it's an anniversary Great Victory- a worthy occasion for Russians to appreciate the merits of a wonderful commander and patriot of our Motherland.

The article was published as part of a socially significant project implemented with state support funds allocated as a grant in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 11-rp dated January 17, 2014 and on the basis of a competition held by the All-Russian public organization Society "Knowledge" of Russia.

A general whom the enemy rated higher than his own command. The contribution to the common victory of General Potapov and the 5th Army entrusted to him can hardly be overestimated - historians do not exclude that it was her staunch defense that prevented the fall of Moscow in the fall of 1941.

My acquaintance with the fate of Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov and the history of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front began by accident. A few years ago, digging around the Internet, I noticed a map of the Soviet-German front as of August 25, 1941, apparently borrowed from some English-language resource. By this time, the Germans occupied Novgorod, Smolensk, approached Bryansk, besieged Odessa in the south and reached the line of the Dnieper from Kremenchug to the mouth.

During the first two months of the war, Potapov’s troops hung menacingly from the north over the German Army Group South, but even after the retreat across the Dnieper, the 5th Army had a noticeable influence on the decisions of the high command of the Reich armed forces. In his very first directive on military operations on the Eastern Front (Directive No. 33 of 07/19/1941), Hitler points out: "The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated." But it does not work out quickly and decisively, and the next directive No. 34 of 07/30/41 again instructs the German troops to "force the 5th Red Army ... to force the battle west of the Dnieper and destroy it." The Fuhrer did not rule out a breakthrough of Potapov's troops to the north through Polesie to the flank of Army Group Center and demanded that measures be taken to prevent this, frankly, an unlikely maneuver. Two weeks pass and Hitler again irritably reminds that "the 5th Russian army must be ... finally destroyed." (Annex to Directive No. 34 of 12.08.41). However, a few days later, Potapov's army hid behind the wide expanse of the Dnieper.
One should not be surprised at the Fuhrer's persistence - he saw the same maps of hostilities that we see now, and quite adequately perceived the threat posed by the activity of the troops under the command of Potapov. Finally, on August 21, Hitler issues an order in which he repeats three times (!) the idea of the need to destroy the 5th Army. But the main thing is that for the first time he is ready to allocate "as many divisions as necessary" to carry out this task. Along with the success of the operation to blockade Leningrad, the Fuhrer considers the defeat of Potapov's army among the prerequisites for a successful offensive "against the Timoshenko group of troops", that is, the Western Front. It turns out that the way to Moscow, according to Hitler, lay through the defeated 5th Army.
I learned all these details later, but when I examined the map, the name Potapov, alas, did not tell me anything. Gradually, after getting acquainted with documents and studies, conversations with the widow of the commander Marianna Fedorovna Modorova, the amazing life path of this person was revealed to me.

From deacons to generals

Mikhail Ivanovich Potapov was born in October 1902 in the village of Mochalovo in the Yukhnovsky district of the then Smolensk province, now the Kaluga region. Although in the questionnaires, the future commander-5 referred his parents to "middle peasants", rather, they should be considered wealthy artisans: Mikhail's father was a contractor when paving roads and streets.
Without leaving the limits of the parish, Mikhail received a very decent primary education for a village boy. In a rural school, his teacher was the "easier" prince from the Gagarin family, later he studied at a parish school at a church in the neighboring village of Putogino. The St. Petersburg millionaire book publisher, a native of these places, Ignatius Tuzov, acted as a trustee of the temple and the school, so, for sure, they cared about the level of knowledge of the students here.

The First World War and the economic crisis did not have the best effect on the Potapov family well-being. As a teenager, Mikhail began to help his father. The Potapovs met the October Revolution in Kharkov, where they worked as bridgemen in a tram depot.

By the spring of 1920, Mikhail returned to his native Mochalovo, and in May he became a Red Army soldier in the Yukhnov military registration and enlistment office. Formally, Potapov is considered a participant in the Civil War, but he did not take a direct part in the hostilities.

Nevertheless, from the very first hours of the war, Potapov's troops fought stubbornly and skillfully. For each destroyed or burned down Soviet tank, the formations of the 1st Panzer Group von Kleist suffered 2.5-3 times more damage. The 5th Army not only defended desperately, but also launched counterattacks on the enemy. “The leadership of the enemy troops in front of Army Group South is amazingly energetic, its continuous flank and frontal attacks cause us heavy losses,” said Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, in his notes.

I will note such a detail: in these days of fierce confrontation, namely on June 30, Potapov issued an order in which he pointed out the inadmissibility of shooting prisoners of war.

On July 1, against the backdrop of a general withdrawal of front troops, the 5th Army launched a powerful counterattack on the northern flank of the German offensive. In particular, the 20th Panzer Division pushed back enemy units by 10–12 km, destroyed up to 1,000 enemy soldiers, 10 tanks, and 2 batteries.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko wrote: "The 5th Army ... became, as they say, a thorn in the eye of the Nazi generals, put up strong resistance to the enemy and inflicted significant damage on him."

The fascist German troops failed to quickly break through the front here. Potapov's divisions knocked them off the road Lutsk - Rovno - Zhytomyr and forced them to abandon an immediate attack on Kyiv.
Shtemenko, in those months one of the leading employees of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, had in mind the successful counteroffensive of the 5th Army, undertaken on July 10. Then Potapov's tankers, behind the backs of the formations of the III Army Corps, intercepted the Novograd-Volynsky - Zhytomyr highway at a width of over 10 km. What a headache for the Germans was the loss of this most important communication can be judged by the fact that the commander of the Army Group "South" Gerd von Runstedt seriously planned to use aviation to transfer the infantry regiment "Hermann Goering" to the Zhytomyr region.
While Potapov's troops attacked the northern flank of the German offensive, the defenders of Kyiv got a breather. The command of the 6th German Army was forced to declare: "The nature of the threat to our troops from the main forces of the 5th Russian Army is still such that this threat should be eliminated before the attack on Kyiv." The loss of the Ukrainian capital was postponed for two months.

German military historian Alfred Philippi also points out that the reason for the slowdown in the advance of Army Group South was the opposition of the 5th Army. “And although this opposition ... was not completely unexpected for the German command, it nevertheless brought tactical successes to the Russians from the very beginning of the campaign, and then in the Novograd-Volynsky, Zhitomir region it also acquired operational significance, much more serious than it can be was to be assumed. This had a rather significant paralyzing effect on the will of the 6th Army command to carry out the main operational task, which was to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv.

In late July - early August, during the battles for the Korostensky fortified area, Potapov's army again not only sought to keep the Germans with a solid defense, but also with decisive counterattacks and pressure on the flanks forced the attackers to weaken the blow. Here the enemy concentrated 11 divisions against the 5th Army. If we take into account that the staffing of the German infantry division was 14 thousand people, then the enemy troops were at least twice as large as the forces available to Potapov. The German military historian Werner Haupt notes that "the 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, was located on the left flank of the 6th German Army and inflicted very heavy losses on it." After the war, it will be calculated that, on average, for every day of hostilities in the zone of the 5th Army, there were from 8 to 10 strikes by our troops against the enemy.

These lines, written after the war, clearly belong to the genre of generals' memoirs "How Hitler prevented us from winning." “It is always easier to extol the merits of some hypothetical alternative than to justify caution and disappointing reality. And in this case, moreover, it turned out that all the people who opposed the offensive in the center had already died. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself - they did not have time to write exculpatory memoirs, ”said British military historian Alan Clark, not without sarcasm.
In fact, in the 20s of August 1941, the question was not so categorical: either to Moscow or to Ukraine. The operation against Potapov's troops was conceived by the Fuhrer as an auxiliary one precisely within the framework of the Wehrmacht's decisive offensive against the capital of the USSR.

Chronicle of the disaster

On August 29, Potapov tried to launch a counteroffensive, this time without success. Not surprising, because the 5th Army has ceased to be that formidable force that it was a month ago. Almost a third of it (five divisions) was transferred to the 37th Army; The 135th Rifle Division and the 5th Artillery Antitank Brigade were transferred to the 40th Army. The 1st Airborne Corps, which entered the front reserve, was also withdrawn from the 5th Army. Due to the lack of tanks, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps had to be reorganized into battalions. Rifle divisions, due to heavy losses, had no more than 20-25% of the personnel.

On the same day, the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front unexpectedly withdrew from its positions, and Wehrmacht units immediately rushed into the gap on the outskirts of Chernigov. On September 1, the Germans occupied a bridgehead on the banks of the Desna in the near rear of the 5th Army. The units abandoned to eliminate the breakthrough failed to succeed. The countdown to the inevitable catastrophe began.
On the evening of September 5, Potapov again turned to the front commander Kirponos on the HF with a proposal to withdraw troops, but received a categorical refusal. It is noteworthy that it was on this day, according to Halder's notes, that Hitler first spoke about the Kiev cauldron. Only on September 9, the Headquarters authorized the withdrawal of the 5th Army to the Desna River. By this time, Potapov's main forces were securely surrounded. From the entire army of 70 thousand personnel, less than 4 thousand fighters remained, as well as about 200 guns and mortars of various systems.

At the end of September 14, Potapov and his headquarters once again made an attempt to stop the withdrawal of the remnants of the army, and delay the advance of superior enemy forces. However, it was not possible to gain a foothold on any of the subsequent lines, since the Germans, pushing from the front, simultaneously bypassed both flanks. And on the morning of September 16, at the headquarters of the 5th Army, it became known that even the day before, in the rear of the front in the area of \u200b\u200bLokhvitsa (Poltava region), the troops of the 2nd tank group of Guderian, advancing from the north, had joined forces with the troops of the 1st tank group of Kleist, who had broken through from south. Five Soviet armies have already been surrounded. The Kyiv cauldron has become a reality. According to German data, more than 660 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured, 884 tanks and more than 3 thousand guns were captured.

On September 21, a combined detachment of the remnants of the headquarters of the front and the 5th Army gave the last battle to the enemy. Potapov was shell-shocked and lost consciousness. In the heat of battle, the general was mistaken for the dead and hastily "buried", throwing the bodies of the dead. Potapov's documents were handed over to Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko, the future marshal, and then the commander of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. “I literally sobbed when they handed over the documents of our army commander to me. I didn’t know at all what would happen to us now, since Mikhail Ivanovich died.”
The bitter fate of the commander

Three days later, Potapov was discovered by the Germans. The trial of captivity began. In the Nazi concentration camps, the paths of Mikhail Ivanovich intersected with Generals M. Lukin and I. Muzychenko, Senior Lieutenant Y. Dzhugashvili, the leaders of the defense of the Brest Fortress, Major P. Gavrilov and Captain I. Zubachev. In 1992, the reports and transcripts of Potapov's interrogations were made public, who, when asked whether "the Russian people are ready to wage war if the army retreats to the Urals," replied: "Yes, he will remain in a state of moral defense, and the Red Army will continue to resist. German investigators assessed the behavior of the Red Army general in the following way: “as a prisoner he behaved with dignity”, “he referred to his ignorance on issues of a strategic nature”, “answered questions regarding his future with restraint”. Even the Germans described Potapov as a "Russian nationalist", although it is difficult to say what exactly they meant by this wording.

Potapov categorically refused to cooperate with the traitors from the ROA. At the same time, Mikhail Ivanovich spoke respectfully about Vlasov himself until the end of his life, did not believe in the betrayal of his southern “neighbor” on the Southwestern Front, believing that the Germans somehow used the general for their own purposes against his will.

The victorious spring of the 45th, Mikhail Ivanovich met in the "general's" camp Hammelburg. On April 22, American troops came close to them. The camp commandant went with a white flag to Patton's army. The Americans arrived at the camp and transported all the prisoners to their place, then they transferred them to the French, and the recent prisoners of war returned home from Paris.
However, the homeland met them unkindly. Literally from the gangway of the plane, Potapov and his comrades were sent to the "object" in Golitsino near Moscow. A special check took place for seven months, which left indelible marks in the soul of Mikhail Ivanovich.

Until the end of his life, the invariably balanced and witty Potapov grew gloomy and closed at the mention of the name of the former SMERSH chief Abakumov, whom he considered a rare scoundrel.

Nevertheless, the results of the check, most likely, turned out to be objective, since Potapov was reinstated in the rank of major general and returned to army service. Mikhail Ivanovich wrote an application for reinstatement in the party. And again, Zhukov came to the rescue, who gave the following recommendation to his long-time ally: “As for commanding qualities, Comrade Potapov was the best army commander, and the units and formations he commanded were always leading. In the border battle, the 5th Army fought with exceptional tenacity and valor. Retreating under the influence of superior enemy forces, she repeatedly counterattacked and defeated the Germans. Comrade Potapov led the army brilliantly. I will also say that he was a man of great soul, whom all subordinates loved for his benevolence and understanding. It is difficult to read these lines from an official document without emotion, which came from the pen of a marshal who was far from sentimental.

Obviously, Zhukov's opinion was shared by many in the political and military leadership of the USSR. In any case, Mikhail Ivanovich turned out to be, probably, the only one of the highest Soviet officers who was captured, who not only returned to the army, but also made, if not enchanting, but, given the vicissitudes of our post-war history, quite a worthy career. He served in Transbaikalia, in the Far East, Colonel-General Potapov died in January 1965 in the post of First Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District.

But still, it cannot be said that the name of the commander of the 5th Army was hushed up. His military leadership talent was highly appreciated in post-war memoirs by the Soviet marshals I.Kh. Bagramyan, I.I. Yakubovsky, and former opponents - Guderian, Keitel, Halder. It should be noted that the 5th Army has become a real forge of personnel - such recognized commanders as M.E. Katukov, K.S. Moskalenko, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.I. Fedyuninsky. All of them highly appreciated the merits of their former commander. Even during Potapov's lifetime, A. Filippi's book "The Pripyat Problem" was published in the USSR, where the role of the 5th Army in disrupting the blitzkrieg was studied in detail.

In 1954, he again became the commander of the 5th Army, albeit without him, but which, in 1945, reached the enemy's lair. His biggest resentment against Fate was this: “I didn’t let you, villain, reach Berlin!” And his wife, Marianna Feodorovna, answered: “Thank God that he remained alive!” "You do not understand!" the stern general was angry.
He passed away on January 26, 1965 from a heart attack - in the rank of colonel general, in the post of 1st deputy commander of the Odessa military district. Streets in Kyiv, Lutsk, Vladimir-Volynsky were named after him.

Maxim Zarezin

Page 1

District Court, considering the case on the claim of Petrov A.T. to Ivanov P.S. for the recovery of a debt under a loan agreement, announced a break for a later time on the same day in order for the plaintiff to submit to the court a genuine written receipt from the defendant.

Since consideration of other cases was also scheduled for that day, the court, during the announced break, considered the reinstatement case, on which it made a decision.

After that, the court continued the hearing in the first case of debt collection under a loan agreement, since the plaintiff presented a genuine receipt from the defendant.

Did the court violate the principles of civil procedural law?

In this task, the object of civil procedural relations is the announcement by the court of a break for a later time of the same day, and consideration of another case during this break.

The subjects in this task are: the district court, the plaintiff - Petrov A. G., the defendant - Ivanov P. S.

When solving this problem, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 3 of Art. 157 Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation.

Answering the question of the task - yes, in this case the principle of continuity of the trial was violated. The court had to postpone the trial (clause 1, article 169 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, in order to provide additional evidence), only after that it is possible to consider other civil cases. After the adjournment, the trial of the case begins anew - paragraph 3 of Art. 169 Code of Civil Procedure.

Potapova V.N. I received a valuable package from my sister. After opening it, it turned out that all the things contained in it were damaged due to the fact that the parcel was stored in a humid room. Potapova V.N. contacted a lawyer for legal advice with a request to assist her in protecting the violated right and recovering the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

What advice should Potapova's lawyer give regarding the procedure for protecting her rights?

In this case, the object of civil procedural legal relations is the protection of the violated right and the recovery of the cost of the parcel from the telecom operator.

The subjects in this case are: Mrs. Potapova VN, a lawyer, a telecom operator, and in the future, depending on the type of protection of the right, another subject may appear - the court.

In this situation, it is necessary to refer to paragraph 2, Art. 11 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, it is also necessary to refer to Part 6, Art. 52 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of April 15, 2005 N 221 Moscow "On approval of the Rules for the provision of postal services"

A lawyer giving advice should explain that in this situation both administrative and judicial procedures for protecting the violated right are possible. Those. Potapov, can make a complaint to the postal operator, and wait for a response. If the postal operator refuses to satisfy the claim, if it agrees to partially satisfy the claim, or if the postal operator does not receive a response within the time period established for considering the claim, the user of postal services has the right to file a lawsuit in court. But the choice by the victim of the administrative procedure for protecting the violated right does not deprive him of the possibility of a subsequent, and sometimes simultaneous appeal on the same issue to the court.

Akimov V.I. filed a claim in the interests of a construction team of three against Polet LLC for the recovery of 60 thousand rubles. for construction work performed under the contract. In the power of attorney issued to Akimov V.AND. foreman Petrov S.K., the right of the representative to sign the statement of claim, present it to the court and perform other procedural actions on behalf of the members of the brigade is indicated. The members of the construction team themselves were not involved in the case.