- (sd) the main operational tactical formation (military unit) of the Red Army of the Armed Forces of the USSR, related by type of troops to the infantry of the Red Army. Consisted of management, three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and other units and subunits. Established ... ... Wikipedia
Rifle division- RIFLE DIVISION, organizationally part of rifle corps or combined arms army and acted, as a rule, in their composition; in some cases, she performed a combat mission on her own. Does not mean. the number of S. d. was included directly in the front ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia
Rifle division number 193 was formed 2 times. 193rd Infantry Division (1st formation) 193rd Infantry Division (2nd formation) ... Wikipedia
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Years of existence 1939 Country USSR Type infantry Insignia ... Wikipedia
- (24sd) Years of existence 07/26/1918 2003 Country of the USSR Submission to the division commander Type rifle division Includes management (headquarters) and military units ... Wikipedia
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- (348th Ural Rifle Division, 348th Rifle Division, 348th Bobruisk Red Banner Order Kutuzov 2nd degree rifle division) Years of existence August 10, 1941 April 1946 Country of the USSR Type rifle division Insignia Bo ... Wikipedia
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11 sd Honorary titles: "Leningradskaya" "Va ... Wikipedia
383sd Years of existence 08/18/1941 Country of the USSR Type rifle division of the Red Army Insignia Feodosia Brandenburg ... Wikipedia
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- , . Print-on-demand reprint edition from the 1929 original. Reproduced in the original author's spelling of the 1929 edition (Publishing house `Trukikoda`ERK``).…
- Year of the Revolution 1917-18 Guards Rifle Division in the Great War. , . Print-on-demand reprint edition from the 1929 original. Reproduced in the original author's spelling of the 1929 edition (Trukikoda publishing house ...
- Muscovite volunteers in defense of the Fatherland. 3rd Moscow Communist Rifle Division in years, Biryukov Vladimir Konstantinovich. On July 2, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks invited local party organizations to lead the creation of a people's militia, and on the same day the Military Council of the Moscow Military District adopted the "Resolution on ...
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By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the front command, not without reason, believed that the line of the 81st Guards. sd is heavily fortified. Therefore, located in the second echelon of the 73rd Guards. SD aimed at restoring the situation (in the event of a breakthrough) and holding the strip of 78 Guards. sd. This is evidenced by the decision to regroup Kozak's formation on the left flank of the 25th Guards. sk (to the second echelon for the 78th Guards Rifle Division) to the line: high. 205.5 high 191.8, cl. "Soloviev", St. "Labor's Dacha", vys. 210.4 by the end of July 2, 1943. By 23.00, the division without an artillery regiment concentrated in the forest, 4 km east of Yastrebovo, and began to occupy the indicated position. And on July 3 from the headquarters of the 25th Guards. the order came: "Be ready to move in a northeasterly direction"53
TsAMO RF. F. 73 Guards. sd. Op. 1. D. 33. L. 26.
That is, closer to the positions of the regiment of the second echelon of the 78th Guards. sd. Therefore, at the last moment Soviet side completely unraveled the enemy's plan and at the tip of the strike AG "Kempf" created the highest density of forces and means. 81 Guards. sd had the maximum possible number of reinforcement units and the density of artillery was 1 km higher than along the entire front (not to mention very high level preparation of the frontier), and for 78 guards. SD deployed the second echelon, a whole division! After that, it is difficult to agree with the authors of works on the Battle of Kursk, even with such authoritative ones as Marshal Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky 54
Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier duty. M.: Veche, 2013. S. 251.
Who accuse N. F. Vatutin of miscalculations and mistakes allegedly made by him in the preparation of the defense system and the distribution of front forces before it began.
As you know, the key to successful long-term defense is the presence at the disposal of the commander of formations and associations of full-fledged reserves, primarily artillery and mobile (armored). Thanks to them, the defending rifle units were able to quickly eliminate the enemy's advantage in the directions where he delivers the most powerful blows. In preparation for the Battle of Kursk, for the first time in the war years, operational mobile reserves and anti-tank weapons reserves began to be created not only in armies and corps, but also transferred to divisions and even rifle regiments. In the 7th Guards. And, relative to the neighbor on the right (6th Guards A), they were quite modest. However, the formations that held its main strip also received additional cannon, mortar and even tank regiments.
By the beginning of the fighting, Shumilov’s army (including the ap sd) had a total of 158 howitzers and howitzers-cannons, including 82 122-mm howitzers, 52 152-mm howitzers-guns (161 guards, 265 guards and 109 guards dads ), 12 122-mm self-propelled guns (1438 saps) and 12 152-mm self-propelled guns (1529 tsap). Only the 6th Guards had a large number of artillery in the front. And, however, this was still not enough to hold the 53 km section. But replenishment was not expected, so the commander, based on a tactical assessment of the terrain and the approximate forces of the enemy, decided to use his resources to strengthen, first of all, the right flank, since there was the Mikhailovsky bridgehead and a junction with the 6th guards. A. The bulk of the forces - two popes (34 152-mm howitzer cannons) and a heavy army ministry regiment (36 120-mm mortars) he concentrated in the band of 81 guards. sd. The third pope was divided between two divisions, two of his divisions (12 152-mm howitzer guns) were withdrawn to left wing, in 36 guards. sd, and the third - in 72 guards. sd.
At the same time, as already mentioned, in order to increase the density of artillery fire on the main zone, the army commander was forced to subordinate to the commanders of divisions of the first line from two divisions to an artillery regiment of divisions of the second echelon. In addition, in order to fight the heavy German "Tiger" tanks, which the troops of the front had already encountered during the February-March battles near Kharkov, he, with the permission of the Military Council of the front, ordered: to install on the positions of 72 guards. sd 12 122-mm howitzers and prepare the OP for direct fire from 152-mm howitzer guns. Let me remind you that at that time howitzers were among the most valuable types of weapons, and it was strictly forbidden to use them directly on the front line. In the event that this order was violated and the gun was lost, its commander was brought to trial by a military tribunal. Only at the critical moment of the Battle of Kursk, on July 9, 1943, the leadership of the Voronezh Front will be forced to give permission for the withdrawal of howitzer regiments to direct fire and in the strip of the 6th Guards. A. Thus, by the beginning of the battles, the formation of the 7th Guards. And the first echelon had the following reinforcement parts:
81 Guards. sd: 161 Guards Pope, 265 Guards Pope, 153 Guards ap (73 guards sd), 290 mp, 114 guards. iptap, 97 guards. and 315 guards. MP "Katyusha", 262 detachment, 2nd PTR battalion;
78 Guards. sd: 3/671 ap (213 rifle division), 4th PTR battalion;
72 Guards. sd: 3/109 Guards. apap, 1.2 / 671 ap (out of 213 sd) and 1st bn PTR;
36 Guards. sd: 43 Guards. ap (15th Guards Rifle Division), 1st and 2nd/109th Guards apap, 115 guards. iptap, 5th bn PTR, 148 rep and 34 odbp.
In case the calculations are not entirely accurate and the enemy strikes main blow not where it was supposed, or there would be a breakthrough in a less covered area, the army artillery headquarters, in terms of organizing fire, provided for a maneuver and a turn of the front of the attached cannon and mine units, as well as their own divisional artillery regiments, into the neighbors' zone. For example:
– 161 Guards dad planned to turn the front to the north (90 degrees) into the lane of the neighbor on the right (375th division of the 6th guards. A), by 180 degrees. when breaking through the line of 78 guards. sd and maneuver to support 73 guards. sd when it delivers a counterattack in the direction of Sabynino;
– 265 Guards pap - turn the front 90 degrees. to the south in the band 78 guards. sd;
– 2/290 mp - rotate 90 degrees. to the south in the band 78 guards. sd and maneuver in the area with. Lower Olshanets;
– 1 and 2/109 Guards. pap - turn south 90 degrees. and a maneuver to support a neighbor on the left (19 sd 57 A);
– 97 Guards mp RS - maneuver along the entire front to support all divisions of the first line.
The anti-tank reserve of the army commander included:
30 October, two of her regiments (the third had no guns) deployed along the line: Starikovo, Kupino, Krasnaya Polyana;
1669 aiptap - at firing positions in the area of high. 133.6, Arbuzovsky junction, southern outskirts of h. Volchansky Farms (two batteries - on the southern outskirts of Volchansk);
1670 iptap - had only 4 guns in service and was not combat-ready.
The brigade was in the center of the second army zone, but in the event of a breakthrough of tanks on the flanks, it was ready to advance into dangerous areas. For this, firing positions were prepared in tank-dangerous directions - gun platforms, trenches for personnel, shell cellars and equipped with car ramps. Similar work was carried out and 1669 iptap, which was planned to be used for active operations on the left flank (including to support the neighboring 57 A), and in the center of the army strip. At the same time, N. F. Vatutin, when developing a plan for using his own mobile anti-aircraft reserves, provided for their maneuver from the city of Korochi (area of concentration before the battle) to the right wing and to the center of Shumilov's army.
Back in May, the commanders of all artillery regiments, together with the unit commanders, conducted a reconnaissance of movement routes for maneuver, additional positions and NPs were prepared to turn the front to the neighbors' sectors. Unfortunately, the plans to "switch" the fire, especially the forces of 81 Guards. sd in the band 78 guards. sd in the first two days of the defensive operation did not justify themselves, with the exception of 2/290 mp. Artillery regiments and RS regiments were deployed far from the front line of the 78th Guards. SD and were unable to conduct effective fire on enemy crossings and bridgeheads. Therefore, for example, the command of the 25th Guards. sk already in the morning of July 5, it was forced to make a decision to transfer (move) the guns of a number of regiments from the strip of 81 guards. sd on the left flank of the hull.
As you know, the joints are always the weakest point of defense and connections, and associations. Therefore, M.S. Shumilov ordered back in April: before planning the system for covering the joints, the artillery commanders of divisions and corps personally conduct reconnaissance, determine the necessary forces and means to support them, and also personally select combat positions for artillery units. In addition, the commander made sure that a direct telephone connection was established between the commanders of all divisions. A lot of work was also carried out to provide artillery fire to army joints. For this, the artillery headquarters of the 7th Guards. And he established telephone and radio communications with the command and 57 A of the South-Western Front, and with 93 dads 27 tpabr 6 guards. A (who was to provide a joint from the side of 6 Guards A), extended a direct telephone line between 93 Popes and 161 Guards. Pope 81 Guards sd, and their joint NPs were also equipped. General NPs also had 36 guards. sd from 19 sd 57 A.
The main task of the armored forces in the upcoming operation was determined by the Military Council of the Army by order No. 00143 of April 1, 1943. It required that they be used only "as a mobile reserve for delivering counterattacks against an enemy that has broken through"55
TsAMO RF. F. 203. Op. 2851. D. 25. L. 54.
The use of a mobile (armored) reserve was planned taking into account the instructions of G.K. Zhukov to strengthen the flanks. It included all the saps, tp and brigade available in the army, with the exception of 262 tp and 148 otp, which, although they were transferred to reinforce the divisions of the first line, continued to be listed in the reserve of the commander. All tank units and formations conditionally (there was no formal order) M.S. Shumilov divided into two parts, gave each of them one glanders and aimed each of the parts to cover the flanks of the army. For each of the groups, five most probable directions of counterattacks were identified.
The right-flank, which included two tank regiments and mixed glanders (69 tanks and 21 self-propelled guns in total), was concentrated in the area of the villages of Blizhnyaya Igumenka, Myasoedovo, and the Postnikov farm. 167 otp lieutenant colonel A. A. Verba and 1438 glanders 56
The documentary fund of the regiment in TsAMO RF is very scarce, so it was not possible to establish who commanded the regiment at that time.
Equipped two anti-tank areas: 1st - in x. Postnikov (1st troop T-34, a company of submachine gunners and 1438 sap), 2nd - the Myasoedovo area (3 tr and a company of PTR 167 tp). Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Verba was appointed senior commander in the defense of both PTOPs. Tankers and self-propelled gunners were ordered to destroy German tanks on the way to Postnikov and Myasoedovo, and if necessary, act together with the 73rd Guards. sd, which occupied the defense in the second echelon of the army.
262 ttp (KV) of Colonel I. I. Aizenberg was transferred to the reserve of 81 guards. sd.
Left flank group - two brigades, a tank regiment and a heavy sap (154 tanks 57
Including 1 KV-1 in 1529 tsap.
And 12 self-propelled guns) - was located in the Voznesenovka, Bochkovo area. 27 Guards Colonel M. V. Nevzhinsky’s brigade defended the Voznesenovka anti-tank area and had additional task: to be ready both independently and together with the 213th rifle division and 1529 tsap to act against enemy tank wedges that broke through into the depths of the line of the 24th guards. sk. The 201st brigade of Colonel I.A. Taranova was in the PTOP: Vyazmin, /sk/ a brick factory on the northern outskirts of Bochkovo, a forestry 1 km from Chainovka, and was preparing to deliver short counterattacks both independently and together with the 15th Guards. sd and 1529 tsap. 1529 tsap was the last of the armored units to arrive in the army and concentrated in the forest 1.5 km southeast of the temporary storage warehouse. Krasnyansky. In early June, his personnel began to equip the main firing positions in the area of heights 167, 171.8, 184.4 and spare ones: southeast of the temporary storage warehouse. "Stalin". With the active actions of the armored forces of the army, the regiment was preparing to support both tank brigades with fire.
148th detachment of Colonel A.M. Lifits until the beginning of June was in the Volchansky Khutor Fri area, then he was subordinate to the commander of the 36th Guards. sd.
The armored vehicles between the tank groups were divided unevenly in order to maintain a balance of firepower on the flanks and facilitate maneuver. Command of the 7th Guards. A considered both flanks to be tank-dangerous directions, but the probability that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the right wing seemed greater. Therefore, 81 Guards. sd transferred significantly larger artillery forces than 36 guards. sd, but if necessary, the brigades of Nevzhinsky, Taranov and the Lifits regiment could be quickly transferred here (heavy cannon and mortar regiments cannot be quickly pulled up). At the same time, as already mentioned, when preparing the action plan for front-line mobile reserves, it provided for the maneuver of the 2nd Guards. TTK from the area of the city of Korochi to the right wing and the center of the 7th Guards. BUT.
In the spring, along with the equipment of combat positions, the development of plans and the training of the arriving replenishment in all tank regiments and brigades, the restoration of worn-out armored vehicles began. But work moved slowly. Assistant commander of the BT and MV army, Lieutenant Colonel Pavlov noted: “ Planning repairs under military conditions is extremely difficult due to the lack of spare parts that came only from front-line warehouses or are sought locally. Repair facilities are mainly used for crews moving to the point of repair. Such an organization leads to an increase in the repair time, but is caused by a lack of evacuation means.58
TsAMO RF. F. 203. Op. 2851. D. 25. L. 60 arr.
The army was in dire need of repair capacity and evacuation facilities, until the end of June it had only three repair units: one army evacuation company (AER No. 119), one army collection point for emergency vehicles (119 SPAM) and one mobile repair base (PRB No. 62) . All these units in the state should have already had modest means for evacuation, but they were not fully equipped with this equipment either. For example, in the army repair units there were only 15 full-time tractor tractors. The same problems existed in the repair units of combat units and formations. In 1438 sap and 1529 tsap had only two tractors each, the rest of the units managed as best they could. Let me remind you that there was an order according to which it was forbidden to dismantle and re-equip even wrecked combat vehicles. Therefore, the command of regiments and brigades was forced to use only ownerless tanks abandoned on the battlefield as tractors, but first they had to be found and repaired. So, in the 201st brigade for fifty combat vehicles, with the permission of the command, it was possible to prepare three tractors, two based on the Mk-3 (without a turret) and one linear Mk-3, and in the 27th Guards. brigade and 148 detachment one by one, based on the restored T-34. And only before the start of the battles to strengthen the 7th Guards. And from the 4th field tank repair plant (4 PTRZ) 78 PTBs were received. The difficult situation with the means of evacuation of Shumilov's army is also evidenced by the fact that its troops, even on their own territory, were not able to assemble foreign equipment on the battlefield. Therefore, from May 10 to May 14, the Remrota of the 96th brigade, which occupied the defense in the second echelon of the 6th Guards. A (in the area of Dalnyaya Igumenka - h. Postnikov), examined the tanks left in the Old City by the Soviet units after the winter battles, and evacuated two “thirty-fours” from here to their SPAM, which were then put into operation and participated in the summer battles 59
TsAMO RF. F. 96 otbr. Op. 3191. D. 3. L. 7 arr.
However, by the beginning of the battle, the armored forces of the army had a high degree readiness. As of July 4, 1943, only 14 of the 224 combat vehicles on the list were under repair: in the 27th Guards. tbr - 2 (one supernumerary tank), 201 brigades - 2, 262 tp - 2, 148 otp - 1, 167 otp - 7 (all supernumerary). For more information about the state of the material part of the BT and MV army at 20.00 July 4, 1943, see table No. 3.
As you know, the most brilliant plan is worthless until it is put into practice, therefore, in order to objectively assess the degree of readiness of the 7th Guards band. And to repel the strike of the Kempf AG, it is important to understand how much the plan of the Soviet command, set out on paper, corresponded to what the troops had prepared by the beginning of July. In the order of the Military Council of the 7th Guards. And on April 4, 1943, one of the main tasks of the troops was the immediate deployment of systematic work on the engineering strengthening of positions, not only in the first, but also in the second echelon. The document emphasized: “The works of the first stage include excerpt and camouflage of the main and reserve trenches of a full profile for all fire weapons, the installation of anti-tank barriers / especially in the system of anti-tank areas /, the widespread use of natural obstacles, flooding and swamping, the installation of barricades in settlements, and blockages in forest.
The available stock of mines should be used massively in tank-hazardous areas.
In the first place, also build NPs and command posts, bunkers in the most important directions and passages of communication in open areas, adapt settlements for defense and mine the places of possible enemy crossings.
An excerpt of single unrelated shooting cells is prohibited.
Secondly: continuing to strengthen and improve the work of the first stage, develop a system of communications, build machine-gun bunkers, shelters, and improve camouflage on a daily basis. During the entire period, keep the roads in a passable condition"60
TsAMO RF. F. 262 TTP. Op. 32956. D. 2. L. 64.
Until that moment, the troops of the Red Army had not erected such a powerful field defensive line. Usually, the personnel of the combat units, together with full-time sappers, had time to prepare the defensive line for battles. Often the local population was also involved in the work. Now, when it became necessary to extract hundreds of thousands of cubes of soil in a relatively short period of time and simultaneously conduct mining large areas, repair bridges, prepare log cabins for firing points, command posts and NPs, a different organization was required. Even with a cursory assessment of the plan for the construction of fortifications and engineering barriers, it was clear that such a large-scale plan would require enormous costs. manual labor and a huge amount of tools - picks, axes, stretchers, etc. For the army, this was a really big problem, since the bill went to tens of thousands of shovels alone. Therefore, it was decided to involve the entire combat personnel of the army in defense work and take measures both to obtain tools from front-line warehouses and to start manufacturing them on the spot. The provision of the armies of the Voronezh Front with entrenching tools and obstacles on April 1, 1943 and by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk is given in table No. 4.
The presence of a river in front of the front line of the divisions of the first line of the 7th Guards. And especially a few hundred meters overgrown with reeds and sedge floodplains greatly facilitated the work of equipping positions. Although the presence in the immediate vicinity of the enemy made itself felt constantly. If the Germans noticed even a slight accumulation of fighters or fixed earthworks, they were sure to fire from machine guns, mortars and guns. Therefore, in order to hide the system of engineering structures, barriers and save personnel, the army command ordered all fortification work to be carried out from 22.00 to 6.00 in March. In the daytime, the fighters had to rest, study, in extreme cases, carry out work invisible from the outside (equip inside the bunkers, dugouts, prepare a entrenching tool).
In this regard, I would like to dwell on an issue that I consider important and express my point of view based on the data collected in the archives. More than once I have heard from researchers, museum staff and foreign historians the assertion that when building defenses near Kursk, the Soviet side actively used not only troops active army and the local population, but also prisoners of war and even prisoners. This, for example, was written in his memoirs by the former commander of the 503 tb "tigers" K. von Kagenek 61
Lochmann F., Rubbel A., Rosen R. The Combat History of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503 in World War II. Stackpole Books, 2008. P. 110.
The following fact was cited as evidence: supposedly for the fortification of the rear line (or the first front) of the troops of the Central Front, two camps of prisoners were specially created and it was they, and not the civilian population of Kurshchina, who prepared trenches, communications and dugouts. The Germans claimed that in the captured trenches of the Soviet units they allegedly found letters German soldiers, from this they concluded that they were being dug by prisoners of war. Indeed, at that time in the Soviet Union, the labor of both prisoners and prisoners of war was widely used, including in providing work. military industry and construction of military installations. So maybe that's how it was. However, on the topic of the Battle of Kursk, I happened to work for quite a long time in various archives, and so far I have not come across documents that would directly or indirectly confirm these assumptions. On the contrary, the sources found indicate that Soviet command at the level of the army and the front, it was required not to involve prisoners of war for the construction of army defense lines, in particular the Voronezh Front, and not even to use them as auxiliary labor in the troops, as was widely practiced in the Wehrmacht (Khivi). For example, I will quote from the order of the commander of the 7th Guards. And on April 19, 1943: “On this date at 8.00 in the morning, a truck of a foreign brand, belonging to the 662nd VNOS company, driven by a driver from German prisoners of war, due to a malfunction, rolled back down the mountain in the area of \u200b\u200bmy dugout62
From March to mid-April 1943, the army headquarters was located in the village of Protopopovka, and then, after April 15, it moved to dugouts prepared in the forest between the villages of Krasnaya Zarya and Ternovaya (On the Belgorod direction. Memoirs of the participants in the battles. Belgorod: Belgorod book publishing house, 1963. S. 95).
, ran into a prisoner of war and a sergeant of a security company, inflicting a wound on the latter. The senior in the car was the assistant company commander for materiel art. Lieutenant Borisov. Such a case could only occur due to the exceptional laxity in the company, since travel to the CP area is prohibited. Departure on a faulty car to the part where the requirements for the operation of the car are observed is also not possible. In addition, keeping a German driver in a company and allowing a prisoner of war to work is a gross violation of my order, since all prisoners are to be immediately sent to a prisoner of war camp. This violation of the order shows at the same time the complete lack of vigilance in the 622nd VNOS company. I order:
1. To all military formations and units where prisoners of war are still for some reason, immediately send them under escort to a prisoner of war camp and continue not to detain them in units and not to involve them in work "63
TsAMO RF. F. 290 mp. Op. 20928s. D. 4. L. 199.
Further in the document, a reprimand was issued to the deputy commander of artillery for air defense, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev, and the commander of the 622nd VNOS company, Captain Khomenko, deputy. company commander for political affairs Lieutenant Amusov and assistant company commander art. Lieutenant Borisov was ordered to be arrested for 5 days and withheld 50% of his salary for this period. The order was to be announced to everything command staff up to and including the company commander and was clearly designed for internal use, since it was sent out for execution to the troops (the given copy was found in the fund of 290 mp). Therefore, there is no reason not to believe in the sincerity of the army commander, who demanded the immediate sending of prisoners of war to the camp, there is no reason.
I spoke in detail about how the defensive lines of the Voronezh Front were erected in the book “Kursk Break. Decisive battle Patriotic War”, therefore, in order not to repeat myself, I will refer the reader to this edition and to the table No. 4 already mentioned above, the numbers of which clearly demonstrate in dynamics the scope of the fortification by the troops of the 7th Guards. And their engineering lines from April 1 to July 5, 1943. To these data I will add that the line of the Voronezh Front was quite saturated with mine-explosive barriers, both at the forefront and in depth. In addition to the formed engineering reserve in each rifle division (1-2 platoons with 400-500 anti-tank riflemen) of the engineering barrier battalions in the rifle corps (for example, 206 biz were registered in the 25th Guards Rifle Corps) and armies, battalions of the anti-tank reserve of the front command were also trained. For example, the 47th engineer-sapper battalion located in Korocha (3 vehicles, 10 carts, 4700 firearms and 500 kg of explosives) was aimed at the 7th guards. And at the junction of it with the 6th Guards. A. To provide battalions of the front-line anti-aircraft reserve at the 5th engineer-sapper brigade, concentrated in the village. Zhuravka, there was a warehouse of constant readiness with 100,000 mines and 10 vehicles. In addition, by July 5, 1943, 82,300 infantry units were delivered to front-line warehouses in the villages of Saraevka, Kholki, Chernyanka and in the city of Ostrogozhsk. By the way, the artillery shells mentioned in Table No. 4 are German large-caliber ammunition captured during the winter battles, which the sappers used as land mines, the fuses were altered, and tons of captured explosives- for mining bridges and buildings.
The construction of field defenses proceeded with considerable difficulty in all armies. And the point here was not only in the colossal volumes of land work and the need to complete formations and train troops in parallel with them. Subjective factors also played a significant role, primarily the personality of the commander (regiment, division), his desire to work for results, the ability to create a workable team of like-minded people from subordinate officers, ready to fulfill the assigned tasks. N. F. Vatutin had served in the army for 23 years (calendar), had extensive practical experience in both staff and command work, knew all the nuances of the service. Therefore, he was well aware that in a large army team, an important condition for the success of any business is strict control over the execution of decisions made. The general of the army attached paramount importance to this aspect of the matter. Beginning in April, the front headquarters, in parallel with the army command, monthly (sometimes more often) carried out its checks of the lines of regiments and divisions. This practice proved to be very useful and effective. Checks were carried out on a wide range of issues: the degree of readiness of the trench network on the main strip, the strengthening of firing points, combat documentation, the depth and density of engineering barriers, the system of small arms and artillery fire, communications at all levels, etc. Departures of specialists from various services and their independent The assessment made it possible to present the real state of affairs in the troops, to identify "bottlenecks" in the work of erecting field fortifications and organizing fire, to assess the abilities and effectiveness of commanders, primarily those who had recently been appointed to their posts. Today, the acts with the results of the work of these commissions and the orders adopted on their basis allow historians to see the real picture of what is happening on the positions of Vatutin's troops in preparation for the Battle of Kursk, including in the 7th Guards. BUT.
In early May (until May 10), the front headquarters conducted the first comprehensive check of the army bands. The reason was the directive of the Headquarters dated May 5, 1943, received by the command of the Central, Voronezh and South-Western Fronts, which stated: “In recent days, there have been significant movements of enemy troops and vehicles in the areas of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov and the approach of enemy troops to the front line. This makes us expect active actions from the enemy in the near future. Bid Supreme High Command requires that you pay attention to the following:
1. Full implementation of the plan for the use of front-line aviation to destroy enemy aircraft and disrupt transportation by rail and dirt roads.
2. Pay maximum attention to all types of reconnaissance in order to reveal enemy groupings and his intentions.
3. Once again check the state of your defenses, the vigilance of the guards and the readiness of all forces and means, including troops, reserves of armies and fronts, to repel an enemy attack that is being prepared. Use every hour to strengthen your defenses. Organize inspections personally and through responsible representatives of your headquarters.64
TsAMO RF. F. 3. Op. 11556. D. 13. L. 160.
During the weekly audit, the commissions determined average level defense readiness (which corresponded to approximately 35-40% of the necessary work) and identified whole line problems. Based on the information collected, the front headquarters made the necessary adjustments and promptly outlined measures to correct the miscalculations and shortcomings. This also applied to the 7th Guards. A, which at the beginning of May carried out a major regrouping in order to increase the density of forces on the main strip and increase the stability of the lines in anti-tank terms. In order for the reader to be able, at least in general terms, to imagine the state of defense of the Shumilov army during this period, I will quote from the “Brief tactical and technical description of the defense sector of the Voronezh Front as of May 12, 1943”, compiled by the department of fortified areas of the front headquarters. For comparison, in parentheses are the figures for the same period for 6 Guards. BUT: " 1. The main line of defense of the army extends for 54 (64) km along the left bank of the river. Northern Donets and consists of 38 (31) battalion sections. On the right flank (81st Guards Rifle Division) the battalion sections were echeloned to the depth of the regiment's defenses. On the left flank at the junction with southwestern front battle areas are echeloned to the depth of the division's defense.
Important directions are: Belgorod - Far Igumenka, Belgorod - Razumnoe - Myasoedovo, Murom - Maslova Pristan - Churaevo, Murom - Staraya Tavolzhanka - Nevizheno, and Murom - Volchansk - Baikovo. Tank dangerous areas are protected by anti-tank barriers(ditches and scarps . – V.Z.), mines and wooden barriers(forest debris . – V.Z.). The military units and regular fire weapons are provided with the main fortifications.
Anti-tank mines 170 (375),
Anti-personnel mines 280 (182),
Anti-tank obstacles 0.10 km (0.28 km),
Anti-personnel barriers 0.53 km (1 km),
Machine gun sectors 12 (14),
Bomb shelters and pillboxes 10.5 (3.2),
Mortar positions 10 (5),
Positions PTR 12 (5.5),
Artillery equipped positions 8.3 (7.7),
Message moves 1.6 (2.2).
2. The second defensive line also crosses the healed area from the right flank to Shebekino and the open area from Shebekino to the left flank. The strip runs along the front for 45 (70) km and consists of 22 (30) battalion sectors. All battalion sectors are active and fortified. Settlements prepared for defense. Important areas are covered by engineering structures. The average saturation of the second line of defense (per 1 km) is:
The average saturation of the main line of defense (per 1 km of the front) is:
Anti-tank mines 11 (25),
Anti-personnel barriers 0.33 km (0.30 km),
Machine gun sectors 12.5 (4.5),
Bomb shelters and bunkers 4 (1),
Mortar positions 8.3 (4),
PTR positions 8.5 (5),
Artillery equipped positions 5.5 (3),
Message moves 0.55 (2.6)"65
Glantz D., House D. Battle of Kursk. The decisive turning point of World War II. Moscow: AST, 2006, pp. 402–408.
An analysis of the acts of inspections carried out in mid-June indicates that in the system of army defensive lines (primarily the main and second), a particularly significant number of serious flaws were found in terms of organizing fire and engineering fortification of positions. Some divisions ignored the requirements of a number of orders from the front and the army, as a result, sometimes due to inexperience, and more often due to negligence and inaction, even the battalions were fortified out of hand badly, the fire was organized illiterately, and in some places the Germans quietly removed some of the mine fields under the noses of negligent commanders, and they did not even know about it. And although the elimination of flaws and frank outrages went on in a "fire order", but this matter was not brought to the end of June. In the 7th Guards. And most of the problems turned out to be in 72 guards. sd Major General A.P. Losev. From June 18 to June 20, her 224th guards were checked. cn. As a result, the leadership of the front and the Military Council of the army were presented with a document full of unsightly facts in the regiment, which was located on the main strip. Here is just one quote: “... Organization and provision of the main line of defense. All fire weapons of the 2nd company are advanced to the front line. The density of rifle and machine-gun fire in the zone up to 400 m from the front edge according to the report of the battalion commander-1 guards. Captain Ragulin, in front of the front of the company is 4 bullets per meter. The distance from the forward edge to the river is over 500 m. Approaches to the forward edge of the defense are provided with oblique and flank fire. The mirror of the river is not shot through by fire. The weapon is not suitable for shooting at night. There is no rifle documentation in platoons and squads ... The battle plan in the regiment has been developed, but subordinates - battalion and company commanders know it poorly.
14th Rifle Division
While studying at the academy, Meretskov was twice sent for combat training in the army. The first time, in early May 1919, was to the Southern Front.
The situation in the south of the country by that time was extremely dangerous. Rostov region and Kuban were engulfed in the fire of war. Quite recently, in April, the situation here seemed quite stable. The Red Army pressed the so-called Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR) to the sea, and Denikin's troops were on the verge of complete defeat. But the Southern Front, commanded by V.M. Gittis, did not have the courage to deliver the final, decisive blow to the enemy. Gittis hoped for the support of the Ukrainian Red Army, but she was busy eliminating the consequences of foreign intervention in the south-west of the republic.
The Entente came to the aid of General Denikin, equipping his army with modern weapons and equipment for that period. The Whites managed to recover from the defeat in a short time and, having gathered powerful forces, went on the offensive. Against the red Southern Front, which numbered 73 thousand people, stood a well-trained, heavily armed white army of 100 thousand soldiers and officers.
The shock groupings of the White Guard Denikin's army broke through the front and rushed to the center of Russia - to Moscow. To the west and north of the Donbass, detachments of Ukrainian atamans-independence actively ruffled the red units. In the rear, unrest broke out among the wealthy part of the population, dissatisfied with the policy of the Soviet government to “decossackize” the Don. Riots swept the villages and farms between Liski and Novokhopyorsk, an armed rebellion rose in Vyoshenskaya.
A group of "academicians", as the troops called the arriving students of the academy (which included Meretskov), were instructed to make their way to the 9th Army. It was precisely “to make their way”, since the dividing front line passed somewhere near Rostov and the 400-kilometer space that lay on the way to it from Voronezh was not controlled by any of the warring parties, all kinds of robber gangs were managing there. In the area between Kurtalak, Medveditsa and Ilova, where the 9th Army was located, the group had to move along the Don steppes, bypassing all kinds of gangs. Fortunately for the “academicians”, nothing bad happened to them on the anxious journey, they safely reached their destination.
The 9th Army (commander P.E. Knyagnitsky) consisted of three divisions - the 14th, operating on the left flank, the 16th - on the right flank and the 23rd - in the center. Vyoshensky, Kazan, Migulinsky, Yelansky and Ust-Khopersky stanitsa "buzzed" in the rear. They were supported by the Cossacks of the farms of Napolov, Astakhov, Shumilin, Solonki. The 9th Army, as well as the neighboring 8th Army, allocated significant forces to suppress the rebels: the rebels were encircled, but did not surrender.
Denikin launched a broad offensive: Volunteer army General May-Maevsky moved through the Donbass to Ukraine; Caucasian Volunteer General Wrangel - Salsky steppes to Tsaritsyn; Don General Sidorin attacked the positions of the Red 9th Army.
It was difficult to resist the White Guards, at the disposal of the commander-9 there were only 15 thousand bayonets and sabers, scattered by separate units from the village of Konstantinovskaya to Kamenskaya. The 3rd Don Cossack Corps easily cut the junction between the 9th and 8th armies, went to the Millerovo area, and the second group of white troops captured the villages of Tatsinskaya, Milyutinskaya, Bokovskaya and joined up with the rebellious Cossacks of the village of Vyoshenskaya ...
Upon the arrival of the trainees at the headquarters of the army, before being appointed to positions, they were taken for general familiarization to the nearest parts. Kirill Meretskov drew attention to the fact that the commanders and Red Army men of the 14th and 16th divisions were in a cheerful mood, despite modest combat successes, and in the 23rd fighters were gloomy. What's the matter? It turned out that they were upset by the departure of their beloved commander F.K. Mironov. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic sent him near Saransk to form a cavalry corps from detachments of the Khoper poor transferred there. The fighters of the 23rd division, mostly from the locals, could not imagine themselves without the dashing Mironych, who was no less famous in the Don than in the Urals about the legendary Chapai. They painfully accepted his move, many believed that with him there would be no “buza” in the villages. The countrymen were looking forward to his return, they said: "Here Philip Kuzmich will return, he will immediately bring order to the Don region."
Employees of the political department of the army told Kirill a lot of interesting things about Mironov. He is a true Cossack, born in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya. Graduated from the Novocherkassk cadet school. He was elected ataman of the village of Raspopinskaya. AT Russo-Japanese War commanded hundreds. For participation in the revolutionary actions of the Cossacks in 1905-1907 he was dismissed from service. In 1914 he was again drafted into the army. During the First World War, he was (with the rank of foreman) assistant regiment commander, awarded four orders and the St. George weapon. He enthusiastically accepted the October Revolution, in 1917 the Cossacks of the 32nd Don Regiment elected him as their commander. In January 1918, Mironov led a regiment from the Romanian front to the Don and joined the active struggle for Soviet power, commanded a red regiment, a brigade, the 23rd rifle division, a group of troops of the 9th army, who participated in the battles against the White Cossack troops of General P .N. Krasnov. On the Don, Mironov enjoyed high prestige for justice, honesty and courage.
Political officers said about Mironov that he political views a typical middle peasant, was previously under the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and has not yet acquired a solid Bolshevik worldview. “As I found out,” Meretskov writes in his memoirs, “Mironov ... hesitated, as part of the middle peasants sometimes hesitated. The course for a firm alliance with the middle peasants, proclaimed in March 1919 by the Eighth Party Congress, was only just beginning to be put into practice. When it becomes stronger, people like Mironov will stop vacillating, the chatter about "decossackization" will stop, and the Veshensky revolt will die out by itself. I heard this opinion from some employees of the political department of the army. Perhaps, I thought, but does this mean that we should wait for the weather by the sea and not liquidate the anti-Soviet uprising faster?
Kirill was appointed assistant chief of staff in the 14th Infantry Division. He regarded this appointment as quite successful: it was important for him to gain experience by serving in a full-blooded line unit that carried out combat operations as part of an army formation and front.
The 14th division was considered the best not only in the army, but also on the scale of the front. Its history dates back to the summer of 1918, with the creation of the Moscow Special Brigade from the working regiments of Krasnaya Presnya and Zamoskvorechye. The brigade was sent to the Southern Front, where it was transformed into the 14th Infantry Division. At the same time, the Special Brigade became known as the 2nd, and the 1st and 3rd brigades were formed already during the battles with Denikin's men from various volunteer detachments. In January 1919, the leadership of the division was completed: a young Latvian, Bolshevik, former officer Alexander Karlovich Stepin became commander (in the 9th army he was called in Russian: Stepin). Commissioner - Rozhkov, chief of staff - Kiselev.
Divisional Commander Stepin treated Meretskov with interest. He asked Kirill: where did he come from, where and by whom did he work in the past, did he fight. And, of course, about training at the academy and the nature of classes, about professors, many of whom he knew from joint service in the old army.
Chief of Staff Kiselev, a man not very talkative, immediately introduced Kirill to the course of duties - he thrust a map into his hands and said: "Your task is to lead it, put the position of the troops, ours and the enemy, and immediately note all changes." This concludes the introduction to the course. In the future, Kiselev spoke with his assistant quite rarely.
Kirill saw that the chief did not really need information about the situation of the troops, which he reported to him, the head of the headquarters. So, his activities brought little benefit to the command.
Indeed, the data of the operational situation, collected and mapped by him, sent from the units, sometimes turned out to be a fake. After checking them, it turned out that they absolutely do not correspond to the real situation. On the one hand, the reports very often sinned with inaccuracies, on the other hand, they arrived at the headquarters with great delay. So it was risky to rely on them: after all, the timeliness of combat orders and the success of the battle as a whole depended on it.
There was no radio in the division, it was not possible to use the telegraph in the steppe, and they did not have time to deploy telephone communications - the units moved too quickly. Now, if Cyril himself personally collected data in the troops! But for this you need to be there, and he sits at the headquarters all the time.
Cyril writes in his memoirs that his dissatisfaction with his work grew day by day. He painfully thought about how to put before Kiselev the question of changing the procedure for collecting information about the disposition of the red and white units. The case helped. Once, Stepin, with adjutants and orderlies, was preparing to leave for the brigades. Seeing Meretskov, the division commander asked how things were going with him.
No matter! Immersed in a clerical routine, and I don’t see any sense from it given the current formulation of the case. The headquarters is late with registering changes in the tactical situation. Therefore, in reality, the situation is one, but on the map it is different.
Do you know how to ride a horse?
I can. And I love horses in general.
Well, here’s a mare for you, - the commander immediately switched to “you” (on “you”, he pointedly politely addressed staff workers who preferred a chair to a saddle), “act at my disposal, jump into the troops and find out what you need.
Kirill thanked the division commander, immediately saddled his horse and went to the brigades.
The matter immediately changed. He arrives at the unit, finds out what happened, immediately puts fresh data on the map, rushes to the headquarters and reports them to Kiselev on the same day
Who is it from the 2nd brigade that promptly gave you information? - the assistant chief of staff asked in bewilderment.
Himself ... - Cyril answered.
How are you?!
Was in the brigade. Seeing everything with my own eyes...
Kiselev began to respect the "academician", began to use the map that Meretskov prepared more often. He now treated Kirill and Stepin with great attention. He instructed him to take care of the 1st Rifle Brigade, which included units of the internationalists. Subsequently, he appointed him to temporarily act as chief of staff of this brigade.
Denikin's men pressed hard on the 14th division, and it "nervously" retreated to the northeast in the direction of the Buzuluk River. She had no one to lend a shoulder to, the front crackled everywhere. Although, according to Cyril, her retreat should have been more organized. He proceeded not only from the theory that he had recently learned at the academy, but simply from common sense. In conditions when, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the entire front retreats and cannot stop in order to establish a proper defense, it would be necessary to put up strong barriers in the rear guard with the task of delaying, albeit not for long, in advantageous positions, the advanced units of the advancing enemy. Due to this, streamline the withdrawal of the main forces, concentrate them and take a new defensive line.
However, in practice this did not work out. The 14th division was cut off from the main army. She retreated to the north not in a straight line, but described a huge arc along the eastern bend of the Don. The route through Tsimlyanskaya, Nizhne-Chirskaya, Oblivskaya, Kletskaya and Ust-Medveditskaya villages on Serebryakovo turned out to be difficult. The division was surrounded by hostile Cossacks who sympathized with the whites. The local population was waiting for "their own", and here come the Bolsheviks, and even non-Russians. This is addressed to the internationalists of the 1st Infantry Brigade. Following them curses were sent, sometimes bullets in the back.
Denikin's OSVAG organization tirelessly trumpeted that the Don people were "saving their homeland from the enemies of Russia." White aviation dropped leaflets over the retreating Red troops, which spoke of the "death of the Soviets." There were even fake copies of the Pravda newspaper. They contained fictitious reports from different fronts, from which it was clear that the end of the Red Army was coming. All this had a negative effect on the mood of the fighters, fermentation began in some units.
In the first days of June, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic released Knyagnitsky from command of the army. In his place was appointed chief of staff, former tsarist colonel N.D. Vsevolodov. However, the change of leadership did not lead to an improvement in the situation in the army; on the contrary, it worsened. If earlier political work in the units was at least somehow carried out, now it has completely died out. Kirill in his brigade felt the increased stupidity of command and control. The army headquarters often commanded over the head of the division, directly giving the units their instructions. Moreover, these instructions were contradictory and, as a result, gave rise to confusion. Units and subunits lost interaction with their neighbors, rushed about the steppe like blind men. Acting alone, they usually found themselves in critical situations. Hence, a chaotic retreat on the verge of flight. The blame for everything that happened fell on the divisional leadership. The commander of the 14th division received systematic thrashings from Vsevolodov.
From the memoirs of Meretskov: “Nachdiv Stepin was constantly in the first line of fighters, encouraging them with his presence. He was well known in the division, they saw him as a brave, enterprising commander and recognized his authority. Further, he writes that every commander and fighter understood that Stepin was not to blame for the disorganization of the actions of the brigades. Staff workers understood this especially well, because the orders coming from the army headquarters made their eyes pop out of their heads. Some orders could not be called otherwise than sheer nonsense.
The situation became more difficult every day. The army machine worked with great failures. The supply of troops stopped, ammunition was not brought up, and soon they became sorely lacking. The rear moved with the troops of the first echelon, epidemics raged, up to a quarter of the personnel lay on carts in typhoid fever.
The Whites were well aware of the situation of the 9th Army and effectively used the mistakes and blunders of the Red command for their own purposes. In each village they had their own eyes and ears. For example, all movements of the brigades of the 14th division were clearly monitored. Therefore, as soon as the Red Army unit entered any locality, after some time, White Guard flying squadrons unexpectedly attacked her.
Cyril analyzed the nature of the combat strategy on the Southern Front and concluded: Civil War in the south of Russia, which took place before his eyes, there was a specific war. The classical concepts of a continuous front, deep and near rear are unacceptable for her. As a rule, trench line systems covered with barbed wire are not here. In the vast majority of clashes - maneuverable. The mass of troops in a vast open area is rapidly moving, covering large distances. In this maneuvering struggle, the one who had more cavalry won the upper hand.
The southern front of the Red Army in June 1919, in terms of the number of cavalry, was about two and a half times inferior to Denikin's. Therefore, he lost to them in most battles.
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To Ivgila Nikolai Grigorievich - assistant platoon commander of the 41st Guards rifle regiment(14th Guards Vinnitsa Red Banner Rifle Division, 33rd Guards Rifle Corps, 5th Guards Army, 1st Ukrainian Front), senior sergeant.
Born on December 6, 1909 in the village of Stavidla, now the Aleksandrovsky district Kirovograd region(Ukraine) in peasant family. Ukrainian. He graduated from the 4th grade of the school. In 1932 he moved to the city of Nizhny Novgorod. Since 1937 he lived in the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk region, worked as a furnaceman at a metallurgical plant.
Since 1939 - in the Red Army. Since August 1941 - in the army. He fought on the Southern, South-Western, Steppe (since October 20, 1943 - 2nd Ukrainian) and 1st Ukrainian fronts. He took part in the defensive battles of 1941, Barvenkovsko-Lozovsky offensive operation, Battle of Stalingrad, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, the liberation of the Left-Bank Ukraine, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Uman-Botoshansky, Lvov-Sandomierz, Sandomiro-Silesian, Berlin and Prague offensive operations. In battles he was wounded twice.
During the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky offensive operation in capturing the village of Reymentarovka (now Dibrovka, Novomirgorodsky district of the Kirovograd region, Ukraine) on January 30, 1944, the guard private N.G. By order of the regiment commander, he was awarded the medal "For Courage".
On April 26, 1944, near the village of Pugacheny (now Pukhechen, Novoanensky district, Moldova), N.G. Kivgila with a group of fighters performed a combat mission of reconnaissance of the enemy’s front line. Secretly approaching the dugout, the soldiers suddenly burst into it and opened fire. As a result, five enemy soldiers were destroyed, and two were taken prisoner and taken to the headquarters of the regiment. The next day the enemy counterattacked our battle formations. N. G. Kivgila was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield and continued to control his subordinates until all counterattacks were repulsed.
P by order of the commander of the 14th Guards Rifle Division of June 4, 1944, Guards Junior Sergeant awarded the order Glory 3rd degree.
In July 1944, the 14th Guards Rifle Division was redeployed to the 1st Ukrainian front and began to prepare for the attack. During the battle on August 12, 1944, in the area of the village of Dombruvka (now the commune of Chermin, Mielesky county of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship, Poland), the N.G. 2 prisoners. By diverting the enemy's fire, the soldiers ensured a successful attack by the company. Continuing the offensive, the detachment of N.G. Kivgyly, when capturing the village of Dolne, destroyed 10 Nazis and captured a machine gun.
P By order of the commander of the 5th Guards Army on September 24, 1944, the Guards Sergeant was awarded the Order of Glory, 2nd degree.
In the battle on the outskirts of the city and fortress of Breslau (now Wroclaw, Lower Silesian Voivodeship, Poland) on February 19, 1945, the assistant platoon commander N.G. German soldiers and capturing 3 prisoners. When repulsing the counterattack, the platoon destroyed over 20 enemy soldiers and captured 4 heavy machine guns.
At By order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 27, 1945, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the German invaders and the valor and courage shown by the guards, the senior sergeant was awarded the Order of Glory 1st degree.
In 1945 he was demobilized. He returned to the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk region. He worked as a senior furnace blast furnace shop. Since 1969 he lived in the village of Moshny Cherkasy region Cherkasy region (Ukraine).
He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree (03/11/1985), Glory 1st (06/27/1945), 2nd (09/24/1944) and 3rd (06/04/1944) degrees, medals, including "For courage" (04.02.1944).