Memoirs of soldiers about the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk View from Germany. it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters "

Reflex, Czech Republic

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 buried German tanks and hopes

About the war 1939-1945

After the Stalingrad victory greatly helped the Red Army to believe in their strength, the Germans were able to at least partially restore their tarnished reputation thanks to the newly captured Kharkov. Nevertheless, they did not give up hopes for a radical change in the eastern campaign. Total mobilization and an increase in the production of weapons allowed them to largely compensate for the heavy losses suffered. The Germans also relied on the new Panther medium tanks, Tiger heavy tanks, Ferdinand self-propelled artillery mounts, new, well-armed and fast Focke-Wulf aircraft (Fw 190A), modernized Heinkel bombers (He 111) and single-seat attack aircraft Henschel (Hs 129). In the battle of Kursk, which began on July 4, 1943, the Germans were about to gain the upper hand again.

According to the data on monthly losses, from the beginning of the implementation of the Barbarossa plan until the end of March 1943, the armed forces of the Third Reich lost 2,237,656 people dead, wounded and missing on the eastern front (cumulative losses reached 2,504,128 people), while, according to the headquarters of the High Command ground forces, the enemy lost 11 million dead, captured and wounded, no longer fit for service.

According to official Russian data from 1993, during the same period, the Red Army and Navy lost 2,325,909 deaths, 387,171 deaths from wounds, 414,692 deaths in hospitals and deaths in emergency situations, that is, a total of 3,127,772 people. Another 3,994,831 were missing or captured, and 5,913,480 were wounded, shell-shocked or burned. That is, the Germans assumed that the Russian forces would run out sooner or later.

Solution: Kursk Bulge

According to German command, the Kursk Bulge, protruding far to the west, concealed a favorable opportunity to encircle and then defeat the armies of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, which had taken up defense there. This task was to be carried out by the troops on the joining flanks of Army Groups Center and South.

Context

July 5: Hell on the Kursk Bulge

Die Welt 30.04.2016

Bet on "Tiger" and "Panther"

Die Welt 07/06/2013

Many mistakes on the way to the Kursk Bulge

Die Welt 05/24/2013 The operation was called "Citadel", and in the operational order, which is quoted in the Wehrmacht's military herald, it was said: "This offensive is decisive. It should be swift and end with undeniable success... Therefore, it is necessary to carry out all the necessary preparations as thoroughly and intensively as possible. The best connections, the best weapon, better command and a large amount of ammunition - all this must be thrown into the main sectors of the front. Every commander and every ordinary soldier must understand crucial this offensive. The whole world should know about the victory at Kursk.”

But also Soviet command did not doze. His intelligence had informed in advance of the German plans. After careful consideration, it was decided to take up a well-prepared defense, and after the enemy's strike formations were exhausted, go on the counteroffensive. Huge forces were concentrated in the area of the Kursk Bulge, significantly superior to the enemy forces: 1,910,361 soldiers, 31,415 guns and mortars, 5,128 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and 3,549 aircraft against 776,907 soldiers, 7,417 guns and mortars, 2,459 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations and 1830 enemy aircraft.

However, the Germans managed to achieve temporary superiority in the direction of the main attack. Each of the closest Soviet armies to the front line built three lines of defense. In June 1943, 300 thousand people took part in the creation of fortifications on the Kursk salient. Never before in all the Great Patriotic war such a large and extensive trench network was not built. In addition to a powerful anti-tank defense, a solid air defense fronts and railways. After listing all these advantages, the question arises: why, then, were the losses, primarily of personnel and armored vehicles, suffered by the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, both at the defense stage and at the offensive stage? The answer lies in the technical superiority of the German armed forces, the extremely high qualification of tank crews and pilots, to whom today even Russian specialists pay tribute, in the perfectly coordinated actions of the repair units, which managed to instantly return damaged tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts back to service, as well as in a number of other factors.

Three strategic operations in one battle

As part of the Battle of Kursk, one of the largest in World War II, three large-scale strategic operations were implemented. Firstly, this is the Kursk defensive operation - the first stage of this grandiose clash, at which the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, at the cost of colossal losses (in people and equipment), stopped the advance of the German shock units. Secondly, the Oryol offensive operation ("Kutuzov"), which was carried out from July 12 to August 18, 1943. During this operation, the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts and part of the forces of the Western Front liberated a vast territory and inflicted a crushing defeat on Army Group Center. The final operation was the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ("Rumyantsev"), which was carried out from August 3 to 23, during which the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts liberated the Kharkov industrial region and defeated a powerful enemy grouping, thereby creating favorable conditions for the liberation left-bank Ukraine. On August 5, festive artillery salvos thundered in Moscow for the first time in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Colossal losses

During the 50-day Battle of Kursk, both sides suffered huge losses. According to official data, Soviet Union lost 863,303 soldiers, 5,244 guns and mortars, 6,064 tanks and self-propelled artillery and 1,626 aircraft, while Germany lost 203,000 soldiers, 720 tanks and self-propelled artillery and 681 aircraft. It is not worth mentioning that, according to Soviet data, German losses were much higher: 30 divisions, including seven tank divisions, from 400 thousand to half a million dead, missing and wounded, three thousand guns and mortars, one and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations , 3700 aircraft.

However, the Germans also exaggerated their successes. During the first four days of the Battle of Kursk, Luftwaffe pilots reported the destruction of 923 Soviet aircraft, although the actual losses reached only 566 aircraft. Some Western authors suggest that Soviet losses in this gigantic battle amounted to as many as 1,677,000 dead, captured, wounded and sick, as well as 3,300 aircraft against 360,000 dead and wounded German soldiers (a ratio of 4.66 to one).

The fierce battles on the eastern front had a great impact on the number and combat effectiveness of Soviet and German armored vehicles in 1943. If by June 30, the Soviet command had 12,576 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations at its disposal, of which 10,060 (80.1%) were combat-ready, and the German command had 3434, of which 3060 (89.1%) were combat-ready, then by December 31, the number of Soviet tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, despite the developed defense industry, which in 1943 produced 19,892 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, dropped sharply to 5,643, of which only 2,413 were combat-ready (42.8% ). By this date, the Germans had 3,356 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, of which 1,818 (54.2%) were combat-ready.

Prokhorovka: myths and reality

In Soviet times, the tank battle near Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12, 1943, was called the largest in the history of World War II, and this misconception still exists. But in reality, on that day, in two directions (southwest and west of the Prokhorovka station), 662 Soviet tanks and 30 self-propelled artillery mounts directly collided with 420 German tanks, that is, a total of not 1200 - 1500 tanks and self-propelled -artillery installations (800 Soviet against 700 German, as Pavel Alekseevich Rotmistrov claimed). According to V. Zamulin, four tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General Rotmistrov, 340 tanks, of which 193 are beyond repair, and 19 self-propelled artillery mounts (14 are irretrievable). That is, a total of 207 armored vehicles (according to another Russian source, 511 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, that is, the ratio was 2.5 to one in favor of the Germans). The 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps lost 193 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, of which 20 were beyond repair. According to German historians, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser lost 153 - 163 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, of which five (!) Could not be restored, and 55 were sent for overhaul. True, this is hard to believe.

However, during the border battle of Brody-Berestechko-Dubno on June 26 - 28, 1941, the Soviet command carried out a counterattack by the forces of the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, numbering five thousand tanks against the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and some formations of the 6th Army, which had a thousand tanks. The Soviet troops then suffered a crushing defeat and lost 2648 tanks. Then for another two years the Germans took foreign correspondents there and proudly showed them a huge cemetery of Soviet armored vehicles. This catastrophe, which surpasses Prokhorovka in scale, is still bashfully silent. As the classic said: "Victory has many parents, and only defeat is always an orphan."

The defeat near Kursk buried all the hopes of the Germans that they would be able to seize the strategic initiative and make a radical change in the war in the east in favor of the Third Reich. For exploits in the Battle of Kursk, 180 people received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.

All comments

04:36 07.07.2018 | 1

goroshek-82

By this date, the Germans had 3,356 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, of which 1,818 (54.2%) were combat-ready. -------------------- And how many of these 54.2% are the work of Skoda factories?
05:18 07.07.2018 | -1

Graz

goroshek-82, well, by the year 43, there was probably little left of the Czech tanks in the Wehrmacht, the Czechs had left the production of light anti-tank self-propelled guns by this time, although at the beginning of the war it seems that maybe up to 50% of the tanks were captured by the Germans and from these captured (and made by the Czechs during the occupation) were precisely Czech
05:26 07.07.2018 | 0

goroshek-82

Graz, after all, will be dragged closer to the factory repair to the Czech Republic than to Bavaria.
09:41 07.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Graz, the Czechs produced StuG throughout the war. This PT was extremely dangerous for Soviet tanks.
05:10 07.07.2018 | 4

Alex81

Unfortunately, it is not worth reading, because the numbers do not beat at all. The author refers to incomprehensible "Russian official sources", but at the same time: - 5128 Soviet tanks participated in the battle. Of these, 6064 are lost. I'm not kidding. Figures from the article. Well, everything else is exactly the same. The author added to the fact that on December 31, 1943, the Soviets had 2,413 tanks combat-ready, and the Fritz had 1,818 (our advantage was only 30%). At the same time, near Kursk, the Fritz advanced with 2459 tanks against our 5128 (with our superiority by 100%), as I understand the author that in 1945 the Fritz still took Moscow. In short, again, not a study, but the devil knows what, without at least trying to comprehend your nonsense.
05:42 07.07.2018 | 5

Veblen

Alex81, "... on December 31, 1943 at the scoops ...". And you are quite original in calling those thanks to whom you live in this beautiful white world. Perhaps you still need to rethink something in your, so to speak, worldview ...?
06:03 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

Veblen, nothing needs to be rethought. I was born in that country, and we were scoops. And they are Fritz and Americans (and not "Pindos" at all).
06:52 07.07.2018 | 3

heard

Alex81, "I was born in that country, and we were scoops." How you were and how you remained (words from the song)
07:02 07.07.2018 | 3

Veblen

Alex81, at 06:03 on 07/07/2018. "I was born in that country..." So now the matter is small: you just need to learn to respect those people who once broke the back of Hitler, other fellow citizens and themselves, at the same time.
20:53 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

Veblen, what do you see offensive in the word "scoop"? Well, for example, a definition from Lurk: SCOOP 1. Socio-economic - a system of bureaucratic management, when everything is up to the lamp, except for its specific profit. Simply put, the scoop is cut according to Soviet laws. 2. Personal - a representative of the Soviet inhabitants, cattle from the Soviet people. According to claim 1. Do you think that the USSR had a wrong economic system? Was everything up to the lamp? :) Who then "broke Hitler's back"? Who built the best education system in the world? How have you achieved all that has been achieved? According to clause 2. Do you consider the Soviet inhabitants (this is the same as the Russian people, in principle) cattle? We are now talking about the most educated people in the world, just in case. It doesn't occur to me. Well, how can a word that describes the Soviet system and Soviet inhabitants (one of whom was me) be considered somehow indecent? Gain self-respect, and look with pride into your past. Then you will not be offended either by the "scoops" or the "quilted jackets".
10:02 07.07.2018 | 2

leoirk

Alex81, The Red Army was armed with T-34, T-70, English Mk.IV Churchill, self-propelled guns SU-122 and SU-76. And it's all against the Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands. At Prokhorovka, almost half of the Soviet tanks were light T-70s with a 45 mm cannon. Well, about "scoops" - an extremely wrong statement ...
16:33 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

Lerik, yes, you haven’t grown to the scoop yet.) You still don’t know how to read and analyze the text.) Read a Pole. Yes, the tanks on the Kursk Bulge were heavier than ours (both in terms of armor and caliber). So if you carefully read this Czech, you would see that, in his opinion, the Fritz defeated us by the end of 1943. We had nothing to fight back with. There are no tanks left. Czech crooked figures (with a claim to "officiality") in my first post I gave you. Think.
10:50 07.07.2018 | 1

Olkhon

Alex81, In short, again, not a study, but the devil knows what, without at least trying to comprehend your nonsense. Not a study, but an experience of the past and an attempt to distort history! Few people think about numbers - they read stupidly and put it off in their heads. Sooner or later, the "whole world" will know that the USSR ATTACKED Europe, and Hitler defended and defended it as best he could
14:01 07.07.2018 | 1

kdmitrii1966

Alex81, and I grew up "in that country", like many others, and I consider such a definition as humiliating, dismissive .. If we take its modern essence, then we have never been like that, like those whom you called that - as a result of whose actions The Soviet army advanced beyond Kharkov and further ..! "Veblen" is absolutely right in his remark!
16:42 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

kdmitrii1966, as a result of the actions of people whom I called "scoops", the Soviet army actually reached Berlin, and did not "advance beyond Kharkov and further." The country built the first nuclear power plant, launched a man into space and did a lot more. What kind of "modern" essence someone puts into the word "scoops" is of little interest to me. You have complexes, you deal with them. Maybe it still offends you when they call you a "quilted jacket"? :)
17:09 07.07.2018 | 2

kdmitrii1966

Alex81, the fact that the Soviet army advanced beyond Kharkov follows from the text of the article - that's why I wrote it that way, and as for the term "scoop", it's useless to explain something to you, "not a horse's fodder" - as they say and inappropriate arguments about space flights and nuclear power plants, little changes! This is where we need to think, not argue.
17:13 07.07.2018 | 1

leoirk

Alex81, >> you have not grown up to the scoop yet. A very pathetic attempt. I don't need to read some Czechs or Poles. Valery Zamulin - Secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify. About the Battle of Kursk is written in great detail.
05:18 07.07.2018 | 2

Kola

look how the Czechs were worried about their masters
05:29 07.07.2018 | 1

fvi

All figures are very arbitrary. and there is no point in commenting on them. but the fact is that our losses were, unfortunately, much greater than those of the Nazis. Probably, only with Operation Bagration, the losses of the Germans equaled ours or became even greater.
06:05 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

fvi, if these "official" figures are accepted, then the losses of the Fritz from Operation Bagration should exceed ours by 4-5 times. ... Maybe it's true. ... But I wouldn't discuss it under this piece of misunderstanding they call a historical article.
17:07 07.07.2018 | 0

dkop

fvi, here's some strange arithmetic - the total losses of personnel following the war, ours and the Germans are quite commensurate, of course, if the Germans count not only true Aryans who died right on the battlefield, but also those who died in hospitals and allies and Volksturm and all kinds of Khivs with volunteers (from France, Holland and further up to Hochland). But as you read such "researchers", so in each specific battle the losses of the Germans were 4-5 times less. So where did they lose the rest then? And why did they retreat and lose if the human resources of the Reich were almost an order of magnitude (at times, that's for sure) superior to the rest of the Union? And how did the economy of Europe united by the Germans surpass the remnants of the Union in quantity and quality? Why did they always win in losses, but at the same time they retreated and then retreated?
17:38 07.07.2018 | 0

fvi

dkop, you correctly add their allies and traitors to the Nazis, but unfortunately the losses of the USSR were much greater than those of Germany. affected and unexpected attack and more high level training and experience of the Wehrmacht and the fact that the war went on in the territory of the USSR for almost all 4 years and millions of prisoners of war and civilians died.
18:06 07.07.2018 | 0

kdmitrii1966

fvi, by the time of the attack on the USSR, Germany, taking into account not significant losses, conducted essentially huge military exercises - in Poland and France, where it worked out the methods of control and interaction of various branches of the military, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers and officers received combat experience .. Was Does the Red Army have a similar experience? No, of course, hence the results of the victories of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR in 41-42 years .. In contrast, in the first two years of the war, in addition to everything else, the Red Army lost a huge amount of personnel commanders all levels, albeit poorly prepared ..
18:23 07.07.2018 | 1

dkop

fvi, I'm talking about the loss of personnel, i.e. military personnel. Roughly speaking, German losses are estimated at about 9 million, that is, together with the allies and so on. more than 10 million will turn out. Soviet losses, according to various estimates, are in the range of 11-13 million military personnel. So purely combat losses are quite commensurate and some "advantage" of the Germans is fully explained by the extremely difficult 41g for us. And the fact that the Germans exterminated about 15 million unarmed people - civilians and prisoners of war, then this is another article. This is not a combat loss, but rather a genocide. It is difficult for us to compete with the Europeans in this.
05:31 07.07.2018 | 3

Veblen

"According to German historians, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser lost 153 - 163 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, of which five (!) Could not be restored ... True, this is hard to believe." So Guderian, too, did not believe it and, apparently, therefore he wrote that after the losses suffered near Kursk, the German tank troops did not manage to recover until the end of the war.
09:50 07.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Veblen, Prokhorovka was a massacre for Soviet tanks. The irretrievable losses of the Germans were minimal. But the Germans evacuated their damaged tanks to Kharkov. Where then they were successfully captured by the advancing Soviet troops. So Guderian wrote correctly ..
10:42 07.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, "So Guderian wrote correctly ...". I think that in this matter it is quite possible to trust him.
02:51 08.07.2018 | 0

Chud Vychegodskaya

leoirk, Prokhorovka was the result of a failure, as a result of which a meeting battle was adopted and at the stage of rapprochement we suffered huge losses. But as soon as the tanks mixed up and close combat began, the menagerie was slaughtered. The turret traverse speed and mobility of our tanks was higher, which gave them considerable advantages. The battlefield was left to the Germans. They evacuated their equipment, blew up ours. Hence the difference in losses. Well, we cannot do without hand-to-hand combat, both in the infantry and on the tanks. In the sky, even "hand-to-hand" planes were rammed. And tanks rammed tanks. And the dismounted crews fought hand to hand.
15:24 07.07.2018 | 0

kdmitrii1966

Veblen, one of our Veteran Tankers, recalled that before the Battle of Kursk they were taken for 300 kilometers to receive tanks .. A huge field, there are a couple of hundred cars - all brand new, green, painted T34 .. Come up the backwater, choose any, with a cast, with a welded tower - try which one you like .., but there weren’t enough trained crews and tankers at all .. This was one of the reasons for such losses of the Soviet Army on the Kursk Bulge! The Germans, in spite of everything, prepared their tankers more thoroughly ..
16:57 07.07.2018 | 0

Alex81

kdmitrii1966, there is little research on this topic, unfortunately. Or like this Czech (I have a whole English book stands on a shelf about the tactics of using Panthers on the Kursk Bulge, written in such a Czech), or ours are hat-throwing ones. Rotmistrov's counterattack ("near Prokhorovka"), apparently, was really disastrous. But there were only a part of the tanks. Our tanks, which in the first days of the battle operated from fortified positions and from ambushes, were much more effective. Neither the Fritz nor the Czechs recognize this, but this can be determined from indirect sources. We must remember that our 76 caliber was really weak, and against panthers too. But position matters. According to statistics, which tanks were defending, they filled the "frags". "Irretrievable losses" in the analysis of tank battles is the first sign of defamation. In fact, this parameter only reflects who has left the battlefield behind. If behind you, you will pull out your tanks and repair them.
06:28 07.07.2018 | 1

foxbat

The Czech was completely confused in the numbers .. His beautiful country also had a hand in that massacre .. I remembered an old joke: "_ Vovochka, what did you do during the war? - And I brought shells to the soldiers! - And what did they tell you? - Danke, Danke, Voldemar!
15:03 07.07.2018 | 0

Arctic

Foxbat, I still remember: - Didu, is it true that you shot down German planes? - Truth. Well, how, I knocked down .... I didn’t completely run it, so they fell.
06:51 07.07.2018 | 4

Zhukomukh

Following the results of three lost matches in Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, the German national team went home ... The following year, the Soviet national team went to visit the Germans. According to the results of the second away matches in Budapest, Vienna and Berlin, the German national team capitulated, the sponsor got poisoned, the coach went to prison. The protracted Second World Mundial is finally over.
07:59 07.07.2018 | 1

gkpractik

And why doesn’t the little brother write that every second cartridge German soldier and every third shell was lovingly produced for them without strikes and sabotage by our brothers Czechs? Hetzer self-propelled guns burned alive our tankers from ambush - a deep bow to the Czechs for well-made vehicles from the leadership of the Reich. The self-propelled guns were pointed from above by spotters of the "frame" FW189 - excellent work of the Slav brothers. At night, fascist bombers loaded their bomb carriers with Czech-made land mines and brought them down on our peaceful cities and villages, on old women and children ... The Judas nation. Even the Poles are decent and worthy in some way than this Carpathian dirt ...
10:18 07.07.2018 | 4

Veblen

1. "... during the border battle of Brody-Berestechko-Dubno on June 26 - 28, 1941, the Soviet command carried out a counterattack by the forces of the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps, numbering five thousand tanks against the advancing German 1st Panzer Group and some formations of the 6th Army, which had a thousand tanks.The Soviet troops then suffered a crushing defeat and lost 2648 tanks ... ". The author of the article forgot to say that at that time the Nazis had treacherously seized the operational initiative and almost complete air supremacy in the absence of any dense air defense system in the Soviet troops. Let's add here the advantage in quality and experience in managing large masses of armored vehicles, as well as the advantage of the Nazis in combat experience, etc. After that, it turns out that the combat equivalent of those five thousand Soviet tanks, no matter how strange it may seem, could correspond to 600 tanks or less. Hence the result. 2. "About this catastrophe, surpassing Prokhorovka in scale ...". Disaster - yes. Surpassing Prokhorovka in scale - no! Simply because with this catastrophe, the Soviet tank troops began the path to victory and world championship, and not to complete destruction, as happened after Prokhorovka among the Nazis. These are the conclusions that the study of the foundations of game theory and some pages of the Second World War leads to.
17:18 07.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Veblen, A. Ulanov and D. Shein “Order in tank troops? Where did Stalin's tanks go? It helps a lot to understand the defeats of 1941 ..
20:27 07.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, leoirk, I think that it is no secret to anyone what is worse summer campaign 1941 was only Gorbachev's "perestroika". But if, indeed, defeats cannot be avoided, then it is better to start a war with them than to end the war with them.
00:19 08.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Veblen, Kamrad. You read. The industry of the USSR could make a bunch of tanks. But the quality was just pipets. The technology just didn't exist. The ungodly Pindos helped us a lot with lend-lease.
02:18 08.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, "The industry of the USSR could make a bunch of tanks. But the quality was just pipets" ....? 1. "... The 78th OGvTTP (numbering 20 IS-2 tanks), advancing on Debrecen in Hungary, from October 6 to 31 destroyed 6 Tigers, 30 Panthers, 10 T-IV tanks, 1 self-propelled guns" Ferdinand", 24 self-propelled guns of various calibers, 109 guns, 38 armored personnel carriers ... 2 ammunition depots and 12 aircraft at the airfield ... Irretrievable losses of the regiment during this period: two IS-2 burnt out from faustpatrons, another 16 tanks received varying degrees of damage ... attacking the town of Kanyar, which was defended by 10 Panthers, the tankers of the regiment destroyed half of them. The next day, having lost three of their vehicles, they burned seven more Panther tanks. During the attack (...) of the Hajdu-Bagosh settlement, two IS-2 had to fight with five T-V tanks"Panther". During the tank duel, our IS-2s managed to destroy three T-Vs, one IS-2 was shot down with a faustpatron (not a Panther!). The next day, October 19, after capturing Hajdu-Bagosh, the tanks of the regiment broke into the city of Debrecen, where two more Panthers were destroyed by direct fire. 2. The 24th tank corps of General Badanov, having overcome about 240 kilometers with battles in five days (and this is in the severe frost of the winter of 1942!), Defeated a supply base, a garrison and a large airfield behind enemy lines, which provided food and ammunition for the encircled Paulus' groupings (at the same time, 86 German aircraft were destroyed on the ground); cut railway to Stalingrad and December 24, 1942 captured railway station and the village of Tatsinskaya, Rostov region. The enemy, having transferred two tank and two infantry divisions to Tatsinskaya, tried to encircle and destroy the corps. After a 4-day battle, the corps left the encirclement (the exit from the encirclement was provided not only by the forces of the corps, but also by a blow from outside the ring). By order of the NPO of the USSR No. 412 of December 26, 1942, the 24th Tank Corps was transformed for military merit into the 2nd Guards Tank Corps with the honorary name Tatsinsky. Well, how do you like the quality of Soviet tanks ...? And let's not confuse such two types of quality as quality in the narrow and broad sense of this concept. As for the lend-lease assistance to the USSR, the West and the God-opposing Pindos, who deliberately infected blacks with syphilis, invested "several" more in the "economic miracle" of the 3rd Reich. And, especially, the quality was artificial gasoline, manufactured according to American technology, on which fascist tanks and trucks went (I suspect the same about aircraft, but I'm not sure). By the way, the "famous" Sherman received the honorary name "Rolsen Lighter" from American soldiers!
02:29 08.07.2018 | -1

leoirk

Veblen, Kamrad. Don't confuse 1941 with 1945. I repeat. The ungodly Pindos helped our industry a lot. Here's an example for you. The largest manufacturer of thirty-fours, Nizhny Tagil Plant No. 183, could not switch to the production of T-34-85, since there was nothing to process the ring gear of the tower with a diameter of 1600 mm. The carousel machine available at the plant made it possible to process parts with a diameter of up to 1500 mm. Of the NKTP enterprises, only Uralmashzavod and plant No. 112 had such machines. But since Uralmashzavod was loaded with the IS tank production program, it was not necessary to hope for it in terms of producing the T-34-85. Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered in the UK (Lowdon) and the USA (Lodge). As a result, the first T-34-85 tank left the workshop of plant No. 183 only on March 15, 1944. These are the facts, you can't argue with them, as they say. If Plant No. 183 had not received imported carousel machines, new tanks would not have come out of its gates. So it turns out that, honestly speaking, 10,253 T-34-85 tanks, produced by the Nizhny Tagil "Vagonka" before the end of the war, need to be added to the Lend-Lease deliveries of armored vehicles. Not bad. Minus 10 thousand T-34-85. The best WWII tanks.
07:27 08.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, 1. "Veblen, Kamrad. Don't confuse 1941 with 1945." If you carefully read the comment to which you are responding, you will understand that in its paragraph 1 we are talking about 1944 ("advancing on Debrecen in Hungary, from October 6 to October 31" could not have happened in 1945, although you , of course, you have the right to a different opinion, which I readily admit, after all, I am Kamrad, after all, and not some kind of satrap!). 2. "I repeat. The ungodly Pindos helped our industry a lot." As Comrade Stalin would say, I am glad, comrades, that we have no disagreements on the quality of Soviet tanks. 3. “Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered in the UK (Loudon) and the USA (Lodge) ... “These are the facts, you can’t argue with them, as they say.” Why argue if there is a biography of Mr. -on Truemna? Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union: "If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and let them kill as many as possible, although I do not want under any circumstances to see Hitler in winners." By the way, both England and the USA were interested in the supplies under consideration, because England had to save its own skin, and the United States eventually had to land in Europe in order to establish its hegemony in its, of course, long-suffering and exhausted land by the monster Hitler. And here are a couple more quotes regarding the creative heritage of Hjalmar Schacht, who in the early 1930s managed to work as the chief German representative of the American financial corporation J.P. Morgan, and then became Hitler's chief financier. “The fact that the United States will not be lost and not confused during the war that broke out in Europe was clear even before the first shots were fired. Indeed, it was not for the same reason that American businessmen and government agencies bought up the German economy “wholesale and retail” for a long time, in order to give up profits because of some hostilities ... "Already during the Nuremberg Trials, the former president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, in a conversation with an American lawyer, said:" If you want to indict the industrialists who helped rearm Germany, then you must indict themselves. You will be obliged to indict the Americans. The Opel car plant, for example, produced nothing but military products. Your General Motors owned this plant. Etc. But the gasoline for the Luftwaffe was supplied by the American Standard Oil. 4. "So it turns out that, honestly speaking, 10,253 T-34-85 tanks, produced by the Nizhny Tagil "Vagonka" before the end of the war, need to be added to the Lend-Lease deliveries of armored vehicles." To be honest, taking into account the simplest expert way of all factors of production and the interest of the United States and Great Britain, there are about 1600 cars, but no more!
08:56 08.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, in paragraph 4. my comment from 07:27 07/08/2018 refers to 1600 so-called conditional machines, i.e. "smeared" all of their considered number.
05:12 09.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Veblen, 1. Kamrad. Just link one to the other. in 1941, the quality of tanks is no. What are the tanks. Industry of the USSR for years! could not master the production of armor-piercing shells 76mm. Here's a quote for you. Statement for military unit 9090 for April 30, 1941, in the column "76-mm armor-piercing tracer" - 33,084 are required, 33,084 are missing, the percentage of security is 0. But under the abbreviation "ve che 9090" hides the 6th mechanized corps Major General Mikhail Georgievich Khatskilevich - the most powerful mechanized corps of the Western Special Military District and one of the most complete in the Red Army. On June 22, he had 238 T-34 tanks and 114 KV. 3rd mechanized corps of the Baltic Special Military District: KB tanks - 79, T-34 tanks - 50, according to the report card 17,948 armor-piercing 76-mm shells, there is zero. The USSR of the 30s was technologically much behind Germany, England and the USA. And in the conditions of the most difficult war, he could not catch up. Miracles don't happen. The quality has improved due to the mass deliveries of machine tools and equipment. And also through the transfer of technology. Without this, the 78th OGvTTP from your example would never have reached Debrecen. I would have lost all my tanks along the way - as it was with fur. hulls arr. 1941..
08:20 09.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, 1. "The USSR of the 30s was technologically much behind Germany, England and the USA." I agree with this right away, because it is an obvious fact. But, in order not to delve into the wilds, I will ask a simple question. The second M.V., as we know it, would have taken place if the United States, England and France, who, by joint efforts, threw the USSR out of European politics, demanded that Hitler comply with the Versailles restrictions on the armament of Germany: 7 infantry divisions and 3 cavalry divisions without tanks , aviation and automatic weapons? Or here's another: who "pumped up" the German economy from a state of devastation in the early 20s to a level that allowed it to compete for primacy in Europe with the economy of England and a gross domestic product of a third of the American early 30s. For a hint, see, for example, at 07:27 on 07/08/2018 the following, said by Hjalmar Schacht: "The fact that the United States will not be lost and confused during the war that broke out in Europe was clear even before the first shots were fired. And indeed, not for the same American businessmen and government agencies have been buying up the German economy “wholesale and retail” for a long time in order to give up profits due to some kind of hostilities ... "And yet, for everything (!) That was supplied to us by the USA, England and Germany (with the exception of trophies) the USSR paid. Well, about the interest of the USA and England in "helping" the USSR, I already wrote in all the same the need to get out of the crisis of 1929-1942, and England had to save its own skin: the old woman played out (in "Hitlerovichok") with Hitler to the point that he reached the English Channel. So there is no need to make benefactors out of those who at first financed Hitler not without profit and set him against the USSR, and then, when he got out of geopolitical control, he began to help the USSR just as profitably, but many times less. How do you like such a business in the economy and geopolitics of those whom you previously designated as "ungodly Pindos"? By the way, during the discussion with you, I finally got around to finding out that without American gasoline, as many as 2 types (!) Hitler would have nothing to fill tanks, cars, or planes with. Here, approximately in this way, min hertz!
09:21 09.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, Kamrad. "Just link one to the other. In 1941, the quality of the tanks is no." How did they win the battle of Moscow at the beginning of 1942 and made the unprecedented Tatsinsky raid at the end of 1942? Why, before the attack on Moscow, Guderian called a group of designers to the Eastern Front and, hardly, demanded to copy the T-34? Why did the collision with this machine come as a shock to the Nazis? Why, before the 1st attack on Moscow, only about a third of the tanks remained in the Wehrmacht tank groups? How did Katukov clean Guderian's face near Tula? How did the KV company of Zinoviy Kolobanov knock out and burn down about 40 fascist tanks during the day of the battle? And all this took place before the supply of equipment from the USA and England could affect! The latter, by the way, will be confirmed by anyone who worked in production. So leave the myths and legends of the Aberdeen Proving Ground for a more naive audience, Kamrad.
05:45 09.07.2018 | 0

leoirk

Veblen, 2. about Truemne and so on. Well, then the bourgeois had no reason to love the communists. Nevertheless, these words can be answered with a quote from Churchill. We will give Russia and the Russian people all the help we can. We will appeal to all our friends and allies in all parts of the world to follow the same course and pursue it with the same steadfastness and unswerving to the end, as we will do. We have proposed to the government Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance that we are in a position to provide and that will be useful to him. Well, about the trade of Pindos companies with Hitler. Well, the USSR also traded with Germany. And even the war in Spain did not interfere with this. And about the treaty of friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany from 1939, it would not hurt to remember ..
10:49 09.07.2018 | 0

Veblen

leoirk, 1. "Well, there was no reason for the bourgeois to love the communists." You've got stories about how J.P. Morgan gave loans to I. G. Farben - the manufacturer of Zyklon B to quote or find it yourself? No, I’ll still quote: “I. G. Farben made a very large contribution to the cause of the Nazi movement: by 1939, it provided 90% of the inflow of foreign currency and 85% of all military and industrial products necessary to prepare Germany for a world war ". And there were also Ford, and General Motors, etc. 2. "... The USSR also traded with Germany. And even the war in Spain did not interfere with this in any way." Before Hitler came to power, it really was a trade; after Hitler came to power, the USSR was squeezed out of the German oil market (who occupied it, you probably know or guess) and the banal forced "appeasing" of the demoniac began. And to compare volumes, see the previous paragraph, and there are a lot of interesting things on the net. About the participation in this case of England, for example. 2. "And it would not hurt to remember about the treaty of friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany of 1939 ...". Let's remember, Kamrad, why not? At the same time, we only note that we already recalled the anti-Versailles tricks of Hitler, the USA, England and France in a comment dated 08:20 07/09/2018. And then everything is simple. Poland concluded a peace treaty with Hitler in 1934, England and France - in 1938 during and after the Munich agreement. It's in the west. And in the east was Hitler's ally - Japan. If I am not confusing anything, then this is called the strategic encirclement of the USSR by Hitler's explicit and secret allies. What was left for Comrade Stalin to do, no matter how to let Adolf think about whom it would be beneficial for him - Adolf to rush first? Hence the treaty, which might not have been if the United States, Britain and France had previously accepted the Soviet proposals on collective security. As a result, the United States sat out overseas, England received Dunkirk and the Air Battle, Hitler simply defeated France in 40 days, and Poland even faster. But, Comrade Stalin did not have to fight alone against everyone! Perhaps the United States, England, France and Poland should not have rounded up Comrade Stalin? And certainly not worth it. this case to make Stalin the instigator of the 2nd M.V.: there are other contenders for this role, to put it mildly.

The words of a German journalist that the monument in honor of the victory at the Kursk Bulge "should have been demolished" outraged Runet. And what do German historians really think about this battle?

An article in the German newspaper Die Welt about the Battle of Kursk, in which, according to the author, the Red Army was defeated, literally blew up the Russian Internet. I was especially outraged by the phrase that the monument in honor of the triumph near Prokhorovka "should have been demolished." But apart from this assumption of the journalist, there is nothing sensational in the article for either Russian or German historians. Suffice it to say, for example, that its author refers to the publication of one of them, who wrote about the ambiguous results of the battle ... six years ago.

How Germany really evaluates the Battle of Kursk in July-August 1943 is one of biggest battles World War II and the most epic tank battles in history? This battle lasted, in total, about 50 days. About 3 million soldiers and officers, almost 8 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, at least 4,500 aircraft took part in it. In a conversation with DW, German historians (including the one referred to by the author of the article in Die Welt) evaluate this battle.

Operation Citadel

In the summer of 1943, the "Third Reich" for the last time managed to unite such large forces on Eastern Front. This was done in order to strike at the advancing Soviet troops and cut off the Red Army forces concentrated on the Kursk Bulge (a ledge on the front line that was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943), and then destroy them. However, Operation Citadel, as it was called in the plans of the Wehrmacht command, failed. The Germans generally lost the Battle of Kursk.

"The main result of the Battle of Kursk is that after the defeat in it, the Germans no longer had the opportunity to launch large offensive operations. This was the last large-scale offensive of the Wehrmacht on the German-Soviet front during the Second World War, after which Nazi Germany finally lost the initiative on Eastern Front," emphasizes Jens Wehner, curator of the Military History Museum of the Bundeswehr in Dresden.

As the Munich historian Roman Töppel explains, “that is why many Wehrmacht generals who advocated the Battle of Kursk later began to assert that the idea to launch this battle belonged exclusively to Hitler. However, this is not so. Just Hitler was at first against the Battle of Kursk Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt, commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, came up with the idea to carry out Operation Citadel, and then Hitler was convinced of its necessity."

All responsibility- on Hitler?

Roman Toeppel has been studying the history of the Battle of Kursk for many years. He even wrote a book about her called "Kursk 1943. The Greatest Battle of World War II" ("Kursk 1943. Die größte Schlacht des zweiten Weltkrieges"). It was published in German in 2017, translated into Spanish, English, French, now appeared in Russian. Archival materials and military diaries were used as sources. Roman Töppel is one of the few historians who have gained access to the archive of the German Field Marshal, a participant in the First and Second World Wars, Erich von Manstein, who was considered the most gifted strategist of the Wehrmacht. The archive is kept by Manstein's son.

While working on this book, Töppel did not set himself the goal of describing in detail the course of the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Instead, he tried to dispel the many misconceptions that exist to this day regarding the Battle of Kursk. Thus, some historians and memoirists argue that the operation "Citadel" undertaken by the Germans, which was the prologue to the battle of Kursk, could have ended successfully if Hitler had started it earlier. But he wanted to wait for the delivery of new tanks and therefore postponed it to July.

“In a number of military memoirs one has to read that if the Germans had started this operation in May 1943, it would have been successful. But this is completely untrue: it was impossible to start it in May, because the weather conditions on the Eastern Front did not allow this: it rained continuously," reminds Roman Töppel.

Destroyed German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand"

Hitler really had high hopes for new models of tanks. “The Germans brought a lot of the latest equipment to Kursk, for example, about 130 heavy Tiger tanks. More than 1,300 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battles,” enumerates Jens Wehner. True, it should be noted that these and other figures given by historians and memoirists sometimes differ markedly, depending on the sources.

Battle of Prokhorovka: who won?

Whatever it was, but the success was at first on the side of the Wehrmacht and just during the tank battle unfolded on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka, which became the most famous part of the Citadel operation. According to military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser, 186 German and 672 Soviet tanks participated in this battle. And although the German troops failed to take the Prokhorovka station, the losses of the Red Army were very sensitive: it lost 235 tanks, and the Germans - less than a dozen.

"In the Battle of Prokhorovka Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat. However, their command presented the outcome of the battle as a victory and reported this to Moscow. In light of the final victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk, it then looked quite plausible," says historian Matthias Uhl.

But how could the Red Army, whose forces significantly outnumbered the enemy (almost twice as many tanks and 130 thousand soldiers and officers against 70 thousand Germans), could lose this battle? According to Karl-Heinz Frieser, in the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Soviet generals made many mistakes because they were rushed by Stalin. They paid with human lives. Thus, the 29th Panzer Corps, sent on the offensive without sufficient preliminary reconnaissance, was met by fire from German tanks hidden in the shelter. And it was almost completely destroyed.

Warlord legendErich von Manstein

There are also allegations that the Germans lost the Battle of Kursk due to Hitler's premature order to stop the offensive in the northern sector and transfer individual tank units from Kursk to Sicily, where British and American troops landed. Roman Töppel and Jens Wehner refute this.

As Töppel explained, “Initially, such a myth appeared in the memoirs of Erich von Manstein. However, this is just a legend. there would have been such heavy losses if in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front they had not gone on the offensive, but remained in defensive positions.

"In fact, this is not so either. Let's start with the fact that Operation Citadel did not cost the Germans such huge losses. In any case, they did not exceed the losses suffered during defensive battles. And secondly, in 1943, the German side simply did not have the opportunity to remain on the defensive and maintain strength, since the Red Army would have gone on the offensive anyway, and heavy fighting, which would have led to no less losses, would have been unavoidable," explains Roman Töppel.

Revaluation inRussia, underestimation in the West

In Soviet and Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk is considered the final turning point of World War II and the third most important battle after the defense of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad. However, German historians refute such an attitude.

"The Battle of Kursk was the largest and one of the bloodiest battles of the Second World War, but by no means decisive. Indeed, at the latest already in 1942, after the failure of Operation Barbarossa and two unsuccessful German offensive operations on the Eastern Front, as well as from By the entry of the United States into the war, after the battle at Midway Atoll, as a result of which the initiative in the Pacific theater of operations passed to the Americans, it became clear that Germany could not win this war," states Roman Töppel.

But in the West, the Battle of Kursk, on the contrary, is underestimated. According to Jens Wehner, they know more about Battle of Stalingrad and the landing of the allies in Normandy, as well as the military confrontation between the Anglo-American and Italo-German troops in North Africa. However, those who are truly interested in the history of the Second World War are well aware of the Battle of Kursk, since it is of great military historical significance.

Be that as it may, it is too early to put an end to the study of the Battle of Kursk, Matthias Uhl believes. "In order to get a true picture of the realities of this battle, scientists still need to work a lot in the Soviet and German archives, study a lot of documents and materials. Now, for example, historians are analyzing German wartime documents, which, after the Second World War, settled in the archives for a long time Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and then Russia. Currently, these papers are being digitized, and soon they will all be available on the Internet, "the German historian said in an interview with DW.

See also:

The longest day in history

"D-Day" is usually called in the West the day of June 6, 1944, when the landing of the Western allies in the anti-Hitler coalition landed on the coast of France, in Normandy. In the course of a grandiose and costly operation, the Western Front in Europe, which was very important in World War II.

The longest day in history

Operation Overlord

"Overlord" - this was the name of this military operation in staff documents. It was attended by military, naval and air forces of 14 countries, including the USA, Great Britain, Poland, Canada, France, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Australia. Only on the first day of the operation, about 5300 ships, boats and barges, 8000 attack aircraft and bombers, 170 thousand soldiers were involved.

The longest day in history

Commander in Chief Eisenhower

The commander-in-chief was General Dwight David Eisenhower, later the 34th President of the United States of America. Prior to the operation in Normandy, in 1942-43, he commanded the Allied forces that defeated the Nazi German forces in North Africa, Sicily, and also in mainland Italy.

The longest day in history

Largest amphibious operation

Before the start of the operation, heavy rains hit Normandy. Under such difficult weather conditions, landing on the coast was considered impossible. But delay increased the risk of leaking classified information. And the offensive was scheduled only one day later than planned: the assault units landed in the early morning of June 6, 1944. Thus began the largest amphibious military operation in history.

The position of the German troops at the time of 1943 was difficult in terms of weapons and the number of tank divisions. On May 10, Guderian was summoned to a regular meeting with Hitler on the production of the Panther tank. After which he asked Hitler to give him the floor. Hitler gave his consent and Guderian began to convincingly dissuade him from advancing on the Eastern Front. He explained that the German troops were currently having difficulties and that they first needed to be overcome, and only then to implement such major operations. Guderian asked: "Why do you want to launch an offensive in the east this year?" Here Keitel intervened: "We must launch an offensive for political reasons." I objected: "Do you think people know where Kursk is? The world is completely indifferent to whether Kursk is in our hands or not. I repeat my question: "Why do you even want to launch an offensive in the east this particular year?" Hitler replied to this literally the following: "You are absolutely right. The thought of this offensive makes my stomach ache.” I replied, “You have the right reaction to the situation. Abandon this idea. "Hitler did not answer. The conversation was over.

After this meeting, Guderian again dealt with the production of tanks, the formation of tank divisions, met with the commanders of tank battalions, visited factories that produced tanks for Germany. And on one of these trips, get acquainted with the negative sides of the Panther tanks, in order to report to Hitler later. Guderian discovered a lot of malfunctions in the Panthers, and the people driving these tanks were little acquainted with their management and sometimes had practically no front-line experience. Guderian, having reached the Fuhrer, immediately reported on all the nuances, but, unfortunately, Hitler did not change his plan to carry out the ill-fated offensive called the Citadel.

Guderian recalls that Hitler launched his offensive in the east. In the south, ten tank divisions, seven infantry and one motorized division advanced from Belgorod. During the offensive, all the ground forces of the German troops were used. Hitler said that it could not fail. Guderian was surprised at how Hitler nevertheless decided on this operation.

Guderian writes that on July 5, 1943, the offensive began. It was organized according to a scheme that had long been calculated by the Russians. Hitler, in turn, decided to abandon the offensive through Sevsk and through Kharkov. He supported Zeitzler's plan, which was to capture the Russian troops advanced in the form of an arc and thereby retake the Eastern Front.

Guderian visited both offensive fronts of Germany in order to identify problems in technology and tactics, as well as to talk with tankers. Guderian had warned Hitler about the ineffectiveness of the Panther tanks, and now he was convinced in practice that they were not sufficiently prepared for combat operations. Also, the "tiger" tanks were not adapted for combat, it turned out that they did not even have the required amount of ammunition. Also Guderian, talking about the shortcomings of weapons german army, mentioned that the Germans did not have machine guns "... and therefore, when they broke into the enemy's defensive positions, they literally had to fire cannons at sparrows." Guderian was upset that his fears were confirmed and angry at Hitler for not listening to him. The Germans could not even destroy the infantry firing points, and thus the infantry could not move forward. Guderian recalls that the German tanks reached the Russian artillery positions already without infantry. Huge casualties, the exceptional courage of the German fighters, but, unfortunately, the infantry was never able to participate in hostilities. In the south, meanwhile, the situation unfolded more prosperously, but the troops stationed there could not fully block the Russian arc. The Russians launched a counteroffensive on July 15 against Orel, which had to be abandoned on August 4. Following Orel, Belgorod fell.

Guderian writes that in the Orel region, where until that day the Germans had repulsed all the attacks of the Russian troops, he wanted to concentrate his 2nd Panzer Army. And just because of this area, Guderian had a conflict with Field Marshal von Kluge, after which Guderian was removed from his post.

Operation Citadel failed. This dealt a crushing blow to the German army. Guderian notes that the tank and armored forces were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses and a shortage of people. Their restoration was called into question to continue operations on the Eastern Front. The Russians were euphoric about their success, and after that the Eastern Front saw a lot of blood. "The initiative has passed to the enemy."

Again, Guderian's warnings were rejected, and only after a while, Hitler told him: "You were right! You told me about this 9 months ago. Unfortunately, I did not listen to you."

Paul Karel "Eastern Front". In two books. Moscow: Izographus, EKSMO, 2003.

BACK IN THE YEARS of the Great Patriotic War, as our front-line soldiers later admitted, each of them (of course, not out loud, but to himself) recognized the Germans as an evil, cunning, skillful and staunch enemy. Even then, Soviet soldiers were asking questions: "Who are they, the Germans? In the name of what are they fighting so desperately and bravely?"

A comprehensive detailed answer, perhaps, is still difficult to find, especially in one source. The full picture is formed on the basis of many memoirs, historical research, literary works and movies. Among them is the book by Paul Karel. It was published in 1963 in Germany, was immediately translated into all European languages, and in the first ten years it went through 8 editions only in German (400,000 copies in total). However, in the USSR, this work was immediately placed in special stores, making it available only to a narrow circle of scientists. And now it was released in Russia, although, frankly, not in a mass circulation of five thousand (the price - 430 rubles - is also not the most affordable).

Of course, the demanding Russian reader will find many shortcomings in Karel's book - in particular, 40 years ago, many archival materials were closed to the author. However, one cannot but admit that we have before us a surprisingly harmonious combination of a scientific monograph and personal memoirs of direct participants in the events of 1941-1944. on the Eastern Front (and Karel cites the stories of several hundred former Wehrmacht servicemen - from the colonel general, army commander to the ordinary infantryman, from the head general staff to a simple signalman), resulting in a vivid and impressive picture of the struggle between German and Soviet troops. Undoubtedly, with all the existing flaws, this work will show us the Great Patriotic War from the other side - through the eyes of German soldiers and officers. And this is its main value.

It is impossible, of course, to acquaint the readers of NVO even briefly with all the main parts of the book. But on the days of the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, we will try to convey the self-awareness of the enemy, who then attacked both the northern and southern faces of the famous arc.

SOUTHERN FAS: "PRELUDE" JULY 4

The main events of the initial stage of the Battle of Kursk on the southern flank of the "fiery arc" have already been described twice on the pages of NVO (## 16 and 20, 2003). But Paul Karel's book allows you to highlight some little-known facts and details of the bloody drama unfolding here. For example, the vast majority of Russians are unaware that the July 5 offensive was preceded by fierce fighting: Gotha's 4th Panzer Army sought to capture the ridge of hills in front of the German positions, which effectively hid the Soviet defense system in depth.

And this is what happened on July 4, 1943 in the area of the 3rd battalion of Captain Leik of the Grenadier Regiment of the SS motorized division "Grossdeutschland".

"14.50. An hour ago, the soldiers had lunch. A thunderstorm had just died down with a torrential downpour. At that moment, squadrons of Ju-87 dive bombers roared over the German trenches towards the Soviet positions. More than 2,500 bombs hit a strip of land 3 km long and 500 m wide.

At 15.00, when the bombed "Junkers" flew away, German guns began to speak. A flurry of explosions again rose where the trenches of the Soviet riflemen, the observation posts of the Soviet artillery were located. A little later there was a piercing cry from Leik: "Forward!"

The captain jumped out of the trench first and ran across the open area. Everyone knew that this area, in which there is absolutely nowhere to hide, is well shot by the Russians. That is why Leik himself rushed forward from the command post to lead the battalion behind him. He was followed by the commander of the 15th company, Lieutenant Metzner. Under the cover of artillery fire, platoons of SS men ran along the passages in the minefields, assault guns moved on their heels, behind the assault guns - guns on self-propelled gun carriages. Along with the artillerymen were groups of sappers, ready to remove any obstacle.

The attack, no doubt, was prepared perfectly and at first developed like clockwork. Soon, however, Soviet fighters from the surviving strongholds opened fire on the advancing from all types of weapons. Soviet artillery also intervened. Volley after volley covered the battle formations of the Germans. But the 3rd battalion was still lucky: it managed to take advantage of the confusion of the Russians in its area and capture the crest of the hill west of the village of Butovo. But then progress stalled. Leic's companies recaptured about seven hundred meters. Then the SS men came under heavy mortar fire. Captain Leik died, Lieutenant Metzner was seriously wounded, a third of the personnel of the 15th company was out of action. Fewer and fewer people got up for the next throw. Many other company and platoon commanders fell. The new battalion commander, Captain Bolk, had his leg blown off by a mine.

By nightfall, the Germans managed to recapture the dominant heights. However, this "prelude" before the offensive on July 5 seemed to determine the whole character of subsequent battles - tense, dynamic, with heavy losses for both sides.

In the chapters of Karel's book devoted to the events on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, one significant point attracts attention, which explains why the Germans achieved quite noticeable success here on July 5-12. Along with other factors, the German attack aircraft Hs-129 and Stukas, equipped with 37-mm guns, played a significant role in this. “They,” writes Karel, “were used as a kind of flying anti-tank artillery: they swooped down from the sky on tanks, like hawks on a poultry yard. Tank counterattacks were thus choked due to the sudden intervention of these machines. Hetman’s Soviet tank formation suffered the most. Twelve of his T-34s were disabled in a very short time by just one of these flying anti-tank aircraft ... "

Further, in Karel's book, with reference to the report of a Soviet artillery observer, it is said: "... An attacking aircraft dives from a height of approximately 800 meters onto an unsuspecting tank column. Approximately fifteen meters from the latter, it comes out of a dive. A cannon shot, a flash, a roar, and through a column of smoke from a stricken T-34, the German pilot soars up. A moment later, he dives again. Always behind ... invariably choosing the most vulnerable place - the engine compartment, each hit in which causes an immediate explosion. "

COMING MODEL

July 5, 1943, 1 hour 10 minutes. Quite unexpectedly, Soviet artillery and mortar fire fell on the formations and units of the 9th German Army under the command of Walter Model, who were preparing for the offensive. A sudden terrible suspicion, writes Paul Karel, arose in the minds of the German staff officers: the Russians were ahead of them and now they themselves will go on the attack. The shelling continued for more than an hour, "caused serious damage," but the enemy did not appear. "The German commanders breathed a sigh of relief."

Exactly according to plan, at 3.30, the German artillery itself began fire training. "Nothing like this has ever happened on the Eastern Front."

Chief corporal of the 3rd battalion of the 478th grenadier regiment of the 258th infantry division Karl Rudenberg, cavalier Knight's Cross(note that this Reich award for the entire Second world war were awarded only 7300 people), the first to reach Soviet positions with his machine gun. After hand-to-hand combat, Rudenberg's platoon captured the fortifications of the first defensive line. Non-commissioned officer of the medical service Pingel hurried here. “Killed and wounded everywhere,” Karel narrates. “The trenches were deep. Karl's side is an open wound... Suddenly Karl pointed his head at the Russian... and said: "He jumped with a grenade right at me". Karl's voice sounded admiration..."

10 minutes later, Chief Corporal Rudenberg died.

Toward evening, according to Karel, the 1st battalion of the 478th Grenadier Regiment, with powerful fire support, including the new Bumblebee and Hornet guns mounted on armored chassis, overcame the remaining 500 m and now lay in front of the first defense line of the Soviet 280th rifle division. Assault detachments managed to break into the Soviet trenches. But all attempts to wedge into a deep defensive system ended in nothing in the face of violent Russian resistance.

The 479th Grenadier Regiment was in the same difficult situation. All 258th infantry division, which, as the right-flank strike group of the 46th Panzer Corps, was supposed to quickly overcome the Soviet barriers along the Trosna-Kursk road, froze after a bloody attack ...

On the left wing of General Zorn's 46th Panzer Corps, the 7th and 31st Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced through fields of rye and thick clover. The Bavarians from the 7th division were soon stopped by intense fire from the defenders. In the rye, where the soldiers hoped to hide, they were blown up by mines. The 31st Infantry also did not go smoothly: the engineer-sapper battalion, which moved forward under the cover of fire of "Tigers" with 102-mm frontal armor, which fired volley after volley from their powerful long-barreled 88-mm cannons, cleared wide passages in the minefields . But...

Karel writes: "... and under these conditions, the task of the sappers remained hellish. The Russians fired at them from heavy mortars installed in deep trenches, not vulnerable to low-trajectory tank guns. It was an unequal duel. And it was the sappers who paid the bills. Commander 2 th company and two platoon commanders died in the first few minutes ... "

Only two hours later the passages were ready, and the Tigers moved forward. Behind the tanks, next to them, ran the assault detachments of the 17th Grenadier Regiment. Despite the mines, heavy fire, the grenadiers reached the first trench and ... It was empty: at the beginning of the German artillery preparation, the Soviet units retreated, leaving only observers and grenade launchers.

Assault guns and half a dozen Ferdinands of Major Steiner's 653rd division, says Paul Karel, operated on the front of the 292nd Infantry Division. Here the Germans were immediately able to advance 5 km deep into the Soviet defenses, to Aleksandrovka. "The firing positions of the Russians were crushed. The assault detachments connected with the battle formations of the 6th Infantry Division, which captured Butyrki." However...

The Soviet riflemen did not panic. They let enemy armored vehicles through their trenches and then engaged the German infantry. German tanks and assault guns had to return to help their infantry. Then they went forward again and ... returned again.

Karel: "By evening, the infantry was left without strength, and the tanks and assault guns - without fuel." And yet from the German battalions and regiments to the higher headquarters they reported: "We are advancing! With difficulty, at a high price. But we are advancing!"

UNFORGETTABLE DAYS

The next day, Model sent three panzer divisions to the sector, where he seemed to be succeeding. They clashed in a fierce battle with Soviet armored units. “Between Ponyri and Soborovka,” says Karel, “on a front of fourteen kilometers, a tank battle began, unprecedented in scale in the history of military operations. It lasted four days.

At the climax of the battle, from 1000 to 1200 tanks and assault guns participated in it on each side. Numerous units of the air force and 3000 guns of all calibers complemented this terrible duel. The reward was a hill near Olkhovatka with its key position - a height of 274".

The 505th Tiger Division, under the command of Major Sovant, was at the forefront of the German attack. Tankers, without exaggeration, met a forest of Soviet anti-tank guns, a whole labyrinth of anti-tank traps. The German infantrymen were met by a wall of fire. The first wave of attackers choked. The second wave swept several hundred meters and also stopped. About nine dozen T-IVs of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd tank regiment of the 2nd TD of Major von Boxberg went in a third wave, but their throw was also stopped. The 9th Panzer Division also failed to do better.

"Infantrymen of the 20th tank division, - we read in Karel's book, - fought furiously under the burning sun on July 8 near the village of Samodurovka. Within an hour, all the officers of the 5th company of the 112th motorized infantry regiment were killed and wounded. Nevertheless, the infantry crawled across the fields, seizing trenches and running into new ones. The battalions melted away. Companies became platoons.

Lieutenant Hensch gathered the few survivors: "Forward, fighters, one more trench!"... They succeeded. Only the lieutenant lay dead twenty paces from the target, and around him half the company, killed and wounded.

The 33rd German motorized infantry regiment fought for three days for a bridgehead near the village of Teploe. Positions changed hands. Captain Diziner, the last surviving officer, gathered the remnants of the 2nd Battalion and again led them into the attack. He took a long-disputed height from the Russians. And again he was forced to retreat. The neighboring 6th Infantry Division captured only the slope of the fiercely defended Hill 274 near Olkhovatka.

Karel: "In the left sector of the breakthrough, the main point of the battle was the village of Ponyri. "We will never forget this village," even now the soldiers of the 292nd Pomeranian division who fought near Ponyri say.

* * *

No, neither new planes, nor new tanks, nor the courage and combat skill of soldiers, officers, generals helped the Wehrmacht: the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front ended in failure, the offensive power of the Germans was irreversibly broken.

What does Paul Karel see as the reasons for the defeat?

"The Soviet army withstood the disasters of 1941-1942; it overcame the crisis, seized the initiative and now dictated the course of events ... most importantly, the quality of strategic and tactical leadership, especially mobile formations, has noticeably improved. This was evidenced not only by the flexibility in controlling the battle , but also the speed with which reserves were transferred to threatened areas ... "The Red Army was also "inspired by a new fighting spirit. The call to fight for the Fatherland was more convincing for Russian soldiers than the old hackneyed slogan to defend the world revolution."

Not the Battle of Stalingrad, but the Battle of Kursk, Karel is convinced, became "in all respects a fateful battle that determined the outcome of the war in the East."

Translator's note.
The YouTube channel of the German Tank Museum in Münster published a short lecture by the historian Roman Töppel "Kursk 1943. The biggest tank battle of World War II?". In it, the historian briefly outlines the Battle of Kursk and the legends associated with it. There are no special revelations in the lecture, but it is interesting because it reflects the modern view of a new generation of German historians on this event.
I present the text translation of this lecture.
Images from the video are used as illustrations.
Slug_BDMP.

Most of those who came to our lecture do not need to be explained what the Battle of Kursk is. You know that this was the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front. Surely you know that this was the largest tank battle of the 2nd World War. You also know that this battle marked the beginning of a series of big retreats for the Wehrmacht and that he finally lost the initiative in the east. And the very definition of the "Battle of Kursk" confuses many, since most books on this topic refer to the "German offensive on Kursk in July 1943." This offensive, known as Operation Citadel, was only a prologue to the Battle of Kursk. The German side did not talk then about the "Battle of Kursk". German propaganda called these events of the summer of 1943 "the battle between Orel and Belgorod." Many German veterans, whom I asked if they were near Kursk, answered in the negative. They say that in the summer of 1943 they took part in the "Belgorod Offensive", referring to Operation Citadel - i.e. the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.

Initially, the definition of the "Battle of Kursk" appeared in the Soviet Union. Soviet historiography divides this event into three phases:
1. Defensive (5.7 - 23.7.1943) - repulse of the German offensive "Citadel";
2. Counteroffensive near Orel (12.7 - 18.8.1943) - operation "Kutuzov";
3. Counteroffensive near Kharkov (3.8 - 23.8.1943) - operation "Commander Rumyantsev".

Thus, the Soviet side considers the start of the Battle of Kursk on July 5, 1943, and its completion - on August 23 - the capture of Kharkov. Naturally, the winner chooses the name, and it has entered into international use. The battle lasted 50 days and ended with the defeat of the Wehrmacht. None of the tasks set by the German command was solved.

What were these tasks?
1. German troops were supposed to break through the Soviet defenses in the Kursk region and surround the Soviet troops there. It failed.
2. By cutting off the Kursk ledge, the Germans would have been able to shorten the front line and free up reserves for other sectors of the front. This also failed.
3. The German victory at Kursk was, according to Hitler, to serve as a signal to opponents and allies that the German troops in the east could not be defeated by military means. This hope also did not come true.
4. The Wehrmacht intended to take as many prisoners as possible who could be used as labor for the German economy. In the battles of 1941 near Kyiv, as well as near Bryansk and Vyazma, the Wehrmacht managed to take about 665 thousand prisoners. In July 1943, only about 40 thousand were taken near Kursk. This was, of course, not enough to make up for the shortage of labor in the Reich.
5. Reduce the offensive potential of the Soviet troops and thus get a respite until the end of the year. This also has not been implemented. Although the Soviet troops suffered huge losses, the Soviet military resources were so huge that, despite these losses, the Soviet side managed, starting from July 1943, to carry out more and more offensives along the entire length of the Soviet-German front.

Let's return to the theater of operations. This is the famous "Kursk Bulge", which, of course, is familiar to you.

The German side intended to break through the deeply echeloned Soviet defenses within a few days with attacks from the north and south to Kursk, cut off this arc and surround the Soviet troops stationed in this space. The actions of the second phase of the battle unfolded in the Oryol direction - this is the upper part of the map.
The third phase - the Soviet advance on Kharkov - Bottom part cards.

I will devote my lecture not to the battles themselves, but to the numerous legends that still exist, connected with this battle. Many of these legends come from the memoirs of military leaders. Although historical science has been trying to deal with them for many decades, nevertheless, these legends are firmly rooted. Many authors do not pay attention to the latest research, but continue to draw information from memoirs. In my short speech, I cannot touch on all the misconceptions about the Battle of Kursk and will concentrate on six of them, the falsity of which has been absolutely proven. I will present only the theses, and those who are interested in more deeply, I will redirect to my own publications, which I will talk about at the end.

Legend one.

After the war, almost all of the German military claimed that the Kursk offensive was Hitler's idea. Most denied their participation, which is understandable - the operation failed. In fact, the plan did not belong to Hitler. The idea belonged to the general least associated with this event, Colonel General Rudolf Schmidt.

In March 1943, he served as commander of the 2nd Panzer Army. He managed to captivate with his idea - at the beginning of the 43rd year to cut off the Kursk Bulge - the commander of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kh.G. von Kluge. Until the very end, Kluge remained the most ardent supporter of the plan to encircle the Kursk salient. Schmidt, Kluge and other generals managed to convince Hitler that the offensive on the Kursk Bulge, Operation Citadel, was the best option for a summer offensive. Hitler agreed, but doubted to the last. This is evidenced by his own, alternative plans. The Panther plan was preferable for him - an attack on Kupyansk.

In this way, Hitler wanted to ensure the preservation of the Donets Basin, which he considered strategically important. But the command of Army Group South and its commander, Field Marshal E. von Manstein, were against the Panther plan and convinced Hitler to attack Kursk first. And Hitler did not share the very idea of attacking from the north and south. He proposed to attack from the west and south. But the command of Army Groups "South" and "Center" was against and dissuaded Hitler.

The second legend.

To this day, some argue that Operation Citadel could have been a success had it begun in May 1943. In fact, Hitler did not want to start the operation in May, since Army Group Africa surrendered in mid-May. He feared that Italy would withdraw from the Axis and that the Allies would attack in Italy or Greece. In addition, the commander of the 9th Army, which was supposed to attack from the north, Colonel General Model explained that the army did not have sufficient forces for this. These arguments were sufficient. But even if Hitler had wanted to attack in May 1943, it would have been impossible. I will remind you of the reason that is usually overlooked - weather conditions.

When carrying out such a large-scale operation, the troops need good weather, which is clearly confirmed by the above photograph. Any prolonged rain turns the travel routes in Russia into an impenetrable swamp, and that is exactly what happened in May 1943. Heavy rains in the first half of the month led to difficulties in movement in the HA "South" lane. In the second half of May, it was pouring almost continuously in the GA "Centre", and almost any movement was impossible. Any offensive during this period was simply not feasible.

The third legend.

New tanks and self-propelled guns did not justify the hopes placed on them. First of all, they mean the Panther tank and the Ferdinand self-propelled gun.

By the way, at the beginning of the 43rd year, the Ferdinands were considered assault guns. Indeed, the first use of the Panthers was disappointing. The machines suffered from a lot of "childhood diseases", and many tanks failed for technical reasons. But the large losses of the Panthers cannot be explained only by the imperfection of technology. Much more important was the tactically incorrect use of tanks, which led to unjustifiably large losses. The situation with the Ferdinands looks very different. Many sources refer to them derogatoryly, including Guderian's memoirs. They say that this car did not live up to expectations. Reports from the parts say otherwise. The troops admired the Ferdinand. The crews considered these machines practically a "guarantee of survival." The ZhBD of the 9th Army notes on 07/09/43: “... It should be noted the successes of the 41st Panzer Corps, which owes much to the Ferdinands ...”. You can read other similar statements in my book, coming out in 2017.

Fourth legend.

According to this legend, the Germans "themselves gave away" the emerging victory at Kursk. (Translator's note: in the original, the word "verschenken" is used - literally "give away" and I did not pick up another translation as "give yourself". Slug_BDMP). Allegedly, Hitler gave a premature order to stop the offensive because of the Allied landings in Sicily. This statement is first found in Manstein. Many to this day stubbornly adhere to it, which is fundamentally wrong. First, Hitler did not stop the advance on Kursk because of the landing in Sicily. To the north of Kursk, the offensive was interrupted due to the Soviet offensive on Orel, which began on 07/12/43, which already on the first day led to breakthroughs. On the southern face of the arc, the offensive was halted on 16 July. The reason for this was the planned Soviet attack on the Donets Basin on the 17th.

This offensive, which is still not given importance, was the beginning of a grandiose battle for the Donets Basin, in which Soviet army involved almost 2000 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The map shows a Soviet plan that failed. This offensive ended in a heavy defeat for the Soviet side. But the reason for this was that Manstein was forced to use tank formations that participated in the offensive in the Belgorod region, including the very strong 2nd SS Panzer Corps, to repel him. In addition, it should be noted that Operation Citadel could not have ended successfully even without the withdrawal of troops to other sectors of the front. The commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel-General Goth, on the evening of July 13, told Manstein about the impossibility of a further offensive. It failed in the south and north, and it was clear to all participants.

Fifth legend.

The Wehrmacht suffered unacceptable losses near Kursk, which would not have happened if the German side had limited themselves to defense in the summer of 1943. This is also not true. Firstly, the Wehrmacht did not have the opportunity to remain on the defensive and maintain strength. Even if the Wehrmacht had remained on the defensive, the Red Army would still have carried out its offensives, and heavy fighting would have been inevitable.

Secondly, although the Wehrmacht's casualties in the Citadel offensive were higher than in subsequent defensive battles (this is due to the fact that the troops were forced to leave their shelters and break through Soviet defenses in depth), but losses in tanks were higher in the defensive phase battles. This is due to the fact that the attacker can usually take out the damaged equipment, and when retreating is forced to abandon it.

If we compare the losses in Operation Citadel with other battles on the Eastern Front, then the losses do not look too great. In any case, not as it is presented.

Legend six.

The Battle of Kursk appears the Soviet side as the third decisive battle of World War II. Moscow-Stalingrad-Kursk. Even in many of the latest Russian studies, this statement is repeated. And many Germans with whom I had to communicate declare that Kursk was the turning point of the war. And he wasn't. There were events that had a much greater impact on the course of the war. These are the US entry into the war, the failure of two German offensives on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942, and the Battle of Midway, as a result of which the initiative in the Pacific theater passed to the Americans. Kursk was a turning point in the sense that it became clear to everyone that the war in the east had finally rolled back. After the failure of the summer offensive, it became clear not only to Hitler, but also to many Germans, that it was impossible to win the war in the east, while Germany was forced to wage war on several fronts.

At the end, R. Töppel presents his new book: "Kursk 1943: Die größte Schlacht des Zweiten Weltkriegs" (Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle World War II"), which is due out in 2017.

Memoirs of soldiers about the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk View from Germany. it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer's Headquarters "

The Battle of Kursk in July 1943 buried German tanks and hopes

Context

July 5: Hell on the Kursk Bulge

Bet on "Tiger" and "Panther"

Many mistakes on the way to the Kursk Bulge

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The words of a German journalist that the monument in honor of the victory at the Kursk Bulge "should have been demolished" outraged Runet. And what do German historians really think about this battle?

SOUTHERN FAS: "PRELUDE" JULY 4

COMING MODEL

UNFORGETTABLE DAYS

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