In the evening, the commander of the 184th regiment received the two remaining guns of the 113th light artillery regiment; they supported the infantrymen as best they could, and the commander of the regiment, Zaitsev, and the chief of staff, Major Danilov, personally commanded the fire. Lieutenant Colonel Zaitsev, who had fearlessly commanded his unit all day under continuous fire, was killed; gunner A. A. Babadzhanyan kept his field bag in memory of his regimental commander. Babadzhanyan said: “The soldiers of the 184th regiment set fire to the first tank with a hand grenade, but the tanks crawl. I point the muzzle of my gun at the one in front. My gun commander gives the order: "4 shells, runaway - fire!" I release projectiles. At that moment, a tank crawling on the left, shelling our firing position, demolished the upper part of the shield of my gun and mortally wounded the commander. Tanks go straight to the gun. I stop shooting. The loader in an instant pulled a hand grenade from the pocket of the deceased commander, hid under a bush, and from there threw it under the tank. The tank caught fire and stopped. The rest turned back." When it got dark, five survivors remained in the firing position: Major F.K. Danilov, Captain Shiryaev and three fighters. During the day, the 184th SP and the 113th LAP knocked out 14 units of enemy armored vehicles, but the artillery regiment actually ceased to exist. Having blown up the guns, the survivors went east in search of a rallying point. So, on the whole, the battle day on June 22 ended on the right flank of the 3rd Army.

In the testimony of the arrested D. G. Pavlov (this is a very important document, and I will often return to it) there is such an entry: “To my question - what is the situation on his right flank - Kuznetsov replied that the situation there, in his opinion, is catastrophic , since scattered units in the Kose region (north of Grodno) hardly hold back the onslaught of the enemy, and the rifle regiment located between Kose and Druskeniki (Gozha and Druskininkai. - D. E.), was crushed by a blow from the rear of very large mechanized units, but that he is now collecting everything he has at hand and throwing it into the Kose area. To the north of Grodno during the day of June 22, first one 184th regiment of the 56th division operated, and then the 59th regiment from the 85th division. It is not clear what kind of mechanized units of the enemy could strike at the Soviet troops from the rear, from Druskininkai. In the direction of Merkin, where there was a bridge across the Neman, after breaking through the border line, the 12th Panzer Division of the 57th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group advanced. It is logically quite possible that after crossing the Neman in Merkin, some part of the tanks could have been sent south to strike at the open right flank and rear of the 3rd Army, but no documentary evidence of this was found. I found only an unsupported statement that the 19th Panzer Division of the 57th Corps was brought into battle through Augustow. It is useless to delve into Goth’s memoirs, it only reports that the 19th TD crossed the Neman in Merkin on the morning of June 24, about June 22 Goth “plays silence”. Of course, everyone is free to invent whatever they want, within the framework of common sense, of course. For example, that the introduction of a division into battle in this direction was recognized by the German command as erroneous, since the formation immediately suffered serious losses in clashes with the 11th mechanized corps of the Red Army and the 7th anti-tank brigade; to spend further in the battles for Grodno its combat potential, when the infantry itself coped well with its task, was an unaffordable luxury. The 19th TD again through Augustow was withdrawn to the Suvalkovsky ledge, during the day on June 23 it put itself in order, on the night of the 24th it again moved east, but already outside the 3rd Army zone, and waited for the turn to force the Neman. Or that on the afternoon of June 22, information was received from the north, from the 39th motorized corps, that during the capture of crossings in the middle reaches of the Neman, Soviet troops showed unexpectedly strong resistance, losses in armored vehicles were excessive, the 19th division should be withdrawn again to the reserve.

Left flank. 27th Rifle Division

The 3rd Army provided cover for the right flank of the Western District and the junction with the Baltic District. Suvalkovsky hung over the Bialystok ledge, as a result of which the outlines of the state border in this place were more than unusual. Therefore, the main blow of the 9th field army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel-General A. Strauss) cannot be attributed to any particular direction. The 8th Army Corps with its three divisions crushed the defenses of the 56th division and the 68th fortified area, moving to the east and southeast. From the area north of Augustow in a southerly direction, the 20th Army Corps attacked with two of its divisions. An auxiliary strike was delivered from the northwest, from there part of the forces of the 129th and the entire 87th infantry division of the 42nd army corps went on the offensive. They were opposed mainly by units of only one division of the 4th Corps: the 27th Rifle Omsk twice Red Banner named after the Italian Proletariat. The unit was commanded by Major General A. M. Stepanov, his deputy was regimental commissar I. V. Zhuravlev, and the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Yablokov. The 345th Regiment, put on alert in advance, withstood the blow of the 162nd Infantry Division of the 20th Corps, which was advancing along the Suvalkovsky highway. In the offensive zone of the corps there was a German armored train No. 1, but it stopped 3 km from the border, as the track was already of a different, Russian standard, width. Next to the soldiers of the 345th joint venture, the Red Army soldiers of the 120th anti-tank division (commander - Senior Lieutenant K.S. Markov) and the 45th separate engineer battalion fought for Augustow. The former fighter of the internal troops L.F. Kachanov wrote that cadets of the Mogilev Interregional School of the NKVD, who were in a summer camp near the city, also took part in the battles. The defenders of the city were supported by barrage fire from the 1st division of the 444th corps artillery regiment (regiment commander - lieutenant colonel Krivitsky, political officer - battalion commissar Popov). As the former cadet of the 1st battery, F.F. Ipatov, recalled, at an altitude of 39.8 they built dugouts by June 20, and there was also a division position nearby. In a short time, the artillerymen fired 185 shells at the enemy, and sometimes they fired in a way that was not typical for howitzers - direct fire at armored vehicles.

When the shelling of the city began, V.K. Solodovnikov called Major G.K. Zdorny to the border detachment, but there was no connection; then he moved to the command post. The divisions of the regiment hastily left the barracks, the families of the commanders hid in the forest. An hour later, an advance detachment of the enemy appeared from the side of Suwalki, but he had to overcome the defile along which the highway passed, and this turned out to be impossible at first. There was no artillery in the regiment, but during a heavy 4-hour battle, the enemy was stopped by fire from mortars and small arms. His units began to cross Lake Necko, but all their attempts to break into Augustow from the left flank were repulsed with serious losses. After a lull, another attack followed, but this time the fervor of the Germans weakened, and it was clear how their officers kicked, poked and threatened to raise the soldiers to attack. After unsuccessful attempts to attack on the move, the Germans decided to gain a foothold at an intermediate line and continue the offensive from it. The terrain and dense shrubs played into their hands. Parallel to the front edge of the 345th SP there was a shooting range 100–150 m long and up to two meters deep. The enemy decided to use this shooting gallery to accumulate forces in order to strike simultaneously from the flank and rear. But on the shore of the lake, 20 meters ahead of the front edge of the regiment, there was a small single-pipe bunker, abandoned due to dilapidation. He was occupied by the calculation of the pulrota of the 1st battalion. Having finished preparing for the attack, the enemy opened heavy artillery fire on the positions of the Soviet troops. When the German infantry was already ready to attack, heavy machine-gun fire was opened from the bunker along the shooting range. About 150 enemy soldiers were killed and wounded, the attack failed. The attack on the right flank of the battalion was also repulsed. There, the Nazis used a barbaric move: they let the children from the captured pioneer camp in front of them. Seeing such a picture, the fighters ceased fire, crawled towards them, repelled the children with a counterattack "with hostility" and took them to the shelter, and then to Augustow.

Feeling empty in front of his right flank (in the area of ​​the 3rd battalion of the 345th regiment), the enemy decided to try to take Augustow not with a frontal attack, but with a roundabout maneuver against our left flank. This direction was promising because the regiment did not have a left neighbor at all - I will discuss the reasons below. Therefore, Colonel Solodovnikov advanced the reconnaissance battalion assigned to him to the Zharnovo area, whose armored vehicles, actively maneuvering and firing heavily, forced the aggressor to concentrate his efforts in the direction of the 3rd battalion, which held on very staunchly. Then the Germans attacked in the interval between the 1st and 3rd battalions, which were separated by a lake. They pulled up artillery and, putting it on direct fire, began shelling the bunkers. At the same time, they were transferring manpower across the lake. Concentrating under the cover of artillery fire, the enemy again attacked the 3rd battalion. The artillery had not yet returned from the range, but the infantrymen and mortarmen managed to repel the onslaught again. During the next attack in hand-to-hand combat, the machine-gun crews of two bunkers died with the death of the brave, but the situation was restored by the introduction of part of the reserve 9th company into battle: the remnants of the enemy retreated in boats to the northern shore of the lake. Losses in the 345th amounted to about 150 people killed and wounded, but its position seemed very strong even without artillery support. However, between 15 and 16 hours, the deputy arrived at the regimental command post. division commander Colonel A. M. Gogoberidze. He gave the command order: to withdraw to the Bialobrzegi area, to the 2nd line of defense. Deputy The commander of the regiment, Captain Sviridov, considered the order a betrayal and tried to sabotage its implementation, but the regiment commander assured Gogoberidze that everything would be in order. When he left, Solodovnikov told his deputy that he was wrong, because he did not know the situation in other areas, - the captain silently agreed. The commanders and fighters were very sad that they were forced to retreat after such successful actions; sadness and grief were on everyone's faces. Having given the order to withdraw, V.K. Solodovnikov sent Captain Sviridov to the 1st battalion, ordering him to start retreating only when the 3rd battalion retreated behind the road Augustov - Graevo. The withdrawal was made successfully, without much pressure from the enemy. Here, on the 2nd line, his artillery and attached to the 53rd LAP, Major I.V. Pchelkin, finally returned to the regiment. But the Colonel's joy was premature. Gogoberidze arrived again with a new order: to withdraw even further and take up defense on the Beaver River, in the Shtabinsky section of the fortified area (30 km from Avgustov). By the evening of June 22, the 345th SP and other units defending Augustov retreated south, retreated across the river and took up a line along its bank. The withdrawal was made in deployed combat formations, under constant air attacks. Together with the 33rd communications battalion, the children of another pioneer camp were withdrawn. The corps artillerymen of the 444th regiment shot all the ammunition, there was nowhere to replenish it, so they were forced to start a retreat towards Grodno, keeping the materiel.

S. S. Zubenko wrote in his unpublished manuscript that one of the battalions of the 345th SP was at the beginning of the war building fortifications along the shore of Lake Raigrudskoye and his fate was unenviable. The tents of the infantrymen, who did not expect an attack, were perfectly visible from the adjacent side, so at dawn the enemy artillery fired at them without delay. The survivors did not have time to come to their senses, as the camp was engulfed in a ring of motorcyclists. What happened next was like a nightmare: the Nazis drove unarmed Red Army soldiers into a column, mercilessly finished off the wounded, separated and immediately shot the political workers. The rest were driven to their side through the border village of Zavala-Tvorki. The description looks quite plausible, especially since the commander of the 345th regiment complained about the absence of a left neighbor, but the belonging of the battalion to the regiment of V.K. Solodovnikov is completely excluded. The section of the border in the area of ​​​​the town of Raygrud, to the left of Avgustov, was supposed to cover the 132nd Infantry Regiment (commander - Major M.A. Medvedev). Zubenko described the death of the 3rd battalion just from this regiment. His main forces were in Sukhovol along with the headquarters of the division and took the fight later. This is confirmed by the memoirs of V. A. Mikhailov, the former commander of the pulrota of the 2nd battalion. At dawn on June 22, almost simultaneously with the combat alarm signal, aviation flew into the camp of the regiment. At the assembly point, the 2nd battalion (battalion commander - captain Sh. N. Zilberbrandt) was ordered to go to the aid of the 3rd battalion, which was on the construction of a defensive line. Near the village of Shtabin, the convoy was attacked by two Messerschmitts, one of them was shot down by fire from their heavy machine gun, the Kalinin twin brothers. At the limit of strength, the battalion continued its forced march in the direction of Augustow. Approximately halfway between Shtabin and Augustow, the forward unit collided with an enemy column advancing towards them. Stopping the march, the battalion turned around and began to dig in. Apparently, help was too late, there was no one to help. Soon the front of the battalion began to accumulate to attack a group of German soldiers. Mortar fire began, then dive bombers appeared. But the battalion did not flinch. The first enemy attack was drowned in two hundred, the second - in three dozen meters from the line of our defense, only loners crawled away. From the continuous fire, the water in the casings of the machine guns boiled. The Germans did not attack again. The soldiers used the relative calm for further digging in, dressing the wounded, and burying the dead. Among them were the Kalinin brothers, who died from a direct hit by a bomb. At five o'clock in the afternoon, an order was received from the regiment: secretly leave the position and retreat to Shtabin, to the line of the UR along the Biebrzha River. Leaving the barrier and hiding from the forest edges of the aircraft, the battalion began to retreat. When approaching the Biebrzha River, a mobile detachment of the enemy sat on the "tail" of the battalion - a dozen or two motorcyclists with two armored vehicles. Fire from an anti-tank gun camouflaged near the bridge destroyed both armored cars and part of the motorcycles, the battalion crossed the burning bridge to the south bank of the river.

It was not possible to achieve complete clarity whether or not the 239th Rifle Regiment (commander - Colonel A.K. Yezhov) managed to occupy its cover sector. The morning report of Army Group Center (at 08:00 on June 22) states: “The populated settlement of Graevo is occupied. The bunkers in front of Graevo were not occupied by the enemy. However, in the appendices of the book "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" on the website "Military Literature" a different translation of the same document is provided. It literally says the following: “Grayevo is taken. The pillboxes in front of Graevo have not been captured yet.” As you can see, there is a discrepancy that does not allow drawing unambiguous conclusions. However, there is evidence that even in the afternoon two battalions of the 239th regiment were still in the foreground of the 68th UR, and one of them kept the Graevo-Avgustov road under fire. If the foreground was occupied by units of the Red Army, then the pillboxes, at least part of them, were probably also occupied. In Graevo itself, a fierce battle was going on. Who led the actions of this small garrison is unknown. At the very first artillery attack, the commander of the 75th GAP, Captain K. N. Ivasenko, was killed; according to eyewitnesses, he rushed to the headquarters of the regiment and was literally thrown into the air by a shell explosion. With his legs torn off, wounded by many fragments, he died on the spot. The Germans were opposed by border guards and cadets of regimental schools of the 239th and 200th rifle regiments (the latter belonged to the 2nd division of the neighboring 10th army - the town was at the junction of two cover areas). At about 8 o'clock, the Germans captured most of Graevo, but from the side of the brick factory and the border commandant's office, a counterattack was soon followed by a joint detachment of infantry, "green caps" and the pro-Soviet-minded local population. The enemy retreated to the cemetery. A second attack of his unit began with the support of tanks and an armored train. An armored caterpillar, covered in spots of camouflage, suddenly crossed the border line, pushing a freight train in front of it. The border guards, who did not expect such a trick, did not have time to blow up the mined bridge in advance; soldiers of the assault landing group poured out of the armored platforms. The armored train immediately came under fire from the howitzer battery of the 75th Artillery Regiment. Despite the distance of five kilometers, the gunners quickly took aim and opened fire to kill. Having received several hits from heavy shells, the armored train backed off and took cover in the forest closest to the station, leaving the landing force without fire support. But four howitzers were not enough to cut off the tanks that had entered the rear of the Graevsky garrison. The battle ended in favor of the Germans; Graevo was captured, and its surviving defenders withdrew to the southeast - to the fortress of Osovets, that is, to the zone of the 10th army. Earlier, at about 10 o'clock, horse teams of those two divisions of the 75th GAP, which had wandered aimlessly on the 21st and on the night of the 22nd between Graevo and Chervony Bor, began to withdraw to the Osovets fortress. The third division of the regiment had mechanical traction, its fate has not been precisely established. Only R. S. Irinarkhov seems to have shed light on what happened to him. Unfortunately, Irinarkhov does not have a link to the source, so it is not clear who messed up by mistaking the division for the entire regiment. According to him, the 75th GAP, which had full mechanical traction (which in fact was not), was on firing practice at an army training ground, which, by the way, also did not exist in the Bialystok ledge - Chervony Bor was a corps training ground. Unable to break through to Graevo, under the bombardment he lost his artillery materiel, tractors and vehicles, broke up into small groups that left on foot to the east.

3.2. Advancement of reserves

Entering the battle of the 2nd echelon

In this situation, the command of the 3rd Army continued to create a rear defensive line with the involvement of units of the 85th Rifle and 204th Motorized Divisions for this. But if the regiments of the 85th division were stationed in Grodno itself and the Sola summer camp near the city, then the units of the 204th MD had to make a long march from the Volkovysk area. The division met the war in the formative stage. There was a lack of small arms, equipment, and transport. Two thousand personnel, headed by the deputy. the division commander, Colonel Matvienko, remained in the places of permanent deployment to receive weapons. The 657th artillery regiment went to the front with one division, the other two had no materiel. The 2nd echelon of the division, in particular two sapper companies of the 382nd light engineering battalion, moved on foot. On foot, despite the fact that there was free transport in Volkovysk. A. G. Pinchuk from the 27th Rifle Division after the war recalled: “[We] retreated through Volkovysk, it was already full of bedrooms, there were only chimneys, and on the right along the road in Volkovysk itself they stood on blocks (and the wheels were painted with white) brand new ZISs and lorries, unharmed, two hundred pieces. Most likely, it was the district reserve. Two hundred openly standing cars are a good target, but enemy aircraft did not touch them. Apparently, she was aware: the cars were on conservation, there was no need to bomb them, the advancing field troops would get them in good condition. Neither the commander of the "foot" motorized division, nor the commander of the mechanized corps himself subjugated these vehicles. Probably, they could not decide, they did not have enough spirit. But the commander of the 9th mechanized corps of the Kyiv military district, K.K. Rokossovsky, in a similar situation, made a strong-willed decision: he took all the vehicles of the district reserve from the district warehouses in Shepetovka with his power and put his 131st motorized division on them, also not equipped with vehicles.

The morning of June 22 was in full swing, approaching noon. Already 5-7 hours after the start of the artillery preparation, the German units overcame the resistance of the 4th Rifle Corps and deeply wedged into Soviet territory. As commander-4 Major General E. A. Egorov showed at a closed trial in his case, already an hour and a half after the start of the fighting, his headquarters had no connection with the command of the 3rd Army, and by the end of the day on June 22, contact was lost with both divisions (from the 27th and 56th, because the 85th division was not part of the corps. - D. E.) . Arrested D. G. Pavlov testified: “In the afternoon, Kuznetsov reported that out of the three radio stations he had, two were broken, and the remaining one was damaged, he asked to plant the radio station. During the same time, information was received from him that Sopotskin had been left by our units, and Kuznetsov, with a tremor in his voice, stated that, in his opinion, a number remained from the 56th Infantry Division. In the combat report of the front headquarters, No. 004 at 10:00, this was recorded as follows: “The commander of the 3rd Army personally reported that the situation was deteriorating. The enemy captured Sopotskin. There are fights for Dombrov, the outcome is not known. The tank division of the 11th mechanized corps is deployed and is sent to attack in the general direction of Sopotskin in cooperation with the 11th mixed aviation division. To strike at the enemy grouping in the Suvalkovsky ledge, a bomber regiment was sent under the cover of a regiment of fighters. The headquarters of the 3rd Army - Grodno, in readiness to move - the forest near Putrishka.

Chief of Staff of the 11th Mechanized Corps S. A. Mukhin

Having blocked the pockets of resistance of the remaining groups of the 56th division, the infantry units of the Wehrmacht, with the support of armored vehicles, bypassed the 213th rifle regiment, which had taken up all-round defense, and advanced on Grodno. To fend off the breakthrough, Army Commander V.I. Kuznetsov brought into battle the 2nd echelon - the 11th mechanized corps (commander - Major General of the tank troops D.K. Mostovenko, chief of staff - Colonel S.A. Mukhin). The task was set as follows: to defeat the German units with a counter strike and reach the Sopotskin - Beaver River line. Deputy The commander of the 11th MK for political affairs, regimental commissar A.P. Andreev, after leaving the encirclement, reported on July 15, 1941: “There was no connection with the headquarters of the 3rd army and the headquarters of the district, and parts of the corps acted independently ... according to the developed cover plan » . The corps 456th communications battalion out of 19 5-AK radio stations relying on the state had only one, which made the work of the headquarters very difficult. Taking into account the evidence of Egorov and Andreev, one can conclude that General V.I. Kuznetsov and the headquarters of the 3rd Army in the first hours lost control over all subordinate troops, with the exception of the 85th division, whose headquarters was also located in Grodno. After some time, the army headquarters managed to contact the mechanized corps. The order could be transmitted by radio, it could also be handed over by a communications delegate when the corps command had already left Volkovysk and was on the march. In the end, the 29th Panzer Division was stationed in Grodno, and the order could be transmitted through its headquarters. Already by 11 o'clock the 29th TD (commander - Colonel N. P. Studnev, deputy commander - regimental commissar N. P. Lebedev) came into contact and started a battle with the enemy troops.

The memoirs of the former chief of staff of the 29th division N. M. Kalanchuk and the former commander of the 57th tank regiment I. G. Cheryapkin, stored in the Belarusian archives, give an idea of ​​how the situation in the Grodno region developed in the morning and afternoon of June 22. When the air raid on Grodno began, an alarm was announced in the 29th division through the internal communication, the unit commanders came to the headquarters. Colonel N.P. Studnev ordered the reconnaissance battalion commander to conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Sopotskin, Sonichi, Kaleta with the task of getting in touch with the enemy, finding out his strength and direction of movement, and reporting the situation every 30 minutes. The commanders were ordered to withdraw units to their concentration areas, where to finish laying artillery rounds and disks for machine guns in tanks and armored vehicles, and to be in full readiness to join the battle. Withdraw the 57th regiment to the area of ​​Koptevka, Gibulichi, the materiel of the 29th artillery regiment, which had no means of traction, equip the artillery regiment with firing positions and be ready to open fire. The 29th Motorized Rifle Regiment to take the line and prepare defenses along the eastern bank of the river. Salmon and be ready to repel enemy attacks. Then began the advancement of units to the designated lines; it took place under the constant influence of enemy aircraft and by 8 o’clock was basically completed with tangible losses. Three thousand personnel who did not have any weapons were sent to the rear under the command of Deputy. division commander for the combat unit, Colonel I. F. Grinin. How their fate turned out is unknown. Major Cheryapkin instructed his deputy senior battalion commissar Tretyakov to organize the evacuation of the families of command personnel and foremen-over-conscripts, while he himself went to the regiment.

After some time, a liaison officer arrived at the command post of the division in the Gibulichi area with the combat order of the commander of the 3rd Army, the essence of which basically coincided with the points of the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. on separate sections of the state border, large sabotage and subversive gangs bombarded some of our cities. I order: the 29th Panzer Division, in cooperation with the 4th Rifle Corps, strike in the direction of Sopotskin, Kaleta, destroy the enemy. Don't cross the border. Report on performance. At about 9 o'clock, the division commander Studnev once again gathered the commanders of the regiments and special units and read out the order to them. As soon as the order for the army was read out, the motorcyclist brought the commander of the corps, General D.K. Mostovenko, who announced his almost identical order, but with clarifications: the 29th Panzer Division strikes at Sopotskin, Suwalki; to the left of the 29th, from the Sokulka, Indura area in the direction of Lipsk, Augustow, Suwalki, the 33rd Panzer Division is advancing.

Colonel Studnev, in pursuance of both orders, made the following decision:

The 57th TP of Major Cheryapkin, in a dispersed column in constant readiness for oncoming combat, move along the route in the direction of Ratichi, Sopotskin, Sonichi with the task of meeting the enemy on the move to turn around in battle formation and, in cooperation with parts of the 4th Rifle Corps, destroy the enemy, do not cross the border;

The 59th TP of Major Yegorov, in a dispersed column, move along the route: Baranovichi (a village west of Grodno. - D. E.), Bogatyri, Golynka and further to the west, when meeting with the enemy, in cooperation with the 57th tank regiment and parts of the 4th rifle corps, destroy the enemy that has broken through, do not cross the border;

Major Brave's 29th MSP to occupy and prepare defenses at the turn on the right of the southwestern outskirts of Grodno and further along the eastern bank of the river. Salmon to a fork in the road, in the event of an enemy breakthrough, in cooperation with an artillery regiment, delay him;

Major Shompolov's 29th GAP to prepare firing positions in the area of ​​Malakhovtsi, Gibulichi, to be ready to open fire on the areas of Ratichi, Bogatyri, Baranovichi, Belyany, supporting the motorized rifle regiment;

Unfortunately, the actions of the 29th division in fulfilling this order can only be judged by very few testimonies, because very few tankers who participated in the battles for Grodno survived until the mid-80s. When units of the 29th TD began to carry out the order, a report was received from the reconnaissance battalion, which stated that up to forty tanks and about an enemy infantry regiment in armored personnel carriers and vehicles had broken through the defenses of the 4th rifle corps and were moving in the direction of Sopotskin and Grodno. The head of the enemy column is Kaleta. Before reaching Sopotskin, Soviet tank units began to deploy their battle formations at the line of Loika, Golynka, Lipsk, and then started a fierce battle with enemy tanks and motorized infantry. The direct participants in the battle told about what happened next and what was not visible from the divisional command post.

Colonel Cheryapkin wrote that the units of his regiment were moving towards Konyukha and Golynka, and to the left - towards Lishany and Selko - the 59th regiment was moving up. By noon, the 57th TP reached the line Naumovichi - Labno - Ogorodniki. The reconnaissance group sent forward in the Golynka area met the enemy infantry battalion with attached armored vehicles. The regiment continued to move, and soon the first clash occurred - with enemy reconnaissance. Then a forward detachment appeared on the road and rye field ahead. During a short battle, 6 tanks and armored personnel carriers were knocked out, the rest retreated. After 40-50 minutes, a new attack followed, already with the support of 18 armored units. From the words of I. G. Cheryapkin, it can be assumed that his regiment, having come into contact with the enemy, initially did not conduct active offensive operations, but beat him, taking up defense. For Soviet tanks with thin armor, this was a completely acceptable type of battle. Therefore, another 12 enemy vehicles remained standing in the rye, and the 57th continued to hold its line. In the excitement of battle, the tankers continued to fire at the damaged and already burning armored vehicles, wasting shells and cartridges uselessly. The regimental commander ran around the positions, knocked on the towers, cursed, demanding to save ammunition. Having received a worthy rebuff and realizing that they had met with an armored unit, the Germans put aviation into action. Ju-87 dive bombers built a gigantic carousel in the air. Air bombs dropped by them dug up the positions of the regiment with dozens of funnels, tons of earth thrown into the sky blocked the sun for some time. There were some losses: several cars burned down that received direct hits, the assistant chief of staff for operational work died, the chief of staff, Major I. I. Petukhov, was torn off both legs. The air raid was followed by a third attack, this time by a large force. Up to an infantry battalion, shouting something and firing aimlessly from rifles and machine guns, moved forward with the support of 30 tanks and armored vehicles. It looked menacing and impressive, and, as I. G. Cheryapkin recalled, he wondered if the battle formations of his regiment would falter. But everything ended as before. Having let the enemy closer, the tanks opened heavy fire from cannons and machine guns. The infantry was immediately cut off, and after more than half of the armored vehicles participating in the attack were knocked out, the Germans began to retreat. Then the 57th Regiment launched a counterattack and began the pursuit. I suppose that Major Cheryapkin kept some of the tanks in reserve and brought them into battle at a moment of crisis. The T-26 driver, V.S. Popov, claimed that his crew entered the battle only around 4 p.m. on June 22, although they went to the assembly area along with everyone else. Having advanced to the line of Perstun, Golynka, the battalions were met by heavy fire from anti-tank weapons, then the Junkers again flew in. This is how the 57th Tank Regiment fought. Senior political officer A. Ya. Marchenko was a political officer of the 3rd battalion of the 59th regiment. His story significantly complements the memoirs of the regiment commander-57. During the first air raid on Grodno, one of the bombs hit the regiment's barracks, many were killed and wounded; The divisional headquarters went on alert. By about 8 o'clock in the morning the regiment reached the area of ​​concentration and took up its original positions. Other parts of the division also set out from the city. The deployment took place under the blows of German bombers. In the direction of the border, to the Augustow Canal, a reconnaissance battalion was sent (commander - Captain Yu. V. Krymsky). Soon, information was received from the reconnaissance battalion commander that two columns of vehicles with infantry, supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers, had crossed the border southwest of Sopotskin and were moving in the direction of Grodno. Since the commander of the 59th TP for some reason (Marchenko did not know this) was absent from the concentration area, he was ordered to lead the regiment into battle, as he had experience in the battles at Khalkhin Gol and the Karelian Isthmus. I think here the political instructor made a mistake after a long time ago: he was most likely entrusted with the command not of the entire regiment, but of the battalion, which, you see, is also quite a lot.

At about 10:30 a.m., a convoy of more than 50 combat vehicles set out across the river on the road to Sopotskin. Halfway to the border, Soviet units met with enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers and immediately entered into battle with them. A. Ya. Marchenko said: “I also remember how our high-speed T-26 tanks rushed to the enemy T-III and T-IV, how German and our tanks began to flash in front of and on the sides of my thirty-four. Ours [flashed] more often, because their armor was twice as thin as the German ones. I don’t forget how my driver Andrey Leonov rushed to the right, then to the left, hurrying with his invulnerable thirty-four to the rescue of his comrades, how we shot the enemy point-blank.” The battle went on with varying success. More than once the regiment threw back the Germans for several kilometers, but after the bombing and shelling, they attacked again, and the tankers were forced to back away, leaving burning cars on the hills. “I didn’t remember how many times they attacked us, but Andrei claimed later that we repelled more than 10 attacks. The armor of our tank was all littered with potholes and dents from enemy shells. We were deafened by their explosions, by the bombs that now and then rained down on us from the sky in the intervals between attacks. Another regiment of our division, commanded by Major Cheryapkin, also fought a heavy battle to our right.

From the combat report of the headquarters of the front No. 005 as of 13:00: “The enemy crossed the river with large forces. Neman between Druskininkai and Gozha and develops an offensive [in the direction of] Porechie. The opposing regiment of the 56th Rifle Division was almost completely destroyed. Troopers landed in the Graevo area. The left flank of the 3rd Army held firm by 1300 hours. The tank division is fighting on the Bogatyr, Golynka, Nowy Dvur fronts. Near Grodno across the river. Only one bridge remained on the Neman, the rest were destroyed. Headquarters of the 3rd Army - Grodno.

In addition to tank divisions, the 29th division also included motorized rifle and howitzer-artillery regiments. Alas, almost nothing is known about their actions, except for the assertion that the 29th SME commander V.I. Kuznetsov subsequently took German paratroopers to fight in the Grodno region. At the same time, I. G. Cheryapkin wrote that after the battle on the Shchara River, he left the encirclement together with the commander of the motorized regiment, Major Brave. During this last battle as part of the division, when breaking through the bridge, Cheryapkin's tank fell behind due to the failure of the gearbox and was shot by an anti-tank gun, while the major himself received a shell shock.

The mention of the counterattack of the 11th Mechanized Corps on the afternoon of June 22 was included in all more or less serious studies on the Western Front. For example, the once famous V. A. Anfilov mentions this in his voluminous monograph, but he does not have details. Details can be found, and even then in a very truncated form, only in a few printed works of Belarusian publishing houses. It is even impossible to calculate exactly how many Soviet tank battalions took part in the attacks, who commanded them, what was the exact number and composition of the armored vehicles involved. The general course of the battle was something like this. The tankers of the 11th MK encountered the forward detachments from the 8th and 28th infantry divisions of the 8th army corps, abundantly equipped with anti-tank weapons and reinforced with attached armored vehicles, including the Shtug self-propelled guns with 75-mm cannons.

The hypothetical participation in the battles of the 19th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht was mentioned earlier. The 29th Soviet division, which was the first to start a battle with the enemy, was mainly engaged in holding back its advance with the forces of the 57th regiment, the 59th regiment, which had a new materiel, fought mostly oncoming battles. The goal of the 29th TD was the release of Sopotskin and the release of the 213th rifle regiment.

To the left of the 29th, the 33rd Panzer Division (commander - Colonel M.F. Panov, deputy commander - regimental commissar N.V. Shatalov, chief of staff - Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Leviev) tried to advance to Lipsk. She met the war at the place of permanent deployment in the town of Sokulka. It was a connection of the "2nd stage", which was in the process of formation. Despite this, by June 22, there were more vehicles in it than in the 29th, the formation of which began much earlier. The 33rd TD had 118 tanks (1 KV, 2 T-34s, 44 BTs, 65 T-26s, 2 KhTs, 4 T-26 tractors) and 72 armored vehicles. And yet it was less than 30% of the required staffing, there was also a serious shortage of personnel. V. K. Gutsalenko served in the battalion of the 65th tank regiment (commander - Major G. A. Manin). When, after the first air raid, the units of the regiment concentrated on the assembly point, the deputy division commander, Lieutenant Colonel G. Ya. Ermachenkov, ordered everyone with weapons to leave the line. 27 people left Gutsalenko's company, 9 more were equipped with the crews of three tanks assigned to the company. As I.V. Kazakov recalled, the personnel of the 1st battery of the 33rd anti-aircraft division (division commander - Major B.N. Funk) remained at the location of the unit in anticipation of tractors and ammunition, the 2nd and 3rd batteries went into battle like infantry. After sitting for a day and waiting for nothing, the anti-aircraft gunners abandoned their useless guns and also became foot soldiers. Almost nothing is known about the actions of the division in the first hours and days of the war. The official historians of the Soviet period diligently "forgotten" the 33rd. I admit that they had nothing to write due to the lack of archival materials. However, I also have nothing special to say, the few letters of former soldiers of the division that I have are by no means enough. But there is a result: by the middle of the day on June 22, the advance of the enemy in the Grodno direction was suspended. As for the cost, Soviet sources kept proud silence, but there are figures in the Wehrmacht headquarters documents. The intelligence department of the headquarters of the 9th German Army in its report at 17:40 on June 23 stated: “The Russians are fighting to the last, they prefer death to captivity (order of political commissars). Large losses of personnel, few prisoners ... 22.6 knocked out 180 tanks. Of these, only the 8th Infantry Division destroyed 80 tanks in the battles for Grodno. This is the payment for a private success west of Grodno, and, if the assumption is correct, it was paid mainly by the 59th Tank Regiment. An indirect confirmation of this can be the fact that in the battles on June 22, its commander and chief of staff, Majors V. S. Egorov and M. V. Okulov. Colonel Kalanchuk recalled that Yegorov died near the village of Ratichi, his deputy. in political matters, the battalion commissar Egoshev - in the very first counterattack near Kaletov. At the cost of heavy losses during the oncoming battle, the 29th Panzer Division pushed back the Germans and reached the Lobny-Ogorodniki line. The direct loss in the battle was 27 tanks of old brands, all the T-34s and KVs that participated in the battle remained in service, despite many hits (as N. M. Kalanchuk claimed, but this does not agree with reality). The same H. Slesina colorfully described how Shtug self-propelled guns knocked out KV tanks, and the photo in his book shows that they were KV-2s with a 152-mm howitzer. He wrote: “The first two shells from our two assault guns hit the most advanced heavy tank and simply tear off its turret with amazing force. She was thrown a few meters. A high column of fire, the flash and impact of exploding ammunition, tank gas tanks soar into the sky. The enemy lost 21 tanks, mostly Pz-IIIs, and 34 armored personnel carriers. It was the maximum that could be achieved. A different result would have been desirable, but probably difficult to achieve. The reason for this was the dominance of enemy aircraft in the air (already on the second or third day of the fighting, a soldier's rumor told that many Soviet tanks were burned by air strikes), bulletproof armor for the bulk of the tanks, and the German infantry was abundantly equipped with anti-tank weapons. According to the staffing table, the Wehrmacht infantry division had 75 anti-tank guns, 20 field artillery guns and 54 howitzers. Rifle division of the Red Army - respectively 45, 46 and 44 and 12 anti-aircraft guns. In general, by June 1941, the German army had: 1047 50-mm anti-tank guns, 14,500 37-mm guns, 25,300 light and 183 heavy anti-tank guns. The Germans chose from the arsenals of occupied Czechoslovakia all of its anti-tank artillery, including 47 mm caliber guns, some of them were subsequently even installed on self-propelled gun carriages, which were used both as their own obsolete tanks and captured French armored vehicles. There were, however, several other reasons for such large losses in tanks. Already in Spain, Soviet volunteer tankers encountered a previously unknown armor-piercing projectile that literally melted through tank armor. Samples were not captured, the mystery remained. The projectile was conditionally called "thermite", although studies by specialists from the GAU of the Red Army proved that no thermite compositions are able to give such a combat effect. And only during the counter-offensive near Moscow, when entire warehouses of Wehrmacht ammunition fell into the hands of the advancing troops, did they finally manage to get a mysterious “product”. It turned out to be a cumulative (directed) action and, with a successful hit, burned through the armor of virtually any Soviet tank then available. Some historians argue that the new projectile entered the Wehrmacht troops only in the middle of autumn 1941, but back in August, Colonel Ivanin, head of the ABTU of the Western Front, analyzing the actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in the first month of hostilities and the reasons for the exorbitant losses in tanks, including other things he indicated: “A significant part of the shells are incendiary (thermite) or armor-piercing incendiary. These shells set fire to our light and medium tanks."

Also, near Moscow, an unusual sub-caliber projectile without explosive fell into the hands of specialists from the Art Committee of the GAU RKKA. A heavy and super-hard armor-piercing core made of tungsten carbide was pressed into the head of a light alloy in the form of a coil. The use of tungsten in an anti-tank projectile is extremely unprofitable from an economic point of view - it becomes literally “gold”. But its ability to penetrate armor... Soviet caliber armor-piercing and armor-piercing tracer shells for most types of guns were much less effective and hit enemy tanks only at close range. The only exceptions were, perhaps, the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun and Grabin's new 76-mm artillery systems ("divisions" F-22 and tank F-34), but, apparently, a sufficient amount of new ammunition was not fired for them. Naturally, the armor resistance of the T-34 and KV, even under the conditions of their shelling with new types of anti-tank ammunition, was high, but in reality there were only 32 of them in the entire 11th mechanized corps: 24 T-34 and 8 KV (12 KV that did not reach their destination , does not count). And finally, one more detail in this not very fun picture. Each tank or motorized division of the Red Army had in its rear units the so-called. ORVB (separate repair and restoration battalion). The functions of such a battalion, in particular, included the task of deploying a SPAM (assembly point for emergency vehicles) near the battle area and pulling all the equipment that was disabled to it in order to repair it on the spot or send it to the rear. One can not even remember the evacuation of wrecked tanks to rear factories in those crazy days. The tank battlefields also remained in the German rear, so there was nothing to repair. And since the divisions, almost defenseless from the air (the 11th SAD, although it tried to somehow cover the ground troops, failed to cope with the task) soon lost all the already small rear areas, the repair base itself was gone. So the failure of the counterattack near Grodno on June 22 was largely predetermined.

3.3. Advancement of the 21st Rifle Corps

Having received information about the enemy crossing the Neman north of Grodno, the command of the ZapOVO decided to cover the designated Lida direction with the reserves available on the right bank of the Neman and already partially on the march. The fact that parts of the strike force Gota were directed not so much at Lida as at Vilnius, Molodechno and Minsk, in Minsk itself, of course, was not known. At the disposal of the district headquarters (not yet the front), sent at 13:55 on June 22 to the commander of the 21st corps through the headquarters of the 11th SAD in Lida, he ordered his two divisions (17th and 37th) to go to the Skidel area, Ostryn and prepare a defensive line on the Merkine, Druskininkai, Lakes, Skidel, Kovshovo fronts, the Neman River on the left flank. Only the deputy signed it. Chief of Staff of the ZapOVO, Major General I. I. Semenov. At 15:45 in Molodechno, signed by the chief of staff of the Western Front, General V.E. Klimovskikh, an order was sent to the commander of the 24th Samara-Ulyanovsk division K.N. Molodechno, Vishnevo, Ivye, Lida. And, finally, in the third order (time not specified), Major General V. B. Borisov, commander-21, was ordered to immediately advance the 17th and 37th rifle divisions to the line of Varena, Novo-Kazakovshchizna, Dubintsy, the Dzitva River; Use the 8th anti-tank brigade to defend the line of the river. Dzitva. Only General Semyonov signed again. Thus, the composition of the corps was increased by one rifle division and one artillery brigade and was supposed to represent an impressive force. The trouble was that such a composition remained only on paper, and all the mentioned formations acted against the enemy tank forces at different times and separately and were subsequently defeated in oncoming battles and surrounded. In addition, at the time of issuing these orders, the headquarters of the 21st SC was still in Vitebsk, had no connection with the divisions, so all these "events" were empty air shaking.

As the former chief of staff of the 37th division, Lieutenant General G.V. Revunenkov, recalled, they learned about the beginning of the war at noon from the speech of V.M. Molotov, being at the Bogdanuv station. At this time, two regiments were moving on foot, and the units stationed in Vitebsk were moving by rail. The divisional communications battalion was moving apart from the tripod, there was no communication with the units, and the ammunition was generally in the last echelon, which, perhaps, had not even set off yet. B. A. Shirokov (in 1941 - a cadet of the regimental school of the 247th rifle regiment of the 37th SD) wrote that on June 22 the regiment was in the forest not far from the Benyakone metro station. The former commander of the 55th Infantry Regiment of the 17th Division, G. G. Skripka, recalled that they set out on a campaign on June 12, and should have concentrated at Lida on June 23. They moved on foot, with the exception of the 390th howitzer artillery regiment, the 102nd anti-tank and 161st anti-aircraft divisions, which were supposed to be transported from Polotsk by rail - they remained in Polotsk. As indicated in the operational summary of the headquarters of the Western Front No. 15, by 08:00 on July 2, 1941, the 2nd echelons of the control units of the 21st Rifle Corps, the 17th and 50th divisions, as well as the 56th Corps artillery regiment, 390th GAP, 102nd OPTD; in Lepel was the 467th corps artillery regiment.

The morning of June 22 found the 55th SP on a day camp near the village of Ivye. Here, from soldiers and commanders passing by in cars, they learned about the bombardment of Lida. The regiment took measures to camouflage from an air attack, put up outposts. At a meeting at the division headquarters (there was no communication with the corps and other higher headquarters), the age-old Russian question "what to do" was decided. The division chief of staff, Colonel Kharitonov, offered to open the "red package" and act in accordance with it, but the division commander, Major General T.K. Batsanov and his deputy. on the political side, the regimental commissar I. S. Davydov did not agree. It was decided to wait for orders "from above".

The former secretary of the party bureau of the 245th howitzer artillery regiment of the 37th division, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel K. N. Osipov (in June 1941 - senior political instructor) recalled that the regiment was advancing westward by four railway echelons. On June 21, the echelon with the 1st Battalion and the headquarters battery arrived in Lida, where it was delayed due to the busy unloading point at the Benyakone terminal station. He wrote: “Life in the city went on, no different from the old days. It was a Saturday. In the evening, the echelon personnel calmly lay down to rest after dinner. Everything was ready for unloading. Everyone knew what he would do. At 4 am on June 22, we were awakened by strong explosions of aerial bombs. What happened? Who is bombing and what? With this question, I ran to the commandant of the Lida station. He sat by the phone and tried in vain to clarify the situation with someone. But there was no communication with other cities... At about 8 am, a passenger train with many battered cars approached the station. As soon as he stopped, they began to carry out the dead and wounded. Now it became clear that the war had begun. Only by noon was the damage on the railway track from Lida to Benyakon restored. The train moved to the place of unloading. At st. Benyakone, the deputy commander of the division, regimental commissar Pyatakov, informed us that fascist Germany had attacked the Soviet Union ... We were ordered to immediately unload and concentrate 2 km from the station. Benyakone in the forest, put everything on alert… I had to urgently send the car to a gas station in the city of Lida for gasoline.”

R. R. Chernoshey, with the rank of lieutenant, served at the headquarters of the 245th GAP of the 37th division. He recalled that they finished loading into the train at 2 am on June 22. An hour later, the train set off, left Vitebsk and moved in a westerly direction. At ten o'clock in the morning he stopped at Vileyka station. The servicemen poured out of the cars and ran to the cafeteria for shopping. But the station, to their surprise, turned out to be empty: the windows and doors were open, everything was thrown, the documentation of the railway workers was scattered on the floor. In Vileyka, they learned the terrible news about the beginning of the war. There was no communication with the tripod and the headquarters of the corps, the communication at the station also did not work. Then the regiment commander I. S. Merkulov decided to move on to his destination. While proceeding to the Yuratishki station, the echelon was machine-gunned by German aircraft; on the evening of June 22, arrived at the station. Gavya. There was not a single carriage on the tracks, there was only one locomotive with a boiler pierced by an aircraft cannon shell; There was no one in the station building either. The station was not equipped with a loading and unloading ramp, but all the materiel was carried out literally by hand and covered in the nearest forest.

The 68th reconnaissance battalion was far less fortunate. The former commander of a tank company, M. T. Ermolaev, recalled that their echelon proceeded from Lida towards Benyakone and began unloading in a forest area. When the unloading was coming to an end, the echelon was attacked by enemy aircraft. These are the events that took place in the rear of the 3rd Army northeast of the Neman at a time when parts of the divisions of its 4th Corps had already suffered heavy losses and were pushed back from the border line at a distance of 20 to 30 km, and the armored forces thrown into battle The 2nd echelon failed to turn the tide and defeat the invading aggressor.

3.4. Exit of enemy units to the approaches to Grodno

The actions of the NKVD troops, the 85th rifle and 204th motorized divisions, artillery of the 4th rifle corps

Despite the desperate heroism and self-sacrifice of the tankers of the 11th mechanized corps, they failed to stop and push the enemy beyond the state border line. In the afternoon, enemy troops reached the approaches to Grodno. Already in the course of the battle of the mechanized corps south of Sopotskin, in separate sections in front of the front of the units that occupied the rear defensive line, advance detachments of enemy troops appeared. Bloody battles ensued, in which the personnel of six schools of junior command personnel of the border and internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR, who were in summer camps in the Grodno region, took an active part. Near the village of Pyshki (emphasis on the last syllable), the cadets of Major B.S. Zinoviev held the defense. The school belonged either to the Shepetovsky border detachment, or it was specialized, preparing junior commanders - heavy machine gunners, and before leaving for the camps it was located in the Brest Fortress. Armed with PPD submachine guns and Maxim machine guns, the cadets twice thwarted enemy attempts to cross the Neman with friendly fire.

Former cadet V. A. Novikov, who ended the war in China with the rank of senior lieutenant, wrote that the enemy managed to “hook” on the right bank, but he was knocked out of the bridgehead by a counterattack of the border guards and thrown into the river. Only bypassed from the flank (the Germans overcame the Neman in another place), the border guards retreated to the village of Grandichi, where they fought stubbornly until late at night at the turn of a nameless height. Novikov remembered that there were some long-term fortifications there (probably the remains of fort No. 7 of the Grodno fortress). By their actions, the KGB soldiers made it possible to turn around and take up positions with units of the 85th rifle and 204th motorized (commander - Colonel A. M. Pirov) divisions.

The main forces of the 85th SD, which were in the Sola camp (103rd Rifle Division, 141st Rifle Division, 167th LAP, 223rd Guards Rifle Division) and raised on combat alert, by order of the commander advanced to the southwestern outskirts of Grodno and occupied defense along the Lososna River. The 346th anti-aircraft division (commander - captain Gombolevsky), which had well-equipped positions, fired barrage at enemy aircraft; having fired about 600 shells on the day of June 22, the division's crews shot down six bombers. From the north, Grodno was covered by the 59th rifle regiment and the 74th reconnaissance battalion. On the march, parts of the division were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft and suffered heavy losses. Three rifle battalions (1st from the 59th regiment, 1st from the 103rd regiment and 2nd from the 141st regiment), allocated for the construction of fortifications in the Sopotskin area, did not return to the division, and nothing about their fate was not known. In addition, three companies were allocated from the 59th regiment by order of the army headquarters for its protection and work at the artillery warehouse, so that in fact the regiment commander had only one battalion and special forces subordinate to him. Armed units of the 204th division, including the 126th tank regiment of Colonel M. I. Makeev (57 T-26 vehicles), advanced to the areas indicated by the command and took up defense at the turn south-west of Grodno: Soly - Lososna River - Noviki. By 4 p.m. on June 22, the 700th MP (commander - Hero of the Soviet Union Major M. I. Sipovich) with a battery of guns and 20 tanks turned to the north-west, the 706th MP (commander - Colonel I. S. Sidenko) - front to the west, west of the railway Grodno - Bialystok. The command post of the division was located southwest of the village of Gibulichi. Until the end of the day, the 85th and 204th continued to improve their defenses and conducted reconnaissance. Only the 223rd Artillery Regiment (commander - Lieutenant Colonel A.T. Kasatkin) fired at the enemy. One of his divisions, located in a position near Cape Kolbasin, supported the 103rd Infantry Regiment with barrage fire, but suffered very serious losses in people, materiel and horse composition from air attacks. Probably, several units of the 444th Corps Regiment were at the same line. The training battery also supported with fire some rifle regiment located in the area of ​​the village of Bratishki (not established). N. S. Belikov recalled that they reported from the NP: “8 shells were used up, the enemy’s battery and heavy machine gun were destroyed.” Subsequently, the training battery withdrew from position and joined the regiment. Where the main part of the 444th KAP was located has not yet been precisely established, it is known that it is relatively close to Grodno. At some height, an NP was equipped, on it were the regimental commander Krivitsky and the commander of the 1st division, Captain Fradkin, the guns fired intensely at the enemy. It turns out that the entire regiment was in position south of Avgustov, see above - the testimony of F.F. Ipatov. G. G. Rak from the 2nd division recalled that Lieutenant Colonel Krivitsky led the actions of both corps regiments, in particular, he set the task of setting barrage fire for the 152nd regiment (commander - Major I.P. Tsygankov, chief of staff - Captain Vorontsov). Apparently, the firing positions were at the turn of the UR, because, as Rak recalled, the camouflage of pillboxes caught fire from shell explosions. With the help of gliders, the Germans threw out small groups of paratroopers with mortars and motorcycles in the rear of the army. After 18 hours, the artillerymen, under the cover of four KV tanks, withdrew to Grodno and crossed the Neman.

The 3rd division of the 152nd corps artillery regiment deployed to positions on the right bank of the Neman, near the railway bridge near the city outskirts. There was no outpost, but in the evening a platoon of junior lieutenant Babich from the 3rd battalion of the 184th KrSP approached the artillerymen, who retreated to Grodno. Having crossed the Neman road bridge, the fighters stumbled upon a cordon that did not let anyone into the city. But on the other hand, all those who came out were given cartridges, 90 pieces per brother. Two squads had already received ammunition from Babich's platoon, when someone "vigilant" suspected soldiers from the 184th regiment of disguised saboteurs. The shutters were already latching, and senseless bloodshed could well begin when someone else reasonably remarked that there could hardly be Uzbeks among the saboteurs. This defused the situation, and then the platoon was subordinated to the commander of the 3rd AD of the 152nd KAP. On the hill where the position was, there were old rifle cells, which were occupied by fighters. It seemed that they would settle here for a long time, even the password for the night was given, but soon the order came - after the explosion of the bridge, withdraw from the position and retreat to a new line of defense. Howitzer crews fired the remnants of ammunition at some targets on the left bank, after which they attached their formidable guns to tractors and began to stretch out onto the highway going from Grodno to Lida. The infantry moved after them.

Note. Now there is a city market in this place, and in 1986 traces of Soviet rifle cells were still visible on the hillside.

The 161st Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, which broke through north of Grodno, crossed the Neman near the village of Gozha and advanced in the general direction to the Lakes. Apparently, it was with her that the border guards from the detachment of Major B.S. Zinoviev fought. Gozha stands right on the highway Druskininkai - Grodno, to the south of it are Grandichi. Here, the 59th joint venture (commander - Colonel Z. Z. Terentyev) and the 74th ORB of the 85th division were supposed to turn around for the defense of the city. In fact, they were withdrawn from the division, as they carried out the orders of the commander.

Professor D. Z. Kagan in June 1941 served as a junior doctor in the medical unit of the 59th regiment. On the night of June 22, he was on duty in the medical battalion of the division, but after the start of the air raid on Grodno, he handed over duty to the commander of the medical battalion and hastily returned to the regiment. Upon arrival in Grodno, the 48th medical battalion was immediately deployed to receive the wounded in the northern third of the main barracks town. Constant air raids forced the division commander to withdraw the battalion from the barracks to the area of ​​the railway bridge. But even there, continuous bombardments did not allow the doctors to work normally, the personnel were forced to take refuge in the niches of the hills near the bridge. Then the 48th OMSB was withdrawn to the nearest forest, and then to the village of Kolpaki. In all places where the battalion stopped, its personnel received the wounded, selflessly provided all possible assistance, performed urgent operations, and evacuated to the rear as far as possible. The wounded came not only from units of the 85th division, but also from other units and formations.

At noon, the command of the 59th regiment received an order: to go to the northeastern outskirts of Grodno. The order was carried out, they went around the city, by country roads. A first-aid post was set up in one of the peasant households. By sunset, the wounded from the 1st battalion, which was on the border, began to arrive. B. S. Kirichenko, the commander of the min company of the 59th SP, wrote that his company had left for the border just with the 1st battalion. At the village Dorgun (the frontier post was located 500 m) built anti-tank obstacles. There was no ammunition, only the sentry norm of rifle cartridges and training mines for mortars. In the morning, the Germans opened heavy fire on the outpost and the position of the UR. A few hours later, they broke through the Soviet defenses and went to the rear of the battalion, skirting Sopotskin from the south. The battalion, which had virtually no ammunition, suffered heavy losses and was dispersed. Kirichenko with difficulty gathered his mortarmen and led them through copses, ravines and rye crops to the burning Grodno. In the place of permanent deployment (11th town), the 59th regiment was no longer there. We found him and connected with him only by 18 pm in the area of ​​​​the city cemetery, next to the anti-aircraft artillery regiment (the command post of the regiment or one of its batteries). Kirichenko reported to Colonel Terentyev about what had happened at the border, he sent his company to the command of the chief of staff. The headquarters was ordered: to carry out reconnaissance in order to establish where the Germans were crossing north of Grodno. It was established that the enemy had built pontoon bridges near the villages of Grandichi and Gozha. By morning they returned to their place, the regiment was not found again. We learned from someone (perhaps from a specially left “lighthouse” soldier) that the regiment had gone to Skidel, and moved on. There is no exact data when the Germans began building a crossing at Grandichi. But, most likely, when units of the 85th division reached the northern outskirts of Grodno, on the right bank of the Neman near Gozha, the enemy had already captured and expanded the bridgehead, and it was not possible to liquidate it.

3.5. Abandonment of Grodno and withdrawal of units of the 3rd Army south and north of the Neman

In such a situation, the army commander, Lieutenant General V. I. Kuznetsov, decided: on the night of June 22-23, leave the left-bank part of Grodno, withdraw the right flank of the army to the line of the Svisloch and Kotra rivers. It can be reflected in the combat report of the front headquarters No. 006 as of 17:00, but, alas, it is not included in the Collection of combat reports No. 35 for some unknown reason. We have to use the apocrypha for the reconstruction of events. There was no single front line, unorganized crowds of refugees, individual military personnel and small disparate units from broken units left to the east. The untouched fuel and lubricant depots and the surviving ammunition depots, by order of the commander, were mined by sappers of the rifle regiments of the 85th rifle division and blown up at 00:30 on June 23. The platoon commander of the regimental school of the 59th regiment, I. Ya. Privalov, was the head of the 3rd guard at military warehouses on the northern outskirts of Grodno. He recalled that his people were instructed to prepare the warehouses for destruction under the leadership of a military technician of the 2nd rank Seregin. Also, several tons of tol were issued from the warehouse for mining bridges across the Neman and fuel depots. By midnight, the order was carried out, using the password "Moscow" a simultaneous detonation of all mined objects was carried out. Ammunition and fuel detonated with terrible force. Not a single piece of glass was left within a radius of several kilometers; the shock wave knocked people off their feet two kilometers from the explosion site.

V. A. Korotkevich recalled: “We pass by a deaf fence, behind which there was a cemetery. It becomes even harder on the soul ... Suddenly, a glow appeared over the city. It was a kilometer column of fire. Heavy explosions were heard, followed by the crackle of exploding cartridges in the sky. Ammunition depots and fuel depots were blown up. The road to Lida, filled with urban refugees and individual military units, was illuminated far and for a long time ... ”At the same time, the last surviving road and railway bridges across the Neman were blown up, and the central span of the latter fell into the river, blocking navigation. They were mined by sappers not from the 85th division (its 140th OSB was on the construction of fortifications on the border, where it was destroyed), but the responsibility for the organization was assigned to the head of the engineering service of the division. Despite the fact that during the day the leaders of military hospital No. 2384 and the 48th divisional medical battalion managed to send two ambulance trains with the wounded from Grodno station, by the end of the day the hospital complex and several more hastily adapted buildings (like schools) were again overcrowded. According to legend, they were not able to take out the heavy ones to the east - the walkers left on foot - but the doctors voluntarily stayed with them in the hope of the enemy's mercy towards the wounded.

The unjustified decision to leave Grodno led to an even greater deterioration in the situation on the right flank of the front. By not trying to delay the enemy, forcing him to get bogged down in street fighting in an ancient city with a bizarre street layout located on the hills, the command of the 3rd Army left the Germans the opportunity to improvise, that is, to act unpredictably. In addition, when leaving the city, the army lost large fuel and ammunition depots that they had personally blown up. Now the supply of BP should have been organized from Lepel and Krulevshchizna, and fuel and lubricants - from the same Krulevshchizna, from the Cherlena airfield, from Orsha, Volkovysk, Mosty, Lida, Dretuni or Molodechno, that is, tens and hundreds of kilometers away. In combat report No. 3 of June 24, the army command reported: “An extremely difficult situation with ammunition has created in the units. Parts have from 1/4 to 1/2 ammunition. Parts, being in peacetime states, do not have transport. Artillery depots and bases are not known to me. Both the situation itself and the lack of supply of ammunition to the army put the army in an extremely difficult position. I ask for urgent orders on the allocation of reserves at my disposal and on the supply of ammunition, fuel and vehicles for delivery. In the end, an advantageous line on the Neman was left; regrouping the available forces, it was possible to strike the mechanized corps in a northerly direction to cut off the 161st division of the Wehrmacht from the river and eliminate the bridgehead on the eastern bank. By depriving the 161st Infantry Division of the opportunity to replenish fuel, ammunition and provisions, it was possible to sharply ease enemy pressure in the Lida direction and thus get the opportunity to transfer one of the divisions of the 21st Corps to Skidel.

When there was no longer a single crossing on the Neman, southeast of Grodno, units of the 1st division of the 444th KAP came out to the river after an exhaustingly difficult march. The division stopped at some village about eight hundred meters from the blown up bridge; some part of us still remained on the east bank. Rafts got stuck on the river in this place: until the very beginning of the war, the timber was rafted to the north, for export, so that at pulp and paper mills in the cities of Koenigsberg, Tilsit and Ragnit (now Russian Kaliningrad, Sovetsk and Neman), diligent Germans could make high-quality paper from it . It was impossible to transport the materiel on rafts, but about three hundred artillery shots were delivered from the other side. Before the approach of the enemy, positions were equipped. With direct fire, the corps artillerymen managed to hold back the enemy, postponing the tragic denouement until the morning. When dawn broke, the Germans resumed their attacks, followed by several dive-bomber raids. By 3 p.m. on June 23, the division ceased to exist. The surviving soldiers and raft commanders went beyond the Neman towards Skidel, all the guns, tractors and vehicles were smashed or drowned in the Neman.

By June 22, the regimental school of the 444th regiment remained at the site of its previous deployment and carried out guard duty. Former cadet U.A. Biletsky recalled that on June 18 the regiment left for summer camps - without ammunition, with a training wooden projectile and an empty cartridge case with each gun. On June 22, when the shelling and bombardment of Grodno began, the loading of ammunition was organized by the forces of all cadets free of duty (the warehouse was filled to capacity) and their delivery to the positions, as Biletsky wrote, in Lososno. N. S. Belikov wrote that their training battery (battalion commander - senior lieutenant Baev) brought ammunition not just artillery supplies, but cadets. This toponym is related to the Lososna River, which was defended by units of the 85th and 204th divisions, as well as some other units. The village of Lososno (Lososno - a Polonized version) is a suburb of Grodno, it is located at the exit from Grodno in the direction of Sopotskin. Zh.-d. Lososno station is located about 3–5 km from the village on the Grodno - Kuznitsa section, in fact, it is already in the city itself. Nearby is Folush (he is now a military town). There is such a village in Poland, called Lososna Wielka. Both villages are located on the banks of Lososna - Lososna, or, as the people of Grodno call it, Lososyanka.

Ammunition was loaded onto trailers coupled in two, after which the tractors took them to the positions; this went on until the evening. In the evening, the tractors did not return, all available trailers were filled. After that, an order was received to connect with the main forces of the regiment. In the Lososno area, the cadets joined up with the firemen. As soon as the ammunition arrived, the gunners opened fire on the enemy and inflicted losses in manpower and equipment. The Germans let the tanks go around in order to reach the firing lines and suppress our artillery, but they were shot at point-blank range. Then a group of saboteurs in the form of the Red Army made their way to the location of the artillerymen, they managed to destroy the personnel of the 1st battery. After that, they retreated to the town of Mosty, where the regiment was reunited (albeit without the materiel of the 1st division). Former sergeant V. D. Naumenko was a topographer by profession and served in the 2nd division of the 444th CAP of the topographers' platoon commander. He wrote that the division also met the war to the west of Grodno, but managed to keep the materiel during the withdrawal.

What happened north of the city was probably not known to the army command. There is nothing in the historical literature either. And only oral stories and letters from personal archives put on paper can help here. M. A. Deinega, an instructor in the political department of the 56th division, recalled: “I headed for the road to Lida. Before I had time to move away from the station, a column of fire shot up high up two or three kilometers away and a strong explosion was heard. It blew up ammunition depots. Coming out on the road, he joined the stream of troops and refugees leaving Grodno. I don’t remember how far I went when I saw the sign to the left: 113th paw. I was delighted, for it was an artillery regiment of our division. Turning to the sign, I saw a group of military men in a young pine forest. Among them was the battalion commissar Protasov, who knew me. He said that the regiment lost almost all the guns during the day, suffered very heavy losses in people, and they are now collecting the remnants of the regiment, that there is confusion and panic everywhere, nothing is known about the division headquarters.

The 85th Rifle Division surrendered its sector to the 204th MD and in an organized manner, marching columns moved to a new line. Her path ran south of the Neman, strict order and blackout were observed on the march. The 204th motorized division, having thinned out its battle formations in order to occupy the 85th lane, remained in its previous positions and continued to strengthen its defenses. Units of the tank divisions of the 11th mechanized corps, having lost dozens of combat vehicles in the bloody battles of the first day, retreated partly to the south, partly to the east. A. Ya. Marchenko recalled: “By evening we were forced to retreat to Grodno. There were few cars left in service. A shell from a 105-mm cannon hit my tank, damaged the turning mechanism and disabled the gun. The car caught fire, but it was extinguished. We ran out of ammunition, we ran out of fuel. There was no supply. In the evening we learned that, on the orders of the command, our troops were leaving Grodno, and our division was to cover their withdrawal. However, we have not received any specific instructions. I decided to return to the regiment's location in order to replenish with everything I needed. In the warehouses, we managed to find some food, ammunition, and refuel. Attempts to contact the division headquarters were unsuccessful. There was no one from the command in the city. I decided to move to Lida after the retreating units. Thus ended the first day of the war for us.

3.6. Preliminary result

Actions of the 27th Infantry Division

Thus, by the end of the day, an exceptionally difficult situation had developed in the zone of the 3rd Army. The right flank and center were broken through, the counterattack by the forces of the mechanized corps ended in vain. Only on the left flank (at the junction with the 10th Army) were the units of the 27th Infantry Division, which had not yet lost its combat capability, relatively successfully held back the enemy, and on the left bank of the Neman, individual pillboxes of the fortified area and units of the 213th joint venture of the 56th division continued to fight. By the evening of June 22, the 75th howitzer artillery regiment of the 27th SD was dispersed and assigned to rifle regiments by separate units. After the death of K. N. Ivasenko, the command of the regiment was taken over by the chief of staff, Captain Fedorenko. By pushing the Soviet units behind the line of the Graevo-Avgustov road, the enemy received an additional opportunity to maneuver on his own. Having found an unprotected joint between the divisions, the Germans began to move freely towards the village of Kuligi. The 4th battery and two companies of the 3rd battalion of the 239th joint venture received an order from the divisional commander, Major General A.S. Stepanov: to advance to the Kuliga area and stop the advance of the German troops. When, after a difficult march, the group passed this village, it turned out that ahead, at a fork in the country roads, significant German forces had stopped for a halt. In a small clearing near the forester's house and in the woodlands, there were a lot of cars, transporters and tools. Security was not posted. It was impossible to miss such an opportunity, the guns were deployed into combat position, the rifle companies covertly covered the enemy's position in a semicircle. Calculations of howitzers on command opened rapid fire with fragmentation shells. The data for firing was prepared correctly, the cover was achieved with the very first salvo. Heavy shells exploded in the midst of vehicles and rushing enemies, columns of black smoke rising into the sky one after another. Throwing guns, tractors and trucks, the Germans began to retreat to the rocade, and then the artillery shifted the fire further, and the infantry went on the attack. In some places the enemy put up fierce resistance, retreating under cover of machine guns; the attackers suffered serious losses, but success was undeniable.

To the right of the town of Ruda, where the 239th Rifle Regiment withdrew on the left flank, the situation also stabilized. The units that retreated to the swamps tore off cells in dry places, put themselves in order, cleaned their weapons, and even shaved. The command post of the 75th GAP was located in Penchikovo, a village inhabited mainly by Belarusians. They were cordial and hospitable, treated the fighters with milk and rye bread. A telephone switchboard was placed in one of the houses, a connection was established with a tripod. Nachoper Major P.F. Tolstikov briefed Captain Fedorenko on the situation and set the task for June 23rd. The situation was next. At 12 o'clock the enemy took Lipsk and advanced in the direction of Dombrova, after 17 o'clock the Germans entered the abandoned Augustow without a fight. On their way, a barrier was placed from the 2nd battalion of the 345th SP and two battalions of the 132nd SP. Subdivisions of the underformed 6th Anti-Terrorist Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Yuryev and the reconnaissance battalion of the division moved into the area of ​​greatest enemy pressure. The 679th PTAP deployed 12 guns, the 713th PTAP - 18. In the center of the division, the defense was occupied by the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 345th SP, which had retreated from Avgustov.

By 5 p.m., gaps had formed between units of the 27th SD: the defense had taken on a patchy character. But due to the fact that the Beaver floodplain in this place to this day is almost a continuous swamp, this did not pose too much danger. It is much worse that the division did not have a right neighbor. Naturally, this right should have been the 56th division. German troops marched along the Graevo-Avgustov road in a continuous stream. They were within range of the guns of the 75th regiment, but the divisional commander Stepanov protected the artillery from air strikes. Only late in the evening, when the activity of the Luftwaffe decreased, did the first sighting shell rustle over the heads of the infantrymen and explode five meters from the road. The commander of the headquarters battery of the 75th GAP, Senior Lieutenant Toropov from the NP immediately made adjustments and gave the command: “- Further 005, from right to left, like a fan, high-explosive shells ... the second - with all guns!”. All batteries opened fire, and immediately the movement along the rocade was interrupted. Explosions of shells tore the cars to shreds and those who were sitting in them, overturned them into ditches. In different places, the columns began to turn around and several tanks drove off the highway. But the firing range of their short guns could not be compared with the range of the new Soviet long-barreled guns, the shells fell with large shortfalls. The German tankers tried to get closer to the firing lines, but barrage fire and marshy soil (the funnels immediately swam with water) stopped them. Having chosen the limit of ammunition, the calculations ceased fire. Heaps of smoky scrap metal piled up on the road, which until recently had been dozens of transport and trucks.

At about the same time, the 1st battalion of the 184th KrSP continued to advance towards the Neman to join up with its regiment. The fighters were hungry and very tired, it was especially hard for the machine gunners, who, in addition to personal weapons and equipment, dragged heavy "maxims" and boxes with ribbons. Late in the evening the battalion made a halt in a hollow sown with rye. Suddenly, German tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry appeared ahead, on the crest of a height. The command “To battle!” Was heard, the infantrymen began to dig in. The Germans, leaving the tanks on the hills on both sides of the hollow, under the cover of their fire, went on the attack. The fighters let the enemy in about a hundred meters and opened fire. The Germans were pressed to the ground by heavy fire and lay down, and when it got dark, they crawled back to their tanks and armored personnel carriers. Both sides suffered heavy losses (the 2nd company was almost completely destroyed), the Nazis did not continue the battle at night and retreated. Then the Soviet soldiers occupied the height and already at night began to open trenches on it. Thus ended the first day of combat in the zone of the 3rd Army.

3.7. Results of the first day of hostilities

Thus, according to the results of the first day of hostilities, the 3rd Army of the Western OVO turned out to be unable to fulfill the tasks assigned to it according to the cover plan, suffered a heavy defeat and was thrown back from the state border for several tens of kilometers, leaving the cities of Grodno, Avgustov, Graevo, Sopotskin and Lipsk. The 56th rifle division was completely destroyed, the 27th rifle, 29th and 33rd tank divisions suffered serious losses. Only the main forces of the 85th Rifle and 204th Motorized Divisions, which occupied the 2nd line of defense, retained relative combat effectiveness. All the rifle, sapper and construction battalions that were on the construction of defensive structures were dispersed or destroyed, only a few of them survived organizationally. So, in the report of the head of the engineering department of the Western Front to the head of the GVIU of the Red Army on the work of the engineering units of the front from June 22 to August 13, 1941, it is written: -political composition and the Red Army. Heavy engineering equipment (road vehicles, compressors, and others) was partly destroyed by artillery fire and enemy aircraft, and partly abandoned. As of June 24, 1941, the 23rd Engineer Regiment in the Sopotskin area was disorganized and dispersed, the 10th Engineer Regiment was involved in the battle on the state border with its main units ... corps working on the border were drawn into the battle and suffered heavy losses, individual units mixed with other branches of the military. According to TsAMO, the commander of the 23rd IP RGC, Lieutenant Colonel P. I. Smirnov, and the chief of staff of the regiment, Captain P. A. Serebryakov, were missing.

The former commander of the partisan detachment named after M. I. Kalinin of the Minsk formation A. M. Oleinik recalled that the tent camp of the 127th engineer battalion, in which he served, was fired on by artillery and mortars on the morning of June 22 and lost most of the personnel, it was hard battalion commander captain Bezzubov was wounded. “The battalion commander repeated the words:“ This is a war, inform the army headquarters, ”but there was no connection, the phones did not work. One of the wounded near the headquarters had a splintered stomach, the intestines fell out, the unfortunate man tried to push them back in agony, but they did not obey, they fell out. I received a shell shock, four broken ribs and many other injuries from the shelling. Vanya, the driver of a lorry-movie van, a soldier of the second year of service, drove the car to the headquarters of the 3rd Army. It got brighter every minute. Houses and streets of the peacefully sleeping city of Grodno were already visible, when an armada of aircraft appeared on the horizon in the sky. It was lively at the headquarters of the 3rd Army out of time. No sooner had the duty officer at the headquarters listened to the report of the Red Army soldier of the 127th OSB than bombs rained down on Comintern Street, where the army was located.

The reason for the defeat was: the significant superiority achieved by the enemy in the main operational areas; disruption of communications and loss of command and control; serious mistakes made by the army command, and unwillingness to take any measures to increase the combat readiness of the units; air supremacy of enemy aircraft, massive use of pinpoint strikes by light dive bombers and, as a result, heavy losses in tanks and artillery on the defending side. Also, extremely weak interaction of infantry with tanks and support of tank attacks by artillery fire were revealed.

Notes:

VIZH, 1989, No. 9., p. 57.

Konovalov G. Origins. M., 1983.

Personal archive of D.N. Egorov - I.I. Shapiro, letter.

VIZH, 1989, No. 5, p. 25.

Heroes of Brest. Minsk, 1991, p. 106–107.

Personal archive of D.N. Egorov - I.I. Shapiro, copy.

Rifle Regiment (State No. 04/601)
reduced division of the Red Army (wartime).
1941
Part 3

BUT The artillery of a rifle regiment in the state at the end of July 1941 consisted of a 45-mm battery. anti-tank guns (6 guns), batteries of 76-mm regimental guns (4 guns) and a platoon of 120-mm mortars (2 mortars). Everything is horse-drawn.

Tactically, as a rule, an anti-tank reserve (PTRez) was to be created from 45-mm guns for the duration of the battle, which remains at the disposal of the regiment commander and is sent to where the breakthrough of German tanks is planned. This is a statutory requirement.
Unfortunately, the low tactical literacy of our command staff for 41 years led to the fact that even before the battle, the guns were evenly distributed into battalions and could not play a significant role in repelling tank attacks. Therefore, the regiment commander in battle was already powerless to influence the course of the battle, and often remained only an indifferent observer and recorder of what was happening.
Approximately the same thing happened with the 76-mm artillery. It was necessary to create a regimental artillery group (PAG) from own and attached guns from the division for massing fire in threatened directions. Instead, the cannons were sprayed on the battalions in the hope of increasing their firepower.

Commanders had to learn already in the course of battles, under fire, paying for this study with the blood of soldiers. The Germans mastered all this during the war against Poland and France. Also, of course, blood. No wonder they say "For one beaten they give three unbeaten."

Explanation. The charging box is practically the same gun limber, i.e. a pair of horses single-axle wagon, which serves to pair the cannon with a means of traction (a pair of horses or a car). The difference is that the limber carries both ammunition for the cannon and accessories (bath, accessories for cleaning and maintaining the cannon, cannon grease, entrenching tools, harness elements, webbing for dragging the cannon, sights, etc.)
In the charging box, only ammunition is transported.

End of explanation.

From the author. According to the German website Lexikon, by the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht infantry regiment as regimental artillery in the 13th infantry gun company (13. Infanteriegeschütz-Kompanie) had 6 infantry guns of 7.6 cm caliber and 2 infantry guns of 15 cm caliber, and in the 14th anti-tank company (14.Panzerjäger-Kompanie) 12 anti-tank guns of 3.7cm caliber. This coincides with the data of the books by K. Shishkin (a very conscientious researcher) and S. Drobyazko "Infantry of the Wehrmacht".
Thus, the German infantry regiment outnumbered the Soviet infantry regiment by two times in infantry guns, and in anti-tank guns also twice.

Of course, the German 37-mm anti-tank gun is significantly weaker than our 45-mm one, but by the time the war began, the T-26 and BT-5 (BT-7) tanks were the basis of the tank fleet of the Red Army, which were quite tough for the German woman. And there were very few new tanks like T-34 and KV. So the enthusiasm of our historians about the fact that the Germans entered the war with weak anti-tank artillery is hardly appropriate. For 41 years, this caliber was quite enough. Moreover, by the summer of 1941, the Germans began to gradually replace 37-mm guns with 50-mm ones in their anti-tank companies.

It follows that in terms of firepower, the German regiment at the beginning of the war was noticeably superior to the Soviet one. Especially when you consider that we were equal in heavy machine guns, in 50 mm. company mortars are one and a half times weaker, three times weaker for 82-mm mortars, two times weaker for light machine guns. The only thing in which we were superior to the Germans was in 120 mm. mortars. The Germans did not have them, and our regiment had 2 such mortars. But they could hardly outweigh the German advantage in other types of artillery.

15. Battery 45 mm. guns.

Personnel 56 people. Of these, 5 officers, 7 sergeants, 44 soldiers. 8 riding horses, 24 artillery horses, 6 45mm guns, 6 ammunition boxes.

* Riding horse.
*Two scouts - Red Army soldiers (2 rifles, 2 compasses). Two riding horses

-1
*

2platoon 45 mm. guns (1 officer, 2 sergeants, 14 soldiers).
* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, binoculars, compass). Riding horse.
* Two gun commanders - junior sergeant - sergeant (2 carbines, 2 binoculars, 2 compasses),
* Two gunners - Red Army soldiers (2 pistols),
* Eight numbers - Red Army soldiers (8 carbines),
* Four riders - Red Army soldiers (4 carbines).
The platoon has 2 45-mm cannons, 2 charging boxes, 8 artillery horses.

3platoon 45 mm. guns (1 officer, 2 sergeants, 14 soldiers).
* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, binoculars, compass) Riding horse.
* Two gun commanders - junior sergeant - sergeant (2 carbines, 2 binoculars, 2 compasses),
* Two gunners - Red Army soldiers (2 pistols),
* Eight numbers - Red Army soldiers (8 carbines),
* Four riders - Red Army soldiers (4 carbines).
The platoon has 2 45-mm cannons, 2 charging boxes, 8 artillery horses.

For one gun, 36 fragmentation shells, 10 armor-piercing and 5 grapeshots are transported in its limber and charging box.

In limbers and charging boxes, in total, shots are transported in the battery:
* 210 fragmentation grenades,
* 60 armor-piercing tracer shells,
*30 buckshot.

In addition, 714 fragmentation shells, 180 armor-piercing shells and 6 buckshot are transported in the battery supply platoon and in the transport company of the regiment.

Together, this number (924 fragmentation, 240 armor-piercing and 36 buckshot) represent 6 ammunition No. 341.

Structural diagram of a 45 mm battery. guns

Table of personnel, vehicles and weapons of the 45-mm battery. guns

	Control	1 platoon	2 platoon	3 platoon	Total
Personnel:
-officers	2	1	1	1	5
-sergeants	1	2	2	2	7
-soldiers	2	14	14	14	44
- all personnel	5	17	17	17	56
Armament:
- pistols	2	3	3	3	11
- carbines	1	12	12	12	37
- rifles	2	-	-	-	2
-45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937	-	2	2	2	6
Riding horses	5	1	1	1	8
Artillery horses	-	8	8	8	24
Charging boxes	-	2	2	2	6

16. Battery 76 mm. guns.

Personnel 103 people. Of these, 7 officers, 15 sergeants, 81 soldiers. 22 saddle horses, 54 artillery horses, 6 baggage horses. 4 guns, 4 ammunition boxes.

*Battery commander - captain (pistol, binoculars, compasses, compass). Riding horse.
* Political leader of the battery - senior political officer (pistol, compass). Riding horse.
*Foreman of the battery - foreman (carbine, compass). Riding horse.
* Sanitary instructor - foreman (unarmed).
* Veterinary paramedic - military paramedic (unarmed).

From the author. It seems that the sanitary instructor and the veterinarian are unarmed not because the Red Army does not have enough weapons, but based on the requirements of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, requiring that doctors not have weapons. It is believed that the Soviet Union did not sign this Convention, but it follows from internal documents that it adhered to its provisions.

Control platoon (17 people, including 1 officer, 4 sergeants, 12 soldiers, 7 top horses and 4 artillery).
* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, binoculars, compass, compasses) Riding horse.
- intelligence department (1 sergeant, 4 soldiers, 5 riding horses).
* Squad leader junior sergeant-sergeant (rifle, binoculars, compass). Riding horse.
*Two senior scouts - Red Army soldiers (rifles-2, compass). Two riding horses.
* Scout - Red Army soldier (pistol, compass). Riding horse.
* Scout - Red Army soldier (rifle, compass). Riding horse.
- communications department (3 sergeants, 8 soldiers)
* Squad leader junior sergeant-sergeant (carbine, compass). Riding horse.
* Two senior telephonists-radiotelephonists - junior sergeants-sergeants (2 carbines, compasses)
* Eight radiotelephone operators - Red Army soldiers (8 carbines)

There are 4 RRU radio stations and 4 telephone gigs in the platoon.

From the author. I would like to draw attention to the fact that both above and below there are soldier positions designated as "senior ....". The regular category of these positions, like those of non-senior positions, is a Red Army soldier. This is me to the erroneous opinion of many, saying that if the position is "senior ...." then its owner is a corporal, and not an ordinary Red Army soldier. No, in our army the rank of corporal is always assigned to soldiers who perform their duties perfectly, regardless of position. So it’s quite possible, say, a senior radio operator to have the rank of private, but simply a radio operator to be a corporal.

1 fire platoon (1 officer, 2 sergeants, 21 soldiers. Total 24 people 4 top horses, 16 artillery horses.

In a platoon, two 76-mm. regimental guns, 2 charging boxes.

2 fire platoon (1 officer, 2 sergeants, 21 soldiers. Total 24 people 4 horses, 16 artillery horses.
* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, binoculars, compass, compasses). Riding horse.
* Two commanders of guns junior sergeants-sergeants (2 carbines, binoculars, compass). 2 horses
* The leader of the means of traction is a Red Army soldier (carbine, compass). Riding horse.
* Two gunners - Red Army soldiers (2 pistols).
* Ten numbers - Red Army soldiers (10 carbines),
* Four riders - Red Army soldiers (4 carbines),
* Four riders - Red Army soldiers (unarmed)

In a platoon, two 76-mm. regimental guns, 2 charging boxes.

From the author. The driver of the means of traction controls the wagons (fronts, charging boxes) and mounts with horses when the guns are in firing position, and the means of traction are diverted to cover. there he is the senior among the personnel.

A platoon of combat nutrition (a total of 22 people, of which 1 officer, 3 sergeants, 18 soldiers. 4 horses and 18 artillery horses).
* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, compass). Riding horse.
* Three squad leaders - junior sergeants - sergeants (3 rifles, compasses). Three riding horses.
* Three senior laboratory workers - non-combatants of the Red Army (3 rifles),
* Six laboratory workers - non-combatants of the Red Army (6 rifles),
* Nine wagon non-combatants of the Red Army (9 rifles)

In a platoon there are 7 steam-horse carts for 76-mm shells and 2 steam-horse carts for 45-mm shells.

From the author. Laboratory workers are soldiers who prepare shells for use (check serviceability, clean them of excess lubrication, sort them according to weight signs) screw in the fuses if the shells arrive incompletely equipped.

The presence of two carts for 45-mm shells is completely incomprehensible, although there are no such guns in the battery. Obviously, it was found more convenient to attach the ammunition supply of the battery of 45 mm guns to the ammunition supply platoon of the 76 mm battery, rather than create two ammunition supply units.

Economic department (Total 11 people, including 2 sergeants, 8 non-combat soldiers, 1 combat soldier. 6 convoy horses
* Senior gun master - junior sergeant - sergeant (rifle),
* Senior cook - junior sergeant - sergeant (unarmed),
* Two cooks - non-combatant Red Army soldiers (unarmed),
* Three wagons - non-combatants of the Red Army (3 rifles),
* Three forging blacksmiths - non-combatants of the Red Army (3 rifles),
* Captainarmus (aka forager) - Red Army soldier (rifle).

In the department there are 2 camp kitchens of a cavalry type and 1 wagon for officers' belongings.

Structural diagram of a 76 mm battery. regimental guns

T table of personnel, vehicles and weapons of the 76-mm battery. guns.

	Management	Vzv. management	1 lights. platoon.	2 lights. platoon	The platoon is ammunition.	Household otd.	Total
Personnel:
-officers	3	1	1	1	1	-	7
-sergeants	2	4	2	2	3	2	15
- combatant soldiers	-	12	21	21	18	1	73
- non-combatant soldiers	-	-	-	-	-	8	8
- all personnel	5	17	24	24	22	11	103
Armament:
- pistols	2	2	3	3	1	-	11
- carbines	1	11	17	17	-	-	46
- rifles	-	4	-	-	21	-	25
-76-mm regimental guns mod. 1927	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Riding horses	3	7	4	4	4	-	22
Artillery horses	-	4	16	16	18	-	54
Carriage horses	-	-	-	-	-	6	6
Charging boxes	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Telephone gigs	-	4	-	-	-	-	4
RRU radio stations	-	4	-	-	-	-	4
Field phones UNA-F	-	6	-	-	-	-	6
Single-core telephone cable	-	10 km.	-	-	-	-	10 km.

In limbers and charging boxes (i.e. with guns) the following is transported:
* 16 shots with high-explosive and high-explosive grenades,
*48 shrapnel rounds.

In the transport company of the regiment and in the battery ammunition platoon, a total of:
* 416 shots with high-explosive and high-explosive grenades,
*80 shrapnel rounds.

Together, all these 432 high-explosive fragmentation and high-explosive rounds and 128 shrapnel rounds make up 6 ammunition sets No. 341.

From the author. And it’s curious - in all historical literature, the fact is presented as the stupidity of the Russian command that by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, our field guns were equipped with shrapnel shells, and the Japanese, they say, only high-explosive fragmentation. This allegedly predetermined a number of heavy defeats of the Russian Army in that war.
It was a mistake, but not stupidity, that the three-inch guns were equipped only with shrapnel, which narrowed the possibilities of field artillery.

As you can see, shrapnel remained in the ammunition of 76-mm regimental guns by the 1941 year as the main type of shells. With skilled artillery commanders and trained crews, shrapnel is very effective against infantry, especially uncovered ones.
It can be considered a mistake that in 1941 there were no armor-piercing shells in the ammunition of regimental guns, while the tank danger turned out to be more serious than the infantry one. But this was already a systematic miscalculation of military theorists, not only ours, but also European ones. They were still thinking in terms of the First World War. And not because of its routine and stupidity, but because it is impossible to predict the nature of future wars.

17. A platoon of 120 mm mortars.

From the author. During the Great Patriotic War, 50-mm mortars belonged to the category of company weapons, 82-mm to the category of battalion weapons, and 120-mm. to the category of regimental weapons.

During the war, it was recognized that the 50 mm. mortars do not adequately meet the requirements of fire support for a rifle company, and 82-mm mortars are weak as a means of fire support for a battalion. And in the post-war period, they completely abandoned the 50-mm and 82-mm mortars, leaving 12 0-m mortars as a battalion weapon. Moreover, the motorized rifle regiments began to be sufficiently saturated, first with trailed, and later with self-propelled 122 howitzers.

However, the Afghan war showed that 120-mm mortars as a means of supporting battalions are too heavy and cumbersome, and companies, especially in mountainous areas, do not have fire support at all. I had to urgently remove the remaining 82nd mortars from the arsenals and organize the production of their modern modifications.
At the same time, local wars at the beginning of the 21st century showed that in flat terrain, 120-mm mortars are an extremely mobile, powerful and effective weapon, which in many cases has an advantage over 122-mm howitzers.
So in modern times, troops need both 82-mm and 120-mm mortars. But 50-mm mortars have remained in history. They found a replacement in the form of automatic anti-personnel grenade launchers of the AGS-17 type. And yet, a number of armies did not abandon mortars of approximately this caliber.

Personnel 21 people. Of these, 1 officer, 2 sergeants, 18 soldiers. 1 riding horse, 12 artillery horses. 2 mortars 120 mm. 2 horse carts (for transporting ammunition).

* Platoon commander - junior lieutenant - lieutenant (pistol, binoculars, compass, compasses). Riding horse.
- 1st mortar (1 sergeant, 9 soldiers. Total 10 people)






- 2nd mortar (1 sergeant, 9 soldiers. Total 10 people)
* Mortar commander junior sergeant-sergeant (carbine, binoculars, compass),
* Gunner - Red Army soldier (pistol),
*Five numbers - Red Army soldiers (5 carbines),
* Riding - Red Army soldier (carbine),
* Rider - Red Army soldier (unarmed),
* Carriage - Red Army soldier (rifle).

From the author. The difference between a wagon and a rider is that the former controls the wagon into which various property is loaded, and the rider controls the horses that pull the gun or mortar. Not necessarily the rider sits on horseback, as shown in the figure. For some artillery systems, riders sit both on the front and on horseback.
But in all cases, if the artillery system is towed by more than a pair of horses, one rider must sit on the horse of the first pair.

Structural scheme 120mm mortar platoon

When mortars are transported:
* 20 high-explosive fragmentation shots,
*20 explosive rounds.

In the transport company, the regiment is transported:
* 40 high-explosive fragmentation shots,
*40 high-explosive shots.

In total, these 60 high-explosive fragmentation and 60 high-explosive rounds make up 2 rounds of ammunition No. 351.

Continued in the last part of the article.

February 2018

Sources and literature.

1. Staff No. 04/601 of the rifle regiment of the reduced rifle division. Glavuprform of the Red Army. July 29, 1941
2. Charter of the internal service of the Red Army (UVS-37). Military publishing house. Moscow. 1938

25.12.1941 - 1954

The army was formed on December 25, 1941 by transforming the 60th Army (1st formation) as part of the Moscow Defense Zone. Since December 27, as part of the North-Western Front.

From January 21, 1942 as part of the Kalinin Front. In January - February 1942, she took part in the Toropetsko-Kholmsky operation, in November 1942 - January 1943 - the Velikoluksky operation, in October - November 1943 - the Nevelsko-Gorodok operation.

Since October 13, 1943, as part of the 2nd Baltic Front. In early 1944, the army fought heavy offensive battles. west and northwest of Nevel, by March 1 went over to the defensive at the turn Balandino, Simanovo, Pustoshka, Denisovo, where she held the lines for more than four months.

From July 1944, the army took part in the Rezhitsko-Dvina offensive operation. On July 10, the troops went on the attack and broke through the front line of the enemy’s defenses. Location on Kharitonov, Naragovo. By the end of July 11, forward formations reached border of the river Alola, bypassing the strongest enemy barriers and bypassing Idritsu from the north- July 12, the city was liberated. On July 17, the army cut Highway Opochka - Sebezh, July 17, army troops liberated Sebezh.

On July 17, 1944, the troops of the 3rd shock army reached the borders of the Latvian SSR, on R. Zilupe. In front of the 3rd shock army, the enemy had a grouping of troops consisting of three infantry divisions (the 329th and 23rd German divisions and the 15th Latvian SS division).

Army troops on the entire front successfully developed the offensive in the general direction of Rezhitsa ( Rezekne) . On July 26, the troops went to railroad line Rezhitsa- Dvinsk ( Daugavpils) . 27 July after fierce fighting Rezhitsa was completely cleared of the Nazi invaders.

In the Rezhitsko-Dvina offensive operation, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army, having advanced 140 km, liberated a territory with a total area of ​​​​about 6,000 square meters from the Nazi invaders. km, 3145 settlements (including the cities of Idritsa and Sebezh), assisted the troops of the 10th Guards Army in the liberation Rezhitsa, destroyed 14,750 enemy soldiers and officers, 13 tanks and self-propelled guns, 180 guns and mortars, 203 machine guns, 17 tractors and 70 vehicles, captured about 3,000 people, captured 350 machine guns, 189 guns, 26 tanks, 21 tractors, 72 vehicles and 32 warehouses with ammunition, equipment and food.

Since July 28, the army has been taking part in the Madona operation. The 3rd shock army, which had left by this time to Luban lowland, received an order to overcome it and exit to boundary of the river Aiviekste. The task was set for the army: in cooperation with the 22nd Army, destroy the retreating enemy and capture border r. Aiviekste, exit to boundary of Cesvaine, Madona, Marciena. On the right, the 10th Guards Army advanced, bypassing lake Luban from north and south.

On August 6, the army troops went to boundary of the river Aiviekste, having crossed the river and, having entered the limits Vidzeme upland, by the end of August 13 came out west of Madona. The task of the army was to strike in the general direction to Ergli and in cooperation with the 10th Guards (right) and 22nd (left) armies, defeat the opposing enemy grouping, seize abroad Ergli, Ozolmuiža.

On August 17, army troops with the forces of five divisions attacked enemy positions, crossed R. Arona and began to develop an offensive in a northwestern direction. August 18 released several settlements southwest of Madona, and the advanced units of the 5th Panzer Corps, having overcome 30 km, broke into Ergli district.

Only by the end of August, as a result of many days and stubborn battles, the troops of the 3rd shock army reached the Ergli region and to the south of it. The situation stabilized and the 3rd shock army received the task of gaining a foothold on the achieved line.

In the Riga operation of the 3rd shock army, a responsible task was assigned: to break through the enemy’s defenses on section August, Ozolmuiža, in cooperation with the 42nd and 22nd armies, defeat its units north of the Western Dvina river and master abroad Taurupe, Mengele. In the future, advance along railway Ergli - Riga and go out to Marciena district, Madliena.

On September 13, the troops of the 3rd shock army regrouped and took up their starting position for the offensive; on September 14, the offensive began. The troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy defenses on a narrow 5-kilometer front. By the end of September 18, as a result of heavy fighting, it was possible to push the enemy back and reach Ogre river. On the night of September 22, hiding behind the rearguards, the enemy withdrew his troops to the western coast rivers Lichupe and Ogre and switched to mobile defense.

On September 24, the 3rd shock army received a new task: to regroup in area southwest of Mitava (Jelgava) and change formations of the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front there.

From September 28 to October 3, 1944, the troops of the 3rd shock army marched to a new area and changed the formations of the 51st army to at the turn of Mitava, Gardena, Besnier. The army received the task of firmly holding the defensive zone, concentrating its main efforts in Mitava area and Dobele, by October 15, complete the equipment of the cut-off defensive line along the line Dobele, Auce, Kalnamuiža; to provide a junction with the 1st Baltic Front. On the right, the 22nd Army was defending, on the left, the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

On October 10, the 3rd shock army received a directive from the front to prepare for the transition to the offensive to defeat the enemy’s Courland grouping together with the 42nd army in general towards Saldus, Libava (Liepaja), the immediate task was to break through the enemy defenses and seize abroad Biksta,Auce. The start of the offensive was scheduled for 16 October. On the right, the 22nd Army was to operate, on the left, the 4th Shock Army of the 1st Baltic Front.

On October 12, tasks were set, the 79th and 100th rifle corps were to strike at general direction on Marberg, oz. Zebres, defeat the opposing enemy forces and advance to a depth of 15-17 km.

On October 16, after a short artillery preparation, the army troops went on the offensive. Overcoming stubborn resistance, they broke through the main and intermediate lines of defense and began to slowly move forward with battles. The enemy resisted fiercely. During October 17 and 18, he brought the 24th Infantry Division into battle from the reserve, so the 79th and 100th Rifle Corps in the following days had to fight hard against the counterattacking units of the 24th and 93rd Infantry Divisions, supported by " tigers" and "ferdinands" of the SS tank brigade "Gross". On October 19, fierce battles were fought in all sectors of the front, as a result of which the enemy managed to push our units somewhat by the end of that day.

On the morning of October 20, the commander of the 3rd shock army brought into battle the 7th rifle corps, which had been included in the army by the start of the offensive, but this did not lead to the desired result. As a result of fierce bloody battles, by the end of October 21, they managed to advance only 5-6 kilometers.

On October 21, the 3rd shock army surrendered the occupied zone of the 22nd army and, by the end of October 23, made a night march to area east of Vegeriai here to prepare an offensive in a new direction. The 100th Rifle Corps was ordered to be transferred to Debele area 22nd Army, and instead of it, the 14th Guards Rifle Corps was included in the 3rd Shock Army.

In the period from October 22 to 26, the army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for the operation, and on the morning of October 27, it went on the offensive from Vegeriai district in northwest towards Saldus. At that time, it included the 7th, 79th and 14th Guards Rifle Corps.

The army struck north of Vegeriai forces of two corps with the task of breaking through the enemy defenses on section Jurgashi, Vegeriai, destroy the opposing enemy and, advancing around Auce from the south, in cooperation with the 10th Guards Army, by the end of the first day of the operation, capture abroad Kevele, Rumbeneki. In the future, attack Ozolmuizhu. The 7th Rifle Corps operated on the right flank, with the 364th and 265th Rifle Divisions in the first echelon. To the left of it, the 79th Rifle Corps advanced, having the 150th and 171st Rifle Divisions in the first echelon. The 14th Guards Rifle Corps was tasked with a strong defense to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the southern and southeastern directions and with units of the 146th Rifle Division to strike in the area Vegeriai, Šilos towards Beleniai.

The 33rd Infantry Division remained in the army reserve. From the very beginning, the fighting in the Vegeriai direction took on a fierce character. They were hard, exhausting, passed under almost continuous autumn rain. The greatest success was indicated in the offensive zone of the 150th Infantry Division. The enemy continued to put up stubborn resistance. In order to complete the breakthrough of its defenses, on the night of October 28, the second echelons of the corps, the 198th and 207th rifle divisions, were brought into battle.

By the end of October 31, army troops, waging continuous battles and repelling counterattacks, advanced 25-30 km, captured dozens of settlements, including the city of Vegeriai, and the formations of the 7th Rifle Corps approached an important node of the enemy defense - Auce.

Attempts by the army troops in the early days of November to continue the offensive did not give the desired results, the enemy troops, being in the Courland cauldron, had heavily compacted battle formations and offered fierce resistance.

3rd shock army, entrenched in at the turn of Pulyas, Jaunsergi, Mezhmali, continued to conduct defensive battles to block the enemy's Courland grouping until the end of November 1944, and on December 15 was withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

On December 31, the army was included in the 1st Belorussian Front. In 1945, army troops participated in the Warsaw-Poznan, East Pomeranian and Berlin strategic offensive operations. Soldiers of the 79th Rifle Corps of the Army hoisted the Banner of Victory over the Reichstag.

After the completion of hostilities in Berlin on May 2, 1945, the army troops participated in the disarmament of the remnants of the German Berlin garrison. After the end of the war, she was part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, headquarters - Magdeburg.

In 1954, the 3rd Shock Army was renamed the 3rd Combined Arms Army. On January 15, 1974, the 3rd Combined Arms Army was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1990, the division was withdrawn from the GDR, with the disbandment of the formation.

Army commanders:

• Lieutenant General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev December 1941 to August 1942
• Lieutenant General Galitsky Kuzma Nikitovich September 1942 to November 1943
• Colonel General Chibisov Nikandr Evlampievich November 1943 to April 1944
• Lieutenant General Yushkevich Vasily Aleksandrovich April to August 1944
• Lieutenant General Gerasimov Mikhail Nikanorovich August to October 1944
• Major General Simonyak Nikolay Pavlovich October 1944 to March 1945
• Colonel General Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich March 1945 to 1948

Members of the Army War Council:

• Brigadier Commissar Ryazanov A.P. December 1941 to February 1943
• Lieutenant General Ponomarenko Panteleimon Kondratievich February to March 1943
• Major General Litvinov Andrey Ivanovich March 1943 to May 9, 1945

Army Chiefs of Staff:

• Major General Pokrovsky A.P. December 1941 to February 1942
• Major General Sharokhin Mikhail Nikolaevich February to August 1942
• Major General Yudintsev Ivan Semyonovich from August 1942 to March 1943
• Major General Busarov Mikhail Mikhailovich March to May 1943
• Major General Fyodor Andreevich from May to October 1943
• Major General Beilin Veniamin Lvovich October 1943 to August 1944
• Lieutenant General Bukshtynovich M. F. from August 1944 to May 1946

Compound:

Composition of the army

June to December 1944

Rifles, airborne troops and cavalry

• 7th Rifle Corps - from October 1944
  • 23rd Guards rifle division - from November to December 15, 1944
  • 33rd Rifle Division - from Decemberto December 15, 1944
  • 198th Rifle Division - from October to November 1944
  • 265th Rifle Division - from November 1944
  • 364th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
• 12th Guards rifle corps - from December 1944
  • 52nd Guards rifle division - from December 1944
  • 364th Rifle Division - from December to December 15, 1944
• 14th Guards rifle corps - from October to December 12, 1944
  • 33rd Rifle Division - to December 1944
  • 198th Rifle Division - from November to December 1944
  • 379th Rifle Division
• 44th Rifle Corps - from August to September 1944
  • 115th Rifle Division
• 79th Rifle Corps
• 93rd Rifle Corps - for July to September 1944
  • 219th Rifle Division - for July to September 1944
  • 379th Rifle Division - for July to September 1944
  • 391st Rifle Division - from July to August 1944
• 100th Rifle Corps - from September to December 1944
  • 21st Guards rifle division - from September to December 1944
  • 28th Rifle Division - from September to December 1944
  • 200th Rifle Division - from September to December 1944
• 827th howitzer artillery regiment - for July to October 1944
• 6th Guards anti-tank artillery brigade - from November to December 15 1944
  • 318th Guards. anti-tank artillery regiment - for July to August 1944
• 18th anti-tank artillery brigade - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
  • 171st anti-tank artillery regiment - from October to November 1944
• 163rd Guards. anti-tank artillery regiment
• 4th Mortar Brigade
  • 193rd Mortar Regiment - from September to October 1944
• 203rd Guards horse-drawn mortar regiment
• 14th Guards rocket artillery mortar brigade - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
• 85th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - from September to October, from Novemberto December 15, 1944
• 93rd Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - for July to September, from Octoberto December 15, 1944
• 310th Guards. rocket artillery mortar regiment - for July to August 1944
• 36th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division of the RGK - for Julyto December 15, 1944
  • 1385th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
  • 1391st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
  • 1397th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
  • 1399th anti-aircraft artillery regiment
• 1622nd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment
• 467th Separate Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion - for Julyto December 15, 1944

Armored and mechanized troops

• 29th Guards tank brigade - for July to September 1944
• 31st Guards separate tank regiment - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
• 227th Separate Tank Regiment - from August to September 1944
• 239th Separate Tank Regiment - from August to September 1944
• 373rd Guards. heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
• 1539th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - for July to August 1944
• 991st self-propelled artillery regiment - from August to September 1944
• 999th self-propelled artillery regiment - from September to November, from Decemberto December 15, 1944
• 1476th self-propelled artillery regiment - from September to December 1944
• 56th separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944
• 57th separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944
• 62nd separate division of armored trains - for Julyto December 15, 1944

Engineering Troops

• 8th motor engineering brigade - from September to October 1944
• 19th Assault Engineer Brigade - to July 1944
• 25th Engineer Brigade
• 924th separate sapper battalion - since Novemberto December 15, 1944
• 54th Pontoon Bridge Battalion - from November to December 1944
• 88th Pontoon Bridge Battalion - from August to October 1944

Flamethrower parts

• 206th separate company of knapsack flamethrowers - from September to October 1944

Source

“THIRD STRIKING. BATTLE PATH OF THE 3rd STRIK ARMY" Order of the Red Banner of Labor MILITARY PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR MOSCOW - 1976

The battles in the Bolkhov direction in the winter-spring of 1942 have been little studied. As a rule, fights are characterized as "senseless slaughter", etc. expressions. At the same time, they are based on the fact that the goals of the operation were not achieved, and the losses of the Red Army were large, and the enemy “did not notice” these battles.

Considering that most of the ski battalions of the Bryansk Front fought in the 3rd Army, I will try to consider these battles in a little more detail. This article is not a review of the Bolkhov-Mtsensk offensive operation from January 8 to April 20, 1942 as a whole, but only the battles of the 3rd Army from February to April. We can assume that this is a chronology of events in the 3rd Army band from February to April 1942. Professional historians may disagree.

I'll start a little from afar. Why were these fights forgotten? The answer is simple - the stated goals were not achieved - the Oryol grouping of the enemy could not be destroyed, Orel and Bryansk could not be taken. Losses were great. Therefore, the military leaders who fought on the Bryansk front had a failure in their memoirs. So the commander of the 3rd army P.I. Batov in his memoirs limited himself to one phrase, that he was the commander of the 3rd army for a month.

Historians have also avoided these battles. There were no high-profile victories or high-profile defeats. Unless those who like to pour mud on everything, did not bypass these fights. Unfortunately, there may be objective studies, but I have not yet met them.

So 3 army

In December, the 3rd Army, together with units of the Southwestern Front, carried out an excellent Yelets offensive operation. Then it advanced on the Bolkhovsky direction. At the onset, starting from December, no new connections were received. In December, on the contrary, the cavalry divisions were taken away from it, and only at the end of January the army received 287 SD. According to Cherevichenko's report, both armies 3 and 13, together for 200 km of the front, as of 8.1.42 had: 4500 bayonets,
117 heavy machine guns, 149 light machine guns, 47 mortars, 82 divisional artillery guns, 19 regimental and 45 mm guns. In fact, this is not a front, but a reinforced division - what the Germans in their memoirs defined as the absolute superiority of the Russians in numbers.
The combat strength of the divisions of both the 3rd and 13th armies was 400-800 people.

In early January 1942, the 3rd Army began to fight at the turn of the Zusha and Oka rivers.

What was the Bryansk Front, which included the 3rd Army, was well described in his memoirs by the Chief of Staff of the Bryansk Front Kazakov.

« The Bryansk Front then included three armies: the 61st, 3rd and 13th, in which there were up to twenty rifle divisions. The operational formation of our troops was here in one echelon with small army reserves. The front reserve was represented by two cavalry corps, each consisting of three divisions. There were no infantry in the front reserve at all.
The most numerous was the 61st Army, commanded by Lieutenant General M. M. Popov. It operated on medium-rough terrain, without natural obstacles, occupying up to 70 kilometers along the front.
The troops of the 3rd Army were located at the turn of the Oka and Zusha rivers, with a front of up to 120 kilometers. This army was commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov.
The 13th Army, under the command of Major General N.P. Pukhov, fought on the Novosil, Vyshe-Dolgoye front with a total length of 110 kilometers.
The neighboring 40th Army of the Southwestern Front, which later also retreated to us, had a front of a little over 100 kilometers, stretching across completely open terrain, without any natural barriers. It was commanded by Lieutenant General M.A. Parsegov.
When studying the situation, I could not help but pay attention to the fact that in our front headquarters and in the headquarters of the armies no one seriously showed concern for the creation of second echelons, and the troops of the first echelon did not have real defensive structures.
I would like to say about one more “disease” that some generals and officers of the front and army departments suffered at that time - this is a passion for private operations with limited goals.

Nevertheless, private operations completely captivated me from the very first days of taking office. All of them required time to prepare. All were associated with losses in personnel and large expenditures of material resources. It is significant that the main flow of reinforcements was sent to the 3rd Army, where such operations were carried out more often than in others. In January, for example, eight ski battalions were sent to the troops of this army - out of fourteen received by us, and six marching companies - out of ten that arrived on the Bryansk Front..»

What was the enemy

« In the zone of the Bryansk Front, the enemy had a rather large grouping. It consisted of more than twenty divisions, including three armored and three motorized. In October-November 1941, a significant part of these troops under the command of Guderian unsuccessfully tried to capture Tula. Now they were located in the area of ​​Orel and Mtsensk. To the south were units of the 2nd German Army.
The enemy has not yet managed to create a solid defense. He used villages and cities with stone buildings as strongholds. The abundance and quality factor of such buildings created certain advantages for the defending German units.»
Summarizing the position of the troops before the start of the February battles, one can see an approximate equality of forces, twenty rifle divisions against 20 enemy divisions that were on the defensive. At the same time, the enemy had 3 tank - 4,17,18 TD, of which there were two 17 and 4 TD near Bolkhov. and two motorized divisions 25 and 29 MD and a motorized SS regiment "Grossdeutschland", all formations near Bolkhov. The presence of armored and motorized divisions meant that the enemy could quickly transfer moving units to the breakthrough area and counterattack. The tank and motorized divisions of the enemy also had strong artillery with a caliber of up to 210 mm inclusive. If some of the enemy divisions were weakened in previous battles, but our units, for the most part, went through the encirclement of the summer-autumn of 1941 and carried out offensives in December and January and were few in number, as already mentioned earlier.
The statement that the enemy did not create a strong defense is also not entirely clear. The Germans stated that along the Tim-Belev line (along the TIM-ZUSHA-OKA rivers and the cut-off position on the Vyrka River), they had a prepared fortified winter position. So the 3rd Army had to storm the enemy's fairly well-prepared positions, which he had been preparing since the beginning of December 1941. 61st Army advanced partly around the fortified line.
The receipt of 14 ski battalions in January is rather doubtful, so far only two 100 and 101 ski battalions are known that are listed as part of the front, but this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
The story about "private" operations is not tenable. Firstly, the command of the Bryansk Front practically withdrew itself from the command of the front, switching all its attention to the direction of the 3rd Army. Secondly, the direction of the 3rd army was not very convenient for the offensive - to force Zusha and Oka and break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses. For a private operation, it would be more logical to surround and take Mtsensk, and then move directly to Orel. But if we take into account that the strikes of the 3rd Army were supposed to lead to the defeat of the enemy's Bolkhov grouping, only in cooperation with the 61st Army of the Western Front, then everything becomes clear. In the third, the operation went on for a long time, almost three months, and in terms of timing it practically coincided with the general winter offensive. Fourthly, the Headquarters could hardly ignore the large enemy grouping on the flank of the Western Front. The enemy, taking advantage of the passivity of our troops, could easily organize a counterattack on the flank and rear of the strike force of the Western Front. The events near Sukhinichi confirm this. The German counterattack was not developed not only because the 16th and 10th armies stubbornly resisted, but also because the 3rd and 61st armies were conducting offensive battles in the Mtsensk-Bolkhov directions. The events of August 1942 once again confirmed that the Oryol salient was extremely dangerous. So, most likely, the operation of the 3rd army was carried out with the sanction and by order of the Stavka. The frequent change of commanders also indicates that they were simply torn off evil for failure. And in early April, organizational conclusions followed on the commander of the Bryansk Front, he was removed from his post with a demotion, not because of the failure of a private army operation. The reference to the fact that the operation was private arose, most likely, due to the failure of the operation.
It should be noted one more feature that had a negative impact on the results of the battles near Bolkhov. The 3rd Army was part of the Bryansk Front, and the 61st Army was either part of the Bryansk, then part of the Western, then again the Bryansk Fronts. Considering that the Bryansk Front was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction (for which the Bolkhov direction was a bearish corner), and the Western Front was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Western direction, it was extremely difficult to organize the interaction of the two armies. Moreover, three commanders have changed in the army in three months. Lieutenant General Pshennikov P.S. - hit a mine. Lieutenant General Batov P. I. - removed from his post and replaced by Major General Zhmachenko F. F., who was also soon replaced. Both subsequently commanded the armies well, but the change of command during the offensive did not favor the success of the operations. Later, the Headquarters corrected the situation by including 61,3,13,40 armies in the Bryansk Front and subordinating the front directly to the Headquarters, but this happened already in April, time was lost, the units suffered losses and the new offensive did not bring success.
The terrain in front of the 3rd army was also unfavorable for the attackers - the Zusha and Oka rivers had high and steep banks and twisted incredibly, which created a certain benefit for the enemy.
Who opposed 3 and 61 armies.

German operational map of the 2 TA section in the Mtsensk - Bolkhov-Sukhinichi area on February 10, 1942

3rd Army Operations Area
And what was the enemy like? There was no trace of any weak parts experiencing supply difficulties.
The 2nd Panzer Army consisted of the 35th and 53rd Army Corps and 47th, 24 Motorized Corps, which defended on a fairly wide front from Mtsensk to Sukhinichi and Kirov.
The 35th Army Corps was defending in the area of ​​Mtsensk 262, 293 PD and 29 MD.

Further, the 53rd Army Corps adjoined it. in a ledge near Bolkhov 25 MD, 112, 167, 296, 56 PD.
The breakthrough of the 61st Army was held back by the 47th Tank Corps, consisting of the 4th and 17th TDs, the SS Regiment "Grossdeutschland", 134th Infantry Division.
In the area of ​​​​Sukhinichi-Kirov, the 24th tank corps united parts of 208,211,216,339 PD and 18 TD.
Other parts were also present, for example, battle groups that are difficult to count and which were formed from various parts of the rear, the Luftwaffe, the TODT organization, the Imperial Labor Service and other organizations that were not part of the Wehrmacht.
So the largest enemy grouping was in the Bolkhov direction in front of the 3rd and 61st armies - 3 out of 4 corps, 5 out of 6 mobile formations. Directly in front of the 3rd army there were 3 mobile formations - 25, 29 MD and 17 TD.
210 mm gun in position

As well as parts of the RGK artillery reinforcement - for example, the 604 division with 210 mm caliber guns 21cm Mrs 18, actively participated in the battles in the area of ​​​​Mtsensk and the surrounding area, supporting 29 MD and 167 PD. Or 69 artillery regiment RGK with 100 mm guns 10 cm sK 18, supported 53 AK from March 1942.
521 PTBs armed with Panzerjäger I were also present - despite the 47 mm gun, it was equipped with sub-caliber shells and could fight T-34s and KVs from a distance of 500-600 meters.
Not all parts of the Germans were battered, for example, 56 PD arrived at the front only in December 1941. The enemy also noted the good completeness of 134 PD and 4 TD.
The enemy's defense along the Oka River was also strong - three lines of defense, three lines of trenches in each, connected by communication lines. The lines of defense are covered with minefields and barbed wire. Bunkers and dugouts are equipped for life in the winter - there were stoves, bunks and more. Bunkers had from 4 to 12 rolls. Each stronghold consisted of at least 12-15 firing points - machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery, the entire defense was supported by heavy artillery fire. The presence of tank units allowed the enemy to quickly transfer them to the threatened direction and launch counterattacks.
The presence in the rear of large junctions of the Bryansk and Orel roads and the Orel-Mtsensk paved highway made it possible for the enemy to easily replenish his units and supply them with everything necessary for battle.

The 3rd army, which had not left the battle for several months, and had not received sufficient reinforcement, had to crack this defense.

During the Great Patriotic War, combined arms and tank armies as part of the Red Army were large military formations designed to solve the most complex operational tasks.
In order to effectively manage this army structure, the commander had to have high organizational skills, be well aware of the features of the use of all types of troops that make up his army, but of course, have a strong character.
In the course of hostilities, various military leaders were appointed to the post of army commander, but only the most trained and talented of them remained in it until the end of the war. Most of those who commanded the armies at the end of the Great Patriotic War held lower positions before it began.
Thus, it is known that during the war years, 325 military leaders were in the position of commander of a combined arms army. And the tank armies were commanded by 20 people.
At the beginning, there was a frequent change of tank commanders, for example, the commanders of the 5th tank army were Lieutenant General M.M. Popov (25 days), I.T. Shlemin (3 months), A.I. Lizyukov (33 days, until his death in battle on July 17, 1942), the 1st was commanded (16 days) by artilleryman K.S. Moskalenko, 4th (within two months) - cavalryman V.D. Kryuchenkon and least of all commanded the TA (9 days) - combined arms commander (P.I. Batov).
In the future, the commanders of tank armies during the war years were the most stable group of military leaders. Almost all of them, starting to fight as colonels, successfully commanded tank brigades, divisions, tank and mechanized corps, and in 1942-1943. led tank armies and commanded them until the end of the war. http://www.mywebs.su/blog/history/10032.html

Of the combined arms commanders who ended the war as commanders, 14 people before the war commanded corps, 14 - divisions, 2 - brigades, one - a regiment, 6 were in teaching and command work in educational institutions, 16 officers were staff commanders of various levels, 3 were deputy division commanders and 1 deputy corps commander.

Only 5 generals commanding the armies at the start of the war finished it in the same position: three (N. E. Berzarin, F. D. Gorelenko and V. I. Kuznetsov) - on the Soviet-German front and two more (M. F. Terekhin and L. G. Cheremisov) - on the Far Eastern Front.

In total, 30 commanders from among the army commanders died during the war, of which:

22 people died or died from wounds received in battle,

2 (K. M. Kachanov and A. A. Korobkov) were repressed,

2 (M. G. Efremov and A. K. Smirnov) committed suicide in order to avoid captivity,

2 people died in air (S. D. Akimov) and car accidents (I. G. Zakharkin),

1 (P.F. Alferyev) went missing and 1 (F.A. Ershakov) died in a concentration camp.

For success in planning and carrying out combat operations during the war and immediately after it, 72 commanders from among the commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 9 of them twice. After the collapse of the USSR, two generals were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

During the war years, the Red Army in its composition totaled about 93 combined arms, guards, shock and tank armies, of which were:

1 seaside;

70 combined arms;

11 guards (from 1st to 11th);

5 drums (from 1 to 5);

6 tank guards;

In addition, the Red Army had:

18 air armies (from 1 to 18);

7 air defense armies;

10 sapper armies (from 1 to 10);

In the Independent Military Review of April 30, 2004. the rating of commanders of the Second World War was published, below is an extract from this rating, an assessment of the combat activities of the commanders of the main combined arms and tank Soviet armies:

3. Commanders of combined arms armies.

Chuikov Vasily Ivanovich (1900-1982) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From September 1942 - Commander of the 62nd (8th Guards) Army. Particularly distinguished himself in the Battle of Stalingrad.

Batov Pavel Ivanovich (1897-1985) - army General. Commander of the 51st, 3rd armies, assistant commander of the Bryansk Front, commander of the 65th army.

Beloborodov Afanasy Pavlantievich (1903-1990) - army General. Since the beginning of the war - the commander of a division, a rifle corps. Since 1944 - commander of the 43rd, in August-September 1945 - the 1st Red Banner Army.

Grechko Andrey Antonovich (1903-1976) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From April 1942 - Commander of the 12th, 47th, 18th, 56th Armies, Deputy Commander of the Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) Front, Commander of the 1st Guards Army.

Krylov Nikolay Ivanovich (1903-1972) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From July 1943 he commanded the 21st and 5th armies. He had unique experience in the defense of besieged large cities, being the chief of staff for the defense of Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad.

Moskalenko Kirill Semyonovich (1902-1985) - Marshal of the Soviet Union. From 1942 he commanded the 38th, 1st Tank, 1st Guards and 40th Armies.

Pukhov Nikolay Pavlovich (1895-1958) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 13th Army.

Chistyakov Ivan Mikhailovich (1900-1979) - Colonel General. In 1942-1945. commanded the 21st (6th Guards) and 25th armies.

Gorbatov Alexander Vasilyevich (1891-1973) - army General. From June 1943 - Commander of the 3rd Army.

Kuznetsov Vasily Ivanovich (1894-1964) - Colonel General. During the war years, he commanded the troops of the 3rd, 21st, 58th, 1st Guards armies from 1945 - commander of the 3rd shock army.

Luchinsky Alexander Alexandrovich (1900-1990) - army General. Since 1944 - commander of the 28th and 36th armies. He especially distinguished himself in the Belorussian and Manchurian operations.

Ludnikov Ivan Ivanovich (1902-1976) - Colonel General. During the war he commanded a rifle division, a corps, in 1942 he was one of the heroic defenders of Stalingrad. Since May 1944 - commander of the 39th Army, which participated in the Belarusian and Manchurian operations.

Galitsky Kuzma Nikitovich (1897-1973) - army General. Since 1942 - commander of the 3rd shock and 11th guards armies.

Zhadov Alexey Semenovich (1901-1977) - army General. From 1942 he commanded the 66th (5th Guards) Army.

Glagolev Vasily Vasilyevich (1896-1947) - Colonel General. He commanded the 9th, 46th, 31st, in 1945 - the 9th Guards Armies. He distinguished himself in the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of the Caucasus, during the crossing of the Dnieper, the liberation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Kolpakchi Vladimir Yakovlevich (1899-1961) - army General. He commanded the 18th, 62nd, 30th, 63rd, 69th armies. He acted most successfully in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Pliev Issa Alexandrovich (1903-1979) - army General. During the war years - commander of the guards cavalry divisions, corps, commander of cavalry mechanized groups. He especially distinguished himself by bold and daring actions in the Manchurian strategic operation.

Fedyuninsky Ivan Ivanovich (1900-1977) - army General. During the war years, he was the commander of the troops of the 32nd and 42nd armies, the Leningrad Front, the 54th and 5th armies, the deputy commander of the Volkhov and Bryansk fronts, the commander of the troops of the 11th and 2nd shock armies.

Belov Pavel Alekseevich (1897-1962) - Colonel General. Commanded the 61st Army. He was distinguished by decisive maneuvering actions during the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations.

Shumilov Mikhail Stepanovich (1895-1975) - Colonel General. From August 1942 until the end of the war, he commanded the 64th Army (from 1943 - the 7th Guards), which, together with the 62nd Army, heroically defended Stalingrad.

Berzarin Nikolai Erastovich (1904-1945) - Colonel General. Commander of the 27th, 34th Armies, Deputy Commander of the 61st, 20th Armies, Commander of the 39th and 5th Shock Armies. He especially distinguished himself by skillful and decisive actions in the Berlin operation.

4. Commanders of tank armies.

Katukov Mikhail Efimovich (1900-1976) - Marshal of the armored forces. One of the founders of the Tank Guard was the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, 1st Guards Tank Corps. Since 1943 - Commander of the 1st Tank Army (since 1944 - Guards).

Bogdanov Semyon Ilyich (1894-1960) - Marshal of the armored forces. Since 1943 he commanded the 2nd (since 1944 - Guards) tank army.

Rybalko Pavel Semyonovich (1894-1948) - Marshal of the armored forces. From July 1942 he commanded the 5th, 3rd and 3rd Guards Tank Armies.

Lelyushenko Dmitry Danilovich (1901-1987) - army General. From October 1941 he commanded the 5th, 30th, 1st, 3rd Guards, 4th Tank (since 1945 - Guards) armies.

Rotmistrov Pavel Alekseevich (1901-1982) - Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces. He commanded a tank brigade, a corps, distinguished himself in the Stalingrad operation. From 1943 he commanded the 5th Guards Tank Army. Since 1944 - Deputy Commander of the armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army.

Kravchenko Andrey Grigorievich (1899-1963) - Colonel-General of Tank Troops. Since 1944 - commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army. He showed an example of highly maneuverable, swift actions during the Manchurian strategic operation.

It is known that army commanders were selected to this list, who had been in their positions for a relatively long time and showed rather high military leadership abilities.