Is the battle for Moscow. Operation "Typhoon" - this was the name of the operation to capture Moscow in Hitler's documents. Moscow was supposed to be captured before the onset of frost. They wanted to turn Moscow into ruins, it was planned to take the Soviet government prisoner. Operation Typhoon in 1941 was supposed to be the end of the war, but Hitler's plans, fortunately, did not come true. November 7 was appointed as the day of the capture of Moscow. This date was not chosen by chance - November 7 in the USSR was a public holiday, the day
Operation "Typhoon" was built as follows. First, powerful blows were to be carried out using military equipment, which would lead to gaps in the defense of our troops. After that, the Nazi tanks and infantry were to move forward and surround the main forces of our troops in the area of Vyazma and Bryansk. After these forces were destroyed, the infantry was supposed to encircle Moscow. The 2nd tank group was supposed to surround Moscow from the south, the 3rd and 4th groups - from the north. The infantry was to enter from the west.
On September 30, the 2nd Panzer Group under command went on the offensive in the field of the Bryansk Front. Operation Typhoon has begun. The German troops greatly outnumbered the Soviet ones in both the number of people and weapons. On October 2, two other tank groups went on the offensive. Soviet troops began to retreat to Moscow. Operation "Typhoon" was successful for some time - on October 7, not far from Vyazma, a part of Soviet troops. On October 13, Rzhev was captured. On October 14, tank groups occupied Kalinin. Surrounded near Vyazma, Soviet units shackled a considerable number of German troops around them. Mozhaisk fell on October 18. November 18 Operation Typhoon enters its second phase.
The defense of the capital was commanded by G.K. Zhukov. Under his leadership, the three fronts were united into one front - the Western. On November 7, a day that was a holiday for the Soviet people, a parade of troops took place on Red Square, from which soldiers and officers went straight to the front. Forces flocked to help from Transbaikalia, Central Asia, Far East. Divisions were formed and immediately sent to the front. Also, from volunteers, fighter battalions were formed, which were engaged in catching enemy spies in the city. A huge number of Moscow women and teenagers were engaged in construction. The Germans managed to advance so much that 30 kilometers remained to Moscow. Stalin in these fateful days decided to stay in Moscow.
On December 4-5, the German advance was stopped. Operation Typhoon failed. On December 5, General Konev's troops launched a counteroffensive, and on December 6, Zhukov's troops launched a counteroffensive. The German troops began to retreat. Skiers and parachutists were sent to the areas of retreat to the Nazi troops. The Nazi army suffered heavy losses. Only people the German army lost about half a million. The losses of the Soviet troops were also huge.
Operation Typhoon of the Second World War was a fiasco, and this was of great importance. The plan for a lightning victory was a failure.
For the first time, the Nazi army failed to achieve its desired goal. It turned out that the German is not at all invincible. Having seized vast territories, it was now retreating before the onslaught of the Soviet people. As a result, the war dragged on, it was not possible to win before the onset of frost, and now Hitler will have to fight in the winter in Russia. The Soviet people showed their courage, the readiness of every soldier to fight to the last breath for their homeland. His courage became known throughout the world.
Even during the battle near Kyiv, when the success of the Nazi troops was indicated, The German General Staff developed a plan for an attack on Moscow. This plan approved by Hitler caused the full approval of the generals and field marshals at a meeting held in September 1941 near Smolensk. Fascist command, who believed that with the victory, Kyiv opened up new opportunities for deep rapid operations on the entire Soviet-German front, no doubt in the rapid capture of Moscow and complete victory. By the end of September, the strategic situation changed dramatically in favor of the Nazi army. Hitler's General Staff gave operations Name "Typhoon", believing that Army Group Center, like a typhoon, would sweep away the Soviet defenses with a swift offensive and capture Moscow. According to the plans of the enemy, the war was to end with his victory before the onset of winter.
Operation Typhoon plan
Army Group Center now included 2nd, 4th, 9th field armies, 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank groups. This group included 77 divisions, including 14 armored and 8 motorized. This amounted to 38% of the infantry and 64% of the enemy tank and motorized divisions operating on the Soviet-German front.
The entire mass of the troops of the "Center" group deployed for an offensive on the front from Andreapol to Glukhov in a zone bounded by the Kursk direction from the south, and Kalinin from the north. In the area of Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka three strike groups concentrated, the basis of which were tank groups. One of these groups after breaking through the enemy defenses near Roslavl was to attack in the north eastbound to Vyazma and there connect with another strike group advancing on Vyazma from the northwest. Thus, it was planned to encircle and destroy the enemy east of Smolensk. The 2nd Panzer Group was tasked with advancing from the Glukhov area to Orel and between Novgorod-Seversky and Bryansk go to the rear of the enemy, whose actions were constrained by the frontal offensive of the 2nd Army. Thus, to strike at Moscow, Army Group Center had significant forces at its disposal: three field armies and three tank groups.
On the way to our capital, they were opposed by the Western(commander - I.S. Konev), Spare(commander - S.M. Budyonny) and Bryansk(commander - A.I. Eremenko) fronts, which numbered about 1,250,000 people, more than 10.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1044 tanks. The reserve front was located mostly in the second echelon, only its left wing occupied positions on the front line.
Of the three directions under the Barbarossa plan, the most important was the direction Minsk-Smolensk - Moscow. A breakthrough to Moscow and its capture was to be carried out by the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock.
G. Blumentritt reports that Army Group Center was the strongest of the three army groups, while noting that "Hitler sought to achieve economic goals: he wanted to seize Ukraine, the Donets Basin and, finally, the Caucasus," and he was least interested in Moscow (15). The question arises why, then, the most powerful of the German groups was the Army Group Center, and not the Army Group South?
As early as September 16, the command of Army Group Center sent directive N1300/41 to the troops on the immediate preparation of the operation to capture Moscow (16). According to the plan, the offensive was to begin no later than the beginning of October and the strike of three armies and three tank groups, with the support of the second air fleet under the command of Field Marshal
A. Kesselring.
During the second half of September, the High Command of the German Ground Forces, or Oberkommando des Heeres) and the High Command of the German Armed Forces, or OKW (Oberkommando der Wermacht) transmitted additional instructions to the headquarters of Army Group Center "in preparation for the offensive, which talked about ensuring secrecy regroupings, about the timing of the arrival of mobile formations and troops of the OKH reserve, about the timing of the transition to the offensive and the clarification of the tasks of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group (17).
Operation "Typhoon" was supposed to "certainly go successfully, in the shortest possible time, before the start of the autumn thaw and winter, and end in victory" (18). For this, armies and divisions were transferred from Army Groups "North" and "South" to the Moscow direction, and the troops were understaffed.
Thus, by the end of September - the beginning of October, there were 74.5 divisions in Army Group Center, including 14 tank, 8 motorized and 1 cavalry, or 64% of all German formations operating on the Soviet-German front (19). By October 1, Army Group Center had 1,800 thousand people (20), more than 14 thousand.
guns and mortars, 75% of the tanks of their total number located on the Soviet-German front. About 1,390 aircraft (21) were allocated to support the attack on Moscow.
On September 26, the command of Army Group Center issued order N1620/41 to advance. The action plan of the armies on it was as follows: the 4th Army (commander - G. von Kluge) and the 4th Panzer Group (commander E. Gepner) are advancing from the direction of Roslavl to Vyazma; 9th aria (commander A. Strauss) and 3rd tank group (commander G. Got) - from the Dukhovshchina region to the side railway Vyazma - Rzhev; The 2nd Army (commander M. von Weichs) is to cover the 4th from the south and is sent to the Sukhinichi area; The 2nd tank group (commander G. Guderian) should launch an offensive two days earlier before the armies go on the offensive and strike in the direction of Orel and Bryansk (22). In addition to the main advancing three armies and three tank groups, the reserve of Army Group Center included
one tank division, one infantry regiment and one motorized brigade (23) were allocated.
Assuming options for possible enemy actions, the Soviet command was not inactive. On September 10, the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov, on behalf of the SVGK, ordered the transition of the troops of the Western Front to the defense. On September 20, the headquarters of the Western Front presented a plan for the defensive operation of the troops, which determined the tasks of the front and armies, as well as the probable directions of the enemy’s actions, and in connection with this
various options for the actions of the armies of the front (24). On September 27, by order of B.M. Shaposhnikov, reconnaissance of all types was organized in the troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts (25).
On September 30, 1941, 15 divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group under the command of G. Guderian went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. The defensive stage of the battle for Moscow began.
What could the Soviet command oppose to the attackers at that time? The Western Front, commanded by Colonel-General I.S. Konev since September 12, with the forces of six armies (16th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 29th and 30th) defended a strip of 340 kilometers from Ostashkov to Yelnya. The reserve front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny, his main forces, consisting of four armies (31st, 32nd,
49th) took up defense in the rear of the Western Front west of Rzhev, Vyazma and Spas-Demensk. The rest of his armies, the 24th and 43rd, continuing the southern wing of the Western Front, covered the junction of the Bryansk and Western Fronts. The Bryansk Front under the command of Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, consisting of three armies (3rd, 13th and 50th) and the operational group of Major General A.I.
Glukhov, i.e. defended the eastern bank of the Desna from Frolovka to Putivl. All three fronts had about 1250 thousand people (i.e. about 30% of the active army), 7600 guns and mortars, 990 tanks (of which only 140 are medium and heavy), 677 aircraft (about 80% of them are obsolete types). Thus, the German troops outnumbered them 1.4 times in manpower, 1.8 times in artillery, 1.7 times in tanks, and 2 times in aircraft (26).
The measures taken by the Soviet command to strengthen the defense and organize intelligence were belated and by the beginning of the German offensive, the construction of defensive lines and the regrouping of troops had not been completed and, therefore, the Soviet army was not ready to meet the enemy attack.
So, on September 30, simultaneously with the 2nd Panzer Group in the Bryansk Front, the 2nd Field Army also went on the offensive. In the evening, the commander of the Bryansk Front, A.I. Eremenko, reported to the Chief of the General Staff about the enemy going on the offensive and using about 250 tanks (27) in battle.
On October 2, the remaining troops of Army Group Center went on the offensive against the Reserve and Western Fronts. By the directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 1 and 2, additional units of aviation and rifle corps were sent to the Glukhov and Sevsk region to help the Bryansk Front in order to defeat the enemy (28). Thus, the Soviet High Command considered it more correct to strengthen the defense of the Oryol-Bryansk direction, while only a distracting blow was inflicted there, the main German offensive was unfolding in the Vyazma region. It was in this direction that the main events of the battle for Moscow unfolded.
Already in the first days of the offensive, the German troops managed to achieve significant results. On October 2, enemy troops struck in the Dukhovshchina region against units of the 19th and 30th armies and wedged into the defenses of the Soviet troops for 15-30 km. Despite the counterattacks undertaken by the Soviet command, by October 7, units of the 19th and 20th armies of the Western Front were surrounded west of Vyazma. At a rapid pace, the enemy continued to break through to Moscow and in other directions: by October 5, the areas of Spas-Demensk, Yukhnov, Yelnya, Zhizdra, Orel, Karachev, and Bryansk were captured.
During the first days of October, a difficult situation developed in the western direction, which created the danger of a breakthrough by the Wehrmacht troops to Moscow. Parts of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts were surrounded, as there was no continuous line of defense, as well as reserves capable of assisting them. The main task was to create a new line of defense in order to stop the enemy on the outskirts of the capital. The Mozhaisk line, which ran from north to south from Volokolamsk to Kaluga, became such a line of defense.
Having lost confidence in the abilities of the commanders of the Western and Reserve fronts, I.S. Konev and S.M. Budyonny, to save the situation in the western direction, I.V. Stalin urgently calls G.K. Zhukov from Leningrad.
Operation "Typhoon" was supposed to adequately crown the Panzerwaffe campaign on Eastern Front another brilliant victory. However, the path to the Typhoon was far from being as simple as it might seem at first glance. The fact is that in mid-August a dispute broke out between Hitler and the command of Army Group Center. Hitler intended to temporarily go on the defensive in this sector of the front in order to defeat the grouping of Soviet troops in the Kyiv region, while at the same time transferring additional tank formations to Army Group North to completely encircle Leningrad. Moreover, I would like to note that not a single word about the storming of Leningrad or Moscow is said in any of Hitler's directives or his memoirs. Everywhere it is carefully emphasized that these megacities should be surrounded and strangled in a blockade ring. By the way, I would like to remind you that the Germans did not storm Minsk and Kyiv either, but simply occupied it after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Therefore, one of the famous exploits of Marshal Zhukov, who allegedly saved Leningrad, is in fact nothing more than a soap bubble. Easily repel a non-existent threat! If the Barbarossa plan lay on Stalin's table 3 hours before Hitler signed it, then why are our glorious knights whips and shovels… ugh! In the sense of a cloak and a dagger... I got confused again... the valiant defenders of the progressive blacks of Zanzibar did not put any of Hitler's subsequent directives there?
Von Bock and Guderian opposed this proposal, and Brauchitsch supported them somewhat unexpectedly. Füpep lost his patience and snapped:
"The proposals of the army regarding the further conduct of operations in the East, made on August 18, do not correspond to my intentions." As a result, he gives his own order, that is, Hitler begins to actively interfere in the direction of the course of hostilities long before he declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces. At the same time, he quite rightly points out one of the main shortcomings of the mode of action of the panzer generals intoxicated with colossal successes: “Unfortunately, as a result of setting too distant targets for tank formations, the gap between them and the infantry formations following behind was so significant that it took many precious weeks, so that the hardly advancing infantry would catch up with the tank formations that had escaped too far ahead. It is thanks to this circumstance that the Russians managed to save part of the formations, which, having received replenishment, are again facing the front of the Army Group today. In his memorandum, Hitler directly states: “The most important tasks that should be solved before the onset of winter are not the capture of Moscow, but the occupation of the Crimea, industrial and coal Donetsk region and blocking the ways of oil supply from the Caucasus”.
Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Colonel General of the German Army (1940), military theorist
Moritz Albrecht Franz-Friedrich Fedor von Bock - German military leader, Field Marshal General. Commander of Army Group Center during the invasion of the USSR. He commanded the offensive against Moscow in the autumn of 1941.
And yet, on September 16, the OKH gives the order to prepare a further offensive against Moscow. To do this, it is planned to return Guderian's tank group to Army Group Center, as well as to transfer Göpner's tank group, which until now was subordinate to Army Group North. On September 16, von Bock's headquarters gives the order for Operation Typhoon. At its first stage, it is planned to encircle and defeat the “armies of Timoshenko” in the region of Vyazma and Bryansk. Here I really want to throw a couple of stones in the direction of the vaunted intelligence of both opponents. For some reason, only "Tymoshenko's armies", "Eremenko's armies" and so on appear in all German orders and directives. Did the Germans fail to determine the exact names of the fronts opposing them? The GRU showed itself no better. Our command spent a lot of effort to prevent the assaults on Moscow and Leningrad, which the Germans did not even think about starting.
All our historians unanimously write that the Germans concentrated all available forces to capture Moscow, which is, to put it mildly, an exaggeration. Yes, von Bock really got the 4th Panzer Group at his disposal - but that's all. Moreover, the Germans took a rather strange step, which cannot be unambiguously assessed. In fact, this step was within the framework of the general strategy of von Bock, who, even during border battles, quite logically doubled tank and conventional armies. But now army corps, consisting of ordinary infantry divisions, have been introduced into all tank groups, so their mobility has noticeably decreased. In preparation for the offensive against Moscow, the panzer generals received a single additional tank division.
In addition, new disputes broke out in the German command. Von Bock wanted to make a deep detour near Vyazma, while the OKH wanted to confine itself to encircling the city. Halder intended to send motorized units directly to Moscow, and Hitler was categorically against street fighting. (Let's note in parentheses - quite rightly!) In addition, the crazy idea was born to combine the attack on Moscow with a strike by von Leeb in the area of Lake Ilmen, as well as with the actions of Army Group South in the Kharkov region. In general, the Germans tried to bring together so many diverse factors that one should be surprised not that the Typhoon failed, but that they even succeeded at all.
Their situation was complicated by the condition of the tank divisions. The thrust to the south hit Guderian's group hard, its divisions now had no more than 50 percent of serviceable tanks. At Hoth, this percentage reached the mark of "70", and Göpner's divisions were fully staffed, but there was another problem. The composition of the 4th Panzer Group changed completely from June 22, and Göpner did not have a single division left with which he started the war. In addition, the Germans experienced a shortage of fuel. Although there were huge warehouses in Gomel, Roslavl, Smolensk and Toropets, only drops came to the front.
The German offensive began with yet another improvisation. Try to guess who tried? Well, of course, "Swift Heinz", which launched an offensive on September 30, that is, two days earlier than planned, hiding behind the expected worsening weather. The operation began successfully for the Germans. Once again, tank wedges cut through the defenses of the Soviet troops, like a red-hot knife on a piece of paper. In the region of Vyazma and Bryansk, several boilers were formed, in which ... But here we will slow down a bit. I have already written and will repeat now that the loss figures quoted by Tippelskirch and readily repeated by all Western authors do not inspire even a shadow of confidence in me. Too well the sum of those killed and captured coincides with the beautiful and round figure of a million. It was possible to write 1.01 million or 998 thousand, but no, no more and no less. I can guess where this figure came from, but I am not able to substantiate my guess. Most likely, this million is an approximate assessment of the results of the battle by the headquarters of Army Group Center, which at that moment was not going to clarify it, there were more important things to do. But over time, an approximate estimate was transformed into an accurate calculation. I can even assume that the notorious 668,000 is not the number of prisoners, but the total losses of the Red Army, but, as they say, I can neither confirm nor refute this point of view.
In any case, this was the last successful blitzkrieg of 1941. On October 7, von Bock gave the order to continue Operation Typhoon. On the left, the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group were to advance on Rzhev and Kalinin, in the center the 4th Army and Goepner's tanks were moving on Kaluga and Mozhaisk, in the south Guderian, who now commanded the 2nd Panzer Army (another renaming, which did not add a single extra tank to him), was supposed to move to Tula. But here the Germans were let down by the same passion for gigantism, which we have already mentioned. Well, Guderian once again repeated the mistake that had already become traditional for him, rushed forward, not caring about the reliable closing of the encirclement, which allowed part of the Soviet troops to escape from the trap. However, even without that, almost two-thirds of von Bock's forces were associated with the elimination of boilers, the field marshal broke into the defenses of the Red Army over a huge stretch, but failed to take advantage of this, giving the Soviet command a break.
In early October, the Germans resumed their offensive, at which point von Bock made a serious mistake. He decided that the Russian armies were finally defeated, and the operation moved into the stage of persecution. The order of the headquarters of the Army Group Center of October 14 speaks directly about this, but the Germans once again faced the Soviet troops reborn from the ashes, like a phoenix. However, for some unknown reason, von Bock did not react to the change in the situation. Entries in his diary indicate that the field marshal continued to be in a state of incurable euphoria.
“In the afternoon, preliminary orders were issued and sent to the armies. Regarding the main goals of the offensive, the following is said: The movement of the 2nd Panzer Army around Moscow to the south should ensure the encirclement of the city from the south and east. At the same time, the 4th Army is responsible for encircling Moscow from the southwest, west and north. The 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group were asked to turn north and move through Torzhok in the direction of the city of Vyshny Volochek. The right flank corps of the 9th Army must join the 4th Army, otherwise the 4th Army will not have enough strength to carry out its mission. The 2nd Army was charged with covering the operation from the right flank. In pursuance of this mission, the 2nd Army must reach the Don River along the Yelets and Stalinogorsk lines.
The German armies continued to advance on a broad front, no longer trying to concentrate their forces, although there was an opportunity to strike a powerful blow in the north, where the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups now occupied a noticeably narrowed front. Von Bock violated the key rule not only of tank warfare, but of military art in general - to concentrate forces to strike, and not to try to spank with an open palm.
Small help. For some unknown reason, the OKH renamed the tank groups into tank armies at the same time. The 2nd was renamed first, on October 5, followed by the 1st on October 25, and the 3rd and 4th had to wait for the New Year, the corresponding order was given only on January 1. All this introduces a fair amount of confusion in the descriptions of military operations.
Optimism proved to be a highly contagious disease that spread from the headquarters of Army Group Center to the walls of the OKH. There, suddenly, the idea was born to turn the 2nd Panzer Army to the south after the inevitable and imminent capture of Tula. Part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Group, the command intended to again turn north to Leningrad. Von Bock managed to defend his divisions so far, but this did little to help him.
However, the German offensive frankly ran out of steam. Von Bock still managed to crush the troops of the Reserve Front on the Mozhaisk line, but it was precisely to crush and discard, and not to destroy. Now decisively everything was working against the Germans, starting with the same autumn thaw. After all, it was not from a good life that the fuel for Guderian's tanks had to be dropped by parachute - automobile columns could not break through to the front line, and transport aircraft were not able to land. All this taken together - losses, command errors, stretched communications, bad weather and much more - predetermined the failure of the Typhoon. None of the factors alone was decisive, but they overlapped each other, and the effect was devastating.
German units in one of the settlements occupied near Moscow. On the road - self-propelled guns StuG III Ausf B, armored vehicles Sd.Kfz.222 in the background. December 1941.
It is difficult to imagine the degree of ignorance of the German High Command about the state of affairs at the front, for some reason convinced that everything was going well. From October 24 to November 13, there was an operational pause. The Germans once again shuffled their forces, and on November 13, a meeting was held between the representative of the OKH, General Halder, and the commanders of Army Group Center in Orsha. Halder conveyed to them Hitler's order to continue the offensive with the available forces, although the Germans had very few of these forces left. For example, Guderian had not managed to take Tula by this time, but he had already received an order to attack Gorky! By the way, if you carefully read the memoirs of German generals (von Bock, Goth, Guderian, Kluge, Raus), then we will see a curious feature: the terms characteristic of mobile warfare have practically ceased to appear in them. All that remains is a primitive frontal bulk, which rarely brings success. In the same period, German troops on other sectors of the Eastern Front suffered a series of sensitive setbacks, which did not sober up the top of the Wehrmacht. The attack on Tikhvin failed, the German troops were driven out of Rostov, but near Moscow the Germans stubbornly rushed forward.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command transferred new large reinforcements to the front near Moscow. If von Bock knew that only in November 22 rifle divisions, 17 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 cavalry divisions and other units appeared at the front, he would be horrified. At the same time, most of them arrived from the Far East and Central Asia and were full-blooded divisions of the pre-war formation.
The Germans began preparations for the final phase of Operation Typhoon with the transfer of a significant part of the aircraft of the 2nd Air Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea. The supply situation deteriorated rapidly. Most of the tank divisions had no more than one refueling, which would be enough for the first strike, but not for the entire operation, and yet the Germans on November 15 went on the offensive. The 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups moved to Klin and Istra to bypass Moscow from the north. But these battles swallowed up the last reserves of fuel from the tanks of Göpner and Hoth, despite the fact that it was not possible to destroy the Soviet units opposing them. The 16th and 30th armies suffered serious losses, but withdrew, keeping the front. The consequence of this turn of events was the transformation of the German offensive into a series of uncoordinated attacks by divisions and even regiments. That is, even at the stage of the offensive, the German military machine (forgive me this worn out stamp) began to fall apart, and its jerks more and more resembled the chaotic actions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.
German soldiers at the tank Pz.Kpfw. IV near Moscow. A captured Soviet Mosin rifle hangs on the barrel of a tank gun.
Therefore, the exit of parts of the LVI Corps of Reinhardt to the Moscow-Volga canal no longer meant anything. Intelligence crossed to the eastern bank of the canal, admired the gathering Soviet troops and hastily retreated. On November 30, the 2nd Panzer Division rolled by inertia to Krasnaya Polyana, but it could no longer take a step. The northern half of the ticks stopped. The joint attack of two panzer groups managed to push back the front by no more than 80 kilometers, an unimpressive achievement that well shows how exhausted the German troops were. When you look at the map, it becomes very interesting: how did Halder imagine an even deeper detour of Moscow? A new generation of historians has become accustomed to accusing Stalin of fighting on the globe, but even a cursory analysis of the second phase of Operation Typhoon raises the suspicion that German generals were engaged in this.
The situation with the southern half of the ticks was no better. Guderian received, in addition to those already available, a battered XLVIII Corps and the task of covering the left flank of Army Group Center from Kursk to Yelets. Indeed, they found someone. Of course, Guderian did not even think about all this, he dangled along the Tula-Orel highway, gathering his troops for the last throw. He somehow managed to get a small supply of fuel and throw the XXIV Corps on Tula. The 4th Panzer Division even approached the outskirts of the city from the south, but it failed to enter the city. On November 18, Guderian made a new attempt to capture the city, but now he moved the XXIV Corps around to the east, while ordering the infantry divisions of General Heinrici's LIII Corps to cover his flank from the east. But this turned out to be too difficult a task - the front of the corps was unreasonably stretched, and it only with great difficulty repelled counterattacks in the area of \u200b\u200bIvanozero, Uzlovaya and Teploe. Guderian was forced to send 2 motorized divisions to help Heinrici, weakening his strike force.
Only on November 24 did he manage to resume the offensive with the forces of the 3rd, 4th and 17th Panzer Divisions east of Tula, although their breakthrough to Venev already meant absolutely nothing. There was no talk of any interaction between tanks and infantry, the principle of "every man for himself" began to operate. In the first days of December, Guderian tried for the last time to encircle Tula, and his motorcyclists even went to the railway leading to Serpukhov, but it was the same minute's loss as in the north near Reinhardt. If the entire Army Group Center went on the defensive on December 4/5, then Guderian was forced to begin a gradual withdrawal of his troops on December 4, since his XXIV Corps was in a very dangerous position. The offensive failed, and it turned out that the Germans themselves climbed into the bag, which could close at any moment. By the way, on the same day, in exactly the same way, without an order, he began to withdraw his troops across the Nara River and von Kluge.
Tank Pz.Kpfw III ausf. H of the 7th Panzer Regiment at the headquarters of the 10th Panzer Division near Moscow.
There were a lot of reasons for the failure of Operation Typhoon, but we will list only purely military mistakes. First of all, the Germans did not concentrate enough forces to capture Moscow, a simple turn to the south of the 4th Panzer Group was not enough. Once again, they made a mistake in assessing the forces of the Red Army, and near Moscow this mistake became fatal for them. "Swift Heinz" did not bother to reliably close the boilers around Bryansk and Trubchevsk, which allowed a significant part of the troops encircled there to retreat to Tula. The OKH made a grave mistake in ordering the 9th Army to advance north towards Kalinin and the 2nd Army to Kursk. Von Bock obediently carried out this order, taking its infantry divisions from the 3rd Panzer Group and sending them to Kalinin. If in the south Guderian's tanks and infantry were forced to split up under the pressure of the Soviet troops, but in the north it was the German generals themselves who did it. Further, von Kluge's 4th Army quite unexpectedly refrained from participating in the second phase of the operation, although, perhaps, the condition of its divisions was such that they simply could not do anything. Sending large aviation forces to another theater does not fit into any gates, so a decisive offensive is not carried out. We have already mentioned the lack of fuel, ammunition, food and other types of supplies, but this means that the army rear services have worked disgustingly.
An impressive list, because all this taken together would be quite enough for the failure of any operation. By the way, as it is easy to see, the Germans began to violate their own canons of tank warfare, forcibly or deliberately turning their tank corps into a kind of English - tanks, again tanks and again tanks. If we talk about tank war, then for the Germans on the Eastern Front it ended on September 30, 1941, and it took a very, very long time to continue, more than six months.
And what was happening on the other side of the front line at that time? The temptation is very great, given the successful end of the battle for Moscow, to declare the actions of Soviet military leaders the pinnacle of military art, especially considering the military results of the battle. After all, the failure of Operation Typhoon meant that the last hopes of the German command for a quick end to the war had crumbled into dust. And in a protracted war, Germany had no chance of winning. That is why we say with full confidence that the battle near Moscow was a radical turning point in the course of the war, not the beginning of a turning point, but the turning point itself.
Statement of a combat mission for a German infantry unit near Moscow.
Naturally, Soviet tank units also took part in the battle, but so far these were separate tank brigades, not even united into corps. In terms of the level of organization of tank troops, the Red Army actually rolled back to the era of the First World War, when tanks were used by small groups attached to infantry divisions and corps. While this was an objective requirement of the situation, the Soviet command simply did not have time to form large formations, after all, the same tank brigade is not just a mechanical assembly of hundreds of vehicles on the parade ground.
The first notable and highly controversial event was the battles near Mtsensk, where Katukov's brigade collided with Guderian's tanks. We talked about this episode in detail in the previous book and can hardly add anything. Let us just recall that not only the opponents describe the results of the battles in an extremely contradictory way, this is quite understandable. The descriptions of the actions of the parties do not match, which is a much more serious problem. As a result, it becomes difficult to give any definite assessment of this episode.
However, it was characteristic of the use by the Soviet tank command during this period of the war. By the beginning of the battle near Moscow, the tank troops included: the Western Front - the 101st and 107th motorized rifle divisions, the 126th, 127th, 128th, 143rd and 147th tank brigades; in the Reserve Front - 144, 145, 146 and 148 tank brigades and three separate tank battalions; in the Bryansk Front - the 108th tank division, the 42nd, 121st, 141st and 150th tank brigades and the 113th separate tank battalion. In total, there were 780 tanks in three fronts (of which 140 were heavy and medium). Tank brigades were not even considered as fire brigades, but as emergency plugs, although the official one ascribes to them the role of mobile reserves, designed to launch counterattacks in order to defeat and destroy the enemy that has penetrated. The statement is certainly correct, and even Guderian himself is! - ordered to act in this way. But, unfortunately, there was one small detail that makes us evaluate this tactic in a completely different way. It can be used when the front line is firmly held and the enemy can achieve only minor tactical successes. Here the picture was completely different. The front was collapsing first in one area, then in another, enemy tanks broke through in large groups, in fact, the Germans did not act differently. And attempts to throw a tank brigade towards the advancing corps, which, moreover, had complete freedom of maneuver, did not end the way the Soviet generals wanted.
Composition with German tanks Pz.Kpfw. III at the station near Moscow.
Of course, an attempt was made to form a unit adequate to the situation, and a task force was created under the command of General I.V. Boldin, which included the 152nd rifle and 101st motorized rifle divisions, the 126th and 128th tank brigades. During the first days of October, General Boldin's group repulsed several attacks by units of the enemy's LVI Corps, but after that Soviet historians begin to talk about the exploits of the communists, which, as a rule, means that the unit did not fulfill its tasks. Later, in the same way, to eliminate the breakthrough in the Kashira region, the Belov group was created, that is, the Soviet command was forced to frantically respond to enemy actions, engaging in momentary improvisations.
Separately, I would like to consider the actions of General Rokossovsky, who deserved such a stormy disapproval of V. Beshanov. It's about about the counterattack on November 16, in which the 58th Panzer Division took part. This counterattack ended in complete disaster for the division, which lost 157 tanks out of 198. True, some sources speak of the loss of 139 tanks. For some reason, most historians place all the blame on Rokossovsky, exposing the division commander, Major General Kotlyarov, as an innocent victim. In the same way, Rokossovsky is exposed as the destroyer of the 17th and 44th cavalry divisions.
German soldiers freezing in the snow near Moscow.
Excuse me, but what does Rokossovsky have to do with it? The army commander gives the order to attack, and that is where his role ends. He is not obliged to schedule tasks for the regiments of the division and determine the time of artillery preparation. This is the task of the division commander, apparently, General Kotlyarov did not cope with it, and he shot himself just in time, otherwise he would have had to answer unpleasant questions. Let's look at the map, as a rule, this is a very useful exercise, and we will try to figure it out after all. Moreover, if you believe the damned fascists, Rokossovsky unmistakably chose the place of the strike - the gap between the 7th Panzer and 14th Motorized Divisions. State German divisions by this time it is well known, look at the books of the same A. Isaev. By the way, General Raus, who during the period of these battles commanded the 6th Panzer Division, quite highly appreciating the qualities of Soviet junior commanders and paying tribute to senior commanders, speaks with frank contempt of middle-level commanders (regiment - corps), considering them to be uninitiated, uneducated gray mass.
There is another nuance that complicates the assessment of events. The fact is that on the evening of November 17, from 23.00, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command finally transferred the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front to the Western Front. The 30th Army was subordinated to the 58th Panzer, 24th and 17th Cavalry Divisions of the 16th Army, which retreated into its lane. The commander of the 30th Army, Major General Lelyushenko, received an order to defend the Klin direction and provide a junction between the 30th and 16th armies. At the time of such reorganizations, it is most convenient to hide any mistakes and failures, placing the blame for them on the old boss. So there is good reason to suspect, especially given the sheer inexperience of the division, that this disastrous attack simply did not take place. Most likely, General Kotlyarov lost his tanks in the forests and snowdrifts, because such cases already took place during the Soviet-Finnish war. And in the summer of 1941, this happened everywhere, except that there were no snowdrifts then.
In the same way, one can ask the question: what, in the order of General Rokossovsky, it says “the 17th and 44th cavalry divisions to attack machine guns in the cavalry formation”, or did the commanders decide so?
Although the actions of Rokossovsky can also be criticized, but, to be honest, the tongue does not turn. He received Zhukov's order to carry out the attack, he carried out the order. V. Beshanov can condescendingly mutter through his teeth: “I think that the commander-16 did not mind too much, he did not want to return to the prison bunk.” But I would be happy to admire Mr. Beshanov after proper treatment: 9 knocked out teeth, 3 broken ribs, toes crushed with a hammer - and would listen to how one should object in such a situation.
Soviet light tanks T-26 near Moscow in December 1941. Tanks of various modifications with turrets of various types are in the column.
Alas, apparently, Marshal Rokossovsky was broken once and for all, otherwise such passages would not have appeared in his memoirs:
“Another stroke of those days, very memorable. In Novo-Petrovsky, Yemelyan Yaroslavsky visited us with a group of agitators of the Central Committee of the Party, and the people knew and loved that man. Our comrades made sure that people from each regiment came to listen to him, and then the soldiers' rumors would spread the word of the party through the positions.
You had to be very scared to write something like this 10 years after Stalin's death.
In general, all these events in the descriptions of Soviet / Russian and German historians differ like heaven and earth. I will give an extensive quote from the work of A. Isaev, concerning all the same events:
“Already in the conditions of the German offensive that had begun on the night of November 16, the 16th Army regrouped its troops and from 10.00 went on the offensive. At the same time, on the same morning, the enemy launched an offensive at the junction of the 316th rifle division and the cavalry group of Dovator. The 16th Army spent the whole day of November 16 in a state of offensive operations of its right wing and defensive operations of its left wing and center. In general, both were unsuccessful. The cavalry of the mobile group entered the battle in parts. At the beginning of the offensive at 10.00, the 17th and 24th cavalry divisions approached the starting line only at 12.30. The rear is hopelessly behind. The advancing 58th Panzer Division suffered very heavy losses, having lost 139 tanks in a day. The defending 316th division and the cavalry group of Dovator were forced to withdraw from their positions. After the battles for Volokolamsk, the artillery grouping of the division I.V. Panfilov was significantly reduced, in addition, part of the artillery forces of the 16th Army was used in the attack on the Skirmanovsky bridgehead (in particular, one of the two anti-tank artillery regiments that became guards). On November 16, the 316th division had twelve 45-mm guns, twenty-six 76.2-mm guns, seventeen 122-mm howitzers, five 122-mm hull guns and one 120-mm mortar. From 207 guns in mid-October 1941, only memories remained. Accordingly, the ability to resist the German offensive was much more modest. A change for the better was the narrowing of the front to 14 km compared to 41 km near Volokolamsk in October. This happened as a result of the arrival of the 78th Infantry Division from the Far East and the exit from the encirclement of the 18th Infantry Division. Also, the division of I.V. Panfilova actually became a four-regiment, she got the 690th rifle regiment 126th division, which emerged from the encirclement near Vyazma. The 316th Rifle Division and the cavalry group of Dovator XLVI opposed the motorized corps (General of the Panzer Forces von Vietinghoff, 5th and 11th Panzer Divisions) and the 5th Army Corps (General of the Infantry Ruoff, 2nd Panzer, 35th and 106th I infantry divisions). The latter was assigned 1 tank battalion from the 11th tank division. In other conditions, the blow of such a mass was irresistible. However, by that time, supply problems had reached their peak, and only parts of the German tank formations that received fuel participated in the battle. By the morning of November 17, the 690th Rifle Regiment was semi-surrounded, the 1073rd and 1075th regiments were driven out of their positions and retreated. At the height of the fighting, on November 17, 1941, the 316th Rifle Division received an order to rename it to the 8th Guards Rifle Division. The next day, November 18, during artillery and mortar shelling of the command post of the division in the village of Gusevo, its commander I.V. was killed. Panfilov. At the request of G.K. Zhukova 8th guards division named after her fallen commander.
Soviet troops on the march. Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow. The tank is covered with winter camouflage, all fighters are in camouflage suits.
The reasons that prompted the author to write this are even more incomprehensible to me than the motives of K. Rokossovsky. Strongly written, in the best traditions of Glavpur and Agitprop! 2 fascist corps, as many as 5 divisions, attacked the unfortunate heroic division of Panfilov. Let's start with the fact that the corps of Ruoff and Vietinghoff had a total of 6 divisions, that is, the feat should have looked as much as 20 percent more heroic. Dear author, somewhere lost the 252nd Infantry Division of the XLVI Corps.
But the Germans claim that the LVI Corps operated 20 kilometers to the north, and all tank divisions were concentrated south of the Volokolamsk-Istra-Moscow railway, while the 316th division occupied positions to the north. And it turns out that she was opposed by the one and only German 35th Infantry Division. By the way, how do you imagine the concentration of 6 divisions in a strip of 14 kilometers? In general, one should probably be more critical of the sources.
According to other sources, the battle looked a little different. The 316th Rifle Division took up defensive positions on the Dubosekovo front - 8 km northeast of Volokolamsk, that is, about 18-20 kilometers along the front, which was a lot for a formation weakened in battles. On the right flank, the neighbor was the 126th Infantry Division, on the left - the 50th cavalry division Cavalry Corps Dovator. In addition, somewhere in the rear, tanks of the 27th Tank Brigade were in ambush. On November 16, the division was attacked by the forces of two German tank divisions - the 2nd tank division attacked the positions of the 316th division in the center of defense, and the 11th tank division hit in the Dubosekovo area, at the positions of the 1075th rifle regiment, at the junction with the 50th and cavalry division. A blow to the joints between formations was a frequently encountered element of the tactics of the German troops.
In general, one thing is clear - so far these battles have not received reliable coverage. Most likely, even those same 2 German tank divisions were actually the mentioned tank battalion of the 11th division. But we somehow avoided describing the actions of Soviet tank units. This is not surprising, because in this period they played a clearly secondary role. After all, it’s not even possible to say that the tank brigades served as a cementing element of the defense, for example, they were present in places and somehow participated, and the long-suffering infantry still bore the brunt of the fighting.
Soviet infantry in defensive positions. The photo was taken during the counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. Interestingly, the individual cells are not yet connected together by passages. It is possible that this is a temporary position at the next liberated height.
The transition of the Red Army to the offensive did not change the situation. Tanks still remained on the sidelines, providing more psychological support than real. Here is another quote:
“The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops subsequently developed into a general winter offensive, which was carried out from January to April 1942. In solving the tasks of defeating the Nazi invaders, together with rifle troops, cavalry and aviation, our glorious tank troops also took part in the winter offensive. Due to the lack of tanks, the Red Army did not have large formations during this period. The basis of the tank forces was brigades and separate battalions, which were used mainly for direct support of the infantry, in tactical interaction with the infantry, artillery and cavalry. The breakthrough of the enemy defense was carried out by infantry together with tanks and artillery. During the pursuit, tanks were used in forward detachments, most often to intercept enemy retreat routes. Sometimes, to bypass the flanks of the defending Nazi troops or capture important objects, mobile groups were created, the striking force of which was made up of tank brigades. However, there were few combat vehicles in the mobile groups and there were not enough vehicles, which reduced their mobility, striking power and limited the ability to operate in operational depth. Still, the mobile groups contributed greatly to the development of operations. The experience of using mobile groups in the counteroffensive near Moscow later played a big role when large formations and formations began to be created in the Red Army.
That is, as it is easy to see, a certain period of balance of impotence has come. Soviet tank troops were still in the process of construction, and by December 1941 the Germans had retired into the plane of virtual existence. Divisions and headquarters were still preserved, but they had no tanks left. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in 1942 both sides began to take vigorous measures to correct the situation.
Soviet soldiers in battle in the forest near Moscow. two are armed with Mosin rifles, the third has a bag with disks for a DP machine gun. Tank - a destroyed German tank Pz.Kpfw. III.
German soldiers who died in the Battle of Moscow.
Group German soldiers captured during the battle for Moscow.
German soldiers surrender to the Red Army during the battle for Moscow. Winter 1941 - 1942
Operation Typhoon, called by the Nazi strategists "the main battle of the year", began on September 30 with the transition to the offensive of the Second Panzer Group of General Heinz Guderian in the Bryansk Front from the Shostka region.
On October 2, the remaining two groups from the regions of Dukhovshchina and Roslavl went on the offensive. Their attacks were directed in converging directions to Vyazma in order to cover the main forces of the Western and Reserve fronts. On the very first day, enemy divisions penetrated the defenses of the Red Army for 15-30 kilometers.
On October 3-4, the command of the Western Front, with the forces of the army and front reserves, launched counterattacks on the broken through Nazi units, which, however, were not successful, since they were carried out by sedentary groups and without proper artillery and air support.
In the first days, the enemy offensive developed successfully. He managed to reach the rear of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, and on October 6, west of Vyazma, encircle the 19th and 20th armies of the Western and the 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve fronts. The troops, who found themselves in the Vyazma encirclement, waged a courageous fight against the enemy. They launched counterattacks and broke through the encirclement. Here is how the participants in the exit from the encirclement as part of the 29th Infantry Division P. Lukin, N. Okhapkin and P. Silantyev tell about this. “The attacks of our troops followed one after another, they were preceded by artillery preparation. Especially fierce were our attacks on October 8-12, when in fighting the division turned on the Katyusha battery of Captain Flerov ... For the Germans, the offensive of the encircled battalions and regiments of Soviet troops was a complete surprise. The Nazis, apparently, believed that since our units were surrounded and suffered significant losses, they were no longer dangerous, they were finished. And suddenly these regiments and battalions found the strength and went forward in an easterly direction. The Germans had to hastily pull together large formations and equipment here.
The active combat operations of the Soviet troops in the encirclement had a serious impact on the development of events. They tied down 28 Nazi divisions in the Vyazma region, which got stuck here and could not continue the offensive against Moscow.
At the same time, in the zone of the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front, the Nazis broke through along the Warsaw highway (now the A101 Moscow-Roslavl highway) and captured the important strategic settlement of Yukhnov. The Soviet command, which discovered the accumulation of German motorized columns late, could not find the strength to stop the breakthrough.
In the afternoon of October 5, cadets of the Podolsk Infantry and Podolsk Artillery Schools were raised on combat alert. By this time, only 17-18 year old cadets of the first year of study remained at the school, since the senior cadets were released ahead of schedule. The cadets had to urgently advance to the Maloyaroslavets area in order to occupy a combat sector on the left flank of the Mozhaisk line of defense. But first of all, it was necessary to throw forward detachments in order to delay the Germans at any cost until the defense was ready. The infantry school allocates an artillery combined division to the forward detachment, which is ordered to command captain Rosikov, one of the cadet teachers.
By the morning of October 6, the advance detachment reached the Ugra River and immediately attacked the already crossed enemy units. As it turned out later, it was the vanguard of one of the divisions of the 4th tank group (army) of the enemy, which was completing the encirclement of several of our armies near Vyazma. The desperate attack of the young "Red Junkers" was a complete surprise for the Germans, and they were forced out beyond the Ugra.
But this was only the beginning of the first test of the cadets. Ahead were several difficult days of withdrawal under the blows of tanks, almost continuous bombing - to the Ilyinsky section of the Mozhaisk line, where the main forces of the schools were deployed. For two weeks, suffering heavy losses, the Podolsk cadets defended the line. Many years later, this will be called the feat of the Podolsk cadets.
In those two weeks, the inscription: "two ill-fated cadet schools" did not leave the operational maps in the German headquarters.
To capture Maloyaroslavets, which was the key to Podolsk and Moscow, the enemy abandoned two divisions - motorized and infantry. They were opposed by formations and units of the 43rd Army of Lieutenant General S. D. Akimov: the 312th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel A.F. Naumov, units of the Podolsk infantry and artillery schools, the 108th reserve rifle regiment, the consolidated battalion 616- 1st Infantry Regiment, six artillery regiments, a guards mortar regiment, three separate machine-gun and artillery battalions, seven separate flamethrower companies, and others.
All attempts to hold back the advance of the enemy in this direction by the forces of the army turned out to be futile. Then, on the orders of the command of the Western Front, on October 13-14, a counterattack was launched by the forces of the 110th and 113th rifle divisions of colonels S. T. Gladyshev and K. I. Mironov. However, he was also unsuccessful. The additional entry into battle of the 53rd Rifle Division (commander Colonel N.P. Krasnoretsky), the 9th (commander Lieutenant Colonel I.F. Kirichenko) and the 17th (commander Major N.Ya. Klypin) tank brigades did not change the situation. . The defense area was surrendered.
Last push for Moscow
German tanks attack Soviet positions near Istra, November 25, 1941.
“Now stop the enemy on the outskirts of our capital, do not let him in, grind the Nazi divisions and corps in battles ... The Moscow knot is now decisive ... A little more time will pass, and the enemy’s attack on Moscow will have to choke. It is necessary at all costs to withstand the tension of these days ”(G.K. Zhukov, 11/26/1941).
To resume the attack on Moscow, the Wehrmacht deployed 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 7 motorized. by design German command, Army Group Center was supposed to break the flank units of the defense of the Soviet troops and surround Moscow.
The Soviet command reinforced the dangerous sectors of the front with reserves and reinforcements. The parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941 was of great political importance. Thus, the government of the USSR and personally I. V. Stalin demonstrated their determination to fight to the end.
The offensive of German troops on Moscow resumed from the northwest on November 15-16, from the southwest on November 18. The enemy delivered the main blows in the directions of Klin-Rogachevo and Tula-Kashira. At the end of November, the enemy managed to capture the area of Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra, reach the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Yakhroma area and occupy Krasnaya Polyana (32 km from the Moscow Kremlin). The further advance of the Germans in the northern direction was prevented by the discharge of water from the Istra, Ivankovsky reservoirs and reservoirs of the Moscow Canal. According to the memoirs of Marshal Shaposhnikov, “as the Germans approached this line, the water outlets of the reservoir were blown up (after the crossing of our troops), resulting in a water stream up to 2.5 m high for up to 50 km south of the reservoir. Attempts by the Germans to close the spillways were unsuccessful.
The 1st Shock Army and the 20th Army were transferred to the Western Front, which covered the gap between the 30th (on November 17 transferred to the Western Front) and the 16th Armies. As a result of the involvement of Soviet reserves, the enemy was stopped and forced to go on the defensive.
At the end of November there were fierce battles in the area of Kashira and Tula. On November 27, Soviet troops launched a counterattack on the 2nd Panzer Army and drove it back from Kashira. The 2nd Panzer Army tried to bypass Tula from the northeast and cut off the Serpukhov-Tula railways and highways, but the counterattack of the Soviet troops threw the enemy back to their original positions.
On December 1, the command of Army Group Center made a new attempt to break through to Moscow in the Aprelevka area. On December 2, the Germans occupied Burtsevo - the closest locality to Moscow in the southwestern sector of the front. Thanks to the well-organized interaction of the 33rd Army of General M. G. Efremov and the 5th Army of General L.A. Govorov, this attempt was eliminated. VGK rate ordered, except for those transferred Western front from the reserve of the Headquarters of the 1st Shock, the new 10th and 20th armies, to include the 24th and 60th armies in the Moscow defense zone.
On December 2, the advanced units of the 1st Shock and 20th armies repelled all enemy attacks north of Moscow in the Dmitrov region and to the south and forced him to stop the offensive. On December 3-5, the 1st Shock and 20th armies launched several strong counterattacks in the Yakhroma and Krasnaya Polyana region and began to push the enemy. The left-flank divisions of the 16th Army, in cooperation with the 5th Army, pushed the enemy back from the large bend of the river. Moscow northeast of Zvenigorod. The strike group of the 33rd Army, having defeated enemy units on December 4-5, restored the situation on the Nara River.
The results of the defense of Moscow
During the defensive stage of the Battle of Moscow, the Soviet command imposed on the enemy a “war of attrition” (when the “last battalion” rushes into battle, which should decide the outcome of the battle). But if during the battle all the reserves of the German command were exhausted, the Soviet command managed to save the main forces (from the strategic reserves, only the 1st Shock Army and the 20th Army were brought into battle).
The commander of the German 2nd Panzer Army G. Guderian wrote down his summary like this:
The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We have suffered a serious defeat, which, due to the stubbornness of the high command, led to fatal consequences in the coming weeks. In the German offensive came the crisis, forces and morale german army were broken.
Feeling a turning point during the battle, the Soviet command gave the order for a counteroffensive.