Military spending is on the rise. In 2013 they amounted to $355.5 million, in 2014 - $405.9 million and in 2015 - $440 million or 0.71% of the country's GDP. At the same time, these funds are not enough to re-equip the national army with modern types of weapons and military equipment(IWT), carrying out intensive combat training in the troops.
The Ethiopian army of the times of the republic has a lot of combat experience. These are the war with Somalia (1977-1978), the war with the Eritrean rebels (1974-1991), the large-scale armed conflict with Eritrea (1998-2000), participation in hostilities in Somalia (2006-2007, from 2011 to the present). In addition, the army participates in military operations against illegal separatist armed formations.
The Ethiopian armed forces number 138 thousand people and consist of ground forces and air forces. In a period of danger and in wartime, irregular formations are transferred to the operational subordination of the army command. There are also territorial troops. The country's mobilization resources are estimated at about 15 million people, including 7.8 million fit for military service.
The military-doctrinal attitudes of the Ethiopian leadership have a distinctly defensive orientation. The country's constitution states that Ethiopia must "seek and maintain peaceful solutions to international disputes."
Article 87 of the Ethiopian constitution, Principles of National Defense, states that "the armed forces shall defend the independence of the state and carry out the duties assigned to them in connection with the state of emergency in the country declared in accordance with the Constitution." Moreover, "the composition of the national armed forces should be proportionally represented by the nationalities, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia." It is specifically emphasized that "the armed forces shall always obey and respect the Constitution" and "carry out their duties independently of any political organization(s)". The Basic Law also specifies that the Minister of Defense "must be a member of the civil service".
Supreme Commander The armed forces are the Prime Minister, who exercises overall leadership of the army through the Ministry of National Defence. The Minister of Defense is responsible for personnel policy, logistics, arms and military equipment procurement and various administrative matters. The direct command of the troops is exercised by the General Staff.
The basis of the Ethiopian armed forces are ground forces(135 thousand people, trained reserve - up to 350 thousand people). They are assigned a leading role in repulsing possible external aggression and countering illegal armed formations. The commander of the ground forces is the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
The ground forces have five regional commands- Northern (headquarters in the city of Mekele), Central (Ynda-Sellase), Western (Bahr-Dar), Eastern (Harar) and Northeastern (Desse), as well as the rear command.
The main tactical unit is the division- mechanized (md), infantry (pd) and special forces (SpN) Agazi. There are 21 divisions in total (md - 4, pd - 16, spn - 1). In addition, there are six separate brigades- airborne, artillery, transport and three security brigades (Ministry of Defense, government facilities, military facilities).
The ground forces are armed with 465 tanks (T-55 - 200, T-62 - 50, T-72 - 215); 877 artillery pieces, including 87 self-propelled guns, caliber 152, 130, 122 and 85 mm; up to 900 mortars of caliber 82, 107 and 120 mm; 75 MLRS, including 50 BM-21 Grad; 20 BMP-1 and 350 armored personnel carriers; over 400 ATGMs, including 87 Russian Kornets and 250 Ukrainian Kombats; up to 300 Strela-2M and Igla MANPADS, S-75 air defense systems (up to 10 divisions, up to 42 launchers) and S-125 (up to 7 divisions, up to 40 launchers), 36 Strela-1 short-range air defense systems ", as well as the latest Chinese air defense system HQ-64 (6PU); anti-aircraft guns and installations of 23, 37 and 57 mm caliber (up to 560 in total, including up to 50 ZSU-23-4 Shilka).
The main part of the S-75 air defense system is located in stationary positions around Addis Ababa, and the S-125 air defense system is deployed mainly near the border with Eritrea. It is reported about the purchase by Ethiopia of the Russian Pantsir-S1E air defense missile systems.
The armament and equipment of the ground forces is represented by Soviet (Russian), Ukrainian, Chinese, American and French models. A significant part of weapons and military equipment is in a technically faulty condition and requires various types of repairs. Many types of military equipment are outdated and require replacement.
Air Force(3 thousand people) are armed with 20 combat aircraft: 12 Su-27SK multipurpose fighters and 8 MiG-23BN fighter-bombers; 9 combat training aircraft (Su-27UB - 5, MiG-23M - 4), up to 33 training and up to 22 military transport aircraft. Helicopter aviation has 26 combat helicopters (Mi-24 - 15, Mi-35 - 11) and up to 45 multipurpose and transport helicopters. Aviation equipment is represented by Soviet / Russian, American, Czech, Italian, French and Canadian models. Air Force aviation is based at 11 airfields.
National military industry in last years received significant development. Currently, its enterprises produce small arms (automatic rifles, machine guns), automatic grenade launchers, 82-mm mortars, ammunition for small arms, artillery and tanks. With the assistance of Israel, a small-scale assembly of light armored vehicles has been mastered. Armored vehicles are being repaired. Self-propelled launchers for the S-75 air defense system based on the T-55 tank have been created. According to experts, this is "the most difficult work that has been done by the Ethiopian defense industry to date." In general, the general low level of economic, scientific and technical potential does not allow creating a full-fledged military-industrial complex, which makes Ethiopia dependent on foreign arms purchases for the long term.
Ethiopia in the military-technical sphere cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, China, Israel, the USA, France and other countries. On the territory of Ethiopia, in the Arba Mink region, there is an American base on which reconnaissance and strike drones are deployed.
The Ethiopian military is actively involved in international peacekeeping operations through the UN and the African Union. Since 2006, a regional training center for peacekeepers has been operating in the country (in the city of Debre Zeit). The largest contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers is deployed in neighboring Sudan.
The Ethiopian Armed Forces are recruited on a voluntary basis. Persons called to active military service undergo a course of initial military training, after which they take the military oath. The minimum term of service for privates and sergeants is seven years, for officers ten.
The training of officer cadres is carried out at the command and staff college, the college for the training of junior officers and the Military University. In addition, there are specialized training centers. Some of the officers are trained abroad, mainly in Western countries.
The military receive a fairly high monetary allowance. Given the mass unemployment and low standard of living of the bulk of the population, the army has the opportunity to select candidates acceptable to it.
In general, the Ethiopian armed forces in terms of numbers, technical equipment and level of training are the largest and strongest in the Horn of Africa region. At the same time, given the low level of economic development of the country, the almost complete dependence of the republic on foreign military supplies, the national armed forces are not able to conduct large-scale fighting over a long period.
Julie 2017
ZVO_11_03
Colonel A. BURKOV
The armed forces of the Federative Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), in the context of the continued consequences of the conflict with Eritrea and the difficult military-political situation in the region, are the main guarantor of the country's security. Considering the special role of the Armed Forces in political system state, its leadership is taking all necessary measures to maintain them in combat readiness.
In accordance with the constitution of the republic, Prime Minister M. Zenawi is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and exercises overall leadership over them through the Ministry of National Defense (MHO). The functions of the Minister of Defense (A. Gymed - a civilian) include issues of general personnel policy, logistics, procurement of weapons and others. The direct control of the troops is entrusted to the chief of the general staff, headed by Lieutenant General S. Jenus.
As in most African countries, military service in Ethiopia is a prestigious activity that provides an opportunity for sustainable income and an authoritative position in society.
After the signing of a peace agreement with Eritrea in December 2000, the country's leadership decided to gradually reduce the total number of national armed forces. The program of their construction and development is under development. At present, a commission set up at the FDRE Armed Forces General Staff is considering proposals for reforming the army, studying various models of building the Armed Forces in other states and the possibility of their application in their own country. The main criteria for its decision were approved - to extract the maximum financial benefit, as well as to obtain preferential terms for military and military-technical cooperation with other states.
On the issue of downsizing, the leadership of the General Staff proceeds from the fact that, first of all, incompetent commanders and chiefs, as well as persons whose loyalty to the current leadership of the country is in doubt, should be dismissed from the ranks of the armed forces. In his opinion, these organizational measures should not reduce the level of combat readiness troops.
The country's armed forces have a two-service structure and consist of ground forces (SV), air force and air defense forces (Air Force and Air Defense). During the threatened period and in wartime, irregular formations are transferred to the operational subordination of the command of the Armed Forces of the republic. Territorial militia units are no longer considered as a reserve component of the armed forces and have been transferred to the jurisdiction and funding mainly of local administrations. Subdivisions and units of territorial troops (irregular troops), whose headquarters was created in the first half of 2002, are at the formation stage. In particular, military personnel dismissed from the ranks of the Armed Forces in connection with the reduction are sent to them. It is assumed that the territorial troops will form a trained army reserve, the recruitment of which will be carried out on a contract basis.
The main branch of the armed forces are the ground forces. They are assigned the main role in repelling possible external aggression and ensuring domestic political stability. The leadership of the SV is carried out by the chief of the general staff, who is also their commander. The number of personnel is about 250 thousand people (according to the "Military Balance" for 2001-2002), and the trained reserve, fit for military service according to general indications, is up to 350 thousand people.
The combat composition of the ground forces includes two combined arms armies, two separate divisions (mechanized and special purpose "Agazi"), six separate brigades (airborne, artillery, motor transport, protection of MHO facilities, protection of government institutions and protection of military facilities), as well as separate military units (company-battalion units) of artillery and special troops.
In the course of the reorganization of the ground forces, the Ethiopian command intends to maintain the number of formations currently available in this type of armed forces (six army corps and 22 divisions). However, on their basis, it is possible to create units of other types of troops and special forces, in particular parachute and mountain infantry units, as well as special forces units (SpN).
The SV is armed with: battle tanks T-54 / -55 and T-62 (about 300), BRDM, BMP, BTR-60 (up to 200), MLRS BM-21 (50), 76-, 85-, 122- and 130-mm field artillery guns (330-350 units), 81-, 82- and 120-mm mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons (including 65 MANPADS), various small arms, acquired mainly abroad.
The main combat formation of the ground forces is a division, the number of personnel of which is 8-10 thousand people. A mechanized division includes a headquarters, tank, mechanized and artillery brigades, an air defense brigade, an anti-tank battalion, separate companies (communications, reconnaissance, engineering and sapper), departments and services . An infantry division was built according to a similar scheme, which includes infantry and mechanized brigades, a counterguerrilla brigade, a combat support battalion, squads and services.
Currently, the command of the country's Armed Forces is faced with the problem of accommodating the units and formations of the ground forces formed during the conflict with Eritrea. For this reason, the process of withdrawing divisions and brigades from the border with Eritrea to new permanent deployment points is proceeding quite slowly and has not yet been completed at this stage. The choice of these points is carried out primarily on the basis of the presence of a minimum household infrastructure there and only then, taking into account the requirements of mobilization deployment and the possible involvement in police operations within the state.
The ground forces are recruited on the principles of voluntary recruitment and proportional representation of all nationalities inhabiting the country. Recruits called up for active military service undergo an initial military training course, after which they take an oath and are sent to combat units. The term of study is included in the term of service (the minimum for private and non-commissioned officers is seven years, for officers - ten). After this period, a new contract may be concluded with the serviceman. The age limit for military service for privates and sergeants is 45 years, junior officers - 48 years, senior officers - 52 years, generals - 55 years.
The leadership of the country intends to solve the problem of training personnel for the military forces in the following way: by developing a network of its own military educational institutions, inviting foreign instructors to the country, including on a private basis, and also by sending military personnel to the United States, China and other countries for training.
Significant changes have taken place in the national military training system in Ethiopia. For example, the Defense University College was established, which currently includes three military educational institutions: a military engineering college (Debre-Zeit settlement); military medical college, management college. It is assumed that in the future the University Defense College will include other military educational institutions.
In addition, two newly created military educational institutions of the Ethiopian Army began to work: the command and staff college on the basis of the former academy at the Holetta training center (500 officers recruited, category "lieutenant-captain"), the training period is three years, the specialty is command and headquarters; secondary command combined arms military school at the base training center"Urso" (500 cadets recruited), training period - three years, specialty - command (platoon commander).
At present, the material, technical and educational bases for officer training courses are being created at the Awash-Arba training center. Officers will be trained here in the following specialties: artillerymen, tankers, commanders of anti-tank and air defense units.
In general, the problem of training military personnel is extremely acute for the Ethiopian military-political leadership. During the years of the war with Eritrea, more than 6 thousand former officers of the army of the previous regime were recruited into the Armed Forces, who mainly held the positions of middle and senior officers. age or health status Equally, there will be no one to replace them due to the lack of trained junior officers. Today, the need for the recruitment of junior officers is estimated at 8 thousand people.
Certain positive results have been achieved in the course of negotiations with the United States, Great Britain, China, France, Italy, South Africa and Turkey on cooperation in the field of military education, and in particular the sending of Ethiopian military personnel to study in these countries, as well as organizing their training in their homeland . In order to exchange experience in the field of military education, trips of representatives of the MHO of Ethiopia to these states were organized. In the Armed Forces, classes were organized to study English and French with Ethiopian officers and generals.
There is no system for the mobilization and operational deployment of the Ethiopian Armed Forces as such. In the future, it is planned to create mobilization bodies, primarily within the framework of the formation of territorial troops. To this end, it is planned to form departments in local administrations to record the assigned composition and persons of military age.
Operational and combat training in units and formations is mainly reduced to episodic exercises in fire, tactical and physical training in the "company - battalion" link. Due to the lack of the necessary educational and material base, the conditions for classes are simplified as much as possible.
Scheduled classes are periodically held only in the training centers (TCs) of the Army, where young recruits are being prepared to replace the dismissed military personnel in the main military specialties. In particular, a company of Special Forces fighters was trained at the Blaten training center, and a group of military intelligence officers was trained at Volmera.
This situation with the training of personnel is explained by the movement of many formations and units to new points and areas of deployment, their arrangement in a new place, a reduction in the personnel of the ground forces by 50 thousand people. armed uprisings by anti-government forces, as well as the extremely poor professional training of junior officers and commanders, the vast majority of whom do not have a special military education.
Recently, there have been positive developments in the conduct of combat and operational training. The Main Directorate of Combat Training of the General Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces developed training programs for units at the Holetta training center (45 km west of Addis Ababa), the heads of departments of the General Staff and heads of training centers held meetings. In addition, within the framework of cooperation with the US Department of Defense, on the basis of the Urso training center (Dire Dawa region), since July 2003, an American-Ethiopian exercise code-named "Golden Spear" has been conducted in order to train units of the first Ethiopian anti-terrorist battalion (total it is planned to form three battalions). During the exercise, the Americans were supposed to train three groups (100 people each) of Ethiopian instructors intended to train military personnel of the counter-terrorism units. All costs associated with the preparation and creation of the educational and material base of these units were borne by the US Department of Defense. It is assumed that after the training is completed, the Ethiopian instructors will continue to independently train their military personnel.
Work has resumed on the creation of a department for peacekeeping operations in the structures of the Ethiopian MHO For this purpose, in the period from September to November 2002, three Ethiopian officers were trained in special UN courses in Switzerland, and from that time the formation of a unit of peacekeeping forces began. As a result, as a result of the decision of the military-political leadership of the country, at the end of September 2003, the first Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent was sent to Burundi. In the near future, its number in this country can be increased to 900 people. Their task is to monitor the implementation of the peace treaty between the Burundian government and rebels from the "Forces for the Defense of Democracy" Ethiopians will be part of the common forces of the African Union (until 2002 - OAU) According to Western media, the Ethiopian contingent is financed by the United States
The plans of the Ethiopian military leadership provide for a significant increase in the level of training, equipment and mobility of the Armed Forces, as well as the creation of rapid reaction units to conduct counterguerrilla and special operations within the country
In addition, it was decided to radically improve the information support of the top military-political leadership. In this regard, it is planned to expand the staff of the special services, increase the level of their technical equipment, organize personnel training, create intelligence centers of the Armed Forces, as well as stationary points and mobile groups of radio and electronic intelligence
Thus, despite the significant reduction in the military potential of the FDRE during the period of the conflict with Eritrea and the ongoing reorganization, the state of the Ethiopian Armed Forces allows at this stage to ensure the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as well as the implementation of its foreign policy interests in the region.
P. S.
According to Western media reports, a report was published in early October. "Foreign and National Security Policy", which indicates that Ethiopia plans to reduce the share of military spending to 2 percent of gross domestic product.
The document acknowledges that the cost of arming and maintaining an army of several hundred thousand soldiers is undermining the country's economy. Instead, a small, professional military force is needed that can be rapidly expanded with reservists The report notes, “It is important to balance our economic development with military needs We must prepare the necessary number of soldiers, as well as reservists, who can support them in an emergency using the limited resources we have Create an army that is resolute, dedicated, well trained militarily and theoretically, modern, efficient and organized. This should be done without placing an excessive burden on the population.
The Ethiopian authorities also hope to cut costs by gathering information. "Intelligence and diplomacy should warn the country in advance of a threat," the report says.
Ethiopia, with a population approaching 70 million, traditionally has a large military, which spends a significant part of its available funds on the maintenance of which the peak of the military budget was reached under the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam Eritrea in (1998-2000) they increased again, approaching 13 percent of GDP As Prime Minister Meles Zenawi admitted at that time, Ethiopia spent a million dollars on the army every day Already in the first post-war budget, the share of military spending was cut by almost a third Three years later, After the war, the situation in the country remains difficult The demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which caused a bloody confrontation, has been postponed indefinitely The bilateral border commission was created after the end of active hostilities that claimed the lives of 70 thousand people. Both countries pledged to abide by its decisions But things have not progressed further Ethiopian-Eritrean relations have not improved to date The border is closed The sides exchange hostile attacks UN units are stationed in the buffer zone to monitor compliance with the truce Demarcation of the border would be an important step towards the final establishment of peace between two neighboring states.
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There was an amazing war in world history, which, according to the Marxist-Leninist theory, simply could not happen. The fact is that in 1977-78 the countries that officially chose the path of "scientific socialism" fought among themselves. And almost exclusively "socialist" countries also acted as allies and sponsors of the belligerents. With all their will, the ideologists of the Central Committee of the CPSU failed to blame such a war on the "aggressive nature of imperialism." Therefore, it was quickly "written off to the archive." Due to the prescription of years and the remoteness of the region from Russia, this war is still rarely mentioned.
Meanwhile, for many people living in the territory former USSR, despite the past years, the names of Adiss Ababa and Awassa, Barentu and Gonder, Debre Zeit and Jijiga, Diredava and Kembolcha, Nokra and Harar, the numbers of military units 44708 and 90245, the call signs of communication centers "Reed" and "Carat". This publication will remind you of how events actually unfolded in the distant and forgotten war.
FOREWORD
In terms of its geographic scope, the forces and means involved, the conflict deserves the name of "total socialist war." 9 “socialist” states participated in it to one degree or another: Somalia, Ethiopia, the USSR, Cuba, South Yemen, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, North Korea and China.
How did this war break out in distant Africa?
Its causes should be sought in the clash of interests of the African "socialist" princelings. It is no secret that politicians in African countries appealed to Marx and Lenin only to pave the way for personal enrichment and to get help from the countries of the communist bloc in the fight against internal and external enemies. Classic example Somali military dictator Mohammed Siad Barre and Ethiopian military dictator Mengystu Haile Mariam presented such an attitude towards Marxism.
Major Mengystu was a member of a group of Ethiopian army officers who were dissatisfied with slow promotions and low salaries. He took an active part in the coup, as a result of which the military overthrew the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. Power passed into the hands of a committee called the Derg, in which Mengystu played a prominent role. Soon strife broke out within the Derg, and three months later, Mengystu staged another coup, putting him at the head of the power structure. The Americans did not really like such abrupt moves of the dictator and they cautiously made contact with the major. Moreover, they didn't promise him anything. Mengystu, don't be a fool, announced the path of "socialist" construction in Ethiopia and was immediately received with open arms in the USSR and Cuba.
The Somali General Mohammed Siad Bare acted in a similar way during the seizure of power in 1969. Declaring himself a follower of "scientific socialism", he obtained large-scale assistance from the USSR. Just in 1974, the USSR and Somalia signed an agreement on friendship and cooperation. Several thousand Soviet and Cuban specialists and a lot of military equipment were sent to Somalia. In response, the USSR was able to build for itself a number of facilities in the Somali port of Berbera, including a military airfield, communications and electronic intelligence centers.
Meanwhile, in Ethiopia in 1976, Mengystu launched the "Red Terror", and among the thousands of his victims, most of the people who sincerely considered themselves Marxists. But the repressions did not bypass either the representatives of the former aristocracy, or the clergy, or the leaders of the tribes. The Soviet Union, turning a blind eye to the brutal extermination of "Marxists", supported the regime of "scientific socialism" in Ethiopia, at the decisive moment refusing to help exactly the same regime of "scientific socialism" in neighboring Somalia. After all, Ethiopia, for many strategic reasons, looked more preferable in the eyes of Moscow than Somalia: its population was 9 times higher than the Somali one, Ethiopia had two convenient ports on the Red Sea. True, Ethiopia waged a long-term war with the separatists in the province of Eritrea (moreover, the separatists received assistance from the USSR during the “imperial” period!) And periodically fought with Somalia for the Ogaden desert (Harerge province), but these moments were considered insignificant, “working”.
On February 3, 1977, Mengystu Haile Mariam shot down the remaining comrades-in-arms in the Derg and single-handedly led the country's leadership. The very next day after carnage he received a congratulatory telegram from the leader of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro. Then, in February 1977, Cuban generals, led by Arnoldo Ochoa, first appeared in Ethiopia, who arrived from Angola to study the situation and determine measures to increase the combat capability of the Ethiopian army, which could not cope with the partisans in Eritrea. March 14, 1977 Fidel Castro arrives in Ethiopia. In close circle with Mengystu and his associates, he discusses the differences between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia. It was after this meeting that Ethiopia received the full support of Cuba, and, at the suggestion of Cuba, the Soviet Union. It was decided to create a "socialist" federation uniting Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and South Yemen.
However, Mohammed Siad Barre did not want to participate in this event. The Somali dictator was a hardened kalach who understood perfectly well that only one would remain in power in the "federation". Therefore, instead of a “federation”, he decided to chop off the Ogaden region from Ethiopia, which was still weak, where tribes of Somali origin lived, and, thereby, partially realize the long-cherished idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a “Great Somalia”. General Mohammed Siad Bare planned to defeat the Ethiopian army in two or three months, believing that no one was able to help Ethiopia in such a short time. This was not the first clash between the two countries over the disputed territory. The previous armed clash between them took place in 1964. Then the Ethiopian army equipped by the Americans prevailed over the Somali.
Ethiopia received from the United States from 1953 to 1974 only $35 million in economic aid and $2,786 million in military aid.
Deliveries of weapons to Ethiopia from the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR began in May-June 1977. Soviet specialists and advisers are sent to Ethiopia on the basis of the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1823 of August 13, 1977. Lieutenant General P. Chaplygin, deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, is appointed chief military adviser.
The fact that the General of the Airborne Forces was appointed as the chief military adviser was reflected in the nomenclature of arms supplies to Ethiopia. In particular, Ethiopia became one of the few countries where airborne self-propelled guns were supplied.ASU-57and airborne combat vehiclesbmd.
HOW THE WAR STARTED
Today it is not uncommon when, impudently, in front of eyewitnesses of events, they try to replace conjectures beneficial to certain circles real story. The calculation is made on the fact that sooner or later the eyewitnesses will die, and the false version will remain the only one and will receive full legitimacy. War 1977-78 in the Ogaden, one of those events real facts which are hidden under layers of misinformation and lies. With Soviet side"Export" myths about this war were composed by the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and inside the country this topic was simply closed and the documents were hidden in secret folders of archives.
In Western countries, the version of the supposedly “national liberation war” of the peoples of Ogaden has become almost official. Now, in Western encyclopedias and reference books, the invasion of armed detachments of the Western Somali Liberation Front (SFLF, English abbreviation WSLF) from Somalia into the Ogaden is considered the beginning of the war.
This is not entirely true. Or rather, not at all. With the same success it can be said that every year from the territory of Pakistan there is an "invasion" of the Pashtun tribes into Afghanistan, as well as the opposite effect - the Pashtuns annually "invade" from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
In fact, the "war" was opened by the Western media in June 1977, after Ethiopia closed the consulates of the United States and other Western states in Asmara on April 23. An American military mission was expelled from the country, their military base. The military attaches of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and Egypt were asked to leave Ethiopia.
The geopolitical struggle between the USSR and the USA did not allow the Americans to ignore this fact. Therefore, the Western press, radio, television suddenly began to write, talk and show a lot of news on one topic - about the WSLF. It was broadcast to the whole world what a powerful organization it was, how freedom-loving, what noble tasks it had, and how it was successfully fighting the communist dictator Mengystu, striving to unite the long-suffering Somali people. That is, the preparation of the war began, according to the scenario, with the processing of public opinion.
However, this propaganda action also had a main addressee - Mohammed Siad Barre. And the addressee fully understood the meaning of the message. Just in case, for complete clarity, the President of the United States of America, Mr. Jimmy Carter, on July 15, 1977, in his planned routine speech after the usual passages about human rights, suddenly announced that the United States was ready to provide military and political support to Somalia. Having received carte blanche from the United States, Mohammed Siad Barre gave the necessary order and already on July 23, 1977 at 6 o'clock local time, the regular army of Somalia invaded Ethiopia. The war for the Ogaden has begun.
Armed Forces of Somalia
In 1977, the Somali army (SNA - Somalia National Armies) numbered about 35,000 people, had up to 200 tanksT-34, 50 tanks T-54/55 , 60 BTR-40 and 250 BTR-152, more than 100 76-mm guns, up to 80 anti-tank guns D-48, 80 122 mm howitzers, about 60 130 mm cannons, more than a hundred 120 mm mortars, about 150 anti-aircraft guns up to 100 mm caliber. The Air Force consisted of approximately 66 aircraft: 10 bombers IL-28, 12 fighters MiG-21, 44 fighters MiG-17 and MiG-15. The officer corps was mainly trained in the USSR, including 1169 people who graduated from the universities of the Ground Forces, 510 people from the Air Defense Forces, 590 people from the Air Force, 450 people from the Navy, 80 people from the rear, and 267 people from other universities. From 1964 to 1977 3911 people visited Somalia through the USSR Ministry of Defense, including 12 generals, 2419 officers, 123 warrant officers, 405 sergeants and soldiers, and 952 workers and employees of the SA and Navy. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the largest formation in the Somali army was a battalion (infantry, mechanized or tank). Since the beginning of the war, 27 infantry and mechanized brigades were formed, each of which included 2-4 battalions, an artillery battery or division, an anti-tank battery, support and maintenance units, with a total strength of 1200-2000 people.
The invasion force numbered up to 23,000 men. They had about 150 tanksT-34 and about 50 T-54/55, up to 250 armored personnel carriers ( BTR-50PK, BTR-152, BTR-60PB), up to 250 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by about 40 aircraftMiG-17 and MiG-21. In addition to the regular Somali troops, up to 15,000 people were active in the Ogaden in the irregular armed formations of the FOZS, which did not represent a real combat force.
Ethiopian Armed Forces
The Ethiopian army as a whole consisted of about 47,000 troops, the core of the ground forces was represented by the 2nd and 3rd infantry divisions. Most of the combat-ready units were in Eritrea, where there were battles with the separatists. The troops in the province of Hararge (later merged into the Eastern Front) consisted of a small force of the 3rd Infantry Division and detached units totaling a little over 10,000 men, supported by 45 tanks. M41 and M47, 48 field artillery pieces and a total of 10 anti-aircraft artillery pieces. During the fighting, two companies of tanks were additionally introduced into the battle. M41 and company M47, mechanized battalion (on M113), division of self-propelled artillery (battery М109А2, battery M114, battery M101). Cuban troops, whose number in Ethiopia by the summer of 1977 was about 1,200 people, did not participate in the battles until September. The officers and sergeants of the Ethiopian army suffered greatly during the period of repression of 1974-77. Many of the professional military fled to Europe just through Somalia, incidentally reporting to Somali intelligence about the extremely deplorable state of the armed forces of the once formidable neighbor.
THEATER OF WAR
Ethiopia is the oldest independent state in Africa. Its name comes from Greek word"Aityopia", meaning "country of people with burnt faces". This legendary land was formerly called Abyssinia.
The southeastern part of Ethiopia is a section of the Ethiopian Highlands, where the administrative regions of Sidamo, Arsi, Bale and Harerge are located. The eastern side of the Great Rift Zone is a clear boundary of this territory, and its southern and eastern edges are located on the territory of the neighboring states of Kenya and Somalia. There are both deep canyons and mountain ranges that fringe the Great Rift Zone.
The southeastern part of the Ethiopian Highlands has a general slope towards the southeast, passing into the Ogaden Desert. River flow here is directed to the Indian Ocean. The largest rivers in this part of the country are the Wabi-Shebelle and the tributaries of the main water artery of western Somalia. Jubba. Along with permanent streams, there are also numerous short rivers and streams that fill with water only during the rainy season, when loose sediments are washed away. Since the meandering beds of permanent rivers receive additional nourishment during such periods, vast areas are flooded.
In the southeastern part of the Ethiopian highlands, located in the zone of influence of the monsoons, two wet periods are clearly distinguished in the annual course of precipitation, separated by a dry summer season. The average annual rainfall here is 500–750 mm. In the Ogaden Desert, rainfall is reduced to 250 mm per year.
On the interior plains, the climate is hot (average daily temperature 27-35°C), with low rainfall. Sparse herbaceous vegetation is common here, and in the areas of Boran and Ogaden, acacia savannahs. On the plateau, the soils are red earth, stony, subject to erosion with the formation of dust storms. When vehicles move off-road, dust clouds in a calm period rise to a height of several hundred meters.
The main fighting area is divided into the Ahmara mountains, which are an endless alternation of deep valleys and mountain ranges, which make off-road movement extremely difficult, and a plateau starting from Jijigi and extending towards Hargeisa to the coast with a gradual decrease to sea level. The road Diredava, Harar, Jijiga, Hargeisa, along which key battles took place, most of the way passes through mountains and gorges, through passes and valleys. The valleys are often filled with remnants. Granite rocks, whimsically corroded by erosion, play the role of a kind of anti-tank gouges, at the same time giving shelter to the defenders. On the plateau (average height 1200-1500 m), the terrain, on the contrary, favors the attacker, offering room for maneuver and providing excellent visibility. In general, the plateau favors the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles in the dry period. During the rainy season, the movement of wheeled vehicles off the roads is practically excluded, and the movement of tracked vehicles is significantly hampered.
The population of Ethiopia is over 60 million people, but it is divided into more than 80 ethnic groups. Most of them belong to the Ethiopian race, which is intermediate between Caucasoid and Negroid. The main nationalities in the theater under consideration are the Hamit-speaking Oromo and Somali. The Oromo occupy the slopes of the mountains of the Akhmar Range and the highlands themselves, while the Somali occupy part of the highlands and desert regions. Both peoples partly lead a nomadic economy, not recognizing official state borders.
THE DEFEAT OF THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY
The Somali army was advancing in two groups: Northern and Southern. The small (two brigades) Southern group delivered an auxiliary strike in the areas of Dolo, Gode, and Imi. The main blow in the direction of Hargeisa, Jijiga, Harar, Diredava was delivered by the Northern Group.
Somali troops mainly squeezed out the Ethiopian units from their positions, bypassing strongholds and intercepting supply routes. The Somali commanders were not eager to storm the prepared defenses, relying more on the fire of tanks and artillery, and the maneuverability of mechanized units. This tactic is successful. Attempts to counterattack the Somali units in the open field led to heavy losses in the most combat-ready tank and mechanized units of the Ethiopian army.
Ethiopia urgently calls for about 100,000 people into the armed forces, forms several new brigades, divisions and two "revolutionary" armies. In recruiting the army, capturing deserters, and raising morale, the Kebele, local governments that arose in the period 1974-76 in all cities and towns of Ethiopia, played an important role. Women played a significant role in these kebelas. As a result, many women appeared in the brigades and divisions of the "revolutionary" formation. They often cemented battle formations with their presence, but in critical situations they could do little to help, since they had no military training.
The overwhelming majority of the rank and file and junior commanders of the "revolutionary" army of Ethiopia had the most primitive military knowledge. Moreover, in the rank and file of the army, there was often no desire to fight. The "revolutionary" units that arrived at the front sometimes scattered at the first collision with the enemy.
At the same time, the high personal fighting qualities of the Ethiopian soldier are beyond doubt: he is brave, hardy, stubborn in battle, endures the hardships and hardships of war. The low combat effectiveness of the units and units of the Ethiopian army in the first half of the war was due solely to organizational failures, the absence of a normal sergeant corps, bad officers, and poor combat coordination of units and units.
Soviet advisor:
“The Ethiopian army made a depressing impression. The officers were not accustomed to the conduct of hostilities, and their role was incomprehensible. For them to climb to the front line ... No, no, what are you ... The division commander did not appear at the front for ten days at all. There were no combat maps. We went to the front line at night. Trenches - none. The tent is standing, the fire is smoking, some kind of brew is gurgling. And what? They, when they saw the Somali tanks, just fled. And when the artillery beat off the attack, they returned. 12 thousand people held a front of one and a half kilometers!
The Ethiopians did not bother themselves with combat training: but, they say, the war will begin, then we will do it. They would have fought for another hundred years if it weren’t for us... After firing, the weapons must be cleaned and the equipment inspected. No-no. From morning to evening - music, dancing. For two days they explained to the division commander what combat readiness was... Our motorized rifle battalion would have scattered the Somalis in a week... And their war was going according to schedule. Let's say, at five o'clock in the evening, artillery fire begins, then one of the sides, if it wants, "advances." And already at 6 pm all war ceased.
Having met the demands of Soviet and Cuban advisers, the Ethiopian leadership decides to seriously train troops. In the huge Tatek military camp near the capital Addis Ababa, five divisions are being formed, which are armed with Soviet equipment, and the training of units begins according to Soviet requirements. However, the reorganization of the army takes time, and the situation at the front is deteriorating.
The Somalis, with the help of several mechanized brigades, besieged the important administrative and military center of the city of Jijiga and, after several days of fighting, captured it on September 13. A further offensive develops along the roads to the passes through the mountain ranges. In mid-September, with a sudden attack to the north, the Somalis captured the city of Aisha and thereby cut off the only railway along which goods arrived from the port of Djibouti.
On September 29, the key Marda pass on the Jijiga-Harar road passed under the control of Somali units. In October, Harar itself, the capital of the province of Harerge, was under siege. North of Harar, Somali tanks broke through to the outskirts of Diredawa (a large military and rear base), but were driven back by desperate counterattacks to mountain range. For the first time, Cuban military personnel participated in this battle. The beginning of the rainy season sharply reduced the offensive capabilities of the Somalis and the situation temporarily stabilized.
In early September 1977, Siad Barre decided on an extraordinary visit to Moscow. He tried to achieve at least a neutral attitude of the USSR to his action in the Ogaden. But most importantly, he needed Soviet military supplies. Negotiations on this topic with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko and the party ideologist M. A. Suslov did not lead to anything. Barre returned to Somalia empty-handed without any commitment from the USSR.
By the beginning of October 1977, Somali troops controlled up to 90% of the territory of the Ogaden (about 320,000 sq. Km). From November 17 to 24, 1977, the Somalis launched an assault on Harar, which was hardly repulsed by Ethiopian units with the help of advisers from the USSR and Cuba. The Ethiopians fought unsteadily, many units were a rabble of downtrodden soldiers and weak-willed officers. Self-mutilators appeared in large numbers, shooting themselves in the arm or leg. The few units of the "old" imperial army were well trained, but suffered serious losses in previous battles. Not a single Ethiopian infantry brigade could withstand close combat.
Therefore, several settings BM-21 "Grad" and a couple of artillery batteries under the control of Soviet and Cuban specialists were, in fact, at that time the only real opponents of the Somali army. In addition, the air superiority of the Ethiopian (actually Cuban) aircraft had a great influence on the course of the war.
In the conditions of the rainy period and the dominance of Ethiopian aviation, the life of the Somalis was greatly complicated by the increased shoulder for the transport of property and ammunition: about 200 km from the Borama transshipment point and up to 300 km from the main rear base of the northern Hargeisa group. Moreover, almost all transportation was carried out by road. The military transport aviation of Somalia, in the amount of several light aircraft, did not play any significant role in the supply.
Big problems arose for the Somalis with the evacuation and repair of weapons and military equipment, especially tanks and heavy field artillery guns. Troop repair facilities, at the very least, coped only with simple current repairs. To restore engines and weapons, tanks had to be evacuated several hundred kilometers to Mogadishu. And there were only a few heavy transporters in the Somali army.
The small accumulated stocks of ammunition did not allow the Somalis to organize powerful artillery preparation, so the shelling of the Ethiopian fortifications usually came down to a dozen shells and mines. Great happiness for the Ethiopian army was the unintentional delay of the USSR with supplies BM-21 and ammunition for them in the Somali army. As a result, this batch of weapons ended up in Ethiopia and was of great benefit in defeating the Somali enemy.
In the battles of the first stage of the war, Soviet tanks performed well. T-54/55, which surpassed the American M41 and M47 Ethiopian army in all respects: firepower, security, mobility and reliability. For example, despite the relatively poor training of crews, Somali tankers destroyed at least 9 M41 and 14 M47 during the capture of Jijiga, and the total losses of Ethiopians in tanks by October 1977 amounted to about 50 units.
The use of tanks by the Ethiopian side basically follows the African tradition: tanks fire from a place from sheltered positions and retreat into the depths, falling under the fire of anti-tank weapons. In an offensive or counterattack, tanks move behind the infantry, supporting it with fire from short stops and from a standstill. The interaction of tanks with artillery and infantry is limited to the simplest tasks at the level of small units. The coordinated actions of tanks, infantry and artillery at the battalion and, even more so, the brigade level represent an insoluble problem for both sides.
Several Somali armored and mechanized battalions that managed to get through full course combat coordination under the guidance of Soviet advisers look very advantageous against this background. It was these battalions that crushed the Ethiopian army in several battles, demonstrating the ability to advance after the explosions of artillery shells, attack on the flank and rear, repel counterattacks with destructive fire from a place, bypass resistance nodes, disrupt supply routes and communication lines, smash the rear and headquarters. However, the losses incurred in these battles, as well as the distance from the rear and repair bases, sharply reduced the combat capabilities of the best units of the Somali army.
In November-December, both sides do not show combat activity familiar to Soviet officers. Often the leading edge of the parties is out of sight of each other, and sometimes out of reach of heavy infantry weapons. Under such conditions, artillery fire also becomes ineffective, since it is carried out over areas with a low consumption of ammunition.
By the end of 1977, the front line has an extremely dangerous outline for the Ethiopians, covering the city of Harar in a semicircle, passing near Diredav, intercepting the railway to Aisha. The Somali side has the initiative, the Somali command can choose several options for further offensive, and all of them threaten to defeat large groupings of Ethiopian troops.
MASSIVE AID TO ETHIOPIA
On November 13, 1977, Siad Barre announced the denunciation of the treaty with the USSR. All Soviet citizens had to leave the country within a week. Electricity and water were cut off in the houses of Soviet advisers, and the village itself was cordoned off by soldiers. But warships of the Pacific Fleet entered the Somali port of Berbera. Marines landed on the shore and our people were evacuated under their cover. On November 20, the large landing ship of the Pacific Fleet "50 years of patronage of the Komsomol" entered the port of the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu. Part of the Soviet military advisers returned to the USSR, and some immediately ended up on the other side of the front line - in Ethiopia.
In November, a Soviet task force is sent to Ethiopia. The group is headed by First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army Vasily Ivanovich Petrov. It included Major General Golitsyn, Lieutenant General of Aviation Dolnikov, and other generals and officers. Former military advisers in Mogadishu report on the state of the Somali army: Major General Barisov, Major General Kryukov, Lieutenant Colonel Filatov, Lieutenant Colonel Nezhinsky.
Cuban officer:
Russian advisers for Ethiopians are like Martians. Firstly, they are "faranji" (whites), and secondly, they live almost under communism. We Cubans are another matter: there are many mulattos among us, there are blacks. In addition, quite recently we lived in the same filth and hopelessness, just like the Ethiopians. Therefore, we can easily understand each other.
When the Soviet leadership finally decided on massive aid to Ethiopia, the Soviet military machine got involved. The possibilities of the USSR to participate in conflicts in remote regions increased many times over the 1960s and 70s. This was facilitated by an increase in the number of military transport aviation, the navy in general and the navy in particular, and the strengthening of expeditionary forces in the form of airborne and marine infantry formations. Some of the new capabilities of the USSR demonstrated in 1968 during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But the real demonstration of the new qualities of Soviet military power, which surprised the whole world, was the supply of weapons to Ethiopia.
In the last three months of 1977 alone, about 50 Soviet ships passed through the Suez Canal on their way to the port of Asseb. In the Mediterranean, as well as in the Red Sea, they were accompanied by ships of the Soviet Navy up to the port of destination. Soviet ships delivered numerous military supplies, including fighter jets, tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft missile systems and ammunition, totaling approximately 60,000 tons.
In connection with the threat of the fall of Harar and the defeat of the Ethiopian army, on November 25, the air bridge of the USSR - Ethiopia (Operation Barracuda) begins to work. Over 200 military transport aircraft are delivering planes, helicopters, artillery, armored vehicles and ammunition in a continuous stream. Only during the first day of the operation, Soviet transport aviation delivered weapons and equipment to fully equip three motorized infantry divisions.
During the three weeks of the "air bridge", among other things, 48 fighters were delivered MiG-21bis and reconnaissance aircraft MiG-21R, 10 transport helicopters Mi-6, 6 combat helicopters Mi-24 and presumably 18 transport-combat helicopters Mi-8.
In total, the Ethiopian ground forces in a relatively short time received up to 600 tanks (mostly T-55, as well as 120 T-62), about 300 units of light armored vehicles ( ASU-57, bmd, BMP-1 and BRDM-2), up to 400 field artillery guns and MLRS. The total cost of the supplied weapons and military equipment was estimated at about 1 billion US dollars.
Soviet specialist
In 1976, our unit in the PribVO received tanks T-64A. Former tanks T-62 they remained in the regiment for a long time, they stood in open areas in the park of combat vehicles. In the spring of 1977, one battalion was transferred T-62 representatives of SAVO, then in the summer another battalion. In mid-November 1977, an order was suddenly received to urgently prepare a complete set of a tank battalion for shipment. T-62. From the armored warehouses of the army and the district, they instantly issued all the necessary spare parts, spare parts kits. Immediately they began to form a group to accompany the equipment. They said that the group should transfer the equipment to Bulgaria, and the delivery would be by sea with loading in Baltiysk and unloading in Varna. I, among about 50 more officers and warrant officers gathered from the entire division, fell into this "escort group".
Of course, we suspected that something was being hidden from us. Firstly, why sail around all of Europe to Bulgaria, if railway shorter and faster? Secondly, we were ordered to take personal belongings for a month, and sail to Varna for several days. Finally, a full set of ammunition in tanks and on cars, full refueling of fuel and lubricants in tanks and tankers aroused suspicion. What, in Bulgaria diesel fuel is over? On the other hand, the battalion was not equipped with crews, accompanied by less than fifty people. In general, we were perplexed.
In a couple of nights, the tanks were delivered by trailers from the regiment to Baltiysk, where we boarded the ship and put to sea on December 2. The tanks were fixed in the holds, the cars - on the decks under the tarpaulin. One hold was filled with boxes of ammunition for riflemen and artillery. We were placed in cabins for 8-12 people. At sea, they announced that we were going to Ethiopia, where we would transfer equipment to the local military. Ten days went to the port of Assab. After Gibraltar, the ship was continuously accompanied by ships of the Soviet Navy. On the way, we mostly slept off, played preference, sunbathed in the Mediterranean Sea. During the passage of the straits and the Suez Canal, access to the deck was prohibited. On the night of December 12-13, they unloaded at the port of Assab. It turned out here that the equipment should be handed over to the Cubans in the Diredava region, and then we remain with the Cuban units as "technical specialists" until further notice. The tanks were driven on trailers to the town of Urso near Diredava, where a camp was set up on the outskirts.
On December 18-20, about 500 Cuban military personnel arrived on planes from Angola, including the personnel of a tank battalion, which, under our leadership, began to develop T-62. The Cubans turned out to be literate guys, and already on December 28, the first Cuban battalion in history on T-62 was ready for combat use. At the beginning of January, most of our group left for the USSR, 11 Soviet tankmen were left in the Cuban brigade and two translators were given to us.
I note that when sending from the USSR, the only document that we received was travel orders indicating the number of the order of the commander in chief ground forces and the numbers of the military unit to which we were seconded. Foreign passports were not issued to us, neither people nor equipment passed through customs and border control in Baltiysk. In Ethiopia, there were also no border and customs formalities. Upon our return, we handed in travel orders and in return, in addition to the usual travel orders in rubles, we received checkbooks in foreign currency, which we could “buy” in special stores. I remember that with this money I bought a miracle of Czech technology - the Java-350 motorcycle, which became the envy of other young officers, since it was impossible to buy it in ordinary stores.
Weapons and equipment for the Ethiopian army were also supplied by the GDR (trucks, field power plants, radio stations, medical equipment, spare parts for aircraft and tanks), Czechoslovakia (tanks T-34, small arms, medical equipment, artillery ammunition), South Yemen (tanks T-34, multiple launch rocket systems BM-21 "Grad" with calculations), North Korea (uniforms, equipment). Ethiopia also received assistance and support in people and finances from Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization and other structures.
In December, a squadron will be relocated to the Diredava airfield MiG-17F, squadron MiG-21bis, two scouts MiG-21R, detachment Mi-8 Cuban Air Force. Aerodrome technical support is carried out by Soviet specialists.
Later, three full-strength Cuban brigades are deployed on Soviet landing ships, dry cargo ships and aircraft from Angola and Cuba. One mechanized brigade (about 2,000 people) arrives from Yemen. Armored vehicles and ammunition continue to arrive on BDK and dry cargo ships from the USSR.
Soviet advisers and specialists
Officially, the number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia did not exceed 1,500 people. However, there is one catch here: this number included only those military personnel who were sent to Ethiopia through the main department of international military cooperation of the Ministry of Defense, with the delisting of units and the issuance of international passports. At the same time, a large number of Soviet military personnel were sent to Ethiopia “on a business trip” by orders of the Minister of Defense and the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, Navy) individually and in groups, without exclusion from the lists of units, and sometimes directly as part of units and parts.
For example, this is how the units of the Marine Corps of the Pacific Fleet appeared in Ethiopia in the PMTO on the island of Nokra (Dahlak archipelago), tankers and gunners in Harar and Areva, aviation technicians and air defense specialists in Diredava and Debre Zeit. According to some Western experts, there were up to 4,000 Soviet troops in Ethiopia, which is several times higher than the official figure of our advisers.
All military personnel who remained on the staff of their units were never included in the lists of “internationalist soldiers” and did not have any benefits, although some of them received injuries, diseases, and some of them died. This scheme was tested in Syria and Angola and, apparently, the Soviet leadership liked it. As a result, in some regiments of the Soviet army, several officers and ensigns were listed on a “long business trip”, occupying full-time positions. This was especially true aviation technicians, anti-aircraft gunners, artillerymen, anti-tankers, to a lesser extent - tankers and motorized riflemen. That is why foreign experts are surprised by our official figure of 1,500 Soviet advisers in Ethiopia.
PREPARATION FOR A COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Preparations for a counteroffensive begin. The command of the joint group is headed by the Cuban divisional general Arnoldo Ochoa. The headquarters of the group included about two dozen Ethiopian, Cuban, Soviet and Yemeni generals.
One of the main problems of the Ethiopian army was poor operational and tactical training, low staff culture, disgusting intelligence. The command did not know either the enemy forces, or the real state of their troops, or even the outline of the front line.
To clarify the situation, the USSR launches the Cosmos-964 optical-electronic reconnaissance satellite aimed at Ethiopia, deploys a radio reconnaissance platoon in the Harar region. Cubans carry out dozens of sorties of reconnaissance aircraft in the operational depth of the Somali troops. By order of General Petrov, Soviet advisers personally specify the outline of the front line and the position of troops on the ground. As a result of the work done at the headquarters, a real picture of the situation at the front is finally emerging.
By mid-January 1978, the Ethiopian troops on the Eastern Front had 26 brigades (infantry - 6, tank - 1, people's militia brigades - 13, proletarian brigades - 6), of which 5 were guarding communications, about 230 tanks, 180 guns and mortars, 42 launchers BM-21.
Contrary to our popular belief, General Ochoa really commanded the joint group, since the main striking force is 12,000 Cuban military personnel, 200 tanks (tank and two mechanized brigades), 40 front-line and army aviation was in his hands. Cuban formations and advisers were commanded by Brigadier Generals López Cubas, Leonardo Andoglio, Gustavo Chui and Rigoberto Garcia. The tank brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Leopoldo Sintra Frias.
Cuban Expeditionary Force
The Cuban leadership adhered to the policy of exporting the revolution almost from the moment the socialist state was formed on the island. The world-famous symbol of the revolution, Ernesto Che Guevara, was sent to Latin America just to organize the insurgency. Less well known is that as early as 1961, the Cubans were shipping weapons to Algiers.
With the growth of the military and economic power of the socialist camp by the 1970s of the last century, the Soviet Union significantly increased the ability to project military power to remote regions. The well-prepared, disciplined Cuban army (Revolutionary Armed Forces, RVS) perfectly suited the role of the shock detachment of socialism. African countries were the first to be targeted by this strategy. We emphasize that here Cuba had neither mercantile interest nor political gain. Moreover, the Soviet Union did not push Cuba to such actions, but, on the contrary, acted as a deterrent. But Fidel Castro was the last statesman in modern history - a convinced idealist. He really sent troops to Africa for the sake of the triumph of the ideas of socialism.
For example, from 1975 to 1988, a contingent of Cuban troops numbering several tens of thousands of fighters (up to 58,000 people) was in Angola. The Cuban units played a key role in the military defeat of the South African army, which fought on the territory of Angola. Ultimately, the Cuban victory led to the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the independence of Namibia. It was in Angola that the Cuban general Ochoa and his associates grew up as commanders.
Arnoldo Ochoa graduated from a military college in Cuba and the Soviet military academy. Frunze. He read fluently and spoke Russian fluently, although with a noticeable accent. In 1975, Ochoa was appointed commander of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola. In 1977 he was sent to Ethiopia to lead the Cuban units in that country. Everywhere the general shows himself brilliantly, demonstrating military talent and considerable courage. This style appealed to Soviet officers and generals, who considered him the best Cuban military leader.
General Ochoa personally led the fighting and liked to command on the front lines. He was very popular in the army and often took the initiative against the orders of the Cuban leadership, that is, he fought the war almost independently. His close ties with Soviet generals (primarily Petrov, Varennikov, Kulikov, and Dolinsky) became the subject of a special investigation that Castro assigned to Security Minister Abrantis.
After the announcement in the USSR of "perestroika" in the Cuban army, a showdown quietly began with generals and officers closely associated with the Soviet Union, who had tremendous authority in the army and among the people due to their military merits. The initiator of this campaign was Minister of War Raul Castro. By the way, they recalled General Ochoa's “frondism”: in the spring of 1989, he was convicted in Cuba on trumped-up charges and shot along with a group of associates. After the collapse of the USSR, the purge in the Cuban army continued on a selective basis. Even those officers who worked closely with Soviet advisers in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia fell under suspicion. Such persons fell under the surveillance of counterintelligence. Therefore, official and personal contacts between Cuban and Soviet officers were abruptly cut off in 1989.
According to expert estimates, about 400,000 Cubans passed through Angola alone, and experts estimate the total number of Cubans participating in foreign missions at 550-600 thousand. Including about 40,000 operated in Ethiopia at various times. In 1989, the Cuban government establishes the "Por la Victoria Cuba-Etiopia" medal, which is awarded to Cuban veterans of the Ogaden War. In 1993, an "association of fighters of the Cuban revolution" was created in Cuba, which unites about 350,000 people: from the revolutionaries of 1959 to the soldiers who fought in Angola and Ethiopia. In recent years, members of the association have been selectively allowed to publish memoirs. Several books on the war in Angola have already been published. Perhaps it will soon be the turn of Ethiopia.
During November-January, in Addis Ababa, Tekra, Diredava, Urso, Dedesa, with the help of Cuban and Soviet specialists, five infantry divisions, several separate tank and mechanized brigades, and artillery battalions complete their training.
Discipline requirements are getting tougher. Field tribunals pass death sentences on deserters and self-mutilators. Leaving positions without an order is considered treason. For example, on the personal order of Mengystu, the commander and political commissar of an infantry division were shot for unauthorized withdrawal. With the arrival at the front in mid-January 1978 of the first brigades that have completed a cycle of combat training, the combat effectiveness of the Ethiopian army increases markedly.
Soviet advisor:
“We immediately made them dig trenches. With a creak, but gone. In the evening you order to dig a trench, in the morning you come - nothing like that. He digs a tiny hole and sits. And their superiors, at least that. At first, the officers looked at us with distrust and even condescension! And how they shot! He hides his head like an ostrich, sticks out his rifle and fires anywhere. Then I cut off a long rod: I see someone shoots like that, as if I'd pull it on the ass! And I’ll still swear in Amharic.
In general, one of our first lessons was shooting. They took all the samples of small arms, cleaned them, shot them. They gathered their leadership and asked to put up an infantry squad. Ethiopians fired from M-16, the six of us are from the Kalashnikovs. And they all hit the first time. I squinted my eyes - the jaws of the Ethiopians drooped. Out of eleven people, only two of them were hit. The chief of staff immediately: “Teach our soldiers to shoot like that!” And there was a sea of weapons. Above the bed I always hung two machine guns, under - a box of grenades, a grenade launcher. And I carried with me TT- it was a good pistol, it sat in his hand much better than Makarov.
We also organized combat guards, reconnaissance, commandant service, forced to dig dugouts, trenches, firing positions. And now, as the Somali artillery began to strike, the soldiers immediately dived into them. You pass later, they smile: “No problem, comrade Viktor!” Still would! Before us, a hundred people were killed almost daily! And as the trenches were dug, in December - March, only four people died from shelling. They did a run-in with tanks. Officers first - no way! Forced. And then they liked it: 5-6 people jumped into the trench so that the tank would pass over them. Sometimes it was necessary to drive tanks instead of them. There are many such roads: on the one hand - a rock, on the other - an abyss. And somehow one tank hooted along with the troops. They were very afraid of such areas. Then I and two more of our tankers sat down at the levers and escorted the entire column in turn ... "
However, the Ethiopian military leadership places its main hope on the Cuban troops and Soviet specialists. It understood that in the Ethiopian units morale remained relatively low, and professional training- weak. However, formations such as the 3rd and 10th infantry divisions of the Ethiopian army gradually gained stamina and gained combat experience. They had already more or less learned how to conduct a defensive battle, they were instructed to hold independent sectors during the period of concentration of forces for the offensive. But the Cuban mechanized and tank brigades are becoming the main striking force.
Soviet advisor:
Cubans, in contrast to the small-holed Ethiopians, are serious disciplined fighters. Warriors. Therefore, they, as usual, "plugged holes" on the fronts, and always successfully (and not only in Ethiopia, remember also about Angola).
Soviet specialist:
The Cubans of "our" tank battalion were literate, but absolutely crazy guys. They shied away from dirty and hard work, such as digging tank trenches and shelters, they acted boldly, but recklessly, without assessing the situation, often at random. It turned out that most of the battalion was a fresh addition almost straight from Cuba, who had no Angolan experience. When, after arriving at the front, we began to dig our own shelter, the Cubans walked along and chuckled. Soon the battalion was covered by mortar fire right in the area of concentration. Although only a few 120-mm mines fell, their fragments shaved everything clean. In just three minutes, about a dozen corpses appeared in the battalion. This made a heavy impression on the Cubans and had a sobering effect. We, in the open ditch next to the tent, sat out safely. Since that day, all engineering work has been carried out by the Cubans with rigor and diligence.
Having honestly handed over all the equipment to the Cubans, right down to the last bolt, we found that no one needs the fuck. After all, we were the only group of Soviet officers who worked in the Cuban troops! There was nothing else like it. Therefore, formally submitting to General Petrov, we actually did not receive any orders or instructions from anyone, acting at our own discretion and at the request of the Cuban command.
Although the Cubans treated us well, we had nothing to go for water or cigarettes. They had to feed in the field kitchen, and there were other inconveniences associated with the lack of their own "corner" and transport. We got tired of bowing to the Cubans every time. We quickly solved our problems after the first battle with the Somalis. They repaired those abandoned by the Somalis BTR-50PK and ZIL-157 with kung. A little later, they removed the air conditioner from the broken car and adapted it into an armored personnel carrier, which turned into our “headquarters”. By the end of the trip, our group acquired equipment, having acquired an Italian light truck and a Japanese jeep.
Small scarce spare parts were carried in the kunga, as well as a supply of food and an Ethiopian cook from Jijiga who had fled from the Somalis, who perfectly cooked any dishes on a trophy camping stove. This cook remained with us after the liberation of the city, until our departure, having fed us a final dinner, the likes of which I have not tasted in the most luxurious restaurants. As a keepsake, we left him a Toyota jeep and a kung to boot.
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
On January 8, 1978, an air operation began to isolate the Harar combat area, fire on the rear bases, artillery and armored vehicles of the Somalis. Cuban pilots MiG-17F and MiG-21bis demonstrate the good effectiveness of attacks on manpower and transport columns of the Somalis.
The Somalis are trying to seize the initiative on the ground and on January 22, with the help of several infantry brigades with the support of tanks and artillery, they begin the second assault on Harar. Fierce fighting broke out around the city at the turn of the heights. The Somali troops delivered the main blow from the Kembolcha region to Haramay in order to cut the only road that supplied supplies to Harar. However, the Ethiopian and Cuban units managed to stop the enemy near the highway linking Harar with Diredava. An artillery battalion of 152-mm howitzers and a battery played an important role in repelling the offensive. BM-21 "Grad".
Soviet specialist
For Cubans, we played the role of a lifesaver for all occasions. Cuban officers are well aware of the tactics within their position, they know how to work with people, but they are poorly versed in technology and, in general, in everything that goes beyond their official duties. For example, a battalion commander has a very vague idea of the capabilities of artillery and aviation, does not know at all the methods of firing a unit at long ranges, is not familiar with the volume and frequency of maintenance, and so on. When a Soviet tanker predicts the duration of an artillery barrage that has begun, then climbs into the tank and adjusts the drive mechanism for ejection of spent cartridges himself, immediately warns of the need to tighten the tracks, the Cuban battalion commander's eyes become square. The commander and chief of staff of the brigade are more calm about such "tricks", they studied at academic courses in the USSR and "Russian" tankers are not a novelty for them.
We were distributed in groups of 3-4 people in battalions, some of the senior officers remained at the brigade headquarters. While the brigade was operating as a whole, we got together every evening, exchanged opinions, had dinner, sang songs. The custom included a double meal: in the morning and in the evening. During the day, we ate what we had to, on the go. They especially carefully monitored the purity of the water, since any nasty things in Ethiopia were beyond measure. Seeing in Diredava a patient with amoebic dysentery, since then I have been disinfecting water all my life by any available means.
On January 24, 1978, a joint grouping of 35 brigades (270 tanks, including 120 T-62), with the support of 46 front-line aviation aircraft and 162 guns, launches an offensive against Somali troops (25 brigades, 135 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 270 PA guns) from positions south of Harar. In this area, the offensive is developing slowly, at a rate of 2-3 kilometers per day.
On February 2, three infantry, mechanized and tank brigades from the Urso-Diredava region in the direction of Areva go on the offensive on the flank of the Somali grouping. An armored ram of 120 tanks is heading the offensive T-62 Cuban tank brigade. At the same time, on the supply route in the rear of the Somali group, an assault force of about a company is landed by helicopters, with severalbmd and BRDM. The suddenness of the action, backed up by a crushing tank strike and strong fire support from the air, led to the defeat of the Somali group in just two days. Only in this direction, the Somalis lost over 1 thousand people, 42 tanks, more than 50 artillery pieces. In total, in the battles near Harar, the Somalis lost about 4,000 people killed, wounded and captured, 57 tanks. The main striking force of the advancing troops consisted of two mechanized and tank brigade of the Cuban army, which led to a quick success.
Soviet specialist
In the early morning of February 2, 1977, in the Areva area, he went on a tank attack for the first time, asking for a gunner's position in the company commander's crew. Outwardly, everything looked like in the exercises: deployment in pre-battle formations, then into the battle line, pillars of artillery bursts in front of the advancing tanks. The difference was that in the sight I observed flashes of anti-tank guns and buried enemy tanks. During the attack, the enemy gunners covered the tanks with barrage fire, from which we quickly emerged without losses.
It rained heavily at night, so the explosions of shells and tank tracks did not raise dust, but visibility was average. Vapors rising from the ground strongly interfered. In the sight, everything was distorted and floated. They opened fire on the move at flashes of anti-tank rounds with high-explosive fragmentation shells with the cap removed, the firing range was about one and a half kilometers. The well-camouflaged guns were almost invisible at first, but after a few shots, the camouflage fell off them, powder gases knocked out clearly visible spots on the ground near the muzzle brake. The tanks switched to rapid fire and in a few minutes crushed all anti-tank artillery.
When the tanks approached the trenches at three or four hundred meters, the Somali infantry ran to the rear. The tanks did not pursue her, they stood in front of the trenches in anticipation of their infantry, which was on BTR-60 far behind. The Cubans did this on purpose in order to call artillery fire on the tanks from closed firing positions, then destroy the artillery with air strikes and then launch the infantry. Everything worked out as intended. There were no losses in the brigade, the tanks worked perfectly. But the outdoor equipment was badly cut by fragments of 130-mm shells. There were practically no whole boxes of spare parts left, many Luna searchlights were broken, several machine guns were broken DShK. Some crews did not remove replenishment oil tanks before the attack; according to the law of meanness, they were also pierced. “My” company commander cursed about this in Spanish and in Russian, while the word “mierda” was the mildest expression.
Unable to withstand the blow, on the morning of February 3, the Somalis hastily retreat in the direction of Jijiga, where they had prepared defensive positions in advance. The retreat of the Somali army to a depth of about 50 km is not very organized. A lot of abandoned equipment remains on the roads, significant difficulties arise with the supply of fuel and food to the troops. In addition, Ethiopian aviation dominates the air, from time to time inflicting sensitive blows on troop columns. On February 5, under the threat of coverage, the Somalis leave Aisha without a fight, and already on February 9, the first echelon with cargo comes from Djibouti to Adiss Ababa.
In the first offensive battles, tanks proved their superiority T-62, which ensured a breakthrough of the defense near Harar, destroying at least 15 tanks. The main anti-tank gun of the Somali army D-48 turned out to be ineffective against Soviet tanks. hit the tanks T-54/55 and T-62 she could only board. Four battalions T-62 tank brigade on favorable terrain were used as a shock fist. Using the advantage in weapons, T-62 destroyed Somali tanks and artillery at ranges over 1500 meters, remaining virtually invulnerable. However, the defeat of dug-in infantry and sheltered firing points required an increased consumption of high-explosive fragmentation ammunition. The effectiveness of fire on such targets was lower than expected.
Cuban officer:
tanks T-62- the most powerful weapon in this war. I would say that this is generally the most useful weapon of the ground forces. Their role here and now is even greater than the cavalry of our ancestors. Without these tanks, we would be stuck here for several years, like in Angola.
Note
Soviet advisor: retired colonel K., graduated from the Kharkov Guards Tank School, the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 1977 - major, chief of staff of the regiment in SAVO. From December 1977 to December 1979 - Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Mechanized Brigade of the Ethiopian Army.
Soviet specialist: reserve colonel M., graduated from the Kazan Higher Tank School, the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 1977 - lieutenant, platoon commander. From December 1977 to March 1978 - a specialist at the Cuban tank brigade in Ethiopia.
Cuban officer: the statements of Cuban officers who fought as part of the Cuban tank brigade in January - March 1978 are given.
End of part 1
Amazing country, amazing people, amazing environment. The stubbornness and cruelty of Mengistu. We must cut unnecessary costs. The country finally got rid of the usurper, but he left in the interests of the people.
In this country, I happened to solve the instructions of our leadership in 1989, i.e., already in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. That is, I run a little ahead in chronology, but I do it deliberately so that different, but similar sections of my service and life are arranged in one book.
I note in passing that I had to go to the fronts in different countries peace. There were, of course, many ordinary trips with official visits, but these trips were carried out only with the aim of maintaining good relations, clarifying some outstanding issues, making certain proposals, etc. Such trips were not associated with the solution of particularly important and major military-political problems and even more risk.
Ethiopia is a country that took its place in my mind back in the 30s, as, obviously, every one of my peers, because the people of Ethiopia fought against the Italian invaders, defending their honor and independence, and we, of course, with all their hearts they were on the side of the fighting people. But then, that is, in 1935-1936, Italy, using an agreement with France, which gave freedom of action to Mussolini, and widely using tanks, aircraft and artillery, which, of course, the Ethiopians did not have, captured this country and created a colony Italian East Africa. It included Ethiopia itself, Eritrea and Italian Somalia. It should be noted that in the League of Nations the only country - the Soviet Union - came out for the suppression of aggression and the provision of assistance to the people of Ethiopia. And Great Britain, France and the United States supplied Italy with weapons and everything necessary for waging war. By the way, in this shameful war, Mussolini even used poison gases.
However, the people of Ethiopia did not submit - they waged a partisan struggle, and already at the beginning of 1941, the Ethiopians liberated their capital Addis Ababa, and by the end of this year they were generally driving the invaders out of the country. Ethiopia is embarking on a truly democratic path of development. In the early 1950s, in accordance with the decision of the UN General Assembly, Eritrea, a former colony of Italy, was also annexed to Ethiopia. By the way, the Eritrean issue has its roots.
At the end of the last century, Ethiopia, weakened by internecine strife, lost ports on the Red Sea and was forced to conclude an unequal treaty with Italy, according to which the northern part of Ethiopia with the city of Asmara also departed, and this area was called Eritrea, which became a colony of Italy. Since then, a spirit of separatism has continued to live among some of the population of Eritrea, although many decades have passed since the last Italian occupier and colonizer was expelled from these lands. In my opinion, this part of society would like Eritrea to exist on an equal footing with Ethiopia, although, of course, it could flourish in a single state with the latter, since its entire economy is connected with the economic objects of the center of Ethiopia.
It should be noted that the democratic development of Ethiopia has stepped so far that it was here in 1963 that the Conference of the Heads of Government of Independent States of Africa was held, at which the Organization of African Unity was established. And the headquarters of this organization is located in Addis Ababa.
In the early 70s, bad weather fell upon Ethiopia - drought, followed by famine, disease, etc. The Provisional Military Administrative Council (VV AC) came to power. Democratic reforms are being carried out, including nationalization. This aggravates the internal political situation - extremists and separatists of all stripes are raising their heads. And after that, Somalia suddenly attacks Ethiopia. It was a bolt from the blue. Apparently, our relevant service missed the preparation of this action. And first of all, this "blunder", in my opinion, is explained by the fact that both Somalia and Ethiopia were on our common list of friends, and the leaders of Somalia, primarily the head of state Barre, constantly and everywhere declared their eternal love for the Soviet Union.
The leaders of Somalia set themselves the goal of using the existing economic and socio-political difficulties inside Ethiopia to seize the western part of the land of their neighbor, which jutted into Somalia, with a short and decisive blow. This is approximately along the line: from Lake Abbe in the north, about 150 km southwest of the city of Djibouti, and to the Woib River - along its eastern shore to the city of Dolo in the south. At a minimum, they believed that it was necessary to recapture the Haud plateau along the line of the Fafen River, which then flows into the Webi Shebeli River. This area is valuable not only because of the fact that they are engaged in cattle breeding and agriculture, but also for its unexplored natural resources (there are signs of wealth). If we consider this area from the standpoint administrative division, then the aggression fell on the province of Ogaden.
The war began on 23 July 1977 with a sudden invasion by Somali troops. By December of the same year, they captured a significant territory of Ethiopia, advancing in different directions from 300 to 700 kilometers. In fact, they achieved the goal they set.
However, there were also deeper goals. As it turned out, the leadership of Somalia had the task of overthrowing the democratic government that was at that time in Ethiopia. The question arises - who was interested in this? Who and why needed the overthrow of the people's democratic government in Ethiopia in 1977? Certainly not the Soviet Union. We supported this government and all its transformations in the country in every possible way, just as we supported the authorities in Somalia. Maybe this war was required by Somalia? Of course not - to any state, if the leadership has normal statesmen, it is necessary to strengthen relations with neighbors to the level of friendship. Somalia's capture of the eastern wedge of Ethiopian territory and aggression were just a cover for the main goal - the overthrow of power in Addis Ababa. So who needs it? Of course, the United States, but carried out the plan, as always, the CIA. Could the American administration at that time have allowed the Soviet Union to become more and more "entrenched" in Africa? Of course not.
Jimmy Carter, having defeated his main rival D. Ford in December 1976 and becoming the President of the United States, promised the Americans to pull the country out of the maelstrom of political and psychological humiliation, which they fell into in connection with the Nixon Watergate and the shameful end of the savage war in Vietnam for the United States. Therefore, Carter's fuss about every foreign policy issue is quite understandable (albeit a lifeline, in the form of an input Soviet troops to Afghanistan, unwittingly presented to him by the Soviet Union, he could not fully use). Somalia has turned up. Of course, with his knowledge, the US Central Intelligence Agency began to forcefully implement the idea of strangling democracy in Africa at the hands of the democrats themselves. And they have had the corresponding tactics in service for many years (judging by Angola, Namibia, Morocco, Zaire, Congo, etc.). And now it would be possible to shine here, in Ethiopia.
Having received the president's blessing and already having great influence on the leader of Somalia (of that time) Barre, the American intelligence services, under the guise of training the Armed Forces of Somalia, are carrying out a series of effective measures that have made it possible to decisively stir up this "sleepy kingdom". Barre himself, greedy for everything that they give him, was not personally offended this time either.
Therefore, he zealously set about preparing for aggression. He went for it consciously and should have seen its possible consequences, including in relations with the Soviet Union. However, he also perfectly understood something else: if it came to a break with the USSR, then the latter simply would not be able to take with him everything that was set up by our specialists, our forces and, in fact, at our expense. Various industrial enterprises, residential areas, roads, defense facilities and much more. We have established diplomatic relations with this country since 1960, and from that time Soviet assistance also begins. And when in 1969 the President of Somalia A. Shermark was assassinated and the country was threatened by the transfer of power into the hands of the reaction, our assistance became even more effective. As you know, the progressive part of the officers of the Somali army, led by the commander of the army, General Barre, seized power. And then all power passed to the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Barre became President of the Council. The country's leadership has announced that the ideology of the socialist path will be the basis for the development of Somalia, and this has found our full support. However, Barre betrayed his people, which at that time was difficult to imagine. But the traitor turned out to be right in his calculations - the Soviet Union, having broken off relations with this country (although the people were not guilty of anything), could not compensate for the expenses that they had made in relation to Somalia. And they were huge. After all, we have built expensive strategic facilities such as an ultra-modern airfield with a runway for all types of aircraft (including those for the future) and a huge capacity, with all elements of comprehensive support and maintenance.
And personally, I don’t understand why our diplomats and our special services of that time missed the rebirth of Barre, and most importantly, didn’t notice the preparations for aggression? And why, from the moment of the first aggravation of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia (and by that time the Somali troops had already prepared for the attack), which was expressed in the territorial claims expressed by Barre against Ethiopia, why even at that time our government did not act categorically enough?
As a result, the aggression came true. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, of course, supported Ethiopia, rendered it all possible assistance and condemned the aggressor Somalia. Everything was done so that Ethiopia not only defended its borders, but also completely defeated all those Somali military units that invaded its territory.
Ethiopia during February and March 1978, with the help of the USSR and other socialist countries, defeated the aggressor and defended the integrity of its state. The young head of the interim military government of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam, was at his best. He has gained great prestige. The whole world was talking about him. He “took off”, but forgot to land in time, which in the end also cast a shadow on his name. Of course, no position can spoil an intelligent person, truly devoted to his people, a true patriot. However, alas, we, unfortunately, were dealing with a different person.
I think that I will be right if I say that our two main departments at that time - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB (which generally faded between 1985 and 2000) should have been more creative in their work. After all, it was about the fate of the people, and not just the individual. But a lot or even almost everything depends on him, so you need to work with him thoroughly, and not flirt. We must pay tribute to the American intelligence services in relation to the first persons in the states - Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Kuchma, Nazarbayev, Landsbergis and others - they worked and work masterfully. For example, the Americans, even in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, organized a “worthy environment” for Gorbachev in the person of Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. As for Landsbergis (Lithuania), back in 1990, he openly introduced American advisers to the staff of power structures, who did not advise, but demanded, dictated. Naturally, in a "civilized" form. And now they demand. They don't throw dollars into the wind. Only - under conditions. This is how Russia is dictated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and various sorros. The IMF promises to give another loan - a handout only if Yeltsin's reforms, that is, the pro-Western course, are continued. What kind of democracy are we talking about? This is ridiculous. Therefore, the Russian rulers can spread demagoguery as much as they like, but they are obliged to do whatever the American monster wants.
In the summer of 1998, I met with a close acquaintance (for certain reasons, I can only mention his name - Vladimir). He shared with me his impressions of his recent trip to the USA, where he was for the first time, but for a long time. Already at the very beginning of the conversation, he literally screamed: “What kind of democracy can we talk about if we are talking about the United States? There are no signs of her! The people have been told that they live in a democratic society. They ring about it all over the world. But there is no democracy there, and there cannot be under their system. Of course, Americans live much better at the expense of other peoples of the world. Their rulers will continue to strive to improve life in the United States, placing other countries in economic and political dependence. Now they will finish off Russia. Then - Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the former republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia, the Baltic states. But they also have an army of unemployed, homeless people, terrible crime. I am disappointed. They have the main thing in life - profit in any way. Abomination! Here - in this stinking swamp they are now pulling us too.
Naturally, I agreed with him, remembering my stay in the USA. According to my observations, the Americans do not have that high spirituality that is inherent in our people. Although in principle they do not have any spirituality at all. That is why the American way of life is not and will not be inculcated in us. In the United States, the ideology of individualism and the law of force dominate. And we are collectivists. Our Soviet spirit has found fertile ground in many countries of the world. And there began to emerge true democracy. This, of course, is contrary to the interests of the United States (more precisely, the ruling circles), especially their global plans for gaining world domination.
The stubbornness and cruelty of Mengistu
However, this is a topic for a separate discussion. Well, in the 1970s, the United States actively intervened in the affairs of young African states that had embarked on the path of democratic development, trying to bring them under its influence. But it is up to the people themselves how to build their future. However, one must be honest and speak frankly that at that time, undoubtedly, the people of Ethiopia needed not only material and spiritual assistance, but also purely organizational - in establishing the work of the state apparatus, in strengthening the economy and in general the internal policy of the state. Consequently, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB, and the government as a whole, had to urgently help the head of state Mengistu Haile Mariam. But at some stage things were lost here. And when Army General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov came to this country as the Chief Military Adviser (from 1978 to 1980), he plunged into the thick of the most difficult contradictions. Especially in the relationship between the central government of Ethiopia and the authorities of the province of Eritrea. The separatist forces of Eritrea, using the difficult situation of the country, which was due to the war with Somalia, decided to secede and create an independent state. Instead of showing wisdom, a certain tact and removing this negative politically, Mengistu decided to attack Eritrea with the forces of the Second Revolutionary Army, which was stationed in the north of the country in the Asmara region. However, the Eritreans were well prepared for such a development of events and foresaw such a difficult turn. The civil war began. It soon took on a protracted character. Instead of developing the country and improving the well-being of the people, the main forces and means went to war. Although V. I. Petrov did a lot for Ethiopia, as, obviously, representatives of other departments of the USSR (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc.), he could not stop the war. And Colonel-General Mikhail Alexandrovich Tyagunov, who later arrived here, actually continued the established course. Being a very diligent person, he also contributed to the construction of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. But he also did not extinguish the war. And it was impossible to do this without Mengistu. But it was not easy to persuade him to such a decision.
The situation worsened even more when Lieutenant General Denisov became our Chief Military Adviser. Not only was he in no way suitable for this military political and diplomatic work, he was also sick. Moreover, the disease was pronounced, which caused compassion among compatriots, and hostility among Ethiopians. Although Denisov was a man, of course, a good one. However, it was useless to expect that after my departure he would be able to implement the planned plan of action, all the more so one could not expect radical steps from him.
What kind of illness has overcome Denisov? In my opinion, it was some form of cerebral vascular sclerosis. Imagine this man under 50 years old, well-built in general, with a slight excess in weight, quite talkative and sociable, moderately mobile. But when we went somewhere and hardly sat down, he immediately fell asleep. He literally fell asleep, putting everyone else, including me, in an awkward position. When I got into this situation on the first day, I thought: “Probably the poor fellow was busy all night.” Indeed, this could not be ruled out. Therefore, until the end of that day, I tried to draw him into a lively conversation - in answering questions, etc., if only he would not fall asleep. Or I told him to do something else with the assistant while I had a conversation with someone. But when all this happened again the next day, I asked his colleagues: “What’s the matter?” They explained to me that this goes on all the time and, perhaps, on this basis, Denisov has zero relations with Mengistu, they actually do not meet, and they rarely see the former defense minister, since the latter avoids such meetings.
However, the apparatus of the Chief Military Adviser was normal. Our Soviet embassy also made a good impression on me. At the same time, the main problem - to put out the fire of the war in Eritrea - is not only not resolved, but the war is escalating, hostilities have already unfolded in the province of Tigre. The 3rd Army is involved here in full force and suffers significant losses, retreating under the blows of units of the so-called Tigre Popular Front. The Popular Front of the rebels seized a large amount of military equipment, weapons, ammunition from government troops and continued to push the 3rd Army.
This war was useless not only for the people of Ethiopia, but also for the Soviet Union. This collar was a big burden for us. Especially after Afghanistan, in the presence of Angola and other similar countries. The internal problems caused by the notorious Gorbachev perestroika also made themselves felt. In short, peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea would be a boon for all. Decisive changes in Mengistu's policy were required, and instead he sends telegrams to the leadership of the USSR and urgently asks for additional help in military equipment, and especially in ammunition.
The leadership of our country decides to send a military delegation to Ethiopia, which I was instructed to lead. The task is to understand the situation and push Mengistu towards peace.
The arrival of the Soviet military delegation was perceived by various sections of Ethiopian society ambiguously. Some believed that this visit would have a stabilizing effect on the situation, and the peaceful steps of the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia would find their place in the ongoing policy. Others said that the arrival of the delegation would lead to an increase in the armed conflict and could damage the ongoing negotiations between the government and the opposition. Meanwhile, a week before our departure, everything was agreed with Mengistu, and he, perhaps, taking into account the appearance of our delegation, initiated negotiations with the opposition, which, by the way, never refused them.
At the same time, the mass media of anti-government organizations spread rumors that the Soviet military delegation had arrived to exert "forceful pressure" on the opposition, thereby fueling anti-Soviet sentiment. In turn, the Ethiopian leadership in every possible way popularized the stay of the Soviet military delegation in the country. Personally, Mengistu Haile Mariam sought to use her visit to strengthen his authority. To this end, the delegation was given special attention both in the center and in the troops and in the provinces.
In the course of our work, in order to get a complete picture of the situation in the country, I visited all three armies (two of which were fighting), in reserve formations, at the main base of the Air Force, at a naval base and drove along the western coast of Krasny sea from the port of Massaura (having visited our sailors on the island of Dahlak) to the port of Assab, from which there is a direct road to Addis Ababa. I also needed this rather difficult trip in order to inspect the ammunition depots located here (and there were many of them) and arsenals. And I really completely examined them, and not selectively, but in full, all the main storage facilities for military equipment, weapons, military equipment and ammunition. I calculated everything I could with the help of my comrades. This was very important, since the telegrams to Mengistu said that they had almost nothing, the warehouses were empty, and if they suddenly needed to give something to the troops, they would not be able to do it. But our rough calculations, as well as the data of the Chief Military Adviser, spoke of something else. In this regard, we had the idea that certain military circles of the Ethiopian army, wanting to justify their defeats in battle by the lack of weapons and ammunition, could mislead Mengistu (if this is not his own "creativity"). To put everything in its place, we have taken such steps.
We also visited military schools.
Interestingly, in addition to the first meeting, at which I conveyed greetings to Mengistu from the political and military leadership of the Soviet Union and told about the purpose of our military delegation's arrival (Mengistu added his own requests), and besides our final conversation, the head of the country invited me several more times. At these intermediate meetings, he was mainly interested in my opinion about what I saw. Perhaps my characteristics and conclusions were not as important to him as the demonstration of such contacts was required to create an appropriate public opinion in the interests of Mengistu.
Our trip around the country began from the north, i.e. from Asmara, where the 2nd Revolutionary Army fought with the Eritrean separatists.
The complexity of the situation of the Ethiopian Armed Forces in general and the 2nd Army in particular was that literally two months before our arrival, Mengistu arrested and shot more than 600 officers. This mainly affected generals and colonels. Dissatisfied with the president's policies, the most progressive group of officers opposed his course, which led the country to a dead end, especially in the war with Eritrea. They believed that a civil war was generally unacceptable. Using channels of communication with the leadership of Eritrea, they negotiated that the war should be stopped on the condition that Eritrea, having received autonomy, remains part of Ethiopia. The country will hold early elections of representative power, which will include deputies from Eritrea.
The officers timed their speech to the moment when Mengistu flew out of the country to one of the international forums. However, in the state security bodies, almost all were Mengistu people - not only from the same tribe, but also relatives. Using the absence of army guards, due vigilance, and also using the complacency of the rebels, they carried out arrests in the center (the speech was led by the chief General Staff) and in the armies, especially in the 2nd, where dissatisfaction with the president for many years, exhausting, useless war was especially strong. The security service sent a telegram to Mengistu about the incident. He, having interrupted his trip, urgently returned home. Having sorted out the situation within 24 hours, he ordered all those arrested to be shot. Something like a court was drawn up based on the materials of the security agencies.
This tragedy has cast an even greater shadow on the already gloomy figure of the president.
In principle, Mengistu was an outstanding personality. And he did a lot of good for his people. However, the lack of control by the parliament and objective self-control (God did not give) contributed to the growth of ambitions. The separation from common sense and a penchant for the vicious principle: "Only I know, and only I am right." The rebirth of thinking and the psyche became irreversible. Under these conditions, it was difficult to expect any new decisive steps from Mengistu to stabilize the domestic political situation. He only resorted to force. His star has already set.
In the 2nd Army, in fact, everything was beheaded - the army itself, all divisions, brigades, regiments, and even some battalions. Those who were just appointed, who temporarily performed someone's position, were in a bad mood. They, of course, answered all questions, tried to be kind, showed due attention to me. However, this was just the performance of their official duties, but not an open friendly conversation. Therefore, although we devoted several days to the army, although we directly passed most of its front line, met with officers and soldiers in units of the first and second echelons, at artillery firing positions and with tankers, but an unequivocal conclusion about the further development of events in this direction it was hard to do. Still, everything was basically inclined to the fact that the battles should be ended.
Ethiopian Armed Forces
Here are some moments from the life of this army.
The front line of the army and the enemy, i.e., the separatists, are separated by 700-800 or more meters. In such a situation rifle and machine gun fire (with the exception of heavy machine guns) is ineffective. Therefore, on both sides, the personnel did not particularly try to hide and move only along the trenches. But when guns and mortars opened fire, everyone jumped into trenches and trenches. In engineering terms, the positions were well equipped. The system of fire and engineering barriers, including minefields, left no doubt that if the enemy dared to attack, he would inevitably suffer heavy losses and unsuccessfully roll back. The personnel knew their tasks well. The reserves were well trained, and their actions to advance to their lines were worked out. Artillerymen and mortarmen showed me from their observation posts where they should have fires on the ground - motionless barrage and concentrated. The provision, in our opinion, was normal - we even had lunch in one of the divisions. Ammunition of all kinds was more than enough both in the subdivisions and in the warehouses of the units and the army.
The terrain for the conduct of hostilities turned out to be difficult - sharply crossed, mountainous, in some places the slopes of the mountains are covered with a sparse forest. I imagined several options for active (offensive) actions and came to the conclusion that any of the options would only lead to large unjustified losses. During our work in some areas there was absolutely no shooting. And this forced me to ask the question: “Do you always have this?” But the officers explained: "The enemy knows that a group of Soviet officers will be with us, and therefore does not shoot." "That's why we don't shoot," the officer concluded. This surprised me even more, but also allowed me to conclude that the so-called separatists were not hostile towards the Soviet military. On the contrary, they demonstrate their readiness for peace. And when I asked: “And if you literally today or tomorrow tell them, the separatists, that you are stopping hostilities, will they do the same or will they take advantage of this and seize your positions?” All the Ethiopian officers present at this conversation unanimously declared that the enemy would immediately support this peace initiative and would not make any territorial claims, by the way, they themselves had repeatedly proposed the same thing before.
We also had an interesting episode. Going to the end of one of the days to go to our "base" (we stayed at a hotel in Asmara), we ended up on a soldier's name day literally at the forefront. Here, the soldiers of one of the companies, under the guidance of their officer, organized in one of the dugouts simple decorations from flags, paper flowers, candy wrappers, some boxes. Someone drew a portrait of the hero of the day with a pencil (he was 20 years old). On a makeshift table lay some fried grains, fruits, candies. The hero of the day in a neat soldier's uniform was standing right there. He was of medium height, well built, with a handsome Ethiopian face. Curly head, eyes - olives, dark skin, but the nose - straight and even a little hump, which gave away Europe. For some reason, I involuntarily remembered Pushkin's ancestors. The young man smiled all the time and, constantly snapping his fingers, shouted: "Soviet, soviet ..." Apparently, he wanted to demonstrate his kind attitude towards the Soviet comrades.
They explained to us what the holiday was about. We joined in the congratulations and presented the birthday man with various badges of soldier's glory and a watch with Soviet symbols on the dial (I always carried a set of modest souvenirs with me). Everyone was very warm and cordial.
I asked if this was a tradition, or if they arranged such a celebration only for this soldier (he did not say that perhaps this was due to our stay). But I was told that they always and everywhere, including in the army, celebrate their birthday.
Well, it's nice that this people has such a good tradition.
Having finished our work in the center and on the left flank, one early morning we went to the very right flank of the army, which rested on the Red Sea. Here they got acquainted with the naval base, its capabilities and abilities, as well as security. We went by boat to the island of Dahlak, where our marine material and technical base settled, which provided and serviced our ships, which solved their tasks in the Indian Ocean, on the transition from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, or vice versa. Service on the mainland is hard (Ethiopia is not Ukraine or France), but on Dahlak it is doubly hard. But how happy these people were when they saw their compatriots! And we did our best to make our sailors happy. And when it was time to leave (and there was still a long road ahead of us), a feeling of involuntary guilt before these warriors swept over us, as if we were leaving them on an island in the Red Sea, and we ourselves were going to heavenly places.
The march of our small group in cars along the coast to the next port, Aseba, was heavy. But it was extremely useful to inspect one arsenal with weapons and two large ammunition depots (the number of small depots was not counted). And the path actually passed through the desert, but the road was built well.
After another visit, at my request to Mengistu, we went to the 3rd Army, based in the province of Tigre. First, we met on the border of the province with the newly appointed chief of the General Staff, who had previously held the post of commander of the Air Force. We got along well in the same car. My interpreter and driver were also with us. The Chief of the General Staff “reassured” me: “We will go by the first car. If the bandits attack the convoy, they usually fire at the last cars for some reason. But cars are rarely fired upon - they hunt for weapons, ammunition, food. And this is all on trucks. I thought: “Like in Afghanistan,” and said out loud: “So, maybe it was necessary to set up guards along the route? It is undesirable for anyone from my group to die."
The Chief of the General Staff assured me that such guards had been placed in the most dangerous sectors. However, although we traveled a long distance, I did not see a single post or protected area. And there were no attacks. I even thought that the general could, for effect, give information about the imminent danger. True, we saw something else, while talking about the state of the Ethiopian Armed Forces and about the problems of the 3rd Army in particular.
Before us ran, steeply meandering, a modern, narrow highway with upland walls beautifully built of stone and sewage, also made of stone, ditches, which made it possible to intercept stones falling from the peaks. On the other side, a powerful parapet was also built, a little more than a meter high, but massive. He reliably protected cars from falling into the abyss if the driver lost control. The area was covered with lush vegetation. Here and there monkeys hung in clusters in the trees. Suddenly, at one of the turns, the driver said loudly: “Look!” - and slowed down the car. A gorilla was sitting on the parapet - a huge male monkey of bright red, almost red color. We caught up with her. I noticed a massive head with huge fangs like a lion's. This magnificent inhabitant of the jungle looked somewhere to the side, not paying attention to the cars. The general told the driver not to stop because some individuals might attack. We drove past, and the owner of this place sluggishly slid off the parapet and walked lazily along the road.
We involuntarily switched the conversation from military theme on the fauna of Ethiopia. It turns out that it is very rich and diverse - lions, leopards, elephants, hippos, buffaloes, giraffes, antelopes, zebras, mountain goats, many species of monkeys and birds, including ostriches. As for gorillas, they already belong to rare species, but mostly monkeys and baboons are found in this area.
They were already waiting for us at the army headquarters. Artillery firing was clearly audible here. After listening to the situation on the map, I suggested leaving for two or three units that are now fighting.
It turns out that the entire province of Tigre, located south of Eritrea, was already in the hands of the rebels. There was no direct road connection from Addis Ababa to Asmara (i.e. north) as the road was blocked. Everything was delivered to the 2nd Army only by sea. Moreover, the rebels sank even further south and entered the province of Wollo. And this has already created quite a tangible threat to the capital.
We went to the military units on three armored personnel carriers with large-caliber automatic guns. At first, I expressed the opinion that the Shilka could not be taken - this is an air defense system, but the enemy does not have aviation. But I was convinced that the ground enemy is more afraid of the Shilka than the tank. And we set off.
The fighting conditions were difficult. They passed on a hilly plateau, sparsely overgrown with tall thorny bushes. Pebbles pressed with sand crunch underfoot. The sun mercilessly burns everyone. Water, as always in such conditions, is scarce. Everyone - both black Ethiopians and white advisers - turned even more blackened from soot, dust, and then the merciless sun.
By the time we arrived, the unit we were in had already twice repulsed the attack of the rebels. And now there was a sluggish artillery exchange.
Having sorted out the situation, I realized that only infantry was attacking the enemy, and five armored personnel carriers (except, of course, artillery and mortars, which were constantly firing) supported it with heavy machine gun fire. When I asked if there was any reserve nearby, I was told that a tank company of seven tanks was standing five kilometers away and ready for action.
Within two hours, together with the Chief of the General Staff, we prepared a counterattack, which should begin immediately as soon as the enemy goes over to the next attack. We also prepared a squadron of attack aircraft with a flight time of 18-20 minutes.
To carry out this action, we pulled the tankers up to the last shelter. Having met with them, I handed all the badges Soviet army, and the company commander (there were no more officers) and all tank commanders - wristwatches and wished them success. Then we checked all communications, chose a convenient place for observation and got ready.
It turned out the best. The enemy launched a massive fire raid - a clear sign of preparation for an attack. The Chief of the General Staff called for aviation. Our artillery opened fire on the enemy batteries. After 15 minutes, the separatists went on the attack. Our artillery carried fire along the attacking line, and the aircraft carried out bombing attacks on enemy artillery. Tanks go to the counterattack. As soon as they passed our front line, the infantry rose and, hiding behind the armor of the tanks, also launched a counterattack. Tanks on the move opened fire from guns and machine guns.
The enemy infantry first stopped and lay down. Then she rushed back to her position. Tanks literally on the shoulders of the retreating enemy broke into his defenses, the infantry followed the tanks. And after 30 minutes, we also moved to the front line of the separatists. The pursuit continued for another two kilometers. The enemy was actually scattered.
I suggested to the Chief of the General Staff to consolidate on the line of captured enemy positions, create a defense here and at the same time start negotiations with the separatists on a possible cessation of hostilities.
Arriving at the neighboring compound, I saw a completely different picture. The staffing of the units here was extremely insufficient. There are no reserves. The morale of the personnel is low. At the first blow of the enemy, they can run and thereby open the way to Addis Ababa and to the rear of those formations that hold their lines.
In this regard, we agreed with the Chief of the General Staff that he would concentrate all military aviation in this direction, it would constantly, with maximum effort, carry out bombing strikes against the separatist troops. At the same time, in the 1st Army, which is stationed in the Somali direction, i.e., in the south-east of the country, at least two formations will be taken and urgently transferred to this direction (Tigre).
Subsequent events showed the correctness of this decision. These and other formations deployed to this direction, plus the effective operations of military aviation, cooled the ardor of the extremists. The proposals for a ceasefire and the suppression of the fratricidal civil war, made through various channels, finally stopped them and forced them to negotiate.
Finally, the 1st Army. Unlike the other two, she was in "greenhouse" conditions - no fighting, no shooting, everything was quiet and calm. Occasionally, some smugglers are captured at the posts. When we arrived in this army, even the appearance of the officers and soldiers said that they seemed to live in a completely different world. And the commander is even in full dress uniform, white gloves and with a stack.
We met and went to the army headquarters. It stood as a separate military town-park. Several one-story rooms were located in a fantastically beautiful area, completely dotted with flowering trees and ornamental shrubs, bright green lawns, intricate small forms of architecture, ostriches and peacocks walked importantly everywhere, and many parrots hung on the trees. It was a fabulous idyll.
But the lion made a special impression on us. For him, a huge niche was cut out in the natural rock - a cave, and the entire entrance part was closed with a powerful metal grate. A medium-sized lion, apparently still young, did not react to people. It can be seen that bondage and constant onlookers broke him. I asked: “How long has he been in this prison?” The army commander said less than a year. They caught him in nets. And proudly declared: “We have only our army has a lion. Therefore, our emblem is a lion with a raised paw.
From the reports that were made at the headquarters, we understood that there are no special problems in the army, except for the fact that there is constant ferment among the Somalis. This is due to the fact that many Ethiopians have relatives living in Somalia, and if earlier there was free access there, now everything is closed. In case of violation of the border regime, they can be shot without warning. The forbidden fruit is known to be sweet. Closing the border only strengthens the craving for communication.
As for the staffing of the army, its provision, there are no problems here. The necessary supplies are available. Parting with the army commander, I wished him further prosperity, an opportunity arose for rapprochement with Somalia.
Returning to the capital, our group completed all the remaining activities in our plan, including visiting the Air Force base, military schools, and a number of central weapons and ammunition storage facilities. Unfortunately, in addition to good moments, there were also unpleasant ones, connected mainly with moral and ethical “dislocations”. I noticed that the armies were trying to show that they were poorly provided with weapons and ammunition. At the same time, they resorted to indecent methods - they transferred their property from the part where we were supposed to go to the one where we had already visited. In this regard, I ordered that the officers of the Chief Military Adviser keep their eyes on the central warehouses and arsenals. This, of course, did not decorate us. But even worse, in my opinion, were the leaders of the rear of the Ethiopian army, who were engaged in such fraud.
In the evening, on the eve of the trip to the central warehouses, we clarified with the General - Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces (by the way, he was also Acting Minister of Defense, since after the mass execution a new one had not yet been appointed) the procedure for visiting these facilities, coordinating it simultaneously with trips to military educational institutions and other institutions (i.e. not to drive the same route twice).
Literally three hours later, our Chief Military Adviser reported to me that a large number of vehicles had overtaken the main ammunition depot, where I intended to go in the morning. Loading teams also arrived at another warehouse, which was not included in the list of inspected after our plan was clarified. The army command began to take out artillery shells and aerial bombs.
Allow me to stop these foul actions of the head of the rear? the Chief Military Adviser asked me indignantly.
Why? I said calmly. - On the contrary, let everything be transported. And your task is to find out where they are transporting.
Already learned - to two other warehouses near Addis Ababa.
That's fine. Tomorrow morning we will go straight there. Just don't announce it yet. Take your camera or camcorder with you.
The next morning, the head of the logistics drove up to breakfast. His mood was excellent. The meal was held in a good atmosphere - we talked peacefully about the history of Ethiopia, about the culture, traditions and customs of the people. By the way, the general enlightened us in one interesting question. Among the millet crops that are grown by the farmers of this country, the main place is occupied by teff. It is eaten in different forms, but, unlike others, it has exceptionally high medicinal properties, helping to strengthen the muscles in general, and especially the muscles of the lungs and heart. The general asked us:
Do you know who is the permanent world and Olympic champion in long distance running? Ethiopians! Why? And here is the secret in this culture (except for the naturally formed school of sports training).
After finishing breakfast, we went to the cars. As I walk, I say to the general:
You know, this morning we consulted and decided to make minor adjustments to our plans: we will look at two ammunition depots (and named exactly those where ammunition was transported from the central warehouse all night), and then on way back in this direction - a military school. It turns out that the school is going to field exercises tomorrow, and we would like to get acquainted with the officers and cadets within its walls.
The general's high spirits blew away like the wind.
Then I will order that the school does not go out into the field yet. It's not a problem, he said without much joy.
Well, why break plans educational process. Yes, and we will be put in an awkward position. After all, nothing fundamentally changes - let's find time to look at the central warehouse, too, - I said innocently.
But they are already waiting there, - the general did not give up.
Therefore, I ask you, Comrade General, send your officer there, who will convey that the visit is postponed. Let them do their own thing. I'm sure they have a lot of work.
The poor general was completely wilted. And not knowing what to do, he began to fumble in his pockets, taking out some papers, notebooks. And then he asked:
Do you mind if I don't go and my deputy accompanies you?
Of course not, I reassured him. - I myself wanted to offer you this option. Still, you remained with the minister and the president may need it at any moment.
Yes Yes. He has already given me one important task.
We broke up. The general went to the General Staff, and we went to the warehouses. The first of these warehouses was on the outskirts of the city, so we got there quickly. And although a little time had passed after parting with the general, however, the head of the warehouse, lieutenant colonel, met us already at the entrance. And after about five minutes, a colonel arrived - the acting head of armaments (the head was shot among the rebels). Getting acquainted with the head of the warehouse, I noticed his tired and insufficiently neat appearance. It was clear to me that this was the result of a sleepless tense night. By the way, at the moment when we were approaching, several trucks with soldiers left the territory of the warehouse - obviously, a loading and unloading team. But we pretended not to pay attention to them.
Being in any country, I always tried to avoid receiving a report (report) from an officer of the army of the host country, with the exception of the guard of honor, when this has to be done in connection with the protocol. Therefore, even now, the lieutenant colonel reported not to me, but to the officer of the General Staff assigned to our group on a permanent basis. And then we, calmly walking around the warehouse, talked with the lieutenant colonel.
How long have you run this warehouse? I asked him.
Already three years. Even more...
So you are not just a boss, but also a dock in your profession!
I know the warehouse well and try to maintain it at the proper level. We haven't had any incidents this year. We have no comments, - the lieutenant colonel said proudly.
Perfectly. And you personally, comrade lieutenant colonel, how do you feel?
The Lieutenant Colonel shot me a look full of chagrin:
Never mind. Still alright.
Excuse me for asking this indelicate question, but the whites of your eyes turned red. It seemed to me that maybe you are unwell today? Therefore, it would be possible to instruct your deputy to represent the warehouse.
No no! I do it myself. I'm just a little overtired... Family circumstances.
OK then. What types of ammunition are stored in your warehouse?
We only have artillery shells for all gun systems and mines for all mortars. In addition, over there in the far corner there is an underground bunker where several tons of explosives are stored.
Is the account maintained? Can you report exactly how much of each type of ammunition is in stock?
The lieutenant colonel began to report from memory, but when the officer of our Chief Military Adviser began to correct him, he took the register and reported quite competently.
But these storages that we see - are they all overflowing? I asked.
No, many of them are half empty, you can see.
Let's go through and see. But it’s surprising - why do you literally have such mountains of ammunition throughout the warehouse?
Yes, there is no time to put everything together well ... They don’t give enough soldiers for this purpose ...
The vaults were mostly full, but some could take some more ammunition. In any case, about a quarter of what is stacked in the open could be placed under the roof. But the most interesting thing is that when we started to inspect the stacks of ammunition boxes in open areas, we found a large number of aerial bombs, missiles, and rockets. To the question - why was nothing said about this during the general report? - the head of the warehouse constantly repeated the same thing: “They delivered it by mistake, but they haven’t managed to return the ammunition to the addressee yet.”
Of course, all this looked, to put it mildly, ugly. We took pictures. And the representative of the General Staff and other Ethiopian officers were asked to draw up an act on the presence of unaccounted for ammunition in the warehouse. The Chief Military Adviser took a copy of the act for himself. Night "operation" for the transportation of shells turned against their organizers.
Approximately the same picture was in the second warehouse. But in the military school we received complete satisfaction. The mood of the officers and cadets is good. Living and studying conditions are normal. The provision is comprehensive. The only thing we did not understand was why no one asked anything, although on the whole the personnel were sociable, they easily made contact and conversation. Faces are pleasant, white-toothed smiles.
Finally, it's time to sum up. Taking into account the assignment I received in Moscow and taking into account the situation with which we met on the spot, I, as I imagined, had to solve two fundamental tasks: to convince Mengistu that only through political means - through negotiations and compromises - can the task of breaking the deadlock in the war with the opposition. This is the first. And the second is to show Mengistu that his exorbitant requests for assistance to Ethiopia with weapons, military equipment and ammunition are not caused by the current situation and the level of equipment of the Ethiopian army today. Although, of course, something had to be additionally highlighted, but this is insignificant. But the most important thing I thought was to speak frankly with Mengistu without diplomacy.
Therefore, during the last meeting with Mengistu, I sent him the following message:
We state that the military-political situation in Ethiopia still remains difficult. But the main danger is a possible escalation, especially in Eritrea and the Tigris. Our group confirms the expediency of the recommendations of the Soviet leadership on the need to find a political way to defuse the situation, the complication of which has come because of the stubborn unwillingness of the Ethiopian leadership to overestimate relations with the opposition and follow the path of agreements. Negotiating with the Popular Front of Eritrea and the Popular Front of Tigre only from positions of strength will not give anything. On the contrary, the "disease" is driven deeper and deeper. After all, everyone can see that over the years, the forces of the opposition are growing, not decreasing. But even more dangerous is the fact that the country is in the process of consolidating opposition forces. At the same time, there is a tendency to intensify the process of isolation of Mengistu Haile Mariam. This is evidenced by the conspiracy of the officers. We condemn these speeches. But at the same time we emphasize that the measures taken against the conspirators will not resolve the crisis. This will only give rise to a new wave of discontent, therefore, Mengistu's popularity will fall. And the people are tired of the protracted war. Of course, the recently appointed chief of the General Staff, commanders-in-chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, commanders of armies, commanders of corps and divisions will carry out the orders of their Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But relapses are not ruled out if Mengistu does not change his course and if he does not lead the line towards establishing peace in the country.
I also gave detailed information (I repeated some of what was in my interim messages) on each army and branch of the Armed Forces. He stressed that the most difficult situation is in the province of Tigre and the areas adjacent to it, that is, in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Army. The enemy (more precisely, the Tigre Popular Front) inflicted a significant defeat on the army, advanced 120 kilometers and actually completely controls the situation in this province and partially in the provinces of Wallo and Gondar. He seized a large amount of weapons and military equipment from government troops. At the same time, during his offensive, he mobilized up to one hundred thousand of the population of Tigre and Wallo. Thus, the leadership of the Tigre Popular Front achieved a significant change in the balance of power in their favor.
At the same time, government troops in the area, having suffered losses in personnel, military equipment and supplies by 70 percent, withdrew south to Waldia. Now measures are being taken to supply replenishment and weapons to the surviving military units. At the same time, emergency measures are being taken to organize the defense of this area. The new Chief of the General Staff and his main forces are in the 3rd Army and, together with the officers of our Chief Military Adviser, are solving this problem.
In the course of my report, I tried to explain to the President the strategic importance of the line now occupied by government troops here for the fate of the country as a whole. He also drew a picture of possible options for the actions of the rebels and, accordingly, what measures should be taken in order to fend off these blows by government troops.
He stressed that in the event of another such defeat of the troops of the 3rd Army, the road to Addis Ababa would be opened with all the ensuing consequences. In addition, the enemy can block the road from the main seaport countries of Assab to Addis Ababa and freely enter the areas of this port. And in the storage facilities of the port there is a huge amount of ammunition, weapons, military equipment, trucks, food and other materiel.
In this regard, he recommended that Mengistu urgently, in addition to what had already been deployed, send several combat formations to the 3rd Army combat area, including from the 1st Army, located on the border of Somalia. At the same time, organize the mobilization of resources in the combat area of the 3rd Army, as well as within the operational boundaries of the 1st Army to replenish its composition in connection with the dispatch of significant forces in the Tigris. In addition, he recommended that the state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs urgently organize the liquidation of all centers of opposition organized in the center and in the rear of the 3rd Army. At the same time, he strengthened the thesis that these bodies are devoted to the president and are obliged to quickly and accurately fulfill his order. He also said that in Addis Ababa and adjacent provinces it is necessary to immediately create strong mobile reserves on the basis of military schools and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, calling for the defense of the Fatherland and the creation of people's militias.
As for the security of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, I said, as if by the way, with one phrase: “The troops, all the army and central warehouses of the country are overflowing with weapons, military equipment, ammunition and other property, therefore this issue should in no case cause the President of Ethiopia anxiety and even more fear, which can be confirmed by the interim Minister of Defense.
All recommendations were gratefully received. At the same time, we agreed with Mengistu that the Soviet military advisers would literally now, together with the officers of the General Staff remaining in Addis Ababa, prepare telegrams and directives and immediately leave for those bodies and organizations on which the direct execution of the president’s orders would depend.
However, before saying goodbye to Mengistu, I tried carefully, in a delicate manner, to express to him one more important, in my opinion, thought. I thought that in these conditions it is necessary to turn to the people for help and support. However, if Mengistu does this today, then not only will there be no support, but there may be backlash. Therefore, I said: “In conditions when the fate of the country is being decided, it is necessary that the people of Ethiopia take an active part in this. Therefore, it would be nice if the most powerful and authoritative public organization appealed to the people and the president of the country with an appeal to mobilize all forces to save the Fatherland. At the same time, oblige all power structures to provide all possible support to this appeal, and mobilize all the media to bring this historical document to the people.
At first, I thought that Mengistu did not accept this offer. Usually, when he did not accept proposals, he simply silently passed them without comment. However, when someone stepped on his “sore spot” with his proposal, as was the case with the idea of organizing negotiations on an equal footing with the Eritrean separatists, he exploded: “You understand - these are bandits! How to negotiate with them at all?!” However, in this case he not only took my advice calmly, but also brightened up, agreeing that this would be an important measure.
Mengistu also enthusiastically accepted our proposal to create the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. I told him how it was done in Afghanistan. He emphasized that it would be expedient for our Chief Military Adviser or his Chief of Staff to be present at all meetings of the Headquarters. This could ensure efficiency in resolving many issues. At the same time, Mengistu requested that the number of military advisers not be reduced.
Saying goodbye, I told the President of Ethiopia that the Soviet Union was and remains a true and sincere friend of the Ethiopian revolution, the people of Ethiopia, is deeply interested in the normalization of the military-political situation in the country and will fully support the peace initiatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia aimed at unblocking the Eritrean and Tigris problems politically.
Flying away from this country to my place in Moscow, I, like my colleagues, carried with me anxious feelings about the future fate of this people, although all our proposals were not accepted formally and were translated into the plane of practical solutions. For example, a directive was signed on the creation of a technical support service for the Armed Forces, which determined the structure of this service, functions, tasks and regulations. Particular attention was paid to maintenance armored and automotive equipment. Previously, a soldier drove a tank or car until it stalled. As stalled - throws it and demands to be given a new one. Now, this soldier, together with the repairmen, will carry out preventive maintenance so that the car does not stall.
It was taken into account that it was necessary to immediately release ahead of schedule a group of military pilots who were trained in the Soviet Union. Currently, there are only 65 crews for 126 combat aircraft and helicopters (many pilots were arrested on suspicion).
Other logistical requests were also taken into account. Of course, you need help. But the appetite was already radically (by 60-70 percent) moderate.
However, all this, in our opinion, was not the most important thing. The main thing is that bold political steps are needed, which will make it possible to really resolve the problems of the north of Ethiopia by peaceful means (Eritrea and the Tigris). But will Mengistu be able to decide on this? Will he have enough courage and wisdom to take the necessary steps in the name of the well-being of the people (even if this will infringe on personal prestige)? Will he continue to act as agreed?
The results of the visit of the delegation of the USSR Ministry of Defense to Ethiopia were officially, by letter, reported by the Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov to the Central Committee of the CPSU on September 1, 1989. But for us, that is, for me and the entire military delegation, the issue was not closed. We were obliged, solving our main tasks in terms of functional duties, to simultaneously monitor (according to the plan) what and how is carried out in Ethiopia (as in other similar countries). In particular, the personnel issue in our advisory apparatus was far from being simply solved. On the one hand, the vast majority of the officers of the Soviet apparatus, starting with the Chief Military Adviser, had to be replaced, since they worked together and for a long time with those who were shot. Just from a purely moral standpoint, it was undesirable to leave them further in this country. At the same time, the extremely difficult military-political situation not only did not allow most of the advisers to be replaced, but even to touch them in general.
And yet, we began to replace. Among the first was the Chief Military Adviser, General Demin. And because a new chief of the General Staff of the Ethiopian army had already been appointed, and because the appointment of a new minister of defense was expected, and because the general’s health, of course, did not allow him to work in this climatically difficult country.
The country finally got rid of the usurper
But only about three months had passed after our return, when suddenly there was a sensation - Mengistu left Ethiopia and flew on his plane to one of the African countries. Of course, he could not go to Somalia or Sudan for political reasons. It is unlikely that he flew to Saudi Arabia, North or South Yemen (the last two states were also unsettled, and Saudi Arabia sympathized with the Eritreans). Therefore, only Kenya remained from the neighbors. Or it was any other country on the African continent up to and including Zaire. But television showed only the moment Mengistu boarded the plane and his departure.
Now it didn't matter at all. It is important that the main thing happened - the one who maintained the tension in the country, removed himself from his post and voluntarily left the state where he was actually a dictator. Thus, all the shackles that held back the peaceful resolution of problems in Ethiopia and the end of the civil war were removed.
The act of Mengistu was evaluated differently. Some said he fled the inevitable retribution for the damage he had done in recent years. Others said he had no other choice. I believe that, without discarding the first two versions (they were quite likely to a certain extent), it is advisable to look at this step from the standpoint of the interests of the people and the state. Of course, who wants to die ingloriously?! Especially if he had just stepped over forty. Nobody. And even more so in the position of Mengistu. But not everyone will dare to take such a step - to leave the throne for the sake of stabilizing the situation in the country. At the same time, leaving the post of head of state was not accomplished in conditions of chaos and anarchy, as, for example, Kerensky or Yeltsin did in their time. Mengistu stepped down from his post in an atmosphere of strong power and a well-organized and well-managed state system. To me, his move is a bit like Najibullah's attempt in Afghanistan, where only the betrayal of Foreign Minister Wakil thwarted Najibullah's flight to India.
Mengistu is a realist and pragmatic politician. He was firmly convinced that he could not come to an agreement with the separatists, and there was only one reason - they did not fulfill his conditions. At the same time, the people were tired of the war and were ready for anything, if only peace would come. And the Soviet Union under these conditions supported the mood of the people. Therefore, based on all the circumstances, Mengistu decides to resign completely from the powers of the head of state. Was it the right move? Undoubtedly. But taking into account the mores and customs of Africa, after leaving the highest post, Mengistu could not remain in his native Ethiopia. And he leaves his homeland - maybe until better times for him, or maybe forever.
But, probably, the descendants will long remember that in the fall of 1993, removed from the post of president by the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, Boris Yeltsin did not resign. Instead, he shot down the Supreme Soviet elected by the people and thousands of unarmed people from tanks. Personal power turned out to be more precious than human destinies and the tranquility of the whole country.
And the fact that in December 1999 Yeltsin handed over power to Putin is by no means a wise and, moreover, not a democratic step, but fear. Fear of the denouement that is already looming over him.
Such are the parallels.
Well, the head of Ethiopia, Mengistu, made the decision to leave himself. Of course, one cannot exclude the influence of all the accompanying circumstances on his decision, including, perhaps, our military delegation also played a certain role.
In any case, a wise step was taken - primarily in the name of the people.
State of the Armed Forces of Abyssinia
In Addis Ababa, they knew about the preparation of the Italian invasion. However, the "king of kings" postponed the mobilization until the last moment, so as not to give reason to accuse Ethiopia of aggression. Realizing that war was inevitable, the emperor in September 1935 announced a general mobilization. Mobilization and concentration, due to the peculiarities of the Ethiopian army, the existence of the feudal system and poor communications, was extremely slow. Thus, the concentration on the Northern Front ended only at the end of December 1935, at the very height of the war. In total, up to 500 thousand people were mobilized.
By the beginning of the war, the Ethiopian army consisted of the following units:
The select core of the army was the Imperial Guard (Kebur Zabanga), or First Division. The guard was both the personal guard of the emperor, and an elite infantry division, the operational reserve of the supreme commander. The guard consisted of about 10 thousand soldiers, including 4 squadrons of cavalry. Guardsmen were trained by Swedish, Norwegian and Belgian officers. The battalions were commanded by officers who graduated from the French military academy Saint-Cyr. The guard had good weapons - rifles, machine guns and mortars, there was one company of heavy machine guns. Only the guards had the uniform of the Belgian army in khaki. The rest of the soldiers were dressed in white cotton uniforms and were good targets for the enemy.
Troops of provinces and tribes - up to 100 thousand people. They were recruited from volunteers and maintained by races (princes). Of these, commanding cadres stood out during the formation of the state militia. There were also about 100 thousand soldiers-settlers (“teklenya”). Among them was a combat core of 30,000 tripolks who had previously served as hired laborers with British and Italian troops in Somalia, Sudan and Libya. "Tripolki" combat core of the Ethiopian army and served as a personnel basis for the formation of new units. There were also a small number of Belgian advisory officers in the country.
The general militia could number up to 500 thousand people. It was the least trained part of the Abyssinian armed forces. Many militia warriors were armed only with bows and spears.
Abyssinian warriors
There was not enough equipment to equip the army. There were about 500 thousand rifles throughout the country, only 10% were modern magazines, the rest were outdated systems. The army had 200-300 machine guns of various systems. The artillery was scanty: up to 50 different guns, several anti-aircraft guns of the Oerlikon system. Ammunition was limited - 150 rounds per rifle, 10 thousand per machine gun. There was practically no aviation - a few old passenger planes. From armored vehicles - several armored vehicles and obsolete tanks. The entire army had only 4 walkie-talkies, wire communication was available in a limited amount. Therefore, communication was often carried out in an archaic way - with the help of messengers - "runners", tam-tams ("talking drums") and fires. For comparison, the Italian army had 6 thousand machine guns, 700 guns, 150 tankettes and 150 aircraft.
At the same time, the Abyssinian warriors traditionally had a high fighting spirit and developed military traditions. The soldiers were unpretentious, hardy, brave, well-versed in the weapons that they had in their hands. They fought well in direct combat, in hand-to-hand combat. The Abyssinians knew the theater of operations well, they could organize partisan and sabotage activities in mountainous, wooded and desert areas.
Thus, the Ethiopian army was still mostly of a feudal type, was not trained in modern battle tactics, and was poorly equipped with equipment. The Ethiopian troops, despite their large numbers, were inferior to the enemy in almost all respects - the unity of command, weapons and equipment, communications. There were almost no armored vehicles and aircraft. Artillery was weak, there were no stocks of food and ammunition for waging a long war. Part of the troops had only archaic weapons. However, the Abyssinians were high-quality combat material, distinguished by courage and stamina, they were excellent at using personal weapons, which made them a dangerous enemy in close combat.
The Abyssinian army at the beginning of the war was divided into three main operational areas. On the Northern Front there was an army group of 150-200 thousand people under the command of the Mulugeta, Seyum, Kam, Imru, Ayelu races. The troops were supposed to cover the main communications leading from the north to the Ethiopian capital. Thus, in the north, the Abyssinians were seriously inferior to the 250 thousand enemy strike force, both in number and in armament. On the Southern Front there were troops of the Desta and Nasibu races - 100-150 thousand soldiers. There were about 110 thousand Italians against them. There were only about 10 thousand soldiers in the central direction, against 17 thousand Italian soldiers. In reserve, the Negus had 10 thousand guards, as well as various militias, numbering up to 100 thousand people.
As a result, at the beginning of the war, Ethiopia fielded 450-500 thousand people, and could increase the number of troops at the expense of the militia, but the problem was a serious lack of modern weapons and ammunition. At the same time, there were many slaves, porters, pack animal leaders, rear services in the army, that is, a large number of non-combatants. As a result, the actual combat strength of the army was much less than the total number of troops. Therefore, the Abyssinian army was much inferior to the enemy and could not fight on equal terms with the Italians, due to a lack of weapons, supply problems and the general backwardness of the country (economic, military-technical, science, education, etc.).
The Negus was the supreme commander, with various military advisers. The headquarters of the “king of kings” was located in Addis Ababa, Dessier and Kuoram during various periods of the war. At the head of the armies and army groupings were the races.
War plans
Italy. The global and domestic political situation required a blitzkrieg. The prolongation of the war could lead to external and internal problems, threatened with a financial crisis. Therefore, they planned to end the war before the start of the period of large tropical rains (since June), which made it difficult to use aviation, armored vehicles and vehicles.
The main target was the capital of Abyssinia - Addis Ababa. The military-political leadership expected that after the direct defeat of the Abyssinian army and the capture of the capital, most of the races-princes and feudal lords would betray the emperor, but this assumption turned out to be erroneous. Most of the races continued to resist and, after the fall of the capital, led the partisan movement.
Of the two operational directions from Eritrea to Addis Ababa, which led through Dessier and Gondar, the Italians chose Dessier, since it was easier to organize an offensive and rear here. Caravan and partially wheeled routes were located here, and the mountainous terrain did not have formidable boundaries. This direction of the offensive of the main forces of the Italian expeditionary army was located further than the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, outside the operational influence of the British. In addition, this most convenient route from the north to the center of Abyssinia led through the richest and most densely populated agricultural areas of the country. The invasion dealt a blow to the economy of the country and facilitated the supply of food to the troops. The Abyssinians were forced to either abandon the richest regions of the country or enter into a decisive battle, which was what the Italians needed. This made it possible to defeat the enemy with one powerful blow and complete the main hostilities. Also, the Italians remembered the defeat on March 1, 1896 in the region of Adua and wanted revenge. Thus, the Italian command concentrated the main strike force of the expeditionary army on the Northern (Eritrean) front.
The southern (Somali) front was to play a supporting role. The southern front was supposed to pin down as many Ethiopian troops as possible and support the offensive of the northern front with a blow to Harar - the center of Abyssinia of second importance. Also, the southern grouping was supposed to operate in the capital direction, striving to connect with the main forces. Thus, the Southern Front diverted almost half of the Ethiopian army and developed an offensive against Harar and Addis Ababa.
The distance of 1200 km separating the two fronts made it difficult for Italian troops to interact, so an auxiliary Central Front was created. Italian troops from the Assaba region were to develop an offensive on Dessier. Thus, a small group of Italian troops in the central direction provided the flanks of the main fronts. As a result, the concept of the Ethiopian campaign was a concentric offensive in the northern, southern and partially central operational directions. The main blow was delivered in the north, from Eritrea in the direction of the capital of Abyssinia.
Source: Korsun N. G. The Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-1936.
Abyssinia. The Abyssinian command fairly correctly identified the main operational areas and distributed troops along them. The main forces were located on the Northern Front, a strong army was in the south. On the southern front, where the Abyssinians planned to defend themselves, they had some numerical advantage over the Italians. At the same time, the disunity of the Northern and Southern fronts, the lack of communications, the almost complete absence of vehicles, the poor organization of the rear did not allow the Abyssinian army to maneuver forces, to quickly transfer reinforcements and reserves. As an operational reserve, the emperor deployed in the junctions of the roads, in the areas of Dessier and Diredawa, the most selective forces - the guard.
The Abyssinian high command also worked out the right strategy: protracting the war by unleashing a broad guerrilla struggle and operating on enemy communications, as well as conducting mobile defense on mountain lines. The prolongation of the war was supposed to stretch the enemy's forces, his communications, and during the beginning of the rainy season, reduce the enemy's mobility, reduce his advantage in aviation and technology to a minimum. Then, after the Italian army was bogged down, it was planned to launch a decisive counteroffensive with the aim of encircling and defeating the main enemy forces. This was supposed to force Italy to go to peace negotiations (the scenario of the First War with Italy).
Thus, Abyssinia had a good war plan that corresponded to the capabilities of her army, which could not measure its strength with the Italian army, well armed and technically equipped, in direct decisive battle. On the other hand, the fighting qualities of the Abyssinian warriors made it possible to unleash an active guerrilla and sabotage war behind enemy lines, on his communications, to wage a small war in the mountains and forests.
However, the problem was that under pressure from Britain and some princes who dreamed of repeating the defeat of the Italian army of the 1896 model, they adopted a different war plan, more decisive. Negus succumbed to the pressure and changed the original plan. As a result, the Abyssinian command prepared for decisive battles with large masses of troops, after the concentration of the army was completed, which was beneficial to the Italian army, which had complete superiority in a direct collision. It was a strategic mistake that led to fatal consequences for the army and the country.
"King of Kings" by Haile Selassie
The beginning of the war
On October 3, 1935, without a declaration of war, the Italian army invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea and Somalia. At the same time, Italian aircraft began bombing the city of Adua. Three Italian corps (1st, colonial and 2nd) under the command of de Bon, which deployed in Eritrea in a narrow area of 10 km, crossed the border river Mareb and began to carefully move deep into Ethiopia to Aksum and Adua, from one mountainous line to to another. At the same time, the Italians made extensive use of artillery, aircraft and armored vehicles. The Italian command was cautious, and in order to protect itself from bypass and encirclement, it deeply echeloned troops. Thus, at the beginning of the campaign, the Italians acted cautiously, tried to suppress the enemy with technical power, organize the rear and prepare communications.
The Abyssinian army, led by Ras Seyuma, evaded the defense of strong mountain positions in the Atssum, Adua and Adigrat regions due to the fact that it had not yet completed mobilization and concentration.
As a result, the Italian army, meeting only weak resistance from scattered enemy detachments, by October 8 reached the line of Aksum, Adua, Adigrat. Then the Italians stopped to organize the rear, prepare roads for the passage of vehicles, strengthen their positions and prepare a bridgehead for further movement. At this time, some feudal lords betrayed the country and went over to the side of the Italians. However, most of the soldiers did not follow their example, remaining loyal to their homeland.
The Italian high command, dissatisfied with the cautious actions of de Bono, demanded an accelerated pace of the offensive. Commander de Bono obeyed the demand of Rome and decided to make the next move, occupying the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Macalle (Macale). The 1st and Eritrean (former colonial) corps, advancing in the zone of the Eritrean ridge and interacting with the flank detachment of General Mariotti, occupied the Makelle area on November 8-11, 1935. The 2nd Corps cautiously advanced on the right with a ledge, which encountered opposition from local partisans. After this success, the Italian army, having advanced significantly with its left wing to the south, again stopped. The Italian front was pulled forward in the direction of one road that linked Makalle and Adigrat, and the interaction of individual groups was difficult due to the mountainous terrain. Again there was a long break in hostilities. The Italians pulled up the rear, regrouped their forces and reinforced the Northern Front with infantry divisions that had arrived. On the Southern Front at that time the battle was limited to skirmishes in the border zone.
The Abyssinian military-political leadership, finishing the concentration of troops, was waiting for the delivery of weapons and ammunition purchased abroad (through Sudan and British and French Somalia). Also, the Abyssinians hoped to hold out until the rainy season, when the roads would become impassable, and the mountain rivers in many areas would become difficult to overcome. In addition, Addis Ababa hoped that the prolongation of hostilities would lead to a deterioration in the international position of Italy and the renunciation of aggression. On October 7, 1935, the League of Nations recognized Italy as the aggressor. On November 11, 1935, the Council of the League of Nations decided to impose economic sanctions against Italy: the supply of weapons and certain types of strategic raw materials were banned. The League of Nations called for restrictions on the import of Italian goods and for refraining from granting credits and loans to Rome. However, a number of leading countries of the world and Europe refused to impose restrictions on trade and economic relations with Italy - among them the United States, Germany, Austria and Hungary. An embargo on the supply of oil and petroleum products to Italy was not introduced. Thus, Ethiopia's hopes for the world community turned out to be ephemeral.
The high Italian command, enraged by the lack of high-profile victories and blitzkrieg, decided to change the command of the expeditionary forces. Instead of de Bono, they appointed the head of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio. In the First Italo-Ethiopian War, he fought as a lieutenant and was badly wounded at the Battle of Adua. Badoglio ordered the troops to prepare for a further offensive. He also limited the bombardment of enemy concentrations of troops in order to allow the Abyssinians to complete their concentration in famous areas(Agents reported about this) so that the enemy could be defeated with several decisive blows. The marshal feared that the Ethiopian command, concerned about air strikes, would divide the troops into small detachments and move on to a small, guerrilla war. The Italian army did not have the strength and capabilities to ensure complete control over such a large country as Ethiopia. Badoglio also regrouped the troops of the Northern Front and formed the 3rd Corps at the expense of the arrived reinforcements, which took up positions between the 1st and Eritrean Corps. Then the 4th Army Corps was formed, which reinforced the right wing of the Northern Front.