The war at sea in 1945 The last battles off the coast of Europe If already in 1944 the few surviving kriegsmarines were faced with insoluble tasks, then in 1945 the German Navy could only cover the coast of Germany in the North and Baltic Seas, as well as

Naval arms race

Stubborn rivalry in building up naval power unfolded before the First World War between Germany and England. England, which owned vast colonies on all continents, occupied the first place in the world in terms of naval forces and merchant marine. The German navy was significantly inferior to the English, as can be seen from the table.

Despite its naval superiority, England continued to build up its naval forces. In 1889, Parliament passed a law that increased loans for the construction of the fleet. This law was based on the principle that the fleet of England was to surpass the two fleets of the most powerful other countries (137).

Table. The composition of the fleets of England and Germany by 1897*

* "Comparative tables of the navies of England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, the USA and the republics of South America." SPb., 1897, pp. 66 - 71. The table includes only ships that had combat value in 1897.

German imperialists, who became in the last quarter of the XIX century. on the path of colonial conquest, decided to intensively develop their Navy. Adopted in March 1898 by the Reichstag, a special "Law on the Navy" provided for a sharp increase in it. Within six years (1898 - 1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 large armored cruisers, 17 cruisers with an armored deck and 63 destroyers (138). German shipbuilding programs steadily expanded in 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the German fleet was supposed to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers and 72 submarines (139). The pace of construction of battleships was especially accelerated. From 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid down in Germany annually (instead of 2 in the previous period) and a corresponding number of cruisers and destroyers (140).

The English bourgeoisie understood that the decisions of the German government in the development of the navy threatened the naval power of England. Not wanting to lose her superiority on the seas, England also intensified the naval arms race. She set a goal of having 60% more battleships than there were in the German fleet (141). In addition, in 1905 the British government began building battleships of a new type - "dreadnoughts", which had a significant advantage over previous ships. By building dreadnoughts, England intended to make a major leap in the development of her naval power and force Germany to admit that she was powerless to shake England's naval hegemony.
However, Germany sought not only to catch up with England in the number of ships, but also not to be inferior to her in their quality and "to build ships so that in the event of a conflict they would be at least equivalent in combat power to the ships of the enemy" (142). Therefore, as soon as the first dreadnought was built in England, Germany began to build similar ships. Already in 1908, England had 8 dreadnoughts (some of them were under construction), and Germany - 7. The ratio of the old type of battleships was as follows: 51 for England and 24 for Germany (143).

In view of the growing threat to British naval power from Germany, England in 1909 decided to build two ships for every newly laid down German ship (144). Adopted in March 1909, the naval budget for 1909/10 allowed the government to build up to eight dreadnoughts, not counting a large number of smaller ships. In fact, nine dreadnoughts were laid - one ship of this type was built at the expense of New Zealand (145).
England also sought to preserve its naval power through diplomacy. After the adoption in Germany of the Naval Law of 1906, the British government came up with a proposal to limit the scale of construction of new warships. At the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, British diplomacy came up with a proposal to limit naval armaments (146). But this diplomatic step of England was rejected by Germany. German diplomacy spoke out extremely sharply and rudely against any kind of arms limitation.
The competition in the construction of the navy between Germany and England continued until the outbreak of the First World War. By 1914, the German fleet firmly took second place among the fleets of the largest maritime powers.

The frenzied arms race that engulfed England and Germany marked the approach of war. V. I. Lenin, noting this in 1911 in the article “Congress of the English Social Democratic Party”, wrote: “It is known that in last years and England and Germany are arming themselves extremely vigorously. The competition of these countries in the world market is becoming more and more aggravated. The military clash is approaching more and more menacingly” (147). This scientific prediction of V. I. Lenin came true only three years later.
Other states (France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary) also sought to increase their fleets by building new, more modern ships. However, the financial and economic capabilities of these countries did not allow to fully implement the adopted shipbuilding programs. Russia can serve as a typical example in this respect.
The tsarist government, which lost during Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet sent to Far East, directed efforts towards the restoration and further development of the navy. To this end, in the period from 1905 to 1914, several shipbuilding programs were developed, which included the completion of the previously laid down 4 squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 4 gunboats and 2 submarines, 2 minelayers and the construction of new 8 battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. However, by the beginning of the war, none of these programs had been completed (148).

Ship classes, combat assets and weapons

The experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism, especially the Russo-Japanese war, presented new requirements for various classes of ships, weapons and military equipment of the navies.

For battleships, it became necessary to strengthen the artillery of the main caliber of 305 - 381 mm to 8 - 12 guns and the anti-mine caliber of 120-150 mm to 14-18 guns by abandoning the medium caliber, strengthening the armor of the main belt to 305 - 350 mm and expanding the armor area in order to increase the survivability of the ship in battle, increase the displacement to 25 - 27 thousand tons and speed to 23-25 ​​knots.
The first battleship of a new type called the Dreadnought was built in England (commissioned in 1907) and, in terms of its tactical and technical data, differed sharply from the squadron battleships of the period of the Russo-Japanese War. Table 10 provides a visual representation of this.

Table 10. The performance data of the Russian squadron battleship "Borodino" and the English battleship "Dreadnought" *

* A. P. Shershov. The history of military shipbuilding from ancient times to the present day. M. - L., 1940, pp. 144, 241-242, 346 - 347; S. P. Moiseev. List of ships of the Russian steam and armored fleet(from 1861 to 1917). M., 1948, pp. 58 - 59.

The table shows that the English ship was significantly superior to the Russian battleship in terms of machine power, speed, main caliber artillery and armor.
Following England, other major maritime powers began building battleships of the "dreadnought" type.
It should be noted that two trends were observed in the development of the class of battleships, which were most clearly manifested in the English and German fleets. They were explained by different operational and tactical considerations. The Germans, expecting an attack by a stronger, English fleet near their coasts, paid their main attention to strengthening the armor and increasing the number of guns, neglecting to a certain extent even the speed of movement. The British, on the other hand, attached paramount importance to the speed and caliber of the guns, so that they could deprive the enemy of the initiative in choosing the time and place of the battle. These trends can be traced by comparing the performance data of the English battleship Queen Elizabeth and the German battleship Koenig (Table 11), which were built at the same time (1911-1914).

Table 11 Tactical and technical data of the battleships "Queen Elizabeth" and "Koenig"*

* F. Jane. Fighting Ships, 1915; AT. Weger. Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, 1914; x.wilson. Battleships in battle. Per from English. M., 1936, pp. 414, 422; "Operational-tactical views of the German Navy". Digest of articles. M. - L., 1941, p. 16.

French and Italian pre-war battleships also had pretty good tactical and technical elements. A characteristic feature of the Italian battleships was the advantage in speed with the same power equipment and armor. The battleships of the Austro-Hungarian fleet were somewhat inferior to the French and Italian ones.
The idea of ​​creating a new type of battleship was first developed by Russian sailors and shipbuilders S. O. Makarov, A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov. But due to economic backwardness tsarist Russia and the inertia of its ruling circles, this idea was not implemented in a timely manner. The construction of new battleships in Russia began with a great delay and was carried out at a slow pace.
The first Russian dreadnought ships ("Sevastopol", "Gangut", "Petropavlovsk" and "Poltava") were laid down in the summer of 1909 at the Baltic and Admiralty plants in St. Petersburg in accordance with the shipbuilding program of 1908. Their construction was delayed, and they entered into operation only in November - December 1914, that is, after the start of the world war (149). The battleships of the Sevastopol type, designed taking into account the experience of the Russo-Japanese war and the achievements of advanced Russian shipbuilding science, surpassed not only the first dreadnoughts of England, Germany and other states, but also the battleships of foreign fleets built simultaneously with them or even later.
On the eve of the war, a new type was born heavy cruiser- a battle cruiser that had a high speed for that time (almost 30 knots), strong artillery (up to 12,356 mm main caliber guns) and powerful armor (up to 300 mm). Cruisers of this type had turbine engines and took a large amount of liquid fuel. In terms of their combat qualities, they left the old armored cruisers far behind.
In Russia, the battle cruisers ("Izmail", "Borodino", "Navarin" and "Kinburn"), intended for the Baltic Fleet (laid down in December 1912), were the most powerful in the world in terms of artillery weapons. But by the beginning of the war they remained unfinished (150).
In all fleets, great attention was paid to the development of light cruisers and destroyers. An increase in the speed and anti-mine artillery of battleships and cruisers required a significant increase in speed (up to 30 knots and more) and the strengthening of artillery and torpedo weapons of light cruisers and destroyers. The old types of these ships could no longer perform their tasks in squadron combat.
In 1910, the construction of new destroyers of the Novik type began at the Putilov Plant, and in 1913 - light cruisers of the Svetlana type. The first destroyer entered service in 1913, but the cruisers could not be completed during the war (151) .
The experience of using mine weapons in the Russian-Japanese war revealed the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping minefields - minelayers and minesweepers

However, in all fleets, with the exception of the Russian fleet, no attention was paid to the construction of such ships. It was believed that with the outbreak of war, merchant ships could be equipped for such ships. In Russia, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and in 1910 the world's first underwater minelayer "Crab" was laid. The construction of special minesweepers of the Zapal type also began.
In the prewar years, insufficient attention was paid in the West European fleets to the construction of submarines. This was due to two reasons. Firstly, the then dominant naval doctrine of "ownership of the sea" assigned the submarine one of the last places in the struggle at sea, since victory was achieved, as she believed, by linear forces in a pitched battle. Secondly, in previous wars, the submarine has not yet revealed its combat capabilities. This happened already during the First World War. As a result, by the beginning of the war, its main participants had a small number of submarines in their fleets. France had 38 of them, Germany - 28, Russia - 23. And only England had 76 boats, but among them there were many obsolete ones. One of the best submarines of pre-war projects was considered to be Russian submarines of the Bars type, laid down in 1912.

In the prewar years, work began on the creation of seaplanes in the largest imperialist states. Several types of such machines were designed and built, but almost all of them did not leave the stage of experimental testing before the start of the war. It was only during the course of the war that the fleets began to receive aircraft suitable for solving combat missions, among them the Avro (England), Borel (France), Flugbot (Germany) (154).
The situation was different in Russia. Russian aircraft designer D. P. Grigorovich in 1912-1913. created several models of the M-type seaplane (M-1, M-2, M-4, M-5), which immediately found practical application in the fleet. The M-5 aircraft turned out to be especially successful. He had high tactical flight qualities (flight weight - 660 kg, payload - 300 kg, ceiling - 4450 m, speed - 128 km / h). In 1914, he was accepted into service with the fleet as a naval reconnaissance officer. It remained in the hydroaviation until 1921. The M-9 aircraft, created by Grigorovich in 1916, had higher tactical flight data.

Russian engineers also took care of special ships - carriers of seaplanes. In 1913, engineer Shishkov designed a high-speed air transport that could take up to seven aircraft. Since the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was equipped with several such aircraft, the aircraft of which carried out aerial reconnaissance and covered the ships of the squadron from the air in remote areas of the sea.
The development of various classes of ships, the increase in the number of submarines in the fleet and their combat capabilities, as well as the emergence of naval aviation, required further improvement of all types of weapons and the creation of new means of combat. Particular attention was paid to improving the tactical and technical data of naval artillery, since it continued to be the main weapon of the fleet. By the beginning of the First World War, the caliber of heavy guns had increased to 356 - 381 mm, mine artillery - up to 152 mm; anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of up to 76 mm appeared. also increased starting speed shells - up to 950 m / s, the rate of fire of large guns - up to two rounds per minute, the firing range - up to 120 cables (156).
At the same time, the relative weight of the shells increased, their penetrating and high-explosive actions increased, as the shells began to be filled with stronger explosives; improved methods of controlling artillery fire. The art of fire control has always been the most important factor in the battle of surface ships.

Speaking of this, it should be noted that the English fleet entered the first world war less prepared for artillery combat than the German fleet. In terms of range, the British and German guns of the main calibers were approximately the same. But the high-explosive shells of the British, which had sensitive fuses, did not penetrate the armor of the German ships, and in the event of penetration they did not cause major damage. The German shells, on the other hand, pierced the weaker armor of the English ships and caused severe damage. The British were also unable to develop their own artillery fire control system before the war. Already in the course of the war, they realized that they were lagging behind in this matter, and used many of the Russian methods of controlling fire (157).
A major contribution to the development of artillery weapons was made by Russian engineers and gunners-sailors. Before the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm (158). The production of three-gun ship turrets also began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov factory F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky were pioneers in the creation of a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm (159).

The Russo-Japanese War had a particularly great influence on the development of torpedo and mine weapons. The improvement of the torpedo went along the line of increasing its destructive power, firing range and speed. The most common in all fleets was the 450-mm torpedo, which had a range of 16 cables (about 3000 m) at a speed of 29 knots. In some fleets during the war, ships were armed with torpedoes of larger calibers (500, 530 and 550 mm), with a speed of 45 knots at a distance of 15 cables.
In Russia, in the prewar period, three new models of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910 and 1912), which surpassed the same type of torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, despite the fact that they had a slightly lower total weight and charge weight (160) .
Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes appeared. The first such (three-pipe) apparatus was produced in 1913 at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg. He provided volley fire with a fan, the methods of which were developed and mastered by Russian torpedoists before the start of the war.
The development of mine weapons was characterized by an increase in the mine charge to 150 kg, consisting of a stronger explosive (tol), improved fuses, and an increase in speed and depth of setting. On the eve of the war, the fleets were armed with shock and galvanic impact mines. During the war, antenna mines appeared, and at the very end of it, magnetic mines.

The first place in the development of mine weapons was occupied by the Russian fleet. Before the World War, the Russian fleet developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 model and the 1912 model. According to the tactical and technical data, these mines were much superior to foreign ones, especially in the reliability of action. In 1913, a floating mine "P-13" was designed, which was kept under water at a certain depth due to the action of an electric navigation device. Mines of old samples of this type were kept under water with the help of buoys that did not ensure the stability of the mine, especially in stormy weather. "P-13" had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tol and could stay at a given recess for three days. None of the foreign fleets had a similar mine. Russian miners created the world's first river mine "R" ("Rybka").
At the beginning of the war, Russian designers of mine weapons and practical miners provided great assistance to the allied English fleet in organizing the production of mines and training personnel in the methods of using mine weapons, since the British were far behind in this matter. At the request of the British Admiralty, a group of miners was sent to England with a supply of mines in 1000 pieces.

The Russian fleet went ahead of foreign fleets also in the creation of more advanced models of minesweeping weapons. In 1911, undercutting kite and boat trawls entered service. The use of these trawls significantly reduced the time of minesweeper work, since mines that were cut and floated to the surface were immediately destroyed. Previously, mines had to be towed to a shallow place and destroyed there, which took a lot of time.
The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio has become a common means of communication in the navy in general, and in particular it has found wide application in command and control of forces in battle. Before the war, Russian radio engineers created radio direction finders, which made it possible to use radio as a means of reconnaissance.

Organization and management

The navies of the major imperialist states (Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and others) consisted of fleets (flotillas) deployed in different maritime theaters. The fleet (naval forces of the theater) was the highest operational formation, which, depending on the composition of its forces, goals and the nature of the war, could solve not only operational, but also strategic tasks.

The squadron was the main operational formation of battle forces (battleships, battleships and armored cruisers) in all fleets, with the exception of the Turkish one. Squadrons could be homogeneous, consisting of ships of the same class (for example, battleships or cruisers), and mixed, which included ships of different classes (battleships, cruisers, destroyers). If there were several squadrons in one theater, they were reduced to large operational formations (for example, the British 1st, 2nd and 3rd fleets). From light surface forces (light cruisers, destroyers, destroyers), submarines and ships special purpose(minelayers, minesweepers, patrol ships, gunboats, etc.) created homogeneous or mixed (again, depending on the availability of ships of these classes) operational and tactical formations - flotillas, divisions, brigades, divisions, detachments. At the same time, it should be noted that the same type of formations in different fleets had different names. For example, formations of destroyers and destroyers in the English, German, French and Austro-Hungarian fleets were called flotillas, in Russian - divisions, and in Italian - brigades, regardless of the number of ships that were part of them. The numerical composition of associations and formations was the most diverse.

Naval command organization different countries was also different. In England, the main governing body of the fleet was the Admiralty, which in the fall of 1911 was headed by W. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty (Minister of the Navy). The Admiralty was engaged in planning the construction of the fleet and its combat training, developing plans of operations and managing military operations on an operational-strategic scale. In the English naval forces there was still the post of the first sea lord, that is, the commander in chief of all fleets. This post was held by Admiral Lord Fisher from October 1914. In 1912, the Naval General Staff was created, but before the start of the war it did not find its place in the fleet management system. The Chief of the Naval General Staff at the beginning of the war was Vice Admiral Sturdy, and from November 1, 1914, Rear Admiral Oliver (163). The rights and obligations of the commanders of individual fleets were limited to the development and conduct of combat operations on an operational-tactical scale, the combat training of the personnel of ships and formations and their maintenance in a combat-ready state.

The supreme command of the naval forces in Germany belonged undividedly to the Kaiser, who was subordinate to: the Naval Ministry (State Secretariat of the Imperial Naval Administration), headed by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet, headed by Admiral Müller, and the Admiral Staff (Naval General Staff) , led by Admiral Pohl. The Naval Ministry was in charge of the organization, management and material support of the fleet. It had no direct influence on the management of the combat activities of the fleet during the war. The Naval Cabinet dealt mainly with the recruitment and service of officers. The Admiral Staff, as an organ of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (Kaiser), carried out the development of plans of operations, the distribution of forces among naval theaters in accordance with the tasks assigned to the fleet. The commanders of forces in the North and Baltic Seas were directly subordinate to the Kaiser. They were responsible for combat training, manning, the technical condition of the ship's composition, and in wartime, for the conduct of hostilities of their fleets (164). As can be seen from the above structure of the fleet control bodies and the functions they performed, in Germany, in fact, there was no high naval command that would be fully responsible for waging war at sea. This circumstance had an extremely unfavorable effect on the combat activity of the fleet.

At the head of the management of the naval forces of France was the Minister of Marine with his operational body - the Naval General Staff. He was directly subordinate to the commander of the fleet of the Mediterranean Sea and the commander of the naval forces of the Channel. The General Staff developed plans for operations and supervised their implementation.

The commander-in-chief of the Italian fleet (he is also the commander of the first squadron), the Duke of Abrutsk, was subordinate to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral di Rivel, who was in charge of the combat activities of the fleet. The Naval Ministry, with its directorates and departments, was in charge of shipbuilding, manning and mobilization, all types of weapons, the development of coastal defense, as well as the equipment of naval bases and ports and the logistics of the fleet, i.e., everything related to general preparation of the fleet for war (166).
In Austria-Hungary, the fleet was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. The Maritime Ministry did not exist. Its functions were performed by the Naval Department of the War Ministry. The head of this department had great independence and could personally report to the emperor on all the most important issues of building, maintaining and managing the fleet.

In Turkey, the fleet management system was violated before the start of hostilities in the Black Sea. With the arrival of the German cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau", the German Admiral Souchon became the commander of the naval forces, who often gave orders over the head of the Minister of the Navy, Ahmet Dzhemal.
The Naval Ministry, which since 1911 was headed by Admiral I.K. Grigorovich, was the governing body of the naval forces of Russia as a whole. The Naval Ministry included: the Admiralty Council, chaired directly by the Minister of Marine, the Main Naval Headquarters, the Main Naval Court, the Main Naval Ship Administration, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding, the Main Hydrographic Directorate, the Main Marine Economic Directorate and other departments, departments and divisions (169).

In 1906, the Naval General Staff was created, which was entrusted with solving strategic problems, planning the construction of the fleet, conducting its mobilization, and directing the general preparation of naval forces for war. The establishment of the Naval General Staff was a positive factor in the restoration of the Russian naval forces. With its creation, the functions of the Main Naval Staff changed significantly, which now was in charge of the personnel of the fleet, combat, administrative and military training units, as well as the legislative part of the maritime department (170).
In addition to naval formations and formations, the naval command in England, Germany and Italy was completely subordinate to the coastal defense of the country, including sea fortresses, naval bases and military ports with their garrisons.

This had a positive effect on the organization and conduct of coastal defense in these countries. This was not the case in other states. In France, for example, there was a dual system of subordination of coastal defense. The entire coast of the country was divided into maritime districts, each of which was divided into several sectors. At the head of the district was the naval commander, but in relation to the command ground forces of his district, he reported directly to the Minister of War. Naval or army officers were appointed as heads of sectors, depending on which forces prevailed there. In Austria-Hungary, coastal defense was the responsibility of the War Ministry. As for Russia, before the start of the war, there was no unified system of coastal defense on a national scale. The land defense of most naval fortresses and naval bases and ports was under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry. The commanders of naval bases (ports) and the heads of their garrisons (commandants) were independent of each other. Only in one Sevastopol the commandant of the fortress was subordinate to the chief commander of the port (171).
Picking system
There was no unified system for manning fleets with rank and file. In some countries, it was carried out by free hiring (recruitment), in others - by military service, and in others - by a mixed system, partly by recruitment, partly by military service.
In England, the rank and file of the fleet was completed by free hiring. Those who wanted to serve in the Navy signed a contract for 5 or 12 years, with subsequent continuation of service with a positive certification for another 6 years for the first and 10 years for the second. Those who signed a contract for 5 years were immediately sent to the ships as sailors of the 2nd article, and those who had a contract for 12 years entered junior schools, after which they were sent to ships and continued to serve as sailors there, receiving a promotion in the articles. The best of them were promoted to non-commissioned officers. For the training of junior specialists in artillery and mine specialties, there were schools for foremen, where cadets who graduated from schools were accepted. In other specialties, there were no schools for either foremen or for officers. Personnel on them were prepared in a practical way, right on the ships. After passing the relevant exams, non-commissioned officers were promoted to officers. To improve the skills of artillerymen, miners and navigators, there were special classes. In England there was a Naval Academy, but with a very short training period - only 4 months. Senior officers and admirals were accepted into it.

The system of manning the fleet adopted in England had the positive side that, as a result of long service, the personnel received extensive experience and good maritime training. But this system did not ensure the accumulation of the reserve. That is why, already during the war, the British were forced to partially introduce military service.
The German fleet was recruited for military service, as well as at the expense of the Jung and volunteers. The term of service in the Navy was set at three years, after which enrollment in the reserve of various degrees followed until the age of 40. The junior officers and specialists of the fleet were recruited from young graduates of the school and volunteers after appropriate training. Mechanical engineers for the fleet were trained from persons who graduated from secondary technical schools and had experience practical work in shipyards. They were sent to serve on ships, and then, after a year of training in the class of marine engineers, they were promoted to the exam in the mechanical engineer of the fleet. The German Naval Academy had a two-year term of study.

The officers of the English and German fleets were recruited according to the class principle - from the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Only mechanical engineers of the German Navy could come from other classes.
In France, the fleet manning system was quite complicated. The rank and file of the fleet was completed on the basis of the so-called naval record, the recruitment of "hunters" and general military service. The “marine record” consisted in the fact that the entire male population of the coastal strip of France aged 18 to 50 years was assigned to the fleet in relation to military service. However, in practice, the "recorded" served in the Navy for no more than 45 months, and then they could, if desired, either continue their service or be transferred to the reserve. The "recorded" enjoyed a number of privileges in receiving pensions, awards and sea fishing. In 1912, the period of compulsory service for them was reduced to 2 years. Those who remained to serve further had the right of their choice to enter the schools of naval specialists and advance in the service up to the officer rank.
When recruiting "hunters", a contract was concluded for 5 years according to the naval specialty chosen by them. The missing number of recruits after the admission of "recorded" and "hunters" was replenished through military service with a mandatory service period of 2 years. In the French fleet, as in other fleets, there was a junior school, which provided the main contingent for schools of junior fleet specialists.

The Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets were recruited for military service from the population of coastal districts or persons who, before being drafted, had something to do with the sea (merchant sailors, fishermen) or the fleet (shipbuilders). In the Italian Navy, in addition, there was a cabin boy school. Terms of service: in the Austro-Hungarian fleet - 12 years, of which 4 years in active service, 5 years in the reserve and 3 years in the militia; in Italian, 4 years in active service and 8 years in reserve. For the training of junior specialists and officer cadres, there were appropriate schools and colleges (175).
The officer corps of the Austro-Hungarian fleet was formed taking into account not only the class, but also the national principle. The vast majority were Austrian Germans.

The rank and file, in addition to the Germans, was made up of Hungarians, Italians and representatives of the Slavic peoples.
The recruitment system of the Russian fleet was almost entirely based on conscription. According to the regulation approved in 1912, upon reaching military age and fit for health reasons, all persons who had navigational ranks and the ranks of ship mechanics, as well as those who sailed on merchant ships as sailors, helmsmen and stokers, were necessarily involved in the service in the navy upon reaching military age and fit for health reasons. Further, preference was given to recruits from factory workers who had specialties in metalwork and assembly, turning, boiler and blacksmithing, minders, electricians, telegraph operators and other specialists.

Therefore, among the rank and file of the fleet there was always a significant layer of factory workers, which created favorable conditions for the development of the revolutionary movement in the fleet. The missing part of the rank and file was recruited from the inhabitants of the coastal and riverine regions of the country.
The total service life for the ratings of the fleet was set at 10 years, of which 5 years in active service and 5 years in reserve (177).
In the prewar years, a Jung school was opened for the Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt. By creating it, the Naval Ministry not only had in mind the improvement of the quality of training of the fleet personnel, but also pursued political goals. Through the Jung school, it hoped to train servicemen devoted to the tsarist autocracy, who could be used in the fight against the revolutionary movement in the navy. However, calculations royal authorities and in this case they were not justified. Despite the brutal repressions and attempts to create a certain layer of trustworthy among the personnel, the revolutionary movement in the navy grew more and more.

For the training of non-commissioned officer rank specialists in the Baltic and Black Seas, there were training detachments, which included artillery and mine schools. In addition, they created various schools, classes and training teams that were not part of the training detachments: engine schools and schools of helmsmen and signalmen of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, a diving school (common for both fleets), a diving school of the Baltic Fleet, paramedic schools in Kronstadt and Nikolaev, training teams of combat non-commissioned officers - Baltic and Black Sea fleets, etc.

The officers of the fleet were recruited from the children of the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and officials. People from other strata of the population were also admitted to engineering schools. Training of officers was carried out in the Naval Corps, special classes and the Naval Academy.
During the First World War, in many countries the system of manning the fleets with privates and officers underwent significant changes. The war caused a large expenditure of naval personnel. Recruitment and training of replacements could not be carried out according to pre-war norms and principles. The terms of training were reduced, some qualification restrictions were abolished in the service of officers, and admission to the officer corps was expanded for people from petty-bourgeois strata.

combat training

In the English and German fleets, combat training was carried out almost all year round. It usually began with a single preparation of the ship, then tactical exercises of homogeneous and heterogeneous formations followed, and as a result, final maneuvers of large formations and formations were carried out. In England, the maneuvers were predominantly operational in nature; Germany conducted bilateral tactical and operational maneuvers.
In the German Navy, much attention was paid to artillery firing, which was carried out at long distances against shields equal in area to ships. In terms of the level of artillery training, the British fleet was significantly inferior to the German one. The well-known English naval historian X. Wilson later admitted that “in the first period of the war british ships... discovered in this respect a significant and very dangerous weakness compared to the Germans.

In both fleets, the destroyers carried out salvo torpedo firing, and the German destroyers, in addition, practiced daytime torpedo attacks. The Germans set up training minefields, and then they were cleared out by minesweepers equipped with obsolete destroyers.
In the English and German fleets great importance was attached to the naval training of personnel and the training of formations in joint navigation. A major shortcoming in the combat training of both fleets was that they did not prepare for joint operations with the ground forces. If we talk about the level of combat training in general, then in the German fleet it was somewhat higher than in the English, especially in the field of tactics and the use of weapons. In other Western European fleets, combat training did not have any significant differences, except that it was carried out at a lower level compared to the fleets of Germany and England.

The Turkish fleet occupied a special position in terms of combat training. The rank and file of the fleet was recruited mainly at the expense of peasants of the Muslim faith. Cadres of junior specialists of the fleet and non-commissioned officers were not being trained. The states of the officers on the ships and in the units were incredibly inflated. By the beginning of the war, there were 8 for 10 sailors.
According to German officer Herman Lorey, who served in the Turkish Navy during the war years, Turkish warships were “mainly “floating barracks”, and life on them was reduced to food, uniforms and theoretical education... Only a small part of the personnel was on the ships, but even that did not swim, but spent time in inactivity in sheltered harbors ”(180). After the war with Russia 1877-1878. Turkish ships did not leave the Bosporus for the Black Sea until the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). “... Therefore,” Lorey continues, “the personnel were not used to the sea and had no maritime experience” (181).

Further, he notes major shortcomings in the organization of certain types of combat training (artillery and torpedo firing, ensuring the survivability of a ship in battle, navigation, etc.), poor provision of the fleet with combat stock, fuel and other types of supplies. Finishing the characteristic Turkish fleet By the beginning of the war, Lorey writes that “by the time the German ships arrived, mobilization was in full swing, but neither the ships nor the shipyards showed any preparations for hostilities” (182). In many ways, Lorey was, of course, right. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Lorey and other Germans, who arrived in the Turkish fleet along with the Goeben and Breslau or later, tried in every possible way to inflate their role in the “transformation” of the Turkish fleet after the war. The fighting on the Black Sea during the war showed that if we exclude the German ships that were part of the Turkish fleet, then the latter made very little progress in its combat capability.
A little more detail should be given to the combat training of the Russian fleet, since it had some characteristic features. The advanced officers of the Russian fleet had a hard time experiencing the tragedy of Tsushima. They paid attention primarily to the combat training of personnel. And, I must say, we have achieved considerable results in this direction, especially in the Baltic Fleet.

In the Baltic Sea, the combat training of the fleet was led by Vice Admiral N. O. Essen, who largely adhered to the views of S. O. Makarov. Since 1906, he commanded the 1st mine division of the fleet, based on the ice-free port of Libau. The ships of the division sailed all year round, regardless of meteorological conditions, which contributed to the development of endurance, courage, initiative and perseverance in the personnel in achieving the set goal, that is, those combat qualities that were required in the war. The 1st Mine Division became a combat training school; many commanders of ships and fleet formations passed through it in the prewar years (183). In November 1908, N. O. Essen was appointed head of the united detachments of the Baltic Sea. The first important event that he carried out on a fleet scale was to bring together previously disparate ships and detachments into formations capable of solving operational and tactical tasks.

A major shortcoming in the combat training of the Russian fleet over a long period was the practice of predominantly raid exercises. Due to the economy of material resources, ships went to sea, as a rule, only in summer time, and even then not for long. Now fundamental changes were made to the organization of combat training. A stage-by-stage training system was introduced: first, a single ship was trained, then a tactical formation (a division, a brigade of ships), then a large formation (a division of ships) and, finally, at the end of the campaign, maneuvers of the entire operating fleet.
Much attention in the Baltic Fleet was paid to artillery preparation. The Russian ships of the pre-war period, in terms of the power of their artillery weapons, were somewhat inferior to the ships of the same type of the German fleet (184). Therefore, equality or superiority over the enemy could only be achieved through the art of artillery shooting. The number of practical shootings was significantly increased, and the provision of their ammunition was improved. In 1910, special devices were introduced for training gunners to control the fire of a single ship and devices for quick loading of guns.

An important place in terms of the war on the Baltic Sea was given to defensive minelaying. To implement them, advance and thorough preparation was required, especially since the Baltic Fleet did not have a sufficient number of special minelayers. In the autumn of 1909, a detachment of minelayers was formed, which, in the spring of the following year, began intensive combat training aimed at carrying out minelaying, determined by the war plan. The ships of the detachment and destroyers of the 1st mine division practiced laying training mines in the areas of future defensive minefields.
No less seriously was organized in the fleet training for use in future war torpedo weapons. New types of torpedoes (1908, 1910, 1912) were put into service, which required a comprehensive test. The carriers of torpedo weapons - destroyers and submarines - also became others. It was necessary to develop more advanced methods of torpedo firing. The center for combat training in the use of torpedo weapons was the 1st mine division of the fleet. Here, new torpedoes were tested and a method was developed for salvo fire on the area from three destroyers armed with three single-tube devices. Since 1910, combat training in the use of torpedo weapons has also been developed in the submarine brigade of the Baltic Fleet.

The boats were involved in all the exercises and maneuvers of the fleet, during which they practiced the methods of attacking warships and transports. In 1912, submariners developed a method of volley firing with a fan. It was tested in torpedo firing 1912-1913. and gave satisfactory results.
In the prewar period, the command of the Baltic Fleet showed particular concern for the preparation of fleet formations for battle at the mine-artillery position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In 1911-1913. Numerous exercises and maneuvers were held here to practice fleet formations of joint combat maneuvering in position, to increase the effectiveness of artillery firing and torpedo attacks, the pace and accuracy of laying mines, etc. (185)
Much attention was paid to the development of joint operations of the fleet with the ground forces. Strategic and operational games and exercises were carried out. In the winter of 1912, a game was held to defend the capital - St. Petersburg - from an enemy landing, and in the summer - the teachings of the 2nd mine division and troops of the 22nd army corps to defend the skerry area.

AT common system combat training, considerable importance was attached to the study of the maritime theater. Despite the defensive nature of the Russian plan for the war in the Baltic Sea, the fleet command did not lose hope for active operations in the southern part of the sea. Floating in this area, Russian ships determined the places of future active minefields, possible positions of submarines, trained in conducting all types of naval reconnaissance, including radio engineering.
On the whole, the combat training of the Baltic Fleet in the pre-war years corresponded to the tasks that were set for the fleet by the plan for the war in the Baltic Sea. Thanks to a seriously thought-out personnel training system, the Baltic Fleet, greatly weakened during the Russo-Japanese War, has become a significant force in a relatively short period of time (5 - 6 years). A great merit in this belonged to the progressive part of the officer corps, which followed the best fighting traditions of the Russian fleet.

The situation with combat training in the Black Sea Fleet was different. There was no that painstaking and purposeful work on training personnel, which was carried out in the Baltic. Attempts by the fleet command to direct combat training to solve the tasks arising from the war plan did not lead to the desired results. In 1912-1913.

Black Sea Fleet actually did not conduct combat training. The command of the fleet was frightened by the upsurge of the revolutionary movement that had begun in the country, which also seized the Black Sea Fleet, and in August 1912 introduced martial law in the fleet, refusing combat training. The events in the Balkans - the Balkan wars - had a negative impact on the combat training of the Black Sea Fleet in the prewar years. The tsarist government, fearing the direct intervention of Germany and Austria-Hungary in these wars and the weakening of its positions in the struggle for the Black Sea straits, for nine months from the end of 1912 kept the Black Sea Fleet in four hours of readiness to go to sea. The fleet did not conduct final maneuvers in 1913 (186). Planned combat training in the fleet resumed only with the start summer campaign 1914 and took place in the tense atmosphere of the last pre-war weeks. It was impossible to make up for lost time in previous years in a short time.

Thus, the Russian naval forces on the Black Sea entered the war insufficiently prepared in combat terms. The Black Sea sailors had to correct the situation already during the war. True, the enemy of the Black Sea Fleet was not the one that opposed the Baltic Fleet. However, the appearance of the German ships Goebena and Breslau on the Black Sea complicated the situation and required additional combat efforts from the Black Sea Fleet.

F. S. Krinitsyn

Military action at sea in World War I mainly consisted of a naval blockade by the Entente fleets of Germany and German attempts to disrupt British and French shipping with submarines and raiders.

background

Naval arms race between the British Empire and German Empire was one of the most important causes of the First World War. Germany wanted to increase her navy to a size that would allow German overseas trade not to depend on the goodwill of Britain. However, the increase in the German fleet to a size comparable to the British fleet inevitably threatened the very existence of the British Empire.

Technology

The main type of warship in World War I was the battleship, modeled after the dreadnought. Naval aviation was just beginning its development. Submarines and sea mines played an important role.

Revealing the German code

On August 26, 1914, the Russian cruisers Pallada and Bogatyr captured the code book from the German light cruiser Magdeburg, which ran aground near Osmussaar Island in the Gulf of Finland. The Russian authorities handed over the book to the British Admiralty, which played a decisive role in revealing the German naval code. The disclosure of the code subsequently had a huge impact both on the fighting at sea and on the course of the war as a whole.

North Sea

Theaters of war

North Sea

The North Sea was the main theater of war for surface ships. Here the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet confronted each other. The much larger British fleet supported the blockade of Germany, cutting it off from overseas resources. The German fleet mostly remained in the harbor, waiting for an advantageous situation to fight.

There were several major battles: the Battle of Heligoland, the Battle of Dogger Bank, the Battle of Jutland, and the Second Battle of Heligoland. In general, the British fleet, although not always tactically successful, was able to maintain the blockade and keep the German fleet in the harbor, although until the end of the war the German fleet remained a serious threat, chaining most of the British forces to itself.

Atlantic Ocean

While Germany was experiencing significant difficulties due to the British naval blockade, the British mother country was heavily dependent on imported food and raw materials. The Germans found that their submarines, although ineffective against surface warships, did well against merchant ships and could easily patrol the Atlantic even with the dominance of British forces on the surface of the sea. In 1915, the Germans attempted to blockade Britain with submarines. They managed to cause significant damage to British shipping, but failed to stop it.

Black Sea

At the beginning of the war, neither the Russian nor the Ottoman Empire had dreadnoughts on the Black Sea. Two dreadnoughts built for the Turkish fleet in England were requisitioned at the start of the war and incorporated into the Royal Navy under the names HMS Erin and HMS Agincourt. The best ships of the Turkish fleet were cruisers SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau from the German Mediterranean squadron. In 1914 they were transferred by Germany to the Ottoman Empire and played a decisive role in subsequent events.

The war on the Black Sea began in October 1914 with the German-Turkish forces bombarding coastal Russian cities. In 1916, the Black Sea Fleet received new dreadnoughts - "Empress Maria" and "Empress Catherine the Great", which radically changed the balance of power.

Soon after October revolution in Petrograd, the Black Sea Fleet lost its combat capability. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the government of Lenin and Germany, the main fleet base in Sevastopol came under the control of the Germans.

Baltic Sea

The Baltic Sea was regarded by the leading maritime powers - Great Britain and Germany - as a secondary theater. The British believed that the Russian fleet, which was slowly recovering after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, would not be able to provide any significant assistance to the British fleet, and the Germans were primarily afraid of the British fleet, so they kept only obsolete ships in the Baltic. The main combat mission of the Russian fleet was to resist the penetration of the enemy into the Gulf of Finland by fighting in a pre-prepared position. To solve this problem, a defensive position was assigned in the narrowness of the bay formed by Norgen Island and Cape Porkalla-Udd - the so-called central mine-artillery position. Military operations in the Baltic began on July 31. At 0656, Russian minelayers, under the cover of battleships, began to lay the first mines.

Capture of Magdeburg

On August 26, 1914, an event took place in the Baltic that had a significant impact on the further course of the war. In the Gulf of Finland near the island of Osmussaar, the German light cruiser Magdeburg ran aground. Attempts to save the ship ended in failure and it was soon captured by the approaching Russian cruisers Bogatyr and Pallada. The main success was the cruiser's signal book raised from the sea, which was then transferred to the British Admiralty, which played a decisive role in revealing the German naval code. The disclosure of the code subsequently had a significant impact, both on military operations at sea and on the course of the war as a whole.

The initial period of the war

On October 11, the Pallada cruiser was sunk by a torpedo from the German submarine U-26. In mid-October, two British submarines broke into the Baltic. On November 17, the German cruiser Friedrich Carl was hit by mines and sank. At the end of 1914, four new battleships Poltava, Gangut, Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol were completed, which changed the balance of power in the Baltic Sea.

On January 25, 1915, the German cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle were blown up by mines and damaged.

On June 19, 1915, the Battle of Gotland took place between the Russian and German detachments of cruisers. The German mine layer "Albatross" was sunk.

Defense of the Gulf of Riga in 1915

On August 8, 1915, German forces, consisting of 7 battleships, 6 cruisers, 24 destroyers and 14 minesweepers, tried to break into the Gulf of Riga through the Irben Strait. They were opposed by the battleship Slava, the gunboats Groziychy, Brave, Sivuch, the mine layer Amur, 16 destroyers and a division of submarines. At 4 o'clock in the morning, German minesweepers began to make a passage in the minefield. They were noticed by Russian planes, soon the gunboats "Grozyashchiy" and "Brave" and destroyers approached the battlefield, which opened fire on the minesweepers. At 10:30, the battleship Slava arrived at the battlefield and entered into an artillery duel with two German battleships, the Alsace and Braunschweig. Having lost two minesweepers T-52 and T-58 on the mines, the Germans abandoned their attempt to break through. On August 10-15, the minelayer Amur laid an additional minefield in the Irben Strait.

On August 16, German forces repeated their attempt to break through the Irben Strait. During the day, the Germans managed to mine the Irben Strait, although they lost a minesweeper T-46. Slava was forced to withdraw after the battle with the German battleships Nassau and Posen. On the night of August 17, the German destroyers V-99 and V-100 entered the Gulf of Riga. In a battle with the Russian destroyer Novik, the V-99 was damaged, and then hit by mines and was flooded by the crew. On the afternoon of August 17, Slava again engaged in battle with the battleships Nassau and Posen, received three hits and retreated to Moonsund. On August 19, the German destroyer S-31 was blown up by mines and sank, and the British submarine E-1 torpedoed the German cruiser Moltke. After that, the German forces left the Gulf of Riga.

Battle for the Gulf of Riga 1917

On October 12-20, 1917, a battle took place between the German and Russian fleets for the Moonsund Islands, during which the German fleet landed troops on the islands of Ezel, Moon and Dago, captured them and, having cleared minefields in the Irben Strait, broke into the Gulf of Riga.

The revolution

After the October Revolution, the Russian fleet completely lost its combat capability. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Russian army and navy were to leave coastal fortifications in Finland and Estonia, which were gaining independence. In May 1918, the ice hike Baltic Fleet: the ships were withdrawn through the ice from Reval and Helsingfors to Kronstadt. The transition was made on the initiative of the commander of the fleet, Admiral A. M. Shchastny, contrary to the order of the Bolshevik government. For violation of the order to surrender the fleet to the Germans on June 22, 1918, Admiral Shchastny was shot on the personal orders of the Bolshevik People's Commissariat for Military Affairs L. D. Trotsky

Pacific and Indian Ocean

A small part of the German naval forces, located in the Pacific Ocean, participated in raider operations from the beginning of the war. The German cruiser Emden in the battle of Penang destroyed the Russian cruiser Zhemchug and the French destroyer Mosquet (Musket) with a surprise attack in the port and sank about thirty merchant ships in raid operations before being sunk in battle off the Cocos Islands.

The German East Asia cruising squadron of Admiral Maximilian von Spee in the battle of Coronel defeated the cruising squadron of Rear Admiral K. Cradock, sinking the armored cruisers HMS Good Hope and HMS Monmout. In December 1914, this squadron was destroyed in the battle of the Falkland Islands.

The German cruiser "Königsberg" at the beginning of the war was in Dar es Salaam, the capital of German East Africa. He also carried out several operations: he captured an English steamer in the Gulf of Aden, fired at the coast of Madagascar; September 20, 1914 in the port of the island of Zanzibar sank the English cruiser Pegasus. July 11, 1915 "Königsberg" was sunk in the Rufiji Delta in a battle with four British ships.

Before the outbreak of the First World War, the great powers paid great attention to their naval forces, and large-scale naval programs were being implemented. Therefore, when the war began, the leading countries had numerous and powerful fleets. A particularly stubborn rivalry in building up naval power was between Great Britain and Germany. The British at that time possessed the most powerful navy and merchant fleet, which made it possible to control strategic communications in the oceans, to link together numerous colonies and dominions.

In 1897, the German Navy was significantly inferior to the British Navy. The British had 57 class I, II, III battleships, the Germans had 14 (4:1 ratio), the British had 15 coastal defense battleships, the Germans had 8, the British had 18 armored cruisers, the Germans had 4 (4.5:1 ratio). ), the British had 125 cruisers of classes 1-3, the Germans had 32 (4: 1), the Germans were inferior in other combat units.

Arms race

The British wanted not only to maintain the advantage, but also to increase it. In 1889, Parliament passed a law that allocated more funds for the development of the fleet. London's naval policy was based on the principle that the British Navy was to outperform the two fleets of the most powerful maritime powers.

Berlin initially did not pay much attention to the development of the fleet and the capture of colonies, Chancellor Bismarck did not see much point in this, believing that the main efforts should be directed to European politics, the development of the army. But under Emperor Wilhelm II, priorities were revised, Germany begins the struggle for colonies and the construction of a powerful fleet. In March 1898, the Reichstag passed the "Law on the Navy", which provided for a sharp increase in the Navy. Within 6 years (1898-1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 17 armored cruisers and 63 destroyers. The shipbuilding programs of Germany were subsequently constantly adjusted upwards - in 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the fleet was planned to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. Particular attention was paid to battleships: in the period from 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid in Germany annually (in previous years, two).

In London, it was believed that German naval efforts posed a great threat to Britain's strategic interests. England intensified the naval arms race. The task was to have 60% more battleships than the Germans. Since 1905, the British began to build battleships of a new type - "dreadnoughts" (after the name of the first ship of this class). They differed from squadron battleships in that they had stronger weapons, were better armored, with more powerful power plant, large displacement, etc.

Battleship Dreadnought.

Germany responded by building its own dreadnoughts. Already in 1908, the British had 8 dreadnoughts, and the Germans had 7 (some were in the process of being completed). The ratio of "pre-dreadnoughts" (squadron battleships) was in favor of Britain: 51 against 24 German. In 1909, London decided to build two of its own for every German dreadnought.

The British tried to maintain their naval power through diplomacy. At the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, they proposed limiting the scale of building new warships. But the Germans, believing that only Britain would benefit from this step, rejected this proposal. The naval arms race between England and Germany continued until the First World War. By its beginning, Germany had firmly taken the position of the second military maritime power, overtaking Russia and France.

Other great powers - France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, etc., also tried to build up their naval armaments, but for a number of reasons, including financial problems, they could not achieve such impressive success.

The Importance of the Fleets

The fleets had to perform a number of important tasks. Firstly, to protect the coast of countries, their ports, important cities (for example, the main purpose of the Russian Baltic Fleet is the protection of St. Petersburg). Secondly, the fight against the enemy Naval Forces, support of its ground forces from the sea. Thirdly, the protection of sea lanes, strategically important points, especially Britain and France, they owned huge colonial empires. Fourthly, to ensure the status of the country, a powerful navy showed the position of the power in the world informal table of ranks.

The basis of the then naval strategy and tactics was a linear battle. In theory, the two fleets were supposed to line up and in an artillery duel to find out who was the winner. Therefore, the fleet was based on squadron battleships and armored cruisers, and then dreadnoughts (from 1912-1913 and superdreadnoughts) and battlecruisers. Battlecruisers had weaker armor and artillery, but were faster and had a longer range. Squadron battleships (battleships of the pre-dreadnought type), armored cruisers were not written off, but they were brought to the background, ceasing to be the main striking force. Light cruisers were supposed to carry out raids on enemy sea lanes. Destroyers and destroyers were intended for torpedo strikes, the destruction of enemy transports. Their combat survivability was based on speed, maneuverability and stealth. The Navy also included special-purpose ships: minelayers (set sea mines), minesweepers (made passages in minefields), seaplane transports (hydrocruisers), etc. The role of the submarine fleet was constantly growing.

United Kingdom

The British at the beginning of the war had 20 dreadnoughts, 9 battlecruisers, 45 old battleships, 25 armored and 83 light cruisers, 289 destroyers and destroyers, 76 submarines (most outdated, they could not operate on the high seas). I must say that, despite all the power of the British fleet, its leadership was very conservative. New items hardly found their way (especially those not related to the linear fleet). Even Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, a naval theorist and historian, author of the book “Naval Warfare, Its Basic Principles and Experience” (1891), said: “There is nothing that would show that the laws of naval wars long established by any have changed in a way." The admiral substantiated the theory of "ownership of the sea" as the basis of the imperial policy of Britain. He believed that the only way to achieve victory in the war at sea was to create complete superiority in naval forces and destroy the enemy's navy in one pitched battle.

When Admiral Percy Scott suggested that "the era of dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts was over forever" and advised the Admiralty to focus on the development of aviation and the submarine fleet, his innovative ideas were sharply criticized.

The general management of the fleet was carried out by the Admiralty, headed by W. Churchill and the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Main Naval Staff) Prince Ludwig Battenberg. British ships were based in the harbors of Humberg, Scarborough, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow. In 1904, the Admiralty considered relocating the main naval forces from the English Channel north to Scotland. This decision removed the fleet from the threat of a blockade of the narrow strait by the growing German Navy, and allowed for operational control of the entire North Sea. According to the British naval doctrine, which was developed shortly before the war by Battenberg and Bridgman, the basing of the main forces of the fleet in Scapa Flow (a harbor in Scotland on the Orkney Islands), outside the effective range of the German submarine fleet, should have led to a blockade of the main forces of the German fleet, which and happened during the First World War.

When the war began, the British were in no hurry to meddle with the German shores, fearing attacks by submarines and destroyers. The main fighting took place on land. The British limited themselves to covering communications, protecting the coast and blockade Germany from the sea. The British fleet was ready to join the battle if the Germans brought their main fleet to the open sea.

Germany

The German Navy had 15 dreadnoughts, 4 battlecruisers, 22 old battleships, 7 armored and 43 light cruisers, 219 destroyers and destroyers, and 28 submarines. According to a number of indicators, for example, in speed, the German ships were better than the British. Much more attention was paid to technical innovations in Germany than in England. Berlin did not have time to complete its naval program, it was supposed to be completed in 1917. Although the German naval leaders were quite conservative, Admiral Tirpitz initially believed that it was "frivolous" to get involved in the construction of submarines. And dominance at sea is determined by the number of battleships. Only realizing that the war would begin before the completion of the battle fleet construction program, he became a supporter of unlimited submarine warfare and the forced development of the submarine fleet.

The German "High Seas Fleet" (German: Hochseeflotte), it was based in Wilhelmshaven, was supposed to destroy the main forces of the British fleet ("Grand Fleet" - "Big Fleet") in an open battle. In addition, there were naval bases in Kiel, Fr. Heligoland, Danzig. The Russian and French navies were not perceived as worthy opponents. The German "High Seas Fleet" created a constant threat to Britain and forced the English Grand Fleet to be constantly in the North Sea region in full combat readiness throughout the war, despite the shortage of battleships in other theaters of operations. Due to the fact that the Germans were inferior in the number of battleships, the German Navy tried to avoid open clashes with the Grand Fleet and preferred the strategy of raids into the North Sea, trying to lure part of the British fleet, cut it off from the main forces and destroy it. In addition, the Germans focused on waging unrestricted submarine warfare to weaken the British Navy and lift the naval blockade.

The lack of autocracy affected the combat capability of the German Navy. The main creator of the fleet was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 - 1930). He was the author of the "risk theory", which argued that if the German fleet was comparable to the British in strength, then the British would avoid conflicts with the German Empire, because in the event of war, the German Navy would have a chance to inflict sufficient damage on the Grand Fleet for the loss of the British fleet supremacy at sea. With the outbreak of war, the role of the grand admiral fell. Tirpitz became responsible for building new ships and supplying the fleet. The "High Seas Fleet" was led by Admiral Friedrich von Ingenol (in 1913-1915), then Hugo von Pohl (from February 1915 to January 1916, before that he was chief of the General Naval Staff), Reinhard Scheer (1916-1918). In addition, the fleet was the favorite brainchild of the German Emperor Wilhelm, if he trusted the generals to make decisions about the army, then the Navy controlled himself. Wilhelm did not dare to risk the fleet in an open battle and allowed only a "small war" to be waged - with the help of submarines, destroyers, mine productions. The battle fleet had to stick to a defensive strategy.

France. Austria-Hungary

The French had 3 dreadnoughts, 20 battleships of the old type (battleships), 18 armored and 6 light cruisers, 98 destroyers, 38 submarines. In Paris, they decided to focus on the "Mediterranean Front", since the British agreed to defend the Atlantic coast of France. Thus, the French saved expensive ships, because there was no big threat in the Mediterranean - the Ottoman Navy was very weak and connected by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Italy was neutral at first, and then went over to the side of the Entente, the Austro-Hungarian fleet chose a passive strategy. In addition, there was a rather strong British squadron in the Mediterranean.

Austro-Hungarian Empire had 3 dreadnoughts (the 4th entered service in 1915), 9 battleships, 2 armored and 10 light cruisers, 69 destroyers and 9 submarines. Vienna also chose a passive strategy and "defended the Adriatic", almost the entire war the Austro-Hungarian fleet stood in Trieste, Split, Pula.

Russia

Russian fleet under the emperor Alexandra III second only to the Navy of England and France, but then lost this position. The Russian Navy received a particularly large blow during the Russo-Japanese War: almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet sent to the Far East were lost. The fleet needed to be rebuilt. Several naval programs were developed between 1905 and 1914. They provided for the completion of 4 previously laid down squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers and the construction of 8 new battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. But by the beginning of the war, not a single program had been fully implemented (the State Duma also played its role in this, which did not support these projects).

By the beginning of the war, Russia had 9 old battleships, 8 armored and 14 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and destroyers, 28 submarines (a significant part of the old types). Already during the war, the following entered service: in the Baltic - 4 dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, all of them were laid down in 1909 - Sevastopol, Poltava, Petropavlovsk, Gangut; on the Black Sea - 3 dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type (laid down in 1911).

The Russian Empire was not a backward power in the naval field. It even took the lead in a number of areas. In Russia, excellent destroyers of the Novik type were developed. By the beginning of the First World War, the ship was the best destroyer in its class, and served as a world model in the creation of destroyers of the military and post-war generation. The technical conditions for it were created at the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of the outstanding Russian shipbuilders A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov and G. F. Schlesinger. The project was developed in 1908-1909 by the shipbuilding department of the Putilov Plant, which was headed by engineers D. D. Dubitsky (for the mechanical part) and B. O. Vasilevsky (ship building part). At Russian shipyards, in 1911-1916, in 6 standard projects, a total of 53 ships of this class were laid down. The destroyers combined the qualities of a destroyer and a light cruiser - speed, maneuverability and rather strong artillery armament (4th 102-mm guns).

Russian railway engineer Mikhail Petrovich Nalyotov was the first to implement the idea of ​​a submarine with anchor mines. Already in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, participating in the heroic defense of Port Arthur, Naleytov built a submarine with a displacement of 25 tons, capable of carrying four mines, at his own expense. He conducted the first tests, but after the surrender of the fortress, the device was destroyed. In 1909-1912, a submarine was built at the Nikolaev shipyard, which received the name "Crab". She became part of the Black Sea Fleet. During the First World War, the "Crab" made several combat exits with mine productions, even reached the Bosphorus.

Already during the war, Russia became the world leader in the use of hydrocruisers (aircraft carriers), since this was facilitated by the factor of dominance in the creation and use of naval aviation. Russian aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, since 1912 he worked as the technical director of the plant of the First Russian Society aeronautics, in 1913 he designed the world's first seaplane (M-1) and immediately began to improve the aircraft. In 1914, Grigorovich built the M-5 flying boat. It was a two-seat biplane of wooden construction. The seaplane entered service with the Russian fleet as a reconnaissance and spotter of artillery fire, and in the spring of 1915 the aircraft made its first sortie. In 1916, Grigorovich's new aircraft, the heavier M-9 (sea bomber), was adopted. Then the Russian nugget designed the world's first seaplane fighter M-11.

On Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type, for the first time, they used the installation system of not two, but three-gun turrets of the main caliber. In England and Germany, they were initially skeptical of the idea, but the Americans appreciated the idea and Nevada-class battleships were built with three-gun turrets.

In 1912, 4 Izmail-class battlecruisers were laid down. They were intended for the Baltic Fleet. These would be the most powerful battlecruisers in the world in terms of artillery armament. Unfortunately, they were never completed. In 1913-1914, eight light cruisers of the Svetlana type were laid down, four each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They were going to be put into operation in 1915-1916, but did not have time. Russian submarines of the Bars type were considered one of the best in the world (they began to be built in 1912). A total of 24 Bars were built: 18 for the Baltic Fleet and 6 for the Black Sea.

It should be noted that in the pre-war years in the West European fleets little attention was paid to the submarine fleet. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, previous wars have not yet revealed their combat significance, only in the First World War did their enormous significance become clear. Secondly, the then dominant naval doctrine of the "high seas" assigned submarine forces one of the last places in the struggle for the sea. Dominance in the seas was to be won by battleships, having won a decisive battle.

Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a great contribution to the development of artillery. Before the start of the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm. The production of three-gun turrets began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov factory F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky became pioneers in the field of creating a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm.

AT Russian Empire before the war, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910, 1912). They surpassed similar torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, although they had a lower total weight and charge weight. Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes were created - the first such tube was built at the Putilov plant in 1913. He provided salvo fire with a fan, Russian sailors mastered it before the start of the war.

Russia was a leader in the field of mines. In the Russian Empire, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and the construction of special minesweepers of the "Zapal" type also began. In the West, before the start of the war, no attention was paid to the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping sea mines. This is proved by the fact that in 1914 the British were forced to buy a thousand ball mines from Russia to protect their naval bases. The Americans bought not only samples of all Russian mines, but also trawls, considering them the best in the world, and invited Russian specialists to teach them how to mine. The Americans also bought Mi-5, Mi-6 seaplanes. Before the start of the war in Russia, galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 and 1912 models were developed. In 1913, they designed a floating mine (P-13). She was kept underwater at a certain depth due to the action of an electric navigation device. Mines of previous models were kept at a depth due to buoys, which did not give much stability, especially during storms. P-13 had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tol and could stay at a given depth for three days. In addition, Russian specialists created the world's first river mine "Rybka" ("R").

In 1911, undercutting kite and boat trawls entered service with the fleet. Their use shortened the time of minesweeping, because the undercut and pop-up mines were immediately destroyed. Previously squandered mines had to be towed into shallow water and destroyed there.

The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio became a means of communication and control in combat. In addition, before the war, Russian radio engineers designed radio direction finders, which made it possible to use the device for reconnaissance.

Given the fact that the new battleships in the Baltic did not enter service, besides the Germans had complete superiority in the forces of the battle fleet, the Russian command adhered to a defensive strategy. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to protect the capital of the empire. Minefields were the basis of naval defense - during the years of the war, 39 thousand mines were put up at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, there were powerful batteries on the coast and islands. Under their cover, cruisers, destroyers and submarines made raids. The battleships were supposed to meet the German fleet if it tried to break through the minefields.

By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was the master of the Black Sea, because the Turkish Navy had only a few relatively combat-ready ships - 2 old squadron battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 8 destroyers. The attempts of the Turks before the war to change the situation by buying the latest ships abroad did not bring success. The Russian command planned with the outbreak of war to completely block the Bosphorus and the Turkish coast, to support the troops of the Caucasian Front (if necessary, the Romanian) from the sea. The issue of conducting a landing operation in the Bosporus region, to capture Istanbul-Constantinople, was also considered. The situation was somewhat changed by the arrival of the newest battlecruiser Goeben and the light Breslau. The cruiser "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the squadron battleships of the Black Sea Fleet would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" retreated, using its high speed. In general, especially after the commissioning of dreadnoughts of the Empress Maria type, the Black Sea Fleet controlled the Black Sea basin - it supported the troops of the Caucasian Front, destroyed Turkish transports, and attacked the enemy coast.