Despite the fact that the USSR suffered very heavy losses during the war years, it entered the international arena not only not weakened, but became even stronger than before. In 1946-1948. in states of Eastern Europe and Asia, communist governments came to power, heading for the construction of socialism on the Soviet model.
However, the leading Western powers pursued a power policy towards the USSR and the socialist states. One of the main deterrents was atomic weapon, which the United States enjoyed a monopoly on. Therefore, the creation of an atomic bomb became one of the main goals of the USSR. This work was headed by the physicist I. V. Kurchatov. The Institute of Atomic Energy and the Institute of Nuclear Problems of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR were created. In 1948, the first atomic reactor was launched, and in 1949, the first atomic bomb was tested at the test site near Semipalatinsk. In the work on it, the USSR was secretly assisted by individual Western scientists. Thus, a second nuclear power appeared in the world, the US monopoly on nuclear weapon ended. Since that time, the confrontation between the US and the USSR has largely determined the international situation.
Economic recovery.
Material losses in the war were very high. The USSR lost a third of its national wealth in the war. Agriculture was in deep crisis. The majority of the population was in distress, its supply was carried out using a rationing system.
In 1946, the Law on the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy was adopted. It was necessary to accelerate technological progress, to strengthen the country's defense power. Postwar five-year plan marked by large construction projects (hydroelectric power station, state district power station) and the development of road transport construction. Technical re-equipment of industry Soviet Union contributed to the export of equipment from German and Japanese enterprises. The highest rates of development were achieved in such sectors as ferrous metallurgy, oil and coal mining, construction of machines and machine tools.
After the war, the countryside found itself in a more difficult position than the city. In the collective farms, tough measures were taken to procure bread. If earlier the collective farmers gave only part of the grain "to the common barn", now they were often forced to give all the grain. The discontent in the village grew. The sown area has been greatly reduced. Due to the depreciation of equipment and the lack of labor, field work was carried out late, which negatively affected the harvest.
The main features of post-war life.
A significant part of the housing stock was destroyed. The problem of labor resources was acute: immediately after the war, many demobilized people returned to the city, but the enterprises still lacked workers. We had to recruit workers in the countryside, among the students of vocational schools.
Even before the war, decrees were adopted, and after it continued to operate, according to which workers were forbidden, under pain of criminal punishment, to leave enterprises without permission.
To stabilize the financial system in 1947, the Soviet government carried out a monetary reform. Old money was exchanged for new money at a ratio of 10:1. After the exchange, the amount of money the population had sharply decreased. At the same time, the government has reduced the prices of consumer products many times. The rationing system, food and manufactured goods appeared in open sale at retail prices. In most cases, these prices were higher than rations, but significantly lower than commercial ones. The abolition of cards has improved the situation of the urban population.
One of the main features of post-war life was the legalization of the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. In July 1948, the church celebrated the 500th anniversary of self-government, and in honor of this, a meeting of representatives of local Orthodox churches was held in Moscow.
power after the war.
With the transition to peaceful construction, structural changes took place in the government. In September 1945, the GKO was abolished. On March 15, 1946, the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissariats were renamed into the Council of Ministers and ministries.
In March 1946, the Bureau of the Council of Ministers was created, the chairman of which was L. P. Beria . He was also instructed to supervise the work of the internal affairs and state security agencies. Pretty strong positions in the leadership held A.A. Zhdanov, who combined the duties of a member of the Politburo, Orgburo and party secretary, but in 1948 he died. At the same time, the positions G.M. Malenkova, who had previously held a very modest position in the governing bodies.
Changes in party structures were reflected in the program of the 19th Party Congress. At this congress, the party received a new na-sha and ne - instead of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), they began to call it Communist Party Council and Union (CPSU).
USSR in the 50s - early 60s. 20th century
Changes after the death of Stalin and the XX Congress of the CPSU.
Stalin died on March 5, 1953. The closest associates of the leader proclaimed a course towards the establishment of collective leadership, but in reality a struggle for leadership developed between them. Minister of the Interior Marshal L.P. Beria initiated an amnesty for prisoners whose term was no more than five years. He put his supporters at the head of several republics. Beria also proposed to soften the policy towards collective farms and advocated detente of international tension, improvement of relations with Western countries.
However, in the summer of 1953, other members of the top party leadership, with the support of the military, organized a conspiracy and overthrew Beria. He was shot. The fight didn't end there. Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov were gradually removed from power, G.K. Zhukov was removed from the post of Minister of Defense. Almost all of this was done on the initiative N.S. Khrushchev, who since 1958 began to combine party and state posts.
In February 1956, the XX Congress of the CPSU was held, on the agenda of which were an analysis of the international and domestic situation, summing up the results of the fifth five-year plan. At the congress, the question of exposing Stalin's personality cult was raised. The report "On the cult of personality and its consequences" was made by N.S. Khrushchev. He spoke of Stalin's numerous violations of Lenin's policy, of " illegal methods investigation” and purges that killed many innocent people. It was said about Stalin's mistakes as statesman(for example, a miscalculation in determining the date of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War). Khrushchev's report after the congress was read throughout the country at party and Komsomol meetings. Its content shocked the Soviet people, many began to doubt the correctness of the path that the country had been following since October revolution .
The process of de-Stalinization of society took place gradually. At Khrushchev's initiative, cultural figures were given the opportunity to create their own works without total control of censorship and strict party dictates. This policy was called the "thaw" after the name of the then popular novel by the writer I. Ehrenburg.
During the "thaw" period, significant changes took place in culture. Works of literature and art have become more profound and sincere.
Reforms in the field of economy. The development of the national economy.
Reforms carried out in the 50s - early 60s. 20th century were controversial. At one time, Stalin outlined the economic frontiers that the country was to reach in the near future. Under Khrushchev, the USSR reached these milestones, but in the changed conditions, their achievement did not have such a significant effect.
The strengthening of the national economy of the USSR began with changes in the raw sector. It was decided to set acceptable prices for agricultural products, to change the tax policy so that the collective farmers were materially interested in selling their products. In the future, it was planned to increase the cash income of collective farms, pensions, and soften the passport regime.
In 1954, at the initiative of Khrushchev, development of virgin lands. Later, they began to reorganize the economic structure of the collective farmers. Khrushchev suggested building urban-type buildings for rural residents and taking other measures to improve their life. Ease in the passport regime opened the floodgates for migration rural population in town. Various programs were adopted to improve the efficiency of agriculture, and Khrushchev often saw a panacea in the cultivation of any one crop. The most famous was his attempt to turn corn into the “queen of the fields”. The desire to grow it, regardless of the climate, caused damage to agriculture, but among the people Khrushchev received the nickname "maize".
50s 20th century characterized by great success in the industry. The production of heavy industry has grown especially. Much attention was paid to those industries that ensured the development of technology. Of paramount importance was the program of continuous electrification of the country. New hydroelectric power plants and state district power plants were put into operation.
The impressive success of the economy aroused the confidence of the leadership headed by Khrushchev in the possibility of even greater acceleration of the pace of the country's development. The thesis was put forward about the complete and final construction of socialism in the USSR, and in the early 60s. 20th century headed for construction communism , that is, a society where every person can satisfy all his needs. According to the XXII Congress of the CPSU adopted in 1962 new program the party was supposed to complete the construction of communism by 1980. However, the serious economic difficulties that began at the same time clearly demonstrated to the citizens of the USSR the utopianism and adventurism of Khrushchev's ideas.
Difficulties in the development of industry were largely due to the ill-conceived reorganizations of the last years of Khrushchev's rule. Thus, most of the central industrial ministries were liquidated, and the leadership of the economy passed into the hands of economic councils, created in certain regions of the country. This innovation led to a rupture of ties between regions, which hindered the introduction of new technologies.
Social sphere.
The government has taken a number of measures to improve the welfare of the people. A law on state pensions was introduced. In secondary and higher educational institutions, tuition fees have been abolished. Heavy industry workers were transferred to a reduced working day without reducing wages. The population received various financial benefits. The material incomes of the working people have grown. Simultaneously with the increase in wages, prices were lowered for consumer goods: certain types of fabrics, clothes, goods for children, watches, medicines, etc.
Many public funds were also created, which paid various preferential benefits. Due to these funds, many were able to study at school or university. The working day was reduced to 6-7 hours, and on pre-holiday and public holidays the working day lasted even less. Work week shortened by 2 hours. On October 1, 1962, all taxes on the wages of workers and employees were abolished. From the end of the 50s. 20th century began selling durable goods on credit.
Undoubted successes in the social sphere in the early 60s. 20th century accompanied negative phenomena, especially painful for the population: essential products, including bread, disappeared from store shelves. There were several demonstrations of workers, the most famous of which was a demonstration in Novocherkassk, during the suppression of which the troops used weapons, which led to many casualties.
Foreign policy of the USSR in 1953-1964.
Foreign policy was characterized by the struggle to strengthen the position of the USSR and international security.
The settlement of the Austrian question was of great international importance. In 1955, at the initiative of the USSR, the State Treaty with Austria was signed in Vienna. Diplomatic relations were also established with Germany and Japan.
Soviet diplomacy actively sought to establish the most diverse ties with all states. The Hungarian uprising of 1956 was a severe test, which was suppressed Soviet troops. Almost simultaneously with the Hungarian events in 1956, arose Suez Crisis .
On August 5, 1963, an agreement between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain on the ban on nuclear tests on land, in air and water was signed in Moscow.
Relations with most of the socialist countries had long been streamlined - they clearly obeyed the instructions of Moscow. In May 1953, the USSR restored relations with Yugoslavia. A Soviet-Yugoslav declaration was signed, which proclaimed the principle of the indivisibility of the world, non-interference in internal affairs, and so on.
The main foreign policy theses of the CPSU were criticized by the Chinese Communists. They also challenged the political assessment of Stalin's activities. In 1963-1965. The PRC laid claim to a number of border territories of the USSR, and an open struggle broke out between the two powers.
The USSR actively cooperated with the countries of Asia and Africa, which won independence. Moscow helped developing countries create national economies. In February 1955, a Soviet-Indian agreement was signed on the construction of a metallurgical plant in India with the help of the USSR. The USSR provided assistance to the United Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Cambodia, Syria and other countries of Asia and Africa.
USSR in the second half of the 60s - early 80s. 20th century
The overthrow of N. S. Khrushchev and the search for a political course.
Development of science, technology and education.
The number of scientific institutions and scientists increased in the USSR. Each union republic had its own Academy of Sciences, which was subordinate to a whole system of scientific institutions. Significant progress has been made in the development of science. On October 4, 1957, the world's first artificial Earth satellite was launched, then the spacecraft reached the Moon. On April 12, 1961, the first manned flight into space took place. The first ascent of the space CSM became Yu.L. Gagarin.
New and more powerful power plants were built. Aircraft construction, nuclear physics, astrophysics and other sciences were successfully developed. Scientific centers were created in many cities. For example, in 1957 Akademgorodok was built near Novosibirsk.
After the war, the number of schools dropped catastrophically, one of the tasks of the government was the creation of new secondary schools. The increase in the number of high school graduates has led to an increase in the number of university students.
In 1954, co-education of boys and girls was restored in schools. The tuition fees for high school students and students were also abolished. Students began to pay scholarships. In 1958, compulsory eight-year education was introduced, and the ten-year school was transferred to 11-year education. Soon in educational plans schools included labor in production.
Spiritual life and culture of "developed socialism".
The ideologists of the CPSU sought to quickly forget Khrushchev's idea of building communism by 1980. This idea was replaced by the slogan of "developed socialism". It was believed that under "developed socialism" nations and nationalities were drawing closer together, a single community had formed - the Soviet people. They talked about the rapid development of the country's productive forces, the erasing of the boundaries between town and country, the distribution of wealth on the principles of "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work." Finally, the transformation of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a nationwide state of workers, peasants and the people's intelligentsia was proclaimed, between which the lines are also continuously blurred.
In the 60-70s. 20th century culture has ceased to be synonymous with ideology, its uniformity has been lost. The ideological component of culture receded into the background, giving way to simplicity and sincerity. Works created in the provinces - in Irkutsk, Kursk, Voronezh, Omsk, etc., gained popularity. Culture was given a special status.
Nevertheless, ideological tendencies in culture were still very strong. Militant atheism played a negative role. The persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church. Temples were closed in the country, priests were deposed and defrocked. Militant atheists created special organizations for preaching atheism.
The difficulties of returning to peaceful life were complicated not only by the presence of huge human and material losses that the war brought to our country, but also by the difficult tasks of restoring the economy. After all, 1,710 cities and urban-type settlements were destroyed, 7,000 villages and villages were destroyed, 31,850 plants and factories, 1,135 mines, 65,000 km were blown up and put out of action. railway tracks. The sown areas decreased by 36.8 million hectares. The country has lost about a third of its wealth.
The war claimed almost 27 million human lives, and this is its most tragic outcome. 2.6 million people became disabled. The population decreased by 34.4 million people and amounted to 162.4 million people by the end of 1945. The reduction of the labor force, the lack of proper nutrition and housing led to a decrease in the level of labor productivity compared to the pre-war period.
The country began to restore the economy during the war years. In 1943, a special party and government resolution was adopted "On urgent measures to restore farms in areas liberated from German occupation." By the colossal efforts of the Soviet people, by the end of the war, it was possible to restore industrial production to a third of the level of 1940. However, after the end of the war, the central task of restoring the country arose.
Economic discussions began in 1945-1946.
The government instructed Gosplan to prepare a draft of the fourth five-year plan. Proposals were made for some softening of the pressure in economic management, for the reorganization of collective farms. A draft of a new Constitution was prepared. He allowed the existence of small private farms of peasants and handicraftsmen based on personal labor and excluding the exploitation of other people's labor. During the discussion of this project, ideas were voiced about the need to provide more rights to the regions and people's commissariats.
"From below" calls for the liquidation of collective farms were heard more and more often. They talked about their inefficiency, reminded that the relative weakening of state pressure on manufacturers during the war years had a positive result. They drew direct analogies with the new economic policy introduced after civil war when the revival of the economy began with the revival of the private sector, the decentralization of management and the development of light industry.
However, these discussions were won by the point of view of Stalin, who at the beginning of 1946 announced the continuation of the course taken before the war to complete the construction of socialism and build communism. It was about returning to the pre-war model of super-centralization in planning and managing the economy, and at the same time to those contradictions between sectors of the economy that had developed in the 1930s.
The struggle of the people for the revival of the economy became a heroic page in the post-war history of our country. Western experts believed that the restoration of the destroyed economic base would take at least 25 years. However, the recovery period in the industry was less than 5 years.
The revival of industry took place in very difficult conditions. In the first post-war years, the work of Soviet people differed little from work in wartime. The constant shortage of food, the most difficult working and living conditions, high level morbidity and mortality, they explained to the population that the long-awaited peace had just begun and life was about to get better.
Some wartime restrictions were lifted: the 8-hour working day and annual leave were reintroduced, and forced overtime was abolished. In 1947, a monetary reform was carried out and the card system was abolished, and uniform prices were established for food products and industrial goods. They were higher than before the war. As before the war, from one to one and a half monthly salaries per year was spent on the purchase of obligatory loan bonds. Many working-class families still lived in dugouts and barracks, and sometimes worked in the open air or in unheated premises, on old equipment.
The restoration took place in the conditions of a sharp increase in the movement of the population caused by the demobilization of the army, the repatriation of Soviet citizens, and the return of refugees from the eastern regions. Considerable funds were spent on supporting the allied states.
Huge losses in the war caused a labor shortage. Staff turnover increased: people were looking for better working conditions.
As before, acute problems had to be solved by increasing the transfer of funds from the countryside to the city and by developing the labor activity of workers. One of the most famous initiatives of those years was the movement of “speed workers”, initiated by the Leningrad turner G.S. Bortkevich, who completed a 13-day production rate on a lathe in February 1948 in one shift. The movement became massive. At some enterprises, attempts were made to introduce self-financing. But to consolidate these new phenomena, no material measures were taken; on the contrary, with an increase in labor productivity, prices were lowered.
There has been a trend towards a wider use of scientific and technical developments in production. However, it manifested itself mainly at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC), where the process of developing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, missile systems, and new types of tank and aircraft equipment was going on.
In addition to the military-industrial complex, preference was also given to machine building, metallurgy, and the fuel and energy industry, the development of which accounted for 88% of all capital investments in industry. As before, the light and food industries did not satisfy the minimum needs of the population.
In total, during the years of the 4th five-year plan (1946-1950), 6,200 large enterprises were restored and rebuilt. In 1950, industrial production exceeded pre-war figures by 73% (and in the new union republics - Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova - 2-3 times). True, reparations and products of joint Soviet-German enterprises were also included here.
The main creator of these successes was the people. With his incredible efforts and sacrifices, seemingly impossible economic results were achieved. At the same time, the possibilities of a super-centralized economic model, the traditional policy of redistributing funds from the light and food industries, agriculture and the social sphere in favor of heavy industry played their role. Reparations received from Germany (4.3 billion dollars) also provided significant assistance, providing up to half of the volume of industrial equipment installed in these years. The labor of almost 9 million Soviet prisoners and about 2 million German and Japanese prisoners of war also contributed to the post-war reconstruction.
Weakened out of the war, the country's agriculture, whose production in 1945 did not exceed 60% of the pre-war level.
A difficult situation developed not only in the cities, in industry, but also in the countryside, in agriculture. The collective farm village, in addition to material deprivation, experienced an acute shortage of people. A real disaster for the countryside was the drought of 1946, which engulfed most of the European territory of Russia. The surplus appraisal confiscated almost everything from the collective farmers. The villagers were doomed to starvation. In the famine-stricken regions of the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Moldavia, due to flight to other places and an increase in mortality, the population decreased by 5-6 million people. Alarming signals about hunger, dystrophy, and mortality came from the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Moldova. Collective farmers demanded to dissolve the collective farms. They motivated this question by the fact that “there is no strength to live like this anymore.” In his letter to P. M. Malenkov, for example, N. M. Menshikov, a student of the Smolensk Military-Political School, wrote: “... indeed, life on collective farms (in the Bryansk and Smolensk regions) is unbearably bad. So, almost half of the collective farmers on the Novaya Zhizn collective farm (Bryansk region) have not had bread for 2-3 months, and some do not even have potatoes. The situation is not the best in half of the other collective farms in the region ... "
The state, buying agricultural products at fixed prices, compensated the collective farms for only a fifth of the costs of milk production, a 10th for grain, and a 20th for meat. Collective farmers received practically nothing. Saved their subsidiary farm. But the state also dealt a blow to it: in favor of the collective farms in 1946-1949. cut 10.6 million hectares of land from peasant household plots, and taxes were significantly increased on income from sales in the market. Moreover, only peasants were allowed to trade on the market, whose collective farms fulfilled state deliveries. Each peasant farm is obliged to hand over to the state meat, milk, eggs, wool as a tax for a land plot. In 1948, collective farmers were "recommended" to sell small livestock to the state (which was allowed to be kept by the charter), which caused a mass slaughter of pigs, sheep, and goats throughout the country (up to 2 million heads).
The currency reform of 1947 hit hardest on the peasantry, who kept their savings at home.
The Roma of the pre-war period remained, restricting the freedom of movement of collective farmers: they were actually deprived of their passports, they were not paid for the days when they did not work due to illness, they did not pay old-age pensions.
By the end of the 4th five-year plan, the disastrous economic situation of the collective farms required their reform. However, the authorities saw its essence not in material incentives, but in another structural restructuring. It was recommended to develop a team form of work instead of a link. This caused the discontent of the peasants and the disorganization of agricultural work. The ensuing enlargement of the collective farms led to a further reduction in peasant allotments.
Nevertheless, with the help of coercive measures and at the cost of the enormous efforts of the peasantry in the early 50s. succeeded in bringing the country's agriculture to the pre-war level of production. However, the deprivation of the peasants of the still remaining incentives to work brought the country's agriculture to a crisis and forced the government to take emergency measures to supply the cities and the army with food. A course was taken to "tighten the screws" in the economy. This step was theoretically substantiated in Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" (1952). In it, he defended the ideas of the predominant development of heavy industry, the acceleration of the full nationalization of property and forms of labor organization in agriculture, and opposed any attempts to revive market relations.
“It is necessary ... through gradual transitions ... to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, and commodity production ... to be replaced by a system of product exchange so that the central government ... can cover all the products of social production in the interests of society ... It is impossible to achieve either an abundance of products that can cover all the needs of society, nor transition to the formula "to each according to his needs", leaving in force such economic factors as collective-farm group ownership, commodity circulation, etc."
It was said in Stalin's article that under socialism the growing needs of the population will always overtake the possibilities of production. This provision explained to the population the dominance of a scarce economy and justified its existence.
Outstanding achievements in industry, science and technology have become a reality thanks to the tireless work and dedication of millions of Soviet people. However, the return of the USSR to the pre-war model of economic development caused a deterioration in a number of economic indicators in the post-war period.
The war changed the socio-political atmosphere that prevailed in the USSR in the 1930s; broke through the "iron curtain" by which the country was fenced off from the rest of the "hostile" world. Participants in the European campaign of the Red Army (and there were almost 10 million of them), numerous repatriates (up to 5.5 million) saw with their own eyes the world that they knew about only from propaganda materials that exposed its vices. The differences were so great that they could not but sow many doubts about the correctness of the usual assessments. The victory in the war gave rise to hopes among the peasants for the dissolution of collective farms, among the intelligentsia - for the weakening of the policy of diktat, among the population of the Union republics (especially in the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belarus) - for a change in national policy. Even in the sphere of the nomenklatura, which had been renewed during the war years, an understanding of the inevitable and necessary changes was ripening.
What was our society like after the end of the war, which had to solve the very difficult tasks of restoring the national economy and completing the construction of socialism?
Post-war Soviet society was predominantly female. This created serious problems, not only demographic, but also psychological, developing into the problem of personal disorder, female loneliness. Post-war "fatherlessness" and the child homelessness and crime it generates come from the same source. And yet, despite all the losses and hardships, it was thanks to the feminine principle that the post-war society turned out to be surprisingly viable.
A society emerging from war differs from a society in a "normal" state not only in its demographic structure, but also in its social composition. Its appearance is determined not by the traditional categories of the population (urban and rural residents, factory workers and employees, youth and pensioners, etc.), but by the societies born of wartime.
The face of the post-war period was, first of all, "a man in a tunic." In total, 8.5 million people were demobilized from the army. The problem of the transition from war to peace most concerned the front-line soldiers. Demobilization, which was so dreamed of at the front, the joy of returning home, and at home they were waiting for disorder, material deprivation, additional psychological difficulties associated with switching to new tasks of a peaceful society. And although the war united all generations, it was especially difficult, first of all, for the youngest (born in 1924-1927), i.e. those who went to the front from school, not having time to get a profession, to gain a stable life status. Their only business was war, their only skill was the ability to hold weapons and fight.
Often, especially in journalism, front-line soldiers were called "neo-Decembrists", referring to the potential for freedom that the victors carried in themselves. But in the first years after the war, not all of them were able to realize themselves as an active force of social change. This largely depended on the specific conditions. post-war years.
First, the very nature of the war of national liberation, just presupposes the unity of society and power. In solving the common national task - confronting the enemy. But in peaceful life a complex of "deluded hopes" is formed.
Secondly, it is necessary to take into account the factor of psychological overstrain of people who have spent four years in the trenches and need psychological relief. People, tired of war, naturally strove for creation, for peace.
After the war, there inevitably comes a period of “healing of wounds” - both physical and mental, - a difficult, painful period of returning to civilian life, in which even ordinary everyday problems (home, family, lost during the war for many) sometimes become insoluble.
Here is how one of the front-line soldiers V. Kondratiev spoke about the painful situation: “Everyone somehow wanted to improve their lives. After all, you had to live. Someone got married. Someone joined the party. I had to adapt to this life. We didn't know any other options."
Thirdly, the perception of the surrounding order as a given, forming a generally loyal attitude towards the regime, in itself did not mean that all front-line soldiers, without exception, considered this order as ideal or, in any case, fair.
“We did not accept many things in the system, but we could not even imagine any other,” such an unexpected confession could be heard from the front-line soldiers. It reflects the characteristic contradiction of the post-war years, splitting the minds of people with a sense of the injustice of what is happening and the hopelessness of attempts to change this order.
Such sentiments were typical not only for front-line soldiers (primarily for repatriates). Aspirations to isolate the repatriated, despite the official statements of the authorities, took place.
Among the population evacuated to the eastern regions of the country, the process of re-evacuation began in wartime. With the end of the war, this desire became widespread, however, not always feasible. Violent measures to ban the exit caused discontent.
“The workers gave all their strength to defeat the enemy and wanted to return to their native lands,” one of the letters said, “and now it turned out that they deceived us, took us out of Leningrad, and want to leave us in Siberia. If it only works out that way, then we, all the workers, must say that our government has betrayed us and our work!”
So after the war, desires collided with reality.
“In the spring of forty-five, people are not without reason. – considered themselves giants,” the writer E. Kazakevich shared his impressions. With this mood, the front-line soldiers entered civilian life, leaving, as it then seemed to them, beyond the threshold of war, the most terrible and difficult. However, the reality turned out to be more complicated, not at all the same as it was seen from the trench.
“In the army, we often talked about what would happen after the war,” recalled journalist B. Galin, “how we would live the next day after the victory, and the closer the end of the war was, the more we thought about it, and a lot of it painted in rainbow colors. We did not always imagine the size of the destruction, the scale of the work that would have to be carried out in order to heal the wounds inflicted by the Germans. “Life after the war seemed like a holiday, for the beginning of which only one thing is needed - the last shot,” K. Simonov continued this thought, as it were.
"Normal life", where you can "just live" without being exposed to every minute danger, was seen in wartime as a gift of fate.
“Life is a holiday”, life is a fairy tale,” the front-line soldiers entered a peaceful life, leaving, as it then seemed to them, the most terrible and difficult beyond the threshold of war. long. did not mean, - with the help of this image, a special concept of post-war life was also modeled in the mass consciousness - without contradictions, without tension. There was hope. And such a life existed, but only in movies and books.
Hope for the best and the optimism it nourished set the pace for the beginning of post-war life. They did not lose heart, the war was over. There was the joy of work, victory, the spirit of competition in striving for the best. Despite the fact that they often had to put up with difficult material and living conditions, they worked selflessly, restoring the destruction of the economy. So, after the end of the war, not only the front-line soldiers who returned home, but also those who survived all the difficulties in the rear last war Soviet people lived in hope that the socio-political atmosphere would change for the better. The special conditions of the war forced people to think creatively, to act independently, to take responsibility. But hopes for changes in the socio-political situation were very far from reality.
In 1946 there were several notable events which, in one way or another, disturbed the public atmosphere. Contrary to the fairly common belief that at that time public opinion was exceptionally silent, the actual evidence suggests that this statement is far from being entirely true.
At the end of 1945 - beginning of 1946, a company was held for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which took place in February 1946. As expected, at official meetings, people mostly spoke “For” the elections, supporting the policy of the party and its leaders. On the ballots one could meet toasts in honor of Stalin and other members of the government. But along with this, there were opinions that were completely opposite.
People said: “It won’t be our way anyway, they will vote for whatever they write”; “the essence is reduced to a simple “formality - the registration of a pre-planned candidate” ... etc. It was a "stick democracy", it was impossible to evade elections. The impossibility of expressing one's point of view openly without fear of sanctions from the authorities gave rise to apathy, and at the same time subjective alienation from the authorities. People expressed doubts about the expediency and timeliness of holding elections, which cost a lot of money, while thousands of people were on the verge of starvation.
A strong catalyst for the growth of discontent was the destabilization of the general economic situation. The scale of grain speculation increased. In the lines for bread there were more frank conversations: “Now you need to steal more, otherwise you won’t live,” “Husbands and sons were killed, and instead of easing our prices they raised prices”; “Now it has become more difficult to live than during the war years.”
Attention is drawn to the modesty of the desires of people who require only the establishment of a living wage. The dreams of the war years that after the war "there will be a lot of everything", a happy life will come, began to devalue rather quickly. All the difficulties of the post-war years were explained by the consequences of the war. People were already beginning to think that the end of peaceful life had come, war was approaching again. In the minds of people, the war will be perceived for a long time as the cause of all post-war hardships. People saw the rise in prices in the autumn of 1946 as the approach of a new war.
However, despite the presence of very decisive moods, they did not become predominant at that time: the craving for a peaceful life turned out to be too strong, too serious fatigue from the struggle, in any form. In addition, most people continued to trust the leadership of the country, to believe that it was acting in the name of the people's good. It can be said that the policy of the leaders of the first post-war years was built solely on the credit of trust from the people.
In 1946, the commission for the preparation of the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR completed its work. In accordance with the new Constitution, direct and secret elections of people's judges and assessors were held for the first time. But all power remained in the hands of the party leadership. In October 1952, the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place, which decided to rename the party into the CPSU. At the same time, the political regime became tougher, and a new wave of repressions grew.
The Gulag system reached its apogee precisely in the post-war years. To the prisoners of the mid-30s. Millions of new "enemies of the people" have been added. One of the first blows fell on prisoners of war, many of whom, after being released from fascist captivity, were sent to camps. “Foreign elements” from the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were also exiled there.
In 1948, special regime camps were set up for those convicted of "anti-Soviet activities" and "counter-revolutionary acts", in which particularly sophisticated methods of influencing prisoners were used. Unwilling to put up with their situation, political prisoners in a number of camps raised uprisings; sometimes under political slogans.
The possibilities of transforming the regime in the direction of any kind of liberalization were very limited due to the extreme conservatism of ideological principles, due to the stability of which the defensive line had unconditional priority. Theoretical basis A “hard” course in the sphere of ideology can be considered the resolution of the Central Administration of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted in August 1946 “On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad”, which, although it concerned the field of artistic creativity, was actually directed against public dissent as such. However, the matter was not limited to one "theory". In March 1947, at the suggestion of A. A. Zhdanov, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted “On the courts of honor in the ministries of the USSR and central departments”, according to which special elected bodies were created” to combat misconduct, dropping the honor and dignity of the Soviet worker ". One of the most high-profile cases that went through the “court of honor” was the case of professors Klyucheva N. G. and Roskin G. I. (June 1947), authors of the scientific work “Ways of Cancer Biotherapy”, who were accused of anti-patriotism and cooperation with foreign firms. For such a "sin" in 1947. they still issued a public reprimand, but already in this preventive campaign the main approaches of the future struggle against cosmopolitanism were guessed.
However, all these measures at that time had not yet had time to take shape in the next campaign against the "enemies of the people." The leadership "wavered" supporters of the most extreme measures, "hawks", as a rule, did not receive support.
Since the path of progressive political change was blocked, the most constructive post-war ideas were not about politics, but about the economy.
D. Volkogonov in his work “I. V. Stalin. Political portrait writes about recent years I. V. Stalin:
“The whole life of Stalin is shrouded in an almost impenetrable veil, similar to a shroud. He constantly watched all his associates. It was impossible to be wrong either in word or deed: “The comrades-in-arms of the “leader” were well aware of this.
Beria regularly reported on the results of observations of the environment of the dictator. Stalin, in turn, followed Beria, but this information was not complete. The content of the reports was oral, and therefore secret.
In the arsenal of Stalin and Beria, there was always a version of a possible "conspiracy", "assassination", "act of terrorism" at the ready.
The closed society begins with leadership. “Only the smallest fraction of his personal life was indulged in the light of publicity. In the country there were thousands, millions, portraits, busts of a mysterious man whom the people idolized, adored, but did not know at all. Stalin knew how to keep secret the strength of his power and his personality, betraying to the public only that which was intended for rejoicing and admiration. Everything else was covered by an invisible shroud."
Thousands of "miners" (convicts) worked at hundreds, thousands of enterprises in the country under the protection of a convoy. Stalin believed that all those unworthy of the title of "new man" had to undergo a long re-education in the camps. As is clear from the documents, it was Stalin who initiated the transformation of prisoners into permanent source disenfranchised and cheap labor force. This is confirmed by official documents.
On February 21, 1948, when “a new round of repressions” had already begun to “unwind”, the “Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” was published, in which “orders of the authorities were sounded:
"one. To oblige the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR of all those serving sentences in special camps and prisons of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyists, rightists, leftists, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists, nationalists, white émigrés and other persons who pose a danger due to their anti-Soviet ties and hostile activities, after the expiration of the terms of punishment, send them, according to the appointment of the Ministry of State Security, to exile to settlements under the supervision of the bodies of the Ministry of State Security in the Kolyma regions in the Far East, in the regions of the Krasnoyarsk Territory and the Novosibirsk Region, located 50 kilometers north of the Trans-Siberian Railway, in the Kazakh SSR ... "
The draft Constitution, which was sustained by and large within the framework of the pre-war political doctrine, at the same time contained a number of positive provisions: there were ideas about the need to decentralize economic life, to provide greater economic rights locally and directly to people's commissariats. There were suggestions about the elimination of special wartime courts (primarily the so-called "line courts" in transport), as well as military tribunals. And although such proposals were classified by the editorial committee as inappropriate (reason: excessive detailing of the project), their nomination can be considered quite symptomatic.
Ideas similar in direction were also expressed during the discussion of the draft Party Program, work on which was completed in 1947. These ideas were concentrated in proposals for expanding intra-party democracy, freeing the party from the functions of economic management, developing principles for the rotation of personnel, etc. Since neither the draft Constitution, neither the draft program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was published and they were discussed in a relatively narrow circle of responsible workers, the appearance in this environment of ideas that were quite liberal for that time testifies to the new moods of some of the Soviet leaders. In many ways, these were really new people who came to their posts before the war, during the war, or a year or two after the victory.
The situation was aggravated by open armed resistance to the "crackdown" of Soviet power in the Baltic republics annexed on the eve of the war and western regions Ukraine and Belarus. The anti-government partisan movement drew tens of thousands of fighters into its orbit as convinced nationalists who relied on the support of Western intelligence agencies, and ordinary people who have suffered a lot from the new regime, who have lost their homes, property, and relatives. The rebellion in these areas was put an end to only in the early 50s.
Stalin's policy in the second half of the 1940s, starting from 1948, was based on the elimination of symptoms of political instability and growing social tension. The Stalinist leadership took action in two directions. One of them included measures that, to one degree or another, adequately met the expectations of the people and were aimed at activating the socio-political life in the country, developing science and culture.
In September 1945, the state of emergency was lifted and the State Defense Committee was abolished. In March 1946, the Council of Ministers. Stalin declared that victory in the war means, in essence, the completion of the transitional state, and therefore it is time to put an end to the concepts of “people's commissar” and “commissariat. At the same time, the number of ministries and departments grew, and the number of their apparatus grew. In 1946, elections were held to local councils, the Supreme Soviets of the Republics and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as a result of which the deputies corps was renewed, which did not change during the war years. In the early 1950s, sessions of the Soviets began to be convened, and the number of standing committees increased. In accordance with the Constitution, direct and secret elections of people's judges and assessors were held for the first time. But all power remained in the hands of the party leadership. Stalin thought, as D. A. Volkogonov writes about this: “The people live in poverty. Here the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs report that in a number of areas, especially in the east, people are still starving, their clothes are bad.” But according to Stalin's deep conviction, as Volkogonov argues, “the security of people above a certain minimum only corrupts them. Yes, and there is no way to give more; it is necessary to strengthen the defense, to develop heavy industry. The country must be strong. And for this, you will have to tighten your belt in the future.”
People did not see that, in conditions of severe shortages of goods, the policy of price reduction played a very limited role in increasing welfare at extremely low wages. By the beginning of the 1950s, the standard of living, real wages, barely exceeded the level of 1913.
“Long experiments, coolly “mixed up” in a terrible war, did little to give the people from the point of view of a real rise in living standards.”
But, despite the skepticism of some people, the majority continued to trust the leadership of the country. Therefore, difficulties, even the food crisis of 1946, were most often perceived as inevitable and someday surmountable. It can be definitely stated that the policy of the leaders of the first post-war years was based on the credibility of the people, which after the war was quite high. But if the use of this loan allowed the leadership to stabilize the post-war situation over time and, on the whole, to ensure the transition of the country from a state of war to a state of peace, then, on the other hand, the trust of the people in the top leadership made it possible for Stalin and his leadership to delay the decision of vital reforms, and subsequently actually block the trend of democratic renewal of society.
The possibilities of transforming the regime in the direction of any kind of liberalization were very limited due to the extreme conservatism of ideological principles, due to the stability of which the defensive line had unconditional priority. The theoretical basis of the “cruel” course in the field of ideology can be considered the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted in August 1946 “On the journals Zvezda and Leningrad”, which, although it concerned the region, was directed against public dissent as such. "Theory" is not limited. In March 1947, at the suggestion of A. A. Zhdanov, a resolution was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks “On courts of honor in ministries of the USSR and central departments,” which was discussed earlier. These were already the prerequisites for the approaching mass repressions of 1948.
As you know, the beginning of the repressions fell primarily on those who were serving their sentences for the "crime" of the war and the first post-war years.
By this time the path of progressive political changes had already been blocked, having narrowed down to possible amendments to liberalization. The most constructive ideas that appeared in the first post-war years concerned the sphere of economy. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received more than one letter with interesting, sometimes innovative thoughts on this subject. Among them there is a noteworthy document of 1946 - the manuscript "Post-war domestic economy" by S. D. Alexander (non-partisan, who worked as an accountant at one of the enterprises of the Moscow region. The essence of his proposals was reduced to the basics of a new economic model built on the principles of the market and partial denationalization of the economy The ideas of SD Alexander had to share the fate of other radical projects: they were classified as “harmful” and written off to the “archive.” The Center remained firmly committed to the previous course.
Ideas about some kind of “dark forces” that “deceive Stalin” created a special psychological background, which, having arisen from the contradictions of the Stalinist regime, in essence its denial, at the same time was used to strengthen this regime, to stabilize it. Taking Stalin out of criticism saved not only the name of the leader, but also the regime itself, animated by this name. Such was the reality: for millions of contemporaries, Stalin acted as the last hope, the most reliable support. It seemed that if there were no Stalin, life would collapse. And the more difficult the situation inside the country became, the more the special role of the Leader became stronger. It is noteworthy that among the questions asked by people at lectures during 1948-1950, in one of the first places are those related to concern for the health of “Comrade Stalin” (in 1949 he turned 70 years).
1948 put an end to the leadership's post-war hesitation about choosing a "soft" or "hard" course. The political regime became tougher. And a new round of repression began.
The Gulag system reached its apogee precisely in the post-war years. In 1948, special regime camps were set up for those convicted of "anti-Soviet activities" and "counter-revolutionary acts." Along with the political prisoners, many other people ended up in the camps after the war. Thus, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 2, 1948, local authorities were granted the right to evict to remote areas persons who “maliciously evade labor activity in agriculture.” Fearing the increased popularity of the military during the war, Stalin authorized the arrest of A. A. Novikov, Air Marshal, Generals P. N. Ponedelin, N. K. Kirillov, a number of colleagues of Marshal G. K. Zhukov. The commander himself was charged with putting together a group of disgruntled generals and officers, ingratitude and disrespect for Stalin.
The repressions also affected some of the party functionaries, especially those who aspired to independence and greater independence from the central government. Many party and state leaders were arrested, nominated by the Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. A. Zhdanov, who died in 1948, from among the leading workers of Leningrad. The total number of those arrested in the "Leningrad case" amounted to about 2 thousand people. After some time, 200 of them were put on trial and shot, including Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Russia M. Rodionov, member of the Politburo and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR N. A. Voznesensky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. A. Kuznetsov.
The "Leningrad case", reflecting the struggle within the top leadership, was to become a stern warning to everyone who thought at least in some way other than the "leader of the peoples."
The last of the trials being prepared was the "case of doctors" (1953), accused of improper treatment of top management, which resulted in the death of the poison of prominent figures. Total victims of repression in 1948-1953. 6.5 million people became.
So, I. V. Stalin became General Secretary under Lenin. During the period of 20-30-40s, he strove to achieve complete autocracy, and thanks to a number of circumstances within the socio-political life of the USSR, he achieved success. But the domination of Stalinism, i.e. the omnipotence of one person - Stalin I.V. was not inevitable. The deep mutual intertwining of objective and subjective factors in the activities of the CPSU led to the emergence, establishment and most harmful manifestations of the omnipotence and crimes of Stalinism. Objective reality refers to the multiformity of pre-revolutionary Russia, the enclave nature of its development, the bizarre interweaving of remnants of feudalism and capitalism, the weakness and fragility of democratic traditions, and the unbeaten paths towards socialism.
Subjective moments are connected not only with the personality of Stalin himself, but also with the factor of the social composition of the ruling party, which included in the early 1920s the so-called thin layer of the old Bolshevik guard, largely exterminated by Stalin, the remaining part of it, for the most part moved to Stalinism. Undoubtedly, Stalin's entourage, whose members became accomplices in his actions, also belongs to the subjective factor.
The Great Patriotic War ended with a victory, which the Soviet people achieved for four years. Men fought on the fronts, women worked on collective farms, at military factories - in a word, they provided rear. However, the euphoria caused by the long-awaited victory was replaced by a sense of hopelessness. Continuous hard work, hunger, Stalinist repressions, resumed with new force, - these phenomena overshadowed the post-war years.
In the history of the USSR, the term " cold war". Used in relation to the period of military, ideological and economic confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. It begins in 1946, that is, in the post-war years. The USSR emerged victorious from World War II, but, unlike the United States, it had a long recovery path.
Construction
According to the plan of the fourth five-year plan, the implementation of which began in the USSR in the postwar years, it was necessary, first of all, to restore the cities destroyed by the fascist troops. More than 1.5 thousand suffered in four years settlements. Young people quickly received various construction specialties. However, there was not enough manpower - the war claimed the lives of more than 25 million Soviet citizens.
To restore normal working hours, overtime work was canceled. Annual paid holidays were introduced. The working day now lasted eight hours. Peaceful construction in the USSR in the postwar years was headed by the Council of Ministers.
Industry
Plants and factories destroyed during the Second World War were actively restored in the post-war years. In the USSR, by the end of the forties, old enterprises began to work. New ones were also built. post-war period in the USSR - 1945-1953, that is, it begins after the end of the Second World War. Ends with the death of Stalin.
The recovery of industry after the war proceeded rapidly, partly due to the high working capacity of the Soviet people. Citizens of the USSR were convinced that they had a great life, much better than Americans living in the conditions of decaying capitalism. This was facilitated by the Iron Curtain, which isolated the country culturally and ideologically from the whole world for forty years.
They worked hard, but their life did not get easier. In the USSR in 1945-1953 there was a rapid development of three industries: rocket, radar, nuclear. Most of the resources were spent on the construction of enterprises that belonged to these areas.
Agriculture
The first post-war years were terrible for the inhabitants. In 1946, the country was gripped by famine caused by destruction and drought. A particularly difficult situation was observed in the Ukraine, in Moldova, in the right-bank regions of the lower Volga region and in the North Caucasus. New collective farms were created throughout the country.
In order to strengthen the spirit of Soviet citizens, directors, commissioned by officials, shot a huge number of films telling about happy life collective farmers. These films enjoyed wide popularity, they were watched with admiration even by those who knew what a collective farm really was.
In the villages, people worked from dawn to dawn, while living in poverty. That is why later, in the fifties, young people left the villages, went to the cities, where life was at least a little easier.
Standard of living
In the post-war years, people suffered from hunger. In 1947, but most of the goods remained in short supply. The hunger has returned. The prices of rations were raised. Nevertheless, over the course of five years, starting in 1948, products gradually became cheaper. This somewhat improved the standard of living of Soviet citizens. In 1952, the price of bread was 39% lower than in 1947, and that of milk was 70%.
The availability of basic commodities did not make life much easier for ordinary people, but, being under the Iron Curtain, most of them easily believed in the illusory idea of the best country in the world.
Until 1955, Soviet citizens were convinced that they owed Stalin their victory in the Great Patriotic War. But this situation was not observed throughout. In those regions that were annexed to the Soviet Union after the war, far fewer conscious citizens lived, for example, in the Baltic states and in Western Ukraine, where anti-Soviet organizations appeared in the 40s.
Friendly states
After the end of the war in countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the GDR, the communists came to power. The USSR developed diplomatic relations with these states. At the same time, the conflict with the West escalated.
According to the 1945 treaty, Transcarpathia was transferred to the USSR. The Soviet-Polish border has changed. Many former citizens of other states, such as Poland, lived on the territory after the end of the war. The Soviet Union concluded an agreement on the exchange of population with this country. Poles living in the USSR now had the opportunity to return to their homeland. Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians could leave Poland. It is noteworthy that in the late forties only about 500 thousand people returned to the USSR. In Poland - twice as much.
criminal situation
In the postwar years in the USSR, law enforcement agencies launched a serious fight against banditry. 1946 saw the peak of crime. About 30,000 armed robberies were recorded this year.
To combat rampant crime, new employees, as a rule, former front-line soldiers, were accepted into the ranks of the police. It was not so easy to restore peace to Soviet citizens, especially in Ukraine and the Baltic states, where the criminal situation was the most depressing. In the Stalin years, a fierce struggle was waged not only against "enemies of the people", but also against ordinary robbers. From January 1945 to December 1946, more than three and a half thousand bandit organizations were liquidated.
Repression
Back in the early twenties, many representatives of the intelligentsia left the country. They knew about the fate of those who did not have time to escape from Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, at the end of the forties, some accepted the offer to return to their homeland. Russian nobles were returning home. But to another country. Many were sent immediately upon their return to the Stalinist camps.
In the post-war years, it reached its apogee. Wreckers, dissidents and other "enemies of the people" were placed in the camps. Sad was the fate of the soldiers and officers who found themselves surrounded during the war years. At best, they spent several years in the camps, until which they debunked the cult of Stalin. But many were shot. In addition, the conditions in the camps were such that only the young and healthy could endure them.
In the post-war years, Marshal Georgy Zhukov became one of the most respected people in the country. His popularity annoyed Stalin. However, put behind bars folk hero he did not dare. Zhukov was known not only in the USSR, but also abroad. The leader knew how to create uncomfortable conditions in other ways. In 1946, the "Aviator Case" was fabricated. Zhukov was removed from the post of Commander-in-Chief ground forces and sent to Odessa. Several generals close to the marshal were arrested.
culture
In 1946, the fight against Western influence began. It was expressed in the popularization of domestic culture and the ban on everything foreign. Soviet writers, artists, directors were persecuted.
In the forties, as already mentioned, a huge number of war films were shot. These films were heavily censored. The characters were created according to a template, the plot was built according to a clear scheme. The music was also under strict control. Only compositions praising Stalin and a happy Soviet life. This did not have the best effect on the development of national culture.
The science
The development of genetics began in the thirties. AT postwar period this science was in exile. Trofim Lysenko, a Soviet biologist and agronomist, became the main participant in the attack on geneticists. In August 1948, academicians who made a significant contribution to the development of domestic science lost the opportunity to engage in research activities.
The end of the Great Patriotic War was a huge relief for the inhabitants of the USSR, but at the same time it set a number of urgent tasks for the country's government. Issues that had been delayed for the duration of the war now needed to be resolved urgently. In addition, the authorities needed to equip the demobilized Red Army soldiers, provide social protection for war victims and restore destroyed economic facilities in the west of the USSR.
In the first post-war five-year plan (1946-1950), the goal was to restore the pre-war level of agricultural and industrial production. hallmark recovery of the industry was that not all evacuated enterprises returned to the west of the USSR, a significant part of them were rebuilt from scratch. This made it possible to strengthen industry in those regions that did not have a powerful industrial base before the war. At the same time, measures were taken to return industrial enterprises to civilian life schedules: the length of the working day was reduced, and the number of days off increased. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the pre-war level of production had been reached in all the most important branches of industry.
Demobilization
Although a small part of the Red Army soldiers returned to their homeland in the summer of 1945, the main wave of demobilization began in February 1946, and the final completion of demobilization took place in March 1948. It was envisaged that the demobilized soldiers would be provided with work within a month. The families of the dead and disabled of the war received special support from the state: their homes were primarily supplied with fuel. However, in general, the demobilized fighters did not have any benefits in comparison with citizens who were in the rear during the war years.
Strengthening the repressive apparatus
The apparatus of repression, which flourished in the pre-war years, changed during the war. Intelligence and SMERSH (counterintelligence) played a key role in it. After the war, these structures filtered prisoners of war, Ostarbeiters and collaborators returning to the Soviet Union. The organs of the NKVD on the territory of the USSR fought organized crime, the level of which increased sharply immediately after the war. However, already in 1947, the power structures of the USSR returned to the repression of the civilian population, and at the end of the 50s the country was shocked by high-profile lawsuits (the case of doctors, the Leningrad case, the Mingrelian case). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, “anti-Soviet elements” were deported from the newly annexed territories of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states: intelligentsia, large property owners, supporters of the UPA and “forest brothers”, representatives of religious minorities.
Foreign policy guidelines
Even during the war years, the future victorious powers laid the foundations of an international structure that would regulate the post-war world order. In 1946, the United Nations began its work, in which the five most influential states in the world had a blocking vote. The entry of the Soviet Union into the UN Security Council strengthened its geopolitical position.
Late 40s foreign policy The USSR was aimed at creating, strengthening and expanding the bloc of socialist states, which later became known as the socialist camp. The coalition governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia that appeared immediately after the war were replaced by one-party ones, monarchical institutions were liquidated in Bulgaria and Romania, and in East Germany and North Korea pro-Soviet governments proclaimed their own republics. Shortly before this, the Communists had taken control of most of China. Soviet attempts to create Soviet republics Greece and Iran failed.
Intra-party struggle
It is believed that in the early 50s, Stalin planned another purge of the top party apparatus. Shortly before his death, he also carried out a reorganization of the party's management system. In 1952, the VKP(b) became known as the CPSU, and the Politburo was replaced by the Presidium of the Central Committee, which did not have the post of General Secretary. Even during Stalin's lifetime, there was a confrontation between Beria and Malenkov on the one hand and Voroshilov, Khrushchev and Molotov on the other. Among historians, the following opinion is widespread: members of both groups realized that the new series of trials was directed primarily against them, and therefore, having learned about Stalin's illness, they made sure that he was not provided with the necessary medical care.
The results of the post-war years
In the post-war years, which coincided with the last seven years of Stalin's life, the Soviet Union turned from a victorious power into a world power. The government of the USSR managed to relatively quickly rebuild National economy, reestablish state institutions and create a bloc of allied states around itself. At the same time, the repressive apparatus was strengthened, aimed at eradicating dissent and at "cleansing" party structures. With the death of Stalin, the process of development of the state has undergone drastic changes. The USSR entered a new era.
At Great Victory There was also a Great Price. The war claimed 27 million human lives. The economy of the country, especially in the territory subjected to occupation, was thoroughly undermined: 1,710 cities and towns, more than 70,000 villages and villages, about 32,000 industrial enterprises, 65,000 km of railway lines were completely or partially destroyed, 75 million people lost their homes. The concentration of efforts on military production, necessary to achieve victory, led to a significant impoverishment of the resources of the population and to a decrease in the production of consumer goods. During the war, the previously insignificant housing construction was sharply reduced, while the country's housing stock was partially destroyed. Later, unfavorable economic and social factors came into play: low wages, an acute housing crisis, the involvement of an increasing number of women in production, and so on.
After the war, the birth rate began to decline. In the 1950s it was 25 (per 1,000), and before the war it was 31. In 1971-1972, there were half as many children born per 1,000 women aged 15-49 in a year than in 1938-1939. . In the first post-war years, the working-age population of the USSR was also significantly lower than the pre-war one. There is information at the beginning of 1950 in the USSR there were 178.5 million people, that is, 15.6 million less than it was in 1930 - 194.1 million people. In the 1960s, there was an even greater decline.
The fall in the birth rate in the first post-war years was associated with the death of entire age groups of men. The death of a significant part of the country's male population during the war created a difficult, often catastrophic situation for millions of families. A large category of widow families and single mothers has emerged. The woman fell on double responsibilities: material support for the family and care for the family itself and the upbringing of children. Although the state took over, especially in large industrial centers, part of the care of children, creating a network of nurseries and kindergartens, but they were not enough. Saved to some extent by the institution of "grandmothers".
The difficulties of the first post-war years were exacerbated by the enormous damage suffered by agriculture during the war. The invaders ruined 98,000 collective farms and 1,876 state farms, took away and slaughtered many millions of heads of livestock, almost completely deprived countryside occupied areas of draft power. In agrarian areas, the number of able-bodied people decreased by almost one third. The depletion of human resources in the countryside was also the result of the natural process of urban growth. The village lost an average of up to 2 million people per year. The difficult living conditions in the villages forced young people to leave for the cities. Part of the demobilized soldiers settled after the war in the cities and did not want to return to agriculture.
During the war, in many regions of the country, significant areas of land belonging to collective farms were transferred to enterprises and cities, or illegally seized by them. In other areas, the land has become the subject of sale. Back in 1939, the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of the Central Committee (6) and the Council of People's Commissars issued a resolution on measures to combat the squandering of collective farm lands. By the beginning of 1947, more than 2,255 thousand cases of appropriation or use of land were discovered, in total 4.7 million hectares. Between 1947 and May 1949, the use of 5.9 million hectares of collective farm land was additionally discovered. The higher authorities, starting from the local and ending with the republican, brazenly robbed the collective farms, charging them, under various pretexts, in fact dues in kind.
By September 1946, the debt of various organizations to collective farms amounted to 383 million rubles.
In the Akmola region of the Kazakh SGR, the authorities in 1949 took from the collective farms 1,500 head of cattle, 3,000 centners of grain and products worth about 2 million rubles. The robbers, among whom were leading party and Soviet workers, were not held accountable.
The squandering of collective-farm lands and goods belonging to the collective farms aroused great indignation among the collective farmers. For example, at the general meetings of collective farmers in the Tyumen region (Siberia), dedicated to the decree of September 19, 1946, 90 thousand collective farmers participated, and the activity was unusual: 11 thousand collective farmers spoke. In the Kemerovo region, 367 chairmen of collective farms, 2,250 members of the board and 502 chairmen of the audit commissions of the former composition were nominated at meetings for the election of new boards. However, the new composition of the boards could not achieve any significant change: the state policy remained the same. Therefore, there was no way out of the impasse.
After the end of the war, the production of tractors, agricultural machinery and implements quickly improved. But, despite the improvement in the supply of agriculture with machines, tractors, and the strengthening of the material and technical base of state farms and MTS, the situation in agriculture remained catastrophic. The state continued to invest extremely insignificant funds in agriculture - in the post-war five-year plan, only 16% of all appropriations for the national economy.
In 1946, only 76% of the sown area was sown compared to 1940. Due to drought and other turmoil, the 1946 harvest was lower even compared to the paramilitary 1945. “In fact, in terms of grain production, the country for a long period was at the level that pre-revolutionary Russia had,” admitted N. S. Khrushchev. In 1910-1914, the gross grain harvest was 4,380 million poods, in 1949-1953, 4,942 million poods. Grain yields were lower than in 1913, despite mechanization, fertilizers, and so on.
Grain yield
1913 -- 8.2 centners per hectare
1925-1926 -- 8.5 centners per hectare
1926-1932 -- 7.5 centners per hectare
1933-1937 -- 7.1 centners per hectare
1949-1953 -- 7.7 centners per hectare
Accordingly, there were fewer agricultural products per capita. Taking the pre-collectivization period of 1928-1929 as 100, production in 1913 was 90.3, in 1930-1932 - 86.8, in 1938-1940 - 90.0, in 1950-1953 - 94.0. As can be seen from the table, the grain problem worsened, despite the decline in grain exports (from 1913 to 1938 by 4.5 times), the reduction in the number of livestock and, consequently, the consumption of grain. The number of horses decreased from 1928 to 1935 by 25 million heads, which saved more than 10 million tons of grain, 10-15% of the gross grain harvest of that time.
In 1916, there were 58.38 million cattle on the territory of Russia, on January 1, 1941, its number decreased to 54.51 million, and in 1951 there were 57.09 million heads, that is, it was still below the level 1916. The number of cows exceeded the level of 1916 only in 1955. In general, according to official data, from 1940 to 1952 the gross agricultural output increased (in comparable prices) by only 10%!
The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February 1947 demanded even greater centralization of agricultural production, effectively depriving the collective farms of the right to decide not only how much, but what to sow. Political departments were restored in the machine and tractor stations - propaganda was supposed to replace food for the completely starving and impoverished collective farmers. Collective farms were obliged, in addition to fulfilling state deliveries, to fill up seed funds, set aside part of the crop in an indivisible fund, and only after that give money to collective farmers for workdays. State deliveries were still planned from the center, harvest prospects were determined by eye, and the actual harvest was often much lower than planned. The first commandment of the collective farmers "first give to the state" had to be fulfilled in any way. Local party and Soviet organizations often forced more successful collective farms to pay with grain and other products for their impoverished neighbors, which ultimately led to the impoverishment of both. Collective farmers lived mainly on the products grown on their dwarf household plots. But in order to take their products to the market, they needed a special certificate certifying that they had paid off the obligatory state deliveries. Otherwise, they were considered deserters and speculators, subjected to fines and even imprisonment. Increased taxes on personal household plots of collective farmers. Collective farmers were required in the form of natural deliveries of products that they often did not produce. Therefore, they were forced to purchase these products at the market price and hand them over to the state free of charge. The Russian village did not know such a terrible state even during the time of the Tatar yoke.
In 1947, a significant part of the European territory of the country suffered a famine. It arose after a severe drought that engulfed the main agricultural granaries of the European part of the USSR: a significant part of Ukraine, Moldova, Lower Volga, central regions of Russia, Crimea. In previous years, the state took the harvest cleanly at the expense of state deliveries, sometimes not even leaving the seed fund. A crop failure occurred in a number of areas that were subjected to German occupation, that is, many times robbed by both strangers and their own. As a result, there were no food supplies to get through the hard times. The Soviet state, on the other hand, demanded more and more millions of poods of grain from the completely robbed peasants. For example, in 1946, a year of severe drought, Ukrainian collective farmers owed the state 400 million poods (7.2 million tons) of grain. This figure, and most of the other planned tasks, was arbitrarily set and did not correlate with the actual possibilities of Ukrainian agriculture.
Desperate peasants sent letters to the Ukrainian government in Kyiv and to the allied government in Moscow, begging them to come to their aid and save them from starvation. Khrushchev, who at that time was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) U, after long and painful hesitation (he was afraid of being accused of sabotage and losing his place), nevertheless sent a letter to Stalin, in which he asked for permission to temporarily introduce a rationing system and save food for supply for the agricultural population. Stalin, in a reply telegram, rudely rejected the request of the Ukrainian government. Now the Ukrainian peasants faced starvation and death. People began to die by the thousands. There were cases of cannibalism. Khrushchev cites in his memoirs a letter to him from the secretary of the Odessa Regional Party Committee A.I. Kirichenko, who visited one of the collective farms in the winter of 1946-1947. Here is what he reported: "I saw a terrible scene. A woman put the corpse of her own child on the table and cut it into pieces. She spoke insanely when she did this:" We have already eaten Manechka. Now we will pickle Vanichka. This will support us for a while ". Can you imagine it? A woman went mad because of hunger and cut her own children to pieces! Famine raged in Ukraine.
However, Stalin and his closest aides did not want to reckon with the facts. The merciless Kaganovich was sent to Ukraine as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, and Khrushchev temporarily fell out of favor, was moved to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine. But no movement could save the situation: the famine continued, and it claimed about a million human lives.
In 1952, state prices for supplies of grain, meat and pork were lower than in 1940. The prices paid for potatoes were lower than the cost of transportation. Collective farms were paid an average of 8 rubles 63 kopecks per centner of grain. State farms received 29 rubles 70 kopecks for a centner.
In order to buy a kilogram of butter, the collective farmer had to work ... 60 workdays, and in order to purchase a very modest suit, an annual salary was needed.
Most of the country's collective and state farms in the early 1950s had extremely low yields. Even in such fertile regions of Russia as the Central Black Earth region, the Volga region and Kazakhstan, the harvests remained extremely low, because the center endlessly ordered them what to sow and how to sow. The point, however, was not only stupid orders from above and insufficient material and technical base. For many years, the love for their work, for the land, was beaten out of the peasants. Once upon a time, the land rewarded for the labor expended, for their devotion to their peasant cause, sometimes generously, sometimes poorly. Now this incentive, which has received the official name "incentive of material interest" has disappeared. Work on the land turned into free or low-income forced labor.
Many collective farmers were starving, others were systematically malnourished. Saved homesteads. The situation was especially difficult in the European part of the USSR. The situation was much better in Central Asia, where there were high procurement prices for cotton - the main agricultural crop, and in the south, which specialized in vegetable growing, fruit production and winemaking.
In 1950, the consolidation of collective farms began. Their number decreased from 237 thousand to 93 thousand in 1953. Consolidation of collective farms could contribute to their economic strengthening. However, insufficient capital investment, mandatory supplies and low procurement prices, the lack of a sufficient number of trained specialists and machine operators, and, finally, the restrictions imposed by the state on the personal household plots of collective farmers deprived them of an incentive to work, destroyed their hopes of breaking out of the clutches of need. The 33 million collective farmers who fed the 200 million population of the country with their hard work remained, after the convicts, the poorest, most offended stratum of Soviet society.
Let us now see what was the position of the working class and other urban strata of the population at that time.
As you know, one of the first acts of the Provisional Government after the February Revolution was the introduction of an 8-hour working day. Prior to this, the workers of Russia worked 10 and sometimes 12 hours a day. As for the collective farmers, their working day, as in the pre-revolutionary years, remained irregular. In 1940 they returned to the 8 o'clock.
According to official Soviet statistics, the average wage of a Soviet worker increased more than 11 times between the start of industrialization (1928) and the end of the Stalin era (1954). But this does not give an idea of real wages. Soviet sources give fantastic calculations that have nothing to do with reality. Western researchers have calculated that during this period the cost of living, according to the most conservative estimates, increased in the period 1928-1954 by 9-10 times. However, the worker in the Soviet Union has, in addition to the official wages received in his hands, additional, in the form of social services rendered to him by the state. It returns to workers in the form of free medical care, education and other things part of the earnings alienated by the state.
According to the largest American specialist in Soviet economy Janet Chapman additional increases in the wages of workers and employees, taking into account the changes in prices that have occurred, after 1927 were: in 1928 - 15% in 1937 - 22.1%; in 194O - 20.7%; in 1948 - 29.6%; in 1952 - 22.2%; 1954 - 21.5%. The cost of living in the same years grew as follows, taking 1928 as 100:
This table shows that the growth in the wages of Soviet workers and employees was lower than the growth in the cost of living. For example, by 1948 wages in monetary terms had doubled compared to 1937, but the cost of living had more than tripled. The fall in real wages was also associated with an increase in loan subscriptions and taxation. The significant increase in real wages by 1952 was still below the level of 1928, although it exceeded the level of real wages of the pre-war 1937 and 1940s.
In order to form a correct idea of the position of the Soviet worker in comparison with his counterparts abroad, let us compare how many products could be bought for 1 hour of work expended. Taking the initial data of the hourly wage of a Soviet worker as 100, we get the following comparative table:
The picture is striking: in the same time spent, an English worker could purchase in 1952 more than 3.5 times more food, and an American worker 5.6 times more food than a Soviet worker.
The Soviet people, especially the older generations, have an ingrained opinion that, they say, under Stalin, prices were reduced every year, and under Khrushchev and after him, prices were constantly growing. Hence, there is even some nostalgia for Stalin's times.
The secret to lowering prices is extremely simple - it is based, firstly, on a huge rise in prices after the start of collectivization. Indeed, if we take the prices of 1937 as 100, it turns out that the yen for baked rye bread increased 10.5 times from 1928 to 1937, and by 1952 almost 19 times. Prices for beef of the 1st grade increased from 1928 to 1937 by 15.7 times, and by 1952 by 17 times: for pork, respectively, by 10.5 and 20.5 times. The price of herring rose by 1952 by almost 15 times. The cost of sugar rose by 1937 by 6 times, and by 1952 by 15 times. The price of sunflower oil rose from 1928 to 1937 by a factor of 28, and from 1928 to 1952 by a factor of 34. Egg prices increased from 1928 to 1937 by 11.3 times, and by 1952 by 19.3 times. And finally, the price of potatoes rose from 1928 to 1937 by 5 times, and in 1952 they were 11 times higher than the 1928 price level.
All these data are taken from Soviet price tags for different years.
Having once raised prices by 1500-2500 percent, then it was already quite easy to pull off the trick of lowering prices every year. Secondly, the price reduction was due to the robbery of collective farmers, that is, extremely low state delivery and purchase prices. Back in 1953, procurement prices for potatoes in Moscow and Leningrad regions were equal to ... 2.5 - 3 kopecks per kilogram. Finally, the majority of the population did not feel the difference in prices at all, since the state supply was very poor, in many areas meat, fats and other products were not brought to stores for years.
This is the "secret" of the annual decline in prices in Stalin's time.
A worker in the USSR, 25 years after the revolution, continued to eat worse than a Western worker.
The housing crisis worsened. Compared to pre-revolutionary times, when the problem of housing in densely populated cities was not easy (1913 - 7 square meters per 1 person), in the post-revolutionary years, especially during the period of collectivization, the housing problem became unusually aggravated. Masses of rural residents poured into the cities, seeking salvation from hunger or in search of work. Civil housing construction in Stalin's time was unusually limited. Apartments in the cities were received by senior officials of the party and state apparatus. In Moscow, for example, in the early 1930s, a huge residential complex was built on Bersenevskaya Embankment - Government House with large comfortable apartments. A few hundred meters from the Government House there is another residential complex - a former almshouse, converted into communal apartments, where for 20-30 people there was one kitchen and I-2 toilets.
Before the revolution, most of the workers lived near factories in the barracks, after the revolution the barracks were called hostels. Large enterprises built new dormitories for their workers, apartments for the engineering and administrative apparatus, but it was still impossible to solve the housing problem, since the lion's share of appropriations was spent on the development of industry, military industry, power system.
Housing conditions for the overwhelming majority of the urban population worsened every year during the years of Stalin's rule: the population growth rate significantly exceeded the rate of civil housing construction.
In 1928, the living area per 1 city dweller was 5.8 sq. meters, in 1932 4.9 sq. meters, in 1937 - 4.6 square meters. meters.
The plan of the 1st five-year plan provided for the construction of new 62.5 million square meters. meters of living space, but only 23.5 million square meters were built. meters. According to the 2nd five-year plan, it was planned to build 72.5 million square meters. meters, was built 2.8 times less than 26.8 million square meters. meters.
In 1940, the living area per city dweller was 4.5 sq. meters.
Two years after Stalin's death, when mass housing construction began, there were 5.1 sq. meters. In order to realize how crowded people lived, it should be mentioned that even the official Soviet housing standard is 9 square meters. meters per person (in Czechoslovakia - 17 sq. meters). Many families huddled in an area of 6 square meters. meters. They lived not in families, but in clans - two or three generations in one room.
The family of a cleaner of a large Moscow enterprise in the 13th century A-voi lived in a hostel in a room of 20 square meters. meters. The cleaner herself was the widow of the commandant of the border outpost who died at the beginning of the German-Soviet war. There were only seven fixed beds in the room. The remaining six people - adults and children were laid out on the floor for the night. Sexual relations took place almost in plain sight, they got used to it and did not pay attention. For 15 years, the three families who lived in the room unsuccessfully sought resettlement. Only in the early 60s they were resettled.
Hundreds of thousands, if not millions of inhabitants of the Soviet Union lived in such conditions in the post-war period. Such was the legacy of the Stalin era.