Recently, the issues of creating aircraft carriers (AB) in our country do not leave the pages of various printed publications and are actively discussed on social networks. However, in order to publish and discuss information, the right to present which everyone who is interested in this topic has, it is necessary to have at least a minimum of reliable information.
Unfortunately, most of the participants in lively disputes, referring to the opinions of various military and politicians, have never seen real documents (including minutes of government meetings) and have not heard real statements by representatives of the military-political leadership of the country, and therefore base their conclusions on the basis of actively circulating rumors.
Let's try to clarify this problem and talk about what was hidden from ordinary citizens by "the formidable guardians of many useless secrets of the USSR and Russia."
To begin with, let's figure it out: who didn't want to build aircraft carriers in the USSR? But for this you will have to make a short digression into history and name some names.
The first in 1918 began to create the AB of the British Navy, having converted the battleship (LK) Furios into an aircraft carrier ship. As the leadership of the Royal Navy believed, aircraft carriers were required to solve auxiliary tasks, in particular, to weaken the enemy’s linear forces with aircraft attacks before the main artillery battle, as well as to cover their own battleships from enemy air strikes.
In Japan and the United States, aircraft carriers began to be built later, but the conceptual views on their use were close to the point of view of the British admirals on this score (with some difference in the Land of the Rising Sun). The Japanese and American naval commanders believed that all ABs should act as a single operational formation to inflict the greatest losses on the main enemy forces before the start of a linear artillery battle, and not be distributed among the LK squadrons.
Based on this, it is clear why the “big” 10-year program for the construction of the Soviet fleet in 1938 included 15 battleships and only two aircraft carriers, and it was planned to create “floating airfields” not in the first five years. Then everyone believed that the AB were auxiliary ships. The command of the USSR Navy intended to entrust them with the provision of air defense of the linear forces and reconnaissance. It believed that since the Soviet fleet at that time should first of all solve the problem of defending its coastal zone in closed seas, air defense and intelligence could be provided in more coastal aviation, and aircraft carriers must be additionally, just in case.
To foresee the great future of the AB and, therefore, to build them instead of the LK, it was necessary to be as brilliant and authoritative a naval figure as the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. And the naval aviation of the USSR Navy itself had mainly reconnaissance and fighter orientation and weak strike capabilities (less than 15% of the entire fleet of strike aircraft), and its further development was also assumed in the same vein. Thus, there is no reason to throw reproaches at the leaders of the USSR and the Navy in the 1930s for insufficient attention to AV.
The concept of the auxiliary purpose of aircraft carriers was also implemented at the beginning of World War II. British aircraft torpedoed three Italian battleships in the Taranto base in 1940, knocked out in Atlantic Ocean in 1941, the German battleship Bismarck, which was then sunk by artillery fire, damaged the Italian battleship Vittorio Vineto off Cape Matapan (only a quick recovery of combat capability and the proximity of the base saved the ship from the fate of the Bismarck).
The Japanese, using the experience of the British, attacked Pearl Harbor with an aircraft carrier formation in December 1941 and disabled all the battleships of the US Pacific Fleet, sinking and damaging eight American light ships. However, only after the battles in the Coral Sea and near Midway Island in 1942 did the AB become the main combat units of the leading fleets of the world, and not as ships in their own right, but as mobile airfields for aviation. It was she who turned into the main force at sea, first defeating surface ships, and then, from 1944, submarines. By the way, even earlier - in 1939-1940, the Luftwaffe, and not German tanks, defeated ground troops Poland, France and the UK.
The prophetic words of the Russian naval theorist N. L. Klado, uttered by him back in 1910, came true: “... when the air force overcomes the obstacles that hinder its development (mainly low payload), it will immediately take a dominant position among the means of warfare. ..”
The Great Patriotic War forced the Soviet admirals to think seriously. In the north, transport convoys for the USSR with weapons and strategic materials from the United States and Great Britain suffered the main losses not from German submarines, but from German aviation. In the Baltic Sea, an attempt at first to keep ships in Kronstadt under the protection of powerful air defense only led to the death of the Marat LK, one leader, several destroyers and submarines. In the future, only the camouflage and relocation of the ships to Leningrad saved them from the inevitable destruction of the Luftwaffe. On the Black Sea, while German aviation was in the Crimea, it completely ousted our surface ships and even submarines from the reach of its aircraft, ensured the blockade and capture of Sevastopol. Until the end of 1943, the appearance in the daytime at a distance of action of Luftwaffe vehicles, even a formation of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet, led to his death. As it turned out, it was possible to provide air defense to ships at sea with coastal fighters only at a distance of 50-100 kilometers from the coast, and even then only in some cases.
Bet on submarines
What lessons did the command of the USSR Navy and the leadership of the country as a whole learn from the experience of the last war?From the unpublished notes of the head of the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding of the Navy, Admiral N.V. Isachenkov, the following is known: work began on the study of the future fleet. Today I. V. Stalin asked me what was the main conclusion I made about the ongoing battles at sea. I answered him that submarines and aviation had become the main forces at sea. “Still, the submarines are the first?”. I confirmed it. “Strange,” he replied. “Prepare a shipbuilding program for 1945-1955.” So, Nikolai Vasilyevich, prepare proposals for the shipbuilding program, taking into account the developments of the commission of Vice Admiral Abankin.
As you can see, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov gave priority to submarines, which somewhat puzzled Stalin.
The commission of theorists of the Navy, chaired by Vice-Admiral P. S. Abankin, presented in March 1945 "Considerations on the most rational ratio of the number of ships of different classes in different theaters and on the advisability of creating new classes of ships or merging existing ones into one class." For a long time this document was labeled "Top Secret", since it analyzed the possible military operations of the USSR Navy against the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in all theaters of operations. At the same time, the importance of aircraft carriers was still determined by the provisions of the old concept (air defense and weakening the enemy to a decisive artillery battle), but their ratio, depending on the theater, was already the same - one or two AB for each LC. At a minimum, it was supposed to have nine LCs and 13 ABs.
The submariners had a special "appetite", requiring the deployment of up to 430 submarines with the tasks of combating enemy warships. Later, already under N. S. Khrushchev, N. G. Kuznetsov insisted on the construction of 800 submarines, which caused the fury of the first person of the state due to the huge costs and contributed to the dismissal of the admiral.
Thus, the command of the USSR Navy, even after the Great Patriotic War, in 1945, relied on submarines, and aircraft carriers, as in the 1920s and 1930s, considered them as auxiliary ships compared to battleships. At the same time, the political leadership of the USSR did not consider this concept correct.
In September 1945, N. G. Kuznetsov’s report on the future shipbuilding program was heard in Stalin’s office, which, judging by the notes of Admiral N. V. Isachenkov, envisaged the construction by 1956 of four LK, 12 AV, 94 cruisers, 358 destroyers and 495 PL. However, the meeting strongly corrected these plans. Let's touch only the aspects connected with AB and PL.
“Departing from the original application, the People's Commissar of the Navy asked to build four large and four small ABs. I.V. Stalin replied: “Let's wait with both,” recalls N.V. Isachenkov. Then, bearing in mind the needs of the Northern Fleet, the Generalissimo, after a short discussion, summarized: "Let's build two small pieces." (However, later, at the insistence of the shipbuilding industry and with the tacit consent of the already new command of the Navy, aircraft carriers disappeared from the program.) Stalin also doubted the need for such a number of submarines: “Do we need so many boats in general, and are large submarines especially needed?”. N. G. Kuznetsov managed to defend only part of the submarine.
Who did not need mobile airfields? Presumably - not to Stalin, but to the ship industry and the new (after N. G. Kuznetsov) command of the Navy. For example, all attempts by Admiral Kuznetsov to organize the completion of the captured German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin were rejected by the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry, even if there was a conclusion from the Baltic Shipyard on the possibility of carrying out the necessary work.
Air defense tool
In the mid-50s, a scientific and technological revolution began and in all countries, including the USSR, a review of the significance for a future war began various kinds weapons. Even in the leading maritime powers (USA, Great Britain and France), against the background of the general nuclear missile hysteria, they began to question the expediency of the existence of AB. In the USSR appeared huge number naval specialists, who believed that it was missiles that would finally help cheaply "overtake, not overtake" the traditional navies of the leading maritime powers.In October 1955, in Sevastopol, under the leadership of N. S. Khrushchev, a meeting of government members with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy was held to work out ways to develop the fleet for the coming decade. The event was held under the slogan "The past experience in the formation of combat assets of the fleet is unsuitable in the new conditions."
At first, N. S. Khrushchev expressed his view on these problems: “With modern means of detection, communications, powerful missile weapons, can surface ships perform their tasks with their large sizes? Surface ships will become a burden... I believe in submarines. The submarine fleet and naval aviation must be made the main force for fighting at sea ... Covering communications requires the creation of aircraft carriers to solve air defense tasks. But this is not a task for the near future. It may be advisable to design and build one aircraft carrier to begin with in order to gain experience in order to determine the procedure for their further construction when necessary ... "
Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov expressed the following views: “... The actions of naval aviation and powerful missile weapons will be of decisive importance in a war at sea ... A powerful submarine fleet is needed to disrupt sea and ocean communications ... Aircraft carriers do not need to be built in the near future. Our strategic position is different compared to a potential enemy ... "
If the marshal knew that for a real disruption of communications of a potential enemy (exceeding losses over new construction), at that time it was necessary to sink transport ships with a total displacement of more than two million tons every month, which required, according to the most conservative estimates, to maintain the number of active submarines at the level of 1000 units and a monthly production of at least 15,000 torpedoes, then he most likely would have refused to set this task for the Navy.
Finally, according to the plans of the General Staff, it was assumed that in the event of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO), in two weeks our troops would reach the coast of the English Channel and begin to force it. This water barrier was considered by the then Soviet strategists as a "wide river", armored vehicles had to force it on special high-speed disposable means. And the first convoys from the US could arrive in Europe only in three weeks.
Giving priority to naval aviation as the main force at sea, the military-political leadership of the USSR either assigned the AB only the role of one of the air defense systems (N. S. Khrushchev) to cover unknown communications (after all, the USSR had them only on land or in the coastal zone, and they , of course, did not require AB for cover), or completely denied the need to create such ships (G.K. Zhukov). If they considered an aircraft carrier as a floating mobile airfield with an entire division of naval aviation on board, then the expediency of building even a small number of aircraft carriers would be justified by the priority of naval aviation put forward by them. Finally, the danger of destroying stationary objects with nuclear weapons required the deployment of a mobile fleet basing system. But AB actually is. Unfortunately, in the speeches of military sailors regarding AB, the latter were also considered as an air defense means for various formations of surface ships.
As we can see, even in the 1950s and 1960s, the leaders of the country, while not objecting in principle to the construction of the AB, simply did not know the goals of this construction. But the naval specialists could not (or did not want to?) correctly orient the government, leaving its views on AB at the level of the 20-30s.
Fantastic Deals
Finally, in the early 1970s, some leaders of the Soviet Navy began to realize that a “powerful missile weapon” alone could not solve all the problems that arise in the confrontation with the US Navy even on their own coasts, including with American aircraft carrier strike formations ( AUS), for which a very good air defense system was created. Design work has begun on the first domestic aircraft carriers, similar to the AB of the United States.In 1973, the finished preliminary design of an aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant (NPP) of project 1160 with a displacement of approximately 100,000 tons was on the table of the Minister of Defense of the USSR A. A. Grechko. The Marshal then said: “Why are you wiser there! Do it like the Americans do, with such a fleet.” He personally crossed out in a blue pencil on the drawing a missile cellar with anti-ship missiles, so beloved by domestic admirals, and wrote the composition of the air group: Su-24K carrier-based bombers, Su-27K fighters and attack aircraft (then code name "Buran") and a number of other aircraft. The head of the military department immediately determined the universal purpose of the ship.
Grechko was the only Minister of Defense of the USSR who correctly understood naval issues and clearly defined the tasks of domestic ABs. Unfortunately, after his death in 1976, the project was “covered up” and speculation began on the well-known words of L. I. Brezhnev: “Aircraft carriers are the weapon of an aggressor.” Who wrote this for the Secretary General is, in principle, unclear. But since Brezhnev had boundless respect for Grechko and never said anything that did not agree with the Politburo and, of course, with him, this phrase could hardly have belonged to him.
At the end of the 70s, an ardent supporter of all science fiction (ekranoplans, large hovercraft, vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, etc.), the new Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov nevertheless allowed the design and construction of an aircraft carrier, which was classified as a heavy aircraft carrier cruiser (TAVKR). During construction, he received project number 11435, and after 1991, his well-deserved name - "Admiral Kuznetsov" (the full name is long and does not correspond to the traditions of the Russian fleet). However, even on the terms of reference for the design of this ship, the hand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, wrote: "Place 12-24 anti-ship missiles, the power plant is a boiler-turbine." So it was again not possible to build a full-fledged AB.
Later it turned out that Ustinov imposed a ban on the nuclear power plant, and Gorshkov did not strongly object. Moreover, he suffered for a long time how to connect his favorite anti-ship missiles with AB aircraft. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral B. A. Kolyzaev, head of the surface control of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, one of Gorshkov’s assistants suggested considering anti-ship missiles as non-returnable attack aircraft, and ship fighters as a means of their defense and escort on the flight route to the target. “Now I know why we need aircraft carriers!” - Admiral S. G. Gorshkov happily answered.
Admiral N. N. Amelko, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for the Navy (1979–1986), had a special approach to the development of the Navy and to the surface fleet in general. He wrote to all conceivable and unimaginable instances until his death: “Surface ships with a displacement of more than 2,000 tons are stupidity and unnecessary expenses for the country, but submarines must be built.”
The first deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral N. I. Smirnov, also distinguished himself with an original “approach” (although many naval commanders later said that these were all Gorshkov’s ideas), who personally oversaw the development of an “armored missile cruiser” with a displacement of 100,000 tons in the 80s with 1000 attack missiles, a kind of revival of the Japanese Yamato-class super battleship. But this ship, instead of AV, the Main Headquarters of the Navy continued to support and push into military shipbuilding programs under the guise of a "missile cruiser coastal defense until the mid-1990s. The compilers of these programs barely fought off such strange ideas. Naturally, the USSR defense ministers, who were well versed only in tanks and artillery, unconditionally believed in the leadership of the Navy, and it sometimes gave rise to very strange ideas.
Vladislav Nikolsky, doctor of technical sciences, professor
Nikolai Novichkov, candidate of technical sciences
In 1943, in Samarkand, a group of evacuated engineers began work on a project for a unique aircraft carrier. Alas, this ambitious development of the Stalin era remained on paper. Nikita Khrushchev had different views on the functionality of the fleet.
Who is Kostromitinov?
According to the historian of the Russian Navy Andrei Platonov, the project of an ultra-modern Soviet aircraft carrier, which was developed by a conditional senior technician-lieutenant Kostromitinov, remained on paper. Imaginable secrecy labels have long been removed, there are graphs (drawings) of the planned ship. There is only no detailed biographical data about the developer of this project, it is impossible to find them. Even his name and patronymic are unknown, although numerous articles have been written about Kostromitinov's work. science articles and even books.
Who worked on the project
For that time, the project was revolutionary, innovative. In 1943, the employees of the Naval Academy, who were evacuated to Samarkand, came up with an original idea. Scientists (including corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) drew plans for an ideal aircraft carrier, taking into account British and American models, as well as the pre-war plan for the device of the German "Count Zeppelin".
What was in the plans
According to the memoirs of Vice-Admiral of the Navy of the USSR Leonid Goncharov, the curator of the thesis of the "mysterious" Kostromitinov, the projected Soviet aircraft carrier had a displacement of more than 50 thousand tons, top speed over 30 knots. Gun crew: 16 guns of 152-mm caliber, plus twin and triple gun mounts. The plans of the "conditional Kostromitinov" assumed the placement on the ship of a large - more than 100 aircraft - air group, the main part of which was to be fighters. The aircraft carrier being developed was supposed to have a large power reserve.
But all this was not destined to come true.
Why didn't it happen?
According to The National Interest (an American analytical publication on military-political topics, it also publishes a print magazine), this project was not accepted by Nikita Khrushchev, who had his own vision of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Navy. Khrushchev expressed his point, it was reflected in the "Project 85".
But this development also turned out to be unpromising - everything was limited only to plans, nothing more.
See also: the choice of the editors of the "Russian Seven"
1927 By the decision of the Revolutionary Military Council, the restructuring of the training ship "Komsomolets" (formerly "Ocean") into an experimental aircraft carrier has begun. The old boilers of various types were replaced with Yarrow boilers made for the Izmail-class cruisers (three of these cruisers were sold for scrap in 1922). The mast, chimney, cabins and bridges were combined into an "island" on the port side. To increase stability, boules 4 meters wide were used (at the same time they were anti-torpedo protection).
After the restructuring, the displacement of the aircraft carrier was 12 thousand tons, and the speed was 15 knots. The air group was planned to be 42 aircraft (26 fighters, 16 attack aircraft). Artillery: 16-102 mm universal guns in twin mounts, 10-40 mm anti-aircraft guns in two five-barrel mounts.
The commissioning took place in 1934.
The disadvantages of the R-5T were its single-seat capacity and the absence of any defensive weapons, so in 1937 the development of a new carrier-based torpedo bomber began.
In 1938, general fleet maneuvers took place in the Baltic, in which the aircraft carrier "Red Banner" (the new name of "Komsomolets") took part, as part of the exercises, aircraft carried out reconnaissance in the interests of the "Reds", escort of the squadron by fighters from the air, as well as training bombing and torpedo throwing at the withdrawn from the fleet to the battleship "Frunze".
In the same year, when discussing the Big Fleet program, it was planned within the framework of the program to build as many as 8 light and 4 large aircraft carriers at once, and the design of these ships began. The light cruiser of project 68 "Chapaev" and the heavy cruiser of project 69 were chosen as the basis.
Project 71a, light AB.
Technical data of the project 71a aircraft carrier: standard displacement 11,300 tons, total displacement 13,000 tons, mechanism power 126,500 liters. s., speed 33 knots; armament: 8 100-mm universal guns, 16 37-mm guns, 20 12.7-mm machine guns; air group: ten multipurpose aircraft and 30 fighters, two pneumatic catapults.
In 1940, the aircraft carrier "Red Banner" was modernized and received new aircraft - I-153K fighters.
The air group was significantly reduced and now amounted to only 18 aircraft. Instead of two small lifting elevators, one large one was mounted, the aircraft carrier received a pneumatic catapult for testing, which also facilitated the take-off of I-153K fighters.
In 1939, the first aircraft carrier of the new program under project 71a was laid down in Leningrad, which received the name "Red Star".
In 1940, the program for the construction of the Big Fleet was seriously reduced, leaving only 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers and 4 (in 1941 there were only 2 light aircraft carriers).
The second Project 71a aircraft carrier was laid down in 1940 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. He received the name "Chkalov".
The Baltic aircraft carrier was destined for the Northern Fleet, the Komsomol - for the Pacific Fleet.
Since the Navy had already been allocated to a separate People's Commissariat by that time, a competition was announced in 1940 for the creation of a specialized carrier-based fighter, in 1941 the Su-4 carrier-based torpedo bomber was already put into service, but as a result, he only managed to operate from coastal airfields.
The descent of the lead aircraft carrier of project 71a "Red Star" took place in the spring of 1941, the war found him in completion. In July 1941, its completion was suspended. "Chkalov" was launched only in 1944 and mothballed.
The aircraft carrier "Red Banner" soon after June 22, 1941 left for Kronstadt, its air group participated in the defense of Leningrad, operating mainly from coastal airfields. The ship itself was camouflaged and repeatedly damaged. It was decommissioned in 1945.
The unfinished "Red Star" in 1943 was turned into an air defense battery. He was equipped with a large number of anti-aircraft guns of various calibers.
In 1943, the escort aircraft carrier "Korregidor" of the "Casablanca" type, which received the name "Molotovsk" in the Soviet fleet, was temporarily transferred to the Soviet Union (until the end of hostilities). The air group consisted of American-made aircraft.
The aircraft carrier participated in the escort of several convoys, supported the offensive of Soviet troops in Norway, providing air cover for the Arkhangelsk battleship, which was shelling German positions. Several air raids were also carried out by the aircraft carrier's Avengers.
In 1945 Soviet troops the damaged unfinished German aircraft carrier Graf Zepellin was captured; its design was carefully studied. The issue of its completion was seriously discussed, but the completion was complicated by the fact that a significant part of the equipment ended up in the western zone of occupation and the allies categorically refused to transfer it. Nevertheless, in 1947, on the personal instructions of Stalin, the completion of the "Graf Zeppelin" began, which inherited the name "Red Banner" from the first Soviet aircraft carrier.
The design of the ship underwent significant changes: casemate guns were abandoned, the area of the "island" was significantly reduced and the length of the flight deck was increased, the German system for transporting aircraft and German catapults was abandoned. The deck was equipped with sponsons for the installation of anti-aircraft guns. Of course, updated radio equipment was installed.
The completion of the aircraft carrier stretched for 6 years, the ship entered service in 1953, a month after the death of I.V. Stalin. In 1955, the ship was relocated from the Baltic to the North.
"Red Banner" (formerly "Graf Zeppelin") after commissioning in 1953.
After the war, measures were also taken to complete the construction of the Project 71 aircraft carriers Krasnaya Zvezda and Chkalov. During the construction, attempts were made to take into account the experience of the war, but the small displacement of the ships prevented serious improvements - they limited themselves to strengthening anti-aircraft weapons by adding additional anti-aircraft guns, both ships received radars and new catapults, more powerful than pre-war and designed for heavier aircraft. "Krasnaya Zvezda" entered service in 1948, and "Chkalov" in 1950.
By the way, about airplanes. The war practically interrupted the development of carrier-based aircraft in the USSR. During the Lend-Lease War, several Martlet fighters and Avenger torpedo bombers were delivered, which were carefully studied in the Soviet design bureaus. Since there was no time to develop new carrier-based aircraft from scratch, it was decided to adapt the latest La-11 fighter. The Sukhoi design bureau, which was loaded less than others during the war, continued the sluggish development of the Su-6 carrier-based torpedo bomber, which was forced after the war. By the time the Red Star entered service, both aircraft had been tested and were ready to fly.
However, by that time it had already become clear that the future belongs to jet machines. In 1947, the country's leading aviation design bureaus were given the task of developing and submitting a carrier-based jet fighter to the government commission.
As for work on new aircraft carriers, it did not stop in the USSR during the war. Several projects were drawn up by different teams, including Project 72, similar to the British Illustrious, and the huge Kostromitinov aircraft carrier of 50,000 tons. However, projects developed during the war were not developed.
Project 72 was developed in 1944-45, and most sources give at least two versions of this project. One, pictured here, has a displacement and dimensions roughly equivalent to the British Illustrious, and a much larger one, with an air group of approximately 62 aircraft and a displacement of over 30,000 tons. The variant shown in the picture has 8 twin 130mm universal guns, 8 twin 85mm anti-aircraft guns and 10 twin 37mm machine guns.
The Kostromitinov project is one of the most interesting Soviet aircraft carrier projects, and one of the least known. This project is the work of Lieutenant Kostromitinov, who was studying the project of the German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. The project bears a certain resemblance to the German aircraft carrier, but is much larger, with a total length of 300 meters and a displacement of over 50,000 tons. Armament according to the project consisted of 8 twin casemate installations, 4 three-gun and 6 two-gun 100mm installations, as well as 8 quadruple 37mm machine guns. The aircraft carrier was supposed to carry 66 fighters and 40 bombers. In terms of the size and composition of the air group, this project approached the most powerful contemporaries - the American Midway-class aircraft carriers.
The new program for the development of the fleet, adopted in 1947, provided for:
Construction of a large series of destroyers based on the modified project 30
Construction of a large series of new generation submarines
Construction of a large series of light cruisers of project 68bis
From the construction of any artillery ships larger than a light cruiser, after a heated debate, it was decided, according to the experience of WWII, to completely abandon.
The design of new aircraft carriers, originally designed to be based on jet aircraft, began.
Along the way, the question arose of what to do with the hull of the unfinished heavy cruiser of project 69 Kronstadt. As a result, it was decided to complete it as an aircraft carrier. Work on the completion began in 1949, correcting the project, drawn up in 1946. The ship entered service under its former name in 1955. By this time, the USSR already had 4 aircraft carriers in service: 2 light and 2 attack.
Project 69AB was developed immediately after the war, in 1945-46. The air group was planned to be 76 aircraft, and the armament was to be 8 twin 130 mm guns and 16 twin 37 mm machine guns.
In 1951 and 1952, the laying of two huge Project 82 aircraft carriers Stalingrad and Moskva took place. These ships were, in fact, a further development of the Kostromitinov project and, with a total displacement of more than 50 thousand tons, they had to carry almost a hundred aircraft. After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet shipbuilding program was revised by the new leadership. For some time, the question of continuing the construction of new aircraft carriers remained open, but just in time for the mid-50s, the creation of new promising nuclear weapons suitable for use by tactical aviation was launched in the USSR. The Navy's argument in favor of continuing to build aircraft carriers was based on the fact that aircraft carriers could be turned into nuclear weapons carriers and used for strategic purposes. A similar argument was used at that time and american admirals in a dispute with the Air Force, defending the future of his aircraft carrier fleet. In 1954, the Stalingrad was launched and entered service in 1957. His sistership Moskva entered service in 1958.
Project 82 aircraft carrier.
By the time the Red Star entered service in 1948, several samples of a carrier-based jet fighter were submitted for testing. An attempt to use the I-250 hybrid fighter, equipped, in addition to a piston engine, with a jet engine, as a temporary measure, failed due to the unsatisfactory characteristics of this machine. In 1948, even before the final entry into service of the Red Star, several experimental takeoffs and landings of a "semi-jet" fighter were made from this aircraft carrier. According to the test results, the aircraft was not accepted into service with the fleet.
In the conclusions of the Act, approved on November 3, 1948 by the Minister of the Navy, Admiral A.G. Golovko, it was noted that the I-250 in the version of a long-range escort fighter could only be classified as a limitedly maneuverable aircraft due to insufficient maximum operational overload, equal to 6.5 . With full flight weight at IAS of 280-329 km/h, the aircraft is unstable in the longitudinal channel. Abnormal takeoff behavior was also noted. There were complaints about the features of the operation of the machine, which was generally recognized as difficult.
At the end of the next, 1949, comparative tests of carrier-based jet fighters created by the Yakovlev Design Bureau, Lavochkin and Mikoyan took place. The Yak-23K quickly left the race, the main battle unfolded between the MiG-15K and La-17 (carrier-based aircraft created on the basis of the low-volume La-15 fighter). As a result, the Ministry of the Navy insisted on adopting the La-17 fighter fleet, in which the requirements for a carrier-based vehicle were most fully embodied. As for the attack carrier-based aircraft, already in the next, 1950, the Tupolev Design Bureau began, on its own initiative, the development of a new carrier-based torpedo bomber. The official assignment for the design of the machine was issued in 1952, and already in 1954 the first flight took place. In 1956, the car under the designation Tu-91 was adopted. In the Navy, the turboprop bomber was nicknamed "Bull", and in the West it was called Tu-91 Boot ("shoe"). In 1957, the first Tu-91 squadron armed with tactical nuclear bombs entered service with the Stalingrad aircraft carrier. In the second half of the 50s, an anti-submarine version, a version of the AWACS aircraft and a jammer were also created on its basis. Simultaneously with the creation of the Tu-91 in the USSR, work began on the creation of a carrier-based supersonic fighter-interceptor.
Tu-91
The commissioning of the aircraft carrier "Chkalov" in the Far East coincided with the beginning of the Korean War. During the war, the aircraft carrier repeatedly went on patrol in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea as part of a detachment also consisting of several Project 26 and 68 cruisers and destroyers. In 1952, instead of La-11, Chkalov received jet-powered La-17s. The actions of the Soviet detachment to some extent hampered the combat work of the navies of the UN countries in the conflict area, because. the Soviet aircraft carrier prevented the Allied ships from freely maneuvering off the Korean coast, forced them to detach large enough forces to track it, and, in addition, it was necessary to take into account the fact that the scouts from the Chkalov could direct Korean and Chinese Tu-14s to strike at the ships allies. During the war, there were several incidents related to the Chkalov, in particular the battle between the La-17 and the F9F Panther, which ended in the downing of one American fighter.
The development of a carrier-based supersonic fighter-interceptor began almost immediately after the adoption of the La-17. This time, the MiG Design Bureau took revenge, leading in parallel with the development of the MiG-19P and the development of its deck version of the MiG-19K "Tiger". This machine was planned to be adopted not only by ship squadrons, but also by land-based air regiments of the Navy. The first flight from a ground airfield was made at the beginning of 1955, and in July of this year the first takeoff of the Tiger was made from the Kronstadt aircraft carrier, before the latter left for Far East. The following year, 1956, the new carrier-based fighter was adopted by the Navy and began to enter the ship and coastal squadrons. Already at the design stage, it became clear that new aircraft could not be operated from Project 71 aircraft carriers at all, and from the Red Banner (formerly Graf Zeppelin) the launch would be possible only after the installation of new hydraulic catapults. In general, by the mid-50s it became clear that light aircraft carriers, laid down in the 30s, no longer meet modern requirements. It became clear that soon they would be forced to leave the aircraft carrier forces. A natural question arose - what ships will come to replace them?
MiG-19K "Tiger"
In 1951, Admiral Kuznetsov again returned to the post of Minister of the Navy. On his initiative, the development of a new program for the construction of the navy began, providing for the continuation of the construction of the largest aircraft carriers in the amount of at least 9 units. The design of a new heavy aircraft carrier with a displacement of 60 thousand tons was immediately begun. However, these plans did not receive high support, especially after the change of political leadership, which believed that the Project 82 aircraft carriers, for all their merits, had cost the country too much. As a result, by order of Kuznetsov, the attack aircraft carrier project was archived and in 1954, the design of its half-sized version, which received the designation project 85, began. Initially, the minister insisted on building at least 6-5 of these aircraft carriers, but in 1955, according to at Khrushchev's direction, the series was limited to 2 ships - to replace obsolete light aircraft carriers of project 71. The project of new aircraft carriers included several important innovations - for the first time in Soviet practice, an angular flight deck and steam catapults were provided. The air group of 50 aircraft was to consist mainly of interceptor fighters, radar detection aircraft and anti-submarine aircraft.
In 1956, the laying of the lead ship took place, which received the name "Leningrad". In 1957, the "Kyiv" was laid down. They were launched in 1958 and 1959, respectively, and entered service in 1960 and 1961.
Project 85.
In 1962, the aircraft carriers Krasnaya Zvezda and Chkalov were put into reserve, which in the 1960s were rebuilt into anti-submarine aircraft carriers capable of taking on board Ka-25 helicopters and Tu-91PL aircraft.
In 1961, after the renaming of the city of Stalingrad "at the request of the workers" to Volgograd, the aircraft carrier "Stalingrad" of project 82, which also became "Volgograd", changed its name. At the end of the same year, the aircraft carrier stood in Severodvinsk for the first time in its career, a medium repair, combined with modernization - they were going to install an angled deck and steam catapults on the aircraft carrier. For this reason, "Volgograd" could not take part in the Caribbean crisis next year. "Red Banner" by the end of 1962 was already performing the functions of a training aircraft carrier and, thus, in fact, the newest "Leningrad" remained the only combat-ready aircraft carrier of the Northern Fleet.
At the head of an aircraft carrier formation, which also included the latest Grozny missile cruiser, the aircraft carrier was sent to the coast of Cuba in order to prevent its blockade. Under the cover of the Soviet AUG, several transports were escorted to Cuban territorial waters, in addition, almost all Soviet diesel submarines participating in the campaign managed to break through to Cuba. However, one aircraft carrier was clearly not enough to fully lift the blockade. Soviet fighters attempted to interfere with the work of American coastal and carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft by performing dangerous maneuvers in their immediate vicinity. One of these episodes ended in a mid-air collision and the death of pilots on both sides.
As a result, the Caribbean crisis was resolved, to everyone's relief, by a compromise - the USSR removed its missiles from Cuba, the United States removed its missiles from Turkey. The United States pledged not to displace the Cuban pro-Soviet regime, the USSR pledged to limit its military contingent on the island to one division.
The Cuban Missile Crisis had a profound impact on the entire subsequent aircraft carrier program of the USSR in the 60s. In addition to understanding the need to combat enemy nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, there was an understanding of the need to ensure reliable air defense of formations and ships for effective operations in the ocean. It was planned to provide reliable air defense both with the help of ships armed with long-range air defense systems and with the help of specialized air defense aircraft carriers. Both were initially included in the military shipbuilding program for 1959-1965, but the results of the Caribbean crisis gave the construction of these ships the highest priority. The new concept for the development of the fleet provided for the creation of powerful search and strike groups, which were to be based on Project 1123 anti-submarine cruisers, Project 1126 air defense missile ships and air defense aircraft carriers (in the terminology of those years - "floating bases of fighter aircraft"). percussion functions by new concept were assigned to Project 58 missile cruisers, Project 1134 missile cruisers, naval missile-carrying aircraft and submarines.
Back in 1958, the design of a large anti-submarine cruiser, armed with a powerful sonar and designed to base a large number of anti-submarine helicopters, began. In 1959, the design of the Project 1126 air defense missile cruiser and the "fighter aviation floating base" began. Initially, the development of PBIA was carried out by TsNII-45. After consideration by the State Committee for Shipbuilding, the development of a draft design was entrusted to TsKB-17 (the future Nevskoye Design Bureau), chief designer A.B. Morin. In the TsKB-17 project, the dimensions and displacement were increased, the composition of the power plant was changed, the air wing and defensive armament were increased. The initial project provided for a diesel power plant, consisting of 6 promising diesel engines from the Kolomna Plant with a capacity of 20,000 hp each. everyone. The exhaust outlet was provided under water. In the TsKB-17 project, the exotic power plant was replaced with a traditional boiler-turbine one. The total displacement of the ship in the final project has increased to 30 thousand tons. The air group consisted of 36 aircraft - 30 fighters, 4 AWACS aircraft and 2 search and rescue helicopters. For self-defense, 8 twin 57mm artillery mounts and 2 short-range air defense systems M-1 were provided. It was decided to abandon any measures for the constructive protection of the ship.
Thus, in this project, the Soviet Navy received a fairly compact aircraft carrier carrying the same number of fighters as the American Forrestal-class strike aircraft carrier, but with half the size. The maximum efficiency of the use of carrier-based fighter aircraft (at the level of American rivals) was ensured by the corner deck, steam catapults and the presence of AWACS aircraft.
PBIA, project TsKB-17, accepted for construction
The lead PBIA of project 1128 "Minsk" was laid down in Leningrad in 1961. The launch took place in 1963, the new aircraft carrier entered service in 1965 and in 1967 was relocated to Pacific Ocean, in connection with the aggravation of the situation around Vietnam.
The second ship was named "Baku" and was laid down in 1963 at the Baltic Shipyard immediately after the sistership was launched. Launching took place in 1965, and commissioning in 1967. This aircraft carrier became part of the Northern Fleet.
Construction of the "Riga" began in 1965, launched in 1967, commissioned in 1969. The ship became part of the Pacific Fleet.
The last of the ships of project 1128 PBIA was named "Tbilisi", laid down in 1967, launched in 1969 and entered service in 1971, becoming part of the Northern Fleet
According to the program for the construction of the Navy adopted in the early 1960s, it was planned to build 4 search and strike groups, which they intended to carry out within 10 years. In addition to the PBIA, each group was also to include large anti-submarine cruisers and air defense cruisers, 1 for each group. Project 1126 air defense cruisers began to be designed at TsKB-17 in 1959. Initially, it was planned to equip them with 2 medium-range M-11 "Storm" air defense missile launchers and 2 long-range M-3 air defense missile launchers. In the latter, it was supposed to use the V-800 missile with a range of up to 55 km. However, by that time, the fleet had already received negative experience in operating the M-2 complex, also with liquid-propellant rockets, which were poorly suited for operation in shipboard conditions, primarily in terms of fire safety. The large size (length 10 meters) of the V-800 missiles also caused criticism.
A way out was found in the development of the M-31 complex with the B-757 rocket, which had a solid propellant sustainer stage and a length of 6.5 meters. The price for improving performance was a reduction in range to 50 km, which was considered quite acceptable. It was also decided to abandon the installation of medium-range air defense systems M-11, replacing them with more compact M-1 air defense systems.
The construction of project 1126 missile cruisers was entrusted to the Black Sea plant in Nikolaev. In 1962, the lead ship Admiral Makarov was laid down, which entered service in 1967 (but the development of the M-31 Shkval air defense system continued until 1969). In 1965, the Admiral Nakhimov was laid down, which entered service in 1968. The laying of two more ships of this type was canceled due to the decision to rebuild 2 Project 68bis cruisers into air defense cruisers with similar weapons. In 1964, the rebuilding of the cruiser "Admiral Ushakov" began in Leningrad, and in 1965, the cruiser "Alexander Nevsky" began in Severodvinsk. "Ushakov" entered service in a new capacity in 1969, and "Alexander Nevsky" in 1970.
Project 1126
Characteristics:
Standard displacement 10 thousand tons, speed 32 knots, boiler-turbine power plant.
Armament: 2x2 M-31 SAM launchers, 2x2 M-11 SAM launchers, 4x2 57mm AU, 2 RBU-6000, 1 Ka-25RTs helicopter
The ship had advanced electronic weapons, including an automated control center for fighter aircraft.
Another combat episode with the participation of Soviet aircraft carriers in the 50s was the participation of the Kronstadt aircraft carrier in the operation against Albania in 1956 and in the Suez crisis. In the spring of 1956, the aircraft carrier, which entered service last year, entered the Mediterranean Sea, so that later it would pass through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean and further to Vladivostok.
However, the events of 1956 delayed the aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. In the summer of 1956, the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, who disagreed with the policy of liberalization and de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, broke off relations with the USSR. The formal reason for conducting a military operation against Albania was the capture of the Soviet naval base in the port of Vlora (Valona) and the ships of the Soviet Navy located there. After several strikes by naval aviation from an aircraft carrier, Soviet troops landed in Vlora. marines. By the end of the year, Hoxha was removed and the USSR retained a strategically important base in the Mediterranean.
In the autumn of 1956, in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, the situation in the Middle East sharply worsened. The presence of the Soviet aircraft carrier "Kronstadt" in the immediate vicinity of Port Said and Alexandria did not allow the Anglo-French fleet to land troops and the "Musketeer" operation ended in complete failure. Because Britain and France exercised their veto power by blocking in the UN a draft American resolution demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula, the United States did not provide any support to its allies in this crisis.
Project 68bis cruiser converted into an air defense missile cruiser.
The design of anti-submarine cruisers of project 1123 began in 1958. Initially, it was planned to build ships with a displacement of no more than 10 thousand tons and with an air group of 12-14 helicopters. But in 1962, obsolete light aircraft carriers of Project 71 were withdrawn to the reserve. The ships not only could not use modern and promising aircraft, but were also badly worn out and needed major repairs. in a natural way the idea arose to rebuild them into anti-submarine aircraft carriers, carrying about 20 anti-submarine helicopters and 8-10 Tu-91PLO aircraft. The implementation of project 1123 was postponed to a later date, and the restructuring of the Red Star and Chkalov began, respectively, in 1963 and 1964. Both aircraft carriers returned to service under their former names in 1967 and 1968. However, despite the air group being powerful enough for PLO purposes, the absence of a powerful sonar station and an anti-submarine missile system was then considered a disadvantage. As a result, the design of project 1123 anti-submarine cruisers was continued. In the final version, the standard displacement of the ship increased to 15,000 tons, and the air group to 20 helicopters. The cruiser was also equipped with the Metel anti-submarine missile system, 2 launchers of the M-11 Shtorm air defense system, 2 Osa-M self-defense systems, torpedo tubes for launching anti-submarine torpedoes, a large-sized GAS Titan station and a towed GAS " Vega".
However, the project of a specialized anti-submarine helicopter carrier remained unrealized due to changes in views on the future construction of the fleet, in which the task of providing ASW was again assigned to multi-purpose aircraft carriers.
Project 1123
The 1950s were a time of rapid progress for young jet aviation. Combat aircraft, which seemed to be the crowning achievement of engineering at the beginning of the decade, could already be considered hopelessly outdated by the end of the 1950s. If still in the Korean War aircraft opposing sides hit each other, as in the days of World War II - with the help of cannons and machine guns, then by the end of the 50s, a crisis in the traditional weapons of fighters was completely outlined.
The way out of this situation was the development of guided air-to-air missiles, the first samples of which were put into service in the late 50s. In 1957, the production of a modified MiG-19PM interceptor fighter, carrying 4 K-5M air-to-air missiles, began. The missile had a lot of flaws and was only suitable for destroying bombers, but there was no alternative to it. Since in the mid-1950s the US Navy received a new A-3 Skywarrior jet carrier-based strategic bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the Soviet fleet was entrusted with the fight against these aircraft. To this end, one of the MiG-19K squadrons on each of the available aircraft carriers was to be re-equipped with the MiG-19KM, a missile interceptor variant. In 1958, Stalingrad, Moscow and Kronstadt received one such squadron each. However, by this time, work was already in full swing on the MiG-19KM receiver as the main Soviet carrier-based interceptor. However, the main promising Soviet interceptor E-7 (the future MiG-21) had takeoff and landing characteristics that were very unsuitable for being based on an aircraft carrier. The leadership of the MiG design bureau did not consider it possible to create a deck version of this aircraft, and the Migovites did not have time to develop a specialized carrier-based fighter due to the high workload of the design bureau with promising developments. Instead of developing a new fighter, they proposed to create a modified version of the MiG-19K. However, the fleet, which wanted to receive a new generation interceptor at the same time as the Air Force, in 1957 achieved the issuance of a decree on the transfer of work on a carrier-based interceptor fighter to the Sukhoi Design Bureau.
In 1958, after the first flight of the Su-11 interceptor, the development of its deck modification began. Since this aircraft also had a fairly high landing speed, it was necessary to significantly change the shape of the wing - instead of the usual "delta" wing of an increased area of the "double delta" type, with folding tips, was used. In 1960, the first flight of the Su-11K interceptor took place, and in 1961, tests began on the aircraft carrier Kyiv. In 1962 (a year later than its land-based progenitor), the Su-11K was adopted by the Navy Aviation. The new supersonic carrier-based interceptor could carry 2 K-8M missiles with a semi-active seeker, or with a thermal seeker. At first, cannon armament was not envisaged. It is interesting that the design of the K-8M missiles and the avionics of the Su-11K aircraft provided for the possibility of using missiles against sea targets. Since 1962, the Su-11K began to be replaced as part of the MiG-19KM air groups, and then the MiG-19K (after the appearance in 1965 of the Su-11KM version with a more powerful engine and built-in gun).
Speaking about the development of Soviet carrier-based aviation, it is necessary to mention such an important component of air groups as AWACS aircraft. Only in the presence of "flying radars" capable of pushing the radio horizon and directing the actions of fighters did the air defense of naval formations become truly effective. The American Navy began to use the first radar patrol aircraft back in World War II, and during the Korean War, the usefulness of "flying radars" for the air defense of an aircraft carrier formation was finally proven. But in the Soviet Navy, attempts to create such an aircraft were unsuccessful for a long time, both due to the lack of radars with the necessary characteristics, and due to the lack of suitable aircraft for them. The appearance at the end of the 50s of the Tu-91 carrier-based turboprop bomber spurred work on the AWACS aircraft. In 1960, the first Soviet AWACS Tu-91RLD aircraft was put into service. It was equipped with a ventral radar, which had a fairly long range, but was unable to detect targets against the background of the underlying surface. Since the presence of an effective AWACS aircraft in the air group was necessary condition to implement the PBIA project, at the end of the 50s, the development of a carrier-based AWACS aircraft similar to the E-1 Tracer was started. The creation of this aircraft was entrusted to the Tupolev Design Bureau. The resulting Tu-93 twin-engine turboprop aircraft, very similar to the American prototype, made its first flight in 1964, and was put into service in 1967. The new radar, as on the Tracer, was placed in a fixed fairing on racks above the fuselage. This aircraft undoubtedly increased the combat capabilities of Soviet aircraft carriers, but the Americans again took the lead in this area, creating the first carrier-based AWACS E-2 Hawkeye, with a rotating antenna, capable of detecting targets against the background of the sea surface. In 1969, the Tu-93PLO aircraft was adopted, replacing the anti-submarine version of the Tu-91.
Also, a purely transport version of the Tu-93 was created.
McMurty names the second aircraft carrier "Stalin". According to him, it was a light cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" with a displacement of 9000 tons, laid down in Nikolaev in 1914. Its completion was delayed until 1929, when it was decided to convert the cruiser into an aircraft carrier. It was assumed that "Stalin" would carry 22 aircraft and have a speed of 30 knots. The ship was expected to be completed in 1939.
Despite all these reports, none of the projects of the Soviet aircraft carrier survived the war, even the bones were not preserved. But even if an aircraft carrier or aircraft carriers were laid down, the Soviets used up the metal for industrial needs during the Second World War. (A proposal to build Soviet ships in American shipyards was rejected when the Soviets signed a pact with Hitler in August 1939.)
Mystery shrouds all Soviet attempts to build an aircraft carrier. This veil of secrecy was slightly lifted by the memoirs of Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy from 1935 to 1947. Describing the shipbuilding program adopted in 1937, Admiral Kuznetsov wrote:
“It was decided to build battleships, heavy cruisers and other classes of surface ships, that is, a large surface fleet. A large number of submarines were also built. The construction of an aircraft carrier was not excluded, but it was postponed for Last year five-year plans. This was explained, I remember, by the complexity of creating ships of this class and special aircraft for them.
There were indications that the pre-war program called for the construction of at least 4 aircraft carriers, which were to enter service in 1948.
In fact, once the Hammer and Sickle flew on an aircraft carrier. At the end of World War II, the sunken German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was captured by the Russians and loaded with trophies. He was dragged in tow across the Baltic Sea. A violent commotion, perhaps during a storm, shifted his cargo. The aircraft carrier capsized and sank. Contrary to popular evidence, it was not saved and remained lying in the depths of the Baltic, a mute testament to the Russians' lack of knowledge about the design of aircraft carriers and the theory of stability.
The Soviet military strategy for the post-war years was announced on July 28, 1945, when Stalin declared: “The Soviet people want to see their fleet growing, even stronger and more powerful. Our people are building new battleships and fleet bases." The naval leadership immediately repeated Stalin's call for the creation of a powerful fleet. A typical statement was the following article in the journal Military Thought.
“The conditions of modern warfare at sea urgently require the participation in combat operations of fleets of powerful aircraft carrier formations, their use to deliver crushing blows to enemy naval forces, as well as to fight enemy aircraft. These tasks at sea, as well as near enemy bases, can only be solved by carrier-based aircraft.”
But again it turned out that the Soviets did not lay down ships larger than light cruisers. Beginning in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union laid down the keels of 20 light cruisers that were larger than the earlier "heavy" ones. 17 of these ships (15450 tons, 12 - 150 mm guns) were launched, but only 14 were completed. Some of them were later re-equipped with missiles. Periodically there were rumors that work had begun on the unfinished ships to complete them as aircraft carriers, but no signs of such work could be found. When one of these Sverdlov-class cruisers was handed over to Indonesia in 1962, rumors immediately spread that one of the unfinished ships had been completed as an aircraft carrier for Indonesia.
But there was not even a simple revival of the construction of warships. Of the 24 Sverdlov-class light cruisers planned, only 14 were completed. Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev fired Admiral Kuznetsov, who in 1951 became commander of the Soviet Navy again, for his support of artillery ships. Khrushchev declared that "Kuznetsov is trying to win future war weapons of the past. On another occasion, Khrushchev said that "cruisers are only good for carrying visits from political leaders and firing cannons at salutes."
The second retirement of Admiral Kuznetsov marked the end of the prospects for a large shipbuilding program, which included aircraft carriers.
Under Khrushchev's regime in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Navy began a new major shipbuilding program. It was based on the construction of a large number of destroyers and submarines and was the epitome of a defensive strategy. The first of the destroyers were armed with guns, the subsequent received anti-aircraft and anti-submarine missiles. These ships also had gas turbine engines and advanced electronic equipment.
The modern warships built under the rule of Khrushchev and his predecessor provided the Soviet Union with a powerful modern navy. However, the suitability of these ships for offensive or defensive operations was questionable. Decisions regarding the types, numbers and characteristics of these ships seemed to be taken by the Communist Party and the High Command, which was controlled by the army. The low weight of the fleet commander in the Supreme Command, as well as budgetary restrictions, make it unlikely that aircraft carriers would appear in the Soviet fleet.
In addition to the ships themselves, in order to create an effective carrier formation, the Soviets had to build special aircraft, collect the necessary cover and supply ships, create tactics, train pilots, and so on. All this made the cost of the aircraft carrier program for the state, which until now did not have aircraft carriers, simply astronomical. Therefore, the increase in combat effectiveness achieved at such a price, by this moment for the Soviets was doubtful.
The Soviets recognized the role of naval aviation mainly for reconnaissance purposes, but not for anti-submarine warfare. In 1966, the Soviet fleet had about 850 aircraft, approximately 500 of them were bombers, jet and turboprop reconnaissance aircraft, and attack aircraft. Previously, the Soviets had abandoned a large number of fighters, including the latest MiGs, which belonged to naval aviation. The maximum number of aircraft in it fell on 1957 - 4000 aircraft.
Oddly enough, it was precisely during the period of a sharp reduction in Soviet naval aviation and its reduction mainly to reconnaissance forces that the West received "accurate" information that the Soviets had finally begun to build aircraft carriers. It was reported that these will be 2 ships with flight decks, designed for basing helicopters. During this time, the Soviets used several types of anti-submarine helicopters, but the only one specifically designed for this purpose was the Kamov Ka-20. This helicopter in NATO troops had the code name "Harp" (Harp). The machine had 2 turboprop engines that rotated 2 coaxial main propellers in different directions, nose and tail fairings for search equipment. The helicopter could carry air-to-surface missiles or anti-submarine torpedoes along the sides of the fuselage.
The inability of the Soviets to build a large force of effective basic anti-submarine aircraft, such as the British Shackleton or the American P-3 Orion, may have given impetus to the construction of carrier-type ships to extend the range of anti-submarine helicopters.
The Soviet "aircraft carriers", which received the names "Moscow" and "Leningrad", resembled American landing ships in design. There was a large superstructure at the bow, and a flight deck occupied the stern. Soviet helicopter carriers had a displacement of about 15,000 tons and a length of 650 feet. Their flight deck was about 300 feet long. Such ships could successfully serve as landing ships and as anti-submarine helicopter carriers.
Although the Soviets made no serious attempt to build attack carriers, they held these ships in high regard. In the book "Military Strategy", published in 1962, Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, analyzing the modern war, touched upon the role of various types of armed forces in the upcoming conflict. He wrote that the task of the Navy would be "the destruction of the enemy naval forces, mainly, the destruction of strike aircraft carrier formations and the destruction of missile submarines, as well as the violation of enemy sea lanes. The order of priority of goals is interesting. Marshal Sokolovsky identified three main goals for the Soviet fleet: 1). Attack aircraft carriers; 2). Missile submarines; 3). Maritime communications. Marshal Sokolovsky was a competent military leader, he served as First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff from 1949 to 1960.
This opinion of the Soviet military about aircraft carriers was later confirmed by the flurry of attacks that communist propaganda brought down on these ships, the frequent pursuit of British and American aircraft carriers by "fishing trawlers" with clearly reconnaissance targets, and intensive overflights of American aircraft carriers by Soviet aircraft. When nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles appeared in the mid-1960s, they replaced attack aircraft carriers as the main striking force of the fleet, Soviet interest in these ships faded. However, the strike power, mobility and flexibility of the American aircraft carrier formations still make them the object of close attention of Soviet sailors.
The debate about whether to build aircraft carriers for Russia does not stop throughout the entire period of the existence of this class of ships. An unbiased analysis shows that in the future the Navy will not be able to effectively solve the important tasks assigned to it in the far sea and ocean zones if its groupings do not include at least one aircraft carrier, possibly with a nuclear power plant, with 70–90 aircraft on board . The optimal number is at least two for each of the ocean fleets.
In almost all countries of the world, the answer to this question was unambiguous: some, which focused on land wars, abandoned such ships, others, striving to expand their sphere of dominance in the world, increased the number of aircraft carriers in their fleet as the main military tool for carrying out their foreign policy.
And there were no aircraft carriers
As part of the Imperial Russian Navy, aircraft-carrying ships appeared almost simultaneously with other countries of the world - during the First World War. On the Black and Baltic Seas, two merchant ships were converted into hydro-air transport. After the October Revolution, the concept of a small war was adopted in the Soviet fleet, in which there was no place for aircraft carriers. However, by the end of the 1930s, there was an understanding of the need to have aircraft carriers in the USSR Navy.
“Modern confrontation between ship groups is carried out almost exclusively in the air”
In accordance with the shipbuilding program, by the end of the 40s, aircraft carriers were to be part of the ocean fleets. Moreover, in the late 1930s, the Soviet government made attempts to buy the unfinished aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin from Germany. However, Berlin refused the deal. Nevertheless, it was this ship that became the first Soviet aircraft carrier. In accordance with the agreement on the division of the German fleet, the Graf Zeppelin, which was in 92% readiness for commissioning, was transferred to the USSR and officially enlisted in the fleet. Its use would make it possible to begin the formation of our own aircraft carrier school. This ship was also of great interest from an engineering point of view, since German shipbuilding at that time was one of the most advanced in the world. Under the influence of various undercover currents, contrary to the opinion of the leadership of the Navy, a political decision was made to destroy this ship. From then until the mid-60s, the attitude towards aircraft carriers in the USSR was negative. Officially, they were considered weapons of aggression.
With the entry of the Soviet Navy into the ocean, it became clear that without aircraft carriers it would be very difficult to ensure the implementation of an active foreign policy in remote areas of the world. And it will be very problematic for fleet groupings at large distances from their bases to withstand massive air strikes without air fighter cover. The design of full-fledged aircraft carriers began. However, again, incompetent, but very influential people intervened, who achieved the construction of some hybrids - aircraft-carrying cruisers that combined the qualities of missile cruisers and carriers of vertical take-off and landing aircraft.
These were Project 1143 ships, which were built by four units. Moreover, the latter was significantly different from the first three weapons, especially electronic ones. The composition of the air group was the same - 36 aircraft. Including one squadron of Yak-38 or Yak-38M VTOL aircraft, a squadron of Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters and several search and rescue helicopters. The experience of their operation has shown the inefficiency of such aircraft in modern warfare at sea.
Therefore, it was planned to build a series of aircraft carriers with "normal" takeoff aircraft. In total, judging by the materials of the open press, they were supposed to be built at least four. Of these, two with a conventional power plant. These are "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" and "Varyag". And the other two - with nuclear, the first of which was laid down under the name "Ulyanovsk". Kuznetsov was accepted into the USSR Navy in 1990 and sent to the Northern Fleet. And the rest were not completed due to the collapse of the country.
Starting with perestroika, a press campaign was launched against the development of aircraft carriers in our country. A number of people who were not very competent in naval problems imposed on the population and politicians the position that our country did not need aircraft carriers. The aircraft-carrying cruisers inherited from the USSR were among the first to be destroyed. By 1993, only two of the five ships of this class remained in our fleet. After the sale of the aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Gorshkov to India in Russian Navy only one such ship - "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov."
Today, judging by the materials of the open press and the statements of prominent military and political leaders, there is an unambiguous opinion whether aircraft carriers are needed in Russian fleet- still does not exist. In the period from 2007 to 2012 alone, views changed to the opposite twice.
Peacetime scenarios
Without going into details, all the tasks of the Russian Navy can be reduced to the main ones - the protection of state interests by military means in Peaceful time, including support for Russian diplomacy and its own citizens, repelling aggression from maritime directions into the military.
The geography of Russia's interests, primarily economic ones, is very extensive and extends over a large part of the World Ocean. This is the development of economic relations within the framework of the BRICS, the extraction of seafood, including areas remote from our shores, the extraction of minerals and energy resources on the sea and ocean floor, the transportation of goods, and much more.
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Among the main tasks requiring the involvement of aircraft carriers for their effective solution, one should note participation in peacekeeping operations, protection of Russian citizens in zones of military conflicts and their evacuation from them, as well as from areas of man-made and natural disasters. Naval groupings assigned to these tasks, especially in zones of military conflicts, must be able to repel limited surprise strikes by small groups and individual boats or small warships and submarines, as well as combat aircraft and missiles. This may be required in the interests of defending naval formations, protecting civil aircraft of Russian or foreign origin and various ground facilities, ensuring the safety of Russian citizens from attacks by hostile military formations (mainly irregular ones) in the process of evacuation.
The latter can be carried out both directly by boarding ships and vessels in the port or from an unequipped coast, and by air - by helicopters and transport aircraft. Their security will also need to be ensured both from ground-based air defense threats and from possible fighter attacks. Without the participation of military aviation, these tasks, in principle, cannot be solved, especially those related to countering aviation and ground military formations in the depths of foreign territory over several kilometers.
To cover the evacuation of Russian citizens, the defense of ship formations, the protection of civil aircraft of Russian or foreign origin and various ground facilities from surprise attacks by individual combat aircraft and missiles or small groups, it will be necessary to patrol the defended area in pairs and links of fighters together with one or two AWACS and U aircraft Depending on the remoteness of the patrol area from the aircraft carrier, from 12-15 to 24-30 fighter aircraft and from four to eight AWACS and U aircraft are needed around the clock.
Under unfavorable conditions, the possibility of an attack by large groups of aircraft, mainly against formations of surface ships, especially important objects, or a large concentration of people, cannot be ruled out. The number of such groups can reach 30 units. To reflect them, it will be necessary to allocate an appropriate amount of fighter aircraft - 12-18 vehicles and, possibly, an additional AWACS and U.
To control the underwater environment in the area where the ship group is located in the interests of timely detection of submarines before they launch an attack with short-range missiles or torpedo weapons, at least two to four helicopters will be required in threatened directions. To do this, it will be necessary to have at least 12 helicopters in the aircraft carrier's air group.
Naval aviation is also needed to counter groups of ground troops and irregular formations. The actions of small groups of irregular formations inflicting surprise strikes are parried only by timely guidance of aviation groups on them from an airborne watch position. Sudden attacks by small groups of boats, especially missile ones, are reflected in a similar way. Therefore, at least one naval strike group of two to four aircraft must patrol the airspace. Outfit forces - also from 12-15 to 24-30 aircraft.
An emergency evacuation of citizens from a dangerous zone in the depths of the territory may require the involvement of a dozen or more transport helicopters. Under adverse conditions, they are provided with groups of fighter and attack aircraft of four to eight aircraft. In addition, support aircraft are needed - one or two - electronic warfare and at least one - AWACS and U. In the absence of such cover, the solution of these tasks may require great diplomatic efforts, be accompanied by significant material and political losses, and even, possibly, large casualties, or even turn out to be unfeasible.
Thus, for the safe implementation of Russia's foreign policy activities in peacetime, a sufficiently powerful aircraft carrier is needed as part of our fleet.
During the war
One of the most important tasks of the Russian Navy will be to defeat the attack aircraft carrier and missile groups of the enemy. The main combat areas of the latter are areas of the far sea and ocean zones, 400–600 kilometers away from our coast. From here they will strike at objects on the territory of our country and ships at sea and at bases.
It is well known that superiority at sea is impossible without achieving air supremacy. Modern confrontation between ship groups is carried out almost exclusively in the air. Attacks by anti-ship missiles and strike aircraft are repulsed by fighters and anti-aircraft fire weapons of ships. Small groups and single surface ships are attacked by two to four cruise missiles or aircraft. In strikes against large formations of surface ships, 30–40 or more anti-ship missiles from missile ships and submarines or up to 40–50 carrier-based or tactical aircraft can be used.
It is practically impossible to repel such strikes only with ship-based air defense systems, no matter how powerful they are. Especially if the means of air attack approach almost simultaneously, they cover themselves with electronic warfare aircraft and the strike of anti-ship missiles is preceded by the actions of air defense aircraft.
Fighter aviation not only destroys part of the attacking enemy aircraft, but also disorganizes their attack. As a result, the latter is stretched in time - the means of air attack are relatively suitable small groups, which the ship's air defense successfully destroys. The target distribution in the enemy strike group is disrupted, his attempts to cover his means of air attack with electronic interference and to suppress the ship's air defense with anti-radar missiles are frustrated.
It is the disorganization of groups of attacking aircraft that is the main contribution of fighter aviation to the air defense of naval formations in repelling attacks by enemy tactical and carrier-based aircraft.
Fighters can also make a significant contribution to the air defense of naval formations when repelling cruise missiles, destroying the most dangerous targets beyond the reach of shipborne air defense systems.
To repulse large groups of tactical aviation or carrier-based aviation, it will be necessary to allocate from 24 to 32 fighter aircraft, the main part of which will operate from the position of duty at the airfield (on the deck) while providing their control from AWACS and U aircraft. Beyond 100-150 miles from coast, this is possible only from an aircraft carrier.
In addition to the largest ship groups, the battle formation of a strike formation includes small groups and single ships that perform various support missions. To cover them, fighter aviation is also needed, which will be able to cover them from sudden attacks by small groups of air attack weapons, mainly from an airborne watch position.
It has a number of advantages over cruise missiles and the use of naval aviation for strikes against formations of large enemy surface ships. Surpassing cruise missiles in range (800 or more kilometers versus 450-500 for long-range missiles), naval aviation groups, which include, in addition to attack aircraft, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, AWACS and U, as well as fighters, are capable of providing higher reliability identify designated targets and hit them. The success of a breakthrough to the target of strike aircraft and their missiles is achieved by suppressing the enemy's air defense system and repulsing the attacks of his fighters.
Ship-borne fighters are also extremely important for covering the operations of strike groups of long-range (naval missile-carrying) aviation against enemy aircraft carriers and other large naval formations in the far sea and ocean zones. Escorting them by ship-based fighters will make it possible, if not to eliminate the threat from enemy carrier-based and coastal fighters, then at least to minimize losses from their actions to an acceptable level. At the same time, the effectiveness of our aviation operations will increase significantly.
perspective look
Groupings of the Russian Navy will have to solve tasks both in peacetime and in wartime, far beyond the reach of shore-based fighter and bomber aircraft. Is it possible to solve these tasks without the support of coastal-based aviation, primarily fighter and ground attack aircraft? With aircraft carriers, yes. They are not a whim of sailors, but an urgent need.
The analysis carried out shows that the air group of Russian aircraft carriers should be quite numerous. To perform the entire range of tasks, it will need to have at least 40-60 aircraft capable of fighting surface and ground targets, as well as an air enemy, including cruise missiles. In addition to them, the air group must have four to eight AWACS and U aircraft, two to four electronic warfare aircraft and two to four reconnaissance aircraft, as well as at least 12 anti-submarine and two search and rescue helicopters. In total, from 70 to 90 aircraft. That is, it is an aircraft carrier of a large class, with a total displacement of 75-85 thousand tons, possibly with a nuclear power plant. Its air defense system should include self-defense equipment capable of repelling small groups of airborne weapons (up to four units) in the presence of interference. To do this, the air defense system on each side must have at least eight target channels for short-range air defense systems and two to four channels for small-caliber artillery.
In addition, the complex of ship's self-defense means must include anti-torpedo protection and electronic warfare, capable of suppressing the seeker of anti-ship missiles.
The CICS and other radio-electronic equipment, as the most important requirement, should provide the possibility of solving the problems of managing an operational formation, ship and cooperating aviation throughout the entire depth of its use in the interests of a ship formation.
It is necessary to have at least two such ships on each of the ocean fleets of Russia. This will make it possible, taking into account scheduled repairs and other measures to maintain these ships in a combat-ready state, to always have at least one combat-ready aircraft carrier on each of the ocean theaters.