Ablazov Valery Ivanovich
Who fought, worked and led in Afghanistan?
Annotation:
To manage the processes, forces and means that the USSR had in Afghanistan, a special Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan was created in Moscow. Representatives of a number of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR worked in Afghanistan. Only their enumeration took up a large amount of material. In addition, some features of the management of the armed formations of the USSR in Afghanistan are given. In Kyiv in 2012, the book "Afghan arena. Diplomats and generals" was published. This is a reference documentary publication. The book managed to virtually bring together all the leaders of the upper echelon who acted in Afghanistan: ambassadors, chief military advisers, army commanders and other persons, to provide their biographical and documentary materials, as well as a point of view on the past events of many of them. This fragment is a small section of the book.

Who fought, worked and led in Afghanistan?

The military-political tasks that faced the Soviet side, and the means of achieving them, changed in accordance with the dynamically changing situation in Afghanistan and in the Afghan arena in general, which includes a number of states, one way or another participating in the Afghan conflict.
To manage the processes, forces and means that the USSR had in Afghanistan, a special Commission of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee for Afghanistan was created in Moscow, which included Andropov Yu.V., Gromyko A.A., Ponomarev B.N., Ustinov D. F.

Representatives of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Representatives of a number of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR worked in Afghanistan.

IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE:
Central Committee of the CPSU:
advisers in party organizations of the PDPA.
Leaders of groups of party advisers (Advisers of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the PDPA):
S.M.Veselov, L.I.Grekov, S.V.Kozlov, A.V.Romantsev, V.G.Lomonosov, N.T.Konyaev, P.P.Mozhaev, N.G.Egorychev. The last two group leaders were at the same time the Ambassadors of the USSR in Afghanistan. Party advisers were in Afghanistan from November 1978 to October 1988. Over the entire period, 316 party advisers, 45 advisers-teachers of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, 150 Komsomol advisers worked in these groups. The apparatus of advisers was completed at the expense of the released workers of the central, republican, regional, regional, city and district party committees. The republics of the USSR were represented in groups of party advisers as follows: the RSFSR - 144, Ukraine - 39, Kazakhstan - 27, Belarus - 12, Uzbekistan - 10, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan - 5 each, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova - 4 each, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania - 3 each, Turkmenistan, Estonia - 2 each, in addition - Moscow 42, Leningrad - 4.
Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League:
counselors in youth organizations.
Leaders of groups of Komsomol advisers (Advisers of the Komsomol Central Committee in the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan): N.I. Zakharov, V.A. Sidorov, V. Struchkov, A.P. Balan, D.G. Ostroushko.
During the entire period, about 400 Komsomol advisers and translators worked in groups, mainly from Tajikistan. Of the 150 Komsomol advisers, 27 represented the Komsomol of Ukraine.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Embassy of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassadors of the USSR in Afghanistan:
Puzanov A.M. (1972 - 1979),
Tabeev F.A. (1979-1986),
Mozhaev P.P. (1986 - 1988),
Egorychev N.G. (1988),
Vorontsov Yu.M. (1988-1989),
Pastukhov B.N. (1989-1991).

IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE:
State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES):
representatives of the Main Engineering Department (GIU GKES),
representatives of the Main Technical Department (GTU GKES).
advisors and specialists.
Ministry of Education, Higher and Secondary Specialized Education of the USSR:
advisers, teachers and specialists of universities and schools in Afghanistan.
USSR Ministry of Health:
advisers and specialists in the medical institutions of Afghanistan.
Ministries of the chemical, gas, automotive industry, geology, energy and electrification, melioration and water management, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Construction (Gosstroy of the USSR), etc.:
advisers and specialists, workers in enterprises.

IN THE MILITARY SPHERE:
The limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA) is a more political term than a military one. Usually, large formations of Soviet troops abroad were called groups of forces: the Northern Group of Forces (SGV), the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), the Central Group of Forces (TsGV), the Southern Group of Forces (YUGV). In addition, there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Mongolia, a Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba. In order to emphasize the temporality and limitations of the tasks and the group itself in Afghanistan, the specified term was used to designate it.
Ministry of Defense (MO), General Staff (GSh), main types of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Soviet Army):
- Operational group of the Ministry of Defense (MO) of the USSR.
Leaders of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense:
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. (1980 - 1984),
General of the Army Varennikov V.I. (1984 - 1989).
- Task Force of the General Staff (OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces).
Heads of the OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces:
Major General B.V. Gromov (March 1985 - April 1986),
Major General Yu.V. Yarygin (April 1986 - May 1987),
Major General V.S. Kudlay (May 1987 - January 1989).
Special OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (to create 3-month supplies for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia), Major General A.G. Gaponenko (May 1988 - January 1989)
- Parts and subdivisions of the Central subordination.
Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh):
- military attaches:
Colonel Baranaev A.B. (1977 - 1980),
Major General Krakhmalov S.P. (1980 - 1985),
Major General Sen V.T. (1985 - 1989),
Colonel Chizhikov A.E. (1989 - 1992);
- formations (brigades) of special forces,
- separate units of special forces.
10 Main Directorate of the General Staff:
- Group of military advisers.
- Office of the Chief Military Adviser.
Chief Soviet military advisers:
Major General Bondarets I.S. (1972-1975),
Lieutenant General Gorelov L.N. (1975-1979),
Colonel General Magometov S.K. (1979-1980),
General of the Army Mayorov A.M. (1980-1981),
General of the Army Sorokin M.I. (1981-1984),
General of the Army Salmanov G.I. (1984-1986),
Colonel General Vostrov V.A. (1986-1988),
Colonel General Sotskov M.M. (1988-1989),
Colonel General Shein B.P. (1989-1990),
General of the Army Grachev N.F. (1990-1991),
Lieutenant General Perfiliev B.S. (1991-1992),
General of the Army Gareev M.A. (Military Advisor to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Republic of Afghanistan 1989-1990),
Ground Forces (SV):
- Turkestan Military District (TurkVO).
Commanders of the TurkVO:
General of the Army Maksimov Yu.P. (1979 - 1984);
General of the Army Popov N.I. (1984 - 1989) ;
Colonel General Fuzhenko I.V. (1989 - 1991);
Colonel General Kondratiev G.G. (1991 - 1992).
- Task Force TurkVO;
- 40th combined arms army (40 OA) TurkVO;
Commanders of the 40th Combined Arms Army of the TurkVO:
Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yu.V. (1979 - 1980),
Lieutenant General Tkach B.I. (1980 - 1982),
Lieutenant General Ermakov V.F. (1982-1983),
Lieutenant General Generalov L.E. (1983-1985),
Lieutenant General Rodionov I.N. (1985-1986),
Lieutenant General Dubynin V.P. (1986-1987),
Lieutenant General Gromov B.V. (1987-1989).
The headquarters of the 40th Army was located in the Taj Beck Palace in Kabul, the former residence of Hafizullah Amin (Amin's Palace).
Air Force (Air Force):
- 34th Aviation Corps (later - Air Force of the 40th Army);
Commanders of the Air Force of the 40th Army:
Major General Lepaev B.A. (1980-1981),
Major General Shkanakin V.G. (1981-1982),
Major General Kalensky S.A. (1982-1983),
Major General Kolodiy G.V. (1983-1985),
Major General Kot V.S. (1985-1987),
Major General Romanyuk D.S. (1987-1989).
- Military transport aviation (VTA);
- Long-range aviation (YES);
- Front-line aviation (FA);
- Army Aviation (AA).
Airborne Troops (VDV):
- connection (103 vdd);
- separate parts (345 opdp).
Navy (Navy):
- part of the construction troops.

State Security Committee (KGB) of the USSR:
- subdivisions (detachments) of special purpose ("Thunder", "Zenith", "Cascade", etc.).
- Border troops of the KGB of the USSR (PV).
Task Force of the Main Directorate of Border Troops in Moscow, head of the Task Force, Lieutenant General I.G. Karpov.
Operational group of the Central Asian border district in Pyanj, head of the Operational group, Colonel N.T. Butko.
PV special forces (combined combat detachments (SBO), motorized maneuver groups (MMG), air assault maneuver groups (DShMG), aviation of the PVS of the Central Asian and Red Banner Eastern border districts),
coordination of combat operations management of special forces of the PV, Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko.
PV advisors,
permanent representative of the PV, Major General A.A. Vlasov
- Representation of the KGB of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Heads of the Representative Office of the KGB of the USSR (KGB advisers in KhAD):
Colonel L.P. Bogdanov (1978 - 1980),
Major General V.N. Spolnikov (1980 - 1982),
Major General B.N. Voskoboynikov (1982 - 1984),
Major General N.E. Kalyagin (1984 - 1987),
Major General V.P. Zaitsev (1987 - 1989),
Major General V.A. Revin (1989 - 1991),

Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR:
- units (detachments) for special purposes ("Cobalt", etc.),
- units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR,
- Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Heads of the Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Counselors of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tsarandoy):
Major General of Militia N.S. Veselkov (1978 - 1979),
Major General A.M. Kosogovsky (1979 - 1980),
militia lieutenant general N.E. Tsygannik (1981 - 1983),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops A.V. Anikeev (1983 - 1984),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops A.M. Loginov (1984 - 1986),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops V.D. Egorov (1987 - 1988),
police lieutenant general G.A. Alekseev (1989 - 1990),

On the work of the Operational Groups of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

The operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (OG MO USSR) was formed on December 13, 1979, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev. It included generals and officers of the General Staff, as well as representatives from all types and branches of the USSR Armed Forces (USSR Armed Forces), the main and central departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At 22.00 on December 14, the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense was already in Termez, on the Soviet-Afghan border, and began to coordinate actions to send troops to Afghanistan. However, General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev fell ill and left for Moscow on December 19, and the leadership of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense was entrusted to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, who, in this regard, in mid-December, D.F. Ustinov recalled from vacation. It was S.L. Sokolov had to carry out the overall leadership of the Soviet troops during their preparation and entry into Afghanistan.
At the initial stage of the "Afghan campaign" the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense did a great deal of organizational work. She supervised the regrouping, mobilization and entry of troops into the territory of Afghanistan, as well as carrying out measures to remove Kh. Amin from power and establish the regime of B. Karmal. In subsequent years, under her leadership, the largest military operations were carried out, and the most complex issues of a military-political nature were resolved ...
The first to arrive in Kabul on December 23, 1979, in agreement with the leadership of the DRA, was the Operational Group of the Airborne Forces. It was formed from officers of the headquarters of the Airborne Forces. It was headed by the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant-General Guskov N.N. The task force of the Airborne Forces conducted reconnaissance of the deployment areas of the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Airborne Division in Kabul and Bagram and the exit routes of the units after landing to the areas assigned to them. From December 28, she also carried out control over units of the 108th Motor Rifle Division, since the control of the 40th Army was introduced into the territory of the DRA only in the first days of January 1980.
At the same time, by decision of the Soviet political leadership, an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. entered Afghanistan. and since that time, the task force of the Airborne Forces has been abolished.
The operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense worked in Afghanistan for 10 months and in November 1980 returned to Moscow. Subsequently, she periodically traveled to Afghanistan for a period of 1.5 to 6 months. Until the end of 1984, it was invariably headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L., and then - Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.I. Varennikov. The last time the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Kabul on January 2, 1987 and left it on February 14, 1989.
The presence of the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in Afghanistan was a forced measure. It was caused by the following circumstances:
1. The situation in this country required coordination and coordination of the efforts of all Soviet representatives (embassies, party and military advisers, representative offices of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, advisers and specialists in the economic departments of the DRA, the command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army, etc.) creating conditions for stabilizing the situation in the country.
Unfortunately, in fact, there was no coordination, and often even simple interaction, between representatives of the Soviet departments in Afghanistan. All of them acted separately, according to the instructions of their Moscow leadership, which did not allow them to achieve the necessary results. There was no authoritative general leader of all Soviet missions, endowed with appropriate powers (including in relation to the OKSV), in Afghanistan until the very end of the Soviet presence.
2. Combat operations on the territory of Afghanistan against detachments and groups of the armed opposition were carried out by Soviet troops, as well as formations and units of the Afghan army, operational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan. In order to achieve a greater effect of hostilities, it was necessary to coordinate the efforts of all these forces. This could be done by the chief military adviser. However, the 40th Army was not subordinate to him (even when the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army A.M. Mayorov, was the chief military adviser). The representative offices of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and their leaders in Moscow generally considered the chief military adviser only an adviser to the Minister of Defense of the DRA (although officially he was called the Chief Military Adviser in the DRA) and strictly monitored that the GVS in the DRA "did not get into someone else's monastery" and did not issue recommendations on the conduct of hostilities directly to the ministers of state security and internal affairs of the DRA, bypassing the relevant representations.
3. The vast majority of issues in Afghanistan, including military ones, required the decisions of the top leadership of the DRA and the PDPA, the decisions of B. Karmal as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. In fact, only the Soviet ambassador had the right to reach such a high level of the Afghan leadership, who was bound by the rules of the diplomatic service, the subordination of the USSR Foreign Ministry, which greatly hampered the work.
Considering all this, the Ministry of Defense was forced to send authoritative leaders to the DRA (RA): Deputy Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. and then Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Varennikov V.I. They could meet and resolve important issues not only with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA (RA), but also with the political leadership of the country.
4. The reason for sending operational groups of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the DRA until the end of 1984 was also the fact that the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov D.F. did not fully believe in the ability of the command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army to properly organize the combat activities of the OKSV. He believed that a "pusher" was needed in Afghanistan, the role of which Ustinov D.F. assigned to the task force.
In connection with such ideas of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the operational group was often forced to interfere in the combat activities of the OKSV, in the direct command and control of the troops. For example, the daily review of incoming intelligence information with the participation of representatives of various types of intelligence (the prerogative of the army headquarters) was carried out in the operational group. In the same place, decisions were made on the implementation of intelligence information. The commander of the 40th Army received a ready-made decision on the use of forces and means of his army, signed by the head of the operational group. In the task force, under the leadership of its head of intelligence, there were daily coordination meetings on intelligence. There were even attempts by the task force to manage specific operations (only two such operations were carried out).
The leaders of the operational group on behalf of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, each time approved by the commission of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, often had to meet and talk with B. Karmal, other statesmen, party and military figures of the DRA on issues of strengthening the fight against counter-revolution by the forces of the Afghans themselves and the stabilization of the military-political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, they sought to encourage the Afghan side to fulfill the recommendations of the Soviet political leadership more fully and on time. However, such meetings were not of a regular nature.
In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against the opposition Afghan forces, the leadership of the task force actually had to coordinate the efforts of all Soviet missions in the DRA (RA).
Officially, the leadership of the USSR did not give such a right to either S.L. Sokolov or V.I. Varennikov, who replaced him, since they were only representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here their personal qualities played a role, their ability to find a common language with representatives of other departments, their readiness to take responsibility for the decisions made. It is regrettable that the Soviet leadership did not listen to the proposals of the USSR Ministry of Defense and did not appoint its plenipotentiary representative to Afghanistan back in 1980.
After Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. became Minister of Defense of the USSR at the end of 1984, and the task force was headed by General of the Army Varennikov V.I. The functions of the task force have changed somewhat. Until the end of 1986, she continued to work in the DRA periodically. After the Soviet political leadership made the final decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the task force arrived in Kabul on January 2, 1987 and left it only on February 14, 1989.
A feature of the work of the operational group at this stage was that it did not interfere at all in the activities of the commander and headquarters of the 40th Army, commanders of all degrees, did not replace them, did not limit independence in making decisions and putting them into practice in Afghanistan. At the same time, through the operational group, the commander and headquarters of the army had access directly to the central planning and contenting bodies of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which made it possible to more quickly resolve all issues of combat activity and comprehensive support for formations and units of the army.
The main attention of the operational group was focused on assisting the command of the Armed Forces of the DRA (RA) and the chief military adviser in increasing the combat capability and combat readiness of the Afghan troops, their independent combat activities, without the participation of Soviet units.
In the spring of 1987, the Operational Group assisted the Afghan side in creating the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a permanent command and control body of the armed forces. Prior to the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the control of forces engaged in an armed struggle against rebel groups was carried out by the ministers of defense, internal affairs and state security independently, independently of each other, without any coordination of their efforts.
With the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the overall leadership of the military operations from the Afghan side was taken over by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the DRA (RA) Najibullah. At the same time, meetings were held daily from 8.00 in the morning under the chairmanship of Najibullah. From the Afghan side, the meetings of the Headquarters were attended by the ministers of defense, state security, internal affairs, the head of the General Staff, head of the department of defense and justice of the Central Committee of the PDPA. As necessary, depending on the issues under consideration, other military and civilian leaders were invited to meetings of the Headquarters. From the Soviet side, the head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the chief military adviser in the DRA constantly participated in the work of the Headquarters. With the main report on the general situation in the country and the nature of the activities of the armed forces at the meetings of the Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff delivered. His report was supplemented by ministers. After them, their assessments and conclusions were reported by the chief military adviser. The head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense acquainted Najibullah and the ministers with the activities of the Soviet troops and expressed his recommendations and requests. The results were summed up by Najibullah. At meetings of the Headquarters, they made decisions arising from the current situation and Soviet recommendations, expressed wishes for involving Soviet units in operations in a particular region of the country. Often, political and economic issues were resolved at meetings of the Headquarters.
The task force did a lot of work to assist the leadership of the DRA in matters of increasing the staffing of the armed forces with officers, increasing the role of the Afghan army in defeating opposition detachments and groups, strengthening the cover of the border with Pakistan and Iran, strengthening and increasing the activity of the border troops, on the priority staffing, weapons and equipment of formations and units in the main directions, from where the Soviet troops were supposed to leave in the first place, etc.
The work of the Operational Group in the Soviet troops was carried out in several directions.
The main attention was focused on preventing unjustified losses of personnel and military equipment. Any fact of the loss of people and equipment was analyzed jointly with the headquarters of the army, formations and units. Some cases were personally investigated by the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Practical assistance was provided in preparing troops for combat operations. The fortification equipment of outposts and posts was checked, measures were taken to increase their combat capabilities and security. Attention was paid to reconnaissance support for hostilities. Measures were taken to improve the tactics of operations in combat for both combined arms and aviation units and subunits. Decisions of commanders and plans for combat operations were constantly considered.
The operational group, together with the office of the chief military adviser and the command of the OKSV, took measures to reduce the participation of Soviet troops in active hostilities by maximizing the involvement of Afghan units and subunits in them so that the Afghan troops would gain as much combat experience as possible and responsibility for the independent solution of all diverse tasks.
Attention was paid to stabilizing the situation by political means through negotiations in different parts of the country. Some economic events were also organized directly by the operational group.
However, such work of Soviet officers, incl. and the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense, did not always meet the understanding on the part of Afghan officials who reported to their leadership (especially the employees of the MGB of the RA sinned with this) that supposedly Soviet commanders were negotiating to the detriment of the interests of Afghanistan, since they did not want to fight with adversary. The representative office of the KGB of the USSR was also jealous of such activities, believing that officers of the OKSV should not conduct such negotiations - their business was to fight, and not engage in political activities, which they informed their leadership in Moscow.
An important activity of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan was the preparation of Soviet troops for the withdrawal from the RA, its planning and implementation. At the same time, the operational group was engaged in equipping the Afghan army, operational units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, took part in the formation of units to replace the Soviet troops at outposts, as well as the Special Guards of the Republic of Armenia, assisted the Afghan command in creating a new one for the Afghans types of troops - missile brigades and divisions.
Thus, the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in Afghanistan carried out a large and varied work in the Soviet troops, in formations and units of the Afghan army, units of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA (RA). It had a significant impact on the political and military leadership of the country, prompting it to strictly and clearly implement all our recommendations. She did a lot of political work. Carried out constant constructive communication with the UN control bodies in Kabul, informing about the progress of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and drawing attention to violations of the Geneva agreements by the Pakistani administration.
The task force played an important role in managing the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, increasing the combat effectiveness of the Afghan armed forces, and in acquiring the ability to independently, without Soviet troops, resist the onslaught of the counter-revolution. To the best of its ability, the operational group coordinated the activities of the Soviet missions in Afghanistan, trying to direct the efforts of all Soviet and Afghan departments to help stabilize the military-political situation in the country.
Regular group of representatives of the General Staff. Due to the fact that the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was periodically in Afghanistan until the end of 1986, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev S.F. in agreement with the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. in March 1985, he established and sent to Afghanistan a full-time group of representatives of the General Staff (OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces) with a permanent location in Kabul. The OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was headed by generals for special assignments of the Chief of the General Staff: Major General B.V. Gromov (March 1985 - April 1986), Major General Yu.V. Yarygin (April 1986 - May 1987), Major General V.S. Kudlay (May 1987 - January 1989). In addition, during the withdrawal of Soviet troops, a Special OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was sent to manage the creation of 3-month reserves for the RA Armed Forces, headed by Major General A.G. Gaponenko (May 1988 - January 1989).
The OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was created for the following purposes:
- implementation of direct verification on the ground of the implementation by headquarters and troops, Soviet military advisers at formations and units of the DRA army of directives and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff for the preparation, conduct of hostilities and their comprehensive support, as well as orders and directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Southern Direction, Commander of the Troops of the TurkVO and the 40th Army, Chief Military Adviser in the RA;
- providing the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces with timely and accurate information on the preparation and conduct of hostilities;
- assisting the headquarters and troops of the 40th Army and advisers in the RA Armed Forces in organizing measures to ensure the fulfillment of combat missions;
- exercising control and assistance in agreeing between the command of the OKSV and the GVS apparatus in the RA on issues related to their activities in the interests of fulfilling their joint combat missions;
- studying the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan, methods of using new means of armed struggle and tactical methods, methods of command and control in combat under the special conditions of the Republic of Armenia by Soviet and Afghan troops.
During the stay in Afghanistan of the operational group of the Ministry of Defense, a group of representatives of the General Staff was part of it and worked according to the plan of the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The commander of the TurkVO troops sent its own task force to Afghanistan. It was insignificant in composition and worked only in the troops of the 40th Army, assisting its command. This operational group could not go to the Afghan side with proposals and wishes, as well as to the Soviet ambassador and other Soviet representatives. She dealt only with issues of combat training and combat activities of the army, and her head (as a rule, the deputy chief of staff of the district) could direct the combat operations of army units and subunits only according to the plan of the army commander.

Features of the organization of control of the Soviet troops.
The General Staff did not develop a plan for bringing troops into Afghanistan in advance, so a general directive for the mobilization of troops and command and control agencies was not given. Formations and units were put on alert after appropriate oral instructions from the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov.
From mid-December 1979, the formation of a contingent of troops for entry into Afghanistan began at an accelerated pace. It was based on replenished formations and units stationed in TurkVO, which were almost all cropped. They were understaffed at the expense of local resources from the reserve. Taking into account the fact that representatives of the Central Asian republics served, as a rule, in construction units and motorized rifle troops, their training was low. The troops were brought to readiness by administrative order, on the basis of separate orders of the General Staff. In just three weeks, more than thirty such orders were issued.
In the Main Operational Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff, a special group of generals and officers from all types and branches of the Armed Forces worked, which prepared draft directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on mobilization and ensuring the entry of troops into the DRA, planned and carried out the transportation of troops, equipment, weapons, materiel to the Afghan border, carried out organizational activities, and also constantly monitored the military-political situation in Afghanistan, making its analysis.
The order to mobilize the field administration of the 40th Army was issued on December 16, 1979. First Deputy Commander of the TurkVO Troops, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, a member of the military council - the head of the political department of the army - Major General A.V. Taskaev, Chief of Staff of the Army - Major General L.N. Zevtsov-Lobanov, head of intelligence - Major General A.A. Korchagin.
Specific tasks for the introduction and deployment on Afghan territory were determined in the directive N 312/12/001, signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, sent to the troops on December 24, 1979. In particular, the following explanation was given for the step being taken: “Given the military-political situation in the Middle East, the last appeal of the government of Afghanistan was considered positively. assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states ... ". Further, the troops were assigned tasks for the march and deployment in Afghanistan. Participation in hostilities was not provided.
Specific combat missions for formations and units to suppress the resistance of the rebels were set in the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of December 27 N 312/12/002.
On December 31, 1979, the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, ended up in the hospital with pneumonia, and the next day, the chief of staff of the army, Major General L.N. In this regard, the commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov, arrived in Kabul and took over the leadership of the troops.
The nature and characteristics of the combat activities of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan left their mark on the organization of command and control. Troops were controlled from stationary and mobile command posts.
Stationary command posts of the army, air force, divisions, brigades, regiments were created immediately after the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan in the points of permanent deployment occupied by them. In addition, aviation guidance points (PN) were created at the airfields of Shindand, Jalalabad (since 1984) and Kandahar and the PU of the EU ATC (since 1985 RC EU ATC) of the interaction group with the Air Defense Command and the Air Force of the Republic of Armenia. Stationary command posts controlled the entire daily life and activities of subordinate troops, as well as their combat operations.
The basis of the stationary command posts was the combat control centers (CBU), which were formed in all levels of command from the army to the regiment, in all SPN battalions and in separate combined arms battalions. Until 1981, the duty shifts of the CBU for every day were formed at the expense of officers from the departments of the army headquarters, formations and regiments. Later they became established. The combat shifts of the CBU were headed by deputy commanders (commanders), heads of departments (departments).
The main tasks of the CBU were:
- collection of daily and combat information, its generalization and report to the commander (commanders) and chiefs of staff;
- transfer of decisions of the commander (commanders) to troops and other performers;
- coordination of all data of the situation with the apparatus of the chief military adviser in the RA (military advisers in the zones or under the commanders of the nearest Afghan units);
- daily report of daily and combat information to higher levels of command;
- ensuring reliable, stable and continuous command and control of subordinate troops.
The main duty of the CBU of all command posts was to provide overall leadership of military operations in its area of ​​responsibility. At all CBUs, workplaces for the commander (commanders), chiefs of staff and operational departments (departments) were equipped. Every morning at the CBU of the army, the commander listened to the general situation and intelligence information received by 8.00, and made a decision on its implementation. At the same time, the commander determined what intelligence information and what forces and means the 40th Army would take for implementation, what forces would be required for joint actions from the Afghan army, and what information it would be desirable to implement independently by Afghan means. The necessary orders were immediately prepared for the formations and units of the 40th Army.
After that, a coordination meeting on intelligence was held at the army headquarters. It was attended by the chief of staff of the chief military adviser in the DRA, adviser to the chief of intelligence of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA, employees of the offices of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, the chief of staff and intelligence chief of the 40th army, officers reconnaissance and operational departments, the headquarters of the Rocket Forces and Artillery (RV and A) and the Army Air Force, representatives of the advisory apparatus of the DRA Air Force. At this meeting, there was an exchange of intelligence information obtained by various agencies and types of intelligence, an analysis of previously received information, and the decision of the army commander to implement the information by the forces of Soviet formations and units.
At the meeting, recommendations were made to the Afghan command to conduct independent military operations and requests for the allocation of forces and means for conducting joint operations with the Soviet troops in accordance with the decisions of the commander of the 40th Army.
Similar work was carried out daily in the formations and units of the Soviet troops in relation to their areas of responsibility.
In addition to the CBU, other administrative structures were created and functioned at the headquarters of the 40th Army (as part of the command post). After the appearance of a large number of radio equipment in the opposition detachments, a purposeful struggle against them was organized by the forces and means of the army. It included electronic suppression of enemy RES and their destruction by air strikes, artillery fire and the actions of troops. To control the forces and means of electronic warfare, a special control group "Screen" was created at the headquarters of the 40th Army, which included representatives of operational control, radio intelligence, artillery and air force headquarters, and other specialists.
Since the spring of 1984, the Veil control group has been operating at the army command post to control the forces and means fighting enemy caravans by carrying out ambush actions as part of the army plan. She coordinated mainly the ambush actions of the SPN units and military intelligence. This group was headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. Since the spring of 1987, general military units were also involved in conducting ambush operations according to the army plan (previously they conducted ambush operations according to the plans of formations and units). Since that time, the coordination of all ambush activities began to be carried out by the Barrier control group (instead of the Veil group).
The management of all daily and combat activities of aviation, including those attracted from the territory of the Soviet Union, was carried out by the aviation command post deployed at the headquarters of the 40th Army.
The supply of material resources to ensure the life and activities of the OKSV was mainly carried out by road transport. For this purpose, 96 companies of automobile columns were involved. Every day there were 1500-2000 cars on the way.
In order to control all automobile transportations on the territory of the Republic of Armenia, a Central Control Center (CDC) and two of its operational groups - "Salang" (at the Salang pass) and in Shindand were created at the headquarters of the rear of the 40th Army. The CDP was subordinate to control points and control posts on the routes. The core of the CDP was the combat control group.
All these bodies and control groups closely cooperated with the CBU of the army and informed it in due time about the situation in their area of ​​responsibility and about the decisions and measures taken.
A feature of the management of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the units conducting the battle were led not by regular bodies of formations and units, but by specially assigned operational groups. This was due to the fact that, as a rule, divisions and regiments performed several different tasks at once, each of which required continuous and firm control.
Operational groups for the management of combat actions (operations), depending on the scale of hostilities and the number of forces and means involved (Soviet and Afghan), consisted of 8-15 people. Initially, each time they were formed immediately before entering the hostilities, they were consolidated, they did not engage in direct planning, but received a ready-made battle plan developed by the corresponding headquarters.
Since 1981, the heads of operations and their control groups in the army, divisions and regiments began to be given special orders in advance, for the whole year, with a personal listing of the entire composition of the groups. The officers began to clearly know who was in which group, who was the leader, and when this or that group would control the combat operations. These orders determined the heads of operations - the army commander, commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, chiefs of staff, deputy commanders (commanders), as well as deputy chiefs of staff of the army. Command and control groups conducted combat coordination exercises and, together with the head of the operation, made up command and control apparatuses ready for action at any time. They themselves developed each operation that they were supposed to manage, based on the decision of their leader, and took part in the preparation of the troops allocated for it. Control groups (operational groups) were fully responsible for the preparation and conduct of a particular operation.
The fighting was usually led by:
- units allocated from one regiment - the regiment's control group;
- subdivisions allocated from different regiments of one division - the division control group;
- subdivisions allocated from different divisions - army command and control groups.
The most complex and large-scale operations were led by the army commander with his control group.
The head of the operation (regardless of level) controlled the combat operations from a mobile command post on an armored base. Due to the special conditions of combat operations in Afghanistan and the small number of command and control groups, other command posts, as a rule, were not deployed. All officers involved in the management and support of hostilities were located together with the head of the operation at one command post, used a single communication center, and were under a single guard. The basis of the mobile command post, as well as the stationary one, was the CBU.
Mobile command posts of all instances were located near the combat area and moved, as a rule, once a day. Troop control was carried out only from the spot. Attempts to control units on the move due to the special conditions for the propagation of radio waves in the mountains were mostly unsuccessful.
When choosing the location of the command post, the main attention was paid not to the conditions for visual observation of the actions of the troops (although this was very desirable), but to the possibility of maintaining continuous, stable communication with the units engaged in combat, aviation and higher authorities. In this regard, the command posts were located on the dominant heights, and if it was impossible - in alignment with the gorges along which the units were advancing.
If the troops were operating along diverging gorges, the command post deployed at the junction of the gorges. In winding gorges, the location of the control point had to be changed more often so as not to lose communication in areas covered by mountain ranges. At the same time, the head of the operation tried to choose each new position of the command post at the break of the gorge.
The situation sometimes forced the head of the operation to move to the command post of a subordinate authority with his own means of communication and a small command and control group. So, in necessary cases, a forward command post arose.
Despite the fact that spare command posts were not created, the principle of continuity of command was strictly observed. This was achieved by transferring control when moving command posts to stationary control posts or to command posts of subordinate command and control units. For the period of moving the command post of the head of the operation, these command posts acted as a kind of ZKP.
Aviation combat operations were controlled from stationary command posts of the army air force and aviation units and from the command post of the air force task force under the head of the operation (created for the period of the operation), as well as combat control groups (GBU) and aircraft controllers. Since the troops in most cases conducted combat operations with reinforced battalions in certain areas, and in some directions even with companies, it was necessary to provide communication with aviation directly to their commanders. This problem was solved by assigning air controllers (regular and non-standard) with radio stations to companies and battalions.
The combat operations of the on-duty subunits were controlled from the stationary command posts of the units that sent these subunits. The direct command of the battle was carried out by full-time commanders of duty units from their mobile command and observation posts. At the same time, as a rule, along with the commander of the duty unit, there were artillery spotters and aviation gunners.
After the completion of hostilities and the return of the troops participating in them to their deployment points, the leaders of operations for each of them compiled detailed reports, which, along with plans for operations, were sent to the headquarters of the 40th Army and the TurkVO.
The experience of the combat activities of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan showed the need for a certain decentralization of command and control, which, in the specific conditions of the DRA, made it more flexible without violating the general principles of command and control.

On the management of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR

The border troops of the KGB of the USSR (PV), in agreement with the Afghan side, gradually increased their presence in Afghanistan.
In early March 1979, to strengthen the security of the USSR Embassy in Kabul, a group of border guards arrived, consisting of 20 people with reinforcements (service dogs, signal devices, night surveillance devices, etc.), and on September 4, they arrived on combat duty in the embassy town a separate PV company of 50 people.
In April - May 1979, 23 border guard officers arrived for advisory work in the DRA border service.
In the summer of 1979, Major General A.A., a permanent representative of the Soviet border troops, was sent to the DRA. Vlasov - head of the PV department.
The command to cross the state border for the special forces of the PV was received on January 6, 1980. At dawn on January 7, the first detachments crossed the border. The operation to bring border units into Afghan territory was led by the Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Border District, Major General I.G. Karpov.
The special forces of the Air Force took part in the hostilities - consolidated combat detachments (SBO), motorized maneuver groups (MMG), air assault maneuver groups (DShMG), Air Force aviation of the Central Asian and Red Banner Eastern border districts.
At the beginning of 1981, in order to increase the efficiency and coordination of the management of the actions of the special forces of the PV in Afghanistan, the Operational Group of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops in Moscow was formed, headed by Lieutenant General I.G. Karpov, and in the Central Asian border district - the Task Force in Pyanj, headed by Colonel N.T. Butko. The coordination of the combat operations of the special forces of the border troops was entrusted to Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko. The created command and control system ensured flexibility in the management of service and combat activities and timely decision-making in a rapidly changing environment. Throughout the Afghan war, the head of the border troops, General of the Army V.A. Matrosov and the chief of staff of the border troops, Lieutenant-General Yu.A. Neshumov, and since 1985 - Lieutenant General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, constantly led the Operational Group of the Central Asian Border Circle and the command of the border detachments, assessed the current situation, clarified their combat missions.
Thus, by the end of 1981, a grouping of border troops and a system for managing the combat operations of special forces on the territory of the DRA were created.
The maximum strength of the PV group was in the period from 1988 to February 15, 1989 and consisted of more than 11 thousand border guards in connection with the withdrawal of army units from some northern regions of Afghanistan and a sharp intensification of rebel actions in the border zone and on the border itself.
As a result of the operations, the plans of opposition centers to seize the entire territory of Badakhshan and other areas adjacent to the Soviet-Afghan border were thwarted, large armed formations were defeated, which were forced to leave the border.

In the winter of 1979, the USSR decided to send troops to Afghanistan - I told about how events unfolded in the first days of the Afghan war of 1979-1989, and today we will go through the battlefields of those years and see what is now left of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. There will be many more interesting posts about Afghanistan, so add me to friends who hasn't done it yet.

In the press and official documents of those years, the name "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" (OKSVA) sounded. In Soviet newspapers (especially those published before 1985), Soviet citizens were told all sorts of tales that "a small number of Soviet soldiers help local Afghan dekhans build water pipes and roads", and also "help fight off Basmachi and bandits" that come from the mountains and interfere with peaceful Soviet construction.

In those years, almost none of the ordinary people thought about what was really happening in Afghanistan and how many people and equipment were actually sent there - information about this was classified, just like the number of zinc coffins that came to the USSR was classified from Afghanistan.

To start, a little history. Under the modest name "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" was hiding nothing more than the whole 40th army, consisting of several motorized rifle, artillery, anti-aircraft and tank regiments, several special forces and landing brigades and many other auxiliary formations. In different years, the army had different commanders, and the separate Headquarters of the 40th Army was engaged in planning operations.

In contrast to the introduction of troops into or into (even with military clashes in Budapest), in Afghanistan he got into a full-fledged multi-year war, completely unaware of what he was getting into. Absolutely all the actions and decisions of the USSR speak eloquently about this - the tank groups introduced into Afghanistan could not really conduct combat operations due to the fact that the tank gun was not adapted to firing at targets high in the mountains - and in the first stages of the war, tanks were simply shot from the mountains Mujahideen, as in a dash. The same applies to the provision of troops - no one really thought about how and what would happen, apparently all decisions were made with the expectation that as soon as Soviet tanks appeared on the horizon, the Afghans would immediately surrender.

The fact that the Soviet army got into a full-fledged war was understood in the USSR only by 1981 - at that time, in the Asian republics of the USSR, special training began to be organized to train soldiers directly for Afghanistan, and in Afghanistan itself, along the route Termez - Hairaton - Puli- Khumri-Bagram began to build a unique pipeline for the supply of diesel fuel and aviation kerosene to the military. To protect the pipeline, it was also necessary to form a separate 276th pipeline brigade.

In general, every year the war in Afghanistan pumped out more and more new resources from the already not too rich USSR, by 1989 almost completely emptying the treasury. What happened next - you know.

02. And in the meantime, we are entering the Panjshir Gorge - these picturesque mountains served in the eighties as the scene of almost the most fierce battles in all of Afghanistan - detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud fought in Panjshir, who himself was born and raised in Panjshir and raised the local population to fight against "shuravi".

03. In 1980, the detachments of Ahmad Shah numbered only about 1,000 soldiers, and by 1996 he already had a full-fledged army of 60,000 soldiers. Ahmad Shah also fought with the Taliban, but in the end they killed him, sending suicide bombers to him under the guise of reporters with explosives in a video camera.

04. The mountain serpentine from the side of Kabul leads all the time to the mountains, and here and there the remains of Soviet military equipment come across on the roadsides - here, for example, a military UAZ with a folding top, adapted for travel in hot climates.

05. The seats from the cabin have long been removed and, apparently, adapted by local residents for some household needs. The cabin offers mountain views.

06. The views in Panjshir, by the way, are amazing. Green valleys, clean mountain air, fast and cold river Panjshir - if not for the war, these places could be a wonderful tourist resort. However, the inhabitants of Kabul and so from time to time get here for the weekend to spend the day in nature.

07. Serpentine mountain roads. You need to drive carefully in Afghanistan - concrete chippers are far from being everywhere.

08. A rusty skeleton of an infantry fighting vehicle near one of the roads - apparently, something from the equipment of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment that stood in Panjshir in the mid-1980s.

09. A little further from the road, in the thickets near the cliff, the skeleton of the T-62 tank is rusting - you need to approach it very carefully, along the trodden paths - there are still very, very many mines in Afghanistan.

10. And these are the outskirts of the village of Rukh - at the bend of the road there was once a Soviet outpost, on the site of which you can still see the remains of broken military equipment. According to the story of the locals, there used to be many times more equipment - most of it was sold for scrap to Tajikistan and Pakistan.

11. Car upholstery riddled with bullets and shrapnel.

12. The skeleton of the tank, looking at the village once destroyed by the war - now new buildings are being built in Rukh and there is a beautiful stadium. Apparently, the tank was left here as a reminder of the past terrible war - the USSR bombed the mountainous parts of Rukhi with gas bombs so that "nothing alive would interfere with the construction of a military outpost" ...

13. On the way of the advance of the 40th Army deep into the Panjshir Gorge, villages with destroyed clay duvals completely destroyed, wiped off the face of the Earth - Soviet troops destroyed them in the first place, so that "nothing living would interfere with the advance of the army." It is dangerous to go inside - inside the destroyed villages there may still be the remains of mines and stretch marks.

14. Modern Panjshir tries to cope with the ghosts of that war in his own way - and basically nothing in the gorge reminds of it. People live a peaceful life, cultivating the fields and praying to their god - just like they did many years ago. Among these eternal mountains, the Soviet-Afghan war is perceived as an unfortunate and already very distant episode of history.

15. For the edification of posterity, in addition to a rusty tank at the entrance to Rukh, a small museum of broken equipment was also left, which is located not far from the mausoleum of Akhmat Shah Masud - the "Panjshir lion", as Ahmad Shah was called during his lifetime, is buried here, in these mountains.

16. Anti-aircraft gun, armored personnel carrier and several armored cars.

17. Anti-aircraft guns in Afghanistan were mainly used not for firing at aircraft (the Mujahideen did not have aircraft), but simply installed on outposts for 360-degree all-round defense and firing at targets high in the mountains.

18. Calculation devices:

19. "In emergency cases, to start the electric motor after the thermal relay trips, press the button and turn it clockwise until it stops. In order to avoid damage to the electric motor and the relay, the button can be left in the recessed position for no more than 1.5 minutes."

20. Next to the anti-aircraft gun, the T-34 tank of sand "Afghan" colors is rustier. Apparently, the tank got to Panjshir in the late eighties, when there were not so many modern tanks left.

21. An old tank, painted in Khokhloma and aiming its cannon at a mountain village - perhaps this is the best image of the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan.

22. Armored personnel carrier and several armored vehicles BRDM-2:

23. I don’t know what kind of technique.

24. And this, apparently, is the remains of a BTS-4 tank tractor.

25. This thing is made on the chassis of the T-44 tank and is designed to evacuate damaged, emergency tanks from the battlefield - I think she had a lot of work in Panjshir ...

26. And in the meantime, we are going to the area of ​​​​the Salang pass - the very one along which military equipment was driven from the USSR to Afghanistan.

27. There are now several Soviet bases left on Salanga, which were built and actively worked during the Soviet-Afghan war.

28. Previously, these buildings were guarded by motorized rifle units, and inside were employees involved in logistics calculations at Salanga.

29. Apparently, an electrical substation serving the entire base.

30. View of the former Soviet base from the inside:

31. Inside the premises, everything remained the same as with the “shuravi”. A long corridor with offices on the sides - once behind these doors the issues of supplying military equipment from the USSR to Afghanistan were resolved.

32. Workers who maintain the local road now live here.

33. Former offices are now adapted for living rooms.

34. Inside like this:

35. Corridors:

36. Huge tanks are hidden under the melted snow - either for fuel or for water.

37. Local workers show a pennant, donated by one of the tourists - former soldiers of the same 40th army.

38. And here is such a badge of a warrior-athlete, which the soldiers called "runner".

39. Nothing more reminds of the 40th Army on modern Salanga - except perhaps a pile of military scrap metal that was used as reinforcement in the construction of a new road.

40. When we were already leaving Salang, I looked at the former Soviet base (there were dozens of them only on Salang), remembered all the broken, rusting equipment and destroyed villages in the Panjshir Gorge, and the dead people - on both sides. And I thought - that's why it was all, for what? Who needed this war?

I don't have an answer to this question.

According to the special department...

Chekists also took direct part in the Afghan war, along with the personnel of the operationally serviced units of the 40th Army. Together they fulfilled their military duty to the end. In total, during the hostilities in the DRA, 14 employees of special departments were killed, 89 special officers were injured. Many Chekists were awarded orders and medals, and the senior detective captain Boris Sokolov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the accumulated experience of counterintelligence work in the conditions of hostilities in Afghanistan is practically not generalized. However, former Chekists see it as their duty to bring it to the attention of young security officers through the advice of veterans ...

The author of these lines, with some interruptions, and then permanently, was in Afghanistan from September 1982 to October 1987, where he held quite high official posts, including in the Operational Group of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Sokolov.

An important role in the introduction of troops was also played by the counterintelligence support for the deployment of the OKSV. Together with the forward units, units of the field department of the Special Department of the KGB of the 40th Army, led by its first chief, Colonel S. Bozhkov, also entered Kabul.

One of the features of our stay in Afghanistan was the complete absence of state-legal documents (decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, decisions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, orders of the KGB of the USSR, etc.) that would regulate the use of Soviet troops in this country, the conduct of counterintelligence and intelligence work in special departments.

To the deep satisfaction of the military Chekists, the nonsense with the lack of an elementary legal basis was largely resolved by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, General of the Army G. Tsinev. It was he, together with the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, who prepared an instruction that allowed the military counterintelligence agencies to carry out their activities in full accordance with those articles of the USSR Criminal Code that were applicable only during the war. Helped in the work of the KGB and special agreements with the security agencies of Afghanistan and on their basis achieved mutual business contacts. All the multifaceted activities of military counterintelligence in the DRA were aimed primarily at assisting the command in increasing the combat capability of the troops and the effectiveness of combat operations. As one of the leaders of the special department of the 40th Army, I would like to express my deep gratitude to all my colleagues, and especially to Colonels V. Kez, P. Shirokostup, Lieutenant Colonels V. Vasiliev, M. Serkov, G. Koryachkin, N. Borin, S. Pleshakov, Major A. Zotov.

A great contribution to the formation of the military counterintelligence of the DRA was made by our military security advisers. With them, the Special Department of the Army maintained a close working relationship.

the focus of our attention was the fight against the undercover activities of the enemy. So, for 1980-1988. Chekists uncovered and suppressed the espionage activities of 44 agents of the special services of the United States, England, France, Pakistan, one from India, as well as 875 agents of gangs and counter-revolutionary underground.

During the years of our stay in the DRA, the enemy not only increased his reconnaissance and subversive efforts, but also gained some experience in this. In recent years, for example, he increasingly began to create recruiting situations for individual Soviet officers. Some of them were suppressed, others developed under our control.

The military counterintelligence officers were especially concerned about the desire of the rebels and the secret services of Pakistan and Iran to penetrate the intelligence network of the intelligence center of central subordination, which was promptly serviced by us.

While staffing the special department of the 40th Army, the leadership of the Military Counterintelligence Department in Moscow introduced into it a small but inherently important special unit. It took into account all, without exception, Soviet military personnel who, due to various circumstances, were captured by bandits, missing. It obtained information about their death or being in a certain gang, collected information about their heroic or criminal behavior, and most importantly, the organization of their withdrawal to our territory.

The activities of this unit were carried out in contact with the command, military advisers, the USSR Embassy in the DRA, local security agencies, the population and various organizations that had at least some opportunity to get into direct contact with field commanders, relevant organizations in Pakistan, Iran and even Switzerland and France. To save the prisoners, bribery, exchange for captured authorities of the Mujahideen and their relatives, and special Chekist-military operations were actively used. In 1988, we brought out more than 80 such people. All of them, except for privates Demidenko and Mogilnikov, after being filtered, were sent to their homeland and dismissed from the Armed Forces.

Not everyone knows that during the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, 573 Soviet servicemen were captured by the enemy. The vast majority of them were heroic. Many people remember, according to media reports, for example, the uprising of our prisoners in the Badabera camp in Pakistan, where 12 servicemen of the 40th Army were killed as a result of an explosion in an ammunition depot. Their surnames have not yet been established, and the blame for this lies with the officials-diplomats from Moscow and the USSR embassy in Islamabad.

I want to emphasize with satisfaction that during the entire period of the Soviet troops' stay in Afghanistan, there was not a single case of a crime committed by Soviet military personnel for political reasons. Gradually, without any indication from above, the following motive for our stay in the DRA, as a defense of the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

The absence of a cultural factor that led to some negative manifestations among conscripts caused serious concern among the management. First of all, in all special departments, because they were the first to catch this negative trend and foresee its consequences. From about 1985, some kind of moral fatigue began to be observed in units and subunits. After summarizing all the facts, the army command was informed and reported to the KGB of the USSR.

It should be emphasized that the Center took prompt measures. A stream of well-known artists poured into Afghanistan, covering almost all the garrisons with their performances. Soldiers' ensembles of the "Blue Berets" type were also created. I would especially like to note the contribution to this noble cause of the artists A. Rosenbaum and I. Kobzon. The latter, for example, on one of his visits to the DRA, presented the army with a set of musical instruments, which was very useful.

The resulting cultural vacuum and the further development of the situation could not be ignored against the backdrop of massive ideological aggression against the Soviet troops. So, in 1983, with the support of the US intelligence agencies abroad, the Resistance International was created. Organizations such as the "Committee for the Rescue of Prisoners in Afghanistan", "Freedom House" appeared, and the activities of the NTS and other anti-Soviet organizations from among the nationalists revived. The Islamic committees of gangs and the counter-revolutionary underground did not lag behind them either. Brief, colorfully designed leaflets began to be distributed in mass circulation in the territory controlled by the 40th Army and the People's Army of the DRA. Malicious elements in France, for example, in the same 1983 fabricated and distributed a false issue of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper with frankly vile fabrications about the events in Afghanistan.

Sometimes some domestic "democrats" like to say that, they say, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan fought against the people and were defeated. This is a vile lie, and I cannot pass it by in silence. I responsibly declare that no one has ever had a crazy idea to defeat the bandits who divided their spheres of influence in this country.

Evil tongues predicted that with our withdrawal from Afghanistan, the government of Najibullah would not last a day. Yes, it fell under the onslaught of the opposition, but only three years after the resources left to it by the 40th Army were exhausted. For more than 10 years of their presence in the DRA, the Soviet people have done a lot in this country for its people, including instilling in the Afghans the consciousness that we are always with them, we will always help them. It must be said frankly - we betrayed this people. If we continue to provide economic and military assistance to Afghanistan, it remains to be seen how the geopolitical situation would develop in the entire southern region today. Perhaps for Russia it would be much more profitable and cheaper.

Show source

In the AFGHAN ARMY, starting from Friday or Saturday, there are days off, some holidays, there are no hostilities, they walk, and we, the army, which was introduced in order to take on security functions and release the contingent of the Afghan armed forces for conducting hostilities with the counter-revolution, as they said then in the media, gradually shifted all the hostilities on their shoulders. As a result, we began to fight instead of the Afghans.

The army began to lose authority and support from the Afghan people, because. in pursuit of victory quickly and at any cost, decisions were repeatedly made to use long-range aviation, GRAD area destruction systems, which wiped out villages with all residents, including the elderly and children, from the face of the earth.

This is how the most respected Soviet man in Afghanistan, whose hands did so much to improve the quality of life of the Afghan people, turned into a killer and an enemy.

Afghanistan is larger in area than France. Add to this the demographics: Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Pashtuns and many others. And each such tribe has its own army, its own lands, its own court, its own leader - the leader. As far as I understood, the whole art of governing Afghanistan by the monarchical regime that ruled before the revolution was the ability to build relationships with the leaders of all these ethnic formations.

Have we taken this into account? Don't know. The army generally did not deal with such problems, this is the work of representatives of the State Security Committee and the chief military and other advisers, who closed in on the ambassador. There were enough controllers and responsible people who reported to Moscow on the state of affairs in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, during my entire stay in Afghanistan, no one ever asked me about any analysis. What is your opinion, comrade commander? What is the conclusion? What are the analytical results of the past hostilities, or the past tense, for half a year, for a year? What is good, what is bad? Never interested.

The war was insidious, because there is no front, there is no focused enemy army in front of you either, the enemy is from all sides. And day and night, and summer, and winter, a bullet could be received from any direction, if you walk with your mouth open. The army is used to fighting a real enemy, seeing him in front of him, feeling him, knowing that there are flanks, some kind of rear, and in Afghanistan everything is mixed. The troops left the garrison, carried out military operations, shot ammunition, ate food, returned to the point of permanent deployment, and those with whom they fought descended from the mountains and continued to do their job, either peaceful or anti-peace. Whether they supported the government or not, it was difficult to understand.

Each year began with an aggravation of the situation in Panjshir, then Kandahar in the south, around Kabul - the shots never ceased, then Jalalabad, Khost, Herat and again Panjshir came. And so they fought in a circle, from year to year. I remember my feeling of admiration for our personnel. Exhausted soldiers who never had enough water, ate canned food, fever. We did not use anything local, being categorically afraid of poison or infections. There were four infectious diseases hospitals in the army, specialized only in the fight against hepatitis, typhoid fever, malaria, fever, etc. Not to mention the hospitals that took care of the wounded and injured.

All my life I have retained a sense of satisfaction with the system that existed in the Soviet Army. Her positive features were revealed mainly during the fighting. That is, the impeccable fulfillment of the assigned tasks, devotion, loyalty to the oath, courage, mutual assistance, mutual assistance.

But why is the attitude of the military-political elite sharply different from the attitude to the service of the lower echelons, subunits and units?

Later, in the Soviet Union, reading documents about Afghanistan, I was surprised at the bias of the information that came to Moscow. In all reports, there were soothing reports, reduced to turns of the type: the situation is difficult, but there are tendencies to improve it, to improve health and, in general, to win. At these levels, careerism, lies and the desire for profit already dominated then. Cashed in on deliveries and on many other things.

Counterintelligence also worked very poorly. I didn't feel it at all. Theft, and especially speculation, all this flourished. I remember that one singer flew to us more than once *. And not many dared to fly here. We considered him a real brave man. Only later did it become known to me that when he flew to Afghanistan with his concerts, he sang as much as necessary, but flew away loaded with smuggling. And in this he was helped by political workers and commanders of the highest rank. I learned about this not from counterintelligence officers, who were supposed to inform me, but from other sources and from witnesses.

The era chose them

Recently, on the Day of Remembrance of Internationalist Warriors, we recalled the exploits of those who have been performing combat missions in Afghanistan for more than nine years. As they say, everyone has their own war - a private, an officer and a general. But military duty - it is the same for everyone. But in fulfilling it, everyone bears his own personal responsibility. And the higher the position, the higher the responsibility. In this regard, I would like to recall a small fragment that ends the book by Konstantin Simonov "Soldiers are not born." The Battle of Stalingrad ended victoriously. And General Serpilin, recently appointed to the post of army commander, visits in the hospital the commander of the rifle battalion, Captain Sintsov, with whom he had been walking along the roads of war since the summer of 1941.

“It's good,” repeated Serpilin… “Rest while you can. And I'll go. Since he took over the army, things have gone over his head - there is no time to breathe! - Just now the voice was muffled, tired, but he spoke about it cheerfully and loudly, as if about happiness!

Serpilin… is one of those people who are most often thought of only in direct connection with the case that the war put on their broad shoulders – the army or the front, and, evaluating their actions, they say, like a horse – will it pull or not pull?

But behind this seeming rudeness of words there is an unrelenting disturbing thought about tens and hundreds of thousands of human lives, the responsibility for which the war placed on the shoulders of this, and not some other person. And Sintsov ... thought: ... it's good when such a person comes to command the army, because such a person will pull, and pull well ... "

It has been 27 years since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Over the years, five of the seven commanders of the 40th Combined Arms Army have passed away.

Today, on the eve of Defender of the Fatherland Day, it is impossible not to remember them - the fighting Soviet generals - both the dead and the living, whose names are inextricably linked with all those brilliant operations that were carried out by the Limited Contingent of Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan. In those years, they were all lieutenant generals. However, I cite the military ranks of former commanders in accordance with their further promotion. I also indicate the dates of death of those of them who will remain in our memory forever.

We, its participants, saw the war in Afghanistan “from the height of our positions” - someone will be able to tell about the military operations of his company, someone - his battalion, someone - his regiment ... Someone happened to fulfill their duties in some department, some branch or some service of headquarters and directorates ... But it is, of course, impossible for us, junior and senior officers, to give a complete picture of the entire army. That is why I turned to the 5th book of the seven-volume edition called "The Unique" of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, a front-line soldier, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. It was a military leader of such a high rank who could truly appreciate the combat activities of each of the commanders of the 40th Army, especially since Army General Valentin Varennikov was the head of the Control Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan in 1984-1989.

“I happened to spend more than four years in this country almost without a break and take a direct part in all military-political events ...” recalled Valentin Varennikov. - Without exaggeration, I believe that I have the moral right to assess many people, phenomena and all the processes that have taken place in Afghanistan since January 1985. And on fundamental issues - and since 1979, because. dealt with this problem in the General Staff far before the introduction of troops.

The commander's book contains not only assessments of the role of each commander of the 40th Army, but also conveys the very situation of that war. Each of us who served in Afghanistan knows firsthand about it. But the way Varennikov characterized this situation - precisely and exhaustively - no one could probably do.

“During their stay in Afghanistan, virtually every one of our soldiers and officers, without exaggeration, always and everywhere had to be ready for battle,” General of the Army Valentin Varennikov wrote in his book. - The main types of military operations - offensive and defense - had many different features, subtleties that were typical only for Afghanistan. But I would like the reader to at least mentally imbue the feeling that each of us experienced in Afghanistan. When you are in your Soviet military camp, you relax a little, feeling the potential strength of a large team - no matter what gang attacks, it will definitely get hit in the teeth. That is why we, in the Task Force, each officer and general had not only a pistol, but also a machine gun with a loaded magazine, as well as several hand grenades. But when you leave or leave this town, you are all internally going - you must always be ready to repel a sudden attack. You are all like a compressed spring: the streets are Kabul, or the rocks of the gorge ... or the desert ... "

Reading these lines from the book of Army General Valentin Varennikov, I immediately recall how, before flying to Bagram at the end of December 1979, at the airfield in Engels, where an intermediate landing was made, we, the Vitebsk paratroopers, were given ammunition - the soldiers were given three magazines on the machine, and the officers - two magazines per pistol. But as soon as we landed in Afghanistan, everyone immediately received a full ammunition load for machine guns - 450 pieces each. We, the officers, were also given machine guns. And we never parted with them in Afghanistan ...

However, I will return to the book of Army General Valentin Varennikov.

“If we are talking about the commanders of the 40th Army,” he wrote, “it is necessary to say about each of them. I think that I will not be mistaken on fundamental issues.

In my opinion, the heaviest burden fell on the shoulders of the first three army commanders ... "

Colonel General Yuri Vladimirovich Tukharinov (May 3, 1927 - December 20, 1998) - Commander of the 40th Army from December 1979 to September 23, 1980.

“The first commander was Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov. At the time of his appointment as army commander, he served as first deputy commander of the Turkestan military district. General Yu.V. Tukharinov received the task of deploying the army (i.e., mobilizing its units), bringing it into Afghanistan and standing up as garrisons in accordance with the instructions of our General Staff. The reader, I hope, can imagine what a huge amount of work had to be done to solve these problems. He solved them successfully. And although Tukharinov was in the position of army commander for a short time, he left a good memory of himself.

Lieutenant General Boris Ivanovich Tkach (10/25/1935 - 10/24/2010) - Commander of the 40th Army from September 23, 1980 to May 7, 1982.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“The second commander was Lieutenant General B.I. Weaver. He was already an experienced general, not a novice in the leadership of the army, but no one had ever commanded such an army and in such conditions. Weaver too. And although the military operations of the army units began even under his predecessor, the main shaft fell on Tkach and V.F., who replaced him. Ermakov. General Tkach was actually the "pioneer" of all large-scale operations, as well as the arrangement of our troops in Afghanistan. The case was very difficult, but he coped with his tasks.

Army General Viktor Fyodorovich Ermakov - Commander of the 40th Army from May 7, 1982 to November 4, 1983. At present, he is Inspector General of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Council of the All-Russian Public Organization of Veterans of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“I saw a real sea storm on the northern and western coast of the Rybachy Peninsula during the years of my service there. Imagine how huge shafts approaching the shore cover one another. And on their crests, in some places, huge logs, apparently thrown from the upper decks of timber trucks, dangle and turn over like matches. Everything in the zone of one kilometer from the coast is spinning, as in a whirlpool. And suddenly a man rushes into such a raging sea ...

It was in such a raging "whirlpool" that Lieutenant General Viktor Fedorovich Ermakov received the 40th Army. In an extremely short time it was necessary to study everything, to understand, to foresee the possible development of events in order to accurately make decisions and firmly manage the situation. The ranks of the army increased somewhat - the rebels had to be given a worthy rebuff, and General Ermakov did it successfully. Having gained excellent combat experience, after that he skillfully commanded the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, then the Leningrad Military District, and at the final stage of his service he was an authoritative Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel.

Colonel General Leonid Evstafievich Generalov (3.5.1937 - 13.8.1991) - Commander of the 40th Army from November 4, 1983 to April 19, 1985.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“Lieutenant General Leonid Evstafyevich Generalov, who took over the army from Yermakov, of course, had to keep the seized initiative by units of the 40th Army. And he coped with this task. Particularly successful in military operations in the provinces. Personally being a brave and energetic person, he wandered all over Afghanistan, went through many hardships, risking his life. And, of course, this had a positive effect on the course of hostilities.

Army General Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov (12/1/1936 - 12/19/2014) - commander of the 40th army from April 19, 1985 to April 30, 1986.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“He was replaced by Lieutenant General Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov. Surprisingly, but true: in the period 1972 - 1974, both of them commanded regiments in the Carpathian military district, i.e. were under my control. Igor Nikolaevich Rodionov excellently commanded the motorized rifle regiment of the 24th "Iron" motorized rifle division subordinate to the district (distinguished himself with this regiment during the exercises of the Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko), and Leonid Evstafyevich Generalov excellently commanded the motorized rifle regiment of the 128th motorized rifle division, which stood in Uzhgorod. They met in Afghanistan like brothers and parted like brothers.

The main merit of Rodionov was the introduction of a strict, clear system into all the processes of life and activity of the army, which made it possible to use the capabilities of the army as efficiently as possible. Naturally, this approach, first of all, had a positive impact on the preparation and conduct of combat operations by all types of military branches, as well as on the training of army command and control bodies. The pedantic fulfillment of his duties personally by him and the presentation of the same requirements to the headquarters and services of the army, to subordinate troops, undoubtedly, quickly and very positively affected the entire life of the army. But the main thing is that there were fewer losses. And this goal lay at the basis of all our activities.

When preparing the operation in Kunar, it was Rodionov who introduced the procedure for the detailed playing out of options for action in the upcoming battles on a terrain model (a box of sand). This lesson took a long time, but lively, and most importantly, everyone left, understanding what exactly was required of him personally and his subordinate units, what would be the procedure (interaction) for performing a combat mission.

We all regretted that in the second year of command of this army, Rodionov had to leave this post due to kidney stone disease. But he left a significant mark in Afghanistan, and the operations he carried out were at their best. Then he became not just the commander of the district, but the commander of the troops of the outstanding Transcaucasian Military District ...

After the Transcaucasus, Rodionov excellently led the highest training body for the elite of the Russian Army, the armed forces of our friends, as well as high officials of the state apparatus - the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Each time, speaking to a new set of listeners, he said: “Study well, diligently. Use all the possibilities of the academy to replenish your knowledge. After all, you will go to high positions, you will decide the fate of our Armed Forces, and this is the fate of the Fatherland ... "

At the final stage of his service, Rodionov was appointed Minister of Defense of Russia. I believe that the appointment was worthy ... "

Hero of the Russian Federation Army General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin (February 1, 1943 - November 22, 1992) - Commander of the 40th Army from April 30, 1986 to June 1, 1987.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“First Deputy Commander of the 40th Army, General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin, received the army from Rodionov. In fact, he did not accept, but became the commander of the army. He personally possessed very high qualities, but besides, he inherited a lot from Rodionov. That's why things in the army went well. He took office as if he had been in command of the army for a long time - he knew everything. Dubynin is a standard of honesty and conscientiousness. Possessing outstanding organizational skills and a penetrating mind, as well as personally showing courage and bravery, he organized and successfully carried out very complex and responsible operations. It was a striking figure. And for good reason, at the final stage of his service, he perfectly performed the duties of Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. All of us, the military, mourned that a serious illness took him out of life in the prime of life.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov - Commander of the 40th Army in Afghanistan from June 1, 1987 to February 15, 1989. Now he is a member of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

From the book by Valentin Varennikov:

“In 1987, the seventh army commander was assigned to the 40th army. He was Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov. He arrived from the post of commander of the 28th army (Grodno, Belarusian military district). Boris Vsevolodovich was not only not a novice in Afghan affairs, but knew Afghanistan and its problems to perfection. This was his third visit to this country. Initially, he served here as chief of staff of the 108th motorized rifle division, stationed north of Kabul. Then he was the commander of the 5th motorized rifle division, which was mainly located in the Herat and Shindand region, controlled the entire situation on the Iran-Afghan border. After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff and serving in the Carpathian Military District as First Deputy Commander of the 38th Army (Ivano-Frankivsk), he again arrives in Afghanistan - already in the role of a general for special assignments - the head of the group of representatives of the Chief of the General Staff. The main task of this general and his group was to, being in a position of complete independence, check the implementation of orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, to give objective assessments of all phenomena (especially military operations) and the commanders who carried out certain Events. Naturally, it was necessary to act not formally, but for the benefit of the cause, so he often had to provide all kinds of assistance to commanders in the preparation and conduct of military operations. Naturally, if someone from the leadership of the army, any division or regiment embellished something, then he double-checked and said to the corresponding chief in person: “It does not look like that. In fact, there is the following situation ... ”And then he stated what really is, because he checked it personally (or on his behalf, someone from the group). Naturally, both Gromov and the team led by him (colonels Yu. Kotov, G. Gromov, V. Petrichenko) had to lead a shuttle lifestyle: circumstances required much to be kept under special control, and therefore literally wander around the country, study it in detail and know everything and everyone. After all, it was about the lives of our people.

Having accepted the 40th Army, Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov did not waste time either on moral and physical adaptation, or on studying the roots in the rebellious movement or the characteristics of the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, and even more so on studying the troops of the 40th Army. All this was known to him to the subtleties, and individual changes in the essence of the matter did not change. Therefore, he immediately began to command as if he had been commander in Afghanistan for a long time.

B.V. Gromov is a man of amazing, tragic fate. He had to go through a lot in his life. Therefore, his heart, wounded by experiences, reacts very sensitively to human suffering. That is why he, along with me, was firm in implementing the motto: "To minimize the loss of personnel of the 40th Army." He skillfully and professionally prepared and conducted all operations, and just as skillfully solved the historic task of withdrawing the army from Afghanistan.

Being a smart and gifted military leader, at the final stage he was deservedly appointed to the Kyiv military district. Then he became Deputy Minister of Defense (having been between these positions in the position of First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR) - and this is quite natural and deserved ... "

When you read all these exhaustive descriptions that General of the Army Valentin Varennikov gave in his book to each of the seven commanders of the 40th Army, one involuntarily lingers on such lines. “He wandered all over Afghanistan, visited many bindings, risking his life,” this is about Colonel General Leonid Evstafievich Generalov. And this is about Army General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin: “Possessing outstanding organizational skills and a penetrating mind, as well as personally showing courage and bravery, he organized and successfully carried out very complex and responsible operations.” All the military leaders in Afghanistan have repeatedly shown their personal courage. Each of them had to risk his life, leading military operations in various provinces of the country. The courage of a military leader is, first of all, the ability to take responsibility for the only right decision he made, on which the lives of thousands of his subordinates depend. But in war, not all decisions are made at headquarters. A lot has to be done directly on the front lines, on the battlefield. The war in Afghanistan was special. There was no clear “front line” here, there was no concept of a continuous “front line” - it was a mobile war, raid operations and military operations were sometimes carried out in almost complete encirclement of the enemy.

As confirmation of what has been said, I will cite excerpts from the memoirs of the commander of the 40th Army, General of the Army Igor Nikolayevich Rodionov:

“In the Afghan army, starting from Friday or Saturday, there are days off, some holidays, there are no hostilities, they walk, and we, the army, which was introduced in order to take on security functions and release the contingent of the Afghan armed forces to conduct hostilities with the counter-revolution, as they said then in the media, they gradually shifted all the hostilities onto their shoulders. As a result, we began to fight instead of the Afghans ...

Quite often I had to fly out with a small operational group of officers, go to combat areas that went in circles throughout the year ...

The war was insidious, because there is no front, there is no focused enemy army in front of you either, the enemy is from all sides. And day and night, and summer, and winter, a bullet could be received from any direction, if you walk with your mouth open. The army is used to fighting a real enemy, seeing him in front of him, feeling him, knowing that there are flanks, some kind of rear, and in Afghanistan everything is mixed. The troops left the garrison, carried out military operations, shot ammunition, ate food, returned to the point of permanent deployment, and those with whom they fought descended from the mountains and continued to do their job, either peaceful or anti-peace. Whether they supported the government or not, it was difficult to understand ...

All my life I have retained a sense of satisfaction with the system that existed in the Soviet Army. Her positive features were revealed mainly during the fighting. That is, the impeccable fulfillment of the assigned tasks, devotion, loyalty to the oath, courage, mutual assistance, mutual assistance.

In Afghanistan, everyone risked his life - and the private, and the officer, and the general.

For example, here is what, for example, Colonel General Yuri Vladimirovich Tukharinov, the first commander of the 40th Army, recalled Major General Vitaly Kupriyanovich Pavlichenko, who was then the head of the political department of the 5th motorized rifle division: “Active support in the deployment of units of the 5th motorized rifle division in Herat and Shindande, as well as in the settlements of the western border of Afghanistan, were provided to us by the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu. Tukharinov. General Tukharinov oversaw the guards division, personally took part in planning and carrying out the division's combat operations against groups of the Mujahideen, and often traveled to the places of hostilities. The authority of the army commander was absolute. He acted confidently, with knowledge of military affairs. The division commander, his deputy, and the head of intelligence flew to the scene of hostilities with the commander. They returned more often in a good mood, cheerful. Resting at lunch. Then they analyzed the operation ... "

Those who had a chance to fight in Afghanistan under the command of Lieutenant General Boris Ivanovich Tkach recall that he was respectfully called a "trench general", since he was constantly in units and battle formations, in areas of military operations, and not at headquarters. stayed up. The journalists wrote: “For two years of commanding the army, tanker Boris Tkach, by the number of raids, was just right to be awarded the title of pilot ... He had “his” An-26 and a helicopter, which he left for a short time to understand the situation, give the necessary orders and fly further " .

And here is what Boris Ivanovich himself said in an interview:

“The column I was in was crossing a small swampy area. Part of the cars passed normally, only one tank got stuck. The tankers drove up the second tank, then the third. As time went. I decided to come up and find out. While approaching, the tankers had already coped and rushed forward. I found myself alone. I began to return to my armored personnel carrier, and then a bullet hit the ground near my left leg. I'm stuck, I can't move. Well, I think it's over. But the fighters realized that I was gone for a long time, and moved towards me. They quickly realized what was happening, and fired a volley towards the mountains, from where the shot supposedly sounded. Then two squads of soldiers went up to the sniper's hideout. The dushman himself was not found, but a weapon was found - an American M-16 rifle. Three notches were made on its trunk in the form of Roman numerals ten "X" and another diagonal line. This rifle was transferred to the military museum of Tashkent.”

Some of the former commanders of the 40th Army wrote books. Among them is General of the Army Viktor Fedorovich Ermakov. The following fragment from his book "The Afghan Heat" deserves special attention:

“To be honest, the prolonged silence on the battlefield even made me uncomfortable, giving rise to thoughts: “What are our opponents up to? Why have they not made themselves known for so long? Where and when can we expect the next blow from them?

Maybe the comparison is too straightforward, but it seems to me that a person begins to get used to war as a natural state, and when there are no direct hostilities, he often cannot understand what he needs to do

As for fear, I do not deny that there was fear. It's scary in war, and when a person boasts, they say, I'm not afraid of anything, don't believe it. There are simply people who do their duty, overcoming their sense of fear, act boldly, achieving victory. But there are those who are completely consumed by the fear of death, and then they lose their will and mind before the battle, which significantly reduces their chances of winning, since panic and cowardice are the worst helpers in the battle.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov during the war in Afghanistan served three times in parts of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces - from February 1980 to August 1982, from March 1985 to April 1986, and in 1987-1989. Here is what he tells in his book "Limited Contingent" about one of the first operations carried out in the spring of 1980, when Boris Vsevolodovich was still chief of staff of the 108th motorized rifle division:

“Spring battles brought a tremendous experience to the Limited Contingent. We have reviewed a lot - from the preparation and formation of troops for movement and ending with the development of interaction with aviation, artillery and their control ...

Around the same time, Tukharinov ordered me to conduct military operations near Kabul. Shelling was constantly carried out from the Khairabad region, and, according to intelligence, major attacks were expected on the army headquarters.

At that time, the term "raid actions along the roads" became very common. One or two battalions operated along several routes, clearing the area around them, destroying and capturing opposition depots. Then they returned. The same task was set for us ...

I carried out these military operations in the position of chief of staff of the division, Ruslan Aushev also participated in them. It was then that I first felt an unpleasant feeling of confusion. We approached one of the small ridges, beyond which there was a village, where, according to our assumptions, dushmans settled. Before reaching three kilometers to the pass, they stopped the convoy, sent forward reconnaissance and cover. In a radio car, taking a small guard with me, I also went. It was necessary to make a decision on the spot - how to take this village. When approaching the pass, our vehicles suddenly opened fire. Almost everyone with whom I later spoke experienced about the same thing at such moments. The first shelling demoralizes a person completely. Although you are internally ready and know that fire can be opened at any moment. Moreover, you yourself are taking risks ...

In the course of the hostilities that I conducted directly, we already tried to secure the movement of columns by blocking roads and setting up outposts on adjacent ridges ... "

It was not easy to gain combat experience in Afghanistan. Sometimes he had to pay for it with blood. But each commander of the 40th Army tried to protect his personnel as much as possible. Once again, I recall the words of Army General Valentin Varennikov, with which he characterized the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel General Boris Gromov: “That is why he, together with me, was firm in implementing the motto: “To minimize the loss of personnel of the 40th Army.”

At the end of the article, it would be unfair not to talk about Hero of the Soviet Union General of the Army Valentina Ivanovich Varennikov (12/15/1923 - 05/06/2009), who for more than four years - in 1984-1989 - was the head of the Control Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan. This was not the first war of General Varennikov. The honored military leader fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War for three years. During the war, he was wounded three times, awarded four military orders. In June 1945, he participated in the Victory Parade, met the Victory Banner brought from Berlin and accompanied him to the General Staff. He finished the Great Patriotic War with the rank of captain. So everyone knew about the courage of the military general. Here is just a small fragment from his "Afghan" memoirs:

“In March 1985, something like my baptism of fire took place ... It was like that. Being in my office at the army headquarters, where I also had my own workplace, I sorted out my affairs. Suddenly, the excited army commander, Lieutenant General L.E. Generalov and reports: he has just spoken with the Chief Military Adviser G.I. Salmanov, and he reported that an infantry division of government troops was surrounded in the Panjshir Gorge, which Ahmad Shah's rebels are now destroying ...

I called a helicopter for my group of six people to the site of the army headquarters and flew to the combat area.

We flew in pairs: our group was on a transport and combat helicopter, followed by a combat helicopter, which received the task of hitting air defense systems that opened fire on the first helicopter. When we began to approach the site where we were supposed to land, they reported from the ground: there was an intensive shelling of the entire area by dushmans from mortars, and in addition, a helicopter that landed in front of us was burning down on our site: the dushmans managed to knock it out. From the ground they added: "Don't let that bother you - the platform allows one more helicopter to land."

We agreed with the crew commander that even before the landing gear touches the ground, he will open the door, and we will jump onto the ground without a ladder. I jumped second, and unsuccessfully - I landed not evenly on both legs, but mainly on my left (wounded on the Vistula in 1944). My leg buckled, and I fell, but quickly got up and ran from the site to the nearest duval - it turns out that not only mortars were firing, but everything was being shot from machine guns. A few steps-jumps, and I overcame a small stream and immediately found myself at the duval, along which there was a trench dug in full growth (in full profile - speaking in military terms). Once in the trench, I watched as the others, jumping out of the helicopter after me, also ran in that direction. The helicopter, immediately taking off, went to the base (we agreed that he would come for us on command) ...

The command and observation post was equipped on the northern outskirts of the village of Baraki ... We began to prepare for the decisive battle.

The fight started in the morning. And in the afternoon, the motorized rifle regiment of the 108th division nevertheless broke through and released parts of the Afghans. Shooting from all types of weapons on both sides either subsided, then flared up again to a frenzy. And so throughout the day ... "

The war in Afghanistan is the brightest page in the history of the Armed Forces of the USSR, telling about the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, whose combat operations were led by experienced, well-trained military leaders. A limited contingent of Soviet troops completed all the tasks on the territory of the neighboring state to the end. In confirmation of this, at the end of the article, I will again turn to the book of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army Valentin Varennikov. Here is how he assessed the outcome of the nine-year war:

“Some people after the war in Afghanistan are trying to draw parallels with the American war in Vietnam. But this is ridiculous. Neither in terms of goals, nor in tasks, nor in methods of action, nor in the number of troops involved, nor in losses, and especially nor in terms of results, these two events have any similarity. Moreover, if the Americans fled from Vietnam, then our troops saw off the people of Afghanistan solemnly, with tears and flowers, because in the end we actually won a military-political victory: we did not allow the opposition, supported by the United States and Pakistan, to crush the people of Afghanistan, as in the period of our stay, and several years after the departure of Soviet troops. Plus, we helped in every possible way to implement the “Policy of National Reconciliation”, which found a wide response among the masses, and if the United States and Pakistan were interested in peace on this earth, it would have come back in the 80s. Finally, our material and technical assistance to Afghanistan, of course, affected the moral and political spirit of this people.

Finally, about our soldiers and officers. Bowing our heads over the graves of those who died in the performance of their duty, swearing that they will forever remain in the memory of our people, it should be noted that everyone who had the honor to visit Afghanistan, and even more so to take part in hostilities, of course, represents the golden fund of our states. It is those who have passed this test ... that can quickly show high human qualities. And this is above all.”

Alexander Kolotilo

"A red star"